[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 30 (Wednesday, March 18, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2176-S2190]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, January 16, 1998
A Charter of Partnership Among the United States of America and the
Republic of Estonia, Republic of Latvia, and Republic of Lithuania
preamble
The United States of America, the Republic of Estonia, the
Republic of Latvia, and the Republic of Lithuania, hereafter
referred to as Partners.
Sharing a common vision of a peaceful and increasingly
integrated Europe, free of divisions, dedicated to democracy,
the rule of law, free markets, and respect for the human
rights and fundamental freedoms of all people;
Recognizing the historic opportunity to build a new Europe,
in which each state is secure in its internationally-
recognized borders and respects the independence and
territorial integrity of all members of the transatlantic
community;
Determined to strengthen their bilateral relations as a
contribution to building this new Europe, and to enhance the
security of all states through the adaptation and enlargement
of European and transatlantic institutions;
Committee to the full development of human potential within
just and inclusive societies attentive to the promotion of
harmonious and equitable relations among individuals
belonging to diverse ethnic and religious groups;
Avowing a common interest in developing cooperative,
mutually respectful relations with all other states in the
region;
Recalling the friendly relations that have been
continuously maintained between the United States of America
and the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia, and the
Republic of Lithuania since 1922;
Further recalling that the United States of America never
recognized the forcible incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania into the USSR in 1940 but rather regards their
statehood as uninterrupted since the establishment of their
independence, a policy which the United States has restated
continuously for five decades;
Celebrating the rich contributions that immigrants from
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have made to the multi-ethnic
culture of the United States of America, as well as the
European heritage enjoyed by the United States as a
beneficiary of the contributions of intellectuals, artists,
and Hanseatic traders from the Baltic states to the
development of Europe; praising the contributions of U.S.
citizens to the liberation and rebuilding of Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania.
Affirm as a political commitment declared at the highest
level, the following principles and procedures to guide their
individual and joint efforts to achieve the goals of this
Charter.
principles of partnership
The United States of America has a real, profound and
enduring interest in the independence, sovereignty, and
territorial integrity, and security of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania.
The United States of America warmly welcomes the success of
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in regaining their freedom and
resuming their rightful places in the community of nations.
The United States of America respects the sacrifices and
hardships undertaken by the people of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania to re-establish their independence. It encourages
efforts by these states to continue to expand their
political, economic, security, and social ties with other
nations as full members of the transatlantic community.
The Partners affirm their commitment to the rule of law as
a foundation for a transatlantic community of free and
democratic nations, and to the responsibility of all just
societies to protect and respect the human rights and civil
liberties of all individuals residing within their
territories.
The Partners underscore their shared commitment to the
principles and obligations contained in the United Nations
Charter.
[[Page S2187]]
The Partners reaffirm their shared commitment to the
purposes, principles, and provisions of the Helsinki Final
Act and subsequent OSCE documents, including the Charter of
Paris and the documents adopted at the Lisbon OSCE Summit.
The Partners will observe in good faith their commitments
to promote and respect the standards for human rights
embodied in the above-mentioned Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) documents and in the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights. They will implement their
legislation protecting such human rights fully and
equitably.
The United States of America commends the measures taken by
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to advance the integration of
Europe by establishing close cooperative relations among
themselves and with their neighbors, as well as their
promotion of regional cooperation through their participation
in fora such as the Baltic Assembly, Baltic Council of
Ministers, and the Council of Baltic Sea States.
Viewing good neighborly relations as fundamental to overall
security and stability in the transatlantic community,
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania reaffirm their determination
to further enhance bilateral relations between themselves and
with other neighboring states.
The Partners will intensify their efforts to promote the
security, prosperity, and stability of the region. The
Partners will draw on the points noted below in focusing
their efforts to deepen the integration of the Baltic states
into transatlantic and European institutions, promote
cooperation in security and defense, and develop the
economies of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
a commitment to integration
As part of a common vision of a Europe whole and free, the
Partners declare that their shared goal is the full
integration of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into European
and transatlantic political, economic, security and defense
institutions. Europe will not be fully secure unless Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania each are secure.
