[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 30 (Wednesday, March 18, 1998)]
[House]
[Pages H1291-H1295]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                    REPORT ON RECENT TRIP TO BOSNIA

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Dickey). Under the Speaker's announced 
policy of January 7, 1997, the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Wicker) 
is recognized for 60 minutes.
  (Mr. WICKER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. WICKER. Mr. Speaker, four weeks ago today I had the opportunity 
to lead a bipartisan group of Members of Congress on a five-day trip to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. This trip was taken at the suggestion of the 
Secretary of Defense and the Speaker of the House. And I was joined on 
this congressional delegation trip by the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. 
Chambliss), the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Graham), the 
gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Gutknecht), the gentleman from Wisconsin 
(Mr. Kind), and the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).
  During our trip, this delegation of first- and second-term Members of 
Congress had the opportunity to meet with senior officers of the U.S. 
Command, as well as enlisted personnel, both in the European theater 
and on the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We met with U.S. 
diplomatic staff and also the people most affected by the ravages of 
war, the ordinary people of the Bosnian region, the Croats, the Serbs 
and the Muslim Bosniaas, who are all living together in this war-torn 
region.
  We went to Bosnia, Mr. Speaker, to begin a better understanding of 
the current political and military situation in the region, to 
understand the stresses that a continued U.S. military deployment will 
place on our armed forces, the impact on training and readiness of the 
United States Army both in theater and elsewhere in the world, the 
conditions necessary to allow for a withdrawal of U.S. forces and when 
those conditions might be obtained.
  Mr. Speaker, I will say at the outset that our 6-Member delegation 
has had a bit of a tough time scheduling this particular special order.

                              {time}  1615

  We had thought that we might be able to bring these remarks during 
the evening hour yesterday. Because of the lateness of legislative and 
House business, we were unable to do so. The other members of the 
delegation may join me in a few moments, but I am told they are in 
various hearings and important meetings, and so I may or may not be 
joined by the other members of the delegation.
  However, I do want to let my colleagues know, Mr. Speaker, the 
unanimous, and I emphasize unanimous, observations and conclusions 
which were reached by the entire delegation. These are people from both 
sides of the aisle. These are Members who came to the congressional 
delegation trip from different perspectives. Some Members had supported 
the Bosnian operation from the outset. Others had been very much 
opposed to the concept of our troops being in country there in Bosnia. 
Based

[[Page H1292]]

