[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 30 (Wednesday, March 18, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2196-S2202]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND, 
                    HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the treaty.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the distinguished Senator 
from the great State of Maryland.
  Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I wish to speak on NATO enlargement and 
wish to consume such time as necessary.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized.
  Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, this is a truly historic occasion. Today 
the Senate begins debate on the ratification of NATO enlargement. By 
ratifying this treaty, we are building an undivided, peaceful, and 
democratic Europe for the new millennium. I stand here to support NATO 
enlargement because it will make Europe more stable and America more 
secure. It means that the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe 
will share the burden of European security.
  It also means that future generations of Americans might not have to 
fight nor die for Europe. America has fought and won three wars in 
Europe: World War I, when an assassination in Yugoslavia led to years 
of bloodshed; World War II, the bloodiest war in history when thousands 
of Americans left factories and farms to fight on the battlefields of 
Europe; and we won the cold war, when Soviet expansionism forced us to 
prepare to defend Western Europe when the captive nations of Eastern 
Europe were forced behind the Iron Curtain.
  If NATO does not enlarge, the Iron Curtain will remain permanent and 
the unnatural division of Europe will live on longer than the Soviet 
empire did. As a Polish American, I and members of my family have been 
waiting years for this debate to occur. I know that the Polish people 
did not choose to live behind the Iron Curtain. They were forced there 
by the Yalta agreement, by Potsdam, and because they and the Baltic 
States and the other captive nations were sold out by the free world.
  My great grandmother had three pictures on her mantlepiece: One of 
Pope Pius XII, because we were Catholic and are Catholic, and that was 
her Pope; my uncle Joe, who was on the Baltimore City Police 
Department, and we were so proud of what he had achieved; and the other 
picture, of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, because of what he had done for 
working people.
  But after Yalta and Potsdam, my great grandmother turned the 
Roosevelt picture face down on her mantel and she let it stay there 
until the day she died because of what happened at Yalta and Potsdam. 
That is why many of us cannot forget the history of that region, the 
placing of a nation and the other nations, the captive nations, 
involuntarily under the servitude and boot heel of then the evil 
empire.
  But my support for NATO enlargement is not based on nostalgia, nor is 
it based on the past; it is based on the future, and it is support as 
an American. I support NATO enlargement because I believe that it will 
make America and Europe more stable and more secure. NATO enlargement 
means a future in which the newly free and democratic countries will 
take their rightful places as members of Europe. NATO played an 
important role in securing this freedom. It has been the most 
successful defense alliance in world history. It is an alliance that 
helped us win the cold war. It deterred war between the superpowers, 
and it has helped prevent confrontation between member states.
  But if NATO is to survive, it must adapt to meet the needs of the 
post-cold-war world or it will become irrelevant.
  NATO has evolved since it was created in 1949. We have enlarged NATO 
on three different occasions, and each new member strengthened NATO and 
increased security in Europe.
  Today, we are facing very different threats to security and stability 
in Europe. We have civil wars, as in Bosnia; we have hot spots caused 
by ethnic and regional tensions, as in Kosovo; we have international 
crime, drugs, and terrorism; and we have the very real threat of the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction. NATO must meet the needs of 
these new threats, and I believe it will do so by changing and 
expanding. Europe's new democracies will help us meet these challenges.
  The countries of Central and Eastern Europe want to help us address 
these new threats. How many times have we in the Senate discussed 
burdensharing in Europe? How often have we complained that European 
countries were not willing to pay their fair share for the European 
defense?
  Now we have countries that are asking to share the burden. They are 
asking to pledge their troops and equipment for the common defense. 
They are asking to share the burden of peacekeeping. In fact, they are 
doing it right now in Bosnia, where there are thousands of troops from 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Mr. President, Hungary is a 
base camp for our troops which enables them to be in Bosnia. These new 
nations have even committed to joining us in Iraq to help us deal with 
ending Iraq's chemical and biological weapons program, which is more 
than some of our allies.
  These countries are not asking for a handout; they are asking for a 
handshake, a handshake to welcome them into NATO. They are not asking 
for our protection; they are asking to be full partners in the new 
Europe and in the new world order. By transforming these countries into 
free-market democracies, they have earned this right. These new 
democracies will contribute

[[Page S2197]]

to America's security by making NATO stronger. They are adding troops 
and equipment. They will provide additional strategic depth to NATO.
  They will also provide the will to fight for our values. Their 
history and geography make them passionate defenders of peace and 
democracy. They know what it means to be occupied and oppressed by 
tyrants. During the 19th century, Poland was partitioned among three 
countries. At the end of World War I, she had a very brief moment of 
democracy, and yet this is the nation that sent its own men to help 
fight in our war of revolution, went back to Poland and wrote the first 
parliamentary constitution on European continental soil, had an elected 
monarchy, and began to establish a parliament when many of the other 
countries had not even been unified.
  When we look at Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, in the days 
after Yalta and Potsdam, they rose with gallantry in terms of their 
dissident movement. We know about Charter 77. We, of course, know about 
Solidarity, and we know the role that dissidents played. In fact, the 
three foreign ministers who came here each had been in prison and even 
had suffered public humiliation at being dissidents in their own 
country.
  What do they say when they come here and come to NATO? They say they 
will put our common values into action. They will join with us in 
defending national security and our Western values, whether it means 
peacekeeping in Europe or preventing the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction anywhere in the world. They are ready for us. I hope we are 
ready for them.
  Opponents of NATO have very valid concerns, and I would like to 
comment on just a few.
  First, opponents of enlargement point to the cost. They say that NATO 
enlargement has a cost, and they are right. The new NATO members must 
modernize their militaries and must make them compatible with the NATO 
systems. The new NATO members have committed to pay this price.
  There will also be a cost to the United States. Our funding of NATO's 
common budget will increase. NATO estimates that the total common 
budget will increase $1.5 billion over 10 years. The American share 
will be $400 million, or $80 million a year. That is a lot.
  But, Mr. President, what is the cost of not enlarging NATO? I believe 
the cost of not enlarging NATO will be far higher. What if we fail to 
enlarge NATO? What will be the cost to European security? What will be 
the cost to the new democracies of Eastern Europe? I can tell you, as a 
member of the Senate NATO observer group, I met recently with the 
foreign ministers of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and I 
asked them these questions.
  The Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek, a hero of the 
Solidarity movement, said Poland would feel abandoned by the West and 
that Poland would still pay to modernize their military. In fact, in 
the absence of belonging to NATO, they would spend even more of their 
own money. The Hungarian and Czech Foreign Ministers agree that they 
would have to spend more money for defense if they did not join NATO. 
Also, they would form their own military alliances, which would be very 
decidedly more anti-Russian than NATO.
  The other foreign ministers said that by refusing to enlarge NATO, it 
would give the hardliners in Russia a great victory. The antidemocratic 
forces in Russia would feel vindicated and proud and would say that 
they themselves stopped the expansion of NATO.
  What would be the long-range cost to America of failing to prepare 
NATO for the 21st century? The cost would be instability in Europe and 
the increased chance of being pulled into yet another conflict. The 
cost of preventive security is always less than the cost of war.
  I also will take a minute to discuss the benefits of enlargement and 
weigh them against the cost.
  The strategic benefits of enlargement are important. NATO enlargement 
will create a zone of peace and stability that includes Eastern Europe. 
It will include NATO's stabilizing influence to more of Europe and 
reduce the chance of aggression or conflict in Eastern Europe. 
Enlargement will bring peace and security for Eastern Europe just as it 
did for the West.
  There are economic benefits. Europe is America's largest trading 
partner, with $250 billion in a two-way trade each year. Our new NATO 
partners will increase trade opportunities. They are building vibrant 
free-market economies. NATO brings stability, and stability brings 
prosperity. We are creating a prosperity zone.
  In addition, there are benefits for democracy. The young military 
officers of new NATO members are learning from us, learning what it 
means to be part of a democratic military, to be under civilian 
control, to have a code of conduct, also to have transparent defense 
spending budgets, no secret police. They are also learning English. 
When they leave the military, they will bring these skills. They will 
bring a sense of democracy. They will bring great skills to the 
operation of their free market. It is clear these benefits of NATO 
enlargement far outweigh the cost.