The Partners reaffirm their commitment to the principle,
established in the Helsinki Final Act, repeated in the
Budapest and Lisbon OSCE summit declarations, and also
contained in the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military
Aspects of Security, that the security of all states in the
Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible.
The Partners further share a commitment to the core
principle, also articulated in the OSCE Code of Conduct and
reiterated in subsequent OSCE summit declarations, that each
state has the inherent right to individual and collective
self-defense as well as the right freely to choose its own
security arrangements, including treaties of alliance.
The Partners support the vital role being played by a
number of complementary institutions and bodies--including
the OSCE, the European Union (EU), the West European Union
(WEU) the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Council of
Europe (COE), and the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS)--in
achieving the partners' shared goal of an integrated, secure,
and undivided Europe.
They believe that, irrespective of factors related to
history or geography, such institutions should be open to all
European democracies willing and able to shoulder the
responsibilities and obligations of membership, as determined
by those institutions.
The Partners welcome a strong and vibrant OSCE dedicated to
promoting democratic institutions, human rights, and
fundamental freedoms. They strongly support the OSCE's role
as a mechanism to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts and
crises.
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania each reaffirm their goal to
become full members of all European and transatlantic
institutions, including the European Union and NATO.
The United States of America recalls its longstanding
support for the enlargement of the EU, affirming it as a core
institution in the new Europe and declaring that a stronger,
larger, and outward-looking European Union will further
security and prosperity for all of Europe.
The Partners believe that the enlargement of NATO will
enhance the security of the United States, Canada, and all
the countries in Europe, including those states not
immediately invited to membership or not currently interested
in membership.
The United States of America welcomes the aspirations and
supports the efforts of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to
join NATO. It affirms its view that NATO's partners can
become members as each aspirant proves itself able and
willing to assume the responsibilities and obligations of
membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of
these nations would serve European stability and the
strategic interests of the Alliance.
The United States of America reiterates its view that the
enlargement of NATO is an on-going process. It looks forward
to future enlargements, and remains convinced that not only
will NATO's door remain open to new members, but that the
first countries invited to membership will not be the last.
No non-NATO country has a veto over Alliance decisions. The
United States notes the Alliance is prepared to strengthen
its consultations with aspirant countries on the full range
of issues related to possible NATO membership.
The Partners welcome the results of the Madrid Summit. They
support the Alliance's commitment to an open door policy and
welcome the Alliance's recognition of the Baltic states
as aspiring members of NATO. Estonia, Lativia, and
Lithuania pledge to deepen their close relations with the
Alliance through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council,
the Partnership for Peace, and the intensified dialogue
process.
The Partners underscore their interest in Russia's
democratic and stable development and support a strengthened
NATO-Russia relationship as a core element of their shared
vision of a new and peaceful Europe. They welcome the signing
of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the NATO-Ukraine Charter,
both of which further improve European security.
security cooperation
The Partners will consult together, as well as with other
countries, in the event that a Partner perceives that its
territorial integrity, independence, or security is
threatened or at risk. The Partners will use bilateral and
multilateral mechanisms for such consultations.
The United States welcomes and appreciates the
contributions that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have
already made to European security through the peaceful
restoration of independence and their active participation in
the Partnership for Peace. The United States also welcomes
their contributions to IFOR, SFOR, and other international
peacekeeping missions.
Building on the existing cooperation among their respective
ministries of defense and armed forces, the United States of
America supports the efforts of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania to provide for their legitimate defense needs,
including development of appropriate and interoperable
military forces.
The Partners welcome the establishment of the Baltic
Security Assistance Group (BALTSEA) as an effective body for
international coordination of security assistance to
Estonia's, Latvia's and Lithuania's defense forces.
