[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 29 (Tuesday, March 17, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Page S2141]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

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                          THE CRISIS IN KOSOVO

 Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I wish to bring to the attention of 
my colleagues a very incisive commentary on the current situation in 
Kosovo. My colleague from Texas, Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, is the 
author of the opinion piece to which I refer and which was printed on 
the editorial page of the Wall Street Journal on March 13, 1998.
  Senator Hutchison has emerged as one of the most articulate and 
knowledgeable voices in the United States Senate on today's foreign 
policy issues and, particularly, our policy in the Balkan region of 
Europe. As the Clinton administration decides upon an appropriate U.S. 
response to the recent violence in Kosovo, it would do well to consider 
carefully the commentary of my distinguished colleague. I ask that the 
article by Senator Hutchison be printed in the Record.
  The article follows:

             [From the Wall Street Journal, Mar. 13, 1998]

                     One Balkan Quagmire Is Enough

                       (By Kay Bailey Hutchison)

       In November 1995, as Congress was debating President 
     Clinton's decision to send 20,000 U.S. troops to Bosnia, 
     Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott warned that, should 
     Congress fail to support that decision, the conflict ``could 
     all too easily spread well beyond Bosnia.'' Mr. Talbott's 
     particular concern was the southern Yugoslav province of 
     Kosovo where ethnic Albanians, making up 90% of the 
     population, are repressed by the Serb-dominated government in 
     Belgrade.
       Recent events in Kosovo, where dozens of ethnic Albanians 
     have been killed in nearly a week of open fighting, would 
     seem to validate the administration's fears. Except for one 
     thing: The fighting has occurred even though we did send 
     troops to Bosnia. It appears, however, that this subtlety may 
     have been lost on the administration. In trying to rally the 
     allies, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has warned that 
     ``the only effective way to stop violence in that region is 
     to act with firmness, unity and speed. . . . The time to stop 
     the killing is now, before it spreads.'' That's essentially 
     the same argument the administration made to justify the 
     troop commitment to Bosnia.
       The administration's response to the crisis in the Balkans 
     has been consistent with the Clinton Doctrine, which calls 
     for decisive action with overwhelming American force only 
     where our national security interests are poorly defined or 
     nonexistent, as in Somalia and Haiti. In contrast, where the 
     U.S. does face a clear threat to its longstanding interests--
     as in the case of North Korea's development of nuclear 
     weapons or Saddam Hussein's saber-rattling--the Clinton 
     Doctrine dictates cutting a deal and declaring victory, 
     preferably with the help of the United Nations.
       The Kosovo crisis is a microcosm of the racial, ethnic and 
     religious tensions, suppressed for decades, that were 
     unleashed in the Balkans with the end of communism. Since 
     1981 the Albanian majority in Kosovo has sought independence 
     or autonomy. Albanians in Kosovo have boycotted all the 
     institutions of the Yugoslav state, including local and 
     national elections. For his part, President Slobodan 
     Milosevic has used his form control of the police to 
     brutalize and repress the Albanians. The Albanians have 
     answered violence with violence, directed by an underground 
     faction called the Kosovo Liberation Army.
       If this story has a familiar ring to it, it should. It was 
     Bosnia's declaration of independence that led to four bloody 
     years of war and the involvement of 20,000 U.S. troops. 
     Again, as in Bosnia, the U.S. finds itself serving the 
     purposes of the most unsavory elements in an ethnic 
     crisis. We are trying to divide the acceptable center 
     between Serbian strongman Milosevic on the one side and a 
     violent insurgency group, the KLA, on the other. In the 
     meantime, ordinary people in Kosovo, both Albanian and 
     Serbian, suffer.
       We are falling into the same trap that ensnared us in 
     Bosnia. Rather than making clear to our allies and to the 
     belligerents themselves the limits of American involvement, 
     Ms. Albright's comments hold out the prospect for greater 
     involvement. We must resist it. There is no reasonable number 
     of American ground troops that can end this crisis.
       We can contain it, though, first by making clear to our 
     NATO allies that we will not accept their involvement as 
     belligerents in this crisis. This is important because both 
     Greece and Turkey have subsidiary interests in the southern 
     Balkans. At the same time, we should make it clear to 
     Germany, Italy and others bordering the region that they have 
     the means and the interest in resolving this crisis 
     themselves.
       The U.S. can and should provide a great deal of support, 
     including airlift, intelligence and, most importantly, 
     diplomatic good offices. But under no circumstances should we 
     hold out the prospect of additional U.S. ground troops. In 
     fact, we should use the opportunity we now have to reconvene 
     the parties to the Dayton Accords, expand the agenda to 
     include the troubles, in Kosovo, and revise the partitions 
     already established in Dayton to permit an early American 
     withdrawal.
       It's time to reverse the Clinton Doctrine. If we do not, we 
     may find ourselves not only failing to reduce our presence in 
     the Balkans, but increasing it dramatically. Maintaining an 
     open-ended troop commitment in Bosnia--and beginning a new 
     one in Kosovo--would further deteriorate our ability to 
     defend our national security interests elsewhere. As Congress 
     considers additional funding for the mission in Bosnia, it 
     should insist that the U.S. not add Kosovo to the long list 
     of far-off places where American forces are present but 
     American interests are absent.

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