  Let me conclude by saying this treaty is very important, and treaty 
ratification is one of our most fundamental duties. We are extending 
our Nation's commitment to the collective defense. We do not take this 
responsibility lightly. We are extending our Nation's commitment to 
collective defense, the so-called article 5. We do not take this 
responsibility lightly, and in the very best tradition of the Senate, 
we are addressing NATO enlargement as a national security issue, not as 
a political issue.
  I am delighted and proud to say that NATO enlargement has been a 
bipartisan process. I remember when we began this debate some years ago 
with the really wonderful leadership of Senator Hank Brown of Colorado. 
It has truly been supported by members of both parties. We have worked 
closely with the President and Secretary Albright, and the Senate has 
been consulted every step of the way. I am proud to support NATO 
enlargement. By ratifying this resolution, we are marking the end of 
the cold war and we are also marking the beginning of a new century. We 
want the new century to be rid of the repugnance of the old century. We 
are laying the groundwork for a new era of peace and stability.
  Mr. President, before I yield the floor, I note on the floor is a 
distinguished war hero, my colleague from the State of Arizona. I was 
not here yesterday to lend my wonderful tribute to him on the 
anniversary of his release from a prison camp. I extend my great 
respect to the senior Senator from Arizona.
  When I visited Vietnam, I saw where they had taken the Senator 
prisoner. Obviously, he is a guy who will never let himself be taken 
prisoner. It is an honor to serve with him in the Senate and to enjoy 
these kinds of debates and discussions. God bless. Godspeed. Mr. 
President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the distinguished senior 
Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. I thank you, Mr. President. I say to my dear friend from 
Maryland, with whom I have had the pleasure and honor of working on a 
number of other foreign policy issues, the Senator from Maryland and I 
were heavily involved with the issue of Central America when there was 
a struggle for freedom and democracy going on there. Due to her efforts 
and those of so many of us who have been involved in these issues, we 
now have a brighter day in Central America.
  What the Senator from Maryland just articulated is a brighter day for 
the people of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. I thank her for 
her remarks about me personally, but I express my even greater 
gratitude for her continued leadership on issues of national security 
and foreign policy in this body, for which she has accumulated enormous 
respect and appreciation, as well as a fair amount of affection. I 
thank the Senator from Maryland.
  I rise today to discuss the issue of NATO enlargement about which 
this body must vote in the near future. I would like to stress three 
points: That NATO enlargement is demanded by our American values; that 
it is in the strategic interests of the United States; and that efforts 
to delay a decision or to mandate policy on other European security 
issues through amendments to the resolution of ratification are 
unnecessary and potentially dangerous.

[[Page S2198]]

These points were made very eloquently by our former majority leader, 
Senator Bob Dole, in an op-ed published today.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Dole's article 
that was published today in the Washington Times be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the op-ed was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                      [From the Washington Times]

                      NATO Test of U.S. Leadership

                             (By Bob Dole)

