[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 30 (Wednesday, March 18, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2196-S2202]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND,
HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC
The Senate continued with the consideration of the treaty.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the distinguished Senator
from the great State of Maryland.
Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I wish to speak on NATO enlargement and
wish to consume such time as necessary.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized.
Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, this is a truly historic occasion. Today
the Senate begins debate on the ratification of NATO enlargement. By
ratifying this treaty, we are building an undivided, peaceful, and
democratic Europe for the new millennium. I stand here to support NATO
enlargement because it will make Europe more stable and America more
secure. It means that the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe
will share the burden of European security.
It also means that future generations of Americans might not have to
fight nor die for Europe. America has fought and won three wars in
Europe: World War I, when an assassination in Yugoslavia led to years
of bloodshed; World War II, the bloodiest war in history when thousands
of Americans left factories and farms to fight on the battlefields of
Europe; and we won the cold war, when Soviet expansionism forced us to
prepare to defend Western Europe when the captive nations of Eastern
Europe were forced behind the Iron Curtain.
If NATO does not enlarge, the Iron Curtain will remain permanent and
the unnatural division of Europe will live on longer than the Soviet
empire did. As a Polish American, I and members of my family have been
waiting years for this debate to occur. I know that the Polish people
did not choose to live behind the Iron Curtain. They were forced there
by the Yalta agreement, by Potsdam, and because they and the Baltic
States and the other captive nations were sold out by the free world.
My great grandmother had three pictures on her mantlepiece: One of
Pope Pius XII, because we were Catholic and are Catholic, and that was
her Pope; my uncle Joe, who was on the Baltimore City Police
Department, and we were so proud of what he had achieved; and the other
picture, of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, because of what he had done for
working people.
But after Yalta and Potsdam, my great grandmother turned the
Roosevelt picture face down on her mantel and she let it stay there
until the day she died because of what happened at Yalta and Potsdam.
That is why many of us cannot forget the history of that region, the
placing of a nation and the other nations, the captive nations,
involuntarily under the servitude and boot heel of then the evil
empire.
But my support for NATO enlargement is not based on nostalgia, nor is
it based on the past; it is based on the future, and it is support as
an American. I support NATO enlargement because I believe that it will
make America and Europe more stable and more secure. NATO enlargement
means a future in which the newly free and democratic countries will
take their rightful places as members of Europe. NATO played an
important role in securing this freedom. It has been the most
successful defense alliance in world history. It is an alliance that
helped us win the cold war. It deterred war between the superpowers,
and it has helped prevent confrontation between member states.
But if NATO is to survive, it must adapt to meet the needs of the
post-cold-war world or it will become irrelevant.
NATO has evolved since it was created in 1949. We have enlarged NATO
on three different occasions, and each new member strengthened NATO and
increased security in Europe.
Today, we are facing very different threats to security and stability
in Europe. We have civil wars, as in Bosnia; we have hot spots caused
by ethnic and regional tensions, as in Kosovo; we have international
crime, drugs, and terrorism; and we have the very real threat of the
spread of weapons of mass destruction. NATO must meet the needs of
these new threats, and I believe it will do so by changing and
expanding. Europe's new democracies will help us meet these challenges.
The countries of Central and Eastern Europe want to help us address
these new threats. How many times have we in the Senate discussed
burdensharing in Europe? How often have we complained that European
countries were not willing to pay their fair share for the European
defense?
Now we have countries that are asking to share the burden. They are
asking to pledge their troops and equipment for the common defense.
They are asking to share the burden of peacekeeping. In fact, they are
doing it right now in Bosnia, where there are thousands of troops from
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Mr. President, Hungary is a
base camp for our troops which enables them to be in Bosnia. These new
nations have even committed to joining us in Iraq to help us deal with
ending Iraq's chemical and biological weapons program, which is more
than some of our allies.
These countries are not asking for a handout; they are asking for a
handshake, a handshake to welcome them into NATO. They are not asking
for our protection; they are asking to be full partners in the new
Europe and in the new world order. By transforming these countries into
free-market democracies, they have earned this right. These new
democracies will contribute
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to America's security by making NATO stronger. They are adding troops
and equipment. They will provide additional strategic depth to NATO.
They will also provide the will to fight for our values. Their
history and geography make them passionate defenders of peace and
democracy. They know what it means to be occupied and oppressed by
tyrants. During the 19th century, Poland was partitioned among three
countries. At the end of World War I, she had a very brief moment of
democracy, and yet this is the nation that sent its own men to help
fight in our war of revolution, went back to Poland and wrote the first
parliamentary constitution on European continental soil, had an elected
monarchy, and began to establish a parliament when many of the other
countries had not even been unified.
When we look at Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, in the days
after Yalta and Potsdam, they rose with gallantry in terms of their
dissident movement. We know about Charter 77. We, of course, know about
Solidarity, and we know the role that dissidents played. In fact, the
three foreign ministers who came here each had been in prison and even
had suffered public humiliation at being dissidents in their own
country.
What do they say when they come here and come to NATO? They say they
will put our common values into action. They will join with us in
defending national security and our Western values, whether it means
peacekeeping in Europe or preventing the spread of weapons of mass
destruction anywhere in the world. They are ready for us. I hope we are
ready for them.
Opponents of NATO have very valid concerns, and I would like to
comment on just a few.
First, opponents of enlargement point to the cost. They say that NATO
enlargement has a cost, and they are right. The new NATO members must
modernize their militaries and must make them compatible with the NATO
systems. The new NATO members have committed to pay this price.
There will also be a cost to the United States. Our funding of NATO's
common budget will increase. NATO estimates that the total common
budget will increase $1.5 billion over 10 years. The American share
will be $400 million, or $80 million a year. That is a lot.
But, Mr. President, what is the cost of not enlarging NATO? I believe
the cost of not enlarging NATO will be far higher. What if we fail to
enlarge NATO? What will be the cost to European security? What will be
the cost to the new democracies of Eastern Europe? I can tell you, as a
member of the Senate NATO observer group, I met recently with the
foreign ministers of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and I
asked them these questions.
The Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek, a hero of the
Solidarity movement, said Poland would feel abandoned by the West and
that Poland would still pay to modernize their military. In fact, in
the absence of belonging to NATO, they would spend even more of their
own money. The Hungarian and Czech Foreign Ministers agree that they
would have to spend more money for defense if they did not join NATO.
Also, they would form their own military alliances, which would be very
decidedly more anti-Russian than NATO.
The other foreign ministers said that by refusing to enlarge NATO, it
would give the hardliners in Russia a great victory. The antidemocratic
forces in Russia would feel vindicated and proud and would say that
they themselves stopped the expansion of NATO.
What would be the long-range cost to America of failing to prepare
NATO for the 21st century? The cost would be instability in Europe and
the increased chance of being pulled into yet another conflict. The
cost of preventive security is always less than the cost of war.
I also will take a minute to discuss the benefits of enlargement and
weigh them against the cost.
The strategic benefits of enlargement are important. NATO enlargement
will create a zone of peace and stability that includes Eastern Europe.
It will include NATO's stabilizing influence to more of Europe and
reduce the chance of aggression or conflict in Eastern Europe.
Enlargement will bring peace and security for Eastern Europe just as it
did for the West.
There are economic benefits. Europe is America's largest trading
partner, with $250 billion in a two-way trade each year. Our new NATO
partners will increase trade opportunities. They are building vibrant
free-market economies. NATO brings stability, and stability brings
prosperity. We are creating a prosperity zone.
In addition, there are benefits for democracy. The young military
officers of new NATO members are learning from us, learning what it
means to be part of a democratic military, to be under civilian
control, to have a code of conduct, also to have transparent defense
spending budgets, no secret police. They are also learning English.
When they leave the military, they will bring these skills. They will
bring a sense of democracy. They will bring great skills to the
operation of their free market. It is clear these benefits of NATO
enlargement far outweigh the cost.
Let me conclude by saying this treaty is very important, and treaty
ratification is one of our most fundamental duties. We are extending
our Nation's commitment to the collective defense. We do not take this
responsibility lightly. We are extending our Nation's commitment to
collective defense, the so-called article 5. We do not take this
responsibility lightly, and in the very best tradition of the Senate,
we are addressing NATO enlargement as a national security issue, not as
a political issue.
I am delighted and proud to say that NATO enlargement has been a
bipartisan process. I remember when we began this debate some years ago
with the really wonderful leadership of Senator Hank Brown of Colorado.
It has truly been supported by members of both parties. We have worked
closely with the President and Secretary Albright, and the Senate has
been consulted every step of the way. I am proud to support NATO
enlargement. By ratifying this resolution, we are marking the end of
the cold war and we are also marking the beginning of a new century. We
want the new century to be rid of the repugnance of the old century. We
are laying the groundwork for a new era of peace and stability.
Mr. President, before I yield the floor, I note on the floor is a
distinguished war hero, my colleague from the State of Arizona. I was
not here yesterday to lend my wonderful tribute to him on the
anniversary of his release from a prison camp. I extend my great
respect to the senior Senator from Arizona.
When I visited Vietnam, I saw where they had taken the Senator
prisoner. Obviously, he is a guy who will never let himself be taken
prisoner. It is an honor to serve with him in the Senate and to enjoy
these kinds of debates and discussions. God bless. Godspeed. Mr.
President, I yield the floor.
Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the distinguished senior
Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. I thank you, Mr. President. I say to my dear friend from
Maryland, with whom I have had the pleasure and honor of working on a
number of other foreign policy issues, the Senator from Maryland and I
were heavily involved with the issue of Central America when there was
a struggle for freedom and democracy going on there. Due to her efforts
and those of so many of us who have been involved in these issues, we
now have a brighter day in Central America.
What the Senator from Maryland just articulated is a brighter day for
the people of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. I thank her for
her remarks about me personally, but I express my even greater
gratitude for her continued leadership on issues of national security
and foreign policy in this body, for which she has accumulated enormous
respect and appreciation, as well as a fair amount of affection. I
thank the Senator from Maryland.
I rise today to discuss the issue of NATO enlargement about which
this body must vote in the near future. I would like to stress three
points: That NATO enlargement is demanded by our American values; that
it is in the strategic interests of the United States; and that efforts
to delay a decision or to mandate policy on other European security
issues through amendments to the resolution of ratification are
unnecessary and potentially dangerous.
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These points were made very eloquently by our former majority leader,
Senator Bob Dole, in an op-ed published today.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Dole's article
that was published today in the Washington Times be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the op-ed was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
[From the Washington Times]
NATO Test of U.S. Leadership
(By Bob Dole)
For decades, the United States urged communist leaders to
``tear down the Wall.'' Within the past 10 years, the people
of Eastern Europe have embraced liberty and undertaken major
reforms in their economies and governments. Now the United
States Senate should take the next step toward ensuring
freedom and democracy for the people of Poland, the Czech
Republic and Hungary by ratifying the NATO enlargement treaty
and inviting them to join us in NATO.
American leadership on NATO enlargement is important to our
security as well as to the security of Eastern Europe.
At the Madrid Summit last July, President Clinton and the
other NATO leaders unanimously decided to invite Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic to become members of the
alliance, culminating years of efforts by these countries to
meet NATO's strict entry criteria. Last week, under the
bipartisan leadership of Sen. Jesse Helms, North Carolina
Republican, and Sen. Joe Biden, Delaware Democrat, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee overwhelmingly endorsed NATO
accession legislation by a vote of 16-2. I hope the full
Senate will follow suit without delay.
Two world wars began in Europe, and strife in Bosnia
continues today. Expanding NATO to include Poland, Hungary
and the Czech Republic will help ensure that new threats,
such as ethnic struggles and state-sponsored terrorism, will
be kept in check.
During the half-century that NATO has helped guarantee
peace in Europe, it has added new members three times,
including Germany, Greece, Turkey and Spain. Each addition
made the Alliance stronger and increased its military
capability. Affirming the military importance of NATO
enlargement, 60 top retired U.S. officers--including Colin
Powell and four other former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, nine former service branch chiefs, and top combat
leaders such as Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf--recently signaled
their support of NATO enlargement. Their statement emphasized
that the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic
will enhance NATO's ability to deter or defend against
security challenges of the future.
