[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 29 (Tuesday, March 17, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2084-S2086]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




       THE IRAQI CRISIS: WALKING SOFTLY AND CARRYING A BIG STICK

  Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, just a short time ago, the Senate was 
prepared to consider, and likely to adopt, a resolution granting the 
President largely unlimited authority ``to take all necessary and 
appropriate actions'' to respond to the threat posed by Iraq's refusal 
to end its weapons of mass destruction programs. After some of us 
raised concerns about the echoes of Tonkin Gulf in that original 
wording, we were then prepared to endorse a measure which constrained 
that authority by requiring that it be ``in consultation with Congress 
and consistent with the U.S. Constitution and laws.''
  Some of us were prepared to stand behind this language, and its 
endorsement of the President's policy determinations which we generally 
believed would culminate in air strikes by American forces against 
Iraq, though no one, including the President, believed that such 
strikes would necessarily accomplish our principle objective of 
removing Saddam Hussein's arsenal of biological, chemical and nuclear 
weapons.
  We then were presented with a diplomatic solution of the crisis 
negotiated by U.N. Secretary-General Annan that offered the prospect of 
achieving our principle goal in a way which strikes from the air could 
not possibly have done. It empowered UN inspectors on the ground in 
Iraq to more fully investigate and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction. The President has, in my view, taken the correct approach. 
He welcomes the agreement as representing a solution to the current 
problem, while immediately seeking to test and verify Iraqi compliance. 
He reserves our ability to take such other action as may be necessary 
if the agreement proves inadequate. Let me say clearly that this 
outcome is a good deal for the United States, the people of Iraq, the 
entire region and for international security. It is especially a good 
deal for the thousands of American families who have loved ones on 
guard right now for us in the Persian Gulf.
  There is no more awesome responsibility facing us as members of the 
United States Senate than the decision to authorize the use of American 
military power. Such action puts America's finest, its servicemen and 
women, in harm's way. This basic fact was driven home to me as I 
reviewed the following press reports from my home state of Georgia over 
the past few weeks:
  From the February 12 Valdosta Daily Times:

       Troops from south Georgia's Moody Air Force Base departed 
     for the Persian Gulf today. Up to 3,000 soldiers from Ft. 
     Stewart are expected to follow soon. About 80 Air Force 
     rescue personnel from the base near Valdosta departed just 
     after 7 AM along with two HC-130s, which refuel rescue 
     helicopters, drop para-rescue jumpers to assist in operations 
     and deploy equipment for rescue operations. . .

  From the February 12 Augusta Chronicle:

       As tensions mount in Iraq, some Fort Gordon troops are 
     preparing for possible deployment in the Middle East, and the 
     513th Military Intelligence Brigade is poised to provide 
     intelligence support for military operations there. . .

  From the February 13 Macon Telegraph:

       Base workers loaded a C-5 cargo plane with communications 
     equipment Thursday afternoon as 30 members of the 5th Combat 
     Communications Group prepared to fly to the Persian Gulf area 
     about 6 a.m. today. The communications group, commonly known 
     as the 5th MOB, primarily is responsible for establishing 
     communications and air-traffic-control systems for military 
     operations. . .

  From the February 18 Savannah Morning News:

       3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) soldiers like Spc. Shane 
     Rollins of the 3rd Battalion, 69th Armor Regiment, had little 
     time to relax as they prepared for a deployment to the Middle 
     East. In less than a week, Rollins and nearly 3,000 other 
     Fort Stewart soldiers will be in Kuwait.

  And from the February 22 Columbus Ledger-Enquirer:

       As about 200 Fort Benning troops left Saturday for a 
     possible confrontation with Iraq, Acting Army Secretary 
     Robert Walker said the decision to send more troops from the 
     post hinges on what Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein does next.

  Such scenes have been repeated all over America in recent weeks, and 
underscore the human consequences of our policy deliberations in this 
chamber. Before discussing those important questions with which this 
body must grapple in fulfilling its Constitutional role, we must always 
be mindful of the young men and women who will risk more than their 
reputations in carrying out the policies we approve.


                            A little history

  Karl Von Clausewitz, the great German theoretician on war, once 
wrote,

       War is not merely a political act but a real political 
     instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carrying 
     out of the same by other means.