The Partners will cooperate further in the development and
expansion of defense initiatives such as the Baltic
Peacekeeping Battalion (BaltBat), the Baltic Squadron
(Baltron), and the Baltic airspace management regime
(BaltNet), which provide a tangible demonstration of
practical cooperation enhancing the common security of
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and the transatlantic
community.
The Partners intend to continue mutually beneficial
military cooperation and will maintain regular consultations,
using the established Bilateral Working Group on Defense and
Military Relations.
economic cooperation
The Partners affirm their commitment to free market
mechanisms as the best means to meet the material needs of
their people.
The United States of America commends the substantial
progress its Baltic Partners have made to implement economic
reform and development and their transition to free market
economies.
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania emphasize their intention to
deepen their economic integration with Europe and the global
economy, based on the principles of free movement of people,
goods, capital and services.
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania underscore their commitment
to continue market-oriented economic reforms and to express
their resolve to achieve full integration into global
economic bodies, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO)
while creating conditions for smoothly acceding to the
European Union.
Noting this objective, the United States of America will
work to facilitate the integration of Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania with the world economy and appropriate
international economic organizations, in particular the WTO
and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), on appropriate commercial terms.
The Partners will work individually and together to develop
legal and financial conditions in their countries conducive
to international investment. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
welcome U.S. investment in their economies.
The Partners will continue to strive for mutually
advantageous economic relations building on the principles of
equality and non-discrimination to create the conditions
necessary for such cooperation.
The Partners will commerce regular consultations to further
cooperation and provide for regular assessment of progress in
the areas of economic development, trade, investment, and
related fields. These consultations will be chaired at the
appropriately high level.
Recognizing that combating international organized crime
requires a multilateral effort, the partners agree to
cooperate fully in the fight against this threat to the world
economy and political stability. Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania remain committed to developing sound legislation in
this field and to enhance the implementation of this
legislation through the strengthening of a fair and well-
functioning judicial system.
the u.s.-baltic relationship
In all of these spheres of common endeavor, the Partners,
building on their shared history of friendship and
cooperation, solemnly reaffirm their commitment to a rich and
dynamic Baltic-American partnership for the 21st century.
The Partners view their partnership in the areas of
political, economic, security, defense, cultural, and
environmental affairs as
[[Page S2188]]
contributing to closer ties between their people and
facilitating the full integration of Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania into European and transatlantic structures.
In order to further strengthen these ties, the Partners
will establish a Partnership Commission chaired at the
appropriately high level to evaluate common efforts. This
Commission will meet once a year or as needed to take stock
of the Partnership, assess results of bilateral consultations
on economic, military and other areas, and review progress
achieved towards meeting the goals of this Charter.
In order to better reflect changes in the European and
transatlantic political and security environment, signing
Partners are committed regularly at the highest level to
review this agreement.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, it is signed by the President and the heads
of state of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia in mid-January, as a
commitment to a Europe that is whole and free, based upon Western
values and Baltic integration into interlocking European and
transatlantic security institutions.
The key language on NATO membership states:
The United States of America welcomes the aspirations and
supports the efforts of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to
join NATO. It affirms its view that NATO's partners can
become members as each aspirant proves itself able and
willing to assume the responsibilities and obligations of
membership, and as NATO determines that inclusion of these
nations would serve European stability and the strategic
interests of the Alliance.
We said the same thing to the Russians and to every other country. I
might add, by the way, when I say the President made the same
commitment for theoretic membership of Russia in the alliance, people
say, ``Oh, my God, how can you say that?'' I would like to take us back
40 years when NATO was contemplating debate on this floor. If someone
would have said, ``if the admission of Germany would enhance stability,
we would invite them,'' they would have been looked at like they were
crazy. Our goal is European stability, territorial integrity. I don't
think the President's actions in fact----
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, if I might remind my colleague, we are
having a colloquy, and he is responding to questions. I appreciate the
enthusiasm.
