[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 30 (Wednesday, March 18, 1998)]
[House]
[Pages H1291-H1295]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
REPORT ON RECENT TRIP TO BOSNIA
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Dickey). Under the Speaker's announced
policy of January 7, 1997, the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Wicker)
is recognized for 60 minutes.
(Mr. WICKER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. WICKER. Mr. Speaker, four weeks ago today I had the opportunity
to lead a bipartisan group of Members of Congress on a five-day trip to
Bosnia and Herzegovina. This trip was taken at the suggestion of the
Secretary of Defense and the Speaker of the House. And I was joined on
this congressional delegation trip by the gentleman from Georgia (Mr.
Chambliss), the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Graham), the
gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Gutknecht), the gentleman from Wisconsin
(Mr. Kind), and the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).
During our trip, this delegation of first- and second-term Members of
Congress had the opportunity to meet with senior officers of the U.S.
Command, as well as enlisted personnel, both in the European theater
and on the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We met with U.S.
diplomatic staff and also the people most affected by the ravages of
war, the ordinary people of the Bosnian region, the Croats, the Serbs
and the Muslim Bosniaas, who are all living together in this war-torn
region.
We went to Bosnia, Mr. Speaker, to begin a better understanding of
the current political and military situation in the region, to
understand the stresses that a continued U.S. military deployment will
place on our armed forces, the impact on training and readiness of the
United States Army both in theater and elsewhere in the world, the
conditions necessary to allow for a withdrawal of U.S. forces and when
those conditions might be obtained.
Mr. Speaker, I will say at the outset that our 6-Member delegation
has had a bit of a tough time scheduling this particular special order.
{time} 1615
We had thought that we might be able to bring these remarks during
the evening hour yesterday. Because of the lateness of legislative and
House business, we were unable to do so. The other members of the
delegation may join me in a few moments, but I am told they are in
various hearings and important meetings, and so I may or may not be
joined by the other members of the delegation.
However, I do want to let my colleagues know, Mr. Speaker, the
unanimous, and I emphasize unanimous, observations and conclusions
which were reached by the entire delegation. These are people from both
sides of the aisle. These are Members who came to the congressional
delegation trip from different perspectives. Some Members had supported
the Bosnian operation from the outset. Others had been very much
opposed to the concept of our troops being in country there in Bosnia.
Based
[[Page H1292]]
on our observations, based on the conversations with generals, enlisted
personnel, with the very fine United States diplomatic men and women
that we have in Bosnia and in the region, as well as NATO and United
Nations forces, we did come to these unanimous conclusions, seven items
in total which I will share with Members today, Mr. Speaker, and which
I will also be sending by way of a Dear Colleague letter.
The number one observation and conclusion, the delegation wishes to
acknowledge the impressive professionalism and dedication of U.S.
service personnel serving on the ground in Bosnia and supporting
Operation Joint Guard from deployment sites in Hungary and Italy.
Indeed we met with not only our troops there on the ground in Bosnia,
but also from the various staging areas in Hungary and in Vincenza,
Italy. We also met with a number of important military leaders in
Stuttgart, Germany before going into Bosnia.
I continue to read from the report. It was clear that U.S. military
forces are performing their mission in an exemplary fashion. They are
being asked to do more with less and are responding admirably. The
American people can be proud of the way their Armed Forces, Active
Duty, Reserve and National Guard components, have risen to the
challenge of ensuring a peaceful, secure and stable environment in
Bosnia. All Americans owe these soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines a
debt of gratitude.
Indeed, Mr. Speaker, our delegation was quite impressed with the
military and diplomatic leadership that we have over there. We received
an in-depth briefing from General Wesley Clark, the Commander in Chief,
U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. I would
just mention that General Clark is not only a 4-star general with a
distinguished record of service to our country, he is a West Point
graduate, holds master's degrees from Oxford University and is a Rhodes
scholar.
We also met with other very fine military leaders, such as Air Force
General James Jamerson, also a 4-star general, and Army Lieutenant
General David Benton, a 3-star general, Chief of Staff for the U.S.