on our observations, based on the conversations with generals, enlisted 
personnel, with the very fine United States diplomatic men and women 
that we have in Bosnia and in the region, as well as NATO and United 
Nations forces, we did come to these unanimous conclusions, seven items 
in total which I will share with Members today, Mr. Speaker, and which 
I will also be sending by way of a Dear Colleague letter.
  The number one observation and conclusion, the delegation wishes to 
acknowledge the impressive professionalism and dedication of U.S. 
service personnel serving on the ground in Bosnia and supporting 
Operation Joint Guard from deployment sites in Hungary and Italy. 
Indeed we met with not only our troops there on the ground in Bosnia, 
but also from the various staging areas in Hungary and in Vincenza, 
Italy. We also met with a number of important military leaders in 
Stuttgart, Germany before going into Bosnia.
  I continue to read from the report. It was clear that U.S. military 
forces are performing their mission in an exemplary fashion. They are 
being asked to do more with less and are responding admirably. The 
American people can be proud of the way their Armed Forces, Active 
Duty, Reserve and National Guard components, have risen to the 
challenge of ensuring a peaceful, secure and stable environment in 
Bosnia. All Americans owe these soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines a 
debt of gratitude.
  Indeed, Mr. Speaker, our delegation was quite impressed with the 
military and diplomatic leadership that we have over there. We received 
an in-depth briefing from General Wesley Clark, the Commander in Chief, 
U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. I would 
just mention that General Clark is not only a 4-star general with a 
distinguished record of service to our country, he is a West Point 
graduate, holds master's degrees from Oxford University and is a Rhodes 
scholar.
  We also met with other very fine military leaders, such as Air Force 
General James Jamerson, also a 4-star general, and Army Lieutenant 
General David Benton, a 3-star general, Chief of Staff for the U.S. 
European Command. I also had an opportunity to visit with enlisted and 
officer personnel from my own State of Mississippi.
  Again, I would say, Mr. Speaker, that we can be proud of the effort 
that these men and women are making. I concluded that they believe in 
the mission, and they are proud of what they have been doing.
  Our conclusion number two is that we have been informed that the U.S. 
force levels in Bosnia are likely to be reduced from the current 8,500 
to 6,900. We are concerned that a lower troop level may lead to 
increased risk, given the potential for violence directed against or 
involving U.S. troops as they execute their missions.
  We believe that an appropriate level of forces in Bosnia must be 
based on sound military assessment of the risks and not on any 
political considerations. Force protection must be a top priority. 
Increasing the risk to U.S. forces is not an acceptable option. At a 
minimum, we recommend unanimously, Mr. Speaker, that U.S. force levels 
not be reduced until after the September 1998 elections are held and a 
review of the security situation is conducted. We feel that progress in 
Bosnia should be judged by the achievement of specific milestones and 
that any troop reduction should be tied to the achievement of these 
milestones.
  Mr. Speaker, I am joined at this point by the gentleman from 
Minnesota (Mr. Gutknecht). Of course, he has never been one to be a 
shrinking violet. He should feel free, Mr. Speaker, to jump in and ask 
me to yield at any point, or I will proceed with the discussion of the 
upcoming election in Bosnia, particularly as it relates to the Republic 
of Srpska.
  Mr. GUTKNECHT. If the gentleman will yield, I will just say that he 
is doing a wonderful job. I apologize for being late. I had thought we 
were going to start a little later than this. I think the gentleman 
should proceed through that. Then we can talk about our trip, what we 
learned and saw, and what an effect it had on the people who took part 
in that particular CODEL.
  Mr. WICKER. I think my colleague will agree that many Americans, and 
many Members of the Congress, both the House and the Senate, perhaps 
are not aware of the complexity of the Dayton agreement. But under the 
Dayton agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided basically into two 
federations, one the Croat Muslim Federation, and then the 
predominantly Serb area, which is referred to commonly as the Republic 
of Srpska.
  Our third conclusion is that prior to the elections in December of 
1997, which brought to power more moderate leadership within the 
Republic of Srpska, hard-line Bosnian Serbs in power demonstrated an 
unwillingness to comply with the terms of the Dayton agreement. As a 
result, the overwhelming bulk of Western economic aid has flowed to the 
Muslim Croat-dominated federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
  The recently elected moderate government within the Republic of 
Srpska lacks the financial resources to function effectively, raising 
concerns about the government's political viability. We were advised by 
our military and diplomatic leadership that $5 million in U.S. 
assistance to the new Republic of Srpska Government is essential as 
part of a $20 million to $30 million international assistance package 
to demonstrate our commitment to the long-term viability of the new 
government until it begins generating sufficient revenues on its own. 
We strongly support appropriation of this $5 million in assistance. 
Compared to the $2 billion to $3 billion invested annually in support 
of the military operation, $2 billion to $3 billion invested annually, 
$5 million on a one-time basis is a relatively small price to pay to 
ensure the stability of the new reform-minded Republic of Srpska 
government. However, we do not believe that any U.S. assistance of this 
nature should be taken from the Department of Defense accounts.
  Number 4. Among the more pressing needs within Bosnia is the 
establishment of an economic infrastructure that will give the Bosnian 
people a sense of hope and the prospect of a brighter economic future. 
Without a productive economy, we believe there is little chance for a 
lasting peace.

