[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 31 (Thursday, March 19, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2268-S2281]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND, 
                    HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

  The Senate continued with consideration of the treaty.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. ABRAHAM. Might I inquire of the Senator from Alaska if he needed 
to introduce amendments?
  Mr. STEVENS. The Senator is very generous. I am awaiting two 
amendments I have drafted that I wish to put

[[Page S2269]]

in. If I can get the time, I will do it today; if not, tomorrow. I was 
not sure we would be in tomorrow. I understand now we probably will be.
  Mr. ABRAHAM. I appreciate the Senator from Virginia yielding to speak 
to me about the issue of enlarging NATO.
  Mr. President, I rise to express my support for legislation expanding 
NATO by admitting, at this time, the newly free nations of Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic. It is my hope that we will act soon on 
the invitation extended to these countries at the Madrid Summit in 
1997, and that this will be only the latest step in an ongoing process 
bringing nations and peoples, until recently suffering under communist 
tyranny, into the community of free nations and into the sphere of 
mutual security provided by NATO.
  We should not forget, in my view, Mr. President, that until less than 
10 years ago most of Asia and half of Europe, as well as vast stretches 
of the rest of the world, were held in the grip of totalitarian 
communism.
  When the Berlin Wall finally came down it marked a new era in our 
history; it marked the greatest explosion in human freedom ever 
witnessed on this earth.
  Ronald Reagan's victory in the cold war rescued millions of Eastern 
Europeans, and Russians, from decades of enslavery. We owe it to him, 
to ourselves and to our children to solidify those gains by bringing 
the emerging democracies of eastern Europe fully into the community of 
free nations. And membership in NATO is a crucial part of that process.
  Since its inception immediately following World War II, NATO has 
brought free nations together for mutual defense and thereby fostered 
mutual understanding and trade.
  Because the world remains a dangerous place even after the successful 
conclusion of the cold war, there remains a place for NATO. Because the 
free world has expanded in the aftermath of the cold war, NATO also 
must expand.
  Recent events in the Balkans, the Middle East, East Asia, and Africa 
show that the world remains a dangerous place, and that the United 
States must continue to prepare itself for conflict in any part of the 
globe.
  Conflicts in the Balkans are particularly disturbing because of their 
proximity to our west European allies and because of its potential to 
spread conflict to other parts of Europe.
  To my mind, Mr. President, it also points up the need for greater 
cooperation and integration in Europe. The structures set up by the 
NATO alliance in my view provide unique opportunities to foster peace 
and cooperation throughout Europe. History shows that the kinds of 
cooperation that made NATO so successful at defending the free world 
from Soviet communism also can breed peaceful cooperation among member 
states.
  I believe it is significant that, while NATO has expanded its 
membership no less than three times since 1949, at no time has there 
been any military conflict among member states, despite sharp and long 
histories of political differences between some.
  Shared commitment to well-ordered liberty--to democratic politics, 
free markets and human rights--united the countries of NATO, in good 
times and bad, until, eventually, they faced down the forces of 
communism.
  What is more, NATO remains the only multilateral security 
organization capable of conducting effective military operations that 
will protect western security interests.
  Of course, Mr. President, we must be careful about which countries we 
allow into NATO, as well as when and under what circumstances. But I 
believe it is in the interest of the United States, as well as our 
European allies, to actively assist European countries emerging from 
communist domination in their transition to free governments and free 
markets so that these countries may eventually qualify for NATO 
membership.
  We must extend our hand to peoples now emerging from the long night 
of communist dictatorship. We cannot afford to let them despair and 
turn, or be dragged, back into the dark.
  This makes it particularly appropriate that we begin the process of 
NATO expansion by inviting into its membership the newly free nations 
of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Each of these countries has 
suffered greviously from war and from Marxist dictatorship. Each has 
worked long and hard to establish its independence, the freedom of its 
people and its markets.
  We should not forget that it was Lech Walesa's Solidarity movement 
that paved the way for the breakdown of the Soviet Empire by refusing 
to be cowed by the Communist authorities.
  The people of Poland, strong in their faith, exhibited a courage few 
of us would wish to be called upon to match.
  As a people they demanded freedom of worship. As a people, they 
demanded real workers rights in the form of free, non-party unions.
  As a people they faced down their communist oppressors and now are 
building a free, open and democratic society.
  The people of Poland have held free and open elections, established 
free markets and worked hard to establish a strong, loyal, civilian-
controlled military. Like few nations on earth, they have embraced 
their new-found freedom and deserve our support.
  The Czech Republic, while still part of the hybrid nation of 
Czechoslovakia, was the last free country to be dragged behind the Iron 
Curtain. And its people tried on several occasions, most notably in the 
spring of 1968, to regain their freedom. They finally succeeded through 
a silent and bloodless revolution.
  Under the playwright and statesman Vaclav Havel, the Czech people 
have made tremendous progress in institutionalizing free government, 
free markets and a responsible military.
  As for Hungary, Mr. President, the Hungarian people's attachment to 
freedom made them a constant thorn in the side of their Soviet 
oppressors. At first their desire for freedom was beaten down with 
tanks, later it was allowed limited free play within the Soviet empire.
  And the Hungarians made the most of their limited freedom, working 
even before the end of the cold war to lay the groundwork for free 
markets. Since the tearing down of the Berlin Wall the Hungarian people 
also have made great strides in building a freer, more open and 
democratic nation.
  By extending NATO membership to these nations we will be showing our 
approval of the hard work they have done to institutionalize free 
government.
  Of course, Mr. President, our first duty is to the American people. 
We must defend their security and protect their pocketbooks.
  But I think we should keep in mind that increasing openness in 
central and eastern Europe will benefit us both in terms of security 
and in terms of economics. Free peoples with free markets make for good 
neighbors and good partners in profitable trade.
  It is my hope that we will build on the freedoms and the 
relationships already established with and within eastern Europe for 
the good of everyone involved.
  I know that a number of my colleagues are concerned that the process 
of expanding NATO not come at too high a price for the American 
taxpayer. As a Senator who has consistently worked for tax cuts, I 
share this concern. But I must observe that the legislation under 
consideration includes provisions limiting expenditures through the 
Partnership for Peace and that it guarantees no country entry into 
NATO.
  Each country will have to show that it has established democratic 
politics, free markets, civilian leadership of police and military 
forces and transparent military budgets to gain entrance.
  Each country will have to show its ability and willingness to abide 
by NATO's rules, to implement infrastructure development and other 
activities to make it a positive asset to NATO in its defensive 
mission, and to contribute to its own security and that of its NATO 
neighbors.
  All told, Mr. President, I believe that the provisions of this 
arrangement can help us build on the success of the NATO alliance.
  I am convinced that we as a nation have a duty to promote democracy 
and free markets, wherever they can take root, just as I am convinced 
that it is in our interest as a nation to do so. When such forces 
coalesce, we should seize the opportunity, as I urge my colleagues to 
do with this legislation.

[[Page S2270]]

  Mr. President, I realize that there are some among us who have grown 
concerned about the prospect of enlarging NATO. But to me, Mr. 
President, it seems that this decision is a pretty clear one. It has 
always been the mission of the United States to support free people, to 
support the efforts of people seeking freedom throughout the globe. In 
Central and Eastern Europe, that was a primary mission of America for 
nearly one-half century. It seems to me that, upon the successful 
completion of the cold war, it would only be natural that the nations 
that came into the world of free countries should have the opportunity 
to extend their participation in the free world to be part of the NATO 
alliance. It was indeed the NATO alliance, more than anything, that 
allowed them to find their freedom. It seems only natural that they 
would wish to be part of that alliance. And it would seem only natural 
that we should allow them to be part of that alliance as soon as they 
are able to meet the various entry requirements that we have 
established. To me, that is the natural outgrowth of the successful 
completion of the cold war.
  So, for those reasons, Mr. President, I intend to support the 
enlargement of NATO. I believe that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic are deserving allies and deserving members. I look forward to 
seeing the successful completion of this legislation during the next 
week.
  Mr. WARNER. Again, I express my appreciation to the Senator from 
Delaware, the distinguished ranking member of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, for his very conscientious attention, along with Chairman 
Helms, to this debate.
  I pick up again in expressing the grounds for my opposition to the 
admission of these three nations, certainly at this time. I also am 
going to place in the Record a series of documents today because I 
think it is important that those following this debate from a distance 
have access to the Record of the proceedings of the U.S. Senate, and 
that the views of a number of persons that I and others think are 
worthy of attention be placed therein. I ask unanimous consent that a 
statement that appeared in the Washington Times on March 18 by Robert 
Dole, the former majority leader of the U.S. Senate, entitled ``NATO 
Test of U.S. Leadership'' be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Times, Mar. 18, 1998]

                      NATO Test of U.S. Leadership

                             (By Bob Dole)

       For decades, the United States urged communist leaders to 
     ``tear down the Wall.'' Within the past 10 years, people of 
     Eastern Europe have embraced liberty and undertaken major 
     reforms in their economies and governments. Now the United 
     States Senate should take the next step toward ensuring 
     freedom and democracy for the people of Poland, the Czeck 
     Republic and Hungary by ratifying the NATO enlargement treaty 
     and inviting them to join us in NATO.
       American leadership on NATO enlargement is important to our 
     security as well as to the security of Eastern Europe.
       At the Madrid Summit last July, President Clinton and the 
     other NATO leaders unanimously decided to invite Poland, 
     Hungary and the Czech Republic to become members of the 
     alliance, culminating years of efforts by these countries to 
     meet NATO's strict entry criteria. Last week, under the 
     bipartisan leadership of Sen. Jesse Helms, North Carolina 
     Republican, and Sen. Joe Biden, Delaware Democrat, the Senate 
     Foreign Relations Committee overwhelmingly endorsed NATO 
     accession legislation by a vote of 16-2. I hope the full 
     Senate will follow suit without delay.
       Two world wars began in Europe, and strife in Bosnia 
     continues today. Expanding NATO to include Poland, Hungary 
     and the Czech Republic will help ensure that new threats, 
     such as ethnic struggles and state-sponsored terrorism, will 
     be kept in check.
       During the half-century that NATO has helped guarantee 
     peace in Europe, it has added new members three times, 
     including Germany, Greece, Turkey and Spain. Each addition 
     made the Alliance stronger and increased its military 
     capability. Affirming its military importance of NATO 
     enlargement, 60 top retired U.S. officers--including Colin 
     Powell and four other former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of 
     Staff, nine former service branch chiefs, and top combat 
     leaders such as Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf--recently signaled 
     their support of NATO enlargement. Their statement emphasized 
     that the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic 
     will enhance NATO's ability to deter or defend against 
     security challenges of the future.
       What these military leaders and many other Americans 
     understand is that no free nation has ever initiated a war 
     against another democracy. Integrating the military, economic 
     and political structures of Europe's newest stable 
     democracies into the NATO alliance will help ensure that this 
     remains true in the 21st century.
       Let me take the opportunity to address four major concerns 
     that critics have raised in this debate. First, some senators 
     have engaged in a last-minute effort to postpone 
     consideration of the NATO accession legislation. But members 
     of both parties and both houses of Congress have already 
     thoroughly examined questions surrounding NATO enlargement. 
     The Senate Foreign Relations Committee alone has held eight 
     hearings with more than 37 witnesses, resulting in 550 pages 
     of testimony. The case has been made: NATO enlargement is in 
     the interest of the United States. It is time to make it a 
     reality.
       Second, other critics in the Senate have suggested placing 
     conditions on NATO expansion, thereby ``freezing'' 
     enlargement for an arbitrary number of years. Like the 
     administration, I oppose any effort in the Senate to mandate 
     an artificial pause in the process. Such a move would send 
     the wrong message to countries in both the East and the West, 
     closing the door on current and potential new allies--and 
     perhaps tying the hands of a future president.
       Furthermore, freezing NATO's membership would create a 
     destabilizing new dividing line in Europe. Currently, non-
     member European nations cooperate extensively with NATO 
     through the Partnership for Peace Program. But if nations 
     believe the ultimate goal of NATO membership is unattainable, 
     any incentive to continue democratic reform will be 
     substantially diminished.
       The alliance's open door commitment, which has been 
     supported by the United States, has been an unqualified 
     success. The prospect of NATO membership has given Central 
     European countries a strong incentive to cooperate with the 
     alliance, strengthen civilian control of the military, and 
     resolve longstanding border disputes. All of these advance 
     U.S. interests. It would be a mistake to abandon a policy 
     that is clearly achieving its objectives.
       Third, some argue that NATO enlargement has hurt or will 
     hurt cooperation with Russia, or may even strengthen the hand 
     of hard-line Russian nationalists. This has not been borne 
     out by the facts. Since the NATO enlargement process began, 
     President Boris Yeltsin has been re-elected and many 
     reformers have been elevated within the Russian government. 
     Mr. Yeltsin pledged at the 1997 Helsinki summit to press for 
     ratification of START II and to pursue a START III accord. 
     The Duma also ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention and 
     President Yeltsin signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act, 
     creating a new, constructive relationshp with the West.
       The world has changed. The debate over NATO expansion 
     cannot be recast as an extension of the Cold War. I believe 
     imposing a mandated pause in NATO's engagement would appear 
     to give Russia a veto over NATO's internal decisions, 
     contrary of NATO's stated policy, and would strengthen Russia 
     extremists by enabling them to claim that their scare-tactic 
     objections swayed the world's most powerful military 
     alliance.
       And last, some skeptics would rather allow the European 
     Union (EU) to take the lead in building Central and Eastern 
     Europe's economic and security structure. But with due 
     respect, NATO, not the EU, is the cornerstone of European 
     security, which is vital to our own.
       As the Senate considers this legislation to allow Poland, 
     Hungary and the Czech Republic to complete their journey from 
     communist dictatorship to NATO membership, we should consider 
     the words of Czech President Vaclav Havel:
       ``The Alliance should urgently remind itself that it is 
     first and fore-most an instrument of democracy intended to 
     defend mutually held and created political and spiritual 
     values. It must see itself not as a pact of nations against a 
     more or less obvious enemy, but as a guarantor of 
     EuroAmerican civilization and thus as a pillar of global 
     security.''
       NATO protected Western Europe as it rebuilt its war-torn 
     political and economic systems. With Senate approval of NATO 
     enlargement, it can, and should, provide similar security to 
     our allies in Central and Eastern Europe as they re-enter the 
     community of free nations.
       This is no time to postpone or delay action. It is time to 
     act so that other NATO member countries can move ahead with 
     ratification knowing the United States is leading the way.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, it is clearly an endorsement of the 
present legislation by one of our most revered and respected former 
Senators, whose wartime record and whose record in many other endeavors 
places absolutely no question about his knowledge and background to 
make such an important contribution as embraced in that article.
  Likewise, Mr. President, appearing in today's Washington Post under 
the byline of Jim Hoagland, an article entitled ``Foreign Policy by 
Impulse.'' I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