European Command. I also had an opportunity to visit with enlisted and
officer personnel from my own State of Mississippi.
Again, I would say, Mr. Speaker, that we can be proud of the effort
that these men and women are making. I concluded that they believe in
the mission, and they are proud of what they have been doing.
Our conclusion number two is that we have been informed that the U.S.
force levels in Bosnia are likely to be reduced from the current 8,500
to 6,900. We are concerned that a lower troop level may lead to
increased risk, given the potential for violence directed against or
involving U.S. troops as they execute their missions.
We believe that an appropriate level of forces in Bosnia must be
based on sound military assessment of the risks and not on any
political considerations. Force protection must be a top priority.
Increasing the risk to U.S. forces is not an acceptable option. At a
minimum, we recommend unanimously, Mr. Speaker, that U.S. force levels
not be reduced until after the September 1998 elections are held and a
review of the security situation is conducted. We feel that progress in
Bosnia should be judged by the achievement of specific milestones and
that any troop reduction should be tied to the achievement of these
milestones.
Mr. Speaker, I am joined at this point by the gentleman from
Minnesota (Mr. Gutknecht). Of course, he has never been one to be a
shrinking violet. He should feel free, Mr. Speaker, to jump in and ask
me to yield at any point, or I will proceed with the discussion of the
upcoming election in Bosnia, particularly as it relates to the Republic
of Srpska.
Mr. GUTKNECHT. If the gentleman will yield, I will just say that he
is doing a wonderful job. I apologize for being late. I had thought we
were going to start a little later than this. I think the gentleman
should proceed through that. Then we can talk about our trip, what we
learned and saw, and what an effect it had on the people who took part
in that particular CODEL.
Mr. WICKER. I think my colleague will agree that many Americans, and
many Members of the Congress, both the House and the Senate, perhaps
are not aware of the complexity of the Dayton agreement. But under the
Dayton agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided basically into two
federations, one the Croat Muslim Federation, and then the
predominantly Serb area, which is referred to commonly as the Republic
of Srpska.
Our third conclusion is that prior to the elections in December of
1997, which brought to power more moderate leadership within the
Republic of Srpska, hard-line Bosnian Serbs in power demonstrated an
unwillingness to comply with the terms of the Dayton agreement. As a
result, the overwhelming bulk of Western economic aid has flowed to the
Muslim Croat-dominated federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The recently elected moderate government within the Republic of
Srpska lacks the financial resources to function effectively, raising
concerns about the government's political viability. We were advised by
our military and diplomatic leadership that $5 million in U.S.
assistance to the new Republic of Srpska Government is essential as
part of a $20 million to $30 million international assistance package
to demonstrate our commitment to the long-term viability of the new
government until it begins generating sufficient revenues on its own.
We strongly support appropriation of this $5 million in assistance.
Compared to the $2 billion to $3 billion invested annually in support
of the military operation, $2 billion to $3 billion invested annually,
$5 million on a one-time basis is a relatively small price to pay to
ensure the stability of the new reform-minded Republic of Srpska
government. However, we do not believe that any U.S. assistance of this
nature should be taken from the Department of Defense accounts.
Number 4. Among the more pressing needs within Bosnia is the
establishment of an economic infrastructure that will give the Bosnian
people a sense of hope and the prospect of a brighter economic future.
Without a productive economy, we believe there is little chance for a
lasting peace.
Number 5. The need for continued American troop presence on the
ground in Bosnia was stressed by U.S. military commanders, political
officials, diplomats and the Bosnian people with whom we met. There is
a widespread conviction that U.S. troops are essential to preventing
the resumption of a war. Having seen the situation in Bosnia firsthand,
it is clear to us that the presence of American forces are necessary.
I might interject here before I read the final two points that the
devastation of this war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the magnitude of it
is really not well known in the United States; 200,000 people dead,
over half of them civilians. Of the over 2.5 million people in the
country of Bosnia, roughly half of them have now been displaced and are
no longer at their home. So the devastation there over this 3-year
period has been enormous.
