[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 29 (Tuesday, March 17, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2106-S2109]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I must leave the floor to take an important 
telephone call. Before I go, I see the distinguished Senator from New 
Hampshire, whom I respect highly, and I hope he will have a few words 
to say about this.
  But I ask unanimous consent that the staff members of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee be granted floor privileges for the 
duration of the debate on this enlargement, and I ask unanimous consent 
that a list of the names of the staff members be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               Staff Members--Foreign Relations Committee

       Andrew Anderson, Christa Bailey, Steve Biegun, Marshall 
     Billingslea, Beth Bonargo, Ellen Bork, Sherry Grandjean, 
     Garrett Grigsby, Patti McNerney, Kirsten Madison, Roger 
     Noriega, Bud Nance, Susan Oursler, Dany Pletka, Marc 
     Thiessen, Chris Walker, Natasha Watson, Michael Westphal, 
     Michael Wilner, Beth Wilson, Alex Rodriguez, Lauren Shedd, 
     Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley, Martha Davis, Ed Hall, Mike 
     Haltzel, Frank Jannuzi, Ed Levine, Erin Logan, Brian McKeon, 
     Ursula McManus, Janice O'Connell, Diana Ohlbaum, Dawn Ratiff, 
     Munro Richardson, Nancy Stetson, Puneet Talwar,

  Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent 
that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I assume the pending 
business is the NATO enlargement?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, the Senate now is about to 
engage in a great debate, a debate that is very important to our 
country and, indeed, to the world. I had hoped that we could have 
postponed this debate somewhat, for a number of reasons. NATO itself is 
planning to put out a report on the requirements, costs and feasibility 
of enlargement sometime in May. Originally this debate was scheduled to 
come up in May, and now it has been moved up to mid-March. It is no 
secret that I am an opponent of enlargement, for reasons that I will go 
into somewhat today and, of course, later on as the debate continues. 
But I also feel very strongly--as some of my colleagues did who signed 
a letter to the leader, on both sides of the aisle--that we need more 
time to debate this, to understand fully what we are doing.
  I think that, when you first look at this issue, you might come to 
the conclusion that after being subjected to the tyranny of communism 
for 45 years, somehow these nations have earned a place in the NATO 
alliance. I think the nations certainly have earned their freedom, 
without question. They paid a heavy price for it. But so did the United 
States of America. We spent about $6 trillion in the Cold War to defeat 
Soviet communism.
  From the time I first came to the Congress, in 1985, I have been a 
strong supporter of our military and a strong supporter of the NATO 
alliance--which, by the way, is a military alliance, which sometimes I 
think people forget. It was a military alliance created to thwart the 
attempt of the Soviet Union to attack Western Europe and conquer it 
with its massive armies.
  But today there is no massive Soviet Army. There is no Soviet Union. 
Is Russia unstable? Of course it is. But it is not the Soviet Union and 
it is not the same threat that NATO was designed to contain. As we 
begin this debate, so many of our colleagues on the other side have 
said expanding NATO is a great idea, and that we need to move forward 
as quickly as possible. I have been around a few years on this Earth, 
and I have generally found that if something is a good idea today, it 
will probably be a good idea tomorrow. If it is a good idea tomorrow, 
it will probably be a good idea next month or perhaps even a year from 
now.
  So I wonder what the hurry is. I wonder why panic has set in among so 
many proponents of enlargement. It seems to me that, if it is a good 
idea, then a healthy debate ought not to ring the curtain down on it. 
But there appears to be some fear, I guess, that adding more time to 
the debate might change the outcome. I hope it does. I hope we have 
enough time to change the outcome, because I sincerely believe, after a 
lot of review on this issue, that we are making a serious mistake.
  Let me offer some of the reasons for opposing NATO enlargement. Given 
the administration's support and that of a lot of very prominent people 
of both