[[Page S2271]]

                       [From the Washington Post]

                       Foreign Policy By Impulse

                           (By Jim Hoagland)

       The U.S. Senate is moving in haste toward a climactic vote 
     on NATO expansion, a foreign policy initiative that defines 
     the Clinton administration's approach to the world as one of 
     strategic promiscuity and impulse. The Senate should not join 
     in that approach.
       Foreign policy is the grand abstraction of American 
     presidents. They strive to bargain big, or not at all, on the 
     world stage. They feel more free there than they do at home 
     to dream, to emote, to rise or fall on principled positions, 
     or to stab others in the back at a time of their choosing.
       More able to ignore the niggling daily bargains that blur 
     and bend their domestic policies, presidents treat foreign 
     policy as the realm in which they express their essence and 
     personality most directly.
       Think in a word, or two, of our recent presidents and U.S. 
     foreign policy in their day: Johnson's word would be 
     overreaching. Nixon, paranoid. Carter, delusionally trusting. 
     Reagan, sunnily simplistic. Bush, prudent technician.
       NATO expansion is the Clintonites' most vaunted 
     contribution to diplomacy, and they characteristically assert 
     they can have it all, when they want, without paying any 
     price. Do it, the president told the Senate leadership Monday 
     in a letter asking for an immediate vote. Others will later 
     clean up messy strategic details such as the mission an 
     expanded NATO will have and who else may join.
       Sound familiar? Yes, in part because all administrations 
     advance this argument: Trust us. This will turn out all 
     right. Russians will learn that NATO expansion is good for 
     them. The French will not be able to use expansion to dilute 
     U.S. influence over Europe, try as they may. This will cost 
     American taxpayers only a penny or two a day. And so on, on a 
     number of debatable points that I think will work out quite 
     differently than the administration claims.
       But there is also a familiarity of style here distinctive 
     to this president and those closest to him. And why not? The 
     all-embracing, frantic, gargantuan life-style that has 
     allowed those other affairs of state--the Lewinsky, Willey, 
     Jones allegations--to become the talk of the world 
     (justifiably or otherwise) also surfaces in major policy 
     matters. The Senate vote on NATO is not occurring in a 
     vacuum.
       Life is not neatly compartmentalized. The paranoia and 
     conspiracy that enveloped the Nixon White House manifested 
     itself in the bombing of Hanoi and the overthrow of Chilean 
     President Salvador Allende as well as in Watergate. The Great 
     Society and Vietnam were not conflicting impulses for Lyndon 
     Johnson, as is often assumed, but different sides of the same 
     overreaching coin. The lack of perspective and deliberation 
     apparent in the handling of NATO expansion is apparent 
     elsewhere in the Clinton White House.
       On the issue at hand, the White House is urging the Senate 
     to amend the NATO charter to admit the Czech Republic, 
     Hungary and Poland. Majority Leader Trent Lott responded to 
     Clinton's letter by saying he would schedule a vote in a few 
     days, despite appeals from 16 senators for more, and more 
     focused, discussion.
       Clinton opposes any more debate, even though he has not 
     addressed the American public on this historic step and even 
     though there is no consensus in the United States or within 
     the 16-member alliance on the strategic mission of an 
     expanded NATO or on its future membership.
       A new ``strategic concept'' for NATO will not be publicly 
     reached until April 1999, when it is to be unveiled at a 50th 
     anniversary summit in Washington. When Secretary of State 
     Madeleine Albright recently said in Brussels that NATO would 
     evolve into ``a force for peace for the Middle East to 
     Central Africa,'' European foreign ministers quickly signaled 
     opposition to such a radical expansion of the alliances's 
     geographical area of responsibility.
       And Albright's deputy, Strobe Talbott, surprised some 
     European ambassadors to Washington last week when he gave a 
     ringing endorsement to the possibility of eventual Russian 
     membership in NATO, an idea that divides NATO governments and 
     which the administration has not highlighted for the Senate.
       ``I regard Russia as a peaceful democratic state that is 
     undergoing one of the most arduous transitions in history,'' 
     Talbott said in response to a question asked at a symposium 
     at the British Embassy. He said Clinton strongly supported 
     the view that ``no emerging democracy should be excluded 
     because of size, geopolitical situation or historical 
     experience. That goes for very small states, such as the 
     Baltics, and it goes for the very largest, that is for 
     Russia.'' This is a message that Clinton has given Boris 
     Yeltsin in their private meetings, Talbott emphasized.
       ``This is a classic case of never saying never,'' Talbott 
     continued. ``If the day comes when this happens, it will be a 
     very different Russia, a very different Europe and a very 
     different NATO.''
       How different, and in what ways, is worth discussing before 
     the fact. The Clinton administration has not taken seriously 
     its responsibility to think through the consequences of its 
     NATO initiative and to explain those consequences to the 
     American people. The Senate needs an extended debate, not an 
     immediate vote.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I will refer in my remarks to a 
Congressional Budget Office report released March 17, addressed to the 
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, regarding the 
Congressional Budget Office cost estimate, a new cost estimate, on NATO 
expansion as proposed by the underlying treaty.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this report be printed in 
the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See Exhibit 1.)
  Mr. WARNER. Now, Mr. President, as we all know, the President has 
announced his goal of welcoming these first three nations into NATO to 
mark the alliance's 50th anniversary, scheduled for April 4 of next 
year. Several weeks ago, the President submitted to the Senate the 
Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic. For the United States, under the 
``advise and consent clause'' of our Constitution, two-thirds of this 
body must give their concurrence to the President's request. Likewise, 
the new admissions must be agreed to by the other 15 nations in NATO. 
Presently, Canada, Denmark and Norway have, in their respective 
Parliaments, ratified these Protocols.
  If the Senate agrees, this would be the first of perhaps many 
expansion rounds to include the nations of Central Europe and some of 
the nations of the former Soviet Union. Twelve nations have publicly 
expressed a desire to join the current 16 that comprise NATO.
  As I said yesterday--and I don't desire to be dramatic--I do believe 
this replaces, symbolically, the Iron Curtain that was established in 
the late forties, which faced west, with now an iron ring of nations 
that face east to Russia. That causes this Senator a great deal of 
concern. I have previously expressed my concerns here. I did so again 
today in the Senate Armed Services Committee, and I was joined in my 
observations on the floor yesterday by my colleague, the senior Senator 
from New York, who pointed out that such an iron ring, extending from 
the Baltics down to the Black Sea, would, in effect, take a present 
part of Russia and place it behind that iron ring. I refer my 
colleagues to the remarks of the senior Senator from New York of 
yesterday.
  In evaluating this issue of NATO expansion, I start from the basic 
premise that NATO is, first and foremost, a military alliance. It is 
not a political club, it is not an economic club; it is a military 
alliance to which members have in the past--I repeat, in the past--been 
invited because they were able to make a positive contribution to the 
overall security of Europe and to the goals of NATO as laid down by the 
founding fathers some nearly 50 years ago.
  Nations should be invited into NATO only if there is a compelling 
military need for additional members, and only if those additional 
members will make a positive military contribution to the alliance. 
That case, in my opinion, has yet to be made persuasively with regard 
to Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic. NATO has been, is, and will 
remain, with its present membership, the most valuable security 
alliance in the history of the United States, if not the history of the 
world. It has fulfilled, it is continuing to fulfill, and will fulfill 
the vital role of spearheading U.S. leadership on the European 
continent.
  Twice in this century American troops, in World War I and World War 
II, have been called to leave our shores and go to Europe to bring 
about the cessation of hostilities and to instill stability. That is 
NATO's principal reason for being, for which we now have that military 
presence in Europe today. It justifies an American voice on the 
continent, which history dictates is essential to maintain stability. 
My concern is, that U.S. military presence could be jeopardized by the 
accession of these three nations at this time. My reason for expressing 
this concern goes back in the history of this Chamber, when the 
distinguished majority leader at one time, Senator Mansfield, beginning 
I think in about 1966, came to the floor repeatedly over a period of 7 
over 8 years urging colleagues to bring down the number of U.S. troops 
in Europe. And, indeed, in

[[Page S2272]]

that period we saw the beginning of a force reduction, where today 
there is the phasedown from 300,000 to 100,000.
  Harry Truman, distinguished President of the United States--and, in 
my judgment, one of the greatest in the history of this country--cited 
NATO and the Marshall Plan as the two greatest achievements of his 
Presidency. NATO has unquestionably surpassed all of the expectations 
that President Truman had, and those associated with him, in founding 
this historic alliance.
  There is an old axiom: ``If something has worked well, is working 
well, what is the compelling reason to try and fix it?'' The burden of 
proof, in my judgment, is on those who now want to change this great 
alliance.
  American leadership has been, is, and always will be essential to 
Europe. History has proven that principle beyond any reasonable doubt. 
Now a heavy burden falls on those who support expansion--indeed, the 
Commander in Chief of our Nation, the President--to carry that burden 
through and to place before the American people a convincing argument 
that this alliance must be substantially changed by the admission of 
three new nations. And I predict, without any hesitation, the beginning 
of accessions periodically of other nations, perhaps to the point where 
12 would join with the current 16.
  It is for that reason that I have filed with the Senate an amendment 
to require a moratorium of 3 years on future accessions, should it be 
the judgment of this body by a vote of two-thirds of the Senators to 
accede these three nations under this treaty. If this first round is 
approved, then I want in the resolution of ratification accompanying 
this protocol a limitation on this Nation not to involve itself in the 
accession of further nations for a period of 3 years. I do that because 
we don't know what the costs are of this first round. I will allude 
specifically to that momentarily. We don't know how quickly these three 
new nations can bring themselves up in terms of military 
interoperability with NATO forces today, in terms of other military 
standards, and how long it will take them to be a positive, full 
partner with NATO and not be what I would regard as a user of NATO 
security in that period of time until they can bring themselves up 
militarily to NATO standards.
  And, most importantly, given the significance of this treaty, why 
should we not let an important decision, should that be the result of 
two-thirds of our Members, for accession of these three nations--why 
should we not patiently wait 3 years so that the next President of the 
United States, whoever that may be, can have a voice to express his or 
her view that the vital security interests of this country dictate 
further accessions, or that the pause should continue for a period of 
time? I think we owe no less to our next President, who will be faced 
with a substantially different set of conditions, particularly, in my 
judgment, as it relates to Russia.