       For decades, the United States urged communist leaders to 
     ``tear down the Wall.'' Within the past 10 years, the people 
     of Eastern Europe have embraced liberty and undertaken major 
     reforms in their economies and governments. Now the United 
     States Senate should take the next step toward ensuring 
     freedom and democracy for the people of Poland, the Czech 
     Republic and Hungary by ratifying the NATO enlargement treaty 
     and inviting them to join us in NATO.
       American leadership on NATO enlargement is important to our 
     security as well as to the security of Eastern Europe.
       At the Madrid Summit last July, President Clinton and the 
     other NATO leaders unanimously decided to invite Poland, 
     Hungary and the Czech Republic to become members of the 
     alliance, culminating years of efforts by these countries to 
     meet NATO's strict entry criteria. Last week, under the 
     bipartisan leadership of Sen. Jesse Helms, North Carolina 
     Republican, and Sen. Joe Biden, Delaware Democrat, the Senate 
     Foreign Relations Committee overwhelmingly endorsed NATO 
     accession legislation by a vote of 16-2. I hope the full 
     Senate will follow suit without delay.
       Two world wars began in Europe, and strife in Bosnia 
     continues today. Expanding NATO to include Poland, Hungary 
     and the Czech Republic will help ensure that new threats, 
     such as ethnic struggles and state-sponsored terrorism, will 
     be kept in check.
       During the half-century that NATO has helped guarantee 
     peace in Europe, it has added new members three times, 
     including Germany, Greece, Turkey and Spain. Each addition 
     made the Alliance stronger and increased its military 
     capability. Affirming the military importance of NATO 
     enlargement, 60 top retired U.S. officers--including Colin 
     Powell and four other former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of 
     Staff, nine former service branch chiefs, and top combat 
     leaders such as Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf--recently signaled 
     their support of NATO enlargement. Their statement emphasized 
     that the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic 
     will enhance NATO's ability to deter or defend against 
     security challenges of the future.
       What these military leaders and many other Americans 
     understand is that no free nation has ever initiated a war 
     against another democracy. Integrating the military, economic 
     and political structures of the Europe's newest stable 
     democracies into the NATO alliance will help ensure that this 
     remains true in the 21st century.
       Let me take the opportunity to address four major concerns 
     that critics have raised in this debate. First, some senators 
     have engaged in a last-minute effort to postpone 
     consideration of the NATO accession legislation. But members 
     of both parties and both houses of Congress have already 
     thoroughly examined questions surrounding NATO enlargement. 
     The Senate Foreign Relations Committee alone has held eight 
     hearings with more than 37 witnesses, resulting in 550 pages 
     of testimony. The case has been made: NATO enlargement is in 
     the interest of the United States. It is time to make it a 
     reality.
       Second, other critics in the Senate have suggested placing 
     conditions on NATO expansion, thereby ``freezing'' 
     enlargement for an arbitrary number of years. Like the 
     administration, I oppose any effort in the Senate to mandate 
     an artificial pause in the process. Such a move would send 
     the wrong message to countries in both the East and the West, 
     closing the door on current and potential new allies--and 
     perhaps tying the hands of a future president.
       Furthermore, freezing NATO's membership would create a 
     destabilizing new dividing line in Europe. Currently, non-
     member European nations cooperate extensively with NATO 
     through the Partnership for Peace Program. But if nations 
     believe the ultimate goal of NATO membership is unattainable, 
     any incentive to continue democratic reform will be 
     substantially diminished.
       The alliance's open door commitment, which has been 
     supported by the United States, has been an unqualified 
     success. The prospect of NATO membership has given Central 
     European countries a strong incentive to cooperate with the 
     alliance, strengthen civilian control of the military, and 
     resolve longstanding border disputes. All of these advance 
     U.S. interests. It would be a mistake to abandon a policy 
     that is clearly achieving its objectives.
       Third, some argue that NATO enlargement has hurt or will 
     hurt cooperation with Russia, or may even strengthen the hand 
     of hardline Russian nationalists. This has not been borne out 
     by the facts. Since the NATO enlargement process began, 
     President Boris Yeltsin has been re-elected and many 
     reformers have been elevated within the Russian government. 
     Mr. Yeltsin pledged at the 1997 Helsinki summit to press for 
     ratification of START II and to pursue a START III accord. 
     The Duma also ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention and 
     President Yeltsin signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act, 
     creating a new, constructive relationship with the West.
       The world has changed. The debate over NATO expansion 
     cannot be recast as an extension of the Cold War. I believe 
     imposing a mandated pause in NATO's engagement would appear 
     to give Russia a veto over NATO's internal decisions, 
     contrary to NATO's stated policy, and would strengthen 
     Russian extremists by enabling them to claim that their 
     scare-tactic objections swayed the world's most powerful 
     military alliance.
       And last, some skeptics would rather allow the European 
     Union (EU) to take the lead in building Central and Eastern 
     Europe's economic and security structure. But with due 
     respect, NATO, not the EU, is the cornerstone of European 
     security, which is vital to our own.
       As the Senate considers this legislation to allow Poland, 
     Hungary and the Czech Republic to complete their journey from 
     communist dictatorship to NATO membership, we should consider 
     the words of Czech President Vaclav Havel:
       ``The Alliance should urgently remind itself that it is 
     first and foremost an instrument of democracy intended to 
     defend mutually held and created political and spiritual 
     values. It must see itself not as a pact of nations against a 
     more or less obvious enemy, but as a guarantor of 
     EuroAmerican civilization and thus as a pillar of global 
     security.''
       NATO protected Western Europe as it rebuilt its war-torn 
     political and economic systems. With Senate approval of NATO 
     enlargement, it can, and should, provide similar security to 
     our allies in Central and Eastern Europe as they re-enter the 
     community of free nations.
       This is no time to postpone or delay action. It is time to 
     act so that other NATO member countries can move ahead with 
     ratification knowing the United States is leading the way.

  Mr. McCAIN. First, Mr. President, the morals and values we share as 
Americans--protecting and promoting human freedom and democracy--
strongly point toward bringing Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland 
into NATO.
  For centuries, these territories were fully integrated with the 
development of modern Europe--politically, economically, militarily, 
culturally, and psychologically. But these countries were unnaturally 
cut off from the West in 1945 by the Iron Curtain that was slammed down 
by the occupying Soviet Red Army. The close ties to the West of over a 
thousand years had been broken.
  The people of Central Europe suffered horribly under communism. Their 
political and economic development was shattered. Arbitrary rule under 
a police state undermined normal relations within society. Citizens 
were pressured to inform on one another. Political prisoners were held 
and tortured simply for demanding freedom.
  Let us be clear, these countries were forced into communism against 
their will by an occupying power. In each country--Hungary in 1956, 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, Poland in 1981--freedom-seeking citizens sought 
to break free from the grip of Soviet-imposed communism, and, as we 
know, they were ruthlessly put down. While the United States and NATO 
staunchly defended freedom in the West, we could do little in the East 
other than offer our moral support, because the risk of nuclear war was 
too great.
  After decades of oppression, when the Soviet Union itself began to 
decline, the people of these three countries again showed tremendous 
courage and determination by seizing the opportunity to throw off the 
yoke of communism. Hungary cut through the barbed wire on the Austrian 
border and allowed East German refugees to escape to freedom. Vaclav 
Havel's peaceful protests ushered out one of the most repressive 
Communist regimes in Central Europe through the ``velvet revolution'' 
of 1989. The Solidarity movement finally pushed the generals and 
commissars out of power.
  In all three countries, communism was peacefully dismantled and 
replaced with parliamentary democracy and free markets. All three 
countries are now thriving, both politically and 
economically. Individual rights and freedoms are protected in both 
theory and in practice. Institutions that guarantee the rule of law are 
firmly entrenched.

