[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 31 (Thursday, March 19, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2251-S2265]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND, 
                    HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       Treaty document 105-36, Protocols to the North Atlantic 
     Treaty of 1949 on Accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
     Republic.

  The Senate resumed consideration of the treaty.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I rise in support of the NATO enlargement 
proposal of including Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. I will 
make a few comments in that regard.
  Many people will say that the cold war is over and then will continue 
to argue that we can now dismantle our defenses and look inward. I 
completely disagree with this assessment. I think that Secretary 
Albright, in testifying before the Armed Services Committee on April 
23, 1997, made the proper statement in relating this to an insurance 
policy, saying ``If you don't see smoke, there is no real reason to 
stop paying for fire insurance.''
  Because of President Reagan and his desire to see the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics put on the ashheap of history, the United States no 
longer faces the threat of the U.S.S.R. But this is no time to be 
complacent. U.S. interests are still being threatened by internal 
political and economic instabilities; the reemergence of ethnic, 
religious, and historic grievances; terrorism; and the proliferation of 
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.
  However, for nearly 50 years, NATO has been the organization which 
has defended the territory of the countries in the North Atlantic area 
against all external threats and today we have an historic opportunity 
to recommit to this security. I believe we must not turn our back on 
this historic opportunity. We must embrace these new market democracies 
and say that the old ways are gone and that we welcome them into the 
free world. Relative peace should not stop us from being engaged for 
peace and freedom. I believe expanding NATO to the Poland, Hungary, and 
Czech Republic is the best way to ensure peace and stability.
  Over the last few decades, much of the United States' focus has been 
on the Middle East, the Far East, and Russia. Throughout history, the 
United States has been closely linked to the stability of Europe. We 
have been through two world wars and one cold war in Europe. However, 
since the formation of NATO, not one major war or aggression has 
occurred against or between member states, except for Argentia's 
invasion of the British Falkland Islands. Adding these three deserving 
countries to NATO can do for all of Europe what it has done for Western 
Europe. It can strengthen emerging democracies, create conditions for 
continued prosperity, assist in preventing local rivalries, diminish 
the need for an arms buildup and destabilizing nationalistic policies, 
and foster common security interests.
  Just as important, enlargement will signal the end of the cold war. 
It will further break down the Stalinistic wall. We will reassure the 
world that these once occupied nations are welcomed free countries. No 
longer will we validate the old lines of Communism but will begin to 
secure the historic gains of democracy in Central Europe. Unlike, the 
Warsaw Pact, these countries are voluntarily wishing to join NATO, 
without the coercion or force from any NATO member.
  Not only will the Stalinist wall be gone, but the acceptance of these 
three countries will positively show that the West will not lock these 
countries out, but will lock in Central Europe's democracies. 
Enlargement will promote multinational defense structures and prevent 
the renationalization of these democracies. Enlargement will fill the 
security vacuum created with the fall of the Soviet Union. If this 
vacuum is not filled, there is concern that the area will begin to 
divide nationalistically and Central Europe could look like the former 
Yugoslavia.
  However, just the possibility of membership into NATO has given these 
countries the incentive to peacefully resolve many of their border 
disputes. Since 1991, there have been 10 major accords settling 
differences and much of this progress is credited to the opportunity to 
join NATO. Even if some of the old disputes arise, NATO membership will 
help keep the peace, just as it has done in relation to the problems 
between NATO members Greece and Turkey. I do not believe the United 
Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the 
European Union, or any other international bodies have the ability to 
keep the peace and promote the stability needed that NATO can bring to 
the area.
  We all know that there has been much concern about the Russian 
response to NATO enlargement. The Russian leaders have been very public 
in their displeasure about enlargement. I believe that this is do in 
part to their misperception that the Alliance poses a threat to 
Russia's security, NATO is not, and never has been an offensive 
alliance. NATO is a defensive alliance only.
  We must respect Russia's concerns. But as my respected predecessor 
Senator Hank Brown has written, ``[W]orking closely with Russia in an 
attempt to allay their concerns makes sense. Slowing or altering NATO 
expansion . . . hands the Russian government a veto pen.'' Like Senator 
Brown,

[[Page S2252]]

I believe that this would be a mistake. An enlarged NATO only promotes 
security and stability in an area of Europe that is vital to Russian 
security. The invited states must clearly know that they are no longer 
``eastern bloc nations'' but an integral of the circle of democratic 
countries.
  Lastly, with any expansion there is a concern about the cost. There 
have been wide ranging estimates. The total amount is estimated at $27 
to $35 billion for all current members and the invitees over 13 years, 
from 1997-2009. A bulk of this cost is to modernize and reform 
militaries and make them operable with NATO. However, with the United 
States already having the world's premier armed forces, the bulk of the 
cost will be incurred by our allies and the three invitees, as they 
upgrade their forces and facilities to meet those standards of the 
United States and NATO.

  With the addition of these countries, the U.S. percentage share of 
the NATO budget will go down, and the resolution before us provides 
that U.S. costs will be kept under control and not be allowed to 
subsidize those members that are not putting forward their share of the 
funds. Adequate defense systems always cost money, but alliances make 
costs more evenly shared through the alliance.
  Let me end with this: NATO enlargement is the Western World's way to 
show that the cold war is over and that we welcome these countries to 
freedom. The new threats we face can only be met by forming new 
alliances to ensure that these democracies do not fall prey to 
nationalistic or terrorist regimes. The Czech Republic, Poland, and 
Hungary, know life without freedom and now deserve the freedom and 
security that only NATO can provide.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I inquire whether we are operating under a 
time limit.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are no limitations on debate.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, I will support the accession of Poland, Hungary, and 
the Czech Republic into NATO. I do so with the realization that this 
represents, in its most basic meaning, a serious commitment by the 
United States to treat an armed attack on any of these nations as an 
attack on the United States.
  NATO has been called the most successful alliance in the history of 
the world. It successfully deterred an attack by the former Soviet 
Union and also, very importantly, it helped to keep the peace among the 
nations of Western Europe. I am convinced that the accession of Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO will help ensure long-term 
stability and peace in Europe and will demonstrate our continuing 
engagement and leadership in transatlantic affairs.
  The inclusion of these three nations that are willing and able to 
defend the common interests will strengthen the alliance. Each of these 
nations provided forces to the United States-led coalition during the 
Persian Gulf war. Their troops are serving with the NATO-led 
stabilization force in Bosnia. Hungary provides a staging and training 
base for U.S. forces in Bosnia. All three are prepared to contribute 
forces to the United States-led force presently deployed in the gulf, 
if that proves necessary. They have, thus, already demonstrated their 
commitment to burdensharing and to be not just consumers of security 
but also contributors to a more secure Europe.
  Most important, I believe that a military invasion of Poland, or 
Hungary, or the Czech Republic would threaten the stability of Europe 
and involve the vital national security interests of the United States. 
All three of these countries have established good relations with their 
neighbors. For example, Poland and Ukraine concluded a declaration of 
reconciliation in December of 1997. Hungary ratified treaties on 
understanding, cooperation, and good neighborliness with Slovakia in 
March of 1995, and with Romania in September of 1996. The Czech 
Republic signed a formal reconciliation pact with Germany in January of 
1997.
  Several issues need to be addressed as part of this momentous debate. 
These issues include the impact that enlargement will have on Russia, 
the commitment of these three nations to the principles of the NATO 
treaty, the cost of NATO enlargement, whether the door to further 
enlargement should remain open after the accession of these three 
nations, and whether the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic should be delayed until they are admitted to the European 
Union.
  First, the impact of enlargement on Russia. I start this with the 
sobering thought that Russia is the only country that could destroy the 
United States. Additionally, although Russia does not today pose a 
conventional threat to NATO, it is a large and resource-rich country, 
whose policies of democratization and movement to a market economy are 
very important to the U.S. and its NATO allies. It is, therefore, an 
important national security interest of the United States to do what we 
reasonably can to ensure that NATO enlargement does not contribute to a 
reversal of Russia's course toward democratization and a market 
economy, nor contribute to a Russian view of the United States as a 
hostile nation.
  In a statement I made at the Armed Services Committee's first hearing 
after NATO's decision to enlarge, a hearing in April of 1997, in which 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Secretary of Defense William 
Cohen testified, I said the following:

       I believe that we must do everything we reasonably can to 
     enlarge NATO in a way that contributes to a greater, rather 
     than less, stability in Europe. How we enlarge NATO is 
     critically important, along with whether we enlarge NATO, 
     since we do not want to contribute to the very instability 
     that NATO enlargement is aimed at deterring.

  Now, in May of 1997--and what is important is that this came 
subsequent to NATO's decision to expand--Russia's President, Boris 
Yeltsin, President Clinton, and leaders of other NATO countries, signed 
a founding act on mutual relations, cooperation, and security between 
NATO and the Russian Federation. I think it is important to read the 
second paragraph of that founding act, which succinctly states the 
relationship between NATO and Russia and the goal of the act. That 
paragraph reads as follows:

       NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries. 
     They share the goal of overcoming the vestiges of early 
     confrontation and competition and of strengthening mutual 
     trust and cooperation. The present Act reaffirms their 
     determination--

  That is NATO and Russia after the decision was made to expand, and 
now we have NATO, having made that decision, and Russia saying that 
they reaffirm their determination--

     to give concrete substance to our shared commitment to a 
     stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free, to the 
     benefit of all its peoples. By making this commitment at the 
     highest political level, we mark the beginning of a 
     fundamentally new relationship between NATO and Russia. They 
     intend to develop, on the basis of common interest, 
     reciprocity and transparency a strong, stable and enduring 
     partnership.

  Now, that was an action that was taken by Russia after the decision 
by NATO was made to expand. It sets up a NATO-Russia Permanent Joint 
Council to ``provide a mechanism for consultations, coordination, and 
to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, for joint decisions 
and joint action with respect to security issues of common concern.''
  The Founding Act further provides that ``The consultations will not 
extend to internal matters of either NATO, NATO member states, or 
Russia.'' Finally, it states--and this is important to all of us--
``Provisions of this document do not provide NATO or Russia, at any 
stage, with a right of veto over the actions of the other, nor do they 
infringe upon or restrict the rights of NATO or Russia to independent 
decision making and action. They cannot be used as a means to 
disadvantage the interests of other states.''
  Now, the signing of this partnership agreement between NATO and 
Russia after the announcement relative to expansion--and it doesn't, of 
course, mean that Russia is happy with NATO enlargement; they are not--
at least many of the leaders are not, although I will get to a public 
opinion poll in a minute, which seems to imply that the majority of 
Russians are satisfied that Russia should expand; nonetheless, it is 
clear that the leaders in Russia, in the Duma, are not happy about NATO 
enlargement, but it does mean that Russia is willing to work with NATO 
for a

[[Page S2253]]

stable, peaceful, and undivided Europe. I think that the Clinton 
administration, which exercised leadership to move the alliance to 
enlarge, deserves much credit for also leading the alliance to enlarge 
in a way that a new relationship with Russia is possible.
  The signing of this NATO-Russia Founding Act is evidence of the fact 
that Russia accepts, albeit grudgingly, the concept of NATO 
enlargement. The leadership in Russia has accepted the likelihood that 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, former members of the Warsaw 
Pact, but independent nations, will join the NATO alliance. Based upon 
my meeting with Russian parliamentarians, indeed, Russian Ministers, I 
am convinced that Russia's political leaders, from all parties, want to 
develop a cooperative relationship with NATO and its members, 
particularly the United States.
  Despite NATO enlargement on the horizon, Russian soldiers still serve 
side-by-side with American soldiers in Bosnia to create a secure 
environment in which the Dayton accords can be implemented. I have 
visited with United States and Russian troops in Bosnia. I witnessed 
firsthand how well they are working together. There has not even been a 
hint of ending Russia's military presence in Bosnia, despite NATO 
enlargement, even though the financial cost, by the way, of that 
presence is clearly a funding problem for the Russian Ministry of 
Defense. Other evidence of the fact that Russia, despite NATO 
enlargement, wants to work with NATO and work with the United States, 
is that Russia has recently agreed to more active participation in 
NATO's Partnership for Peace program. More evidence. Just last week, 
Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin publicly pledged at the end of his 
talks with Vice President Gore that the Russian Government will push 
hard in the Russian Duma for ratification of START II, despite NATO 
enlargement.
  So we have actions here on the part of Russian leadership--staying in 
Bosnia, working with an expanded Partnership for Peace, signing an 
alliance agreement, an agreement with NATO to work with NATO. We have 
all of this evidence of a willingness on the part of the Russian 
leadership to work with NATO and the United States, despite this 
enlargement.
  Again, interestingly, there was a Gallup poll taken in Moscow, 
released last week, that revealed that 57 percent of Muscovites 
supported the Czech Republic's bid to join NATO, 54 percent supported 
Hungary's admission, and 53 percent said Poland should be allowed to 
join NATO. More than a quarter of those polled had no views on the 
subject.
  So, based in part on all of these factors, I am satisfied that NATO 
enlargement will not produce the unwanted effect of causing Russia to 
reverse its course toward democratization and a market economy, nor to 
view the United States as a hostile nation.
  What about commitments to the principles of the NATO treaty, the 
Washington treaty? Article 10 of that treaty addresses the subject of 
the accession of new members to the alliance. It states, in pertinent 
part, the following:

       The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other 
     European state in a position to further the principles of 
     this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North 
     Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.