[[Page S2108]]

political parties--there has been a very impressive outside lobbying 
effort by a lot of people--the political pressure has been very strong 
for moving this forward. Again, the date has been moved forward, from 
May to March. But I believe the Senate should take its advice and 
consent role with treaties very, very seriously. This is a matter for 
advice and consent, and I have a hard time understanding how one can 
adequately advise and adequately consent if we are being told that the 
resolution of ratification has to be voted on now, with minimum debate.
  The distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee is now 
on the floor. I know he had an extensive period of debate on this issue 
in his committee. Unfortunately, I am not a member of that committee. 
Sometimes I wish I were, because I admire the chairman greatly, but I 
am not. However, I am a member of the Armed Services Committee, and we 
are having a hearing this Thursday on NATO enlargement. I would like to 
be able to digest the information that we will receive there. 
Unfortunately, that hearing will now fall right in the middle of the 
debate, so it will be difficult to reflect on the hearing with the 
debate already underway.
  As doubts have begun to appear, it has been somewhat disconcerting to 
see the proponents of NATO enlargement, the expansionists, so afraid 
that the Senate might carefully deliberate on this issue. As I said, if 
it is a good idea today, it ought to be a good idea a month from now or 
perhaps even a year from now. I might also add, only two countries in 
NATO have voted to broaden the alliance and bring in new members.

  Some have suggested that those of us who are opposed to expansion are 
not committed to European security. If there is any Senator in the U.S. 
Senate who has a stronger record of support of the NATO alliance, or 
has a stronger anti-Communist record than I, I would like to know who 
that Senator is. Perhaps, Mr. President, they are really anxious for us 
to vote because they fear the case for enlargement might not bear the 
scrutiny that we are about to give it.
  I have no plausible ulterior motive for opposing enlargement, and I 
am as anti-Communist and tough on the Russians as anybody alive. But 
this is not about communism anymore, although it appears some still 
think it is.
  Since coming to Congress in 1985, I have enthusiastically supported 
spending billions of dollars for the defense of Europe. As a matter of 
fact, the United States spent roughly $6 trillion on defense during the 
Cold War, much of it directly for the defense of Europe. A lot of 
American lives were lost in wars against communists, and millions of 
Americans served in uniform at great sacrifice to their own families to 
contribute to the security of Europe. So, with the greatest respect for 
those countries that now seek membership in NATO, I do not think we owe 
anything to anybody. I have weighed all the alleged benefits, I have 
looked at the potential risks, and I have come to a number of 
conclusions which I would like to cite here.
  First, if Europe or North America were truly threatened by Russia, 
the question of financial cost would be as irrelevant now as it was 
during the Cold War. Would we have gotten into a debate about how much 
it was going to cost if the Soviet Union had attacked North America? or 
attacked Europe? I don't think so. But for the foreseeable future--and 
I emphasize ``foreseeable future''--Russia does not pose a conventional 
threat to any country in Europe.
  What is the conventional threat from Russia? They do not have a 
capable army. They have removed most of the conventional weapons, the 
tanks, and other items of warfare that would be associated with a 
standing army. I am unaware of any credible analysis of their military 
that disagrees with that conclusion. So, cost is an issue today 
because, unlike during the Cold War, we are not sure what we are 
buying.
  Second, I cannot imagine a worse long-term strategy for European 
security than jeopardizing United States-Russian relations. We have 
fought now for 50 years, first to defeat communism and to rid the world 
of the Soviet Union, and now to bring Russia and the Independent States 
back into the family of democratic nations. Russia is not there yet. We 
know that. Russia has many problems. But their once-mighty military is 
gone, for all intents and purposes.
  Regardless of what experts and even United States Senators may say, 
Russia opposes NATO expansion. Of course, that does not mean that we 
should. Russia does not dictate our foreign policy. In fact, as 
chairman of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces in the U.S. Armed 
Services Committee, I routinely confront Russia on matters of arms 
control, proliferation, and national missile defense. These are 
important things to confront them about. But extending an alliance that 
she considers hostile to the countries that she cannot threaten is 
basically kicking the Russians for no reason. History tells us that 
this is unwise.
  You see, I think some are still in the Cold War looking at a 21st-
century issue. I want to be talking to the Russians about national 
missile defense, about weapons proliferation, about arms control, about 
the ABM Treaty, and about how we can hopefully work together for the 
sake of keeping the peace in the world. This is far more important than 
picking 3 nations as winners--Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland--
and ignoring 14 or 15 others who could also make a compelling case to 
come in. And we have now said: ``You, you, and you, can come in.'' And 
to take this token step, we are putting at risk progress with Russia on 
arms control, proliferation, missile defense and the ABM Treaty.