  I have great doubts that this burden of proof can be met in such a 
way as to prove that NATO expansion now is ``vital'' to America's 
national security interests, present or future. For nearly 50 years, 
the NATO alliance unquestionably has been vital to our security 
interests. To me, ``vital'' means that we will put--I want to speak 
very slowly and clearly--that we will put at risk life and limb of the 
young men and women who proudly wear the uniforms of the United States 
Armed Forces, our troops, as they are called upon to protect any member 
nation of NATO. We make that commitment today to the other 15. Now, if 
adopted, this treaty pushes the boundary of NATO another 400 miles 
towards Russia, taking on hundreds and hundreds of square miles of new 
territory. That is what we must focus on--our young men and women who 
wear the uniforms and who will be deployed for our contribution to the 
NATO force.
  Up front, this administration must explain to Americans that any 
country joining NATO will be extended protection of article V of the 
NATO treaty. That article V states: ``An armed attack against one or 
more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack 
against them all''--which means we put at risk our people who are sent 
as a part of the overall NATO force, along with their comrades, 
soldiers and sailors and airmen of the other nations.
  This is the most solemn commitment our Nation can make, particularly 
as NATO is in a transition phase now, performing a vital mission in 
Bosnia, a mission that was never envisioned under the original charter 
with clarity. I think the charter conceivably can be interpreted, as it 
has been, to embrace this type of mission. What about the next mission, 
and the next mission, and the next mission? What about border disputes 
between the two nations, three nations, and their neighboring 
countries? What about ethnic strife? What about religious strife?
  All of these problems are now manifesting themselves throughout this 
area as these nations struggle to accede to democracy in the former 
Warsaw Pact and other places in the world, and it is a NATO force that 
is looked to, to come to the rescue. Bosnia is a case in point.
  It is incumbent on the administration next year and the year after to 
face up to the request of some nine other nations at the moment who 
express a desire to join. If Congress is to concur now, it will have to 
justify to the American people, first, the extension of article V to 
these three nations, followed by perhaps as many as nine nations in the 
years to come.
  Let's step back. In the 19 years that I have been privileged to serve 
in this Institution, I have participated in all of the debates 
regarding the deployment of our troops. But I will bring one to mind, 
and that is Somalia.
  I was strongly in favor of President Bush deploying our forces in the 
cause, not so much because of the vital security interests of the 
United States, but for our troops to allow the measure of protection 
needed to distribute food and medicine and other benefits to a starving 
people, people who are deprived of food as a consequence of a series of 
droughts and civil strife in that country.
  Senator Levin and I wrote a very detailed report on behalf of the 
Armed Services Committee, which traces the entire history of that 
operation from the first day that the troops landed under President 
Bush as Commander in Chief to the troops withdrawing under President 
Clinton. And that mission went through a series of transformations, 
transformations that were not carefully observed by the Senate or, 
indeed, the Congress.
  There came a time when our mission involved what we would call 
``nation building,'' and our troops were deployed in a combat role 
to try and achieve the goal of nation building. And we all know the 
tragedy that ensued when one of those missions resulted in the death of 
17 or 18 and the wounding seriously of 70-plus other brave soldiers. We 
recall very well the absolute tragic abuse of the body of one of those 
brave Americans. This country rebelled. This Chamber rose up in 
contempt of what we saw before us, and the call was to bring them 
home--bring them home right now. And I felt that the decision having 
been made by one President followed up by a second President to deploy 
those troops, the decision as to when to bring them home should be made 
pursuant to the Constitution of the United States by the Commander in 
Chief, the President. I was among those Senators who said let the 
President make the decision rather than the Congress as to when to 
bring them home. But the Congress reflected the sentiment across 
America.

  I point this out to illustrate what I call the limited staying power 
of this country today. It is far different from what we saw in World 
War II, far different from Korea. But we saw the manifestations 
beginning in Vietnam--the limitation on the staying power to continue 
to accept casualties and losses by this country unless it is manifestly 
clear that those losses, be it their death or injury, are clearly 
identified with the vital security interests of the United States of 
America. I forewarn that with this expansion, our troops committed to 
NATO someday could be involved in missions which, in my judgment, would 
be very, very hard to justify as being in the vital security interests 
of this country, and at that point in time our Nation might focus on 
the continued contributions, be it financial or manpower, to NATO. And 
underlying that is the question of the possibility of once again 
America's presence in Europe, through its NATO

[[Page S2273]]

association, being challenged by the American public.
  I see the Senator from Delaware. I will be happy to take a question 
at any time.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, earlier my friend and colleague, the 
Senator from West Virginia, described the ring we were putting into 
Europe. I observe that within that ring there would be a portion of the 
Russian nation. Here is the map.
  Mr. WARNER. From the Baltics down to the Black Sea, which face east.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. This is Kaliningrad right here, cut off from Russia by 
Lithuania, Belarus, and Latvia.
  I would like to make a point that the Russians have already asked for 
passage through Latvia and have not received it.
  One point about the proposal of the Senator from Virginia to have a 
pause before further expansion. Last December, the Woodrow Wilson 
National Center for Scholars had a conference on NATO enlargement, and 
there was just this one passage that struck me by a Finnish scholar 
Tiiu Pohl. She said, ``In 1994, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung of Germany 
organized a study of the Russian military elite to find out whom they 
considered to be enemies of the state. The results of the research 
showed that Latvia was named most frequently, by 49 percent of the 
respondents. Latvia was followed by Afghanistan, Lithuania, and 
Estonia. After Estonia came the United States.''

  Sir, we are walking into historical ethnic and religious enmities. 
Catholics here, Orthodox here, and Lutheran here. We have no idea what 
we are getting into.
  I thank the Senator.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my scholarly friend, the senior 
Senator from New York for his valuable contribution. I think the 
Senator's point, if I might rephrase it, is those potential disputes 
grounded in ancient civilizations and ancient religions can and do 
burst open today and result in conflict into which the Armed Forces can 
be dragged. What better example than Bosnia.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, we would 
march our troops right up the Volga.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank my friend.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I find this absolutely astounding. Are my 
friends suggesting that the Russians were justified in marching into 
Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania and annexing them in the name of 
preventing a ring from surrounding them? What in Lord's name are we 
talking about? No. 1.
  No. 2. I have the map, and I am looking at the map. I am trying to 
figure where the ring is. But let's assume it is a ring. It seems to 
me, if it is a ring, it is a ring of freedom, a ring of freedom that 
tolls out and says anybody who wants to have it put on their finger can 
join and work it out, including Russia.
  And Kaliningrad is a port, but if you look at the Kola Peninsula at 
the top of that map, which is considerably more armed, including with 
nukes, than Kaliningrad is, it happens to have shared for the last 40 
years a border with a NATO country called Norway, about the same length 
of mileage.
  Now, look, this is a bit of a red herring, as we used to say when you 
practiced law or in law school. What is this ring? We are not talking 
about Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia or Belarus or Ukraine or Romania 
now. That is not part of the debate today.
  Now, if my friends are saying anyone who votes for expanding NATO to 
include Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary are tying this noose 
around the Russian neck, this iron ring, well, then, I don't quite get 
it. But if they are saying that if you vote for these three you must be 
saying you are going to vote for all 12 or 15 or whatever, well, then, 
that is not how it works. That is a fight for another day.
  But I find this notion that Kaliningrad, which was awarded, if you 
will, to Russia after World War II, that subsequent to that the 
Russians were justified--they didn't say this; I am saying this--that 
the Russians were justified to assure that they could have access to 
this piece which was separated from their otherwise--we call them the 
contiguous 48--separated from their historic border, that they were 
justified in taking the freedom of the Lithuanians so they could have 
access, the Lithuanians are somehow out of line because they will, 
based on some notion of, apparently, religion or some just 
international pique of some kind, not allow Russian troops to march 
through their country and that makes them bad guys--the same troops 
that subjugated them for the last four decades. I don't find that a 
religious concern. I do not understand how that somehow makes the 
Lithuanians a little bit shaky. These are the people who for 40 years 
subjugated them, took away their national identity. And now just 7 or 8 
short years after the wall is down they are somehow the bad guys 
because they will not allow Russian divisions to march from Kaliningrad 
to Moscow. Oh, my goodness.
  And the other argument I am finding fascinating, the solemn 
commitment--it is a solemn commitment--we make if, in fact, we find 
ourselves saying that another member can join, we make a solemn 
commitment to them just as we did Germany, and the comparison is made 
between Poland and Somalia. We had no staying power in Vietnam and 
Somalia. I would respectfully submit that Vietnam and Somalia are not 
Central Europe; they are not Poland; they are not Hungary.

  Implicit in the statement is if, in fact, tomorrow or the next day or 
the next year or the next decade someone invaded Poland again, we 
would, like the French, stand there with our thumbs in our ears and not 
respond, then I say we really have lost the meaning of what it means to 
be an American. That is what Europe did. They refused to make a solemn 
commitment to Poland. Then when they did make it, they broke it.
  What I find an incredible leap here is, what commitment are we making 
in NATO that I hope every Senator on this floor would not make absent 
Poland being part of NATO? Is someone suggesting to me tomorrow--and 
this is not a possibility realistically, but if Russia decided to put 
40 divisions back in Poland and the Senator from Oregon, presiding, 
stood up and said, ``We should respond,'' what do you think would 
happen on this floor? Well, I hope to God what would happen on this 
floor would not be what happened in the British Parliament, what 
happened in the French legislature, what happened in the other capitals 
of Europe. I hope we would not say, ``Oh, my goodness, no; maybe they 
have a historic right. Oh, my goodness, let's think about it. We will 
be making a commitment that is awful. Oh, my goodness, this is a 
dilemma.''
  What is the dilemma? What is the dilemma? Or Hungary. By the way, I 
happened to notice on the map, I don't know that anybody is talking 
about Ukraine, including Ukraine. I don't know that anybody is talking 
about Belarus, including Belarus. I don't know that anybody is talking 
about Slovakia, including Slovakia as being members of NATO now or in 
the near term. It seems to me they somehow sit between that iron ring 
and that noble emerging democracy of Russia.
  Look, I guess the thing that sort of got my goat a little bit here is 
that Americans do not have staying power. What they are really talking 
about is the Senator's generation and mine, Mr. President, that we do 
not have staying power. I will tell you about the staying power. The 
staying power of my friend's generation was real, but it was enviable 
because they didn't have to doubt whether or not what they were doing 
was saving the world. They didn't have to doubt whether or not what 
they were doing was, in fact, literally preserving the freedom of their 
wives and children back home in the old U.S.A. They didn't have to 
doubt that they were out there fighting one of the most miserable SOBs 
in the history of mankind.
  But my generation went full of doubt and still went--and still went--
never once having the solace of knowing the malarkey we were being fed 
about Vietnam approached the truth of what their generation was fed 
about Nazi Germany and fascism in Europe. But they went. I don't doubt 
the staying power of the American people. I doubt the wisdom of our 
leadership in the places we have asked them to stay. But if this 
implies that if there were--and there is no realistic prospect of 
this--but if there were an invasion of Poland or Hungary or the Czech 
Republic, not a border dispute, an invasion, that we would not respond, 
that we would have

[[Page S2274]]

to think about it, that there is any substantive difference today----
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I might----
  Mr. BIDEN. Between the invasion of Warsaw and the invasion of a 
former East German city, Dresden, what is the substantive difference?
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I would like to reply to the Senator.
  Mr. BIDEN. I will yield in just 2 seconds.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, it happens to be my floor.
  Mr. BIDEN. I yield then. I am sorry. I thought the Senator yielded.
  Mr. WARNER. Go ahead.
  Mr. BIDEN. It just confuses me.
  Mr. WARNER. Go ahead and finish up.
  Mr. BIDEN. I am finished. It seems to me this iron ring is no ring at 
all, the notion that Kaliningrad is somehow going to be isolated 
relating to expansion. It is already isolated because of the place 
called Lithuania. The only answer to the lack of isolation is Lithuania 
limiting their sovereignty. That is the only answer. There is none 
other. Nobody can get from Kaliningrad to Russia through Poland. They 
are not trying to get there that way. This is about Lithuania when you 
talk about Kaliningrad. And the commitment being made to Poland and the 
Czech Republic and to Hungary, I hope we would make whether or not 
there was a NATO to which they would join.