  The principles in Article 10 can be summed up in the preamble to the 
NATO treaty, as follows:

       They (the NATO Parties) are determined to safeguard the 
     freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, 
     founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, 
     and the rule of law.

  The first chapter of the alliance's September 1995 ``Study on NATO 
Enlargement,'' in addressing the criteria for candidates for accession, 
stated that candidates must:

       Conform to basic principles embodied in the Washington 
     Treaty: democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.

  Mr. President, I know that most of us have met with Cabinet-level 
officials and parliamentarians from Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic. As a member of the Senate NATO Observer Group, I have also 
been able to meet with those officials, as well as with NATO officials, 
including Secretary General Javier Solana; the Chairman of NATO's 
Military Committee, General Klaus Naumann; and other members of the 
military committee, and the Chiefs of Defense of the present alliance 
members.
  I also have explored the important issue of the commitment of Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO'S basic principles: democracy, 
individual liberty, and a commitment to the rule of law.
  It has been 9 years since the democratic revolutions of 1989 swept 
Eastern Europe. Poland established the first non-Communist-led 
government in the Warsaw Pact in April of 1989. I can still remember 
the feelings of admiration, respect, and, indeed, elation that we all 
experienced when we watched the Solidarity-led movement of Lech Walesa 
guide Poland into democracy. Hungary moved gradually and systematically 
toward democratic and market economic reforms and was generally viewed 
as a haven of stability in Eastern Europe. In Czechoslovakia, former 
dissident playwright, Vaclav Havel, was named President in December of 
1989 and has guided first Czechoslovakia and, after the split, the 
Czech Republic, with a steady and inspiring hand ever since.
  Many of us had the opportunity to be in Eastern Europe in 1989 and 
1990 when these events took place. I remember my wife Barbara and I 
being in Prague when Havel, after elected, was about to assume the 
Presidency of that nation, and the inspiration that was provided by the 
people of Prague, protecting that election and protecting his movement 
to the castle, where he would serve, and how they would fill the 
streets protecting that free election and protecting their democracy.

  After the freedom came, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic 
signed association agreements with the European Union in 1991. The 
European Union leaders decided in March of 1998 to convene full 
accession negotiations with these three nations. Poland has held seven 
free and fair elections since 1989. Hungary has had two democratic 
changes of government since 1989 in fully free and fair elections. 
Since 1989, first Czechoslovakia and then the Czech Republic have had 
three free and fair elections. All three governments established 
civilian control over their military, and their Parliaments are 
increasingly active in overseeing military budgets and activity.
  So I am satisfied with the commitments of Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic to democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. 
Indeed, I believe the people throughout the world can draw inspiration 
from the extraordinary accomplishments of these three formerly 
Communist-ruled nations.
  What about the cost of NATO enlargement? It has perhaps been the most 
written about and the least understood aspect of NATO enlargement. It 
is an important subject, and it needs to be examined carefully.
  Pursuant to congressional direction, the Clinton administration sent 
a report to Congress in February of 1997 on NATO enlargement that 
included an illustrative estimate of the cost in the range of $9 
billion to $12 billion over 13 years. The term ``illustrative'' was 
necessary because the Department of Defense, which prepared the 
estimate, did not know which nations or even how many nations would be 
chosen for NATO membership and it, therefore, could not conduct a 
detailed and comprehensive analysis that would be required for a true 
cost estimate. That report estimated not only the costs that would be 
occasioned by NATO enlargement, but also the costs to present NATO 
members to implement the alliance's new strategic concept that requires 
reorientation from a static defense posture suitable during the cold 
war to a more flexible and mobile set of capabilities to respond to 
different types of threats.
  So, the costs that were looked at related only in part to NATO 
enlargement and were illustrative, based on no knowledge as to how many 
or which nations would be added, but also included illustrative costs 
of an entirely new concept, a strategic concept for NATO, which didn't 
relate to the question of NATO enlargement at all, but which would 
occur whether or not NATO was enlarged.
  This report provided a comprehensive look at some possible future 
costs, but it also added some confusion since it went beyond the common 
costs to

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NATO members that are a direct result of NATO enlargement, which is the 
real issue that we must deal with in considering the accession of 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The really relevant aspect of 
the administration's cost assessment, the assessment of the costs for 
NATO members for the direct costs, is the figure $9 billion to $12 
billion over 13 years. But that figure, again, included both costs that 
would be eligible for common funding and those that would have to be 
borne by the new member states.
  There was a new cost assessment that was made in November of 1997. 
That was made by the NATO staff. The assessment was produced under the 
direction of NATO's Military Committee and has since been approved by 
the North Atlantic Council. It estimates the costs which will be 
eligible for common funding at $1.5 billion over 10 years. Those are 
the real costs as estimated carefully, knowing which countries would 
come into NATO which had been approved for accession and looking at 
just the direct cost of adding those countries and excluding other 
costs which are not directly related to that accession. The estimate, 
again, for all of the members was $1.5 billion over 10 years. The U.S. 
share would be about $400 million over 10 years. The Department of 
Defense reviewed the NATO study and has determined that its conclusions 
concerning enlargement requirements is thorough, militarily sound, and 
based upon a range of reasonable contingencies, and the Department 
concurred with the NATO cost assessment. The General Accounting Office 
evaluated the basis for NATO's cost estimate, reviewed the DOD 
assessment of that NATO cost estimate, and concluded that the approach 
used by NATO in determining the estimated direct enlargement cost for 
commonly funded requirements is reasonable. They also determined that 
the DOD assessment of the NATO cost study was reasonable.
  Thus, the question is why was there such a discrepancy between that 
original estimate of $9 billion to $12 billion and NATO's estimate of 
$1.5 billion? The answer then lies in several of those factors.
  First, the administration's estimate included both costs that would 
be eligible for common funding and those that would be needed to be 
borne by new member states. Deducting the cost that would have to be 
borne by new member states reduces the administration's original 
assessment, which was $9 billion to $12 billion, to $5.5 billion to $7 
billion.
  Second, the DOD assessment was based upon four new NATO members, not 
the three new members which were actually selected for accession to 
NATO. Had the administration made an assessment of the cost for three 
new members, that would have reduced its estimate to between $4.9 
billion and $6.2 billion.

  Additionally, NATO actually visited the facilities in new member 
countries that would need to be upgraded in order to extend NATO's 
communication links to new members; in order to conduct air defense, 
which reflects the integration of new members into NATO's air defense 
systems; in order to provide reinforcement reception facilities, which 
reflect upgrades for infrastructure, particularly airfields to receive 
NATO forces; and in order to carry out training and exercises. NATO 
found that those facilities were in better shape than the Department of 
Defense had assumed. The Department of Defense had not actually visited 
those facilities. NATO's staff did. In addition, NATO used the more 
limited funding eligibility for NATO common funding, NATO had more 
empirical data as to actual pricing, and there were some minor 
differences between NATO and the United States as to new member 
requirements.
  So for all of those reasons, that original estimate of the 
administration was way off and it was way high, and the revised 
estimate done by NATO after on-site visits and looking only at the 
direct costs resulting from the increase in the size of NATO, that 
assessment has been approved by the GAO and by the DOD.
  Next, should we have a pause? In the course of this debate the Senate 
will be dealing with an amendment that would, in essence, establish a 
3-year pause, after the accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic, before NATO could consider the accession of any other nations 
to the alliance.
  I have already cited article X of the NATO treaty. On July 8, 1997, 
NATO heads of state and government, in their Madrid Declaration on 
Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation, in which they announced their 
decision to invite Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to begin 
accession talks, reaffirmed that ``NATO remains open to new members 
under article X of the North Atlantic Treaty.''
  Since its inception in 1949, the alliance has been enlarged on three 
separate occasions to include Greece and Turkey in 1952, the Federal 
Republic of Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982. All of these 
enlargement decisions, including the decision to invite Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic, have been the product of careful and 
comprehensive consideration. The alliance's 1995 ``Study on NATO 
Enlargement'' set out the criteria that was used for these three 
nations and that will be used for any consideration of future 
enlargement of the alliance. I am satisfied with the criteria and with 
the process that has been and will be used. I see no reason to mandate 
a pause, particularly since the desire to join the alliance has been 
such a productive force for candidate nations to proceed on the road to 
democracy and the rule of law and to reach accommodations with their 
neighbors.
  Given the deliberative process that was involved in NATO's 
enlargement decision, it is clear that it will take some time before 
any new nations will be chosen for accession to NATO. But a 3-year 
mandated pause could actually imply too much. It could imply that, 
after 3 years, we will support more nations joining NATO, and that is 
not necessarily the result of the process which has been adopted.
  It seems to me that mandating a pause is no more logical than 
mandating when the next round of NATO accessions should occur. Further 
enlargement of the alliance should be judged by the circumstances and 
developments that exist at the time and whether a candidate nation 
meets the criteria for NATO membership. That should not be decided 
arbitrarily in advance by either deciding that new members should not 
be taken in before a certain date or that new members will be taken in 
after a certain date.
  No nation can be admitted to NATO without the advice and consent of 
this Senate. We do not need to condition our advice and consent on the 
admission of these three nations in order to establish that fact, the 
fact that we have control over who is admitted, and when, to NATO. So I 
would vote against such an amendment that would establish that 
arbitrary 3-year moratorium.
  Mr. President, another issue that is going to come up is membership 
in the European Union and whether or not we should delay the accession 
of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic until they are admitted into 
the European Union. I understand the positive motivating forces behind 
that amendment. There may even be some truth to the statement that in 
the present low-threat environment, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic have a greater need for economic stability than for the added 
security that membership in the NATO alliance will bring.
  I have discussed this issue with numerous visitors from the three 
countries with whom I have met. They have all stated their preference 
for joining NATO before joining the European Union. They want to be in 
the European Union, but they want to be in NATO even more, and they 
want it first. They cite the historical experience of their countries 
under foreign domination. They stress that they seek a closer 
relationship with the United States, a relationship to which NATO but 
not European Union membership is related.
  When the experts speak of the contribution that NATO has made or that 
the U.S. military presence in Europe or the Far East has made, the 
first thing that is noted is the peace and security that allows 
economic development to then occur. Nations look to their external 
security first and then to their economic security, for without the 
former, you cannot have the latter.
  During the Senate NATO observer group's meeting with NATO's military 
committee, I was struck by a statement by its chairman, General Klaus 
Naumann. He made the point that one