The entire delegation that was over there and saw this concluded that
we simply cannot afford to withdraw our troops at this point and see
the resumption of hostilities on this scale. At this point, I yield to
my colleague for a comment about that conclusion. I think it is central
to the observations that we came away with.
Mr. GUTKNECHT. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I especially thank
him for reserving this time today so we could have an opportunity to
share some of our observations with our colleagues and others.
I think most of us, and I certainly speak for myself, went to Bosnia
with a bad attitude about the entire mission. Those of us who had a
little bit of a history lesson in that particular region of the world
were aware that they have been fighting over there literally since, I
believe it is 1279. I think the feeling that I took with me was these
people have been fighting in the Balkans for all of these generations,
they have very long memories, it is a trouble spot that will probably
never completely heal. My attitude going over there was that this was
an act of ultimate American arrogance. To believe that somehow the Nazi
panzers and previous occupation armies could not ultimately bring
lasting peace to the Balkans, how is it that we now seem to believe
that the American forces will magically make these people begin to love
each other?
[[Page H1293]]
I must say, and I expect that my colleague from Mississippi will
agree, that when we first arrived, and particularly when we had our
first briefings from the NATO High Command, we were awfully rough on
them in terms of questions. In fact, I think one of our colleagues
said, do you really expect to turn these people who have been fighting
for all of these generations into Republicans and Democrats, and you
are going to create a new American democracy here in an area where they
have never known democracy, they have never known the economic freedoms
and so forth that we take for granted in the United States?
Those were troubling questions. Frankly, we did not get completely
satisfactory answers on that first day or two that we were in Europe.
But as we began to listen to some of the experts, the picture became
clearer as one of the experts over there described Europe. First of
all, to understand, I think, the region we call Bosnia, the entire
Balkan area, to really understand that, I think we must first
understand Europe. I think Americans do have a somewhat hazy and fuzzy
understanding of how Europe works and how it fits together. I think the
best description that I heard and that began to change my whole way of
thinking was that one of the people described Europe in some respects
like a dysfunctional family. It is roughly 16 different countries, they
speak about a dozen different languages, and they all have memories as
well. There have been world wars and there have been various wars down
through the centuries so that we have a situation where none of the
countries completely trust the others.
The one thing that the United States can bring to the mix, as one of
them indicated, the French do not particularly trust the Germans, the
Germans do not trust the Italians, the Italians do not trust the
British. There is a certain dysfunctionality to this European family.
In some respects the United States is like the big brother of this
dysfunctional family. When the United States enters the discussion, we
are the one entity that can come in and say, ``Okay, knock it off, this
is what has to be done.''
{time} 1630
We saw that as an example when the European allies first went into
Bosnia and tried to bring peace to the region. It was, to use Jimmy
Carter's term, an incomplete success. It really was not until the
United States came in, and what was very, very apparent to me when we
saw the successor to Rommel, who was the German general who was in
charge of the panzer division that Rommel had commanded in World War
II, when we met with him, I think on the second day, and had lunch in
Sarajevo, it was clear to me that he had no problem whatsoever taking
orders from an American general.
I do not think that that would have been the case if he had to take
orders from a French general or some other general, and I think vice
versa. I think the Italians would have had a hard time taking orders
from one of the other commanders in Europe, but they had no problem
whatsoever responding to the orders and the commands of an American
general.
So the first thing I began to conclude that, without an American
presence there, this whole thing would begin to unravel.
Mr. WICKER. If I could interject, Mr. Speaker, we are there at the
request of Europe. We were certainly a reluctant participant, and I
know that there are Members in this body, the gentleman from Minnesota
and me included, who were very, very reluctant to participate. So we
are not over there insinuating ourselves into a situation where we are
not welcome. We are told by our international friends that we are the
glue holding the peace together at this particular time, and it would
not work there without our presence.