  In August of 1990, Saddam Hussein tried to accomplish by war what he 
could not achieve by other means. Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait. This 
came just two years after the conclusion of the eight-year Iran-Iraq 
War, a terrible conflict in which Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons. 
The war left 600,000 Iranians and 400,000 Iraqis dead.
  After months of fruitless negotiations and after a huge U.S. and 
allied military build-up in the region, in January of 1991 President 
Bush was granted authority by Congress to use force to compel Iraqi 
withdrawal from Kuwait. The resulting Persian Gulf War lasted 44 days, 
and the U.S.-lead forces achieved the primary mission of evicting Iraqi 
forces from Kuwait. In the process, the United States crippled Iraqi 
defense forces, and in the words of Lt. General Tom Kelly, ``Iraq went 
from the fourth-largest army in the world to the second-largest army in 
Iraq.''
  All along, the U.S. goal was to compel Iraqi compliance with U.N. 
Security Council resolutions calling for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. 
Destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, and in particular 
its nuclear weapons program, was only a secondary goal. It was only 
discoveries made during and after the Gulf War of greater than 
anticipated Iraqi capability for deploying chemical and biological 
weapons, in addition to nuclear weapons, which elevated the destruction 
of these capabilities to a key aim of American policy.
  After the cease fire which ended the 1991 war, the U.N. Security 
Council established the U.N. Special Commission, or UNSCOM, to 
investigate, monitor and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction 
capability, including its delivery systems.
  Over the past 6 years, UNSCOM has been doing yeoman's work in 
fulfilling this task by destroying more Iraqi chemical weaponry than 
was accomplished in the Gulf War itself. Late last year, Saddam Hussein 
began denying UNSCOM the ability to inspect key Iraqi facilities where 
production and processing of weapons of mass destruction materials was 
suspected to be taking place.
  Since then, the United States, our allies and the U.N., have been 
working

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around the clock to win access to Iraqi sites in compliance with U.N. 
Resolution 687, which calls for the dismantling of Iraq's weapons of 
mass destruction capability.


                            Permission Creep

  A few weeks ago, I raised concerns regarding the original version of 
the Senate resolution which, though not sought by President Clinton, 
would have given the President largely unlimited authority to use 
whatever force he deemed necessary to accomplish this objective. I was 
concerned that the original resolution was overly broad. I did not 
think it was appropriate to grant such authority on the monumental 
issue of war and peace without the Congress being thoroughly consulted 
about the President's plans and justifications.
  I was concerned about ``Permission Creep.'' Permission Creep is when 
Congress grants the President broad powers in the glow of victory 
without thinking about the long term consequences of granting such 
authority. Of course, the reverse is also true. Whenever the United 
States suffers a defeat, the Congress is swift to limit presidential 
authority.
  Prior to the Vietnam War, President Johnson reported that as a result 
of military tensions in the Gulf of Tonkin he had ordered a strike 
against certain North Vietnamese naval targets and oil reserves. In the 
glow of the victory of this air strike, the Congress passed the 
infamous Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that approved the President's taking 
``all necessary measures'' to repulse an armed attack against U.S. 
forces and to assist South Vietnam in the defense of its freedom. It is 
reported that President Johnson compared the resolution to ``grandma's 
nightshirt--it covered everything.''
  Of course, we all know the history of Vietnam--a history we are so 
carefully trying to avoid repeating. We gave the U.S. military 
extremely difficult and complex missions. We asked it to prosecute a 
war against a seasoned and highly motivated opponent while 
simultaneously engaging in ``nation building'' in South Vietnam. At the 
same time, we did not give the military the latitude to win. Political 
leaders micro-managed the Vietnam War, and we did not use decisive 
force. Of course, in the aftermath, the Congress saw fit to reign in 
the President's authority to commit U.S. troops in harms way when it 
passed the War Powers Resolution in the early 1970s.
  A more immediate example of ``Permission Creep'' is the 1991 Defense 
Authorization Act. Again, in the glow of victory in the Gulf War, the 
Congress expressed its approval for the ``use of all necessary means'' 
to achieve the goals of U.N. Resolution 687. That is where we stand 
today. This authority exists as a result of the initial joint 
resolution passed by Congress in January 1991 authorizing the use of 
force to compel Iraqi compliance with the relevant U.N. resolutions of 
the time, particularly with respect to the withdrawal of Iraqi forces 
from Kuwait. This authority was later extended to cover U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 687 which established the U.N. Special Commission 
whose function is to uncover and dismantle Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction.
  The Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1992 states 
specifically that it was the sense of Congress that:
  ``The Congress supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the 
goals of Security Council Resolution 687 as being consistent with the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public 
Law 102-1).''
  I appreciate the fact that some interpret this as being non-binding, 
even though it was passed by both houses of Congress and presented to 
the President as part of the Defense Authorization Act. And, though 
some contend that these expressions of Congressional will are no longer 
in effect, in the absence of formal action to rescind or terminate 
these non-time limited authorizations, I am led to the conclusion that 
the President continues to have all the authority he needs to use 
military force against Iraq pursuant to our laws and relevant U.N. 
Security Council resolutions. The real question is whether or not he 
should! I for one am glad that President Clinton showed restraint in 
the most recent confrontation with Iraq.
  I see signs that some are already viewing the President's acceptance 
of the diplomatic agreement as somehow a defeat. I do not share that 
view! In the words of UN Secretary-General Annan, I think America 
showed, ``resolve on substance and flexibility on form.'' To paraphrase 
President Teddy Roosevelt, in the recent Iraq crisis this nation, 
``walked softly and carried a big stick.''