[[Page S2255]]

of the major benefits of NATO enlargement was to prevent the 
renationalization of defense in candidate countries. In other words, if 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were not admitted to NATO, they 
would have to devote much more of their scarce resources to national 
defense. That would have a significant negative impact on their 
economies. And General Naumann could also have added that the 
burdensharing that membership in NATO provides allows NATO member 
nations not to build large military forces that could be perceived as 
threatening to their neighbors and prove destabilizing to the region.
  But finally on this issue of whether we should condition accession of 
these three nations to their membership in the European Union, there is 
one other thought that I think we have to consider. If we condition our 
action on something that Europe does or must do, it seems to me that it 
would justify the perception in some quarters of Europe that we decide 
that we are determined to dominate our friends and our allies. We 
should not dictate membership in a partnership to which we do not 
belong.
  I happen to favor that membership very strongly. And, again, in this 
low-threat environment, these three nations might be wiser to seek that 
membership before they seek membership in NATO, even though I think if 
we were in their position, we would put NATO first, too, because 
security physically of a nation, I think, instinctively is more 
important to people in that nation than economic security, as important 
as the latter is.
  What troubles me about this relationship that is being attempted in 
European Union membership perhaps more than anything is that it would 
reinforce a perception that even though we are not a member of that 
partnership, we are trying somehow or other to dictate or to dominate 
that partnership. I do not think that perception is either accurate or 
we should give any credence to it by conditioning accession or our 
approval of accession of these three nations into NATO based upon their 
acceptance into the European Union. I just do not think it is healthy 
for our partnership and our relationship with our European allies for 
us to condition in that way.
  So in conclusion, Mr. President, I believe the accession of these 
three nations will contribute to stability in Europe and is in the 
national interest of the United States.
  I have carefully considered the strategic rationale for NATO 
enlargement and the impact that enlargement would have on the movement 
toward democratization and a market economy in Russia, the commitment 
of the three nations to the principles of the NATO treaty, and the cost 
of enlargement. I believe the three nations that have contributed 
forces to the Persian Gulf war and to the stabilization force in Bosnia 
are willing to do their part to defend the common interests and will 
strengthen the alliance. In my view, accession of these three nations 
will not contribute to a reversal of Russia's course toward 
democratization and a market economy nor to a Russian view of the 
United States as a hostile nation.
  And again, we should consider carefully and thoroughly the impact on 
our relationship with Russia. It is an important relationship and we 
should not unwittingly damage it.
  We should not in the effort to create stability in Europe unwittingly 
contribute to instability. But I don't think the accession of these 
three countries will have that effect. And I emphasize, after the 
announcement of NATO enlargement, Russia agreed to an expanded 
participation in the NATO Partnership for Peace program, signed an 
agreement with NATO providing for a special relationship between NATO 
and Russia--after the announcement of an expanded NATO, nonetheless 
agreed to a relationship with NATO.
  With Mr. Chernomyrdin's, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's, decision last 
week to go to the Duma and press for the ratification of START II in 
the Duma, all of these things are despite the increase in the size of 
NATO. Despite an enlarged NATO, these actions on the part of Russia 
show how important it is to Russia to relate to Europe and to relate to 
us. It is important to us, too. But I do not think that ratifying the 
expansion of NATO will jeopardize in any way our relationship with a 
democratic, market-oriented Russia, and their actions are more 
important in this respect than my words.
  Their action in working out an agreement with NATO, participating in 
Bosnia--there has been no suggestion that they would no longer 
participate in Bosnia if NATO is enlarged. They are committed to that. 
I think all of these actions on their part indicate their acceptance of 
the idea that NATO will be enlarged.
  Do they like it? The leadership doesn't like it. I mentioned a public 
opinion poll a little earlier, interestingly enough, just last week in 
Moscow, showing a majority of people in Moscow support the enlargement 
of NATO through the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic. To the extent that public opinion polls are things that we 
should be relying on, it is an interesting little footnote to this 
debate.

  But for all of those reasons, Mr. President, I have concluded that 
the cost is affordable; for security and the stability it will provide 
in Europe it is the right thing for us to do.
  I will end my comments by reading a quotation from the President of 
the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel, who led the Czech democratic 
resistance under communism. This is what he stated about NATO 
enlargement.

       Our wish to become a NATO Member grows out of a desire to 
     shoulder some responsibility for the general state of affairs 
     on our continent. We don't want to take without giving. We 
     want an active role in the defense of European peace and 
     democracy. Too often, we have had direct experience of where 
     indifference to the fate of others can lead, and we are 
     determined not to succumb to that kind of indifference 
     ourselves.

  For all those reasons, Mr. President, I will be supporting this 
resolution of accession.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, it was a great treat for me to listen 
to the very eloquent comments of the Senator from Michigan. A few years 
ago, Vice President Walter Mondale said to me ``When you go to the 
Senate, listen to Carl Levin; he is one of the most articulate and 
erudite Members of that body.'' After hearing his discussion of the 
NATO enlargement, I just want to say the Vice President was correct.
  Mr. LEVIN. Let me thank my good friend from California. I doubt that 
he was correct in that one respect. In so many other ways he is wise, 
and I hope he is also wise here.
  I thank the Senator.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the Senator.
  Mr. President, I rise as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee 
to support the legislation before us. I happen to believe that 
admitting Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO is a natural 
and logical response to the end of the cold war, and is a crucial 
element of a larger strategy to build a Europe that is at last 
undivided, democratic, and at peace. I support enlargement because, 
first, I believe there is a sound strategic rationale for enlargement; 
secondly, because I believe that Russian concerns that NATO expansion 
presents a threat or a challenge to the well-being of Russia are 
unfounded; and, thirdly, because I believe that costs of enlargement 
will not be an undue burden on the United States but, rather, will be 
shared among all members on a fair basis.
  Let me speak briefly about each of these issues. For almost 50 years, 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has served as the centerpiece of 
American foreign policy in the European theater. NATO presented a firm 
committed alliance, a major deterrent to any aggressive thrust by the 
Soviet Union. It has been a successful military alliance, and it has 
served the national interests of the United States in preventing 
aggression in uncertain times.
  When NATO was originally formed during the early days of the cold 
war, it was conceived as a purely defensive alliance, a static line 
protecting Western Europe from Soviet encroachment. But it has been 
more than 8 years since the Berlin wall came down. Today, the Soviet 
Union is gone and the sort of military threat for which NATO was 
originally conceived and designed, thankfully, no longer exists.

[[Page S2256]]

  I believe that this new post-cold-war era calls for a new NATO, a 
NATO that is an alignment of like-thinking states committed to 
democratic values and mutual defense within a given geographic 
community. This new, enlarged NATO is not intended to be, nor do I 
believe it will be, a threat to any other State or group of States.
  As our Secretary of State has put it, the strategic rationale for 
enlarging the Alliance is straightforward. Admitting Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic to NATO ``will make America safer, NATO stronger 
and Europe more peaceful and united.'' I believe that.

  A larger NATO will make the world safer by expanding the area of 
Europe where wars do not happen. Twice in this century we have sent our 
sons and daughters across the Atlantic to Europe to fight and die in 
world wars which began in Europe. By reaffirming our commitment to an 
enlarged NATO, history teaches us that we make it less likely that we 
will be called to do so again. It has often been said that vigilance is 
the price of freedom. NATO remains a form of vigilance.
  A larger NATO will also be a stronger NATO. To align themselves with 
NATO, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have strengthened their 
democratic institutions and resolved ethnic and border disputes in the 
region. They are bringing their militaries into alignment with the 
requirements of NATO membership. They have met the requirements for 
application: democratic reform, development of free market economies, 
and that each country be able to make a substantial military commitment 
to the alliance.
  The United States has important political, economic, security and, 
yes, moral and humanitarian interests in Europe. These interests demand 
continued active U.S. engagement in the transatlantic community. Just 
as NATO has for the past 50 years, I believe that an enlarged Alliance 
will provide an effective mechanism to maintain a more unified European 
community with shared values.
  The second issue which I mentioned, the future of NATO-Russia 
relations, is one which I know is of great concern to many of our 
colleagues. Let me share my perspective on this issue.
  I would agree with some who oppose enlargement that if it inflames 
``the nationalistic, anti-western and militaristic tendencies in 
Russian opinion,'' as George Kennan recently wrote, then it truly would 
be a questionable course of action. But I do not really believe that 
NATO enlargement provides a realistic basis for this thinking.
  In fact, for all the politicking against NATO enlargement inside 
Moscow's ring road, many thoughtful Russians, especially younger ones, 
realize that NATO enlargement is not a threat.
  Russia now has a constructive relationship with NATO. Our troops are 
cooperating in Bosnia. Russia has requested that their troops be 
allowed to participate in all future Partnership for Peace exercises. 
And we are moving ahead with arms control. Russia is ahead of schedule 
under the START I treaty. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin has committed to 
Duma ratification of START II. And we have agreed on the outlines of a 
Start III treaty that will cut both United States and Russian nuclear 
arsenals to 80 percent below their cold war peak. Russia has joined us 
in banning nuclear testing and ratifying the treaty to outlaw chemical 
weapons.
  Now, all this is not to say that future NATO-Russia or United States-
Russia relations will be smooth and trouble free. There probably will 
be issues in the years ahead on which we will disagree and which we 
will have to work through. But if Russian policy and/or Russian-
European relations should sour, it is my belief that it will be because 
of the internal dynamics of Russia itself, not because of NATO 
enlargement. In fact, it is my belief that enlargement of the Alliance 
and engagement with Russia may offer increased opportunity for the 
development of a democratic Russia and an even more productive 
relationship between Russia and the United States.

  I strongly believe that a key and critical outcome of NATO 
enlargement must be a greater engagement with Russia to assure that 
NATO enlargement is not perceived as a threat nor as an act that in any 
way signals aggressive intent. It is this path, I believe, which offers 
the best hope for a peaceful and secure Europe in the decades ahead.
  A third area of concern is questions which have been raised about the 
costs of enlargement.
  NATO has estimated that the common fund cost for enlargement will be 
$1.5 billion over 10 years. The U.S. share of these enlargement costs 
is about $360 million, in proportion to the current 24 percent U.S. 
share for common-funded projects. I believe that this cost for the U.S. 
share of enlargement is reasonable.
  In my mind, however, the critical cost issue is burdensharing. If we 
go forward and enlarge and adapt the Alliance, all NATO members must be 
willing to pay their fair shares.
  I must say I was very concerned last year when French President 
Chirac commented, in effect, that France would not pay one more centime 
for the costs of enlargement.
  During the hearings conducted by the Foreign Relations Committee, 
assurances were received from the administration that all allies will, 
in fact, pay their fair share. And, despite the earlier negative French 
comments, both the current members of NATO and the three prospective 
members have pledged that, indeed, they will meet their share of 
Alliance costs.
  I have been reassured by these comments, and I have also worked with 
the chairman and ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee to 
assure that strong, clear, and unambiguous language regarding costs and 
burdensharing has been included in the resolution of ratification. That 
in fact is now the case.
  The language which we have included requires the President to certify 
that the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will not 
increase the overall U.S. share of the NATO common budget, and that the 
United States is under no obligation to subsidize the costs of new 
members joining the Alliance. The President must also certify that 
enlargement will not undermine our ability to meet other security 
obligations.
  Finally, the resolution of ratification also includes a reporting 
requirement which will provide Congress with detailed information on 
the national defense budgets of NATO members, their contributions to 
the common budget, and U.S. costs associated within enlargement.
  So, as we proceed with the process of enlargement, this information 
will allow Congress to make a determination about the efforts that our 
allies are making and, if necessary, take action at the appropriate 
time to ensure that the burdens of the expanded alliance are fairly 
met.
  In summary, I believe the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic in NATO will contribute to a stronger, more stable, and more 
secure Europe, one that is even a more reliable partner for the United 
States. Such a Europe is clearly in U.S. national interests, and I urge 
my colleagues to vote in favor of the resolution of ratification.
  I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                         privilege of the floor

  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I ask that Corey Perman, who is a 
fellow in my office, be granted the privilege of the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, it is my understanding--although I 
think really what we are doing here is just making opening statements 
on NATO expansion--and my hope, if not this week then when we come back 
to this discussion, that a number of us will have amendments on the 
floor and that we will have, hopefully, a sharper and more focused 
debate.
  Mr. President, I speak on the floor of the Senate about a matter that 
I think is of great importance. I think the decision that we make here 
in the Senate about whether or not to support expansion of NATO will, 
as a matter of fact, crucially affect the quality or lack of quality of 
the lives of our children and our grandchildren. I have given this