Mr. GUTKNECHT. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield, I think that
is clearly true; and now I think, at least from my own perspective, I
do understand that relationship; and I think it is important. Part of
the reason we are respected by all of the parties in Europe is because
we are a reluctant leader. We are not there because we want to gain any
particular territory or any particular political influence in the
Balkans. It is only because we believe it is the right thing to do, and
I think that does give us some moral authority that goes a long way.
The other thing that we saw and we witnessed, and I know that we
should not make some of these decisions purely based on emotional
issues, but as we went out and toured some of the villages and actually
met with some of the people themselves, the pictures, the stories,
there are certain images that I think I speak for myself, but I know
that I speak for everyone that was on that delegation, there are images
that are just burned into our minds.
I remember, as I am sure the gentleman does, the meeting we had with
some of the mayors in that small little portable building that they had
constructed and the emotion in their eyes. One of the mayors said, when
we talked about people had been displaced from their homes, he said, I
have moved nine times in the last 2 years. Please tell me which house
is mine.
I mean, that is something that Americans have a very, very difficult
time even relating to. And the fact that the whole notion of a rule of
law and having real estate laws so that one has clear title to the home
that one lives in, that is somewhat foreign to the people of that
region.
There is so much that it is very difficult for us to understand, but
it was easy for us to see in the people's faces the appreciation that
they have for the American soldiers. In fact, I think the gentleman
remembers the story, it may have been told to the gentleman, the old
gentleman who told us that he sleeps soundly now because he hears the
sounds of the American humvees. I remember the tears on the cheeks of
some of the women when they realized that we were Americans and they
said, thank you, America.
So I think that we began to see in the faces of the Bosnian people
the appreciation for what they know the United States has done and is
doing to at least make it safe.
I think we really cannot talk about Bosnia without talking about the
Bosnian children. When we got off the planes we were told not to get
off the concrete because there were over 1 million land mines buried in
that country. They are gradually, with the help of American technology,
getting those mines removed, but there are still a huge number of those
land mines.
I remember one of the mothers telling me that, yes, they tell the
children to play on the traveled areas. They tell them to play in the
streets, because the streets are safe. Somehow, for American parents,
for a parent of three children myself, to tell one's kids to go out and
play in the street is something we would not imagine, but it is safer
for them to play in the traveled areas.
There was so much about Bosnia. The more you saw the more you
realized that these are people who ultimately do want peace. They
ultimately do want to live together in harmony. They do not want to go
back to the situation that they saw a few years ago, and that the one
entity that stands between them and returning to the chaos of the past
are the American GIs.
I think I should say this, and I think the gentleman has already
mentioned, that the other thing this is indelibly imprinted in my mind
is the enormous professionalism of the American servicemen and women
who are serving in Bosnia, from the top generals right down to the
lowly infantry men who go to lunch every day with their rifles with
them.
They take it very seriously. It is a dangerous place. It is much less
dangerous because they are there, but I think I would have to conclude
by saying, the best salesmen of all for the Bosnian mission are those
kids that are wearing camos and sleeping in tents and the ones who take
their rifles with them to lunch and to supper everyday.
They are the ones who literally, in having lunch with them, they told
me to a person that they believed that what we were doing, what the
United States was doing in Bosnia was important and that we should stay
until the mission is done. And they said that in spite of the fact that
all of them were homesick, all of them wanted to come home.
I might just share, as long as some of my colleagues may be watching,
one other point that they made. I asked them what I could take home and
tell people, and one of them says, mail, sir.
[[Page H1294]]
Mail is golden. They do love to hear from home. And those who may be
watching this, we would certainly encourage them, if they have not
written to a friend or a loved one who is over there or if they would
like to write to somebody they may not even know, getting mail from
home when you are 6,000 miles away and sleeping in a tent is something
that is very valuable to our servicemen and women. So I encourage my
constituents and my colleagues to write when they can.
Mr. WICKER. Mr. Speaker, that is right. They are over there in the
name of the United States of America, and the least we can do as
Members and as fellow citizens is to make sure that they and their
families realize how much we appreciate them.
