[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 31 (Thursday, March 19, 1998)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E421-E424]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



   THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY AND THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

                                 ______
                                 

                          HON. C.W. BILL YOUNG

                               of florida

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, March 19, 1998

  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I commend to my colleagues the 
following report on my trip to Bosnia and Herzegovina from March 6-8. 
At your request, I had the honor of leading a delegation of ten Members 
on an inspection trip to the Republic of Hungary and the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, from March 6-8. You asked us to review the 
current military operations and international assistance efforts 
involving Bosnia and the other former Yugoslav republics.
  We had an informative and productive trip, including meetings with 
President Bjilana Plavsic of the Republika Srpska (the Bosnian Serb 
Republic); the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; the Commander of NATO 
Stabilization Forces in Bosnia; other senior U.S. military and 
diplomatic personnel; U.S. troops in the field; senior military 
commanders from other nations participating in the Stabilization Force; 
and representatives of a variety of international assistance programs. 
On behalf of the other Members of the delegation, I am forwarding with 
this letter a detailed report which summarizes our activities and 
observations.
  Of course, I am available to discuss this trip as well as the 
significant policy questions associated with our involvement in Bosnia 
should you find it useful. In the meantime, I want to thank you again 
for providing this opportunity to me and our colleagues who made this 
trip.

          Congressional Delegation Trip Report March 5-9, 1998

       Members: Representatives C.W. Bill Young, Tom Sawyer, Neil 
     Abercrombie, Henry Bonilla, Tillie Fowler, Eddie Bernice 
     Johnson, David Minge, Charles Bass, George Nethercutt, Allan 
     Boyd.
       Purpose: At the request of the Speaker and Minority Leader 
     of the House, the delegation was asked to inspect and review 
     the current deployment of U.S. and NATO forces to Bosnia-
     Herzegovina and the status of U.S. and international civic 
     and economic recovery efforts.
       Itinerary: As shown below.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Date               Places visited             Officials met     
------------------------------------------------------------------------
March 5............  Depart Washington, D.C...  N/A                     
March 6............  Budapest, Hungary........  Deputy Chief of Mission,
                                                 U.S. Embassy; Defense  
                                                 Attache, U.S. Embassy; 
                                                 Liaison Officer to U.S.
                                                 Embassy, U.S.          
                                                 Stabilization Force    
                                                 (SFOR)                 
March 7............  Sarajevo, Bosnia.........  Supreme Allied          
                                                 Commander, NATO;       
                                                 Commander, U.S. Army in
                                                 Europe and             
                                                 Stabilization Force    
                                                 (SFOR); U.S. Ambassador
                                                 to Bosnia-Herzegovina; 
                                                 Deputy Commissioner,   
                                                 United Nations; High   
                                                 Commission on Refugees 
                                                 (UNHCR)                
                     Banja Luka, Bosnia.......  President of the        
                                                 Republika Srpska       
March 8............  Tuzla, Bosnia............  Commander, U.S. Task    
                                                 Force Eagle            
                     Camp McGovern, Bosnia....  Personnel of the U.S.   
                                                 1st Armored Division   
                                                 and 2nd Armored Cavalry
                                                 Regiment assigned to   
                                                 SFOR                   
                     Brcko, Bosnia............  Host-nation city and    
                                                 civic group officials; 
                                                 officials of the Office
                                                 of the High            
                                                 Representative for     
                                                 Brcko; officials of the
                                                 United Nations         
                                                 International Police   
                                                 Task Force (IPTF)      
March 9............  Return Washington, D.C...  N/A                     
------------------------------------------------------------------------