[[Page S2257]]

matter a great deal of thought. For the last year I have had a lot of 
discussions, a lot of briefings with a lot of people on both sides of 
the question. I have done my very best as a U.S. Senator from Minnesota 
to inform myself. This is a very difficult decision to make.
  There are thoughtful and knowledgeable Senators who are on the other 
side from where I am. Certainly there are thoughtful and knowledgeable 
Minnesotans, whom I respect greatly, who have urged me to vote in favor 
of expanding NATO. So have many of my colleagues. So has President 
Vaclav Havel from Czechoslovakia, who I believe is one of the giants of 
the 20th century, a playwright and former prisoner of conscience. When 
he speaks, with such passion, about the importance of expanding NATO, I 
listen. I will tell you, probably more than anything, I would like to 
cast a vote that would please President Havel.
  Why, then, do I oppose the expansion of NATO? Because I have come to 
believe that it would lead to the redivision of Europe and that we 
would needlessly poison U.S. relations with Russia for years to come 
and increase the prospects that in the post-Yeltsin world--President 
Yeltsin will not be there forever--the ultranationalists and anti-U.S. 
forces, militaristic forces, will gain power.
  Before I go into greater detail on the reasons for my opposition to 
enlarging NATO, just permit me to say a few words about the process 
that I have gone through to reach this decision. Again, I understand 
full well that our decision has enormous implications for our country 
and the world. I am a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 
We have had any number of different hearings on this. I have read as 
many articles as I can read and have talked with as many people as I 
can talk with. I want to assure my fellow Minnesotans and my colleagues 
that in reaching this decision I have done my homework.
  That does not mean I am arrogant about it. That does not mean that I 
believe the people who take a different position have not done their 
homework. But there are a number of questions and doubts that I have. I 
have submitted questions in writing to Secretary of State Albright and 
to other key administration officials. Last June I sent a letter to 
President Clinton, cosigned by my distinguished colleague Senator 
Harkin, where we raised a number of different questions. Unfortunately, 
at least from my point of view, a number of these questions are still 
out there and administration officials have not allayed my concerns 
about NATO expansion. So, as I give this matter a great deal of 
thought, carefully weighing the pros and the cons of NATO expansion and 
meeting with those who have strong expansionist viewpoints, I still 
believe that I must oppose NATO expansion.
  Permit me to outline my concerns. The best way is for me to summarize 
questions that I have had and to talk about some of the answers that 
have been given but which I do not think are persuasive answers.
  First, what military threat is NATO expansion intended to address? 
The Russian military has collapsed, the Russian Army's ability to quell 
tiny, ill-equipped Chechen forces raises doubts about Russia's 
capability to threaten its former Eastern bloc allies in the 
foreseeable future.
  Second, arms control agreements signed between 1987 and 1993, that 
were pushed through by Presidents Reagan and Bush working with 
President Gorbachev, have helped to establish a new security structure 
that makes a surprise attack on Central Europe virtually impossible.
  Third, there is peace between states in Europe, between nations in 
Europe, for the first time in centuries. We do not have a divided 
Europe, and I worry about a NATO expansion which could redivide Europe 
and again poison relations with Russia. Why, then, are we rushing to 
expand a military alliance into Central Europe?
  How can Russia not feel threatened by, one, the prospect of NATO 
forces moving hundreds of miles closer to its borders and, two, the 
possibility of further NATO expansions, including even the Baltic 
States? This has all been left, as my colleague the distinguished Chair 
knows, open-ended.
  Although the administration claims that extending NATO toward 
Russia's borders would not threaten Russia, there seems little doubt 
that many Russians feel threatened, especially, I argue, any number of 
the opinion leaders in Russia. Whatever explanation there is for the 
fact that Russian politicians, the reformers, the pro-Western democrats 
to the centrists to the Communists and even to the extreme 
nationalists, who may agree with us on little else, all strongly oppose 
NATO expansion.
  In pursuing the NATO expansion, why is the administration 
disregarding the warnings of George Kennan and other distinguished 
Russian scholars that NATO expansion is likely to sow the seeds for a 
reemergence of antidemocratic and chauvinistic trends in Russia?
  I am especially puzzled by this since it must be evident to both 
supporters and foes of NATO expansion that European security and 
stability--and I need to make this point twice--that European security 
and stability is greatly dependent on Russia's successful transition to 
democracy. That, I think, is the central point. A democratic Russia is 
unlikely to threaten its neighbors. I am worried, I am terribly 
worried. I think this is a profound mistake. I think this NATO 
expansion could threaten that democracy in Russia, and I think, if we 
do not have a successful transition to democracy in Russia, that, in 
turn, threatens European security and stability.
  Why then are we considering a step that is apt to strike at Russian 
ultranationalists who oppose democracy? George Kennan, who is probably 
over 90 now, a great scholar--George Kennan is probably as wise and 
profound a thinker as we have in our country about Russia, about the 
former Soviet Union. I might add--and I have said this to friends--my 
father, who was born in the Ukraine, born in Odessa, his family then 
moved to Russia--they kept moving to stay one step ahead of the 
pogroms--he was a Jewish immigrant; he came over in 1914 at the age of 
17. He never saw his family again. My father had the honor many times--
he passed away in 1983--but he had the honor many times to speak with 
and meet with George Kennan. My father, who spoke 10 languages 
fluently--I am sorry to say I don't--but my father, who spoke 10 
languages fluently, had such great respect for George Kennan's mastery 
of the language and his understanding of Russia.
  George Kennan has said that expanding NATO ``may be expected to 
inflame nationalistic anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in 
Russian opinion and to have an adverse effect on the development of 
Russian democracy.''
  I urge my colleagues to carefully consider George Kennan's words 
before they cast their votes on ratification of NATO expansion.
  I want to say this about the process: I am in sharp disagreement with 
the majority leader on the way we are doing this. We had hearings in 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I give Chairman Helms full 
credit for that. He and Senator Biden--who takes a very different 
position than I do--have been very respectful about the need to have a 
debate. But the way we are doing this is we are doing it in bits and 
pieces. We should have been on the education bill, and we have just 
come back to NATO as filler until we get back to the education bill. It 
is a way of avoiding debate about education and education amendments.
  This decision we are going to make about NATO expansion is as 
important a decision as we are ever going to make. But Senators coming 
out here, as I have, individually and then leaving after they give 
speeches is not enough. Yesterday, we had some good discussion. I hope 
next week, or whenever we take this back up, we will figure out a way 
to have Senators out here with amendments and we can have a give-and-
take discussion and we can have an important debate about this.
  What basis is there for Secretary Albright's claim that expanding 
NATO will produce an ``undivided'' Europe? Rather than creating an 
undivided Europe, my view is that NATO expansion would re-create a 
dividing line in Europe, only further to the east than the original 
cold war dividing line, and I do not consider that to be progress for 
the world.
  In fact, President Clinton himself, before he decided to back NATO 
expansion, avowed that it would ``draw a new line through Europe just a 
little further east.'' This is hardly an academic

[[Page S2258]]

question, for I believe that a Europe without dividing lines is vital 
if the continent is to be peaceful, prosperous and secure. That is why 
I think we will be making a fateful mistake if we vote for the NATO 
expansion, if we support this.
  Finally, Mr. President, I must ask whether it makes sense for the 
administration to contend that a key reason NATO expansion is necessary 
is that it will promote democracy, stability and economic reform in 
Central Europe. There are a whole lot of countries in the former Soviet 
Union for whom that challenge is out there. I am not even sure these 
countries would be the first countries by that criteria. But what I do 
know is that, if the administration really believes that a prime goal 
of NATO expansion is to solidify democracy and economic reform, then 
perhaps we ought to really think about other countries first. Yet I 
think that would be a mistake. And, most important of all, if we are 
going to be talking about expanding markets and expanding democracy, 
why don't we use our leverage--the United States of America--to promote 
membership in the European Union?
  I think that is the single best way that our country could exert its 
leadership. The single best way that we could exert our leverage for 
Poland, for Hungary, for the Czech Republic, if the goal of this is to 
expand markets and democracy, would be for the United States to be the 
leader, the leading voice in calling for expansion in the European 
Union.
  Let me simply say that I do not think a military alliance is the way 
to do that. I do not think a military alliance has as its primary goal 
expanding markets and democracy, and, moreover, I think we take a 
terrible risk.
  In closing, I would like to quote from a New York Times op-ed written 
over a year ago by George Kennan, a man who, as I said, I have long 
admired for his remarkable contributions to American diplomacy and 
scholarship and keen insights into Russian history, politics and 
diplomacy:

       . . . something of the highest importance is at stake here. 
     And perhaps it is not too late to advance a view, that, I 
     believe, is not only mine alone but is shared by a number of 
     others with extensive and in most instances more recent 
     experience in Russian matters. The view, bluntly stated, is 
     that expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of 
     American policy in the post-cold-war era.

  Mr. President, I say to my colleagues, let me repeat this. I am 
quoting a profound thinker. George Kennan states:

       The view, bluntly stated, is that expanding NATO would be 
     the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-
     cold-war era.
       Such a decision may be expected to . . . restore the 
     atmosphere of the cold war in East-West relations, and to 
     impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to 
     our liking. And, last but not least, it might make it much 
     more difficult, if not impossible, to secure the Russian 
     Duma's ratification of the START II agreement and to achieve 
     further reductions of nuclear weapons.

  George Kennan's words have already proved to be prophetic. The START 
II agreement is stalled in the duma, and troubling frictions have 
developed with Russia on a number of other issues, ranging from U.S. 
policy toward Iraq to the management of Russia's nuclear materials.
  I urge my colleagues to ponder George Kennan's powerful arguments and 
to join me in opposing ratification of NATO expansion.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of George 
Kennan's article be printed in the Record at the end of my statement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Let me conclude on a personal note. What I have tried 
to say on the floor of the Senate, and I want to summarize, because, 
again, I actually believe, without being melodramatic, I can truthfully 
say this has been one of the most difficult decisions. I do not believe 
for a moment that people who favor NATO ratification are doing it 
because of simplistic thinking or because they have not thought this 
issue through, although I think all of us before we cast the final vote 
should inform ourselves.
  Some people I have tremendous respect for strongly favor NATO 
ratification. I have met with people back in Minnesota--Czechs, 
Hungarians and Poles--people who feel so strongly about this, wonderful 
people, people who have been big supporters of me, and they are 
disappointed in me.
  I want to say one more time, I have done my best to really be a 
scholar and to study this matter. I have tried to meet with people 
representing different points of view. But I very honestly and 
truthfully believe that this would be a terrible mistake. I think the 
way to expand democracy and market economies, which is a very important 
goal for Hungary, for the Czech Republic, for Poland, for other 
countries, is membership in the European Union. Our country should be 
using our leverage to make that happen.
  I think there is no reason for NATO expansion. I see no military 
threat that calls for expansion of a military alliance. I think the 
downside is that we risk signing arms agreements with Russia, we risk 
poisoning relations with Russia, we risk putting the democratic forces 
in Russia in peril, and I think if we don't have a stable Russia, if we 
don't have a secure Russia, then all of Europe is threatened by that.
  I had a chance to travel to Russia a few years ago. I wanted to visit 
where my father grew up since he could never go back because the 
Communists ruled. I went there full of hope, and I came back with less 
hope. Of course, I am an optimist; I am always hopeful. The reason I 
had less hope is because of all the economic disintegration, how 
difficult a transition it is for this nation to move from a 
totalitarian government, to move from Communist rule to democracy and, 
indeed, too much economic pain for too many people in the country.
  I will never forget being on the Trans-Siberian Railroad and talking 
to a woman, I am sorry to say, through a translator and having her say 
to me, ``You can't eat freedom.''
  What I worry about--I don't think this issue is the issue alone, and 
I know there have been public opinion polls recently taken--I am sure 
my colleague from Delaware, Senator Biden, has spoken about some of 
that--where a majority, not a large majority, but a majority says they 
favor NATO expansion. What I worry about is this can be a triggering 
event if things don't go well. I am worried if things do not go well 
economically; I am worried if there is a considerable amount of 
instability, if President Yeltsin should run into difficulty with an 
illness and should pass away; I am worried about what is going to 
happen in the future, not in the distant future but in the medium 
future and maybe in the near future. I do not think the benefits of 
NATO expansion come close when measured up against what I consider to 
be the very real dangers of doing this.
  I think we are making a fateful decision. I said in the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee--I like to say it because my father was my 
teacher. My father--I miss him, I wish he was alive. I wish he was here 
to provide me with advice. When I was growing up, I was a little 
embarrassed by my father because he was very ``old country.'' He was 
almost 50 when I was born. He wasn't cool and didn't fit in and really 
didn't fit in with my friends' parents. When I got to be high-school 
age, the age of some of the pages here, I realized what a treasure he 
was. For 3 years before I went away to the University of North 
Carolina, every night at 10 o'clock, except for the weekends, I would 
meet him in our kitchen and we would have sponge cake and hot tea, and 
he would talk about the world. For 3 years, I had a chance to just 
listen to my father and learn from him. I really believe that my father 
would say to me today that George Kennan is right and that we will make 
a fateful decision if we vote for ratification of this NATO agreement.
  Mr. President, it is with strength and feeling very strongly about my 
position--but nevertheless it is a difficult decision--that I speak 
today on the floor. I urge my colleagues to oppose ratification of NATO 
expansion. I shall vote no, though I am hopeful that maybe we will be 
able to pass some amendment which I think will make a huge difference.
  I yield the floor.