  Number 5. The need for continued American troop presence on the 
ground in Bosnia was stressed by U.S. military commanders, political 
officials, diplomats and the Bosnian people with whom we met. There is 
a widespread conviction that U.S. troops are essential to preventing 
the resumption of a war. Having seen the situation in Bosnia firsthand, 
it is clear to us that the presence of American forces are necessary.
  I might interject here before I read the final two points that the 
devastation of this war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the magnitude of it 
is really not well known in the United States; 200,000 people dead, 
over half of them civilians. Of the over 2.5 million people in the 
country of Bosnia, roughly half of them have now been displaced and are 
no longer at their home. So the devastation there over this 3-year 
period has been enormous.
  The entire delegation that was over there and saw this concluded that 
we simply cannot afford to withdraw our troops at this point and see 
the resumption of hostilities on this scale. At this point, I yield to 
my colleague for a comment about that conclusion. I think it is central 
to the observations that we came away with.
  Mr. GUTKNECHT. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I especially thank 
him for reserving this time today so we could have an opportunity to 
share some of our observations with our colleagues and others.
  I think most of us, and I certainly speak for myself, went to Bosnia 
with a bad attitude about the entire mission. Those of us who had a 
little bit of a history lesson in that particular region of the world 
were aware that they have been fighting over there literally since, I 
believe it is 1279. I think the feeling that I took with me was these 
people have been fighting in the Balkans for all of these generations, 
they have very long memories, it is a trouble spot that will probably 
never completely heal. My attitude going over there was that this was 
an act of ultimate American arrogance. To believe that somehow the Nazi 
panzers and previous occupation armies could not ultimately bring 
lasting peace to the Balkans, how is it that we now seem to believe 
that the American forces will magically make these people begin to love 
each other?

[[Page H1293]]

  I must say, and I expect that my colleague from Mississippi will 
agree, that when we first arrived, and particularly when we had our 
first briefings from the NATO High Command, we were awfully rough on 
them in terms of questions. In fact, I think one of our colleagues 
said, do you really expect to turn these people who have been fighting 
for all of these generations into Republicans and Democrats, and you 
are going to create a new American democracy here in an area where they 
have never known democracy, they have never known the economic freedoms 
and so forth that we take for granted in the United States?
  Those were troubling questions. Frankly, we did not get completely 
satisfactory answers on that first day or two that we were in Europe. 
But as we began to listen to some of the experts, the picture became 
clearer as one of the experts over there described Europe. First of 
all, to understand, I think, the region we call Bosnia, the entire 
Balkan area, to really understand that, I think we must first 
understand Europe. I think Americans do have a somewhat hazy and fuzzy 
understanding of how Europe works and how it fits together. I think the 
best description that I heard and that began to change my whole way of 
thinking was that one of the people described Europe in some respects 
like a dysfunctional family. It is roughly 16 different countries, they 
speak about a dozen different languages, and they all have memories as 
well. There have been world wars and there have been various wars down 
through the centuries so that we have a situation where none of the 
countries completely trust the others.
  The one thing that the United States can bring to the mix, as one of 
them indicated, the French do not particularly trust the Germans, the 
Germans do not trust the Italians, the Italians do not trust the 
British. There is a certain dysfunctionality to this European family. 
In some respects the United States is like the big brother of this 
dysfunctional family. When the United States enters the discussion, we 
are the one entity that can come in and say, ``Okay, knock it off, this 
is what has to be done.''