The gentleman from Minnesota mentioned the doubts that a number of us
had at the beginning of our involvement in 1995 and earlier in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, the fact that there had been fighting there and ethnic
animosity for centuries. That is certainly true, and I hope to get to
the point about the importance of Central Europe in just a moment. But
it is also true that Serbs, Croats, Muslims and also Jews and other
small ethnic groups had lived side-by-side in that country as neighbors
and as good neighbors for generations.
I can remember, as I am sure the gentleman from Minnesota can
remember, going that day into Tuzla, which is up near the north part of
the Bosnian federation, it is actually on the border between the Serb
federation and the Bosnian federation, to Camp McGovern, and then
taking those helicopters on in to Brcko, which is a very, very critical
area and a flash point if this conflict breaks out again, and flying
over neighborhoods where there would be one burned-out house and one
left standing and one burned-out house and one left standing, based on
the fact that one house might have been a Bosnian Croat house. Another
might have been a Bosnian/Serb house. And the armies came through and
chose to burn down a house based on what ethnic group that family was
in, even though the families themselves had been living together in
harmony and had nothing whatever against each other.
Major General Larry Ellis, who is a very fine representative of the
United States in theater there, was pointing that fact out to us. It
certainly occurs to me and I think to other Members of the delegation
that the people of Bosnia of the various ethnic groups were not well-
served by their leadership during the breakup of the former Yugoslavia
by the ultranationalist leadership of Croatia, of Serbia, and of Bosnia
and Herzegovina itself and that, actually, these good neighbors were
drawn into a conflict that was not of their design and not of their
choosing, because of some forces of ultranationalism there that we hope
are on the wane.
So I think there is hope that these people who lived once side-by-
side can return to that if we can hold our resolve and continue to be a
force for stability in that area.
Mr. GUTKNECHT. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman would yield, I do
apologize, but I have another meeting that started at 4:30. So I have
to run, but I appreciate this time and this opportunity.
In terms of what really happened in Yugoslavia when communism
collapsed, when the whole country sort of was torn apart, we need to
understand that the real precursor, in my opinion, having seen this
now, to the ethnic unrest that then started was really an economic
motivation.
When unemployment hit 40 percent, all of a sudden that created
tensions between the groups that had not been there when the economy
was relatively strong. It may have been a false economy, it was a
Communist economy, but I think that is something that is important.
I think where the administration has, in some respects, done a poor
job of communicating the situation over there, I think long-term what
we need to think about, and I think that this was generally the
consensus of the delegation, that rather than focusing on this myopic
view of an exit strategy and when are the troops going to be out, I
think our conclusion was that we need to focus on what are the
expectations of the Bosnian people.
In the book of Proverbs it says, ``Where there is no vision, the
people perish.'' And the question we asked several times is, what is
the vision of the Bosnian people? Can they return to a peaceful
coexistence?
I think, generally speaking, the answer to that question is yes. But
I think we have to be there to provide that police force while we move
to a transition of a stronger economy. By that, I mean, I think
ultimately we are going to be able to reduce our military force. I
don't think we do that precipitously. I do not think we should do it
before the September elections. But I think, ultimately, we can draw
down those forces; and the need for a military presence will be less.
But I think, coupled with that, I think the gentleman already
mentioned, we have to do more in the way of helping to rebuild their
economy. If there is jobs and prosperity and freedom and opportunity,
then I think the likelihood for resumed hostilities between the ethnic
bands is dramatically reduced long term.
So I say our strategy should not be about how soon can we get the
troops out. Our strategy should be much more about what are the
expectations of the Bosnian people. Are they interested in electing
people in September who are committed to a long-term, peaceful
relationship in Bosnia? Or are they the hardliner militants who would
just as soon return to solving their problems with guns and with
violence?
If that is the answer, then, obviously, then the United States can
probably do no real good over there, and perhaps we should bring the
troops home, strike the tents and bring the kids home.
