[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 29 (Tuesday, March 17, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2111-S2112]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                           EXECUTIVE SESSION

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PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND, 
                    HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, peace and stability in Europe are among 
America's most vital security interests. In support of these interests, 
NATO has been the cornerstone of American leadership in Europe and the 
foundation for security and peace on that continent.
  The Alliance serves the transatlantic community not only as a proven 
deterrent against aggression, but also as an unmatched instrument of 
integration and trust--two key pillars of peace and stability. Through 
NATO, old enemies have not only been reconciled, but now stand side by 
side as allies; national defense policies are coordinated between 
nations that half a century ago were at war; and, on a day to day 
basis, consultation, joint planning, joint training and cooperation 
between these countries reinforce the trust and commitment to the 
shared values that underpin this alliance of democracies.
  Nearly a decade ago, ``velvet revolutions'' championed by the likes 
of Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel renewed freedom in Central Europe. 
These remarkable and peaceful revolutions tore down the Iron Curtain 
that divided the continent and provided the basis upon which democracy 
is now flourishing.
  Today, nearly a decade after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, we 
begin formal consideration of a resolution of ratification that would 
extend NATO membership to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. Few 
votes before the Senate have as much far-reaching significance as this.
  This vote concerns not only the integration of these three 
democracies into the Alliance, it is also very much about the strategic 
relationship between the United States and Europe. It is about 
America's role in Europe and the ability of the transatlantic community 
to respond to challenges of the future--both of which hinge on whether 
the United States wishes to remain a European power and whether we 
desire a unified, democratic, and larger Europe to remain linked to 
America.
  The case I would like to make today is that NATO enlargement is 
consistent with the moral and strategic imperatives of the Euro-
Atlantic relationship. It is central to the vitality of the trans-
atlantic community, to the future of a stable and peaceful Europe and, 
thus, to the ability of America and Europe to work together effectively 
in promoting common interests in the 21st century.
  Inclusion of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary into the 
Alliance will strengthen NATO. It will make NATO militarily more 
capable and Europe more secure. These three democracies have 
demonstrated their commitment to the values and interests shared by 
NATO members: human rights, equal justice under the law, and free 
markets. Each has a growing economy and a military under civilian 
control.
  It is important to note that they also contributed forces to 
Operation Desert Storm, as well as to our peacekeeping missions in 
Haiti and Bosnia. They were among the first countries to commit forces 
to serve side by side with the United States in the stand-off against 
Saddam Hussein. The admission of these three democracies will add an 
additional 200,000 troops to the Alliance, thereby strengthening its 
ability to fulfill its core mission of collective defense.
  NATO enlargement will eliminate immoral and destabilizing lines in 
Europe, a division established by Stalin and perpetuated by the Cold 
War. The extension of NATO membership to Poland, the Czech Republic, 
and Hungary is an imperative consistent with the moral underpinning of 
U.S. foreign policy and the North Atlantic Treaty that established the 
Alliance in 1949. Indeed, Article 10 of the Treaty states that 
membership is open to ``any other European state in a position to 
further the principles of this treaty and to contribute to the security 
of the North Atlantic area.''
  Mr President, this powerful statement reflects the emphasis the 
Alliance places on democracy and inclusivity.
  But NATO enlargement is not driven just by moral imperatives. It is 
also a policy rooted in strategic self-interest and driven by objective 
political, economic, and military criteria.
  Indeed, for these reasons, NATO has expanded three times since its 
founding, and continued enlargement will expand the zone of peace, 
democracy, and stability in Europe. This benefits all countries in 
Europe, including a democratizing Russia.
  Throughout its history, Europe has been a landscape of many insecure 
small powers, a few imperialistic great powers, and too many 
conflicting nationalist policies, each creating friction with the 
other. Twice in this century, these dynamics pulled America into wars 
on the European continent. They contributed directly to a prolonged 
Cold War. And the potential for them to create conflict in the future 
is all too real unless we seize opportunities like the one before us. 
As Vaclav Havel put it, ``If the West does not stabilize the East, the 
East will destabilize the West.'' Every time America has withdrawn its 
influence from Europe, trouble has followed. This we cannot afford.
  Mr. President, NATO enlargement is the surest means of doing for 
Central and Eastern Europe what American leadership, through the 
Alliance, has done so well for Western Europe. This includes promoting 
and institutionalizing trust, cooperation, coordination, and 
communication. In this way, NATO enlargement is not an act of altruism, 
but one of self-interest.
  Allow me to reemphasize that NATO enlargement benefits all 
democracies in Europe, including Russia. I say this because there are 
still those who assert that NATO enlargement is a policy that mistreats 
Moscow, thereby repeating mistakes made in the Versailles Treaty. That 
argument is dead wrong. It ignores the hand of partnership and 
assistance that the West, including NATO, has extended Russia. Last 
May, the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed, providing the foundation 
for not only enhanced consultation, but also unprecedented defense 
cooperation. Today, Russian troops serve with NATO forces in Bosnia. 
And, unlike the punishing economic retribution carried out under the 
Versailles regime, the West has extended some $100 billion since 1991 
to help Russia's democratic and economic reforms, including over $2 
billion in weapon dismantlement and security assistance.
  Others suggest NATO enlargement endangers a positive relationship 
between Russia and the West. The United States and its NATO allies will 
not always share common interests with Russia, irrespective of NATO 
enlargement. Differences over Iraq, Iran, the Caucasus, arms sales, and 
religious freedom are not related to NATO enlargement. Moscow will 
always have its own independent motivations. Unfortunately, there are 
still those in Moscow who reject NATO enlargement out of a desire to 
preserve Russia's sphere of influence. Let us not give credibility to 
the likes of Vladimir Zhirinovsky by acceding to these demands.
  As I have written with my colleague Senator Lugar, the bottom line is 
that if Russia cannot accept the legitimate right of its neighbors to 
choose their own defensive security arrangements, then NATO's role in 
Central and Eastern Europe is even more important.
  Keeping the above arguments in mind, it follows that the costs of 
enlargement are insignificant to the