                              {time}  1630

  We saw that as an example when the European allies first went into 
Bosnia and tried to bring peace to the region. It was, to use Jimmy 
Carter's term, an incomplete success. It really was not until the 
United States came in, and what was very, very apparent to me when we 
saw the successor to Rommel, who was the German general who was in 
charge of the panzer division that Rommel had commanded in World War 
II, when we met with him, I think on the second day, and had lunch in 
Sarajevo, it was clear to me that he had no problem whatsoever taking 
orders from an American general.
  I do not think that that would have been the case if he had to take 
orders from a French general or some other general, and I think vice 
versa. I think the Italians would have had a hard time taking orders 
from one of the other commanders in Europe, but they had no problem 
whatsoever responding to the orders and the commands of an American 
general.
  So the first thing I began to conclude that, without an American 
presence there, this whole thing would begin to unravel.
  Mr. WICKER. If I could interject, Mr. Speaker, we are there at the 
request of Europe. We were certainly a reluctant participant, and I 
know that there are Members in this body, the gentleman from Minnesota 
and me included, who were very, very reluctant to participate. So we 
are not over there insinuating ourselves into a situation where we are 
not welcome. We are told by our international friends that we are the 
glue holding the peace together at this particular time, and it would 
not work there without our presence.
  Mr. GUTKNECHT. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield, I think that 
is clearly true; and now I think, at least from my own perspective, I 
do understand that relationship; and I think it is important. Part of 
the reason we are respected by all of the parties in Europe is because 
we are a reluctant leader. We are not there because we want to gain any 
particular territory or any particular political influence in the 
Balkans. It is only because we believe it is the right thing to do, and 
I think that does give us some moral authority that goes a long way.
  The other thing that we saw and we witnessed, and I know that we 
should not make some of these decisions purely based on emotional 
issues, but as we went out and toured some of the villages and actually 
met with some of the people themselves, the pictures, the stories, 
there are certain images that I think I speak for myself, but I know 
that I speak for everyone that was on that delegation, there are images 
that are just burned into our minds.
  I remember, as I am sure the gentleman does, the meeting we had with 
some of the mayors in that small little portable building that they had 
constructed and the emotion in their eyes. One of the mayors said, when 
we talked about people had been displaced from their homes, he said, I 
have moved nine times in the last 2 years. Please tell me which house 
is mine.
  I mean, that is something that Americans have a very, very difficult 
time even relating to. And the fact that the whole notion of a rule of 
law and having real estate laws so that one has clear title to the home 
that one lives in, that is somewhat foreign to the people of that 
region.
  There is so much that it is very difficult for us to understand, but 
it was easy for us to see in the people's faces the appreciation that 
they have for the American soldiers. In fact, I think the gentleman 
remembers the story, it may have been told to the gentleman, the old 
gentleman who told us that he sleeps soundly now because he hears the 
sounds of the American humvees. I remember the tears on the cheeks of 
some of the women when they realized that we were Americans and they 
said, thank you, America.
  So I think that we began to see in the faces of the Bosnian people 
the appreciation for what they know the United States has done and is 
doing to at least make it safe.
  I think we really cannot talk about Bosnia without talking about the 
Bosnian children. When we got off the planes we were told not to get 
off the concrete because there were over 1 million land mines buried in 
that country. They are gradually, with the help of American technology, 
getting those mines removed, but there are still a huge number of those 
land mines.
  I remember one of the mothers telling me that, yes, they tell the 
children to play on the traveled areas. They tell them to play in the 
streets, because the streets are safe. Somehow, for American parents, 
for a parent of three children myself, to tell one's kids to go out and 
play in the street is something we would not imagine, but it is safer 
for them to play in the traveled areas.
  There was so much about Bosnia. The more you saw the more you 
realized that these are people who ultimately do want peace. They 
ultimately do want to live together in harmony. They do not want to go 
back to the situation that they saw a few years ago, and that the one 
entity that stands between them and returning to the chaos of the past 
are the American GIs.
  I think I should say this, and I think the gentleman has already 
mentioned, that the other thing this is indelibly imprinted in my mind 
is the enormous professionalism of the American servicemen and women 
who are serving in Bosnia, from the top generals right down to the 
lowly infantry men who go to lunch every day with their rifles with 
them.
  They take it very seriously. It is a dangerous place. It is much less 
dangerous because they are there, but I think I would have to conclude 
by saying, the best salesmen of all for the Bosnian mission are those 
kids that are wearing camos and sleeping in tents and the ones who take 
their rifles with them to lunch and to supper everyday.
  They are the ones who literally, in having lunch with them, they told 
me to a person that they believed that what we were doing, what the 
United States was doing in Bosnia was important and that we should stay 
until the mission is done. And they said that in spite of the fact that 
all of them were homesick, all of them wanted to come home.
  I might just share, as long as some of my colleagues may be watching, 
one other point that they made. I asked them what I could take home and 
tell people, and one of them says, mail, sir.

[[Page H1294]]

 Mail is golden. They do love to hear from home. And those who may be 
watching this, we would certainly encourage them, if they have not 
written to a friend or a loved one who is over there or if they would 
like to write to somebody they may not even know, getting mail from 
home when you are 6,000 miles away and sleeping in a tent is something 
that is very valuable to our servicemen and women. So I encourage my 
constituents and my colleagues to write when they can.
  Mr. WICKER. Mr. Speaker, that is right. They are over there in the 
name of the United States of America, and the least we can do as 
Members and as fellow citizens is to make sure that they and their 
families realize how much we appreciate them.
  The gentleman from Minnesota mentioned the doubts that a number of us 
had at the beginning of our involvement in 1995 and earlier in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, the fact that there had been fighting there and ethnic 
animosity for centuries. That is certainly true, and I hope to get to 
the point about the importance of Central Europe in just a moment. But 
it is also true that Serbs, Croats, Muslims and also Jews and other 
small ethnic groups had lived side-by-side in that country as neighbors 
and as good neighbors for generations.