I simply say, Madam President, that the Baltic charter--while it has
a lot of verbiage in there, I never said it was a commitment. Let me
tell you, Senator, with that, our President slipped the engagement ring
on. I don't know how long it will come before that issue is squarely
before this Chamber to the effect that now the time has come to admit
those nations. If my good friend will look at the map of Europe, as he
does, I think, on a daily basis, and see that arch from Poland down
through Hungary, the Czech Republic, on down through the next nations
to be admitted, Romania and Bulgaria, it's an arch. And just as the
Iron Curtain was dropped in the late 1940s by the Soviet Union facing
west, that ring of countries constitutes an iron ring now, encircling
much of Russia.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Would my distinguished friend yield for a question?
Mr. WARNER. This is a good debate, and I yield to the distinguished
senior Senator from New York.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. My friend spoke of this arch dropping from Poland
through Romania and Bulgaria.
Mr. WARNER. I have said, Madam President, an iron ring has now
replaced the Iron Curtain. It flashed into my mind as I was debating
with my distinguished colleague here that while the Iron Curtain faced
west, the ring now faces east. I will deal with the Russian planners
who have to look at this force that has moved now a border 400 miles
east, with the accession of these three nations, closer to Russia.
Every military planner has to look at that force and advise the Russian
President today, tomorrow, and in the future, as to what the
capabilities of that force are, no matter what the intentions may be. I
will return to that.
I yield back to my colleague for a question.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. I wanted to respond to his wonderful, vivid image of an
iron ring surrounding Central Europe and facing Russia. Would my friend
not agree--and of course, he will agree because it is a fact of
geography--that Russian territory will be within that ring? The simple
fact that Poland will be in NATO means that Kaliningrad will border
NATO though it is cut off from the rest of Russia. It is cut off, in
any event, by Lithuania and Belarus, but I don't have to tell the
former Secretary of the Navy that, other than Sebastopol in the Black
Sea, the main port of what was the navy of the Soviet Union is in
Kaliningrad. We may expand NATO beyond that. Surely that cannot but
cause anxiety in Russia.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I thank my distinguished colleague. I
think obviously history has to be in our rearview window as we look
toward what we are about to do here in the Senate. I thank him for that
very valuable contribution. I want to now turn to another question.
Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield for 60 seconds?
I point out to my friend from New York that the border with Norway
has been there for 50 years. And Norway is now providing aid and
assistance to Russia. They seem to be getting on very well. It seems
not to have caused all that big a problem.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. A tiny border on the Arctic sea.
Mr. BIDEN. A distinction.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Not a Naval base in the Baltic.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I thank my colleague.
Now I proceed to another question to my colleague from Delaware.
Madam President, for some reason we have decided to go ahead. I am
not here to argue on the question of timing. But one of the most
valuable resources to this debate is the studies undertaken in the past
by the NATO staff, and which are still being undertaken. NATO cannot
tell us with certainty what the costs are going to be. They are going
to issue another report in the June timeframe, long after this debate
will be concluded and this body will have made its decision. But in the
current NATO studies--again, they are all classified, so I can't bring
them out. But I think without breaching any classification, I ask my
good friend: These studies are predicated on a 10-year cost analysis
and timeframe, but it is a period of 10 years that NATO is looking at
for these three nations and the subject of this accession. It is 10
years before they can bring the level of their military
professionalism, the level of their military interoperability--and for
those following the debate, I would say that is so we can talk on the
same radio and have commonalty among our weapons systems, command and
control, and the like--10 years before that level will be brought up to
the standards that will be acceptable to our NATO forces.
I say to my good friend: What are his estimates of the cost? What
cost estimates is he now putting to this Chamber, to this U.S. Senate,
on which we can rely with that degree of certainty as we undertake to
commit the United States, in our military budget, to future costs
associated with this expansion of three nations?
And, as a subset to my question, will he comment on France's
statement to the effect that they will not bear any added costs
associated with this expansion. Do I and do others interpret that as
saying that we are paying--the United States of America today--26
percent of all the costs of NATO, and that that will be a further added
cost to the American taxpayer occasioned by the sustaining of France
and meeting whatever level of cost the Senator is about to exchange
with us for the NATO expansion?
Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I will attempt to respond. Please, I ask
both my colleagues. I have a very good friend whose interest is more
practical in academics, and every once in a while I will say, ``Bob, do
you understand what I am saying?'' And he will look at me, and say,
``Joe, I not only understand, I overstand.'' If I get into the
``overstand'' category, please let me know if I am overresponding to
what you wish me to respond to.
But let me answer the French issue first. It is always difficult, as
my friend knows, understanding what the French mean. But the short
answer to his question is that France has changed its view. France has
publicly now said that in fact it will now meet its share of the
expansion cost.
Second, on the first question asked about target goals, I remind my
friend of a little bit of history; that is, that it is important to
note that Greece, Turkey, Germany, and Spain were admitted to NATO
without any target force
[[Page S2189]]
goal, and that no ally meets--including us--100 percent of the target
force goal now, No. 1.
No. 2, to the extent that the three new applicants are committing to
and fulfilling their targets in advance of accession is another
demonstration that their commitment to the alliance and their
capability to fulfill those target goals are, in fact, real, Poland has
stated that it will fulfill all the target force goals that are due
prior to accession. The Poles address the capabilities of NATO military
authorities to determine what NATO military authorities have determined
are necessary for new members. Of the additional target force goals
over the planning period of 1999 to 2003, only a portion of them have
target dates that are applicable prior to accession. Poland has also
stated that it will complete all the remaining target goals; the other
nations as well. And when you talk about the target goals, the Senator
makes it sounds as though it will be 10 years before anything is done,
10 years before all of these things are met. Many of them will be met
within the next 6 months; some will take as long as 10 years.
With regard to what number I am using in terms of the cost of
enlargement, I am using the figure $40 million a year for the next 10
years. If you want me to elaborate on that, I will be happy to explain
what I mean by how I arrive at that and why I think the figure that has
been put forward by NATO is an accurate figure. But I do not want to
take the time of my colleagues, if they wish to respond.
So I say to my friend, the figure that I am using is the figure of
$40 million a year based upon a U.S. commitment of $400 million over 10
years. That reflects roughly a 25 percent burden sharing on our part
for the costs of enlargement, the total cost being, over 10 years,
roughly $1.5 billion. That is how I arrive at our cost. I will be
happy, as I said, to go into detail on that if my friends would like me
to.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I am sure there will be further debate.
But I also point out that the Congressional Budget Office came up with
a figure of $125 billion. The Senator is familiar with that. Of course,
we recognize that embraces some other aspects of the cost, but,
nevertheless, I think in fairness to all parties, we are handing out
blank checks. That is in the words of my able colleague, Senator Smith,
who used that phrase first as we began to proceed on this thing.
Mr. BIDEN. Let the Record reflect that I will not engage the Senator
now, but I totally disagree with that argument and that statement that
we are signing a ``blank check.'' It is nowhere near a blank check. But
I will be happy, again, to engage at the appropriate time.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that two
articles in today's Washington Post--one entitled ``NATO Hopefuls Lag
in Meeting Requirements'' and the other entitled ``Deciding NATO's
Future Without Debate''--be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Washington Post, Mar. 18, 1998]
Deciding NATO's Future Without Debate
(By David S. Broder)
This week the United States Senate, which counts among its
major accomplishments this year renaming Washington National
Airport for former president Ronald Reagan and officially
labeling Saddam Hussein a war criminal, takes up the matter
of enlarging the 20th century's most successful military
alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
The Senate just spent two weeks arguing over how to slice
up the pork in the $214 billion highway and mass transit
bill. It will, if plans hold, spend only a few days on moving
the NATO shield hundreds of miles eastward to include Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic.
The reason is simple. As Sen. Connie Mack of Florida, the
chairman of the Senate Republican Conference, told me while
trying to herd reluctant senators into a closed-door
discussion of the NATO issue one afternoon last week, ``No
one is interested in this home,'' so few of his colleagues
think it worth much of their time.