  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. I say in a very calm way, I listened carefully to my 
colleague. I take to heart what he has said. And I think it is very 
important. I don't question his generation in Vietnam. It was my 
privilege to be in the Pentagon at that point in time with the 
Department of the Navy. I went out across the country, spoke at the 
campuses, watched the extreme objection by his generation and, in 
hindsight, there was a lot of merit to that objection.
  I remember very well Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, under whom I 
served as Secretary of the Navy, saying, we have to figure out how to 
withdraw the United States from Vietnam. That is history. But in World 
War II, during which I served a modest period at the very end, and my 
colleague from New York, a somewhat longer period, our generation 
marched off under the old refrain, ``Ours is not to reason why, ours is 
but to do or die.'' We simply went, never questioned it. And as the 
Senator from Delaware said, there was greater clarity as to the enemy, 
the cause, and we had absolutely magnificent support on the home front.
  When I returned from Korea, then serving in the Marines for a short 
period of time, there was a marked difference between the attitude in 
America for the returning veterans of Korea and the veterans of World 
War II. And then during the Vietnam war we all know full well the 
turmoil on the home front and the difficulty with which the brave young 
men and women who fought in that battle wearing the uniform of the 
United States had to cope with not only in battle in Nam but 
regrettably a battle of a different form at home.
  But I say to my friend, staying power in this Senator's mind is an 
important point, and that is why I brought it up because we no longer 
have the attitude: ours is not to reason why, ours is but to do or die. 
Every person in uniform reasons today. I don't suggest they question 
the orders, but they reason. The people at home reason. They want to 
know with clarity as to what the mission is, and whether or not it is 
in our vital security interests.

  I remind my good friend of the debate that took place on this floor 
before the Persian Gulf war. It was my privilege to have written the 
resolution authorizing the use of force in 1991, after President Bush 
had put in place, in the gulf, 500,000 American troops, had formed a 
coalition of 30-plus nations, and we were ready to do battle with 
Saddam Hussein, who had invaded Kuwait and perpetrated acts of criminal 
warfare that we had not seen for some period of time.
  Kuwait was aflame, the streets littered with the debris of war. In 
this Chamber we had an excellent debate as to whether or not we would 
allow the President of the United States to use force by the men and 
women already in place to repel that invasion. It went on for 2\1/2\ 
days. And by a mere five votes, only a five-vote margin, did this 
Chamber agree with that resolution. How well I remember that event.
  Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield for a short question?
  Mr. WARNER. Yes.
  Mr. BIDEN. As calmly as I can say it, I guess the point I am trying 
to make is, it seems to me we should compare apples and apples and 
oranges and oranges. Does the Senator believe there is any more or less 
support on the part of the American people to defend Dresden than there 
is Warsaw? To defend Budapest than there is Florence? To defend any one 
of the countries that we are talking about, their cities, than any 
other European city? It seems to me that is the question. If we would 
not go, if we cannot get American staying power to defend Poland, then 
I respectfully suggest we cannot get American staying power to defend 
Germany.
  I would think, in America, if you ask for a show of hands, so to 
speak, on a question of whether we should defend anybody--but the 
reasonable comparison was these NATO nations that are seeking admission 
versus NATO nations that are already in. To compare this to Iraq, with 
all due respect, is comparing very different things.
  By the way, five votes were a close call. But in my father's 
generation it was one vote that allowed the draft. The British had 
already been pushed into the English Channel, all of Europe had already 
been conquered, Jews were already being slaughtered, and there were not 
a lot of people walking off this floor, or any other floor in this 
generation or any other generation, raising their hands to join. It was 
only after Pearl Harbor. I don't say that critically; I say that as an 
observation, a statement of history, historical fact.
  So, this notion that the staying power in Somalia or even in the gulf 
should be equated to the staying power that would or would not exist in 
Poland, the Czech Republic or Hungary, I think is comparing two 
different things. I think the most appropriate comparison would be--and 
you may be right, Senator, that there is no staying power--but the 
staying power we would have to defend Germany, the staying power that 
we would have to defend Turkey, I will lay you out 8 to 5, you take the 
bet, if you took a poll in the United States of America and said you 
must send your son or daughter to defend one of the two following 
countries, Poland or Turkey, I will bet my colleague a year's salary 
they will say ``Poland.''
  I will bet you a year's salary, and that is all I have. I have no 
stocks, bonds, debentures, outside income. I will bet you my whole 
year's salary. You know I am right. As Barry Goldwater would say, ``you 
know in your heart I'm right.''
  So, if there is no staying power for Poland there sure in heck is 
none for Turkey.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I brought this up because this Senator 
feels differently. I think the American people in their heart of hearts 
want to go to the defense of human beings wherever they are in trouble 
in the world, irrespective of race, color or creed. But they must apply 
a standard because it is their sons and daughters who go, and that 
standard should always be: Is that deployment and risk of life in the 
vital security interests of our Nation and/or our allies? The NATO 
treaty, as it has been drafted and utilized these nearly 50 years, has 
had clarity on that point. We have now gotten involved in an internal 
conflict in Bosnia, and we thank the dear Lord that we have not 
experienced in that ravaged nation the casualties that could have come 
about. And the staying power of the American people, had we experienced 
over the past year a considerable number of casualties--I am not 
certain what that staying power would have been. I really am not 
certain. But I want to make it very clear it is the vital security 
interests that should always underlie any deployment.

  I brought in Somalia because I was greatly disturbed by the debate. 
Some of my most respected colleagues said, ``Bring them home 
tomorrow,'' irrespective of the President's, the Commander in Chief's 
prerogatives to decide when to deploy and when to bring troops back, 
absent the Congress of the United States speaking through its

[[Page S2275]]

power of the purse. I think we should always defend that executive 
prerogative.
  So my concern is just to raise the article 5 commitment clearly, that 
``an attack on one is an attack on all,'' and away we go. And now, as 
we are broadening the basis for NATO military actions, as we have in 
Bosnia, to involvement in a clear, historical conflict rooted in the 
diversity of religions and ethnic differences, we have to be ever so 
careful, as we add nations into the NATO alliance.
  At the conclusion of this colloquy I would like to have printed in 
the Record, jointly with my distinguished colleague from New York, one 
of the most erudite pieces I have ever seen written on the debate we 
are now having, ``Expanding NATO Would Be the Most Fateful Error of 
American Policy in the Entire Post-Cold-War Era,'' by George F. Kennan. 
I know my distinguished colleague has a great deal of respect for the 
author of this article.
  I have a number of serious concerns with the policy of NATO expansion 
that I would like to address today. Among these concerns are the impact 
of expansion on NATO's military capabilities; the cost of expansion to 
the United States; the role expansion will play in the economic 
competition currently underway in Central Europe; and the impact of 
expansion on U.S.-Russian relations.
  Keeping in mind that NATO is fundamentally a military alliance, we 
must ask this question--Will Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic be 
able to contribute to the security of the Alliance, or will they be net 
consumers of security for the foreseeable future? In other words, 
what's in it for NATO? Even by its own estimates, NATO is working with 
a ten-year time line for the cost of NATO expansion which indicates 
NATO is planning on at least a decade of modernization efforts before 
these three nations can ``pull their weight.'' That's a long time to 
extend a security commitment with little or no ``payback.''
  We must also keep in mind that once these three are admitted to 
NATO--if indeed that does happen--there would be 19 nations, not just 
the current 16, that must agree before NATO could act on any issue. As 
we all know, NATO acts only by consensus. The more nations that are 
added, the harder that consensus will be to achieve. If NATO expands 
much further, we are in danger of turning this fine Alliance into a 
``mini-U.N.,'' where all action is reduced to the lowest common 
denominator.
  What are the monetary costs involved in expansion? Well, at this 
point, it's anyone's guess. The cost estimates on NATO expansion have 
ranged from a low of $1.5 billion over 10 years (NATO estimate), to a 
high of $125 billion over the same time frame CBO original estimate. I 
expect that the truth lies somewhere in between these two extremes--
only time will tell. What will be the U.S. share of this expansion 
bill? Will our current allies pay their fair share? As we evaluate 
these questions, we must keep in mind a couple of facts: our European 
allies have traditionally spent less on defense as a percentage of GDP 
than we have, and they are all currently in a period of reducing their 
defense forces.
  Is this a time when it is realistic for us to assume that our allies 
will increase their defense spending for the purpose of expanding the 
Alliance? The French have certainly made their position clear on this 
issue. They simply will not increase their contributions to NATO for 
the purpose of expansion. According to French President Jacques Chirac, 
``France does not intend to raise its contribution to NATO because of 
the cost of enlargement. We have done our own analysis and we concluded 
that enlargement could be done at no additional cost, by re-directing 
funds and making other savings.'' This is not the type of attitude we 
need from our allies at a time when we are contemplating a major new 
commitment, which will involve substantial costs.
  I am also greatly concerned about the economic aspects of NATO 
expansion. In my view, the greatest threat to the nations of Central 
Europe today is the struggle for economic survival. These nations are 
all competing for previous foreign investment as they struggle to 
rebuild economies devastated by decades of Communist rule. If we grant 
NATO membership to three of these nations, those three will gain a 
tremendous advantage in this fierce economic competition. They will be 
able to advertise that foreign investment will be safe in their 
nation--it will be protected by the NATO security umbrella. What type 
of resentment will this breed between the NATO ``haves'' and ``have-
nots?'' Will this encourage conflicts into which NATO will be obligated 
to intervene on behalf of Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic? Again, 
only time will tell.
  And what of the impact of NATO expansion on U.S.-Russian relations? 
We all know that Russia is not happy with the expansion policy. They 
have grudgingly accepted the first round, but will clearly be 
strenuously opposed to future rounds which move NATO's border even 
farther eastward. While I do not believe that we should allow Russia to 
dictate U.S. policy on issues which we regard as vital to our national 
security, I also do not believe that we should unnecessarily antagonize 
the only nation with the nuclear capability to destroy our nation. The 
Administration readily admits that there is no foreseeable military 
threat to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. If that is the case, 
what is the rush to expand the Alliance? Wouldn't it be more important 
to the national security interests of the United States to first deal 
with the Russians on issues such as the further reduction of nuclear 
weapons and the control of the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction before we worried about changing an Alliance which is 
currently functioning without problems?
  To continue as the leading nation in NATO, we must have the American 
people solidly behind our President, our committed troops. It was not 
so long ago--back in the 1960s and 1970s--that Majority Leader Mike 
Mansfield annually sponsored legislation calling for a reduction in the 
U.S. military presence in Europe. Those debates continued into the 
1980s during a peak of the cold war. I fear we could see a return of 
these annual calls to reduce our commitment to NATO if the American 
people become disillusioned with an expanded NATO.
  This nation will continue to engage in a comprehensive debate on this 
issue over the years to come, but next week the Senate will be asked to 
vote on NATO membership for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The 
American people must be convinced that the protection of these new NATO 
member nations is worth the sacrifices of life and economy--in our 
``vital'' security interest.
  If that case is not made, the staying power of the American people is 
sure to wane were a dispute to arise involving the new NATO nations. 
And the support of the American people for NATO itself, which has been 
the pillar of U.S. national security policy in Europe since the end of 
World War II, could be threatened. That would be the greatest tragedy 
of all.
  I am not willing to take that risk. I will vote against ratification 
when the Senate is asked to cast its vote on the resolution of 
ratification.
  I am going to momentarily conclude my remarks. But I want to cover 
the important hearing of the Armed Services Committee today. We had 
former Secretary of Defense Perry; Ms. Susan Eisenhower, the daughter 
of Colonel John Eisenhower, and the granddaughter of our distinguished 
former President; William Hyland, a man who has had many, many years of 
professional association in foreign policy; and William Kristol, who is 
a noted commentator on very many issues, particularly security issues.
  I want to read part of the testimony given by Ms. Eisenhower. She 
recites an important part of contemporary history on this issue.