  I can remember, as I am sure the gentleman from Minnesota can 
remember, going that day into Tuzla, which is up near the north part of 
the Bosnian federation, it is actually on the border between the Serb 
federation and the Bosnian federation, to Camp McGovern, and then 
taking those helicopters on in to Brcko, which is a very, very critical 
area and a flash point if this conflict breaks out again, and flying 
over neighborhoods where there would be one burned-out house and one 
left standing and one burned-out house and one left standing, based on 
the fact that one house might have been a Bosnian Croat house. Another 
might have been a Bosnian/Serb house. And the armies came through and 
chose to burn down a house based on what ethnic group that family was 
in, even though the families themselves had been living together in 
harmony and had nothing whatever against each other.
  Major General Larry Ellis, who is a very fine representative of the 
United States in theater there, was pointing that fact out to us. It 
certainly occurs to me and I think to other Members of the delegation 
that the people of Bosnia of the various ethnic groups were not well-
served by their leadership during the breakup of the former Yugoslavia 
by the ultranationalist leadership of Croatia, of Serbia, and of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina itself and that, actually, these good neighbors were 
drawn into a conflict that was not of their design and not of their 
choosing, because of some forces of ultranationalism there that we hope 
are on the wane.
  So I think there is hope that these people who lived once side-by-
side can return to that if we can hold our resolve and continue to be a 
force for stability in that area.
  Mr. GUTKNECHT. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman would yield, I do 
apologize, but I have another meeting that started at 4:30. So I have 
to run, but I appreciate this time and this opportunity.
  In terms of what really happened in Yugoslavia when communism 
collapsed, when the whole country sort of was torn apart, we need to 
understand that the real precursor, in my opinion, having seen this 
now, to the ethnic unrest that then started was really an economic 
motivation.
  When unemployment hit 40 percent, all of a sudden that created 
tensions between the groups that had not been there when the economy 
was relatively strong. It may have been a false economy, it was a 
Communist economy, but I think that is something that is important.
  I think where the administration has, in some respects, done a poor 
job of communicating the situation over there, I think long-term what 
we need to think about, and I think that this was generally the 
consensus of the delegation, that rather than focusing on this myopic 
view of an exit strategy and when are the troops going to be out, I 
think our conclusion was that we need to focus on what are the 
expectations of the Bosnian people.
  In the book of Proverbs it says, ``Where there is no vision, the 
people perish.'' And the question we asked several times is, what is 
the vision of the Bosnian people? Can they return to a peaceful 
coexistence?
  I think, generally speaking, the answer to that question is yes. But 
I think we have to be there to provide that police force while we move 
to a transition of a stronger economy. By that, I mean, I think 
ultimately we are going to be able to reduce our military force. I 
don't think we do that precipitously. I do not think we should do it 
before the September elections. But I think, ultimately, we can draw 
down those forces; and the need for a military presence will be less.
  But I think, coupled with that, I think the gentleman already 
mentioned, we have to do more in the way of helping to rebuild their 
economy. If there is jobs and prosperity and freedom and opportunity, 
then I think the likelihood for resumed hostilities between the ethnic 
bands is dramatically reduced long term.
  So I say our strategy should not be about how soon can we get the 
troops out. Our strategy should be much more about what are the 
expectations of the Bosnian people. Are they interested in electing 
people in September who are committed to a long-term, peaceful 
relationship in Bosnia? Or are they the hardliner militants who would 
just as soon return to solving their problems with guns and with 
violence?
  If that is the answer, then, obviously, then the United States can 
probably do no real good over there, and perhaps we should bring the 
troops home, strike the tents and bring the kids home.
  But that should be our message. That should be the message of the 
administration. And I think that has somehow been lost in all of this 
discussion about when the troops are going to come home. I think that 
is a mistake, because I think the American people and the American 
Congress, to a large degree, has been denied the real reasons we are 
there; and the real issues at stake in the Balkans have been ignored 
and, as a result, I think we have rather clouded thinking about how 
important that area is and, frankly, in the end, how important Europe 
is to the United States.
  We do have a vital national interest in a strong and stable Europe. 
That is important to the United States. It seems to me a relatively 
modest investment, I think perhaps $2 billion is too much, but 
certainly there is a level of investment that the United States can 
make to ensure a strong and stable Eastern and Central Europe; and that 
is I think, in the end, something that needs to be talked about as 
well.
  So I appreciate the gentleman getting this time today. I regret that 
I have to go to a budget meeting that started about 15 minutes ago, but 
this was a very, very important, and in my life I think almost an 
epiphany type of an event, because it did change my whole view of that 
region and our role that we can and probably should play.
  I would also suggest, as I did earlier on the House floor, I think 
the President, the administration, needs to work in consultation more 
carefully with the Congress. Because I think if we are going to have 
strong and solid and defensible national policy, in particular as it 
relates to diplomatic and military policies, I think we cannot do that 
unilaterally. It cannot be done simply at one end of 1600 Pennsylvania 
Avenue. I think the United States Congress has to be full partners in 
those debates, those discussions and, ultimately, in those decisions.
  So we can have our differences about it, but I think we need that 
healthy debate and dialogue, and I think the Congress needs to be much 
more actively participating in those discussions. So I think this 
Special Order today, I say to the gentleman, the gentleman's 
participation, the leadership in the delegation, the mission that we 
took to Bosnia was very important.
  I thank the gentleman for my own behalf because it really did open my 
eyes; and, frankly, this is something that is seldom said by people 
here in Washington. It made me change my mind. Too often, those of us 
here in Washington are unwilling or unable to say, I was wrong; and, 
frankly, in the area of the Bosnian policy, I think having seen for 
myself what is going on over there and what can happen and what our 
role in the world should and can be, it did change my mind.