       Friday, March 6: Upon its arrival in Budapest, Hungary, the 
     delegation met with U.S. Embassy and U.S. military personnel 
     regarding the political, economic, and military outlook for 
     Hungary; NATO expansion (Hungary is one of the three proposed 
     new member nations); and Hungary-based operations associated 
     with the NATO-led Stabilization Force for Bosnia.
       Since turning to democracy in 1989, Hungary has pursued 
     domestic and foreign policies emphasizing the establishment 
     of democratic institutions and free market practices, and 
     integration into Western political, economic and security 
     institutions. There have been two national-level democratic 
     elections since 1990 with a third scheduled for this summer. 
     Hungary has encouraged outside investment and is the largest 
     recipient of foreign investment in Eastern Europe, including 
     more than $6 billion from the United States. Hungary has 
     joined the OECD, is slated to formally enter NATO in 1999, 
     and is pressing for membership in the European Economic 
     Community.
       The prospect of joining NATO enjoys broad political support 
     in Hungary, although it has not become a prominent issue 
     domestically. Embassy officials believe Hungary fully 
     recognizes its obligations upon joining NATO and note that 
     the government has committed to gradual increases in defense 
     spending which, in several years, will then be in line with 
     the NATO average (as expressed as a percentage of annual 
     government spending).
       Since 1989 Hungary has cut its armed forces by two-thirds 
     in size, and its intent is to streamline and modernize that 
     force in order to meet NATO needs, with an immediate goal of 
     learning how to ``think, speak, and act NATO.'' To that end 
     many senior Hungarian military officials have or are planning 
     to attend U.S. military war colleges. Both the Hungarian 
     government and U.S. officials believe this transition to 
     NATO's way of doing business must occur prior to any major 
     equipment modernization effort.
       In late 1995 Hungary responded to NATO requests and 
     permitted use of its airbase at Taszar as the major logistics 
     transhipment point for U.S. and other NATO forces involved in 
     the initial deployment of the Implementation Force (IFOR) to 
     Bosnia. While total personnel and activities at Taszar have 
     dropped with the completion of the initial Bosnia deployment 
     and stabilization of operations, NATO still maintains over 
     2100 personnel (military and civilian) there, under command 
     of an American major general, as part of the overall 
     Stabilization Force (SFOR). Taszar is the last waystation in, 
     and first waystation out, for U.S. forces involved in 
     operations in Bosnia or Croatia.
       Saturday, March 7: The delegation traveled to Bosnia with 
     the first stop in Sarajevo.
       The delegation first met at NATO SFOR Headquarters with 
     General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; 
     General Eric Shinseki, Commander, U.S. Army Europe and 
     Commander, SFOR; and U.S. Ambassador Rich Kauzlarich. General 
     Clark gave a briefing summarizing the NATO mission following 
     the Dayton Peace Agreement, with particular emphasis on 
     SFOR's continued success in stabilizing the overall security 
     situation, the greater pace of civic and political progress 
     in the past year, and recent efforts to marginalize Serb 
     hardliners.
       In questions and answers with delegation members, other key 
     points made by General Clark, General Shinseki and Ambassador 
     Kauzlarich included:
       1. While still lagging, there is growing progress on the 
     civilian side of the ledger in Bosnia:
       Joint governing institutions are beginning to function;
       The new Serb government in the Republika Srpska (``RS'') is 
     more committed to Dayton implementation and has moved to 
     reduce to the influence of Serb hardliners (especially the 
     so-called ``Pale faction'');
       The hardline Serb party's representation in the RS 
     parliament dropped from 54 percent to 28 percent in the 
     September 1997 elections;
       There has been steady progress in returns of refugees and 
     resettlement of displaced persons;
       The media is being restructured under Western supervision 
     and is no longer an anti-SFOR propaganda outlet;
       Freedom of movement within Bosnia is returning with 
     agreements reached on a common license plate and on 
     passports;
       More indicted war criminals have either been seized or 
     voluntarily turned themselves in;
       The Bosnian factions and the International Police Training 
     Foundation (IPTF) have reached agreement on a plan for police 
     restructuring which is now underway throughout most regions 
     of the country.
       In summary, Bosnian society is beginning to heal itself. 
     Among the general populace, there is a growing mindset that 
     people are building towards their futures, and not for war. 
     Elections are shifting power from those groups who started 
     the war and who impede Dayton implementation. Progress is 
     being made in establishing freedom of movement, refugee 
     returns to contentious areas such as Brcko are picking up, 
     and initial efforts to reform/retrain police are promising. 
     Yet in all these areas much more remains to be done.
       2. General Clark, General Shinseki, and Ambassador 
     Kauzlarich all stated SFOR must stay in Bosnia beyond the 
     previously-announced June 1998 withdrawal date. Recent gains, 
     while positive, are tenuous and will not hold absent 
     continued aggressive efforts to implement the Dayton 
     agreement with SFOR as the guarantor of a peaceful 
     environment.
       Current SFOR force levels (33,000 total, 8,500 U.S.) will 
     be maintained through the national elections scheduled for 
     September 1998. If successful, shortly thereafter U.S. forces 
     could be reduced by 20 percent, to 6,900. (There was no 
     discussion regarding contemplated changes in the number of 
     non-U.S. forces.)
       General Clark suggested that with sufficient progress in 
     improving the local policing function, SFOR could be 
     downsized even