It is a cliche to observe that since the Cold War ended,
foreign policy has dropped to the bottom of voter's concerns.
But, as two of the veteran senators who question the wisdom
of NATO's expansion--Democrat Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New
York and Republican John Warner of Virginia--remarked in
separate interviews, serious consideration of treaties and
military alliances once was considered what the Senate was
for.
No longer. President Clinton's national security adviser,
Sandy Berger, has pressed Majority Leader Trent Lott to get
the NATO deal done before Clinton leaves Sunday on a trip to
Africa. When Warner and others said the matter should be
delayed until the Senate has time for a full-scale debate,
Lott refused. He pointed out that a Senate delegation had
joined Clinton at NATO summits in Paris and Madrid last year
(no sacrifice being too great for our solons) and that there
had been extensive committee hearings.
Wrapping the three former Soviet satellites in the warm
embrace of NATO is an appealing notion to many senators,
notwithstanding the acknowledgment by advocates that the
Czech Republic and Hungary have a long way to go to bring
their military forces up to NATO standards. As the date for
ratification has approached, successive estimates of the
costs to NATO have been shrinking magically, but the latest
NATO estimate of $1.5 billion over the next decade is barely
credible.
The administration, in the person of Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright, has steadfastly refused to say what
happens next if NATO starts moving eastward toward the border
of Russia. ``The door is open'' to other countries with
democratic governments and free markets, Albright says. The
administration is fighting an effort by Warner and others to
place a moratorium on admission of additional countries until
it is known how well the first recruits are assimilated.
Moynihan points out that if the Baltic countries of Latvia,
Estonia and Lithuania, which are panting for membership, are
brought in, the United States and other signatories will have
a solemn obligation to defend territory farther east than the
western-most border of Russia. He points to a Russian
government strategy paper published last December saving the
expansion of NATO inevitably means Russia will have to rely
increasingly on nuclear weapons.
Moynihan and Warner are far from alone in raising alarms
about the effect of NATO enlargement on U.S.-Russian
relations. The Duma, Russia's parliament, on Jan. 23 passed a
resolution calling NATO expansion the biggest threat to
Russia since the end of World War II. The Duma has blocked
ratification of the START II nuclear arms agreement signed in
1993 and approved by the Senate two year ago.
George Kennan, the elder statesman who half a century ago
devised the fundamental strategy for ``containment'' of the
Soviet Union, has called the enlargement of NATO a classic
policy blunder. Former senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, until his
retirement last year the Democrats' and the Senate's leading
military authority, told me, ``Russian cooperation in
avoiding proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is our
most important national security objective, and this [NATO
expansion] makes them more suspicious and less cooperative .
. . The administration's answers to this and other serious
questions are what I consider to be platitudes.''
Former senator Mark Hatfield of Oregon, for 30 years
probably the wisest ``dove'' in that body, agrees, as do
former ambassadors to Moscow and other Americans with close
contacts in Russia.
To the extent this momentous step has been debated at all,
it has taken place outside the hearing of the American
people. Too had our busy Senate can't find time before it
votes to let the public in on the argument.
____
[From the Washington Post]
NATO Hopefuls Lag in Meeting Requirements
(By Christine Spolar)
Warsaw, March 17.--As the U.S. Senate moves toward
approving NATO expansion, the alliance's three prospective
new members are quietly being told to step up basic revisions
to their military forces such as English-language training of
senior officers.
Diplomats and defense experts from Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic acknowledge that since they were invited to
join NATO last July their countries have fallen behind in key
areas designed to ensure military compatibility with the
West.
Training in English, NATO's standard operating language, is
lagging in all three countries. Nearly nine years after the
fall of communism in Eastern Europe, none of the three armies
has more than a few hundred officers who have achieved a
level of fluency in English acceptable to NATO.
In addition, interviews with politicians, analysts and
military officers indicate each country is having trouble
meeting or maintaining promised changes such as providing for
adequate civilian control of their militaries, installing
safeguards to protect NATO secrets and modernizing their air
defense systems.