  These three countries now seek our help in securing their newfound 
freedom for membership in NATO--just as was done with Western Europe 
after World War II. While there is no immediate military threat, the 
Poles,

[[Page S2199]]

Czechs, and Hungarians know from bitter experience that they cannot 
afford to wait until a new threat emerges to protect their freedom.
  Protecting freedom was the beacon of our policy in Europe during the 
cold war. It would be an incomprehensible tragedy for us to abandon 
that stance now when the opportunities for freedom in Central Europe 
are greater than ever and the risks are far lower than at any time 
during the cold war.
  Second, beyond any moral arguments, NATO enlargement serves strategic 
interests of the United States. The national security of our country 
still depends on a stable and secure Europe where democracy and free 
markets can flourish. This was the lesson from two world wars and the 
reason we created NATO in the first place.
  Today, the U.S. economy is more tightly tied to the rest of the world 
than it was in 1949. Thus, America's well-being depends more than ever 
on an environment of stable market democracies. NATO remains the only 
organization capable of guaranteeing security and protecting democracy 
in Europe.
  Enlarging NATO will prevent the emergence of a security vacuum in 
Central Europe. Absent NATO, the states of this region would have no 
choice but to remain anxious about historical animosities and worry of 
a resurgent Russia. They would be forced to seek security through 
national means--creating the possibility of diverging military and 
security strategies and raising the risk of miscalculation.
  NATO enlargement guarantees that there is a single, constructive 
focus to security and stability in Europe--West, Central, and East. 
Taking prudent steps now--enlarging NATO gradually to include these new 
democracies--will reduce the likelihood of a conflict that might later 
involve the United States.
  More than just filling a vacuum, NATO enlargement will ensure that 
the security environment in Europe remains conducive to U.S. interests, 
and it will strengthen and expand our base of support in Europe. 
Ratification will enlarge the secure, democratic, prosperous space in 
Europe where countries share our values and can act as meaningful 
partners for the United States, helping promote democracy, free 
markets, and security beyond the bounds of NATO Europe itself.
  Europe has already changed, and NATO enlargement is necessary to 
adjust to these changes. Not ratifying enlargement at this stage would 
isolate NATO from the fundamental political and economic changes that 
are reshaping the continent. A stagnant NATO would be relegated to the 
``dustbin of history,'' something the Soviet Union sought and failed to 
achieve during the cold war.
  Equally distressing, failure to ratify enlargement would undercut 
U.S. leadership in Europe, with consequences well beyond NATO itself. 
We would not only be demonstrating that we are no longer prepared to 
play the leading role in European security, a role that has served our 
common interests well for 50 years, but we would be undermining the 
only meaningful organization in Europe where the U.S. has a seat at the 
table.
  Moreover, voting against ratification would deliver to hardline 
Russian nationalists the victory they failed to achieve through threats 
and intimidation over the past several years. Reformers, who argue that 
cooperation with the West is the only way to serve the interests of 
modern Russia, would be proved wrong. Instead, our action would 
demonstrate that confrontation, not cooperation, is the most effective 
policy for Russia.
  Mr. President, an extraordinary array of the most senior foreign 
policy and military leaders of this Nation have spoken out in support 
of NATO enlargement, including former President Bush, two former Vice 
Presidents, eight former Secretaries of State, six former Secretaries 
of Defense, five former National Security Advisors, five former 
Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nine former Chiefs of the 
Military Services, and some 60 retired four-star generals.
  Mr. President, I ask that their declaration of support for NATO 
enlargement be printed in the Record and that the list of names be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

             A Declaration of Support for NATO Enlargement

       The Senate is faced with a historic opportunity--to extend 
     NATO membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. 
     The outcome of this vote will in large measure determine the 
     future of the NATO alliance and whether it will continue to 
     be a vital force for peace and stability in the Europe of the 
     21st century.
       We believe that NATO has been the most effective military 
     alliance in history. It was the centerpiece of the strategy 
     that kept Europe secure and free during the darkest days of 
     the Cold War. Under its protection, Western Europe recovered 
     from the devastation of World War II to enjoy 50 years of 
     increasing stability, prosperity, and freedom. Now, in an 
     expanded NATO, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic can 
     enjoy similar success.
       The situation in Europe is very different than during the 
     Cold War. But the need for NATO remains. The admission of 
     Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will make for a 
     stronger NATO. It will strengthen NATO's ability to help 
     Europe set aside old quarrels and overcome a long history of 
     conflict and war. It will eliminate a source of instability 
     that contributed to two World Wars and could again become a 
     source of confrontation and even conflict. It will enhance 
     NATO's ability to deter or defend against the security 
     challenges of the future.
       The admission of these three countries into NATO is not 
     directed against Russia. Rather it is directed toward the 
     stability of Europe--stability that will benefit Russia as 
     much as anyone, and will ultimately facilitate a closer 
     relationship between Russia and the United States.
       We believe that the cost of bringing these three countries 
     into NATO is manageable especially when compared to the 
     potential cost of not doing so--a Europe moving not toward 
     stability and peace but toward instability and contention.
       We believe that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic 
     will make a useful contribution to our common security. They 
     already possess credible military capability and are engaged 
     in adapting their armed forces to the standards of the NATO 
     alliance. They have shown a willingness to participate in 
     collective defense by their contributions during the Gulf War 
     and the Yugoslav crisis. Because of their histories, these 
     nations know that freedom is not free. They take security 
     seriously. They will make good allies.
       The upcoming Senate vote is fundamentally a test of whether 
     the United States will stay engaged in the Europe of the 21st 
     century. Since the end of World War II, our nation has 
     expended enormous effort to build a Europe of free and 
     democratic states at peace with one another. For the first 
     time, there is a realistic possibility of achieving this 
     goal. Now is not the time to turn our back on this great 
     project.
       The lessons of history are clear. Two World Wars and one 
     Cold one have established beyond question that American 
     security and European security are inseparable. In the 
     aftermath of World War I, America turned its back on Europe, 
     only to have America's sons and daughters pay the price a 
     generation later. We cannot afford to make that mistake 
     again.
       The creation of NATO in 1949 took foresight and 
     determination to do what was right. Today, the stakes are 
     just as high. We urge the Senate to reaffirm American 
     engagement in Europe by ratifying the admission of Poland, 
     Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO--to secure the peace, 
     security, and prosperity on which we all depend.
       General Joe Ashy, USAF (Ret), Former CINCUSSPACE/CINCNORAD.
       General George S. Blanchard, USA (Ret), Former CINC, 
     USAREUR COMCENTAG.
       General Walter E. Boomer, USMC (Ret), Former Assistant 
     Commandant, USMC.
       General Michael P.C. Carns, USAF (Ret), Former Vice Chief 
     of Staff of the Air Force.
       General W.L. Creech, USAF (Ret), Former CINCAFLANT.
       Admiral William J. Crowe, USN (Ret), Former Chairman, Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff.
       General James Dalton, USAF (Ret), Former Chief of Staff, 
     SHAPE.
       General Mike Dugan, USAF (Ret), Former Chief of Staff of 
     the Air Force, COMAAFCE.
       Admiral Leon Edney, USN (Ret), Former SACLANT.
       General Ronald Fogleman, USAF (Ret), Former Chief of Staff 
     of the Air Force.
       General Al Gray, USMC (Ret), Former Commandant of the 
     Marine Corps.
       General Alfred G. Hansen, USAF (Ret), Former AFLC 
     Commander.
       General Monroe Hatch, USAF (Ret), Former Vice Chief of 
     Staff of the Air Force.
       General Charles A. Horner, USAF (Ret), Former CINCSPACE/
     NORAD.
       General Andrew P. Iosue, USAF (Ret), Former ATC Commander.
       Admiral David E. Jeremiah, USN (Ret), Former Vice Chairman, 
     Joint Chiefs of Staff.
       General David Jones, USAF (Ret), Former Chairman, Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff.
       General George Joulwan, USA (Ret), Former SACEUR.
       General P.X. Kelley, USMC (Ret), Former Commandmant of the 
     Marine Corps.
       Admiral Frank B. Kelso, USN (Ret), Former Chief of Naval 
     Operations, SACLANT.
       General William L. Kirk, USAF (Ret), Former CINCUSAFE/
     COMAAFCE.