                           The Senate Debate

  Whatever happens from this point, I am pleased that our deliberations 
on the details of the Senate resolution led to closer consultation 
between the Administration and the Congress, and to a more informed and 
thoughtful consideration of the policy choices before us. The current 
diplomatic solution offers us a great opportunity to debate our policy 
in the Persian Gulf. I welcome that opportunity.
  I know some are concerned about whether this debate sends the wrong 
message to the world about American resolve. If I were able to address 
Saddam Hussein today, I would say the following words:
  ``The future is up to you. If there is to be light at the end of the 
tunnel for you and the Iraqi people, it is your decision. Because 
America walked softly during this crisis, consulted with our allies, 
and chose a diplomatic solution does not mean the willingness of the 
President and the Congress to use the big stick has gone away.''
  As for the U.S. troops stationed abroad listening to this debate, as 
I listened thirty years ago when the U.S. Senate debated the Tet 
Offensive, the Siege of Khe Sahn, and the future of the Viet Nam War, I 
say this: ``Your country is the oldest constitutional democracy in the 
world. As such, we all have a right to express our views openly and 
honestly about the most important act of that democracy--sending you 
into harm's way. You are America's finest. We are all proud of your 
service. If called upon to conduct military action, I know you will do 
your duty. We are with you all the way. You will be in our thoughts and 
prayers until you return safely home.''


                     What is the National Interest?

  My first question in the debate on Persian Gulf policy is: ``What 
vital national interests do we have at stake?'' In answering this 
question, the President and the Congress together must determine what 
responsibilities should be shared by other nations which also have 
vital interests involved. In some cases those interests are more vital 
than our own!
  I believe that we do have a number of vital national interests in the 
Persian Gulf region, including:
  Fighting the spread of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons 
around the world;
  Promoting stability in an area where Iraq shares borders with: Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and Syria, all potential flashpoints on the world 
scene; Turkey, an important U.S. ally; and Jordan, historically a key 
moderating force in the region;
  Securing access to the region's oil supplies, which account for 26 
percent of world oil stocks, and 65 percent of global oil reserves; and
  Building regional support for the Middle East peace process between 
Israel and its neighbors.
  I would stress that these interests will remain regardless of whether 
or not Saddam Hussein is still in power. For example, Saddam is not the 
only problem with respect to weapons of mass destruction even in the 
Persian Gulf region itself. With respect to stability, it is very 
possible that if Saddam suddenly vanishes from the scene, the 
situation, at least in the short run, will worsen, with particular 
instability along the Turkey-Iraq and Iran-Iraq borders.
  Along these same lines, I believe we must take a hard look at how 
containment of Iraq is related to the achievement of our vital national 
interests, which, as just noted, are basically regional in nature. On 
weapons of mass destruction, for example, the nation of Iran poses a 
similar challenge. In terms of access to oil supplies, while Saudi 
Arabia supplies over half of all Persian Gulf oil exports (and 85 
percent of U.S. oil imports from the region), even before the Gulf War 
Iraq accounted for a much smaller portion of Persian Gulf oil 
production. With sanctions now in place, Iraq's contribution to global 
oil supplies is minimal. The point is, while we must not underestimate 
the threat

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posed by Saddam Hussein, and especially by his willingness to use 
weapons of mass destruction, we must be careful to not overestimate the 
role of Iraq and thereby get preoccupied with that nation to the 
detriment of focusing on our vital regional and global interests.
  Another matter which begs an answer is the question of 
sustainability, of our capacity to maintain our policies, not only now 
but also well into the future. For example, on the military front, are 
we going to require deployments for months and years rather than just 
days and weeks?
  There is also the question of consistency--the extent to which our 
policy choices in pursuit of one national interest objective do not 
hamper the achievement of other vital objectives. For example, we need 
to take into account what impact each of the diplomatic and military 
options designed to contain Saddam Hussein's chemical and biological 
weapons programs are likely to have on other vital American interests 
such as our encouragement of Russia to continue forward with 
ratification and implementation of START II, and other arms control 
agreements.
  On a more specific matter of military policy, I feel we need to take 
a long, hard look at our current force deployment strategy. Before we 
get to the point of committing our servicemen and women, we must 
certainly determine if we have an appropriate military mission which 
can only be accomplished by military means. Once such a determination 
is made, we must provide our forces with sufficient resources, and 
clear and concise rules of engagement to get the job done.
  The distinguished Senator from Kansas, Senator Roberts, made a very 
fine and thoughtful address to the Senate the other day. He cited the 
following quotation from one of my personal heroes, Senator Richard B. 
Russell, from thirty years ago during the War in Viet Nam. At that time 
I was serving in that war. Senator Russell said:

       While it is a sound policy to have limited objectives, we 
     should not expose our men to unnecessary hazards to life and 
     limb in pursuing them. As for me, my fellow Americans, I 
     shall never knowingly support a policy of sending even a 
     single American boy overseas to risk his life in combat 
     unless the entire civilian population and wealth of our 
     country--all that we have and all that we are--is to bear a 
     commensurate responsibility in giving him the fullest support 
     and protection of which we are capable.

  As part of our effort to produce an effective long-term policy for 
dealing with Iraq and Saddam Hussein we must also ask the question 
about appropriate burden-sharing among all of the nations, including 
the United States, which have vital interests in the area. It should be 
the long-term aim of our policies that the American people should not 
be asked to alone shoulder the costs, whether in terms of financial 
expenses, potential military casualties or diplomatic fallout, of 
pursuing objectives whose benefits will not be realized exclusively, or 
in some cases, even primarily, by the United States. To cite but one 
example of the kind of calculations I have in mind here, while the 
Persian Gulf accounts for 19% of U.S. oil imports, that region provides 
44% of Western Europe's oil imports and fully 70% of Japan's.
  In posing these questions regarding our long-term policy toward Iraq, 
and arriving at my own answers to them, I am led to make the following 
conclusions.
  First, the best, and perhaps the only, way to secure our vital 
interests of curbing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and 
preventing Saddam Hussein from developing the capacity to threaten 
neighboring countries is through a continuation of people on the 
ground. In this case right now, the people on the ground are the UNSCOM 
inspections. It is these inspections, and not any conceivable military 
option, short of an all out invasion and occupation of Iraq, which can 
locate, identify, and destroy, or at least impede Iraq's development of 
chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.
  Second, in order to secure our national interests, we should place a 
priority on international coalition building for peace and security in 
the Persian Gulf. Not only is such an exercise called for in order to 
insure that American soldiers and American taxpayers are not asked to 
bear a disproportionate share of the burden in confronting the mainly 
regional threat posed by Saddam Hussein, but also it is essential to 
achieving our policy goals--anti-proliferation and regional stability.
  Third, in order to aid both weapons inspection and coalition-
building, we should be prepared to re-examine our approach to sanctions 
policy. We should not follow an approach which isolates us from our 
allies in the region or elsewhere, nor which makes us the villain in 
the minds of the Iraqi people and its future leaders. In other words, 
just as I don't want us to pay a disproportionate economic cost, 
neither should we have to alone bear the diplomatic costs of containing 
Saddam Hussein. While I certainly do not call for an end to economic 
sanctions against Iraq, and indeed I believe the international 
community will need to find a mechanism to secure long-term leverage to 
maintain adequate surveillance of Iraq's weapons-building programs, I 
believe that we should work with our allies to develop a comprehensive, 
long-term approach with respect to sanctions, with graduated 
modifications geared to concrete Iraqi actions.
  Finally, consistent with my view that we are currently paying more 
than our share of the financial and political costs of dealing with 
Saddam Hussein, I believe that, in the long run, we should phase-down 
our military presence in the Persian Gulf. While we do have important 
national interests in the region, these interests are neither our's 
alone nor are they our only national interests. The over-extension of 
American troop and naval deployments in the Persian Gulf compromises 
our ability to sustain commitments in the Mediterranean, on the Korean 
Peninsula, in the Balkans and elsewhere.
  In short, I don't want the United States to pursue policies which 
might win the battle against Saddam Hussein but lose the larger war of 
securing our vital interests throughout the Persian Gulf and around the 
globe, now and into the future. We should continue to carry the big 
stick, but build our coalition stronger to do it and not fail to walk 
softly as the situation requires.
  Mr. President, I look forward to continuing this debate on these and 
related matters in the weeks and months ahead.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, it is my understanding that at 11 o'clock 
Members from the other side of the aisle will be coming in. I think the 
moment is close to that. I do not have that long a presentation, but I 
ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to proceed for such time as I 
need, which will not be very long.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hagel). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. KERRY. I thank the Chair.

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