       In 1991, a distinguished bi-partisan panel of 26 current 
     and former government officials offered recommendations for 
     the post-Cold War security environment in a booklet published 
     by the Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute/SAIS. Titled, 
     ``The United States & NATO in an Undivided Europe,'' the 
     report outlined the remarkable series of changes that had 
     recently taken place and focused on NATO's future role in 
     assuring that ``Europe is truly 'whole and free.' '' The NATO 
     alliance would require reform and downsizing to ``a small, 
     but militarily meaningful number,'' they said, along with the 
     capability for a future ``redeployment of U.S. combat troops 
     in the event of crisis.'' But they asserted, ``The Alliance 
     should reject proposals to expand its membership by including 
     east European nations.''


[[Page S2276]]


  That is rather interesting. There is another paragraph.

       Obviously such an extension of the Alliance's area of 
     responsibility would be perceived by the Soviets as 
     threatening and as a repudiation of Mikhail Gorbachev's aim 
     to build a ``common European home,'' the justification for 
     his voluntary relinquishment of the USSR's previous hold on 
     Eastern Europe.

  Then I skip to a final paragraph:
  ``Among the twenty-six signatories were Senators Sam Nunn and Bill 
Bradley, as well as Generals Andrew Goodpastor and William Y. Smith. 
But the document was also signed by our current Secretary of Defense, 
William Cohen, along with Zbigniew Brzezinski, Peter Rodman,''--who 
spoke before a group here in the Senate yesterday and with whom I 
debated before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City on 
Monday--``Helmut Sonnenfeldt and Norm Augustine, all of whom have since 
done an about-face and are outspoken advocates in favor of expanding 
the alliance.''
  It is very interesting. In the course of this debate, I and others 
will point out where not more than 8 or 9 years ago there was serious 
opposition in many circles of Government to the very thing that we are 
espousing in this treaty.
  I conclude by referring to an article in the New York Times, which I 
will ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record of today's 
colloquy. October 21, 1997, the article was jointly written by Warren 
Christopher, former Secretary of State, and William J. Perry, former 
Secretary of Defense, who testified before us today. I will read a 
paragraph attributed to both.

       And what should the alliance do about other countries 
     seeking admission? It should remain open to membership to all 
     states of the Partnership for Peace, subject to their ability 
     to meet the stringent requirements for admission. But no 
     additional members should be designated for admission until 
     the three countries now in the NATO queue are fully prepared 
     to bear the responsibilities of membership and have been 
     fully integrated into the alliance military and political 
     structures.

  Mr. President, Dr. Perry today implied that would take years. The 
NATO cost report itself indicated that would take years. That is the 
very reason that my distinguished colleague from New York and I have 
put in our amendment, as an insurance, should this body go forward with 
this treaty and the three accessions, that there be a period of 3 years 
within which the United States of America can examine the cost, examine 
the ability of new nations to measure up to NATO standards and make a 
positive contribution to the objectives of NATO. And I add, of course, 
I think the next President is entitled to the strongest of voices on 
the issue of further accessions.
  Mr. President, I now ask unanimous consent the material to which I 
referred be printed in the Record, and I yield the floor.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                             [From Newsday]

 Expanding NATO Would Be the Most Fateful Error of American Policy in 
                      the Entire Post-Cold-War Era

                         (By George F. Kennan)

       The U.S. Senate seems poised to make that error.
       In the next few weeks it is expected to approve an 
     amendment to the NATO treaty that would add Poland, Hungary, 
     and the Czech Republic to the defense alliance. It is 
     potentially a mistake of historic proportions.
       Despite the warning of Ambassador George Kennan, one of the 
     most respected foreign-policy thinkers of the century; 
     despite the reality that there has been little substantive 
     debate; despite the admission by many senators that the more 
     they learn about the consequences of enlarging NATO, the more 
     doubtful they become about its merits; despite the widespread 
     distrust of the administration's estimate of what enlargement 
     would actually cost American taxpayers; despite the lack of 
     compelling national interest, the Senate seems ready to plow 
     ahead.
       Why? Part of the answer is that in this post-Cold War 
     period, foreign policy has become a second-level, even a 
     third-level interest, in Washington. Nobody has been paying 
     that much attention. It is inconceivable that such a war-and-
     peace issue would have received so little attention during 
     the Cold War. But now many senators admit they are just 
     beginning to focus on this question. New York's Alfonse 
     D'Amato said last week that the more he has learned about the 
     issue the more troubled he is about it. He no longer sees it 
     as an open-and-shut case.
       But there are many other reasons for the Senate's dogged 
     march toward approval. One is politics. There are organized 
     ethnic interest groups lobbying for NATO enlargement, while 
     those who oppose it cannot exert a counterbalancing political 
     force. Another is that the Clinton administration, led by 
     Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, has committed the 
     nation's prestige to enlarging NATO and many senator fear--
     falsely in our opinion--that it is too late to turn back now. 
     Documents have been signed, promises have been made. But the 
     U.S. Constitution requires that the Senate approve treaties 
     by a two-thirds vote. More damaging than turning back now 
     would be to move ahead arrogantly and blindly.
       Still another factor is a belief by some that the only way 
     to maintain the U.S. military presence in Europe and bring 
     stability to Eastern Europe's new democracies is to expand 
     NATO's security blanket there. They believe the vacuum 
     created by the fall of the Soviet Union must be filled by the 
     West. And finally, another reason is the visceral anti-
     Russian feeling that still exists in this country, post-Cold 
     War, * * * Soviet Union. The attitude is that the Russians 
     can't be trusted and this will make it clear that the Iron 
     Curtain will never again be drawn across Eastern Europe.


                     these questions must be faced

       But while some of that thinking is explicable, it doesn't 
     stand up to the tough questions that must be asked about NATO 
     expansion:
       For instance, if the purpose of post-Cold-War foreign 
     policy is to bring the former Soviet bloc nations into a 
     united Europe, why do it through a military alliance instead 
     of a political-economic alliance designed for the future of 
     Europe, namely the European Union? NATO, by its very nature 
     if threatening to Russia.
       For instance, if NATO expands to include these three 
     countries, what is the next step? Romania and Slovenia? 
     Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia? Ukraine? Where to draw the 
     line? And what effect will moving NATO's boundaries next to 
     Russia have on Russia's foreign policy and its attitude 
     toward the West?
       For instance, is it really a wise policy to humiliate 
     Russia, especially when doing so provides no clear gain for 
     U.S. policy. The United States and its allies promised that 
     NATO's borders would not be moved eastward when Moscow agreed 
     to the peaceful unification of Germany. How can this action, 
     then, be justified? Is it right to say the promise need not 
     hold because the USSR no longer exists and the West won the 
     Cold War? Russia simply isn't in a position to stop the West 
     from strutting.
       For instance, to what extent has the threat of NATO 
     expansion already contributed to a deterioration of relations 
     with Russia? In dealings with Iraq? In the Balkans? On the 
     critical issue of eliminating Russia's weapons of mass 
     destruction--nuclear, chemical and biological? One of 
     Russia's top security experts, Alexei Arbatov, who has 
     championed cooperation with the West, recently wrote that, in 
     Russia, NATO expansion is seen as a defeat for the policy of 
     broad cooperation with the West. He said: ``NATO expansion 
     will plant a permanent seed of mistrust between the United 
     States and Russia. It will worsen existing differences on 
     everything from nuclear arms control to policies in Iraq 
     and Iran. It will push Moscow into alliances with China, 
     India and rogue regimes. And it will move America toward 
     unilateral actions, disregarding the interests and 
     positions of other states.''
       For instance, what happens if NATO takes in just the three 
     nations and then stops expanding, as some senators have 
     suggested. Won't that result in a new division of Europe? 
     Wouldn't it be a tacit signal that those not part of NATO are 
     within a Russian sphere of influence? To counter that, will 
     NATO be compelled to continue expanding east, right up to 
     Russia's borders? Would that move set Washington on a 
     collision course with the European members of NATO who 
     strongly oppose further expansion? If it is important to 
     bring Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO now, 
     why can't the same argument be made of Lithuania, Latvia and 
     Estonia? They, after all, border Russia.
       For instance, do the American people really understand that 
     this is a treaty commitment to defend these nations of 
     Eastern Europe as if an attack on any one of them is an 
     attack on the mainland of the United States? And if the 
     country is not absolutely serious about such an obligation, 
     as some fear, what does that do to the credibility of NATO 
     and the United States?
       For instance, what will expansion cost? the administration 
     recently estimated the total cost would be $1.5 billion. But 
     only last year the estimate was $27 billion to $35 billion. 
     Has the Senate asked how the administration came to shrink 
     its estimate 96 percent, especially in light of the 
     Congressional Budget Office's estimate of $125 billion? the 
     Europeans have already indicated they will not share in the 
     cost of expanding NATO. And does it make any sense for the 
     emerging economies of the Eastern European states to increase 
     defense spending? Isn't that the last thing their economies 
     need?
       And, most important of all, if everybody agrees the goal is 
     the long-term independence, freedom and stability of the 
     former Soviet bloc nations, isn't the most important 
     historical variable the success or failure of democracy in 
     Russia? Indeed, isn't that the single most important foreign-
     policy question for the United States and its allies in the 
     coming years? And, if that is so, why take any steps now that 
     would undercut the

[[Page S2277]]

     position of the pro-democracy forces in Russia and play into 
     the hands of the ultranationalists and xenophobes? Russia, by 
     almost all estimates, is in such bad military shape now that 
     it could not threaten its neighbors for seven to 10 years. If 
     things go badly, there will be time to take steps to protect 
     Eastern Europe. But what is the rush? Albright reassures us 
     that the Russians don't really mind. Does anybody really 
     believe that is the case?


                one answer: wait until they join the eu

       If voting against NATO enlargement is too heavy a political 
     lift, New York's senior senator, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, has 
     offered an amendment that would delay NATO expansion until 
     these nations first are voted in as members of the European 
     Union. That is a commonsense proposal, first suggested by a 
     bipartisan group of foreign-policy experts including former 
     Sens. Sam Nunn and Howard Baker and retired Gen. Brent 
     Scowcroft, the national security advisor to both Presidents 
     Gerald Ford and George Bush. Moynihan correctly asks what is 
     the need to rush into such an important and consequential 
     decision.
       The answer to Moynihan's question is simple: There is no 
     reason to rush into expanding NATO. The U.S. Senate shouldn't 
     be acting until it has a much better grasp of how all those 
     questions can be answered.
                                                                    ____


                [From the New York Times, Oct. 21, 1997]

                          NATO's True Mission

              (By Warren Christopher and William J. Perry)

