[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 29 (Tuesday, March 17, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2145-S2146]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                             NATO EXPANSION

  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I would like to speak just for a few 
minutes about the issue of the NATO expansion that has come to the 
floor today. As I understand the parliamentary situation, the NATO 
expansion resolution has been laid down, we are now in morning 
business, and we will not be back on the NATO expansion resolution 
until sometime later--not tomorrow--maybe later this week or maybe next 
week or beyond.
  I am hopeful at the outset that even though the bill has been laid 
down, the Senate will be given time for due discussion and debate on 
the proposed NATO expansion. Quite frankly, I was one of those who 
signed a letter with my colleague Senator Smith from New Hampshire and, 
if I am not mistaken, 17 other Senators, both Republicans and 
Democrats, asking that the debate on the proposed NATO expansion be 
suspended or postponed for a while. I will get into the reasons for 
that in just a moment. I am sorry it is now before the Senate. I think 
it should have been postponed for very good and sufficient reasons.
  This is an issue with profound implications for our Nation and the 
international community. It is also an issue that, I am disappointed to 
say, has not received the kind of vigorous national debate that it 
deserves. I was asked the other day when I was in my home State of Iowa 
about the NATO expansion bill and what kind of interest was in it. I 
said basically it is a big yawn. No one is talking about it, very few 
people are writing about it, and yet this may be the most serious vote 
that we take this year in the U.S. Senate.
  Quite frankly, even though I respect the Foreign Relations Committee, 
they have had a lot of hearings on it I know, they have had witnesses 
in, but still it has not received the kind of national debate and 
national focus that it really deserves. I think we are kind of rushing 
this issue right now in light of the fact that there is supposed to be 
a NATO study that is due this June. Again, I will talk about that in a 
moment.
  Taking such a huge step in foreign policy with such low levels of 
awareness among the public and even in Congress is not a good idea. The 
debate or, more accurately, I should say the lack of debate on this 
important policy question has concerned and surprised me. Moving 
forward before legitimate concerns and competing viewpoints receive a 
complete airing does not seem prudent. The usually deliberative Senate 
seems to be in a rush to pass judgment on this issue. I ask, what's the 
rush?
  Concerns about the extension of America's military obligations have 
been voiced by Members, interest groups and academics across the 
political spectrum. One must observe more than just casually that when 
the voices expressing caution include progressives, conservatives, 
libertarians and others, Republicans and Democrats, such diverse 
opposition may be a sign to act more slowly and deliberatively on this 
issue.
  Let me be clear, I have not yet decided how I will vote on NATO 
expansion. If I had to vote tomorrow, I would vote no, because I 
believe, more often than not, that is the safest way to proceed when 
one does not have all the information that one needs and when there 
are, I think, sufficient questions about the expansion and what it is 
going to cost and what its implications for our foreign policy will be. 
However, later on, after more information is gleaned in a vigorous 
public debate, I might be inclined to vote for it. But at the present 
time, I cannot support it without more information and without some 
more enlightenment as to the actual cost figures.
  Without a comprehensive consideration of the issues surrounding NATO 
expansion, I am concerned that we will continually have to revisit 
potentially divisive issues, such as cost and burdensharing among 
member nations, the issues of command and coordination of forces, 
issues of responses to real and perceived threats, or even the more 
basic question of the mission and scope of the organization itself. 
These are not simple questions that lend themselves to a sound-bite 
debate. These are questions which will shape, for better or for worse, 
our defense and foreign policy options for decades to come.
  To be sure, NATO has been a success. It has helped keep the peace in 
Europe for nearly 50 years both by deterring aggression from the Warsaw 
Pact nations and encouraging cooperation between NATO members. I must 
say that due to the commitment of its members and the leadership of the 
United States, NATO has largely fulfilled the reason for its very 
birth--the Soviet Union. NATO has fulfilled its original intent, it has 
outlived the Soviet Union, and now we have to ask, what is its future? 
What role would an expanded NATO play in a post-cold-war era? What role 
would it play in a new century, in a new millennium? And the question I 
will be raising tonight and many times during this debate is, at what 
cost, both in financial terms and in less tangible areas such as the 
potential for strained relations with nonmember nations or even a 
dangerous rollback of the nuclear nonproliferation progress made since 
the end of the cold war?
  One of my primary concerns, as I said, is the wide variance in and 
suspect reliability of projected financial costs. I have seen 
projections range from $125 billion down to $1.5 billion. When you have 
that kind of wide variance, something is very strange.
  Another piece of the puzzle we are missing is how new members are to 
address their military shortfalls. Although the shortfalls were to be 
identified in December 1997, the countries' force goals will not be set 
until this spring. In other words, we are without a plan to address the 
force goals and the price tag associated with it. I am very 
uncomfortable signing the American taxpayer's name to a potentially 
ballooning blank check.
  What share the taxpayers ultimately will pay for NATO expansion is 
not at all clear, not just because there is no consensus on what the 
overall costs will be, but also because burdensharing arrangements 
between current and prospective members have not been firmly 
established.
  I will offer an amendment at the beginning to deal with some of the 
cost concerns I have been raising. As we know, the $1.5 billion cost 
figure that we have seen for the United States for NATO expansion is 
quoted widely and broadly. That figure includes only what is known as 
common costs. The figure excludes a number of other expansion costs for 
the three nations that are due to join NATO if this resolution passes 
relating to the upgrading of their militaries. The United States is 
expected to contribute substantially to the ``national'' costs through 
bilateral subsidies my amendment would require, including the bilateral 
contributions, when calculating the U.S. share of enlargement costs.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of my amendment be printed in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the text of the amendment was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:


[[Page S2146]]


       At the end of section 3(2)(A) of the resolution, insert the 
     following:
       (iv) as used in this subparagraph, the term ``NATO common-
     funded budget'' shall be deemed to include--
       (A) Foreign Military Financing under the Arms Export 
     Control Act;
       (B) transfers of excess defense articles under section 516 
     of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961;
       (C) Emergency Drawdowns;
       (D) no-cost leases of United States equipment;
       (E) the subsidy cost of loan guarantees and other 
     contingent liabilities under subchapter VI of chapter 148 of 
     title 10, United States Code; and
       (F) international military education and training under 
     chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

  Mr. HARKIN. Basically, we see this figure bandied about that it is 
going to cost $1.5 billion. That is common costs. There are other 
national costs to which we have committed to subsidize. Already, just 
in the past 2 years, the figures that we have been able to unearth and 
dig into show that the United States has already spent about $1 billion 
in subsidies to these countries for their NATO expansion purposes. That 
is not calculated in the $1.5 billion. It should be, because it is 
still a cost to the U.S. taxpayers.
  This amendment, plus some others that I will have, will try to 
fashion this resolution so that we will have a really good handle as we 
go year by year as to just what the costs are to the U.S. taxpayers. We 
know already that $1.5 billion is not the total cost to U.S. taxpayers. 
It is more than that. How much more? We don't know. That is why I was 
one who wanted to postpone the debate and vote on NATO expansion after 
June. I thought we could take it up in July, have a serious debate, 
pass it in midsummer, or not pass it, as the will of the body would be. 
At least at that time we would have a study being done by NATO at the 
present time that is due in June. We don't have that study right now. 
This study is basically on the requirements for upgrading the 
militaries of these three countries. That way we would have a better 
idea of the shortfalls in these countries, in their militaries, and the 
costs to the United States--not just the common costs, but the other 
kinds of costs that we will be enlisted to come up with in terms of the 
national costs which we will be subsidizing for these three countries.
  I am hopeful as this debate ensues that I will be able to engage with 
members of the Foreign Relations Committee to explain thoroughly for 
the record exactly what these national costs are, what our commitments 
are, what the subsidies are, and if we have any data at all, to give us 
a better idea of what these subsidies and the national costs will be. 
If we just projected ahead based upon what we found in the last couple 
of years, in the next 10 years we would be looking at somewhere in the 
neighborhood of at least an additional $10 billion for our taxpayers, 
at a minimum, and that is before any of the upgrades have taken place 
in any of these countries. So that is just based upon what we spent in 
the last couple of years.
  Mr. President, again I hope we have a good debate on this. I am 
hopeful we can get some better cost figures. As I said, I will offer 
this amendment at the appropriate time. I printed it in the Record 
today, to get a better handle on the costs. I also will be placing in 
the Record letters from former Senators, questions raised by academics 
around the country as to just what the purposes of NATO expansion are, 
what the goals will be, how will this affect our relations with Russia, 
how will it affect our relations with other countries that are not 
members of NATO now but perhaps want to be in the near future.
  I understand there will be an amendment offered that will close the 
door for certain other countries to join NATO for some specified amount 
of time. What will this do to our relations with these countries and 
the relations of those countries with those nations that will be 
joining NATO if this resolution passes? I think these are all very 
serious questions. I hope the debate will flesh these out and that we 
can have some solid answers, especially as to the costs.
  Perhaps as to relations between nations in the future, this may be 
more in the realm of speculation. But I believe that at least these 
ought to be talked about and debated, and they ought to be debated in 
light of what the costs to our taxpayers would be.
  I am more interested in that than any of the other aspects of the 
bill that is now before us.
  Mr. President, with that, I yield the floor.

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