[[Page H1295]]

                              {time}  1645

  So I thank the gentleman for inviting me to go along on the 
delegation. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today, and I regret 
that I have to leave now.
  Mr. WICKER. I thank the gentleman for his contribution to this 
special order. I know that the other four members of the delegation had 
intended to participate in this, and perhaps in the few moments 
remaining, we will still get their participation.
  Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Minnesota mentioned that he had 
actually changed his mind fundamentally on the issue of whether our 
troops should be there. I think when Americans remember that 
instability in this area, instability in Europe and particularly in 
Central Europe, has drawn our Nation into two world wars in this 
century, then we need to be very, very cautious about any action that 
we might take at this point to cause hostilities to resume there.
  We know that in another area of the former Yugoslavia, the Kosovo 
region, there is a very dangerous situation going on there. Anything 
that we might do now in a precipitate way I think might bring our 
allies into a widened conflict, and then the question would be, what 
does the United States do now that NATO allies are fighting?
  The gentleman from Minnesota mentioned a couple of things that I want 
to follow up on before I get to our final two observations and 
conclusions. First of all, he mentioned mistakes that the 
administration had made, and certainly no one is perfect. But I would 
certainly concur that the administration has not adequately made the 
case to the American people about why we are doing what we are doing in 
the Balkans.
  I think it was a mistake, Mr. Speaker, for the administration to set 
artificial timetables. The President may have felt that he had to do 
this in order to prevent public opinion from stopping the deployment of 
these troops in late 1995, but I think the establishment of artificial 
timetables, a year and then we will be out, that sort of talk only gave 
encouragement to the forces over there who wanted to resume the 
conflict, who want to resume the ultranationalism that led to this 
horrible war. So I think that was a mistake.
  I am glad that the administration is being more realistic about that 
now and saying, we want our troops to come home, certainly we want the 
Bosnian people and people in the Balkans to handle this situation, but 
we do not believe a timetable is the right way to go. We think specific 
goals and benchmarks of achievement are better.
  It is also regrettable, Mr. Speaker, that the administration has 
refused to budget honestly for the Bosnian deployment. We have had our 
troops there since 1995. It has been very expensive, as we mentioned, 
$2 billion to $3 billion.
  The administration fully intends to keep troops there, and I support 
keeping the troops there, during the entirety of the remainder of this 
fiscal year and through fiscal year 1999. But the administration has 
refused to budget for this Bosnian operation.
  I do not believe that is honesty in budgeting. I think the 
administration should admit what they expect we will spend, because 
certainly it will be expensive, and the administration should submit a 
budget in the regular budget process so we can adequately plan our 
budget.
  Certainly I want to reiterate the feeling that we should not be 
taking this peacekeeping money from the other very important national 
defense needs that we have, separate and apart from our being in there 
with the stabilization force.
  Mr. Speaker, in the few moments that I have remaining, let me simply 
mention the last two items of our observations and conclusions. That 
would be items 6 and 7.
  Item 6, and the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Gutknecht) spoke about 
this, the importance of the September, 1998, elections.
  ``The September, 1998, Bosnian elections will be a watershed in 