[[Page E422]]

     further. There will be six-month reviews to consider 
     additional SFOR downsizing/restructuring. However, non-U.S. 
     financial and personnel support for the International Police 
     Task Force (IPTF), which is responsible for restructuring and 
     retraining local police, remains inadequate.
       3. The delegation was advised to be cautiously optimistic 
     regarding recent political shifts in the Republika Srpska, 
     particularly steps taken by President Plavsic and newly-
     elected Prime Minister Dodik. It is unclear whether they have 
     had a real change of heart regarding reforms or whether these 
     moves are tactical in nature. Nonetheless, their ability to 
     promote change is circumscribed given their current narrow 
     political margin, continued recalcitrance on the part of Serb 
     hardliners, and the sheer weight of problems confronting the 
     RS (the sorry state of the economy, the lack of knowledge, 
     institutions, and outside investment needed to establish a 
     more viable commercial sector, and the continued 
     pervasiveness of corruption, black markets, and bribery.)
       4. When asked, both General Clark and General Shinseki 
     declined to estimate how long the presence of U.S. forces 
     would be required, saying it is impossible to predict.
       At one point General Clark stated, somewhat off-handedly, 
     ``I don't see this as a 5-10 year problem . . . SFOR is 
     getting a little smaller, somewhat less expensive . . . If 
     [this September's] elections are successful, we should be 
     able to get even smaller.''
       At another juncture, General Clark said that the U.S. 
     component of SFOR is ``now down to the equivalent of three 
     combat battalions . . . it is not that much of a burden 
     anymore . . . we can meet our military requirements 
     elsewhere.'' He conceded that in the event of a major 
     conflict elsewhere that the U.S. role in SFOR would need to 
     be revisited.
       General Clark also cited the need for the just proposed 
     emergency supplemental for Bosnia, totaling $489 million. He 
     said these costs could not be absorbed and that they couldn't 
     be offset from within existing Department of Defense funds.
       5. All three officials pointed to economic reconstruction 
     as an essential element of any long-term strategy. Both 
     General Shinseki and Ambassador Kauzlarich indicated the lack 
     of jobs was the biggest impediment to the successful return 
     of displaced persons and refugees. They added that refugee 
     returns also require local security, a function now performed 
     by SFOR and one which eventually must be assumed by the 
     restructured police forces.
       6. At various points in the discussion, several members 
     inquired as to the national interests being served by the 
     U.S. deployment. General Clark responded by reviewing 
     Bosnia's strategic location and problems posed for Europe by 
     the Bosnian war, as well as the fissures which were opening 
     up within NATO during the 1993-1995 timeframe when UNPROFOR 
     was the international presence in Bosnia. General Clark 
     portrayed NATO as being on the brink of disintegration over 
     disagreements over what to do about Bosnia. The French and 
     British were on the verge of withdrawing their forces from 
     UNPROFOR, until the U.S. stepped forward in 1995 with its 
     bombing campaign against the Serbs and then sponsorship of 
     the Dayton negotiations. General Clark also said now that the 
     U.S. is in Bosnia, as part of NATO, a precipitous American 
     withdrawal would call into question U.S. credibility and 
     ability to live up to its commitments. In addition, at one 
     point he said ``We can't be successful in NATO if we aren't 
     successful in Bosnia.''
       Following this meeting, the delegation moved to the U.S. 