What these military leaders and many other Americans
understand is that no free nation has ever initiated a war
against another democracy. Integrating the military, economic
and political structures of the Europe's newest stable
democracies into the NATO alliance will help ensure that this
remains true in the 21st century.
Let me take the opportunity to address four major concerns
that critics have raised in this debate. First, some senators
have engaged in a last-minute effort to postpone
consideration of the NATO accession legislation. But members
of both parties and both houses of Congress have already
thoroughly examined questions surrounding NATO enlargement.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee alone has held eight
hearings with more than 37 witnesses, resulting in 550 pages
of testimony. The case has been made: NATO enlargement is in
the interest of the United States. It is time to make it a
reality.
Second, other critics in the Senate have suggested placing
conditions on NATO expansion, thereby ``freezing''
enlargement for an arbitrary number of years. Like the
administration, I oppose any effort in the Senate to mandate
an artificial pause in the process. Such a move would send
the wrong message to countries in both the East and the West,
closing the door on current and potential new allies--and
perhaps tying the hands of a future president.
Furthermore, freezing NATO's membership would create a
destabilizing new dividing line in Europe. Currently, non-
member European nations cooperate extensively with NATO
through the Partnership for Peace Program. But if nations
believe the ultimate goal of NATO membership is unattainable,
any incentive to continue democratic reform will be
substantially diminished.
The alliance's open door commitment, which has been
supported by the United States, has been an unqualified
success. The prospect of NATO membership has given Central
European countries a strong incentive to cooperate with the
alliance, strengthen civilian control of the military, and
resolve longstanding border disputes. All of these advance
U.S. interests. It would be a mistake to abandon a policy
that is clearly achieving its objectives.
Third, some argue that NATO enlargement has hurt or will
hurt cooperation with Russia, or may even strengthen the hand
of hardline Russian nationalists. This has not been borne out
by the facts. Since the NATO enlargement process began,
President Boris Yeltsin has been re-elected and many
reformers have been elevated within the Russian government.
Mr. Yeltsin pledged at the 1997 Helsinki summit to press for
ratification of START II and to pursue a START III accord.
The Duma also ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention and
President Yeltsin signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act,
creating a new, constructive relationship with the West.
The world has changed. The debate over NATO expansion
cannot be recast as an extension of the Cold War. I believe
imposing a mandated pause in NATO's engagement would appear
to give Russia a veto over NATO's internal decisions,
contrary to NATO's stated policy, and would strengthen
Russian extremists by enabling them to claim that their
scare-tactic objections swayed the world's most powerful
military alliance.
And last, some skeptics would rather allow the European
Union (EU) to take the lead in building Central and Eastern
Europe's economic and security structure. But with due
respect, NATO, not the EU, is the cornerstone of European
security, which is vital to our own.
As the Senate considers this legislation to allow Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic to complete their journey from
communist dictatorship to NATO membership, we should consider
the words of Czech President Vaclav Havel:
``The Alliance should urgently remind itself that it is
first and foremost an instrument of democracy intended to
defend mutually held and created political and spiritual
values. It must see itself not as a pact of nations against a
more or less obvious enemy, but as a guarantor of
EuroAmerican civilization and thus as a pillar of global
security.''
NATO protected Western Europe as it rebuilt its war-torn
political and economic systems. With Senate approval of NATO
enlargement, it can, and should, provide similar security to
our allies in Central and Eastern Europe as they re-enter the
community of free nations.
This is no time to postpone or delay action. It is time to
act so that other NATO member countries can move ahead with
ratification knowing the United States is leading the way.
Mr. McCAIN. First, Mr. President, the morals and values we share as
Americans--protecting and promoting human freedom and democracy--
strongly point toward bringing Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland
into NATO.
For centuries, these territories were fully integrated with the
development of modern Europe--politically, economically, militarily,
culturally, and psychologically. But these countries were unnaturally
cut off from the West in 1945 by the Iron Curtain that was slammed down
by the occupying Soviet Red Army. The close ties to the West of over a
thousand years had been broken.
The people of Central Europe suffered horribly under communism. Their
political and economic development was shattered. Arbitrary rule under
a police state undermined normal relations within society. Citizens
were pressured to inform on one another. Political prisoners were held
and tortured simply for demanding freedom.
Let us be clear, these countries were forced into communism against
their will by an occupying power. In each country--Hungary in 1956,
Czechoslovakia in 1968, Poland in 1981--freedom-seeking citizens sought
to break free from the grip of Soviet-imposed communism, and, as we
know, they were ruthlessly put down. While the United States and NATO
staunchly defended freedom in the West, we could do little in the East
other than offer our moral support, because the risk of nuclear war was
too great.
After decades of oppression, when the Soviet Union itself began to
decline, the people of these three countries again showed tremendous
courage and determination by seizing the opportunity to throw off the
yoke of communism. Hungary cut through the barbed wire on the Austrian
border and allowed East German refugees to escape to freedom. Vaclav
Havel's peaceful protests ushered out one of the most repressive
Communist regimes in Central Europe through the ``velvet revolution''
of 1989. The Solidarity movement finally pushed the generals and
commissars out of power.
In all three countries, communism was peacefully dismantled and
replaced with parliamentary democracy and free markets. All three
countries are now thriving, both politically and
economically. Individual rights and freedoms are protected in both
theory and in practice. Institutions that guarantee the rule of law are
firmly entrenched.
These three countries now seek our help in securing their newfound
freedom for membership in NATO--just as was done with Western Europe
after World War II. While there is no immediate military threat, the
Poles,
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Czechs, and Hungarians know from bitter experience that they cannot
afford to wait until a new threat emerges to protect their freedom.
Protecting freedom was the beacon of our policy in Europe during the
cold war. It would be an incomprehensible tragedy for us to abandon
that stance now when the opportunities for freedom in Central Europe
are greater than ever and the risks are far lower than at any time
during the cold war.
Second, beyond any moral arguments, NATO enlargement serves strategic
interests of the United States. The national security of our country
still depends on a stable and secure Europe where democracy and free
markets can flourish. This was the lesson from two world wars and the
reason we created NATO in the first place.