[[Page S2200]]

       General Frederick Kroesen, USA (Ret), Former CINC US Army 
     Europe.
       General William Livsey, USA (Ret), Former CINC Combined/UN 
     FORCES KOREA.
       General John Michael Loh, USAF (Ret), Former Commander, Air 
     Combat Command.
       General David M. Maddox, USA (Ret), Former CINC USAREUR.
       General Robert T. Marsh, USAF (Ret), Former Commander, 
     AFSC.
       General James P. McCarthy, USAF (Ret), Former DCINCEUR.
       General Charles McDonald, USAF (Ret), Former AFLC 
     Commander.
       General Merrill A. McPeak, USAF (Ret), Former Chief of 
     Staff of the Air Force.
       General Jack N. Merritt, USA (Ret), Former U.S. 
     Representative to NATO Military Committee.
       General James P. Mullins, USAF (Ret), Former AFLC 
     Commander.
       General Carl Mundy, USMC (Ret), Former Commandant, U.S. 
     Marine Corps.
       General Wallace Nutting, USA (Ret), Former USCINCRED.
       LTC William E. Odom, USA (Ret), Former Director, NSA.
       General Glenn K. Otis, USA (Ret), Former CINC US Army 
     Europe.
       Admiral William Owens USN (Ret), Former Vice Chairman, 
     Joint Chiefs of Staff.
       General Binford Peay, USA (Ret), Former CINC, U.S. Central 
     Command.
       General Colin L. Powell, USA (Ret), Former Chairman, Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff.
       General Bernard P. Randolph, USAF (Ret), Former Commander, 
     AF Systems Command.
       General Robert H. Reed, USAF (Ret), Former Chief of Staff, 
     SHAPE.
       General Robert W. RisCassi, USA (Ret), Former VCSA/CINC 
     UNC/USFK.
       General Bernard W. Rogers, USA (Ret), Former Army Chief of 
     Staff and SACEUR.
       LTG Edward L. Rowny, USA (Ret), Former Special Advisor on 
     Arms Control.
       General Crosbie E. Saint, USA (Ret), Former CINC USAREUR.
       General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA (Ret), Former CINC 
     Central Command & Operation Desert Storm.
       General Robert W. Sennewald, USA (Ret), Former CINC 
     Combined/UN FORCES KOREA.
       General John Shalikashvili, USA (Ret), Former Chairman, 
     Joint Chiefs of Staff.
       General John Shaud, USAF (Ret), Former Chief of Staff, 
     SHAPE.
       General John J. Sheehan, USMC (Ret), Former SACLANT/CINC, 
     USACOM.
       Admiral Leighton Smith, USN (Ret), Former CINC US Naval 
     Forces Europe.
       General Carl Stiner, USA (Ret), Former US CINC, Special 
     Operations Command.
       Admiral William Studeman, USN (Ret), Former Deputy 
     Director, Central Intelligence.
       General Gordon Sullivan, USA (Ret), Former Chief of Staff 
     of the Army.
       General John W. Vessey, USA (Ret), Former Chairman, Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff.
       General Carl E. Vuono, USA (Ret), Former Chief of Staff of 
     the Army.
       General Volney Warner, USA (Ret), Former CINC, US Readiness 
     Command.
       General Larry D. Welch, USAF (Ret), Former Air force Chief 
     of Staff.
       General J.J. Went, USMC (Ret), Former Assistant Commandant, 
     USMC.
       General Ronald W. Yates, USAF (Ret), Former Commander, AF 
     Materiel Command.
       Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN (Ret), Former Chief of 
     Naval Operations and Member of Joint Chiefs of Staff.
                                                                    ____


       The New Atlantic Initiative Statement on NATO Enlargement

 (Presented by Richard Holbrooke, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Anthony Lake and 
   Paul Wolfowitz at the Andrew Mellon Auditorium, September 9, 1997)

       The New Atlantic Initiative, an international network 
     dedicated to revitalizing and expanding Atlantic ties, 
     released the following statement in support of NATO 
     enlargement on September 9, 1997. The statement was released 
     by Richard Holbrooke, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Anthony Lake, and 
     Paul Wolfowitz at the Andrew Mellon Auditorium, where the 
     original North Atlantic Treaty was signed in April 1949.
       NATO was the bulwark of America's successful Cold War 
     strategy of containment. Largely due to NATO, Europe has 
     enjoyed more than fifty years without war among its major 
     powers, the longest such period in modern history.
       NATO succeeded not only by providing a shield against 
     aggression from without but also by helping to knit together 
     a community of democracies in which old quarrels faded, the 
     civic culture of democracy sank deep roots, and market 
     economies prospered.
       In part because of NATO's success, the Cold War has ended, 
     and with it NATO's original mission. Its larger purpose of 
     ensuring peace and freedom in Europe and the Atlantic region 
     endures. To continue to fulfill this purpose NATO is adapting 
     to an undivided Europe. NATO is no longer an anti-Soviet 
     alliance; nor should it engage in the self-fulfilling 
     prophecy of pre-selecting new enemies. Rather it is defining 
     itself in more positive terms: as an alliance aiming to 
     promote peace and stability in the Atlantic region, devoted 
     to the spread and consolidation of democratic ways in Europe, 
     and capable of protecting Western interests against such 
     future threats as may emerge. At bottom, NATO remains a 
     mutual defense pact, and this solemn commitment gives all of 
     its acts a weight and seriousness that distinguish it from 
     other international organizations.
       Crucial to this process of adaptation is NATO's willingness 
     to admit new members able to meet meaningful criteria of 
     democracy and military effort. Otherwise it will remain a 
     relic of the Cold War of diminishing relevance to the 
     contemporary world. Admission to NATO will consolidate 
     democratic transitions, and the prospect of admission will 
     spur reform and the resolution of disputes, as indeed has 
     already happened. In addition, NATO has made clear its desire 
     to develop cooperative security relations among all of the 
     states of the Euro-Atlantic region including Russia. Czech 
     President Vaclav Havel has put it: ``NATO expansion should be 
     perceived as a continuous process, in which the nations of 
     Central and Eastern Europe mature toward the meaning, values 
     and goals of the enlarged and revived alliance.''
       To those who say that the nations of central Europe face no 
     threat today, we say that the most likely way to preserve 
     this situation, which has been all too rare, is to extend 
     NATO to that region. To those who say that the addition of 
     these new members will somehow dilute NATO, we say that 
     Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, where freedom is 
     dearly cherished having been so recently won, will add 
     strength to NATO. To those who say that expanding NATO will 
     draw new lines in Europe, we say that it will erase old 
     lines, relics of a bitter time, and that NATO's openness to 
     additional accessions means that new lines are not in fact 
     being drawn. To those who worry that Russia will feel 
     threatened, we emphasize that NATO is a defensive alliance 
     that threatens no one and extends a hand of cooperation to 
     Russia.
       The decision on NATO expansion is of historic importance. 
     The stakes are high. The issue is clear. Admitting Poland, 
     Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO will strengthen the 
     alliance, reinforce new democracies, renew the American 
     commitment to Europe, and reaffirm American leadership. To 
     turn back now would be a tragic mistake.