  I think we could be engaging the Russians to promote a world in the 
21st century that has no dividing line between Western and Eastern 
Europe or dividing line between all of Europe and Russia. In the 21st 
century, I want this to be a world of peace. The 20th century was a 
world of war. I want to try to build something in the 21st century by 
looking ahead instead of thinking in the past. How do we do that? We 
engage the Russians on these issues, instead of antagonizing them or 
insulting them; we engage them. I think then, when the 21st century 
comes, we will see a Europe that is united with all nations in the 
European Union--united, friendly, cooperative in their economies, for 
the most part; perhaps even in their monetary system; and certainly 
acting as democratic nations with a common military bond.
  But in addition, I hope to see a Russia that is a buffer between 
Islamic fundamentalism and China, a buffer between Europe and those two 
entities, Islamic fundamentalism and China, two very, very dangerous 
philosophies looming out there. One, China, has nuclear, biological, 
and chemical weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. 
Fundamentalist Islamic countries are getting these weapons. We want a 
Russia that is going to be a buffer against these threats. We want a 
Russia that is a part of the West. For 50 years we have dreamed of the 
day that we could make this happen.
  I am not some George McGovern liberal talking here. I am one who has 
been fighting the Soviet Union for 50 years, as many others have in 
both political parties. But we need to look ahead, think a little bit 
into the future about what we are doing. We are beginning to carve up 
Europe again, picking Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland and 
putting them on the right side of the line. But what is the threat to 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland today from Russia? I have not 
heard anybody tell me what it is.
  If Russia decides to build its defenses back up--and it very well may 
happen--if they decide to turn to communism again, or some other brute-
force-type government, if that even begins to happen, we can take the 
necessary steps, including the expansion of NATO. But why do it before 
we have to? Why pass up the greatest opportunity we have had in 75 
years to bring the Russian people into the West? We have that 
opportunity. It would be a crime to pass it up. Declining to expand 
NATO now does not in any way prevent us from doing so in the future. 
There is absolutely no reason why we cannot do this in the future --no 
reason. If somebody can come on the floor and explain to me why we 
cannot do this a year from now, or 2 years from now, if the danger so 
exists, I would like to hear that argument.
  It doesn't prevent us from doing it. Adding three insiders--Poland, 
the Czech Republic, and Hungary--creates a whole category of outsiders 
who say,

[[Page S2109]]

``Well, why not us? We were dominated by the Soviet Union. Why are you 
picking them over us?''
  So you are going to subject NATO almost annually to the perpetual 
anguish of, ``Am I next?'' Latvia, Estonia, Romania, on and on down the 
line. ``When is it my turn to come into NATO?'' And meanwhile, while 
focusing on a cold war alliance, we continue to ignore what we want to 
do, which is to bring Russia into the Western World.
  With the end of the cold war, NATO now faces serious internal issues 
about its means and ends which should be aired and resolved before new 
countries are added. Enlargement is a token and, frankly, an 
unimaginative distraction from these real problems. We saw this in the 
debate in the Persian Gulf crisis last month. Many NATO countries 
weren't with us.
  Mr. President, I hope that we will think very carefully about this. 
It is a hardnosed decision about extending a military guarantee to a 
precise piece of territory under a specific set of strategic 
circumstances; it should not be a sentimental decision about a moral 
commitment to Europe. We already have that.
  What do we really want to accomplish? Do we really want to accomplish 
another line drawn through Europe this year, perhaps extending that 
line through another part of Europe next year and another line bringing 
in another nation the following year and continue this cold-war-era 
attitude? Or do we want to build a world where the United States and a 
strong Europe and a strong, democratic Russia can be a buffer, a source 
of power to confront Islamic fundamentalism and perhaps--perhaps--
Communist China? I think we are being shortsighted, and I am going to 
get into more detail as to why later in the debate. Mr. President, I 
yield the floor.
  Mr. ROTH addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DeWine). The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.