Today, the U.S. economy is more tightly tied to the rest of the world
than it was in 1949. Thus, America's well-being depends more than ever
on an environment of stable market democracies. NATO remains the only
organization capable of guaranteeing security and protecting democracy
in Europe.
Enlarging NATO will prevent the emergence of a security vacuum in
Central Europe. Absent NATO, the states of this region would have no
choice but to remain anxious about historical animosities and worry of
a resurgent Russia. They would be forced to seek security through
national means--creating the possibility of diverging military and
security strategies and raising the risk of miscalculation.
NATO enlargement guarantees that there is a single, constructive
focus to security and stability in Europe--West, Central, and East.
Taking prudent steps now--enlarging NATO gradually to include these new
democracies--will reduce the likelihood of a conflict that might later
involve the United States.
More than just filling a vacuum, NATO enlargement will ensure that
the security environment in Europe remains conducive to U.S. interests,
and it will strengthen and expand our base of support in Europe.
Ratification will enlarge the secure, democratic, prosperous space in
Europe where countries share our values and can act as meaningful
partners for the United States, helping promote democracy, free
markets, and security beyond the bounds of NATO Europe itself.
Europe has already changed, and NATO enlargement is necessary to
adjust to these changes. Not ratifying enlargement at this stage would
isolate NATO from the fundamental political and economic changes that
are reshaping the continent. A stagnant NATO would be relegated to the
``dustbin of history,'' something the Soviet Union sought and failed to
achieve during the cold war.
Equally distressing, failure to ratify enlargement would undercut
U.S. leadership in Europe, with consequences well beyond NATO itself.
We would not only be demonstrating that we are no longer prepared to
play the leading role in European security, a role that has served our
common interests well for 50 years, but we would be undermining the
only meaningful organization in Europe where the U.S. has a seat at the
table.
Moreover, voting against ratification would deliver to hardline
Russian nationalists the victory they failed to achieve through threats
and intimidation over the past several years. Reformers, who argue that
cooperation with the West is the only way to serve the interests of
modern Russia, would be proved wrong. Instead, our action would
demonstrate that confrontation, not cooperation, is the most effective
policy for Russia.
Mr. President, an extraordinary array of the most senior foreign
policy and military leaders of this Nation have spoken out in support
of NATO enlargement, including former President Bush, two former Vice
Presidents, eight former Secretaries of State, six former Secretaries
of Defense, five former National Security Advisors, five former
Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nine former Chiefs of the
Military Services, and some 60 retired four-star generals.
Mr. President, I ask that their declaration of support for NATO
enlargement be printed in the Record and that the list of names be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
A Declaration of Support for NATO Enlargement
The Senate is faced with a historic opportunity--to extend
NATO membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.
The outcome of this vote will in large measure determine the
future of the NATO alliance and whether it will continue to
be a vital force for peace and stability in the Europe of the
21st century.
We believe that NATO has been the most effective military
alliance in history. It was the centerpiece of the strategy
that kept Europe secure and free during the darkest days of
the Cold War. Under its protection, Western Europe recovered
from the devastation of World War II to enjoy 50 years of
increasing stability, prosperity, and freedom. Now, in an
expanded NATO, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic can
enjoy similar success.
The situation in Europe is very different than during the
Cold War. But the need for NATO remains. The admission of
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will make for a
stronger NATO. It will strengthen NATO's ability to help
Europe set aside old quarrels and overcome a long history of
conflict and war. It will eliminate a source of instability
that contributed to two World Wars and could again become a
source of confrontation and even conflict. It will enhance
NATO's ability to deter or defend against the security
challenges of the future.
The admission of these three countries into NATO is not
directed against Russia. Rather it is directed toward the
stability of Europe--stability that will benefit Russia as
much as anyone, and will ultimately facilitate a closer
relationship between Russia and the United States.
We believe that the cost of bringing these three countries
into NATO is manageable especially when compared to the
potential cost of not doing so--a Europe moving not toward
stability and peace but toward instability and contention.
We believe that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic
will make a useful contribution to our common security. They
already possess credible military capability and are engaged
in adapting their armed forces to the standards of the NATO
alliance. They have shown a willingness to participate in
collective defense by their contributions during the Gulf War
and the Yugoslav crisis. Because of their histories, these
nations know that freedom is not free. They take security
seriously. They will make good allies.
The upcoming Senate vote is fundamentally a test of whether
the United States will stay engaged in the Europe of the 21st
century. Since the end of World War II, our nation has
expended enormous effort to build a Europe of free and
democratic states at peace with one another. For the first
time, there is a realistic possibility of achieving this
goal. Now is not the time to turn our back on this great
project.
The lessons of history are clear. Two World Wars and one
Cold one have established beyond question that American
security and European security are inseparable. In the
aftermath of World War I, America turned its back on Europe,
only to have America's sons and daughters pay the price a
generation later. We cannot afford to make that mistake
again.
The creation of NATO in 1949 took foresight and
determination to do what was right. Today, the stakes are
just as high. We urge the Senate to reaffirm American
engagement in Europe by ratifying the admission of Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO--to secure the peace,
security, and prosperity on which we all depend.
General Joe Ashy, USAF (Ret), Former CINCUSSPACE/CINCNORAD.
General George S. Blanchard, USA (Ret), Former CINC,
USAREUR COMCENTAG.
General Walter E. Boomer, USMC (Ret), Former Assistant
Commandant, USMC.
General Michael P.C. Carns, USAF (Ret), Former Vice Chief
of Staff of the Air Force.
General W.L. Creech, USAF (Ret), Former CINCAFLANT.
Admiral William J. Crowe, USN (Ret), Former Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
General James Dalton, USAF (Ret), Former Chief of Staff,
SHAPE.
General Mike Dugan, USAF (Ret), Former Chief of Staff of
the Air Force, COMAAFCE.
Admiral Leon Edney, USN (Ret), Former SACLANT.
General Ronald Fogleman, USAF (Ret), Former Chief of Staff
of the Air Force.
General Al Gray, USMC (Ret), Former Commandant of the
Marine Corps.
General Alfred G. Hansen, USAF (Ret), Former AFLC
Commander.