     Signers to New Atlantic Initiative NATO Enlargement Statement

       (Organizational affiliation given for identification 
     purposes only. Views reflected in the statement are endorsed 
     by the individual, not the institution.)
       Richard V. Allen, Former National Security Advisor.
       Morris B. Abram, Chairman, United Nations Watch, Former 
     Permanent Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations 
     office in Geneva.
       Elliott Abrams, President, Ethics & Public Policy Center, 
     Former Assistant Secretary of State.
       David M. Abshire, Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO.
       Michael H. Armacost, President, The Brookings Institution, 
     Former Undersecretary of State.
       Richard Armitage, President, Armitage Associates L.C. 
     Former Assistant Secretary of Defense.
       Bernard Aronson, Chairman, Acon Investments, Former 
     Assistant Secretary of State.
       Norman R. Augustine, Chairman, Lockheed Martin Corp., 
     Former Undersecretary of the Army.
       James A. Baker, III, Former Secretary of State.
       Mira Baratta, Vice President for Programs, Freedom House.
       Dennis Bark, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institute.
       Michael D. Barnes, Partner, Hogan & Hartson, Former Member 
     of Congress.
       Douglas J. Bennet, President, Wesleyan University, Former 
     Administrator, USAID.
       Lucy Wilson Benson, President, Benson Associates, Former 
     Undersecretary of State.
       Jeffrey T. Bergner, President, Bergner, Bockorny, Clough & 
     Brain.
       Coit D. Blacker, Senior Fellow, Institute for International 
     Studies, Stanford University.
       J. Kenneth Blackwell, Treasurer, State of Ohio, Former U.S. 
     Ambassador to the UNHRC.
       John Bolton, Senior Vice President, American Enterprise 
     Institute, Former Assistant Secretary of State.
       David L. Boren, President, University of Oklahoma, Former 
     U.S. Senator.
       Zbigniew Brzezinski, Former National Security Advisor.
       Richard Burt, Chairman, IEP Advisors, Inc., Former U.S. 
     Ambassador to Germany.
       Frank C. Carlucci, III, Former Secretary of Defense.
       Ashton B. Carter, Ford Foundation Professor, JFK School of 
     Government, Harvard University, Former Assistant Secretary of 
     Defense.
       Hodding Carter, Knight Professor of Journalism, University 
     of Maryland, Former Assistant Secretary of State.
       Richard Cheney, Former Secretary of Defense.
       Warren Christopher, Former Secretary of State.
       Clark M. Clifford, Former Secretary of Defense.
       Chester A. Crocker, Research Professor for Diplomacy, 
     School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.
       Ivo H. Daalder, Associate Professor, School of Public 
     Affairs, University of Maryland.
       Arnaud de Borchgrave, Senior Advisor, CSIS.

[[Page S2201]]