                               Exhibit 1

                [From the New York Times, Feb. 5, 1997]

                            A Fateful Error

                         (By George F. Kennan)

       In late 1996, the impression was allowed, or caused, to 
     become prevalent that it had been

[[Page S2259]]

     somehow and somewhere decided to expand NATO up to Russia's 
     borders. This despite the fact that no formal decision can be 
     made before the alliance's next summit meeting, in June.
       The timing of this revelation--coinciding with the 
     Presidential election and the pursuant changes in responsible 
     personalities in Washington--did not make it easy for the 
     outsider to know how or where to insert a modest word of 
     comment. Nor did the assurance given to the public that the 
     decision, however preliminary, was irrevocable encourage 
     outside opinion.
       But something of the highest importance is at stake here. 
     And perhaps it is not too late to advance a view that, I 
     believe, is not only mine alone but is shared by a number of 
     others with extensive and in most instances more recent 
     experience in Russian matters. The view, bluntly stated, is 
     that expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of 
     American policy in the entire post-cold-war era.
       Such a decision may be expected to inflame the 
     nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in 
     Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development 
     of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the cold 
     war to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign 
     policy in directions decidedly not to our liking. And, last 
     but not least, it might make it much more difficult, if not 
     impossible, to secure the Russian Duma's ratification of the 
     Start II agreement and to achieve further reductions of 
     nuclear weaponry.
       It is, of course, unfortunate that Russia should be 
     confronted with such a challenge at a time when its executive 
     power is in a state of high uncertainty and near-paralysis. 
     And it is doubly unfortunate considering the total lack of 
     any necessity for this move. Why, with all the hopeful 
     possibilities engendered by the end of the cold war, should 
     East-West relations become centered on the question of who 
     would be allied with whom and, by implication, against whom 
     in some fanciful, totally unforeseeable and most improbable 
     future military conflict?
       I am aware, of course, that NATO is conducting talks with 
     the Russian authorities in hopes of making the idea of 
     expansion tolerable and palatable to Russia. One can, in the 
     existing circumstances, only wish these efforts success. But 
     anyone who gives serious attention to the Russian press 
     cannot fail to note that neither the public nor the 
     Government is waiting for the proposed expansion to occur 
     before reacting to it.
       Russians are little impressed with American assurances that 
     it reflects no hostile intentions. They would see their 
     prestige (always uppermost in the Russian mind) and their 
     security interests as adversely affected. They would, of 
     course, have no choice but to accept expansion as a military 
     fait accompli. But they would continue to regard it as a 
     rebuff by the West and would likely look elsewhere for 
     guarantees of a secure and hopeful future for themselves.
       It will obviously not be easy to change a decision already 
     made or tacitly accepted by the alliance's 16 member 
     countries. But there are a few intervening months before the 
     decision is to be made final; perhaps this period can be used 
     to alter the proposed expansion in ways that would mitigate 
     the unhappy effects it is already having on Russian opinion 
     and policy.

  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, NATO has been the keystone for Western 
Democracy for the past 50 years. It has stood solidly as a successful 
deterrent against the spread of Communism and as a community of 
democracies where markets have flourished and where differences are 
settled without drawing a sword against one another. NATO's key 
alliance was based upon a mutual pact of deterrence from external 
threats . . .  and lets be honest--it was and I stress was, an 
alignment to offset the voracious behemoth called the Soviet Union. The 
Soviet Union is dead. We need to keep it so. Expansion of NATO to 
include nations who have struggled to extricate themselves from years 
of slavery under the yoke of Leninist/Stalinist dictatorial regimes 
will insure the eternal demise of a world-communist conspiracy.
  NATO was a major contributor to the successful end of the Cold War 
and was in fact responsible for a 50 year period of peaceful 
coexistence in Western Europe; the longest such period in modern 
history. In order to continue to fulfill its purpose of ensuring peace 
and freedom, NATO needs to adapt to a new Europe, a Europe without a 
Soviet-alliance but a Europe which faces a myriad of other challenges.
  As our country adapts to a changing world situation, a world without 
a Cold War, so must our alliances. NATO must change or become a mere 
relic of the Cold War. Those who advocate the status quo ask us to live 
in a non-existent past.
  To those who claim that the expansion of NATO will be a threat to the 
Russian people, I note that the 50 years of relative peace on the 
European continent extended to the Russian border, as well. Stability 
in the region has been and will be stability for the Russians. NATO 
poses no offensive threat to any other nation. It is a gathering of 
countries who want to break the cycle of war.
  For those who are afraid of Russians who threaten their neighbors 
because these nations desire peaceful alliances, I say, ``Do not bow to 
the will of a few radical extremists; stand up for those who strive to 
join a community of free and democratic nations who are our neighbors. 
Do not let the Russians run our foreign policy.''
  For those who say that the nations of Central Europe face no threat 
today, I say that this expansion is the most likely way to preserve 
this situation.
  For those who claim that this will dilute NATO, I say that Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic, whose people have demonstrated their 
embrace of democracy, will add a renewed strength of purpose to the 
alliance.
  Yes, there are questions which must be answered concerning the costs 
to the United States of this expansion. I have stated time and again 
that the costs must be defined and we will hold NATO to those numbers. 
Our coffers are not limitless. But any costs which insures peace and 
stability will be less than the costs of the anarchy and chaos of 
medieval conflicts or a resumption of the Cold War. To have set a list 
of conditions for admittance to the organization, and then to change 
our minds to those countries which have achieved those conditions is 
isolationist, elitist and shortsighted. It could drive them to make 
other alliances for their own collective protection and rather than 
resulting in a series of treaties the likes of which have fostered the 
most fruitful 50 years in history, we will set the stage for a 
complicated entanglement of alliances which will look curiously like 
those which precipitated World War One. We do not need to learn that 
lesson all over again.
  I am very comfortable in joining the company of such individuals as 
General Collin Powell, General Norman Swartzkopf, Former Sec Def 
Richard Cheney, Former Secretaries Baker, Eagleburger, Haig, former 
Ambassador Kirkpatrick, and a host of other Secretaries, Generals, 
Admirals and other distinguished personages. So, I call upon my 
colleagues to support an expansion of freedom, democracy and peace vote 
to support including Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in the NATO 
family of nations.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
order for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hagel). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Today I wish to speak from the heart about a 
decision we will make as U.S. Senators about one of the most solemn 
issues that we will face, and that is whether or not we will expand 
NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.
  I would like to put some personal context into what I am about to 
say. Like you, Mr. President, I grew up in a time when we could 
accurately be described as children of the cold war. Unlike you, I did 
not serve in Vietnam, but grew up under the threat of nuclear 
annihilation.
  I remember as an elementary school child going through drills where 
the teacher would tell us to get under our desks and hope for the best. 
It was a time when, frankly, we were taught to be afraid.
  I was too young to remember the Hungarian uprising in 1956, but I was 
old enough to remember the Prague Spring of 1968. I remember holding my 
breath as I watched the Solidarity movement develop in Poland and 
wondering how long it would be until Soviet tanks snuffed out that 
breath of freedom.
  And I remember with amazement and with emotion the night when this 
Nation sat transfixed at the falling of the Berlin wall. I never 
thought that would happen in my lifetime, and yet it did. I remember 
how courageous I thought it was of President Ronald Reagan when he went 
there, like his predecessor, John Kennedy, and spoke about the

[[Page S2260]]

wall and challenged Mr. Gorbachev to tear it down.
  As a child of the cold war, I now come, as a Senator from Oregon, to 
this decision about what we do in Europe, whether we now expand NATO. 
Though an Oregon Senator, I grew up fairly close to here in Bethesda, 
MD--my father and mother moved our family from Oregon to Maryland so my 
father could work for General Eisenhower, in his administration.
  At the beginning of the Kennedy administration, my cousin, Stewart 
Udall, was nominated as Secretary of the Interior. And I suppose 
because of that correlation between a Republican and a Democrat 
administration and family ties that went across the aisle, my family 
participated in a number of the inaugural events for President John F. 
Kennedy.
  I remember it was a very cold January day. I remember, with my 
family, hearing words that struck me then as important. John F. Kennedy 
called out to my generation--our generation, Mr. President--of 
Americans to accept the torch of liberty. At least that is what I 
heard. I was only 8 years old, but even though that young, I felt his 
words' impact. I would like to begin by quoting some of his words that 
he spoke that day just outside of this building.

       We dare not forget today that we are the heirs of that 
     first revolution. Let the word go forth from this time and 
     place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been 
     passed to a new generation of Americans--born in this 
     century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter 
     peace, proud of our ancient heritage--and unwilling to 
     witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to 
     which this Nation has always been committed, and to which we 
     are committed today at home and around the world.
       Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, 
     that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any 
     hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to 
     assure the survival and the success of liberty.
       This much we pledge--and more.

  Well, that set a standard for this country, a high water mark, if you 
will. And many criticized this as imperialistic rhetoric. But neither 
that President nor any since him have suggested that we aspire to 
territory--what we do aspire to is freedom.
  Prior to winning the cold war, a hot one had ended. And then we won 
the Cold War.
  As World War II ended, an agreement called Yalta was struck, signed 
by Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt. It promised newly liberated 
countries of Eastern and Central Europe that they would have a chance 
at freedom and free elections. Mr. Stalin broke his agreement and the 
countries of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and many more were denied 
the promise offered at Yalta.
  I suggest one of many reasons that we should expand NATO is that we 
have a moral obligation to live up to the terms that were made at Yalta 
but went unfulfilled, especially with these three countries, as I said, 
which openly rebelled against Soviet domination.
  Whether you agree with expanding NATO or not, I believe the crux of 
the issue is two questions. As we stand at the end of this century I 
ask you, has human nature fundamentally changed from this century's 
beginning to its end? I ask you the second question: Is the world 
better because of the standing and position of the United States in the 
world as a leader of the free world? I suggest the answer to the first 
question is, human nature has not fundamentally changed but that the 
world is a better place because the United States of America has lived 
up to its international responsibilities.
  I have been throughout my life a student of history. I have 
particularly enjoyed European history. As I look at the Balkans today 
and I see the turmoil and the terror that rage between the Balkans, the 
Croats and the Serbs, I am reminded that the Balkans are but a 
microcosm of Europe as a whole throughout its history. As I look at 
this century and European history, I see the United States of America 
as having twice been drawn into European civil wars over the first 50 
years. But for the last 50 years we have been waging peace. And we have 
done it through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
  And lest you think this does not matter anymore and it is over and we 
can go home, I remind you, looking further back in history, you will 
see since the 1600s when Europeans began to settle in America 
establishing colonies in Virginia, Massachusetts, and throughout the 
eastern seaboard--since that time there have been nine major European 
wars. In every one of them, Americans died. We were drawn into them. 
America has a role in European history. We have come out of Europe; we 
are even a European power. I suggest to you that Europe has been at 
peace for 50 years because America did not retreat and become 
isolationist. NATO has been called the most successful military 
alliance in history, and so it is.
  I believe that all the discussion about the costs of NATO expansion--
we have heard wild estimates that are undoubtedly false, and we have 
heard other estimates that are as low as saying that over 10 years 
America will pay $400 million to participate in this portion of NATO 
expansion. I believe the latter. I have to say, if history teaches us 
anything, it is that nature abhors a vacuum and we can either fill that 
vacuum with our values or leave it there for the mischief of others. 
How can we morally say to the Hungarians, the Czechs, and the Poles 
that even though we won the cold war and they were at play throughout 
it, that we now want to walk away from this victory without leaving our 
values, democratic institutions, the spreading of private property, of 
free elections, and great dreams for these nations? I don't believe we 
can.
  I do know that history teaches us that waging peace, or peacekeeping, 
is always less expensive than war. So when a mother in Oregon asks me, 
why should we expand NATO and put at risk the life of a son or daughter 
to die for a Czech, a Hungarian or a Pole, my answer to her is that in 
order that your son or daughter not die in that cause, we should expand 
NATO.
  Now, where does this leave Russia? I am not anti-Russia; I am hopeful 
for Russia. But as part of NATO expansion, the Clinton administration 
has held out to Russia, along with our NATO allies, the Russia-NATO 
Founding Act. I happened to be present in Paris when this was signed. 
Now, there are parts of this that give me heartburn, but there are 
parts that give me great hope, because with this Founding Act I think 
what we have done is held out to Russia the opportunity to develop in 
the best of ways and to become a part of the Western community of 
European nations. But if it does not develop that way, what we are 
doing by expanding NATO is hedging against the worst kinds of 
developments there. I think we must do that. I think we owe it to our 
friends, the Czechs, the Hungarians, and the Poles. But more, we owe it 
to ourselves, as defenders of peace and liberty in the world.