       Fifty years ago Secretary of State George Marshall called 
     upon the people of the United States to contribute to the 
     building of a new Europe ``united in freedom, peace, and 
     prosperity.'' Succeeding generations of Americans rallied in 
     support of Marshall's vision, electing leaders who were 
     committed to fostering and maintaining the strongest possible 
     ties between America and Europe's democracies, both old and 
     new.
       The most important expression of this commitment has been 
     the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. And, we believe, NATO 
     still has that central responsibility even though the 
     political and military circumstances that prevail in Europe 
     have changed.
       It is true that the alliance has achieved its original 
     military mission, having deterred attack from the Warsaw 
     Pact. But that was never its only role. It was given that 
     task in the context of General Marshall's much larger 
     vision--of a democratic Europe committed to working together 
     instead of against itself, with the unflagging involvement of 
     the United States as the ultimate guarantor of that spirit of 
     cooperation.
       The United States must continue to play this role as 
     democratic Europe itself enlarges, and this is why a Senate 
     vote against enlargement of NATO would be a major mistake.
       But it is also time to move beyond the enlargement debate. 
     Adding new members is not the only, or even the most 
     important, debate over the alliance's future. A much larger 
     issue looms: What is the alliance's purpose?
       The alliance needs to adapt its military strategy to 
     today's reality: the danger to the security of its members is 
     not primarily potential aggression to their collective 
     territory, but threats to their collective interests beyond 
     their territory. Shifting the alliance's emphasis from 
     defense of members' territory to defense of common interests 
     is the strategic imperative.
       These threats include the proliferation of weapons of mass 
     destruction, disruption of the flow of oil, terrorism, 
     genocidal violence and wars of aggression in other regions 
     that threaten to create great disruption.
       To deal with such threats, alliance members need to have a 
     way to rapidly form military coalitions that can accomplish 
     goals beyond NATO territory. This concept is not new. Such a 
     ``coalition of the willing'' made up the Implementation Force 
     in Bosnia under alliance command and control, and another 
     made up the war-fighting force in Desert Storm, which drew 
     heavily on alliance training and procedures.
       Such coalitions will include some--but not necessarily 
     all--NATO members, and will generally include non-members 
     from the Partnership for Peace program, the alliance's 
     program of training the militaries of the former warsaw Pact. 
     In both the Persian Gulf war and in Bosnia, the coalitions 
     did not include NATO members alone. So the distinction 
     between full membership and partnership promises to be less 
     important in the alliance of the future.
       The decision to use the alliance's forces beyond NATO 
     territory would require a unanimous decision of its members, 
     including the United States. That is the answer to those who 
     fear that such troops might be deployed imprudently on far-
     flung missions to other continents.
       Defense of members' territory would remain a solemn 
     commitment of the Allies, of course. But such territory is 
     not now threatened, nor is it likely to be in the foreseeable 
     future.
       What should NATO do with, and about, the Russians? An 
     evolution in the alliance's focus and forces from defense of 
     territory to defense of common interests would signal to 
     Russian skeptics that NATO had moved beyond its original 
     purpose of containing Moscow. Moreover, Russian military 
     leaders can well understand the alliance's shift from the 
     large static deployments of the cold war to smaller, more 
     mobile forces. They are trying to do the same in their own 
     program of military reform. They have a strong incentive to 
     carry out such reforms in cooperation with other partners.
       The NATO-Russia Founding Act, which provides the framework 
     for the new alliance and the new Russia to work together, is 
     an important step toward forging a productive relationship 
     between the two. Putting the act's political provisions into 
     practice will require responsible actions on both sides. But 
     the Founding Act's military provisions are less problematic 
     and more important. They offer tangible benefits to both 
     sides in the short and long term.
       The objective of these provisions should be permanent, 
     institutionalized military relationships modeled on those 
     forged in Bosnia, where NATO and Russian soldiers have served 
     shoulder to shoulder. As has happened before in the alliance, 
     such cooperation changes attitudes by creating shared 
     positive experiences to supplant the memory of dedicated 
     antagonism. It also engages a critical constituency in the 
     formation of the new Eurasian security order: the Russian 
     military. Practical cooperation dealing with real-world 
     problems of mutual concern is more important than meetings 
     and councils.
       And what should the alliance do about other countries 
     seeking admission? It should remain open to membership to all 
     states of the Partnership for Peace, subject to their ability 
     to meet the stringent requirements for admission. But no 
     additional members should be designated for admission until 
     the three countries now in the NATO queue are fully prepared 
     to bear the responsibilities of membership and have been 
     fully integrated into the alliance military and political 
     structures.
       What about the alliance's relations with other non-member 
     states? The security concerns of most countries of Eastern 
     Europe and the former Soviet Union will be addressed outside 
     the context of NATO membership. But the alliance and the 
     United States must play a crucial role. Partnership for Peace 
     should receive attention comparable to that accorded to 
     enlargement. In particular, the partnership should receive 
     substantially more financing from alliance members. 
     Partnership for Peace countries should be as capable of 
     working with NATO as NATO members are.
       The alliance must also devote time, attention and resources 
     to its relations with Ukraine, now formalized through the 
     NATO-Ukraine Charter, and continue its strong support of 
     regional military cooperation among partnership members.
       We well understand that some of the ideas we are advancing 
     go beyond tradition. But to resist change because change 
     entails risk is not only short-sighted but also dangerous.
       One thing is clear. Neither the American public nor the 
     citizenry of its allies will continue to support an 
     alliance--enlarged or unenlarged--that appears to focus on 
     nonexistent threats of aggression in Europe. For NATO to 
     succeed, it must develop the ability to respond to today's 
     security needs.
       Leadership requires vision. It also entails determination, 
     persistence, and having the courage of one's convictions. 
     George Marshall understood what it meant to lead. So must we.

                               Exhibit 1

                                                    U.S. Congress,


                                  Congressional Budget Office,

                                   Washington, DC, March 17, 1998.
     Hon. Jesse Helms,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
     prepared the enclosed cost estimate for the Resolution of 
     Ratification of Treaty Document 104-36.
       If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
     pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Jeannette 
     Deshong.
           Sincerely,
                                                  June E. O'Neill,
                                                         Director.
       Enclosure.


               congressional budget office cost estimate

     Resolution of Ratification of Treaty Document 105-36 
         (Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on 
         Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic)
       Summary: The resolution would ratify protocols to the North 
     Atlantic Treaty of 1949 that would admit Poland, Hungary, and 
     the Czech Republic as members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
     Organization (NATO). Expanding the alliance would require the 
     United States to contribute additional funding for equipment 
     or capabilities shared by members of NATO. CBO estimates that 
     those costs would initially be in the tens of millions of 
     dollars and would reach about $100 million a year after four 
     or five years. Ultimately, the United States and its NATO 
     allies have considerable discretion in how to implement the 
     protocols and, therefore, in the costs that would be 
     incurred.
       Estimated cost to the Federal Government: On December 16, 
     1997, the United States and the other parties to the North 
     Atlantic Treaty signed protocols to expand NATO to include 
     three new members. Article V of the treaty commits each 
     nation to provide assistance--including the use of armed 
     force--to restore and maintain the security of any threatened 
     member. The protocols, if ratified, would extend full NATO 
     membership to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic 
     including a security guarantee under Article V.

[[Page S2278]]

       In addition to spending for special national needs, NATO 
     members contribute funds for equipment and facilities needed 
     to accomplish common goals. NATO members share the costs of 
     the alliance's spending for civilian and military 
     headquarters, the Airborne Early Warning Force, various 
     science and public information programs, and the NATO 
     Security Investment Program (SIP) that covers common 
     infrastructure projects, communications and air defense 
     systems. Overall totals for the commonly funded budgets 
     are determined collectively, and individual contributions 
     are based on formulas for burden sharing.
       Expanding the alliance would entail greater costs for 
     improving command, control, communications, logistics and 
     infrastructure--primarily the activities covered under SIP. 
     The United States and its NATO allies, however, would have 
     considerable discretion in how to implement the protocols 
     and, therefore, in the costs that would be incurred. For 
     example, standards for facilities, equipment, and training 
     cover a wide range. Depending on what standards NATO sets, 
     the budgetary consequences could vary substantially. 
     Nevertheless, NATO has provided some initial studies that lay 
     out basic military requirements.
       At the December 1997 ministerial meetings, NATO's Senior 
     Resource Board (SRB) presented cost estimates for expansion-
     related projects that would be eligible for common funding. 
     In that report, the SRB identified cost of $1.5 billion for 
     the next ten years. Assuming that current rules for burden 
     sharing would continue under the protocols, the United States 
     would cover 25 percent of those costs, or approximately $40 
     million per year. Similarly, the Department of Defense (DoD) 
     assumes that NATO funding will increase gradually over the 
     next four to five years with U.S. assessments for additional 
     military costs reaching $36 million in 2002.
       CBO's estimate includes an allowance of $25 million a year 
     for the likelihood that U.S. costs would rise as NATO 
     finalizes implementation plans, engineering surveys, and 
     eligibility criteria for common funding. U.S. costs might 
     also be higher if new member countries face difficulties 
     paying for infrastructure or if military plans become more 
     ambitious. In addition, the United States is likely to incur 
     bilateral costs for expanded exercises, training, and 
     programs to incorporate NATO compatible equipment into the 
     Central European militaries. CBO estimates these costs would 
     be low in the near-term but could amount to $30 million to 
     $45 million a year after 2001 based on additional exercise 
     costs for one brigade and two air squadrons every year plus 
     the cost of subsidies for weapons purchases by the new 
     members.
       Thus, CBO estimates that the costs to the United States of 
     expanding NATO would total about $100 million a year after a 
     transition period of four or five years. Roughly 90 percent 
     of these costs would be charged to Defense Department 
     accounts for operation and maintenance, and military 
     construction. The remaining 10 percent would accrue to budget 
     function 150, International Affairs.
       Previous CBO estimate: The CBO paper The Costs of Expanding 
     the NATO Alliance (March 1996) explored five different 
     scenarios for extending the NATO security guarantee to four 
     central European countries. The scenarios ranged from a low-
     threat security environment that called for minimal NATO 
     reinforcement of Central Europe to a scenario assuming a 
     resurgent Russian threat that required the forward 
     positioning of NATO troops in Central Europe.
       The cost estimates in that report focused on the total 
     costs to all NATO members, including the new members who 
     would bear the largest shares of the total. Average annual 
     costs to the United States over a 15-year period ranged from 
     about $300 million to $1.3 billion. However, some CBO 
     prepared that study, the SRB has provided clearer indications 
     of how NATO would use its discretion to implement the 
     protocols.
       Pay-as-you-go considerations: None.
       Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: Section 4 of 
     the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 excludes from the 
     application of that act any legislative provisions that are 
     necessary for the ratification or implementation of 
     international treaty obligations. CBO has determined that 
     these protocols fit within that exclusion, because they make 
     the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary parties to the North 
     Atlantic Treaty of 1949.
       Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Jeannette Deshong. 
     Impact on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Pepper 
     Santalucia. Impact on the Private Sector: Eric Labs.
       Estimate approved by: Paul N. Van de Water, Assistant 
     Director for Budget Analysis.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington.
  Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, half a century ago this year there were 
giants in the land. President Truman, followed by President Eisenhower, 
Senator Vandenberg in this body, others who first envisaged and passed 
the Marshall plan to secure economic freedom and prosperity in Western 
Europe and then to create the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to 
provide physical security behind which the nations of Western Europe 
could build free and prosperous societies. Those giants were followed 
by dozens, perhaps hundreds, of Members of this body who kept the 
faith--my predecessor, Scoop Jackson, from the State of Washington; 
Presidents down through and including Ronald Reagan and George Bush. 
And I come to the floor today astounded at opposition to this extension 
and to any other extension to free nations, so astounded that by 
comparison with those giants, I am reminded of Casius' description of 
Julius Caesar in Shakespeare's great play, when we are asked to live up 
to his description of:

       . . . we petty men
       Walk under his huge legs and peep about
       To find ourselves dishonorable graves.
  Because of the vision of those men and those women and, for that 
matter, of the United States of America and our allies in Western 
Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization became the most 
successful single defense organization, security organization, in the 
history of the world. Its ultimate dreams came true both earlier and 
more completely than any of its founders could possibly have imagined 
when they put it together and brought the American people into it.
  It was a treaty that joined together not just allies in World War II, 
but joined those allies together with their principal enemies in World 
War II, Germany and Italy, in the feeling that if they were together, 
the kind of breakdown that took place in the years leading up to 1914 
and, again, up to 1939 would be much less likely to take place.
  During that entire period of time, there was a line, a north-south 
line, through Central Europe: oppression and dictatorship and economic 
stagnation to the east; freedom, security and prosperity to the west. 
Not once in its most powerful days did the Soviet Union ever cross that 
line and not at all, incidentally--not once--during all those years did 
the Western powers with their military force cross that line to the 
east. It was a shield, a carapace behind which freedom could develop.
  But the dream of that freedom was not limited to those within the 
organization to the west of that line. It activated, it inspired men 
and women east of the line to be like the people of the West, to join 
the people of the West, tremendously costly to many of them.
  When the people of Hungary attempted to liberate themselves from that 
Soviet tyranny, they were brutally repressed by Soviet tanks. When the 
people of the Czech Republic, in the beginning of those years, 
attempted even a modest measure of freedom, they were repressed by 
Soviet tanks, and those tanks spent the better part of half a century 
in Poland absolutely to ensure that the liberty-loving people of Poland 
were not able to exercise that liberty or to have a government that was 
truly their own.
  Then wonder of wonders, in a very few short years, symbolized a 
little less than a decade ago by the destruction of the Berlin Wall, 
those nations and others became free nations. They began to realize 
their aspirations, and in the case of those three, each one, in a short 
period of time of less than a decade, has become a functioning 
democracy, has made a major beginning in reforming its armed services, 
has moved decisively in the direction of free markets and has begun the 
long, long journey to catch up with the West economically, but catch up 
with the West in spirit it has.
  What do those nations desire? They desire the security that history 
has never given them, that their own independent power has never given 
them. They desire to be a part of the West, lock, stock and barrel, and 
they see the essential element of being western to be members of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. They know, they have learned from 
history, that that membership, and that membership alone, will ensure 
that they can continue the freedom which is still so young in them and 
continue the move toward prosperity and toward Western institutions, 
and that we, who not only spent trillions of dollars in preserving the 
free world through our armed services, but hundreds of millions, 
billions of dollars in broadcasting to these countries the message of 
freedom and the, at least implicit and I think often explicit, promise 
that the day would come when they could be lock, stock and barrel a 
part of the West, are now asked by, hopefully, not much more than a 
handful of the Members in this

[[Page S2279]]

body, to reject them, to say that somehow or another, there will be 
more security in a vacuum in Eastern and Central Europe than there will 
be with the very kind of precise line that the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization drew so decisively and so successfully half a century ago.