determining whether Bosnia moves forward or backward. Until then, we 
believe the United States should actively continue to support the 
process of Dayton implementation. Given the effort already expended, it 
would be foolish to change our political, diplomatic, or military 
policy in Bosnia before the September elections have taken place.
  ``However, we do not believe that the United States' commitment can 
be open-ended. We do not believe it can be open-ended. Stabilization 
forces will provide important support to the Office of the High 
Representative in its efforts to create a climate for a fair election. 
Notwithstanding our observations of the role in peace being played by 
U.S. troops, we are concerned about the annual exercise of funding our 
peacekeeping operations in Bosnia by means of supplemental 
appropriations.''
  This is what I was alluding to earlier, Mr. Speaker.
  ``We encourage the administration to pursue means by which such 
contingencies can, at least to some degree, be funded, other than at 
the cost of other important national priorities.''
  Finally, conclusion and observation number 7, ``We are convinced that 
the United States has a vital interest in the stability of Central 
Europe.''
  I might interject here, Mr. Speaker, that Sarajevo in Bosnia was the 
flashpoint for the start of World War I with the assassination of 
Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1940. As a matter of 
fact, when we were meeting in Sarajevo with Lieutenant General David 
Benton, he pointed out that we were meeting in the very room, Mr. 
Speaker, where the Archduke slept his last night.
  Also, in World War II, it was in Bosnia where we saw the first 
instance of the most heinous forms of ethnic cleansing. The subsequent 
disintegration and division among ethnic groups was in part a source of 
the Communist influence which later came into that region.
  I continue with conclusion number 7, Mr. Speaker. I quote:

       The United States is the undisputed leader of the free 
     world. This role carries with it responsibilities, and among 
     these is participating in efforts to ensure Europe's 
     stability. However, it is our desire that the future of 
     Bosnia ultimately be determined by the Bosnian people 
     themselves.
  This statement is signed by the gentleman from Mississippi (Roger 
Wicker), the gentleman from Georgia (Saxby Chambliss), the gentleman 
from South Carolina (Lindsey Graham), the gentleman from Minnesota (Gil 
Gutknecht), the gentleman from Wisconsin (Ron Kind), and the gentleman 
from Ohio (Dennis Kucinich), persons that I am delighted to have gone 
to Bosnia with on this congressional delegation trip, and to have been 
associated with. I think all five of these gentlemen that I went to 
Bosnia with represented the Congress in an able fashion and represented 
the United States, and came back with some valuable, valuable 
information.
  In conclusion, let me just say, Mr. Speaker, that our visit to the 
Balkans, to Bosnia, to the troops there, and to the American personnel 
on the ground, made me proud to be an American, proud of the role that 
the United States of America is playing in preventing another world 
war, perhaps, or at the very least, another deadly conflict.

  I am proud of our military. I am proud of the fact that our friends 
in Europe, in spite of the many differences we may have on certain 
issues, turned to the United States for help in stabilizing this 
region, and preventing a resumption of hostility.
  I would say that the six of us all concluded that no matter what we 
initially thought about the United States' deployment in this area, we 
feel that we cannot in good conscience turn our back on the effort that 
we have already expended, and I commend the report to the reading of 
our fellow Members of Congress, Mr. Speaker. They will be receiving it 
in the form of a Dear Colleague letter in the next day or two.

                          ____________________