     Embassy in Sarajevo and met with U.S. Ambassador Kauzlarich 
     and other State Department officials. Joining this meeting in 
     progress was American Jacques Klein, the Deputy High 
     Commissioner of the United Nations High Commission on 
     Refugees (UNHCR).
       Ambassador Kauzlarich reviewed the embassy's various 
     missions, which include:
       Facilitation of refugee return process at a workable pace, 
     and in a fashion which promotes reintegration of ethnic 
     groups;
       Working with the Federation and the RS to restructure their 
     law enforcement institutions, including police restructuring 
     and orientation towards demonstratic policing, and 
     transformation of the judicial system;
       Advancement of democracy, by working towards free and fair 
     elections and implementation of the results, and also 
     pressing for a free and independent media;
       Promotion of reconstruction, by helping to facilitate 
     investment, assisting the governments in creating a legal 
     framework for a viable national economy, and also by 
     promoting American products as well as open markets to ensure 
     U.S. companies market access;
       And strengthening of peace and stability, by assisting 
     Federation military integration (former Muslim and Croat 
     armies), support for the ``Train and Equip'' program, and by 
     facilitating the work of the International War Crimes 
     Tribunal.
       The Ambassador reviewed the ``train and equip'' program 
     with the delegation and offered his opinion that besides 
     working to redress the Muslim/Croat military disadvantage 
     vis-a-vis the Serbs, it had important side benefits. These 
     include helping keep out Iran and other interests who had 
     supported the Muslims or Croatians during the war. It also 
     provides a forum whereby the Muslims and Croats are learning 
     to work together, not only at the military level but also at 
     the political level which is essential if the Federation 
     government is to become a success.
       The delegation then had the opportunity to question both 
     the Ambassador and Jacques Klein. In response to queries, Mr. 
     Klein explained the goal of being able to gradually withdraw 
     U.S. forces by disengaging them from many functions over time 
     as civilian institutions develop or are reestablished.
       Mr. Klein then expressed his view as to some of the larger 
     geopolitical issues involved in Bosnia. Simply stated, he 
     said, Europe does not want a Muslim-dominated state in the 
     region and a viable Serbia and Croatia are viewed as needed 
     to prevent that from happening.
       He then drew attention to the large Yugoslav refugee 
     population in Germany, whose eventual return is needed 
     because they will bring money, skills, and some measure of 
     stability back to the region.
       Mr. Klein remarked upon the Europeans initial response to 
     crises which is always to deny they need U.S. leadership. But 
     Bosnia has only provided the most recent example (over the 
     period of 1991-1995, including the failure of UNPROFOR) of 
     Europe's need for American leadership and capabilities, a 
     point most Europeans will now concede.
       Finally, on the matter of war criminals, Mr, Klein 
     suggested they are nothing but thugs. A pro-active, ``get-in-
     their-face'' policy is needed and will work because when 
     confronted with a professional military, they will always 
     back down.
       The delegation then traveled to Banja Luka in the Republika 
     Srpska, where it met with Bjilana Plavsic, the President of 
     the Republika Srpska.
       President Plavsic began with an opening statement and then 
     responded to questions from members of the delegation. In her 
     opening statement, the President cited her priorities as 
     being moving towards democratic procedures and also improving 