  I began with the words of John F. Kennedy and I will end with them, 
also, again from his inaugural address. I will say it is my view that 
America is the indispensable nation. Europe needs what we bring in its 
history. They need us in Bosnia to help keep the peace. They need us in 
NATO in order that they not begin fighting again. I believe NATO is 
really responsible for the Franco-Prussian rapprochement that has 
occurred since the founding of NATO. I believe NATO's existence has 
helped to settle disputes between the British and the Spanish. It is 
helping to settle disputes between the Hungarians, who are offered 
membership, and the Romanians, who still want membership in NATO. In 
instance after instance, you will see where NATO membership provides a 
vehicle for these kinds of differences to be worked out. And they are 
long-lasting cultural, ethnic, religious kinds of differences which 
have manifested themselves throughout European history in bloodshed. 
NATO means that those things don't occur. Again, waging peace is always 
less expensive than waging war, either in terms of treasure or 
especially in terms of human life. So we are, I think, the keeper of 
the peace, and it is in our interest that we remain so.
  In America, we often talk about the American dream. But really it 
isn't America's dream, it is a human dream. It is a dream that all 
people aspire to. It is just that we enjoy it in great abundance--life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. And we must continue to keep 
that dream and to defend it in the world for our sakes, not just 
theirs.
  So said President John F. Kennedy in 1961,


[[Page S2261]]


       ``To those new states whom we welcome to the ranks of the 
     free, we pledge our word that one form of colonial control 
     shall not have passed away merely to be replaced by a far 
     more iron tyranny. We shall not always expect to find them 
     supporting our view, but we shall always hope to find them 
     supporting their own freedom.

  I believe we should expand NATO for that reason, because these people 
deserve freedom. They can secure it with our help. With that security 
will come capital and investment so that their labor can be busy, so 
that their dreams can be realized, and so that American opportunity 
there can also be expanded. Security goes before economic investment. 
It always has, and it always will. Capital is something like a river. 
It will take the course of least resistance to seek the highest rate of 
progress.
  I don't believe our option is to expand NATO or to leave it as it is. 
I believe NATO desperately needs new blood. We desperately need the new 
voice of freedom that Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs will bring because 
they have known the opposite of freedom for too long. Some of us become 
complacent as to what that means. We need their blood, we need their 
spirit, we need their sense of freedom, so that we can keep NATO fresh 
and alive. Our option in the end isn't expanding NATO or not. But 
ultimately, if we don't expand, I believe we will disband, and that 
will leave a vacuum that will be filled by the values of others when 
history calls us to fill it on the basis of ours.
  I believe America is a better world because we are not isolationist 
but because we are internationalists who care not for territory or 
treasure but for freedom and liberty.
  Mr. President, the United States is engaged in an ambitious effort to 
reshape the political and security structures of post-cold-war Europe. 
The goal is to build strong states, stable democracies, prosperous 
economies, and friendly governments across the breadth of Europe. We 
are joined in this endeavor by our NATO allies and by newly democratic 
people yearning for the opportunity to pursue political freedom and 
economic prosperity.
  This effort should fulfill the stolen promise of Yalta, and provide 
the formerly captive nations of Central and Eastern Europe with the 
opportunity to pursue democratic institutions and economic development 
of their own choice. This is accomplished first and foremost through 
the enlargement of NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic.
  NATO has proven its value over the past half century as a mechanism 
through which the United States has been able to exercise leadership in 
Europe. By its unequivocal commitment to the collective defense of its 
members, NATO successfully withstood the communist threat posed by the 
former Soviet Union during the cold war. Though confronting communism 
is no longer NATO's primary purpose, a secondary function--the 
cementing of relationships between former adversaries in Europe--is 
equally as relevant in the post-cold-war period as it was after World 
War II. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, as well as other 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe that aspire to join NATO, have 
worked to alleviate historical grievances and build relationships with 
their neighbors based on mutual trust, respect, and cooperation. In 
doing so, stability in Europe has been enhanced and the likelihood that 
European nations will return to the competitive policies that led to 
two World Wars in the first part of this century is greatly reduced. It 
is in the interests of the United States to encourage and foster these 
developments.
  Last May, I travelled with President Clinton to Paris for the signing 
of the NATO-Russia Founding Act. After witnessing this historic event, 
I was left with a profound feeling that NATO was holding out a hand to 
Russia, and that addressing legitimate issues, such as international 
terrorism and drug trafficking, could be well served by NATO and Russia 
acting together. However, it is incumbent upon Russia to use this 
opportunity in a responsible manner. The consultative mechanism 
established by the Founding Act should be one that furthers the 
interests of both NATO and Russia, and is not used to infringe upon 
internal Alliance matters.
  It is also imperative that the goals of the Founding Act are 
implemented in a manner that does not weaken the principal function of 
the Alliance or threaten the interests of Central and Eastern European 
countries that aspire to NATO membership.

  Mr. President, I take this opportunity not to simply state my support 
for the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO, 
but also to address the issue of imposing a pause on NATO enlargement 
for several years. Before I do so, however, I emphasize that neither 
NATO, nor the United States, has invited any country other than Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic to join the Alliance. Proceeding with 
future rounds of enlargement is a decision that all members of NATO 
will certainly face, but is a question that is not before the United 
States Senate today.
  In Article 10, the North Atlantic Treaty clearly lays out the process 
by which NATO may invite additional countries to join the Alliance. 
This provision states ``The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite 
any other European State in a position to further the principles of 
this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic 
area to accede to this Treaty''. Of course, any such revision to the 
North Atlantic Treaty requires the advice and consent of the United 
States Senate, which is what brings us here today.
  I wholeheartedly agree with my colleagues who want to ensure that 
NATO remains a strong, military alliance of democratic nations. 
However, I firmly believe that Article 10 of the Treaty sets a high 
standard for the inclusion of new members--not only must a country be 
in a position to further the principles of democracy, but must be a 
contributor, not just a beneficiary, of security. The possibility of 
Alliance membership has been a source of hope to countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe and an important incentive for democratic and 
economic reform. Were the United States to impose an artificial time 
period when NATO's door will be shut--despite the qualifications of a 
country for membership--would send a signal to these countries emerging 
from communist domination that their historical affiliation is more 
important to NATO than their ability to contribute to security and 
stability in Europe.
  History awaits American leadership at this propitious moment. We 
cannot be certain what the European security environment will look like 
in three, five, or ten years, but if we act now, we will be better 
prepared for any outcome. We should not be overly consumed with the 
picture of Europe as it looked during the last century. It is up to the 
United States to outline a vision of what we want Europe to look like 
in the next century. That vision is a democratic, undivided, Europe 
safe for American commerce and friendly to American values. That vision 
includes Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO.
  I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I seek recognition to speak on this issue 
of NATO enlargement and ask unanimous consent that Senator Dorgan be 
allowed to follow me.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DURBIN. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, we are debating something of historic proportion, and 
that is the question of whether or not the NATO alliance shall be 
enlarged to include three countries. At this point, those three 
countries are Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. This is not a 
new concept.
  In 1994, the United States announced that we were, in fact, going to 
consider the enlargement of NATO. Why? The world has changed so 
dramatically. The Berlin Wall is down. The Soviet Union has dissipated, 
or at least broken up into different political entities. We are 
starting to see the world in different terms. For over 50 years, we saw 
the world in terms of East and West, the Soviet Union and the United 
States, the cold war.

[[Page S2262]]

  How many of us, as kids in the 1950s, huddled under our desks in 
preparation for the possibility of an air raid? Now what a different 
world we live in--a world where the United States of America and its 
taxpayers, since 1991, have given to Russia over $100 billion in an 
effort to help that country get back on its feet. What was once our 
mortal enemy, a country that we literally spent $6 trillion to defend 
against, is now our ally. So we view the world in much different terms, 
and now we should view NATO in different terms.
  My colleagues who come to the floor in opposition to NATO enlargement 
are stuck in old thinking, as far as I am concerned. They view Europe, 
East and West, in terms of lines that were drawn by Adolf Hitler and 
Joseph Stalin. We should not. We should view Europe and its future in 
terms of a new century and new opportunities.
  When you visit a country like Poland--which I did a year ago--and 
realize now that the Poland of today is not looking to the East, but 
rather to the West, that the Poland of today wants to be part of an 
axis which includes Western Europe, the United States, and freedom-
loving countries around the world, then you can understand the momentum 
and impetus behind the enlargement of NATO. These countries like 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are willing to step away from 
the old Soviet way of doing things; they are willing to pledge 
themselves to human rights, respecting the borders of their neighbors, 
and to civilian controlling of the military, and to free markets. They 
are prepared to join NATO because they know NATO is the future.
  What an alliance NATO has been in the history of the world. If you 
study the history of the world and consider all of the different 
countries that have come together for various reasons, NATO is an 
anomaly, NATO is an oddity. Why? Because it is a purely defensive 
alliance. It was created by the United States and our allies after 
World War II to defend Western Europe against the possibility of Soviet 
aggression and expansion. Throughout its history, since 1949, NATO has 
consistently stood for that principle. There is not a single instance 
that anyone can point to in the history of the alliance where the NATO 
countries have come together in an aggressive way to try to take over 
some other country. It is just not the nature of that alliance.
  So when I hear the criticisms--and you hear them from many people who 
come to this floor--that the Russians are worried about NATO expansion, 
my obvious question is, Why? Why would any country be concerned about 
other countries coming together simply to defend their own borders and 
pledge themselves to principles that I think all freedom-loving 
countries should be dedicated to? This troubles me, too. If there is 
genuine concern in Russia that these countries are going to come 
together in a defensive alliance, maybe the defensive alliance is 
necessary. It is something to pin our hopes on the relationship between 
the United States and Russia on the medical reports on Boris Yeltsin. I 
hope that he continues in power for a long time. I am happy to report 
that, by and large, with few exceptions, his relationship with the 
United States has been a very positive one. But we have to accept the 
reality that there will be change in Russia. I hope it is change for 
the better.
  Now put yourself in the shoes of Poland, Hungary, or the Czech 
Republic, or, for that matter, the Baltic States. What gamble are they 
willing to take about the future of Russia? What they have said to us 
is: We feel comfortable coming together with you in an alliance, which 
will stabilize our boundaries and give us some certainty about our 
future. So if a future leader in Russia is more conservative, more 
liberal, more expansionist, or more friendly, they know that they have 
this alliance to turn to.
  When you look at those who are supporting the idea of expanding the 
NATO alliance, the list is very impressive. It includes not only 
General Colin Powell, but former President Bush, Margaret Thatcher, 
Lech Walesa, and Vaclav Havel. The list goes on and on and on. These 
leaders, worldwide, understand what NATO means.