General Monroe Hatch, USAF (Ret), Former Vice Chief of
Staff of the Air Force.
General Charles A. Horner, USAF (Ret), Former CINCSPACE/
NORAD.
General Andrew P. Iosue, USAF (Ret), Former ATC Commander.
Admiral David E. Jeremiah, USN (Ret), Former Vice Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
General David Jones, USAF (Ret), Former Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
General George Joulwan, USA (Ret), Former SACEUR.
General P.X. Kelley, USMC (Ret), Former Commandmant of the
Marine Corps.
Admiral Frank B. Kelso, USN (Ret), Former Chief of Naval
Operations, SACLANT.
General William L. Kirk, USAF (Ret), Former CINCUSAFE/
COMAAFCE.
[[Page S2200]]
General Frederick Kroesen, USA (Ret), Former CINC US Army
Europe.
General William Livsey, USA (Ret), Former CINC Combined/UN
FORCES KOREA.
General John Michael Loh, USAF (Ret), Former Commander, Air
Combat Command.
General David M. Maddox, USA (Ret), Former CINC USAREUR.
General Robert T. Marsh, USAF (Ret), Former Commander,
AFSC.
General James P. McCarthy, USAF (Ret), Former DCINCEUR.
General Charles McDonald, USAF (Ret), Former AFLC
Commander.
General Merrill A. McPeak, USAF (Ret), Former Chief of
Staff of the Air Force.
General Jack N. Merritt, USA (Ret), Former U.S.
Representative to NATO Military Committee.
General James P. Mullins, USAF (Ret), Former AFLC
Commander.
General Carl Mundy, USMC (Ret), Former Commandant, U.S.
Marine Corps.
General Wallace Nutting, USA (Ret), Former USCINCRED.
LTC William E. Odom, USA (Ret), Former Director, NSA.
General Glenn K. Otis, USA (Ret), Former CINC US Army
Europe.
Admiral William Owens USN (Ret), Former Vice Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
General Binford Peay, USA (Ret), Former CINC, U.S. Central
Command.
General Colin L. Powell, USA (Ret), Former Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
General Bernard P. Randolph, USAF (Ret), Former Commander,
AF Systems Command.
General Robert H. Reed, USAF (Ret), Former Chief of Staff,
SHAPE.
General Robert W. RisCassi, USA (Ret), Former VCSA/CINC
UNC/USFK.
General Bernard W. Rogers, USA (Ret), Former Army Chief of
Staff and SACEUR.
LTG Edward L. Rowny, USA (Ret), Former Special Advisor on
Arms Control.
General Crosbie E. Saint, USA (Ret), Former CINC USAREUR.
General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA (Ret), Former CINC
Central Command & Operation Desert Storm.
General Robert W. Sennewald, USA (Ret), Former CINC
Combined/UN FORCES KOREA.
General John Shalikashvili, USA (Ret), Former Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
General John Shaud, USAF (Ret), Former Chief of Staff,
SHAPE.
General John J. Sheehan, USMC (Ret), Former SACLANT/CINC,
USACOM.
Admiral Leighton Smith, USN (Ret), Former CINC US Naval
Forces Europe.
General Carl Stiner, USA (Ret), Former US CINC, Special
Operations Command.
Admiral William Studeman, USN (Ret), Former Deputy
Director, Central Intelligence.
General Gordon Sullivan, USA (Ret), Former Chief of Staff
of the Army.
General John W. Vessey, USA (Ret), Former Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
General Carl E. Vuono, USA (Ret), Former Chief of Staff of
the Army.
General Volney Warner, USA (Ret), Former CINC, US Readiness
Command.
General Larry D. Welch, USAF (Ret), Former Air force Chief
of Staff.
General J.J. Went, USMC (Ret), Former Assistant Commandant,
USMC.
General Ronald W. Yates, USAF (Ret), Former Commander, AF
Materiel Command.
Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN (Ret), Former Chief of
Naval Operations and Member of Joint Chiefs of Staff.
____
The New Atlantic Initiative Statement on NATO Enlargement
(Presented by Richard Holbrooke, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Anthony Lake and
Paul Wolfowitz at the Andrew Mellon Auditorium, September 9, 1997)
The New Atlantic Initiative, an international network
dedicated to revitalizing and expanding Atlantic ties,
released the following statement in support of NATO
enlargement on September 9, 1997. The statement was released
by Richard Holbrooke, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Anthony Lake, and
Paul Wolfowitz at the Andrew Mellon Auditorium, where the
original North Atlantic Treaty was signed in April 1949.
NATO was the bulwark of America's successful Cold War
strategy of containment. Largely due to NATO, Europe has
enjoyed more than fifty years without war among its major
powers, the longest such period in modern history.
NATO succeeded not only by providing a shield against
aggression from without but also by helping to knit together
a community of democracies in which old quarrels faded, the
civic culture of democracy sank deep roots, and market
economies prospered.
In part because of NATO's success, the Cold War has ended,
and with it NATO's original mission. Its larger purpose of
ensuring peace and freedom in Europe and the Atlantic region
endures. To continue to fulfill this purpose NATO is adapting
to an undivided Europe. NATO is no longer an anti-Soviet
alliance; nor should it engage in the self-fulfilling
prophecy of pre-selecting new enemies. Rather it is defining
itself in more positive terms: as an alliance aiming to
promote peace and stability in the Atlantic region, devoted
to the spread and consolidation of democratic ways in Europe,
and capable of protecting Western interests against such
future threats as may emerge. At bottom, NATO remains a
mutual defense pact, and this solemn commitment gives all of
its acts a weight and seriousness that distinguish it from
other international organizations.
Crucial to this process of adaptation is NATO's willingness
to admit new members able to meet meaningful criteria of
democracy and military effort. Otherwise it will remain a
relic of the Cold War of diminishing relevance to the
contemporary world. Admission to NATO will consolidate
democratic transitions, and the prospect of admission will
spur reform and the resolution of disputes, as indeed has
already happened. In addition, NATO has made clear its desire
to develop cooperative security relations among all of the
states of the Euro-Atlantic region including Russia. Czech
President Vaclav Havel has put it: ``NATO expansion should be
perceived as a continuous process, in which the nations of
Central and Eastern Europe mature toward the meaning, values
and goals of the enlarged and revived alliance.''