  But nothing, Mr. President, nothing in the history of nations in this 
world indicates that a vacuum filled by small and weak powers can 
possibly be stable, can possibly be the object of anything other than 
irredentist aspirations on the part of one of the two nations that 
throughout its history has been the most aggressive in destroying the 
freedom of those countries.
  Germany, now totally integrated into the West, no longer a threat, 
but no longer a threat to France because they are joined together, and 
is soon to be no longer a threat to Poland or to Hungary or to the 
Czech Republic, because they will be joined together.
  The case for NATO expansion is simply overwhelming. It is stunning to 
me that we are so much as debating its desirability in this body and 
stunning to me that essentially the only reason for opposition to it is 
that the most truculent element left in Russia, its Duma, dominated by 
former Communists, those portions of its leadership that are most 
unwilling to give up what they have had previously, most desirous to 
restore the status quo ante-1989, will be offended if these countries 
are brought into alliance with the United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, Germany and the other members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization.
  Mr. President, that is the best reason to join those countries with 
us. Far better to do it when there is no immediate threat from the East 
than when there is, when, I can assure you, the kind of opposition you 
have heard here today would be much louder than it is today.
  I think it is appropriate to go beyond the naming of these three 
nations. One of the most principled actions in American diplomatic 
history, in my view, was the absolute refusal for more than half a 
century on the part of the United States to recognize the Soviet 
conquest of the three Baltic republics. We, and almost we alone, 
continued to recognize their right to independence, and one can 
certainly make the proposition that it was the desire and the movement 
for independence in those three countries that was the immediate and 
proximate cause of the collapse of the Soviet Union itself.
  I believe, Mr. President--I believe firmly--that any nation that 
adopts secure and democratic institutions, a free-market approach to 
its economy and a Western-oriented means of defense, has the right 
seriously to be considered in this part of Europe for membership in the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Personally, I believe that both 
Slovenia and Estonia have already met those qualifications. Other 
nations have not yet, though most of them strive in that direction.
  Again, to crush their aspirations, legitimate aspirations, 
aspirations that we have supported for more than half a century, by an 
arbitrary statement that they will not be considered for membership for 
a fixed period of time, no matter how successful they are, no matter 
how democratic they are, no matter how much they may be threatened by 
some future Russia in that period of time, is perverse and wrong and, 
even more significant, dangerous to the peace of Europe and to the 
peace of the world.
  A bright line is a much greater contributor to peace than a vague set 
of feelings or concerns or worries about the least regressive elements 
in Russian society. Just as a democratic and a free-market Germany 
appropriately became a pillar of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, so at some future date could a secure and stable and 
democratic and free-market Russia.
  I think that day is a long way off, much farther than I would like. 
But until that day, to say that others who have met those 
qualifications, who have had to live through occupation and repression 
from that country, should be left on their own flies in the face of all 
of the lessons of history that we have learned since the end of World 
War II.
  So, Mr. President, I believe that we should reject soundly the 
Warner-Moynihan pause proposal and enthusiastically and overwhelmingly 
adopt the resolution of ratification that we have before us.
  The cold war resulted in a victory for the ideals of the United 
States and its Western allies. And it should be consolidated by joining 
with it those who share those ideals, those who fought for those 
ideals, often to their very great detriment over the course of the last 
century.
  The position taken by my distinguished friend from Delaware is 
totally and entirely correct. I congratulate him for it. I am convinced 
that we should go forward boldly into the future with the greatest 
degree of confidence in the correctness of our cause and only in that 
fashion will we be worthy of our predecessors in this body who created 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I rise to request that my 
colleagues in the Senate conduct deliberative and thorough debate on 
NATO expansion before the expected vote next week.
  Many questions remain regarding cost, strategic objective and 
military requirements of the proposed expansion. If NATO enlargement 
makes sense, it will make more sense the more it is discussed. We 
should not casually rush through debate in the Senate.
  This should not be a sentimental decision about our historic 
relationship with Europe, but a hard-nosed decision about extending a 
military guarantee to a precise piece of territory under current 
strategic circumstances. Our moral obligation to these countries was 
abundantly met by generations of Americans, who spent trillions of 
dollars to win the cold war. This decision should be about the next 50 
years, not the last 50.
  For this reason, I ask unanimous consent that several editorials and 
articles about the impact of NATO expansion be printed in the Record 
for the benefit of all Senators.
  There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Post, Mar. 19, 1998]

                       Foreign Policy by Impulse

                           (By Jim Hoagland)

       The U.S. Senate is moving in haste toward a climactic vote 
     on NATO expansion, a foreign policy initiative that defines 
     the Clinton administration's approach to the world as one of 
     strategic promiscuity and impulse. The Senate should not join 
     in that approach.
       Foreign policy is the grand abstraction of American 
     presidents. They strive to bargain big, or not at all, on the 
     world stage. They feel more free there than they do at home 
     to dream, to emote, to rise or fall on principled positions, 
     or to stab others in the back at a time of their choosing.
       More able to ignore the niggling daily bargains that blur 
     and bend their domestic policies, presidents treat foreign 
     policy as the realm in which they express their essence and 
     personality most directly.
       Think in a word, or two, of our recent presidents and U.S. 
     foreign policy in their day: Johnson's word would be 
     overreaching. Nixon, paranoid. Carter, delusionally trusting. 
     Reagan, sunnily simplistic. Bush, prudent technician.
       NATO expansion is the Clintonites' most vaunted 
     contribution to diplomacy, and they characteristically assert 
     they can have it all, when they want, without paying any 
     price. Do it, the president told the Senate leadership Monday 
     in a letter asking for an immediate vote. Others will later 
     clean up messy strategic details such as the mission an 
     expanded NATO will have and who else may join.
       Sound familiar? Yes, in part because all administrations 
     advance this argument: Trust us. This will turn out all 
     right. Russians will learn that NATO expansion is good for 
     them. The French will not be able to use expansion to dilute 
     U.S. influence over Europe, try as they may. This will cost 
     American taxpayers only a penny or two a day. And so on, on a 
     number of debatable points that I think will work out quite 
     differently than the administration claims.
       But there is also a familiarity of style here distinctive 
     to this president and those closest to him. And why not? The 
     all-embracing, frantic, gargantuan lifestyle that has allowed 
     those other affairs of state--the Lewinsky, Willey, Jones 
     allegations--to become the talk of the world (justifiably or 
     otherwise) also surfaces in major policy matters. The Senate 
     vote on NATO is not occurring in a vacuum.
       Life is not neatly compartmentalized. The paranoia and 
     conspiracy that enveloped the Nixon White House manifested 
     itself in the bombing of Hanoi and the overthrow of Chilean 
     President Salvador Allende as well as in Watergate. The Great 
     Society and Vietnam were not conflicting impulses for Lyndon 
     Johnson, as is often assumed, but different sides of the same 
     overreaching coin. The lack of perspective and deliberation 
     apparent in the handling of NATO expansion is apparent 
     elsewhere in the Clinton White House.

[[Page S2280]]

       On the issue at hand, the White House is urging the Senate 
     to amend the NATO charter to admit the Czech Republic, 
     Hungary and Poland. Majority Leader Trent Lott responded to 
     Clinton's letter by saying he would schedule a vote in a few 
     days, despite appeals from 16 senators for more, and more 
     focused, discussion.
       Clinton opposes any more debate, even though he has not 
     addressed the American public on this historic step and even 
     though there is no consensus in the United States or within 
     the 16-member alliance on the strategic mission of an 
     expanded NATO or on its future membership.
       A new ``strategic concept'' for NATO will not be publicly 
     reached until April 1999, when it is to be unveiled at a 50th 
     anniversary summit in Washington. When Secretary of State 
     Madeleine Albright recently said in Brussels that NATO would 
     evolve into ``a force for peace from the Middle East to 
     Central Africa,'' European foreign ministers quickly signaled 
     opposition to such a radical expansion of the alliance's 
     geographical area of responsibility.
       And Albright's deputy, Strobe Talbott, surprised some 
     European ambassadors to Washington last week when he gave a 
     ringing endorsement to the possibility of eventual Russian 
     membership in NATO, an idea that divides NATO governments and 
     which the administration has not highlighted for the Senate.
       ``I regard Russia as a peaceful democratic state that is 
     undergoing one of the most arduous transitions in history,'' 
     Talbott said in response to a question asked at a symposium 
     at the British Embassy. He said Clinton strongly supported 
     the view that ``no emerging democracy should be excluded 
     because of size, geopolitical situation or historical 
     experience. That goes for very small states, such as the 
     Baltics, and it goes for the very largest, that is for 
     Russia.'' This is a message that Clinton has given Boris 
     Yeltsin in their private meetings, Talbott emphasized.
       ``This is a classic case of never saying never,'' Talbott 
     continued. ``If the day comes when this happens, it will be a 
     very different Russia, a very different Europe and a very 
     different NATO.''
       How different, and in what ways, is worth discussing before 
     the fact. The Clinton administration has not taken seriously 
     its responsibility to think through the consequences of its 
     NATO initiative and to explain those consequences to the 
     American people. The Senate needs an extended debate, not an 
     immediate vote.
                                                                    ____


         [From the Hill, Mar. 18, 1998] NATO: What's the Rush?

       There's an unseemly haste in the way the Clinton 
     administration and the foreign policy establishment are 
     pushing the Senate for an immediate vote on expanding the 
     North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to include Poland, 
     Hungary and the Czech Republic.
       As a bipartisan group of 17 senators argued in a letter 
     urging Majority Leader Trent Lott (R) of Mississippi to 
     postpone the vote until at least June 1, there are still to 
     many unanswered questions about what figures to be one of the 
     most important foreign policy issues in recent years.
       ``We are uncomfortable voting when so many of the purposes 
     and assumptions of NATO enlargement remain either ambiguous 
     or contradictory,'' the senators wrote Lott last week. The 
     group of eight Republicans and nine Democrats, let by Bob 
     Smith (R-N.H.) and Tom Harkin (D-Iowa), pointed out that 
     expanding the NATO military alliance to include the three 
     former Communist countries could have enormous unforseen 
     financial, political and military consequences.
       ``This is basic, hard-nosed American foreign policy here,'' 
     Smith told The New York Times as he explained why he and his 
     colleagues are seeking to delay a vote, which was expected in 
     the next few days, and force an extended public debate on the 
     issue. ``It deserves that attention,'' he added.
       Some of the unforeseen consequences of a rush to judgment 
     on NATO expansion are spelled out on page 40 by Ted Galen 
     Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy 
     studies at the libertarian Cato Institute. According to 
     Galen, ``three lethal booby traps await the United States if 
     NATO expansion goes forward. ``They include potential 
     conflicts between Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic and 
     their neighbors; damaging our relationship with Russia and 
     driving it into the arms of Iran, Iraq and China; and 
     committing the United States to pouring money down ``a 
     financial black hole.''
       The latter point is one of the most critical, according to 
     those who either oppose expansion or want to see it more 
     fully debated. The Clinton administration has estimated that 
     the cost of expanding the alliance will be $1.5 billion over 
     the next decade, but earlier estimates range from $27 billion 
     to $35 billion over 13 years (the Pentagon) and from $61 
     billion to $125 billion over 15 years (the Congressional 
     Budget Office). The fact is that more accurate and realistic 
     cost projects simply cannot be calculated at this time.
       The administration's $1.5 billion projection ``is a 
     politically driven document that reflects the inability of 
     the proposed new members and the unwillingness of the West 
     European countries to pick up the real financial tab,'' 
     Carpenter asserts.
       We agree with Carpenter and the Senate's go-slow faction, 
     including Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.), who thinks 
     that there is no quick fix for healing the wounds inflicted 
     on Central and Eastern Europe by a half century of harsh 
     authoritarian Soviet rule.
       Rather than adding three former Communist countries to an 
     organization that was conceived as a military barrier to the 
     spread of communism in Europe--a dubious proposition now that 
     such a threat no longer exists--Moynihan would like to see 
     them first become members of the economically oriented 
     European Union before being admitted to NATO.
       Lott should delay the vote on NATO expansion and give the 
     Senate time to conduct a full and extended debate on this 
     important issue.
                                                                    ____


