[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 29 (Tuesday, March 17, 1998)]
[House]
[Pages H1181-H1192]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




  URGING RESOLUTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
                                 CHINA

  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and 
agree to the resolution (H. Res.

[[Page H1182]]

364) urging the introduction and passage of a resolution on the human 
rights situation in the People's Republic of China at the 54th session 
of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, as amended.
  The Clerk read as follows:

                              H. Res. 364

         
       Whereas the State Department's Country Reports on Human 
     Rights Practices for 1997 state that ``[t]he Government [of 
     China] continued to commit widespread and well-documented 
     human rights abuses, in violation of internationally accepted 
     norms,'' including extrajudicial killings, the use of 
     torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, forced abortion and 
     sterilization, the sale of organs from executed prisoners, 
     and tight control over the exercise of the rights of freedom 
     of speech, press, and religion;
       Whereas, according to the State Department, ``Serious human 
     rights abuses persisted in minority areas [controlled by the 
     Government of China], including Tibet and Xinjiang [East 
     Turkestan], where tight controls on religion and other 
     fundamental freedoms continued and, in some cases, 
     intensified [during 1997]'';
       Whereas, according to the 1997 Country Reports, the 
     Government of China enforces its ``one-child policy'' using 
     coercive measures including severe fines of up to several 
     times the annual income of the average resident of China and 
     sometimes punishes nonpayment by destroying homes and 
     confiscating personal property;
       Whereas, according to the 1997 Country Reports, as part of 
     the Chinese Government's continued attempts to expand state 
     control of religion, ``Police closed many `underground' 
     mosques, temples, and seminaries,'' and authorities ``made 
     strong efforts to crack down on the activities of the 
     unapproved Catholic and Protestant churches'' including the 
     use of detention, arrest, and ``reform-through-education'' 
     sentences;
       Whereas, although the 1997 Country Reports note several 
     ``positive steps'' by the Chinese Government such as signing 
     the United Nations Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
     Rights and allowing the United Nations Working Group on 
     Arbitrary Detention to visit China, Assistant Secretary of 
     State John Shattuck has testified regarding those reports 
     that ``We do not see major changes [in the human rights 
     siguation in China]. We have not characterized China as 
     having demonstrated major changes in the period over the 
     course of the last year'';
       Whereas, in 1990, 1992, and each year since then, the 
     United States has participated in an unsuccessful 
     multilateral effort to gain passage of a United Nations 
     Commission on Human Rights resolution addressing the human 
     rights situation in China;
       Whereas the Government of China has mounted a diplomatic 
     campaign each year to defeat the resolution and has succeeded 
     in blocking commission consideration of such a resolution 
     each year except 1995, when the United States engaged in a 
     more aggressive effort to promote the resolution;
       Whereas China's opposition to the resolution has featured 
     an attack on the principle of the universality of human 
     rights, which the United States, China, and 169 other 
     governments reaffirmed at the 1993 United Nations World 
     Conference on Human Rights;
       Whereas on February 23, 1998, the European Union (EU) 
     agreed that neither the EU nor its member states would table 
     or cosponsor a resolution on the human rights situation in 
     China at the 54th Session of the United Nations Commission on 
     Human Rights;
       Whereas on March 13, 1998, the Administration announced 
     that it would not seek passage of a resolution at the United 
     Nations Commission on Human Rights addressing the human 
     rights situation in China;
       Whereas without United States leadership there is little 
     possibility of success for that resolution;
       Whereas, in 1994, when the President announced his decision 
     to delink Most Favored Nation (MFN) status for China from 
     previously announced human rights conditions, the 
     Administration pledged that the United States would ``step up 
     its efforts, in cooperation with other states, to insist that 
     the United Nations Human Rights Commission pass a resolution 
     dealing with the serious human rights abuses in China'' as 
     part of the Administration's ``new human rights strategy'';
       Whereas a failure vigorously to pursue the adoption of such 
     a resolution would constitute an abandonment of an important 
     component of the ``expanded multilateral agenda'' that the 
     Administration promised as part of its ``new human rights 
     strategy'' toward China; and
       Whereas Chinese democracy advocate and former political 
     prisoner Wei Jingsheng has stated that ``[t]his [United 
     Nations Commission on Human Rights] resolution is a matter of 
     life and death for democratic reform in China'': Now, 
     therefore, be it
       Resolved, That the House of Representatives--
       (1) urges the President to reconsider his decision not to 
     press for passage of a resolution on human rights violations 
     in China at the 54th Session of the United Nations Commission 
     on Human Rights;
       (2) expresses its profound regret that the European Union 
     will not table or cosponsor a resolution on human rights 
     violations in China at the 54th Session of the United Nations 
     Commission on Human Rights; and
       (3) urges all members of the United Nations Commission on 
     Human Rights to support passage of a resolution on human 
     rights violations in China at the 54th Session of the United 
     Nations Commission on Human Rights.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Smith) and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Davis) each will 
control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr.Smith).
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge every member of this body to support House 
Resolution 364. This strongly bipartisan resolution urges the 
introduction and passage of a resolution on human rights in the 
People's Republic of China at the 54th session of the U.N. Human Rights 
Commission which began yesterday and runs to the 24th of next month.
  If any government deserves to be the subject of a U.N. Human Rights 
Commission resolution, the Beijing regime does. In its testimony before 
my subcommittee last month, Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck 
made it very clear that ``. . .the government of China continues to 
commit widespread and well-documented abuses in all areas of human 
rights.'' He also testified that there have not been any major 
improvements in that situation during the last year.
  As detailed in the State Department's country reports on human rights 
practices in China, those abuses included extrajudicial killings, the 
use of torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, forced abortion and 
forced sterilization, the sale of organs from executed prisoners, and 
tight controls over religion, speech, and press. Persecution in some 
areas, such as the captive nations of Tibet and East Turkistan, even 
intensified during the past year.
  House Resolution 364 merely urges the administration to reconsider 
and to do what it promised to do when it delinked MFN for China from 
human rights considerations in 1994: ``. . . to insist that the U.N. 
Human Rights Commission pass a resolution dealing with the serious 
human rights abuses in China.''
  However, this past weekend, the administration signaled that it is 
backing away from that promise, just as it backed away from its 
previous promise to link China's MFN status to respect for human 
rights. In both cases, the retreat has not been justified by any 
improvement in the Chinese government's human rights record. As a 
matter of fact, it has gone backwards.
  In explaining its decision not to seek a China resolution in Geneva, 
the administration has highlighted the PRC's recent announcement that 
it intended to sign the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. However, that rationale does not justify the President's latest 
deference to the Beijing dictatorship for three basic reasons.
  First, the Beijing regime regularly ignores its legal promises, 
especially where human rights are concerned. The Constitution of the 
PRC already guarantees freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of 
association, of procession, and of demonstration, as well as the 
freedom of religious belief and the freedom of ethnic minorities such 
as the Tibetans and Uyghurs from discrimination and oppression.
  According to the administration's own reporting, the Beijing regime 
routinely and systematically violates those freedoms.
  In a further example, China signed the U.N. Convention Against 
Torture over a decade ago; but according to the State Department, and 
other sources in human rights organizations, the Chinese government 
continues to use torture against prisoners each and every day. Thus, in 
return for its silence, the United States must demand real 
improvements, not paper promises.
  Second, experience demonstrates that ratification of the 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights does not 
guarantee genuine respect for human rights. Many of the most abusive 
countries on the planet, including Iraq, North Korea, Nigeria, to name 
a few, are parties to that convention.
  Third and most important, by using convention ratification as an 
excuse for the United States' inaction in Geneva, the administration 
has set up an