       Dennis De Concini, Former U.S. Senator.
       Midge Decter, Author.
       James Denton, Executive Director, Freedom House.
       I.M. Destler, Professor and Director, Center for 
     International and Security Studies, University of Maryland.
       Paula J. Dobriansky, Vice President, Director of Washington 
     Office, Council on Foreign Relations.
       Bob Dole, Former U.S. Senator.
       Pierre S. DuPont, Former Governor of Delaware.
       Lawrence Eagleburger, Former Secretary of State.
       J.J. Exon, Former U.S. Senator.
       Dante B. Fascell, Partner, Holland & Knight, LLP Former 
     Member of Congress.
       Douglas J. Feith, Managing Attorney, Feith & Zell, P.C.
       Sandra Feldman, President, American Federation of Teachers.
       Francis Fukuyama, Hirst Professor of Public Policy, George 
     Mason University.
       Evan G. Galbraith, Chairman of the Board, LVMH Inc., Former 
     U.S. Ambassador to France.
       Richard N. Gardner, OF Counsel, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, 
     Former U.S. Ambassador to Italy.
       Charles Gati, Senior Vice President, Interinvest.
       Jeffrey Gedmin, Executive Director, New Atlantic Initiative 
     Research Fellow, American Enterprise Institute.
       Gary L. Geipel, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute.
       David C. Gompert, Professor, U.S. Naval Academy, Former 
     Senior Director for European and Eurasian Affairs, National 
     Security Council.
       Stephen J. Hadley, Shea & Gardner, Former Assistant 
     Secretary of Defense.
       Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Former Secretary of State.
       Edward T. Hanley, General President, Hotel Employees and 
     Restaurant Employees International Union.
       Marshall Freeman Harris, Director of Publications and 
     Public Outreach, Freedom House.
       Carla A. Hills, Chairman and CEO, Hills & Company, Former 
     U.S. Trade Representative.
       Richard Holbrooke, Vice Chairman, Credit Suisse First 
     Boston, Former Assistant Secretary of State.
       Walter D. Huddleston, Former U.S. Senator.
       Samuel Huntington, Weatherhead University Professor, 
     Harvard University.
       Kenneth Jensen, Executive Director, The American Committees 
     on Foreign Relations.
       John T. Joyce, President, International Union of 
     Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers.
       Robert Kagan, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for 
     International Peace.
       Max M. Kampelman, Chairman, American Academy of Diplomacy, 
     Former Counselor, U.S. Department of State.
       Adrian Karatnycky, President, Freedom House.
       P.X. Kelley, Gen. USMC (ret.), Former Commandant of the 
     U.S. Marine Corps.
       Jack Kemp, Co-director, Empower America, Former Member of 
     Congress.
       Zalmay M. Khalizhad, Director, Strategy and Doctrine 
     Program, RAND Corporation.
       Lane Kirkland, President Emeritus, AFL-CIO.
       Jeane Kirkpatrick, Former U.S. Ambassador to the United 
     Nations.
       Henry Kissinger, Former Secretary of State.
       William Kristol, Editor, The Weekly Standard.
       Melvin Laird, Former Secretary of Defense.
       Anthony Lake, Professor, Georgetown University, Former 
     National Security Advisor.
       F. Stephen Larabee, Senior Staff Member, RAND Corporation.
       Arnold G. Langbo, Chairman of the Board/CEO, Kellogg 
     Company.
       Ronald S. Lauder, Chairman, Central European Media 
     Enterprises Ltd.
       Michael Ledeen, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise 
     Institute.
       I. Lewis Libby, Partner, Dechert, Price & Rhoads, Former 
     Principal Undersecretary of Defense.
       Robert J. Lieber, Professor of Government, Georgetown 
     University.
       Seymour Martin Lipset, Hazel Professor of Public Policy, 
     George Mason University.
       Bette Bao Lord, Chairwoman, Freedom House.
       Winston Lord, Former Assistant Secretary of State.
       Will Marshall, President, Progressive Policy Institute.
       Paul McCracken, Professor Emeritus, University of Michigan 
     Business School, Former Chairman, Council of Economic 
     Advisors.
       Dave McCurdy, Chairman, McCurdy Group, Former Member of 
     Congress.
       Robert C. McFarlane, Former National Security Advisor.
       John Melcher, Former U.S. Senator.
       Walter Mondale, Former Vice President of the United States.
       John E. Moon, Commander in Chief, Veterans of Foreign Wars 
     of the United States.
       Joshua Muravchik, Convenor, New Atlantic Initiative Working 
     Group on NATO Enlargement, Resident Scholar, American 
     Enterprise Institute.
       Michael Nacht, Former Assistant Director, U.S. ACDA.
       Matthew Nimetz, Partner, Paul, Weiss, Rukind, Wharton & 
     Garrison, Former Undersecretary of State.
       James J. Norton, President, Graphic Communications 
     International Union.
       Michael Novak, George Frederick Jewett Scholar in Religion, 
     American Enterprise Institute, Former U.S. Ambassador to the 
     UNHRC.
       William E. Odom, Ltg. USA (ret.), Director, National 
     Security Studies, Hudson Institute, Former Director, National 
     Security Agency.
       Daniel Oliver, Former Chairman, Federal Trade Commission.
       John O'Sullivan, Founder and Co-chairman, New Atlantic 
     Initiative, Editor, National Review.
       William A. Owens, President, COO, Vice Chairman of the 
     Board, Science Applications International Corporation.
       Charles Percy, Chairman, Charles Percy & Associates, Former 
     U.S. Senator.
       Richard Perle, Resident Fellow, American Enterprise 
     Institute, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense.
       William Perry, Former Secretary of Defense.
       Daniel Pipes, Editor, Middle East Quarterly.
       Norman Podhoretz, Editor-at-large, Commentary Magazine, 
     Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute.
       Colin Powell, Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 
     Former National Security Advisor.
       Dan Quayle, Former Vice President of the United States.
       David Rockefeller, Retired banker.
       Peter Rodman, Director of National Security Programs, Nixon 
     Center for Peace and Freedom, Former Director, Policy 
     Planning Staff, U.S. Department of State.
       William Rogers, Former Secretary of State.
       Henry S. Rowen, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Former 
     Assistant Secretary of Defense.
       Edward L. Rowny, Ltg. USA (ret.), Former Chief U.S. 
     Negotiator to START talks.
       Donald Rumsfeld, Former Secretary of Defense.
       Jeffrey D. Sachs, Director, Harvard Institute for 
     International Development.
       Jeffrey T. Salmon.
       George Shultz, Former Secretary of State.
       Dmitri K. Simes, President, Nixon Center for Peace and 
     Freedom.
       Paul Simon, Former U.S. Senator.
       Alan Simpson, Former U.S. Senator.
       Joseph J. Sisco, Former Undersecretary of State.
       Leon Sloss, President, Leon Sloss Associates.
       Stephen Solarz, President, Solarz Associates, Former Member 
     of Congress.
       Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Guest Scholar, The Brookings 
     Institution, Former Counsellor, U.S. Department of State.
       Fritz Stern, University Professor Emeritus, Columbia 
     University.
       Robert S. Strauss, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, 
     Former U.S. Ambassador to Russia.
       William O. Studeman, Adm. USN (ret.), Former Deputy 
     Director of Central Intelligence.
       Stephen Szabo, Academic Dean, Johns Hopkins SAIS.
       Gregory F. Treverton, Director, International Security and 
     Defense Policy, RAND Corporation, Former Vice Chairman, 
     National Intelligence Council.
       Cyrus R. Vance, Former Secretary of State.
       Stephen W. Walker, Director, Balkan Institute.
       Ben J. Wattenberg, Senior Fellow, American Enterprise 
     Institute.
       Vin Weber, Partner, Clark & Weinstock, Former Member of 
     Congress.
       William H. Webster, Former Director of Central 
     Intelligence.
       George Weigel, Senior Fellow, Ethics and Public Policy 
     Center.
       W. Bruce Weinrod, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
     Defense.
       Ross Williams, President, Secretary/Treasurer, Oklahoma 
     State AFL-CIO.
       Paul Wolfowitz, Dean, Johns Hopkins SAIS, Former 
     Undersecretary of Defense.
       Ronald B. Woodard, President, Boeing Commercial Airplane 
     Group.
       R. James Woolsey, Former Director of Central Intelligence.
       Dov S. Zakheim, CEO. SPC International Corporation.
       Robert B. Zoellick, Vice President, Fannie Mae, Former 
     Undersecretary of State.
       E.R. Zumwalt, Jr., Adm. U.S.N. (Ret.), Former Chief of 
     Naval Operations.