[[Page S2112]]

costs of rejecting NATO enlargement. I urge my colleagues to consider 
three severe costs that would be incurred should the Senate fail to 
ratify NATO membership for Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary:
  A rejection of NATO enlargement would prompt a massive crisis in 
America's role as the leader of the transatlantic community. NATO 
enlargement is a policy that has been championed by the United States, 
including the United States Senate. Rejection of the resolution before 
us would vindicate those in Europe who express doubt and who resent 
U.S. leadership.
  Rejection of this resolution would spread massive disillusionment 
across Central Europe. It would stimulate a pervasive feeling of 
abandonment and rekindle a sense of historic despair. This could prompt 
political crises. It would surely prompt a turn to more nationalist 
policies--including nationalist defense policies. A rejection of 
enlargement would reverse the remarkable development of European 
security around an Alliance-determined agenda--a development in no 
small way facilitated by the process of NATO enlargement.
  Rejection of this resolution would undercut Russia's democratic 
evolution, stimulating Russian imperialist nostalgia. It would give 
great credibility to those in Russia who argue that Russia is entitled 
to a sphere of influence in Central Europe. That would be at the 
expense of those who desire Moscow to focus on the priorities of 
economic and political reform.
  NATO enlargement is a critical, non-threatening complement to the 
hand of partnership that the West and NATO have extended to Russia. It 
ensures the secure and stable regional context in which a democratic 
Russia will have the best prospects for a normal, cooperative 
relationship with its European neighbors.
  Indeed, there would have been no German-French reconciliation without 
NATO. And, the ongoing German-Polish reconciliation would not be 
possible without NATO. In fact, as one thoughtful thinker on these 
matters, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, has written ``with NATO enlarged, a 
genuine reconciliation between former Soviet satellites and Russia will 
be both truly possible and likely.''
  Finally, Mr. President, NATO enlargement is fundamental to Europe's 
evolution into a partner that will more effectively meet global 
challenges before the transatlantic community. An undivided Europe at 
peace is a Europe that will be better able to look outward, a Europe 
better able to join with the United States to address necessary global 
security concerns. A partnership with an undivided Europe in the time- 
and stress-tested architecture of NATO will enable the United States to 
more effectively meet the global challenges to its vital interests at a 
time when defense resources are increasingly strained.
  Mr. President, allow me to close by pointing out that NATO 
enlargement is a policy validated by unprecedented public and 
Congressional discourse on a matter of national security.
  Over the last five years, NATO enlargement has been the topic of 
countless editorials and opinion pieces in national and local papers. 
Over the last two years some fourteen states, including the First 
State, Delaware, have passed resolutions endorsing NATO enlargement. 
This policy has been endorsed by countless civic, public policy, 
political, business, labor and veterans organizations.
  NATO enlargement has also been repeatedly endorsed by the North 
Atlantic Assembly, an arm of the Alliance that convenes parliamentary 
representatives of NATO's sixteen countries. Congress has always been 
an active player in this organization and I have the honor today of 
serving as President of the NAA.
  Congress, in particular, has led the charge for NATO enlargement. Its 
committees have examined in detail the military, intelligence, foreign 
policy, and budgetary implications of this long overdue initiative. 
Since last July alone, twelve hearings have been conducted on NATO 
enlargement by the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations, Armed 
Services, Appropriations, and Budget. The Senate NATO Observer Group, 
which I chair with Senator Joseph R. Biden, has convened seventeen 
times with, among others, the President, the Secretaries of State and 
Defense, NATO's Secretary General, and the leaders of the three invitee 
countries.
  For me, it is no surprise--indeed a matter of pride--that Congress 
has legislatively promoted NATO enlargement every year since 1994. To 
be exact, this chamber has endorsed NATO enlargement some fourteen 
times through unanimous consent agreements, voice votes and roll call 
votes. I only wish all dimensions of U.S. national security policy 
would receive this much public attention and endorsement.
  Mr. President, these arguments make it clear that America's best 
chance for enduring peace and stability in Europe--our best chance for 
staying out of war in Europe, our best chance for reinforcing what has 
been a strong, productive partnership with Europe--is to promote a 
Europe that is whole, free, and secure. What better organization to do 
this than the North Atlantic Alliance--an organization that has kept 
the peace for more than fifty years and remains unmatched in its 
potential to meet the security challenges of the future. The extension 
of NATO membership to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary is a 
critical step to ensure that the Alliance remains true to the values of 
the Washington Treaty, to consolidate the gains in democracy, peace, 
and stability in post-Cold War Europe, and to ensure that the 
transatlantic community is fully prepared for the challenges and 
opportunities of the next century.
  Mr. President, we should all commend the Chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Jesse Helms, for producing an 
outstanding resolution and ratification. He has been a true leader in 
the effort behind NATO enlargement. He has ensured that all Members of 
the Senate have had ample opportunity to be fully engaged on this 
important matter. I applaud his leadership. Senator Helms and his 
colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee have produced, as I said, 
an outstanding resolution of ratification. I urge my colleagues to give 
it their unqualified support.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor and I suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Santorum). The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brownback). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.

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