[[Page H1183]]

explicit double standard benefitting the Beijing regime.
  Yet, last year alone, the administration supported seven U.N. Human 
Rights Commission resolutions concerning other countries that have 
signed the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights: 
Nigeria, Iran, Sudan, Iraq, Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Yugoslavia, and Equatorial Guinea.
  The unprecedented favors shown to the Beijing dictatorship suggest 
that, in reality, the President's latest decision has little to do with 
the convention and everything to do with dollars and cents.
  Wei Jingsheng, Mr. Speaker, the great Chinese democracy advocate and 
former prisoner of conscience, testified before my subcommittee just a 
few weeks ago. He said that a U.N. Human Rights Commission resolution 
at this time is a ``matter of life or death'' for the democratic reform 
in China.
  Last week, in an open letter urging the U.S. to support a China 
resolution in Geneva, he explained that ``the success of the Chinese 
government to silence the world community has serious consequences. It 
is a massive blow to the Chinese people's determination to struggle for 
human rights and democracy. They are left with the feeling that they 
are being betrayed.''
  Mr. Speaker, the President's decision this past weekend was, indeed, 
a betrayal, a betrayal of the countless Chinese, Tibetans, and others 
who suffer under the current regime, and a betrayal of our own 
democratic and humanitarian ideals.
  The United States' support for a U.N. human rights resolution is the 
very least that we can do for the Chinese and the Tibetan peoples. If 
the U.S. will not raise human rights violations in a forum dedicated 
exclusively to human rights concerns, then where will we raise those 
issues and how can we expect tyrants to heed our admonitions in private 
when they know we will lack the will to speak about them in public?