                     [From the Hill, Mar. 18, 1998]

                The Three Booby Traps of NATO Expansion

                        (By Ted Galen Carpenter)

       Both the Clinton administration and the Senate Republican 
     leadership are using a full-court press to get an immediate 
     Senate vote on NATO expansion. Senators should resist such 
     pressure for a rush to judgment before addressing the 
     numerous problems associated with NATO expansion.
       Proponents frequently act as through NATO is a democratic 
     honor society that the nations of Central and Eastern Europe 
     should be able to join. But NATO is a military alliance, and 
     the decision to extend U.S. security guarantees to new 
     members is serious business.
       Three lethal booby traps await the United States if NATO 
     expansion goes forward.
       Any enemy of my ally becomes my enemy: Before senators 
     welcome Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary into NATO's 
     ranks, they should assess potential conflicts that might 
     embroil those countries. It would be a sobering exercise. 
     Relations between Poland and neighboring Belarus, already 
     tense, are rapidly deteriorating. Belarus recently recalled 
     its ambassador from Warsaw and has banned Polish priests from 
     entering the country. President Alexander Lukashenko 
     ominously accuses the Polish minority in Belarus's western 
     provinces of disloyalty.
       Hungary has troubled relations with three of its 
     neighbors--Romania, Slovakia and Serbia. Slovakia's prime 
     minister continuously slanders the large Hungarian minority 
     in his country and late last year proposed a population 
     transfer that would send tens of thousands of ethnic 
     Hungarians back to Hungary.
       Relations between Hungary and Serbia are even worse. 
     Indeed, the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Serbia's 
     province of Vojvodina mirrors Belgrade's repression of the 
     Albanians in Kosovo. Vojvodina has the potential to explode 
     just as Kosovo has now done.
       Thus, NATO expansion could entangle America in numerous 
     murky, parochial disputes among Central and East European 
     countries. Do Americans really want U.S. troops in the middle 
     of a conflict between Hungary and Slovakia, or Hungary and 
     Serbia, or Poland and Belarus? Yet NATO expansion entails 
     precisely that sort of danger.
       Poisoning the relationship with Russia: The conventional 
     wisdom is that, since the signing of the Founding Act between 
     Russia and NATO, Moscow no longer opposes NATO expansion. 
     Nothing could be further from the truth. A recent op-ed by 
     Russia's ambassador to the United States makes it clear that 
     Russian leaders regard even the first round of expansion as 
     an unfriendly act. Any subsequent round, especially one that 
     tried to incorporate the Baltic republics, would risk a 
     military collision with a nuclear-armed great power.
       Indeed, the Founding Act itself could become a source of 
     recrimination. U.S. officials insist that the agreement gives 
     Russia ``a voice, not a veto'' over NATO policy, but that is 
     not the way Russian officials have interpreted the Founding 
     Act. President Boris Yeltsin assured the Duma that the act 
     gave Russia a veto over invitations to new members beyond the 
     first round as well as over future ``out of area'' NATO 
     missions, for example in the Balkans. U.S. and Russian 
     officials cannot both be right.
       Russia is reacting badly even to the initial round of 
     expansion. Moscow has responded to NATO's encroachment by 
     forging closer ties with both Iran and Iraq and undermining 
     U.S. policy throughout the Middle East. Still more worrisome 
     are the growing political and military links between Russia 
     and China. Moscow and Beijing speak openly of a ``strategic 
     partnership,'' and China has become Russia's largest arms 
     customer--something that would have been unthinkable a few 
     years ago.
       If the United States drifts into a new Cold War with Russia 
     because Washington insists on giving security guarantees to a 
     collection of small Central and East European states, that 
     will go down in history as a colossal policy blunder.
       A financial black hole: NATO and the Clinton administration 
     now insist that the alliance can be expanded for a paltry 
     $1.5 billion over 10 years. That conclusion differs sharply 
     from an earlier Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimate of 
     $61 billion to $125 billion over 15 years and the Pentagon's 
     own original estimate of $27 billion to $35 billion over 13 
     years. The latest NATO and administration projection doesn't 
     even pass the straightface test. It is a politically driven 
     document that reflects the inability of the proposed new 
     members and the unwillingness of the West European countries 
     to pick up the real financial tab.

[[Page S2281]]

       Johns Hopkins University Professor Michael Mandelbaum aptly 
     describes NATO expansion as ``the mother of all unfunded 
     mandates.'' If expansion is not merely an exercise in empty 
     political symbolism, even the CBO estimate could prove to be 
     conservative. Moreover, none of the estimates takes into 
     account the probable costs of subsequent rounds of expansion, 
     yet administration leaders insist that they will occur.
       In light of those troubling facts, the Senate should at 
     least conduct a lengthy, comprehensive debate on NATO 
     expansion, not rush through the proceedings as if the issue 
     was akin to designating National Wildflower Week. After all, 
     the decision may determine whether American troops someday 
     have to fight and die in Eastern Europe.
                                                                    ____


                 [From the Boston Globe, Mar. 18, 1998]

                      Senate Recklessness on NATO?

       The Senate is poised to make a serious mistake by ratifying 
     a first stage of NATO expansion. The anticipated inclusion of 
     Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic is a momentous 
     decision, enlarging the treaty organization and the 
     geopolitical area covered by the allies' mutual security 
     guarantee. If ever a Senate vote deserved prudent 
     deliberation, this is it.
       Unfortunately, sensible requests from some senators to 
     pause for careful consideration of this first round of 
     enlargement have been rejected, and there are not enough 
     votes to pass an amendment by Senators John Warner of 
     Virginia and Patrick Moynihan of New York, who proposed a 
     pause of three years before NATO admits a second flight of 
     new members.
       In a letter to the Senate minority leader, Tom Daschle, on 
     Saturday, President Clinton argued that for the sake of 
     enhanced security, ``we must leave the door open to the 
     addition of other qualified new members in the future. The 
     `open door' commitment made by all the allies has played a 
     vital role in ensuring that the process of enlargement 
     benefits the security of the entire region, not just these 
     first three members.''
       But the administration has yet to make a convincing case 
     that NATO enlargement at the present time is truly necessary 
     to European or American security. With the disappearance of 
     the Soviet Union, the states of Central and Eastern Europe 
     face no imminent threat from an expansionist superpower. And 
     if political upheavals in Russia raised the specter of such a 
     threat in the future, there would be time to prepare for it 
     and enlarge the alliance. NATO's expansion, rather than 
     enhancing Europe's stability, could endanger it.
       President Vaclav Havel of the Czech Republic has made a 
     strong case for anchoring the former members of the Warsaw 
     Pact in the West. But the commonality of values invoked by 
     Havel need not mean immediate inclusion in a military 
     alliance formed to keep Soviet forces from invading Western 
     Europe.
       There are other, wiser ways to pursue what Clinton calls 
     ``our strategic goal of building an undivided, democratic, 
     and peaceful Europe.''
                                                                    ____


                   [From the Newark (NJ) Star-Ledger]

                     Undue Haste on NATO Expansion

                           (By David Border)

       This week the Senate, which counts among its major 
     accomplishments this year renaming Washington National 
     Airport for President Ronald Reagan and officially labeling 
     Saddam Hussein a war criminal, takes up the matter of 
     enlarging the 20th century's most successful military 
     alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
       The Senate just spent two weeks arguing over how to slice 
     up the pork in the $214 billion highway and mass transit 
     bill. It will, if plans hold, spend only a few days on moving 
     the NATO shield hundreds of miles eastward to include Poland, 
     Hungary and the Czech Republic.
       The reason is simple. As Sen. Connie Mack of Florida, the 
     chairman of the Senate Republican Conference, told me while 
     trying to herd reluctant senators into a closed-door 
     discussion of the NATO issue one afternoon last week, ``No 
     one is interested in this at home,'' so few of his colleagues 
     think it worth much of their time.
       It is a cliche to observe that since the Cold War ended, 
     foreign policy has dropped to the bottom of voters' concerns. 
     But as two of the senators who question the wisdom of NATO's 
     expansion, Democrat Daniel Moynihan of New York and 
     Republican John Warner of Virginia, remarked in separate 
     interviews, serious consideration of treaties and military 
     alliances once was considered what the Senate was for. No 
     longer.
       Wrapping the three former Soviet satellites in the warm 
     embrace of NATO is an appealing notion to many senators, 
     notwithstanding the acknowledgement by advocates that the 
     Czech Republic and Hungary have a long way to go to bring 
     their military forces up to NATO standards. As the date for 
     ratification has approached, estimates of the costs to NATO 
     have been shrinking magically, but the latest NATO estimate 
     of $1.5 billion over the next decade is barely credible.
       The administration, in the person of Secretary of State 
     Madeleine Albright, has refused to say what happens next if 
     NATO starts moving eastward toward the border of Russia. 
     ``The door is open'' to other countries with democratic 
     governments and free markets, Albright says. The 
     administration is fighting an effort by Warner and others to 
     place a moratorium on admission of additional countries until 
     it is known how well the first recruits are assimilated.
       Moynihan points out that if the Baltic countries of Latvia, 
     Estonia and Lithuania, which are panting for membership, are 
     brought in, the United States and other signatories will have 
     a solemn obligation to defend territory farther east than the 
     western-most border of Russia. He points to a Russian 
     government strategy paper published last December saving the 
     expansion of NATO inevitably means Russia will have to rely 
     increasingly on nuclear weapons.
       Moynihan and Warner are far from alone in raising alarms 
     about the effect of NATO enlargement on U.S.-Russian 
     relations. The Duma, Russia's parliament, on Jan. 23 passed a 
     resolution calling NATO expansion the biggest threat to 
     Russia since the end of World War II. The Duma has blocked 
     ratification of the START II nuclear arms agreement signed in 
     1993 and approved by the Senate two years ago.
       George Kennan, the elder statesman who half a century ago 
     devised the fundamental strategy for ``containment'' of the 
     Soviet Union, has called the enlargement of NATO a classic 
     policy blunder. Former Sen. Sam Nunn of Georgia, until his 
     retirement last year the Democrats' and the Senate's leading 
     military authority, told me, ``Russian cooperation in 
     avoiding proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is our 
     most important national security objective, and this (NATO 
     expansion) makes them more suspicious and less cooperative.''
       To the extent this momentous step has been debated at all, 
     it has taken place outside the hearing of the American 
     people. Too bad our busy Senate can't find time before it 
     votes to let the public in on the argument.

  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. I know the Senator from Connecticut wishes to speak. I 
will just take 2 minutes here.
  One, I want to make it clear, when I was making a case to my friends 
from Virginia and New York about the comparison of Turkey and Poland, 
it did not relate to whether there was merit in defending Turkey. There 
is. Not only merit, there is an obligation. I was making the larger 
point which goes to the serious issue the Senator from Virginia has 
raised honestly--and the only one who has done it forthrightly so far--
and that is, is there a consensus in America to defend any European 
country?
  Whatever commitment we make, we must keep. And he is right in raising 
the issue: Are the American people--do you all understand, all America, 
that if we expand, we are committing our sacred honor to defend Poland 
as we have Germany, to defend the Czech Republic as we have England, to 
defend the country of Hungary as we have Denmark? Are we prepared to do 
that? That should be discussed, and it should be discussed 
forthrightly. And I thank him for raising that issue.
  There is much more to say, but I will have plenty of chance to say 
it, so I yield to my friend from Connecticut.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. DODD. I see my colleague from Missouri is here. I tell him this 
will be very brief, my remarks. I don't want him to depart. I know he 
has been standing here for some time.
  It is on an unrelated matter that is the subject of this debate, Mr. 
President. And let me just say, having the privilege of standing here 
and listening to the Presiding Officer share his remarks, I commend him 
for those remarks. And I thank my colleague from Delaware for yielding 
here.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning 
business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________