     the economy. She stated ordinarily economic improvement would 
     be the top priority but that without greater democracy, they 
     couldn't fully realize the necessary economic improvements. 
     She said the previous 50 years (under Communist rule) had 
     left the economy in quite a mess. The President also stressed 
     the need for the Ministry of the Interior and the justice 
     system to work, saying ``there must be a framework for a 
     legal economy.''
       She finished by proclaiming ``I as President must have the 
     power to replace people [who resist change], and I will do 
     so.''
       In response to questions from the delegation, President 
     Plavsic addressed a number of issues including:
       The role of SFOR and its importance: ``SFOR is keeping the 
     peace here. No amount of money is worth peace. If someone 
     started the war there would be no telling what the effects 
     would be . . . They are doing a very nice job, a noble job. 
     We couldn't even consider economic recovery without the 
     presence of foreign armies.''
       When she believes the U.S. and SFOR can withdraw: ``I will 
     tell you what I told President Clinton [when he visited 
     Bosnia in December 1997]: `we have started in a good way, but 
     we need your patience' . . . Please help us, it won't last 
     long. When we are offered a chance, the people will see this 
     and grab for it. Remember, Dayton is a creation of the U.S., 
     it is well balanced. Please support what you created . . . 
     Much progress can be lost with impatience.''
       On prospects for continued peace: ``Problems must be solved 
     by democratic means. Last June [when hardline Serb elements 
     were on the verge of staging a coup until SFOR intervened] 
     was difficult. Now we have elections, and for the first time 
     in decades people understand they do not have to go to war.''
       Regarding the refugee problem: ``The Republika Srpska has 
     1.2 million people, and 400,000 of those are refugees . . . 
     they must have homes, they must find work. With our new 
     government we can start new industrial and economic 
     processes.''
       On war criminals: ``We understand the obligations of 
     Dayton. This is a very sensitive and complex issue. But 
     Dayton isn't just a document, we must accept it . . . You 
     must realize this is difficult for Serbs to do to Serbs. Now 
     within the last 20 days, four men have [voluntarily] 
     surrendered to the Hague. There will be people who recognize 
     the problems of living a life under indictment, and I expect 
     we will see more in the next phase. This is the best way, for 
     Prime Minister Dodik and myself--it is also better for SFOR 
     troops.''
       Regarding the upcoming March 15th arbitration decision for 
     Brcko (an unsolicited comment): ``March 15th is Brcko. This 
     could make everything harder, it could be a destroyer. It 
     will only help the hardliners.''
       The role Radovan Karazdic is now playing and whether he 
     remains an obstacle: ``There have been great improvements in 
     the last 3, 4 months. There are new institutions in the 
     Republika Srpska responsible for policy. He did have 
     influence before, now he does not. His influence is getting 
     smaller and smaller. People just want to live their lives, 
     it's not right that we should accommodate just one person. I 
     have not had contacts with him in a long time.''
       On the ethnic violence in the Serbian province of Kosovo: 
     ``My opinion is not an official one. I am familiar with the 
     Balkans and Kosovo, it is in every Serb's heart. Tito made 
     many mistakes . . . he forced Serbs out of Kosovo and invited 
     Albanians in . . . Kosovo dates back to medieval times, there 
     are many Serb monasteries . . . Kosovo belongs to Serbia . . 
     . Milosevic should know