  Now, let me say this. Some criticize this NATO enlargement by saying, 
``There they go again. They are ending up giving away U.S. taxpayer 
dollars for the defense of Europe. Shouldn't the Europeans be defending 
themselves?'' The answer is, of course, that they should. That is their 
own personal responsibility. I, for one, in my 15 years on Capitol Hill 
in the House and Senate, have argued for burdensharing at every turn in 
the road. I think more and more of these countries should accept that 
responsibility.
  But let's be honest. If these countries come together, if they agree 
on certain standards for their own military development, if they agree 
on certain principles, if this alliance is in place and strong, the 
likelihood of needing these military forces is dramatically diminished. 
And each of these new countries that wants to join us in NATO has 
proven their bona fides in terms of their good-faith effort to be part 
of a Western alliance by already committing troops when we have asked, 
some in the Persian Gulf war, some in Bosnia.
  In fact, in the situation in Bosnia, Lithuania sent a brigade down 
and within a few weeks one of their soldiers was killed by a landmine. 
It was devastating news in that tiny country. It might have led their 
legislature to convene and bring their troops home from Bosnia. But 
they did not. They convened and, with a vote that should tell you about 
their view of the world, voted to send even more forces down to Bosnia. 
To prove that they wanted to be part of this alliance, they were 
willing to put their troops and the lives of their countrymen on the 
line.
  That story is repeated over and over. This is a positive thing. This 
is something that we should view in terms of NATO's future as really, I 
guess, an excellent start for the 21st century--that we are now at a 
point where we can talk about all of these countries--which once were 
at war and in the past had been rivals with conflicting ideologies--
that are now coming together.
  Some have said, Well, let's not hurry this debate. Can't this wait 6 
months or a year? I suppose it could, but I hope it doesn't, because we 
have spent more than 4 years preparing for this debate. We have gone 
through lengthy hearings in the Foreign Operations Committee. We have 
had many people meet--NATO allies and others--to discuss the expansion 
of NATO. We have studied this to the point where we can make an 
intelligent and mature decision, and we should.
  Last Friday night in Chicago, IL--which is in my home State and which 
boasts the largest Polish population outside of the city of Warsaw, 
Poland--we entertained the new President of the Assembly of Poland. 
Marian Krzaklewski is the new President and a member of the Solidarity 
party. I can't tell you what this issue means to the future of Poland. 
Any of you who have studied World War II and understand the devastation 
that was wrought on Poland as a result of World War II understand how 
important it is to the people of Poland today to have the security of 
an alliance that they can count on. We, of course, know of the tragedy 
of the Polish Jews who were lost in the Holocaust, but there were many 
others of other religions, and some of no religion, but they were all 
victims in World War II. The numbers stretch into the hundreds of 
thousands and millions. That is the legacy of war in countries like 
Poland.
  For those who come to the floor saying, ``Can't we wait 6 months or a 
year before we give to countries like Poland the assurance that those 
days are behind them?'' I have to say that I think that is 
shortsighted. I think the right thing for America to do is to follow 
the leadership of the President, follow the bipartisan support on the 
floor of the U.S. Senate, and enlarge NATO. This Senate should vote for 
the enlargement, first, to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic, and then, frankly, open it up to any other country that is 
able and willing to dedicate itself to these same principles.
  We don't like to think in terms of the military and war; we tend to 
focus more on domestic life in the United States, as we should. But I 
happen to believe that an investment in our time and debate on this 
issue at this moment is the right thing to do. I believe that if we 
make the proper move today, this week, and next week in the Senate to 
debate this issue fully and vote on it, we can bring together the kind 
of alliance that will give our children and

[[Page S2263]]

grandchildren peace of mind for decades to come. I hope that we will do 
that, and I hope that we will understand, as well, that what is at 
stake here is more than just a debate over a single issue; what is at 
stake here is whether the legacy of World War II and the legacy of the 
cold war will or will not be revisited on our friends in Europe.
  The United States cannot be the policeman for the world, but we can 
ally ourselves with other nations of like mind and like values, who 
will join us in bringing stability to this Earth, so that the day may 
never come when we are asked to send large numbers of Americans to 
fight in foreign lands for issues and causes and for American 
interests. These are things that I think are part of this debate today.
  I close by saying that I appreciate this time to speak, and I hope my 
other colleagues will join me. I don't know that there is another 
single issue relative to global security that is more important than 
this debate about the future of NATO. I hope that the United States and 
our NATO allies will write our foreign policy and plan our future based 
on the interests and values that have held us together as a Nation for 
over 200 years.
  When the argument is made that moving forward with the expansion of 
NATO makes some people nervous in Moscow, I have to ask, Why should it? 
Why should we not even hold out the possibility that the day will come 
when Russia will ask to be part of NATO? It is not an incredible idea. 
The thought that they would give civilian control of the military, 
pledge to the same principles, and cooperate with the United States--
that should be the new world order; that should be the new thinking.
  But the belief that we should hold back and not engage these other 
countries in an alliance, important for our security and theirs, 
because of some misgivings among some hardliners in Moscow is just 
plain wrong. We should be driven by foreign policy decisions right for 
America, right for our allies. We should not be driven by the 
melancholy of the few in Moscow who long for the return of empire. When 
you hear the argument made that we can include Warsaw Pact countries 
like the three I mentioned, and that is all right, but you can't 
include former republics like the Baltic States, it troubles me 
greatly. My mother was born in Lithuania, so I come to this debate with 
a special interest, and maybe even some prejudice is involved.
  For 50 years, we refused to recognize Soviet domination over the 
population of those sovereign states and thought they were entitled to 
have their own self-government. We ignored Soviet domination and we 
fought Soviet domination for over 50 years. And now, to defer to some 
Russian thinking that because these republics that were once part of 
the Soviet Union want to be in NATO, that is supposedly unthinkable, I 
disagree. For the Baltic States and so many other countries in Eastern 
Europe and near the Baltic Sea, NATO really is their security of the 
future. It is something the United States can be proud to support. I 
know they will be supportive of the values which we treasure in this 
country.
  Mr. President, I yield the remainder of my time.
  Mr. DORGAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I enjoyed hearing the comments of my 
colleague from Illinois, Senator Durbin. He, as always, is interesting 
and thoughtful, and he comes to this debate with a substantial amount 
of knowledge about the foreign policy issues. I appreciate his 
position.
  I must confess, however, that I come to the Senate with a different 
position on this issue. I want to explain why I have reached that 
position.
  I must confess, also, that I am not someone who considers himself an 
expert in foreign policy. There are some--only a handful of Members 
here in the Senate--who spend a great deal of their time thinking about 
and working on foreign policy issues. I have great respect for them. 
But I don't consider myself a part of that group of Senate foreign 
policy experts.
  But all of us in the Senate have some acquaintance with the questions 
that are presented to us on issues of international policy. And NATO 
expansion is one such issue. Indeed, as I indicated yesterday, it is a 
``legislative main course.'' NATO expansion is a very significant 
matter for this country and for many other countries in the world that 
are affected. One of those countries is Russia.
  Russia is an important part of our future, and our relationship with 
Russia will have a significant impact on the future of everyone in this 
country. I want to speak about that just a bit, because Senator Durbin 
also alluded to that issue.
  I want to remind my colleagues that some while ago I stood on the 
floor of the Senate and held up a piece of metal that came from a 
missile silo near Pervomaysk, Ukraine, a silo that had held a Soviet 
missile aimed at the United States. But the piece of metal I held up 
here on the floor of the Senate was no longer a missile. It was scrap 
metal. The missile is gone from the silo and destroyed. The weapon does 
not any longer exist. Where there was a missile with a nuclear warhead 
aimed at the United States, planted in that ground in the Ukraine now 
are sunflowers--planted on exactly that same ground. The missile is 
gone. The warhead is gone. Sunflowers are planted.
  How did that happen? Was it by magic? No. It was as a result of arms 
control agreements between this country and the then Soviet Union, now 
Russia, that required the reduction of nuclear devices and systems to 
deliver them. It was also the result of U.S. funding initiated here in 
the Senate--funding that comes from the Nunn-Lugar program--that 
actually helps to pay for the destruction of Russian nuclear weapons 
that had previously been aimed at this country. We have had very 
substantial success in reducing Russia's nuclear stockpile.
  We have had that success not just because the Soviet Union no longer 
exists. We have had that success because Russia and the United States 
abide by a series of arms control agreements that call for the 
reduction of nuclear weapons, the reduction of missiles, and the 
reduction of bombers. And that reduction has taken place. It means that 
this is a safer world.
  So, the Soviet Union has disappeared. Eastern Europe and the Warsaw 
Pact in Eastern Europe has dramatically changed. There is no Soviet 
Union. There is no Warsaw Pact. There is Russia. There are Baltic 
States. There exists in Eastern Europe a series of countries that are 
now free and democratic. The world has changed dramatically.
  All of this relates to the discussion we are having today. I want to 
describe how and why.
  But I wonder, in the context of this issue of the reduction of the 
nuclear threat, how many of my colleagues--for that matter, the 
American people--are aware of an incident that occurred on December 3, 
1997, in the dark hours of the morning. North of Norway in the Barents 
Sea, several Russian ballistic missile submarines prepared to fire SS-
20 missiles. Each of these missiles could carry 10 nuclear warheads and 
travel 5,000 miles--far enough to have reached the United States from 
the Barents Sea.

  That morning, on December 3, 1997, the submarines launched 20 of 
those SS-20 missiles. Twenty of them roared skyward. Swiftly they rose 
to an altitude of tens of thousands of feet. U.S. satellites quickly 
detected these missiles and tracked them as they rose. Our early 
warning phased array radars in Thule, Greenland, and Flylingdales, 
England, tracked the missiles.
  The radars and satellites alerted the U.S. Space Command Missile 
Warning Center at the NORAD complex in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. 
Space Command plotted the trajectories to determine where the missiles 
were going.
  However, within a few moments, every single one of those SS-20 
missiles blew up at about 30,000 feet. Why? Because this wasn't a 
Russian missile attack. In fact, seven American weapons inspectors were 
watching from a ship a few miles away as the missiles were launched 
from the Russian submarines. These were self-destruct launches. It was 
a quicker and cheaper way for Russia to destroy submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles, which it was required to do under the START I arms 
reduction treaty. These were self-destruct launches to destroy missiles 
under the START treaty.
  These missile launches should remind all of us about what the 
ultimate security threat to the United States has

[[Page S2264]]

been. Only Russia, if it desired today, can renew the hair-trigger 
nuclear tensions of the cold war. Only Russia could do that. And only 
Russia can destroy its nuclear weapons and its delivery mechanisms, 
missiles and bombers, by which it delivers those weapons. Whether we 
like it or not, we must take this into account when we evaluate 
international security issues. Yes, even in the debate about the 
expansion of NATO, we must evaluate those issues in the context of our 
relationship with Russia and with others, but especially with Russia.
  I don't come to the floor of the Senate saying that Russia should 
have some kind of special veto power over American foreign policy. 
Russia should really play no role in our decision about what is best 
for this country. But the opportunity to reduce the nuclear threat, the 
real opportunity that has allowed us to reduce in real terms the 
nuclear threat, is something that we should take into account.
  When we talk about expanding NATO with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic, I think of the story I heard one day in the dark days of the 
fight for a free Czechoslovakia when very courageous, brave men and 
women were storming the streets of Czechoslovakia demanding their 
freedom. I remember the story about Mr. Havel, who was a playwright and 
an intellectual who then became President of that new democracy. I 
remember how at midnight the knock on his door from the Communist 
secret police was a knock that he knew too well because it had come 
before. He knew it was the secret police. He knew he would be arrested 
again. He knew they would throw him in jail again, because he had been 
in jail before. I remember the story about this courageous man and what 
he did for his country. I remember the stories about in the middle of 
the crowd in downtown Prague someone standing on the upper strut of a 
streetlight hanging with one arm and reciting the Declaration of 
Independence of the United States of America. Think of that--a crowd in 
Prague inspiring itself by a recitation of the Declaration of 
Independence of the United States of America.
  We understand what we mean to much of that part of the world. We know 
that this democracy has given great inspiration to those who want 
freedom and who have had the courage to fight for freedom in their 
countries. We understand all of that. And I think it is critically 
important that in every way possible we support these emerging 
democracies. Our relationships with them are important to this country.
  However, expanding NATO is a much larger question than that as well. 
It involves a number of broader issues. Again, I say that there are 
other Senators who have had longer relationships with the question of 
NATO than I have had.