But that should be our message. That should be the message of the
administration. And I think that has somehow been lost in all of this
discussion about when the troops are going to come home. I think that
is a mistake, because I think the American people and the American
Congress, to a large degree, has been denied the real reasons we are
there; and the real issues at stake in the Balkans have been ignored
and, as a result, I think we have rather clouded thinking about how
important that area is and, frankly, in the end, how important Europe
is to the United States.
We do have a vital national interest in a strong and stable Europe.
That is important to the United States. It seems to me a relatively
modest investment, I think perhaps $2 billion is too much, but
certainly there is a level of investment that the United States can
make to ensure a strong and stable Eastern and Central Europe; and that
is I think, in the end, something that needs to be talked about as
well.
So I appreciate the gentleman getting this time today. I regret that
I have to go to a budget meeting that started about 15 minutes ago, but
this was a very, very important, and in my life I think almost an
epiphany type of an event, because it did change my whole view of that
region and our role that we can and probably should play.
I would also suggest, as I did earlier on the House floor, I think
the President, the administration, needs to work in consultation more
carefully with the Congress. Because I think if we are going to have
strong and solid and defensible national policy, in particular as it
relates to diplomatic and military policies, I think we cannot do that
unilaterally. It cannot be done simply at one end of 1600 Pennsylvania
Avenue. I think the United States Congress has to be full partners in
those debates, those discussions and, ultimately, in those decisions.
So we can have our differences about it, but I think we need that
healthy debate and dialogue, and I think the Congress needs to be much
more actively participating in those discussions. So I think this
Special Order today, I say to the gentleman, the gentleman's
participation, the leadership in the delegation, the mission that we
took to Bosnia was very important.
I thank the gentleman for my own behalf because it really did open my
eyes; and, frankly, this is something that is seldom said by people
here in Washington. It made me change my mind. Too often, those of us
here in Washington are unwilling or unable to say, I was wrong; and,
frankly, in the area of the Bosnian policy, I think having seen for
myself what is going on over there and what can happen and what our
role in the world should and can be, it did change my mind.
[[Page H1295]]
{time} 1645
So I thank the gentleman for inviting me to go along on the
delegation. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today, and I regret
that I have to leave now.
Mr. WICKER. I thank the gentleman for his contribution to this
special order. I know that the other four members of the delegation had
intended to participate in this, and perhaps in the few moments
remaining, we will still get their participation.
Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Minnesota mentioned that he had
actually changed his mind fundamentally on the issue of whether our
troops should be there. I think when Americans remember that
instability in this area, instability in Europe and particularly in
Central Europe, has drawn our Nation into two world wars in this
century, then we need to be very, very cautious about any action that
we might take at this point to cause hostilities to resume there.
We know that in another area of the former Yugoslavia, the Kosovo
region, there is a very dangerous situation going on there. Anything
that we might do now in a precipitate way I think might bring our
allies into a widened conflict, and then the question would be, what
does the United States do now that NATO allies are fighting?
The gentleman from Minnesota mentioned a couple of things that I want
to follow up on before I get to our final two observations and
conclusions. First of all, he mentioned mistakes that the
administration had made, and certainly no one is perfect. But I would
certainly concur that the administration has not adequately made the
case to the American people about why we are doing what we are doing in
the Balkans.
I think it was a mistake, Mr. Speaker, for the administration to set
artificial timetables. The President may have felt that he had to do
this in order to prevent public opinion from stopping the deployment of
these troops in late 1995, but I think the establishment of artificial
timetables, a year and then we will be out, that sort of talk only gave
encouragement to the forces over there who wanted to resume the
conflict, who want to resume the ultranationalism that led to this
horrible war. So I think that was a mistake.
I am glad that the administration is being more realistic about that
now and saying, we want our troops to come home, certainly we want the
Bosnian people and people in the Balkans to handle this situation, but
we do not believe a timetable is the right way to go. We think specific
goals and benchmarks of achievement are better.
It is also regrettable, Mr. Speaker, that the administration has
refused to budget honestly for the Bosnian deployment. We have had our
troops there since 1995. It has been very expensive, as we mentioned,
$2 billion to $3 billion.