[[Page E423]]

     the police cannot solve this problem over the long haul, this 
     is another example of his bad policies . . . Kosovo, there 
     must be civil rights for all . . . if we do some thing 
     special for one group [evidently referring to Albanian 
     demands for automony], it is wrong.''
       When asked if whether she sees a future for multi-ethnic 
     relationships in the RS, in the Federation, in Croatia: 
     ``This is a priority . . . this must be achieved, but certain 
     things must be a pre-condition . . . In 1945, the Communists 
     rose, and the people were not allowed to say `I am a Serb, I 
     am Croatian, I am a Muslim.' For 50 years everything we 
     accumulated was very orthodox. Then Serbs, Muslims, Croatians 
     starting asking questions about who you are. This is 
     something that was not allowed in the United States. People 
     wanted to say who and what they are, and this is what started 
     the war. The Republika Srpska started with this, what is 
     wrong with people stating who we are and what we are.''
       Sunday, March 8: The delegation first traveled to Tuzla, 
     Bosnia.
       Upon arrival in Tuzla, the delegation proceeded to 
     Headquarters Task Force Eagle, the headquarters for both U.S. 
     forces deployed in Bosnia and for the overall operations in 
     the SFOR zone ``MND-North'' (Multi-National Division North). 
     The delegation first met with Major General Larry Ellis, 
     Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, who commands the 
     multinational forces in MND-North.
       General Ellis and his HQ staff briefed the delegation and 
     answered questions on current operations in MND-North as well 
     as particular issues of concern. Among the points covered:
       MND-North is currently comprised of 13,500 troops, made up 
     of U.S. troops drawn largely from the 1st Armored Division 
     (7,950 troops), a Nordic-Polish brigade (comprised of 2,800 
     troops from the Baltic States, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, 
     Finland and Poland), a Russian brigade (1,425), and a Turkish 
     brigade.
       The various armed factions within MND-North have complied 
     with the provisions of the Dayton Accord and the zone has 
     been ``quiet''.
       34 of the 40 municipalities within MND-North which held 
     elections in September 1997 have had their results certified 
     by the OSCE. There are several instances where the elections 
     resulted in governments which do not reflect the ethnicity of 
     the local population, a result due to the use of absentee 
     balloting whereby displaced people were permitted to cast 
     votes in their former locales.
       The most sensitive area in the region (if not all of 
     Bosnia) remains Brcko, which due to its location (it connects 
     the western half of the RS to the eastern half) and the 
     results of the war is perhaps the most valuable and contested 
     territory in Bosnia. Its pre-war population was 56 percent 
     Muslim and 20 percent Serb; it now is over 90 percent Serb.
       The Dayton Accord left the fate of Brcko to international 
     arbitration. In March 1996 the arbitrator extended the date 
     for a final determination to March 15, 1998. \1\ In recent 
     months over 700 displaced Muslim families have returned to 
     Brcko and efforts to restructure local institutions, such as 
     a police force, along multi-ethnic lines have shown progress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \1\ On March 15, 1998, the international arbitrator for 
     Brcko, Mr. Roberts Owen, announced he was once again delaying 
     a decision on the territorial status of Brcko, until 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       SFOR retains custody of three media broadcast towers which 
     were seized from Serb control last fall, which had served as 
     active anti-SFOR outlets. SFOR is working with civil 
     authorities to develop an open and free media system.
       When queried as to U.S. forces' direct participation in 
     activities such as elections/election support, location of 
     mass graves, and law enforcement, General Ellis stated his 
     forces' role was only incidental, with the primary task the 
     provision of security in the area of operations.
       General Ellis reviewed how troops inbound to Bosnia receive 
     tailored training for the unique environment prior to 
     deploying, including a full mission rehearsal. Compared to 
     combat training, the skills required are less demanding but 
     the difficult part is integrating and coordinating tasks 
     which have a significant ``non-combat'' component, such as 
     civic affairs.
       Regarding mines, there are over 128,000 remaining in MND-
     North, with approximately 1,000 being cleared each month. 
     U.S. forces participation in this is restricted to direct 
     mineclearing only when needed to support U.S. operations, and 
     a supervisory/training role for the former Bosnian armed 
     forces.
       The delegation then flew to Brcko, Bosnia, where after a 
     visual inspection of the city by helicopter it moved to Camp 
     McGovern, a U.S. base camp just outside Brcko.
       While enroute to Camp McGovern, there were several 
     observations:
       A coal-fired power plant was observed northeast of Tuzla; 
     according to major General Ellis, it is currently operating 
     at only 20 percent of capacity due to lack of spare parts. 
     Efforts are being made to correct this problem with the plant 
     to be brought to 80-90 percent capacity in several months.
       A large open-air market, the ``Arizona Market'' was 
     observed, with hundreds of cars enroute backing up local 
     traffic for miles. General Ellis noted this market, and 
     another (``Virginia Market'') were stood up last year and 