To those who say that the nations of central Europe face no
threat today, we say that the most likely way to preserve
this situation, which has been all too rare, is to extend
NATO to that region. To those who say that the addition of
these new members will somehow dilute NATO, we say that
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, where freedom is
dearly cherished having been so recently won, will add
strength to NATO. To those who say that expanding NATO will
draw new lines in Europe, we say that it will erase old
lines, relics of a bitter time, and that NATO's openness to
additional accessions means that new lines are not in fact
being drawn. To those who worry that Russia will feel
threatened, we emphasize that NATO is a defensive alliance
that threatens no one and extends a hand of cooperation to
Russia.
The decision on NATO expansion is of historic importance.
The stakes are high. The issue is clear. Admitting Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO will strengthen the
alliance, reinforce new democracies, renew the American
commitment to Europe, and reaffirm American leadership. To
turn back now would be a tragic mistake.
Signers to New Atlantic Initiative NATO Enlargement Statement
(Organizational affiliation given for identification
purposes only. Views reflected in the statement are endorsed
by the individual, not the institution.)
Richard V. Allen, Former National Security Advisor.
Morris B. Abram, Chairman, United Nations Watch, Former
Permanent Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations
office in Geneva.
Elliott Abrams, President, Ethics & Public Policy Center,
Former Assistant Secretary of State.
David M. Abshire, Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO.
Michael H. Armacost, President, The Brookings Institution,
Former Undersecretary of State.
Richard Armitage, President, Armitage Associates L.C.
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense.
Bernard Aronson, Chairman, Acon Investments, Former
Assistant Secretary of State.
Norman R. Augustine, Chairman, Lockheed Martin Corp.,
Former Undersecretary of the Army.
James A. Baker, III, Former Secretary of State.
Mira Baratta, Vice President for Programs, Freedom House.
Dennis Bark, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institute.
Michael D. Barnes, Partner, Hogan & Hartson, Former Member
of Congress.
Douglas J. Bennet, President, Wesleyan University, Former
Administrator, USAID.
Lucy Wilson Benson, President, Benson Associates, Former
Undersecretary of State.
Jeffrey T. Bergner, President, Bergner, Bockorny, Clough &
Brain.
Coit D. Blacker, Senior Fellow, Institute for International
Studies, Stanford University.
J. Kenneth Blackwell, Treasurer, State of Ohio, Former U.S.
Ambassador to the UNHRC.
John Bolton, Senior Vice President, American Enterprise
Institute, Former Assistant Secretary of State.
David L. Boren, President, University of Oklahoma, Former
U.S. Senator.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Former National Security Advisor.
Richard Burt, Chairman, IEP Advisors, Inc., Former U.S.
Ambassador to Germany.
Frank C. Carlucci, III, Former Secretary of Defense.
Ashton B. Carter, Ford Foundation Professor, JFK School of
Government, Harvard University, Former Assistant Secretary of
Defense.
Hodding Carter, Knight Professor of Journalism, University
of Maryland, Former Assistant Secretary of State.
Richard Cheney, Former Secretary of Defense.
Warren Christopher, Former Secretary of State.
Clark M. Clifford, Former Secretary of Defense.
Chester A. Crocker, Research Professor for Diplomacy,
School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.
Ivo H. Daalder, Associate Professor, School of Public
Affairs, University of Maryland.
Arnaud de Borchgrave, Senior Advisor, CSIS.
[[Page S2201]]
Dennis De Concini, Former U.S. Senator.
Midge Decter, Author.
James Denton, Executive Director, Freedom House.
I.M. Destler, Professor and Director, Center for
International and Security Studies, University of Maryland.
Paula J. Dobriansky, Vice President, Director of Washington
Office, Council on Foreign Relations.
Bob Dole, Former U.S. Senator.
Pierre S. DuPont, Former Governor of Delaware.
Lawrence Eagleburger, Former Secretary of State.
J.J. Exon, Former U.S. Senator.
Dante B. Fascell, Partner, Holland & Knight, LLP Former
Member of Congress.
Douglas J. Feith, Managing Attorney, Feith & Zell, P.C.
Sandra Feldman, President, American Federation of Teachers.
Francis Fukuyama, Hirst Professor of Public Policy, George
Mason University.
Evan G. Galbraith, Chairman of the Board, LVMH Inc., Former
U.S. Ambassador to France.
Richard N. Gardner, OF Counsel, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius,
Former U.S. Ambassador to Italy.
Charles Gati, Senior Vice President, Interinvest.
Jeffrey Gedmin, Executive Director, New Atlantic Initiative
Research Fellow, American Enterprise Institute.
Gary L. Geipel, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute.
David C. Gompert, Professor, U.S. Naval Academy, Former
Senior Director for European and Eurasian Affairs, National
Security Council.
Stephen J. Hadley, Shea & Gardner, Former Assistant
Secretary of Defense.
Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Former Secretary of State.
Edward T. Hanley, General President, Hotel Employees and
Restaurant Employees International Union.
Marshall Freeman Harris, Director of Publications and
Public Outreach, Freedom House.
Carla A. Hills, Chairman and CEO, Hills & Company, Former
U.S. Trade Representative.
Richard Holbrooke, Vice Chairman, Credit Suisse First
Boston, Former Assistant Secretary of State.
Walter D. Huddleston, Former U.S. Senator.
Samuel Huntington, Weatherhead University Professor,
Harvard University.
Kenneth Jensen, Executive Director, The American Committees
on Foreign Relations.
John T. Joyce, President, International Union of
Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers.
Robert Kagan, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace.
Max M. Kampelman, Chairman, American Academy of Diplomacy,
Former Counselor, U.S. Department of State.
Adrian Karatnycky, President, Freedom House.
P.X. Kelley, Gen. USMC (ret.), Former Commandant of the
U.S. Marine Corps.
Jack Kemp, Co-director, Empower America, Former Member of
Congress.
Zalmay M. Khalizhad, Director, Strategy and Doctrine
Program, RAND Corporation.