The administration fully intends to keep troops there, and I support
keeping the troops there, during the entirety of the remainder of this
fiscal year and through fiscal year 1999. But the administration has
refused to budget for this Bosnian operation.
I do not believe that is honesty in budgeting. I think the
administration should admit what they expect we will spend, because
certainly it will be expensive, and the administration should submit a
budget in the regular budget process so we can adequately plan our
budget.
Certainly I want to reiterate the feeling that we should not be
taking this peacekeeping money from the other very important national
defense needs that we have, separate and apart from our being in there
with the stabilization force.
Mr. Speaker, in the few moments that I have remaining, let me simply
mention the last two items of our observations and conclusions. That
would be items 6 and 7.
Item 6, and the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Gutknecht) spoke about
this, the importance of the September, 1998, elections.
``The September, 1998, Bosnian elections will be a watershed in
determining whether Bosnia moves forward or backward. Until then, we
believe the United States should actively continue to support the
process of Dayton implementation. Given the effort already expended, it
would be foolish to change our political, diplomatic, or military
policy in Bosnia before the September elections have taken place.
``However, we do not believe that the United States' commitment can
be open-ended. We do not believe it can be open-ended. Stabilization
forces will provide important support to the Office of the High
Representative in its efforts to create a climate for a fair election.
Notwithstanding our observations of the role in peace being played by
U.S. troops, we are concerned about the annual exercise of funding our
peacekeeping operations in Bosnia by means of supplemental
appropriations.''
This is what I was alluding to earlier, Mr. Speaker.
``We encourage the administration to pursue means by which such
contingencies can, at least to some degree, be funded, other than at
the cost of other important national priorities.''
Finally, conclusion and observation number 7, ``We are convinced that
the United States has a vital interest in the stability of Central
Europe.''
I might interject here, Mr. Speaker, that Sarajevo in Bosnia was the
flashpoint for the start of World War I with the assassination of
Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1940. As a matter of
fact, when we were meeting in Sarajevo with Lieutenant General David
Benton, he pointed out that we were meeting in the very room, Mr.
Speaker, where the Archduke slept his last night.
Also, in World War II, it was in Bosnia where we saw the first
instance of the most heinous forms of ethnic cleansing. The subsequent
disintegration and division among ethnic groups was in part a source of
the Communist influence which later came into that region.
I continue with conclusion number 7, Mr. Speaker. I quote:
The United States is the undisputed leader of the free
world. This role carries with it responsibilities, and among
these is participating in efforts to ensure Europe's
stability. However, it is our desire that the future of
Bosnia ultimately be determined by the Bosnian people
themselves.
This statement is signed by the gentleman from Mississippi (Roger
Wicker), the gentleman from Georgia (Saxby Chambliss), the gentleman
from South Carolina (Lindsey Graham), the gentleman from Minnesota (Gil
Gutknecht), the gentleman from Wisconsin (Ron Kind), and the gentleman
from Ohio (Dennis Kucinich), persons that I am delighted to have gone
to Bosnia with on this congressional delegation trip, and to have been
associated with. I think all five of these gentlemen that I went to
Bosnia with represented the Congress in an able fashion and represented
the United States, and came back with some valuable, valuable
information.
In conclusion, let me just say, Mr. Speaker, that our visit to the
Balkans, to Bosnia, to the troops there, and to the American personnel
on the ground, made me proud to be an American, proud of the role that
the United States of America is playing in preventing another world
war, perhaps, or at the very least, another deadly conflict.
I am proud of our military. I am proud of the fact that our friends
in Europe, in spite of the many differences we may have on certain
issues, turned to the United States for help in stabilizing this
region, and preventing a resumption of hostility.
I would say that the six of us all concluded that no matter what we
initially thought about the United States' deployment in this area, we
feel that we cannot in good conscience turn our back on the effort that
we have already expended, and I commend the report to the reading of
our fellow Members of Congress, Mr. Speaker. They will be receiving it
in the form of a Dear Colleague letter in the next day or two.
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