  But it seems to me, first, that NATO has largely been a security 
alliance over many years and a very successful alliance at that. It 
also seems to me that the decision that has been made to expand NATO is 
largely a decision that moves in the direction of forming an economic 
alliance, or one that meets the economic needs of the new members.
  Second, to the extent that it remains a security alliance, it, of 
course, will require countries in Europe, many of whom can least afford 
it, to spend a substantial amount of additional money on new arms to 
bring them to the standards that NATO requires. The requirement that 
the new entrants to NATO rearm, modernize their military equipment, to 
bring themselves up to NATO standards, also means that some of us are 
very concerned that in the end, while some of that burden will fall on 
these countries, much of that burden will fall on us.
  This leads me to the third issue. The question of what this expansion 
will cost the United States produces answers that wildly roam all over 
the board. I have not found a good answer except that most do not know 
the answer to the question. It is an important question. What will NATO 
expansion cost the taxpayers of the United States?
  And the fourth issue is the one I have spoken about at length. What 
does NATO expansion mean to the long-term security interests of the 
United States? Will expansion of NATO lessen the danger of nuclear war? 
Will it lessen the danger of nuclear threat? Will the expansion of NATO 
forge a continued, new, or expanded relationship with Russia that will 
allow us to reduce even further the nuclear threat? Will NATO expansion 
allow us to continue to reduce the number of warheads and delivery 
vehicles, to lessen the nuclear threat for us and all the people of the 
world? I fear the answer to that is no.
  I think the expansion of NATO will likely create divisiveness in our 
critical relationships with Russia and with some other nations as well. 
We have made great progress in our relationship with Russia. I hope 
that progress will include a decision by the Russian Duma to ratify 
START II and immediate movement by Russia to begin START III talks. But 
I fear that NATO expansion will retard that kind of movement, which I 
think is very important to us. We must continue the progress we have 
made in reducing the nuclear threat.
  It is interesting to me how many people would have predicted in this 
Chamber--the best foreign policy thinkers or anywhere in this country--
how many would have predicted that, if you backed up 10 years ago, that 
in 5 years or 10 years the following will exist in our world: There 
will be no Berlin Wall, there will be no Warsaw Pact, Eastern Europe 
will be free, there will be no Soviet Union, the Ukraine will be 
nuclear-free, and spots in the Ukraine that used to hold missiles and 
nuclear warheads will now hold sunflowers. How many would have 
predicted that? I bet almost no one.
  We have made enormous progress. To the extent that we feel that the 
cold war and the tensions between us and the Soviet Union, produced a 
nuclear threat, and to the extent that we have moved away from that 
with Russia, that is wonderful progress for the entire world.
  The question today is not just a narrow question of, Shall we admit 
three additional countries to NATO? The question is much, much more 
than that. It deals with other relationships. It deals with the issue 
of nuclear proliferation of weapons and delivery mechanisms and so on, 
and the desire by many of us to move along quickly, not slowly, on the 
question of further arms reduction talks and treaties and agreements 
that will further reduce the nuclear threat. That is what is embodied 
in this question.
  I have spent a lot of time reading about this issue, studying this 
issue, and trying to understand this issue. As I said when I started, I 
confess I am not a foreign policy expert. But I believe very strongly 
that a security alliance as successful as NATO has been should not 
become an economic alliance; should not become an alliance that imposes 
new burdens on countries that can least afford to ramp up military 
spending in order to comply with NATO requirements; should not, in any 
event, add substantial new burdens to the American taxpayers; and 
should not, especially and most importantly, do anything that 
interrupts the stream of progress we have made in reducing the nuclear 
threat through arms reduction talks, treaties, and agreements.
  I am fairly well convinced that this step to expand, which to some 
seems so modest, is just a step in the wrong direction.
  Can we, should we, will we be involved with the Czech Republic, 
Poland, and Hungary, with or without NATO expansion? Of course. They 
are wonderful people. They are countries that are very important. Our 
relationship with them is very important. I have just come to the 
conclusion, however, that this proposal to expand NATO is not a step in 
a constructive direction.
  The columnist David Broder yesterday wrote a column that I think was 
important in this discussion. He indicated that this debate about NATO 
seemed to be forming here in the Congress with almost no fanfare, and 
the implication of his column was that that is not the way it should 
happen.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Broder's column be 
inserted into the Record.
  There being no objection, the column was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Post, Mar. 18, 1998]

                 Deciding NATO's Future Without Debate

                          (By David S. Broder)

       This week the United States Senate, which counts among its 
     major accomplishments

[[Page S2265]]

     this year renaming Washington National Airport for former 
     president Ronald Reagan and officially labeling Saddam 
     Hussein a war criminal, takes up the matter of enlarging the 
     20th century's most successful military alliance, the North 
     Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
       The Senate just spent two weeks arguing over how to slice 
     up the pork in the $214 billion highway and mass transit 
     bill. It will, if plans hold, spend only a few days on moving 
     the NATO shield hundreds of miles eastward to include Poland, 
     Hungary and the Czech Republic.
       The reason is simple. As Sen. Connie Mack of Florida, the 
     chairman of the Senate Republican Conference, told me while 
     trying to herd reluctant senators into a closed-door 
     discussion of the NATO issue one afternoon last week, ``No 
     one is interested in this at home,'' so few of his colleagues 
     think it worth much of their time.
       It is a cliche to observe that since the Cold War ended, 
     foreign policy has dropped to the bottom of voters' concerns. 
     But, as two of the veteran senators who question the wisdom 
     of NATO's expansion--Democrat Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New 
     York and Republican John Warner of Virginia--remarked in 
     separate interviews, serious consideration of treaties and 
     military alliances once was considered what the Senate was 
     for.
       No longer. President Clinton's national security adviser, 
     Sandy Berger, has pressed Majority Leader Trent Lott to get 
     the NATO deal done before Clinton leaves Sunday on a trip to 
     Africa. When Warner and others said the matter should be 
     delayed until the Senate has time for a full-scale debate, 
     Lott refused. He pointed out that a Senate delegation had 
     joined Clinton at NATO summits in Paris and Madrid last year 
     (no sacrifice being too great for our solons) and that there 
     had been extensive committee hearings.
       Wrapping the three former Soviet satellites in the warm 
     embrace of NATO is an appealing notion to many senators, 
     notwithstanding the acknowledgment by advocates that the 
     Czech Republic and Hungary have a long way to go to bring 
     their military forces up to NATO standards. As the date for 
     ratification has approached, successive estimates of the 
     costs to NATO have been shrinking magically, but the latest 
     NATO estimate of $1.5 billion over the next decade is barely 
     credible.
       The administration, in the person of Secretary of State 
     Madeleine Albright, has steadfastly refused to say what 
     happens next if NATO starts moving eastward toward the border 
     of Russia. ``The door is open'' to other countries with 
     democratic governments and free markets, Albright says. The 
     administration is fighting an effort by Warner and others to 
     place a moratorium on admission of additional countries until 
     it is known how well the first recruits are assimilated.
       Moynihan points out that if the Baltic countries of Latvia, 
     Estonia and Lithuania, which are panting for membership, are 
     brought in, the United States and other signatories will have 
     a solemn obligation to defend territory farther east than the 
     western-most border of Russia. He points to a Russian 
     government strategy paper published last December saying the 
     expansion of NATO inevitably means Russia will have to rely 
     increasingly on nuclear weapons.
       Moynihan and Warner are far from alone in raising alarms 
     about the effect of NATO enlargement on U.S.-Russian 
     relations. The Duma, Russia's parliament, on Jan. 23 passed a 
     resolution calling NATO expansion the biggest threat to 
     Russia since the end of World War II. The Duma has blocked 
     ratification of the START II nuclear arms agreement signed in 
     1993 and approved by the Senate two years ago.
       George Kennan, the elder statesman who half a century ago 
     devised the fundamental strategy for ``containment'' of the 
     Soviet Union, has called the enlargement of NATO a classic 
     policy blunder. Former senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, until his 
     retirement last year the Democrats' and the Senate's leading 
     military authority, told me, ``Russian cooperation in 
     avoiding proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is our 
     most important national security objective, and this [NATO 
     expansion] makes them more suspicious and less cooperative. . 
     . . The administration's answers to this and other serious 
     questions are what I consider to be platitudes.''
       Former senator Mark Hatfield of Oregon, for 30 years 
     probably the wisest ``dove'' in that body, agrees, as do 
     former ambassadors to Moscow and other Americans with close 
     contacts in Russia.
       To the extent this momentous step has been debated at all, 
     it has taken place outside the hearing of the American 
     people. Too bad our busy Senate can't find time before it 
     votes to let the public in on the argument.

  Mr. DORGAN. I placed David Broder's column in the Record because I 
agree with what he says. NATO expansion is a big issue. It is an 
important issue. We all come to this issue with our points of view, and 
no one knows exactly what the future will hold. But this country 
deserves a long, full, thoughtful Senate debate on the question of NATO 
expansion and then a vote. This President deserves a vote on expansion 
as well.
  But when the vote comes, I have concluded I think the best course for 
this country, the best course for the world for that matter, and the 
best course to stimulate further reductions in the nuclear threat for 
this world, is to vote ``no'' on this particular plan for NATO 
expansion.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor, and I make a point of order that a 
quorum is not present.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
Senator is recognized.
  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as if in 
morning business for 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The remarks of Mr. Gregg are printed in today's Record in ``Morning 
Business.'')
  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I make the point of order a quorum is not 
present.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, let me observe, first, that I have had the 
opportunity off and on during the day to listen to some of the debate 
on the NATO enlargement issue. I have to say there have been some 
excellent speeches and some very thoughtful observations about the 
importance of this legislation and what we should do. I am glad we have 
gone ahead and taken it up. It has given Members notice that we are 
moving toward a period where we will have the final debate on 
amendments and a vote on this issue. But I have been very impressed 
with the quality of the speeches that I have heard today. We will 
continue on until, I think it is quarter till 5, this afternoon on NATO 
enlargement. We will continue to have debate on NATO enlargement until 
we get something worked out on the Coverdell education savings account 
legislation and conclude that, and then we will go to the final round 
of debate and amendments on NATO enlargement.
  The way we are doing the debate, the dual track of both the education 
issue and NATO enlargement, is not intended at all to diminish either. 
It is intended to raise up both of them and the awareness and 
consciousness of the American people and give Senators an opportunity 
to make their positions known on both these issues. We will do them in 
a way where we will get a focus on the issue and have a good debate in 
the final analysis.
  Mr. WARNER. Will the distinguished leader yield?
  Mr. LOTT. Yes, I will yield.
  Mr. WARNER. I anticipated that, and I think it is working out. I, in 
many respects, wish it was more in block pieces. Very substantive 
debate has taken place in the last 48 hours, plus the Armed Services 
Committee held a 3-hour hearing on the subject. So work is going on 
very conscientiously on this subject.
  Mr. LOTT. I thank the Senator from Virginia for his comment and his 
thoughts on this important issue. I know he has a lot of reservations. 
That has a real impact here with his knowledge in the defense area, and 
we are going to be listening to his remarks.
  There have been good speeches on both sides. Senator Smith from 
Oregon gave a magnificent speech this afternoon, I thought one of the 
best I have heard this year.
  I think it is working, and we will have a focused debate when we get 
toward the end of the final debate.
  Mr. President, as in morning business, I would like to take this 
moment also to talk a little bit about the other issue that is pending 
before the Senate at this time.

                          ____________________