While the problems are not expected to derail NATO's plans
to welcome the three former Soviet Bloc countries as new
members next year, they have raised concerns about their
ability to meet their commitments to the Western alliance.
``I know many of our politicians are lying to themselves
and saying, `They tell us we have to do these things but we
probably have more time,' '' said Jiri Payne, a member of the
Czech Parliament and, until last year, a deputy defense
minister. ``My feeling is that people here still don't
understand how much we need to change our system.''
Poland, the largest NATO aspirant, has been vexed by a
dearth of civilians who want
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to work at the Defense Ministry. The Czech Republic has yet
to enact legislation to protect classified information and to
define military pay ranks. Hungary has delayed required
purchases of radar air defense systems in part because of
bureaucratic inertia and in part to see whether NATO would
pick up most of the tab.
``Militarily, we're not so behind,'' said Imre Mecs, head
of the Hungarian parliament's defense committee. ``What we're
lagging behind in is language and mentality. The qualitative
changes require a lot more work, a lot more money and a lot
more energy. And you don't see the changes quickly.''
Language training is a significant barometer to gauge how
the three countries are doing as they prepare for NATO
accession.
In assessing applications for membership last year, NATO
settled on largely political criteria. Poland, Hungary and
the Czech Republic were invited primarily because of the
progress they had made in creating stable democracies and
instituting market reforms.
None was expected to achieve overnight a level of force
modernization on par with NATO standards. But they were asked
to ensure that their armies were able to communicate with
those of the alliance's 16 other members.
Over the past couple of years, each country received
hundreds of thousands of dollars in U.S. aid for language
labs, and support from Canada and Britain for classes or
instruction.
Last fall, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Franklin
Kramer underscored the need for English training in testimony
to the Senate Foreign Relations' Committee. ``English
language proficiency is a critical element of NATO inter-
operability,'' he said, adding that Poland, the largest NATO
aspirant, with 230,000 troops, expected to have 25 percent of
its officers proficient in English by 1999.
Results so far suggest Poland will have difficulty meeting
that target. It has about 60 officers who are considered
fluent by NATO standards; it needs about 400 within the year,
according to Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek.
Military officials in Hungary and the Czech Republic claim
as many as 300 officers are fluent in English. Interviews
with military instructors familiar with the training,
however, indicate the total is about one-third to one-half
that many. Hungary has yet to even implement NATO English-
language testing standards.
Officials from all three countries claimed last year that
between 1,200 and 1,500 of their soldiers speak English. Some
officials said they revised their numbers downward after
examining NATO standards.
Since the fall of communism, Poland has been cited as the
best argument for NATO's eastward expansion because of its
size and strategic location in the heart of Europe. Eighty
percent of Poles supported joining the alliance. But within
the military itself, the idea was a tougher sell.
Before a trip to Washington last month, Geremek said top
NATO officials had been frank about Poland's need to improve
officer language training and to appoint more civilians to
key positions in the Defense Ministry.
``Civilian control means we should have civilians in this
department,'' said one official in the Defense Ministry who
asked not to be identified. ``And we have a handful. With
what we have, it's difficult to change attitudes and
mentality.''
Lt. Gen. Ferenc Vegh, chief of Hungary's armed forces, said
no former Warsaw Pact army finds the change easy. ``It's
clear what's supposed to be done,'' he said. ``But of course
we don't have enough civilians to fill the jobs.''
One Hungarian Defense Ministry official said that over the
past six months he had offered jobs to at least 20 people.
They all said no. They could earn four to five times more in
the private sector, he said.
Mr. WARNER. I see our distinguished colleague, the senior Senator
from New York, who has a corporate memory of affairs beyond this border
of our great country, who is in the mold of that great Senator
Vandenberg who said that ``all politics stops at the water's edge''--am
I not correct on that?--I am sure he can extol on that virtue, and I
have subscribed to that theory.