     have enjoyed a significant business. The markets are multi-
     ethnic and run by local entrepreneurs. The markets have to 
     some degree exasperated local authorities who, due to the 
     lack of government control, have been unable to share in the 
     proceeds.
       Upon overflying Brcko, the destruction of housing in the 
     outskirts of the city was evident. Some reconstruction was 
     seen with many houses having new roofs, which General Ellis 
     stated had mostly occurred within the past six months.
       The bridge spanning the Sava River from Brcko to Croatia 
     was observed, with it having been repaired last fall through 
     insertion of a new span in mid-section. General Ellis noted 
     that rail and barge traffic through the region had also 
     recently resumed.
       General Ellis also made some personal observations while 
     enroute to Brcko:
       All three parties (Serb, Muslim, and Croat) want SFOR to 
     stay. At this stage, without SFOR fighting would eventually 
     start up again.
       Regarding war criminals, he doesn't disagree with the need 
     to see them turned in or apprehended, but that this effort 
     needs to go beyond just Serbs and the Republika Srpska.
       The delegation then inspected Camp McGovern and also had 
     the opportunity to eat lunch with the troops. Among the 
     observations at this location:
       Camp McGovern is located on the outskirts of Brcko, and in 
     fact sits astride the Dayton-imposed military zone of 
     separation.
       Nearly 800 troops are currently deployed there. Forces are 
     primarily from the 2nd Armored Cavalry Division, from Fort 
     Polk, Louisiana, with some armored support from the 1st 
     Armored Division which is home-stationed in Germany. Units 
     from Fort Polk, were deployed last August, as part of a 
     scheduled rotation, just before the September 1997 elections.
       Efforts are being made to adhere to a six-month tour length 
     for forces sent to Bosnia. This contrasts with a one-year 
     duration at the start of the mission in 1995-1996.
       The base camp features a small shopping area with a PX, a 
     weight room, and a learning center with classes offered 
     either through correspondence or instruction on-site by U.S. 
     nationals on contract to the Army.
       Nonetheless, conditions at Camp McGovern are austere, with 
     all forces billeted in tents with wooden floors and a nominal 
     ``tent complement'' of 8 soldiers per tent. However, on 
     occasions of troop rotation or reinforcement this has been 
     upped to as many as 12 per tent. Officers escorting the 
     delegation indicated there has been some discussion about 
     expanding the perimeter of Camp McGovern (a complicated 
     endeavor given the proximity of minefields) in order to 
     slightly increase the potential number of troops who can be 
     stationed there, solely as a precautionary measure depending 
     on future reaction to the Brcko arbitration decision.
       Mail service has been good. When possible soldiers are 
     offered access to computers for e-mail and there are 
     opportunities for phone calls out of country.
       In random conversations with troops, the delegation found 
     that morale is generally good. There was concern voiced by 
     individual service members about whether ``the folks back 
     home'' understood what they were doing in Bosnia, and also 
     about the effects of repeated deployments on individual 
     family situations.
       Members who met with Reservists heard complaints about the 
     administration of the Reserve Mobilization Income Insurance 
     program [which, due to initially faulty actuarial 
     calculations at the Pentagon, continues to require funding in 
     excess of prevously appropriated amounts despite the infusion 
     of over $70 million over the past two years].
       Some soldiers from the 1st Armored Division are on their 
     second deployment to Bosnia (having been sent in the initial 
     movement of U.S. forces during late 1995-early 1996 as part 
     of IFOR, the ``Implementation Force.''). These who had served 
     at Camp McGovern on their first tour said there had been 
     considerable improvement in and around Brcko, with the most 
     noticeable change being the return of and visibility of 
     children.
       These soldiers observed that recent progress in returning 
     refugees to Brcko is due to careful planning and oversight by 
     the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). In an effort to 
     restore confidence and build trust, returns to date have been 
     focused on those areas which are ``less difficult'' and have 
     involved only families who can clearly demonstrate they once 
     lived in a particular area or dwelling.
       Continuing, these soldiers said unemployment was a huge 
     problem, with the population subsisting largely on 
     international assistance, black market activities, and 
     remittances from displaced persons who had moved abroad such 
     as to Germany.
       The soldiers' personal view was that the local population 
     was genuinely tired of the war and its aftermath and wanted 
     to get on with their lives.
       The delegation then traveled to a resettlement camp on the 
     outskirts of Brcko (Stari Rasadnik) where it was joined by 
     Ambassador Kauzlarich and met with the group of 12 local 
     citizens.
       The local group was divided equally between Muslims and 
     Serbs, including the Muslim ``mayor'' of Stari Rasadnik and 
     six women from a local women's group. In questions and 
     answers with the delegation several points rapidly became 
     apparent:
       The group was genuinely thankful for the role being played 
     for SFOR with many expressing the opinion that conditions 
     would rapidly deteriorate should SFOR leave in the near 
     future;