Lane Kirkland, President Emeritus, AFL-CIO.
Jeane Kirkpatrick, Former U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations.
Henry Kissinger, Former Secretary of State.
William Kristol, Editor, The Weekly Standard.
Melvin Laird, Former Secretary of Defense.
Anthony Lake, Professor, Georgetown University, Former
National Security Advisor.
F. Stephen Larabee, Senior Staff Member, RAND Corporation.
Arnold G. Langbo, Chairman of the Board/CEO, Kellogg
Company.
Ronald S. Lauder, Chairman, Central European Media
Enterprises Ltd.
Michael Ledeen, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise
Institute.
I. Lewis Libby, Partner, Dechert, Price & Rhoads, Former
Principal Undersecretary of Defense.
Robert J. Lieber, Professor of Government, Georgetown
University.
Seymour Martin Lipset, Hazel Professor of Public Policy,
George Mason University.
Bette Bao Lord, Chairwoman, Freedom House.
Winston Lord, Former Assistant Secretary of State.
Will Marshall, President, Progressive Policy Institute.
Paul McCracken, Professor Emeritus, University of Michigan
Business School, Former Chairman, Council of Economic
Advisors.
Dave McCurdy, Chairman, McCurdy Group, Former Member of
Congress.
Robert C. McFarlane, Former National Security Advisor.
John Melcher, Former U.S. Senator.
Walter Mondale, Former Vice President of the United States.
John E. Moon, Commander in Chief, Veterans of Foreign Wars
of the United States.
Joshua Muravchik, Convenor, New Atlantic Initiative Working
Group on NATO Enlargement, Resident Scholar, American
Enterprise Institute.
Michael Nacht, Former Assistant Director, U.S. ACDA.
Matthew Nimetz, Partner, Paul, Weiss, Rukind, Wharton &
Garrison, Former Undersecretary of State.
James J. Norton, President, Graphic Communications
International Union.
Michael Novak, George Frederick Jewett Scholar in Religion,
American Enterprise Institute, Former U.S. Ambassador to the
UNHRC.
William E. Odom, Ltg. USA (ret.), Director, National
Security Studies, Hudson Institute, Former Director, National
Security Agency.
Daniel Oliver, Former Chairman, Federal Trade Commission.
John O'Sullivan, Founder and Co-chairman, New Atlantic
Initiative, Editor, National Review.
William A. Owens, President, COO, Vice Chairman of the
Board, Science Applications International Corporation.
Charles Percy, Chairman, Charles Percy & Associates, Former
U.S. Senator.
Richard Perle, Resident Fellow, American Enterprise
Institute, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense.
William Perry, Former Secretary of Defense.
Daniel Pipes, Editor, Middle East Quarterly.
Norman Podhoretz, Editor-at-large, Commentary Magazine,
Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute.
Colin Powell, Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Former National Security Advisor.
Dan Quayle, Former Vice President of the United States.
David Rockefeller, Retired banker.
Peter Rodman, Director of National Security Programs, Nixon
Center for Peace and Freedom, Former Director, Policy
Planning Staff, U.S. Department of State.
William Rogers, Former Secretary of State.
Henry S. Rowen, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Former
Assistant Secretary of Defense.
Edward L. Rowny, Ltg. USA (ret.), Former Chief U.S.
Negotiator to START talks.
Donald Rumsfeld, Former Secretary of Defense.
Jeffrey D. Sachs, Director, Harvard Institute for
International Development.
Jeffrey T. Salmon.
George Shultz, Former Secretary of State.
Dmitri K. Simes, President, Nixon Center for Peace and
Freedom.
Paul Simon, Former U.S. Senator.
Alan Simpson, Former U.S. Senator.
Joseph J. Sisco, Former Undersecretary of State.
Leon Sloss, President, Leon Sloss Associates.
Stephen Solarz, President, Solarz Associates, Former Member
of Congress.
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Guest Scholar, The Brookings
Institution, Former Counsellor, U.S. Department of State.
Fritz Stern, University Professor Emeritus, Columbia
University.
Robert S. Strauss, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld,
Former U.S. Ambassador to Russia.
William O. Studeman, Adm. USN (ret.), Former Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence.
Stephen Szabo, Academic Dean, Johns Hopkins SAIS.
Gregory F. Treverton, Director, International Security and
Defense Policy, RAND Corporation, Former Vice Chairman,
National Intelligence Council.
Cyrus R. Vance, Former Secretary of State.
Stephen W. Walker, Director, Balkan Institute.
Ben J. Wattenberg, Senior Fellow, American Enterprise
Institute.
Vin Weber, Partner, Clark & Weinstock, Former Member of
Congress.
William H. Webster, Former Director of Central
Intelligence.
George Weigel, Senior Fellow, Ethics and Public Policy
Center.
W. Bruce Weinrod, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense.
Ross Williams, President, Secretary/Treasurer, Oklahoma
State AFL-CIO.
Paul Wolfowitz, Dean, Johns Hopkins SAIS, Former
Undersecretary of Defense.
Ronald B. Woodard, President, Boeing Commercial Airplane
Group.
R. James Woolsey, Former Director of Central Intelligence.
Dov S. Zakheim, CEO. SPC International Corporation.
Robert B. Zoellick, Vice President, Fannie Mae, Former
Undersecretary of State.
E.R. Zumwalt, Jr., Adm. U.S.N. (Ret.), Former Chief of
Naval Operations.
Mr. McCAIN. Third, Mr. President, because of the moral and strategic
interests we have in NATO enlargement, it would be a grave mistake to
endanger ratification by delay or by using amendments to the resolution
of ratification to mandate specific policies on other separate European
security issues.
Some of our colleagues have argued for making ratification contingent
on certain other matters of European security policy. I believe the
enlargement of NATO warrants our support without further condition.
The protocols on enlarging NATO are short, simple documents that do
nothing more than extend the existing NATO treaty, in effect for nearly
50 years, to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. The protocols say
nothing about further enlargement, Russia,
[[Page S2202]]
costs, the changing role of the alliance, the EU, or intra-alliance
disputes. Past rounds of enlargement have gone forward with little or
no conditions attached.