  Mr. McCAIN. Third, Mr. President, because of the moral and strategic 
interests we have in NATO enlargement, it would be a grave mistake to 
endanger ratification by delay or by using amendments to the resolution 
of ratification to mandate specific policies on other separate European 
security issues.
  Some of our colleagues have argued for making ratification contingent 
on certain other matters of European security policy. I believe the 
enlargement of NATO warrants our support without further condition.
  The protocols on enlarging NATO are short, simple documents that do 
nothing more than extend the existing NATO treaty, in effect for nearly 
50 years, to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. The protocols say 
nothing about further enlargement, Russia,

[[Page S2202]]

costs, the changing role of the alliance, the EU, or intra-alliance 
disputes. Past rounds of enlargement have gone forward with little or 
no conditions attached.
  There is something to be said for knowing this historical precedent 
as it demonstrates the nonpartisan U.S. commitment to NATO, the 
European security, and to being a reliable partner, setting the kind of 
example we want our allies to follow on this and many other matters.
  Imagine our reaction if the parliament of one of our allies were to 
attach conditions to NATO enlargement that we would find unacceptable--
for example, restricting use of NATO designated forces in strikes 
against Iraq.
  To the extent conditions are attached, they must be of a nature so as 
not to impede or slow down the ratification of NATO enlargement, here 
or in other Allied capitals. There are many complicated issues at stake 
in European security that demand our attention, but these issues cannot 
and should not be solved through hurried words in the resolution of 
ratification.
  We risk doing more harm than good by mandating simplified solutions 
to problems where there is need for more thoughtful consideration and 
where there is no consensus within this body or among our country's 
foremost experts. This applies in particular to questions about NATO's 
``new missions'' and the alliance's strategic concept. Clearly, we need 
to pay close attention to NATO's growing out-of-area role and its 
greater emphasis on peacekeeping and crisis management.
  In today's world, no longer dominated by an East-West divide in 
Europe, these new directions of NATO make sense. Rather than seeking to 
use a resolution of ratification to restrict development of these 
concepts in NATO, we simply need to continue to do our job in the 
Senate of exercising oversight to ensure that NATO's evolving strategic 
concept remains consistent with our treaty commitments and that the 
United States does not commit to foreign military engagements that do 
not have sufficient support in the Senate and among the American 
public.
  I do not see the logic in a mandated pause before future rounds of 
enlargement. It is scarcely necessary, given there will be a de facto 
pause as the alliance absorbs the first round of new members. The 
United States always maintains a veto at NATO, and the Senate always 
has the right of advice and consent. All a pause would do is needlessly 
tie our own hands and those of a future President in the event a 
qualified country that could make a real contribution to NATO wanted to 
join. Even worse, it would eliminate the incentive other Europeans have 
to spend now the resources necessary to prepare for NATO membership in 
the future. A mandated pause buys us nothing we do not already have, 
yet has real down sides.
  Burdensharing is an issue of constant concern and debate with our 
allies. It is a long-term struggle for this country to ensure that we 
bear only a reasonable and fair share of the costs of our common 
security through NATO. Enlargement itself already implies a small 
reduction in the U.S. share of NATO's common expenses, although the 
total dollar amount will go up as NATO takes on new costs associated 
with enlargement. But seeking to use the resolution of ratification to 
mandate further reductions in our share of NATO expenses that have not 
been consented to by our allies is simply another way to try to scuttle 
enlargement.
  I also fail to see the logic of tying NATO enlargement to decisions 
by the European Union about its enlargement. Security is an issue in 
its own right, independent of economics, and we need to fill the 
security vacuum in Central Europe, bind these countries to the West, 
and guarantee a stable environment in Europe regardless of the state of 
European Union enlargement.
  Moreover, the European Union is dragging its feet on enlargement. We 
should not allow this foot-dragging to delay our taking action to 
enhance security in Europe. The U.S. is not a member of the EU and has 
almost no influence over its membership decisions. There is no reason 
for the U.S. to abdicate to the EU the decisions about which countries 
we will end up defending through NATO and when.
  Finally, the EU is negotiating with six candidates for future EU 
expansion. Three of these countries are the same as the three NATO 
invitees, but the others include countries such as Cyprus and Estonia 
for whom near-term NATO membership would be problematic.
  In my view, the resolution of ratification, as currently drafted, 
addresses most of the concerns that Senators have raised in a 
responsible and thoughtful manner. It does not impose any unacceptable 
conditions. It calls for a reaffirmation from the administration on a 
few key points--the primacy of the North Atlantic Council vis-a-vis the 
NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council; the maintenance of collective 
defense, not collective security and out-of-area missions, as the core 
mission of NATO; and the requirement to keep the costs of enlargement 
under control and shared equitably among the allies. These are sound 
policy positions soundly formulated. Neither the administration nor our 
allies should have any difficulty supporting them.
  Mr. President, there is no reason to delay bringing this issue to a 
vote. This issue has received more attention in the Senate and in 
public discussion than most other foreign policy issues in recent 
memory. The proliferation of op-eds, articles, studies, think-tank 
papers, and conference proceedings is astonishing.
  Over the past several years, the Senate has on 14 separate occasions, 
through unanimous consent resolutions, voice votes, rollcall votes, on 
things such as the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act, repeatedly given 
a strong endorsement to NATO enlargement. We even urged the 
administration to include one more country in the enlargement talks 
that was ultimately invited at Madrid.
  Several Senate committees have held hearings on NATO enlargement. The 
Foreign Relations Committee has held numerous hearings and published 
552 pages of testimony about the issue. This level of attention has 
been the most extensive of any previous enlargement of NATO. 
Ratification of Spain's membership was done by a voice vote. To say 
that there has not been enough debate is to say that no amount of 
debate will ever be enough.
  The complaints that there has not been sufficient debate--often 
coupled with a request to postpone such debate--instead seem like an 
effort by opponents of enlargement to scuttle the issue because they 
know a majority in the Senate has considered the issue and is prepared 
to vote in favor.
  The issues before us are clear and well defined. For the moral, 
strategic, and practical reasons I have outlined, the most important 
thing the Senate can do now is to offer an overwhelming, positive 
``yes'' vote on the enlargement of NATO-- without crippling 
amendments--to bring these countries back into the Western fold 
forever. I urge my colleagues to support the current resolution of 
ratification with no further amendments.
  Mr. President, I thank the majority leader. I thank his staff and 
others who have contributed enormously to this effort. I want to thank 
Senator Biden and I want to thank Senator Helms for their efforts. 
Without their work, we probably would not have gotten this issue to the 
floor. The majority leader has committed on this issue, and I 
appreciate his leadership.
  But I also cannot help but recall, Mr. President, our former majority 
leader, Bob Dole, whose op-ed piece appeared in the Washington Times 
today. I will not take the time in the Senate to read the whole thing, 
but Senator Dole sums up where he says--and I quote--

       This is no time to postpone or delay action. It is time to 
     act so that other NATO member countries can move ahead with 
     ratification knowing the United States is leading the way.

  Senator Dole, throughout his long and illustrious career here, always 
believed that the United States should lead the way. With our vote in 
favor of enlargement of NATO, the United States will again, in the 
words of Bob Dole, lead the way.

                          ____________________