[[Page E424]]

       Many of the group had been forced to move to many places 
     through the duration of the war. The biggest impediment to 
     returns and the reuniting of families is the absence of jobs. 
     There had been noticeable improvement in recent months in 
     terms of greater freedom of movement throughout Bosnia;
       The mayor portrayed his relations with the Serbs as one of 
     cooperation in trying to resettle the area;
       Midway through the discussion, there were several 
     acrimonious exchanges between members of the group at various 
     points, prompted by charges that one side or the other (Serb 
     or Muslim) was responsible for the war. One individual stated 
     ``we cannot forget what one side did to the other.'' This was 
     met by another's response that ``we were the ones who were 
     thrown out, that suffered atrocities, but I have returned 
     home. I am no war criminal.''
       When asked what the reaction would be should the 
     arbitration decision give control to Brcko to the Serbs, one 
     person responded ``We can live side-by-side . . . but not 
     together.''
       The delegation then proceeded to a brief tour of Brcko by 
     bus, before proceeding to a meeting with representatives of 
     the Office of the High Representative for Brcko (OHR) and the 
     International Police Task Force (IPTF).
       While on the tour of Brcko, the delegation briefly crossed 
     over the now-repaired bridge over the Sava River into 
     Croatia. SFOR escorts made several comments while on the tour 
     including:
       In downtown Brcko, there was a smattering of political 
     posters featuring President Plavsic and Prime Minister Dodik 
     of the RS. It was explained that several months prior, there 
     were many posters featuring Radovan Karazdic. By all 
     appearances these had been removed;
       Within Brcko, it was claimed there are little or no 
     problems with freedom of movement for any of the three 
     formerly warring factions;
       The local schools are now open, with both classes and 
     faculties represented on a multi-ethnic basis. This is said 
     to have created no problems.
       The delegation then met with representatives of the OHR and 
     the IPTF.
       According to Mr. Ian McCloud, Deputy Commissioner of OHR:
       The Office of the High Representative for Brcko was 
     expanded and given greater authority in early 1997 after the 
     arbitrator for Brcko, Mr. Roberts Owen, decided to delay his 
     decision until March 1998. OHR was charged with working 
     actively in the Brcko area to return refugees and displaced 
     persons, to achieve a greater freedom of movement (in 
     conjunction with the IPTF), to aid in ensuring democratic 
     processes were established and respected, and to help with 
     economic revitalization. Regarding each of these areas:
       Since early 1997, OHR has approved over 2600 homesteads for 
     return to displaced persons, with 755 families having 
     actually returned and taken occupancy.
       Freedom of movement within Brcko is pretty well 
     established, and over 400 vehicles daily transit the bridge 
     from Brcko to Croatia. However, Serbs are still not allowed 
     by Croatia to pass over the bridge into Croatia.
       Mr. McCloud had an upbeat assessment regarding the 
     implementation of the local elections, saying that the re-
     establishment of multi-ethnic institutions is starting to 
     ``take'' and is making progress.
       Regarding the local economy, Mr. McCloud indicated this was 
     a major challenge as OHR believes there needs to be the 
     creation of 28,000 industrial and supporting jobs in the 
     community to get Brcko back to its pre-war levels of 
     employment.
       The delegation was then briefed by Mr. Don Grady of the 
     IPTF (who had come to Bosnia after a career in the United 
     States in local law enforcement, most recently in New 
     Mexico):
       In Brcko, the local IPTF-trained and supervised police 
     force is now on the verge of being able to do open policing. 
     The police force has been structured on multi-ethnic lines 
     and has been functioning as a unit since the beginning of 
     1998.
       Mr. Grady explained that in building this police force, the 
     IPTF role centers on training for ``democratic policing'', 
     which perhaps can be best understood when contrasted with the 
     previous role of police in Bosnia, which had inherited the 
     mindset and functions of the internal security forces 
     established over 50 years as part of Communist Yugoslavia.
       IPTF training is centered out of Sarajevo, where after 
     individual certification by IPTF, prospective police members 
     are provided what in essence is ``mini-police academy 
     training''. The Intent is to train police to conduct a ``full 
     service police operation'', with jurisdiction ranging from 
     local traffic and petty crimes to more serious phenomena such 
     as organized crime and the black market. For the latter, 
     where offenses cross local jurisdictional lines and also 
     simply require greater resources and expertise, local forces 
     work in conjunction with the ministry.
       Mr. Grady summarized his presentation by saying ``I think 
     what's going on here is pretty spectacular . . . it could be 
     a prototype for the rest of Bosnia.'' He did state that the 
     IPTF was well aware of the unique position of Brcko given its 
     being subject to arbitration and that it was working with 
     SFOR, as well as the local police, to ensure there would be 
     coordination in the event of violence.

     

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