There is something to be said for knowing this historical precedent
as it demonstrates the nonpartisan U.S. commitment to NATO, the
European security, and to being a reliable partner, setting the kind of
example we want our allies to follow on this and many other matters.
Imagine our reaction if the parliament of one of our allies were to
attach conditions to NATO enlargement that we would find unacceptable--
for example, restricting use of NATO designated forces in strikes
against Iraq.
To the extent conditions are attached, they must be of a nature so as
not to impede or slow down the ratification of NATO enlargement, here
or in other Allied capitals. There are many complicated issues at stake
in European security that demand our attention, but these issues cannot
and should not be solved through hurried words in the resolution of
ratification.
We risk doing more harm than good by mandating simplified solutions
to problems where there is need for more thoughtful consideration and
where there is no consensus within this body or among our country's
foremost experts. This applies in particular to questions about NATO's
``new missions'' and the alliance's strategic concept. Clearly, we need
to pay close attention to NATO's growing out-of-area role and its
greater emphasis on peacekeeping and crisis management.
In today's world, no longer dominated by an East-West divide in
Europe, these new directions of NATO make sense. Rather than seeking to
use a resolution of ratification to restrict development of these
concepts in NATO, we simply need to continue to do our job in the
Senate of exercising oversight to ensure that NATO's evolving strategic
concept remains consistent with our treaty commitments and that the
United States does not commit to foreign military engagements that do
not have sufficient support in the Senate and among the American
public.
I do not see the logic in a mandated pause before future rounds of
enlargement. It is scarcely necessary, given there will be a de facto
pause as the alliance absorbs the first round of new members. The
United States always maintains a veto at NATO, and the Senate always
has the right of advice and consent. All a pause would do is needlessly
tie our own hands and those of a future President in the event a
qualified country that could make a real contribution to NATO wanted to
join. Even worse, it would eliminate the incentive other Europeans have
to spend now the resources necessary to prepare for NATO membership in
the future. A mandated pause buys us nothing we do not already have,
yet has real down sides.
Burdensharing is an issue of constant concern and debate with our
allies. It is a long-term struggle for this country to ensure that we
bear only a reasonable and fair share of the costs of our common
security through NATO. Enlargement itself already implies a small
reduction in the U.S. share of NATO's common expenses, although the
total dollar amount will go up as NATO takes on new costs associated
with enlargement. But seeking to use the resolution of ratification to
mandate further reductions in our share of NATO expenses that have not
been consented to by our allies is simply another way to try to scuttle
enlargement.
I also fail to see the logic of tying NATO enlargement to decisions
by the European Union about its enlargement. Security is an issue in
its own right, independent of economics, and we need to fill the
security vacuum in Central Europe, bind these countries to the West,
and guarantee a stable environment in Europe regardless of the state of
European Union enlargement.
Moreover, the European Union is dragging its feet on enlargement. We
should not allow this foot-dragging to delay our taking action to
enhance security in Europe. The U.S. is not a member of the EU and has
almost no influence over its membership decisions. There is no reason
for the U.S. to abdicate to the EU the decisions about which countries
we will end up defending through NATO and when.
Finally, the EU is negotiating with six candidates for future EU
expansion. Three of these countries are the same as the three NATO
invitees, but the others include countries such as Cyprus and Estonia
for whom near-term NATO membership would be problematic.
In my view, the resolution of ratification, as currently drafted,
addresses most of the concerns that Senators have raised in a
responsible and thoughtful manner. It does not impose any unacceptable
conditions. It calls for a reaffirmation from the administration on a
few key points--the primacy of the North Atlantic Council vis-a-vis the
NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council; the maintenance of collective
defense, not collective security and out-of-area missions, as the core
mission of NATO; and the requirement to keep the costs of enlargement
under control and shared equitably among the allies. These are sound
policy positions soundly formulated. Neither the administration nor our
allies should have any difficulty supporting them.
Mr. President, there is no reason to delay bringing this issue to a
vote. This issue has received more attention in the Senate and in
public discussion than most other foreign policy issues in recent
memory. The proliferation of op-eds, articles, studies, think-tank
papers, and conference proceedings is astonishing.
Over the past several years, the Senate has on 14 separate occasions,
through unanimous consent resolutions, voice votes, rollcall votes, on
things such as the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act, repeatedly given
a strong endorsement to NATO enlargement. We even urged the
administration to include one more country in the enlargement talks
that was ultimately invited at Madrid.
Several Senate committees have held hearings on NATO enlargement. The
Foreign Relations Committee has held numerous hearings and published
552 pages of testimony about the issue. This level of attention has
been the most extensive of any previous enlargement of NATO.
Ratification of Spain's membership was done by a voice vote. To say
that there has not been enough debate is to say that no amount of
debate will ever be enough.
The complaints that there has not been sufficient debate--often
coupled with a request to postpone such debate--instead seem like an
effort by opponents of enlargement to scuttle the issue because they
know a majority in the Senate has considered the issue and is prepared
to vote in favor.
The issues before us are clear and well defined. For the moral,
strategic, and practical reasons I have outlined, the most important
thing the Senate can do now is to offer an overwhelming, positive
``yes'' vote on the enlargement of NATO-- without crippling
amendments--to bring these countries back into the Western fold
forever. I urge my colleagues to support the current resolution of
ratification with no further amendments.
Mr. President, I thank the majority leader. I thank his staff and
others who have contributed enormously to this effort. I want to thank
Senator Biden and I want to thank Senator Helms for their efforts.
Without their work, we probably would not have gotten this issue to the
floor. The majority leader has committed on this issue, and I
appreciate his leadership.
But I also cannot help but recall, Mr. President, our former majority
leader, Bob Dole, whose op-ed piece appeared in the Washington Times
today. I will not take the time in the Senate to read the whole thing,
but Senator Dole sums up where he says--and I quote--
This is no time to postpone or delay action. It is time to
act so that other NATO member countries can move ahead with
ratification knowing the United States is leading the way.
Senator Dole, throughout his long and illustrious career here, always
believed that the United States should lead the way. With our vote in
favor of enlargement of NATO, the United States will again, in the
words of Bob Dole, lead the way.
____________________