                              {time}  1515

  Notwithstanding his announcement this weekend, Mr. Speaker, I urge 
the President, we urge collectively the President to honor his previous 
pledge to support a China resolution at the U.N. Human Rights 
Commission in Geneva. In the meantime, I urge my colleagues to support 
passage of the resolution.

                               I. Summary

       China appears to be on the verge of ensuring that no 
     attempt is made ever again to censure its human rights 
     practices at the United Nations. It is an extraordinary feat 
     of diplomacy and an equally extraordinary capitulation on the 
     part of governments, particularly the United States and the 
     countries of the European Union, that claim to favor 
     multilateral initiatives as a way of exerting human rights 
     pressure. One of the few remaining international fora to 
     exert such pressure is the annual meeting of the U.N. 
     Commission on Human Rights in Geneva--in session this year 
     from March 10 to April 18--where countries with particularly 
     egregious human rights records can become the subject of 
     resolutions. Every year save one since 1990, the U.S. and the 
     E.U. have taken the lead, with support from Japan and other 
     governments, in sponsoring a resolution on China, and every 
     year save one, China has successfully blocked even debate on 
     the subject. The threat of a resolution, however, has itself 
     been an effective form of pressure, as illustrated by the 
     time and resources China has spent in trying to counter it.
       This report is an analysis of China's diplomatic efforts 
     with respect to key members of the commission over the last 
     three years. It describes a pattern of aggressive lobbying by 
     Chinese officials, using economic and political 
     blandishments, that has worked to undermine the political 
     will in both developed and developing countries to hold 
     Beijing accountable in Geneva, coupled with procrastination 
     and passivity on the part of China's critics, the same 
     governments that have been such vocal proponents of 
     multilateralism.
       The report suggests that countries concerned about human 
     rights in China should put more, not less effort into a 
     carefully constructed resolution at the U.N. Human Rights 
     Commission; that the process of fashioning a resolution and 
     lobbying for its passage is important, whether it ultimately 
     reaches the floor of the commission for debate or not; and 
     that ending all efforts on China at the U.N. Human Rights 
     Commission, as the U.S. and Europe seem to be considering, 
     will be seen in China as a triumph over the West's dominance 
     of international institutions and one that it may want to 
     follow up in fields other than human rights.
       As this report went to press, the U.S. and the E.U. were 
     involved in diplomatic negotiations with China on a possible 
     package of limited steps or promises in exchange for dropping 
     a resolution this year and in subsequent years. The U.S. in 
     particular, seemed poised to accept any last-minute gestures 
     that China might make during Vice President Albert Gore's 
     trip to China in late March, midway through the commission's 
     deliberations. But the prospect of obtaining truly meaningful 
     improvements from Beijing on human rights would have been far 
     higher had there been a real threat of a coordinated, high-
     level lobbying effort behind a resolution in Geneva, the work 
     on which would have had to have begun in September or October 
     1996. For the U.S. and E.U. to suggest at this late date that 
     a resolution cannot pass is a prophecy they have done their 
     utmost to make self-fulfilling.


                               background

       A resolution on China at the commission is a curiously 
     potent tool for raising human rights issues, given that it is 
     an unenforceable statement that carries no penalties or 
     obligations. But as the product of the U.N., it has major 
     implications for a country's international image, and even to 
     table a resolution for discussion is considered by many 
     countries, China among them, as a major loss of face. But 
     China considers the U.N. Human Rights Commission an important 
     forum for other reasons as well, including as a vehicle for 
     countering Western ``hegemonism,'' particularly through 
     alliances with governments in Asia, Africa and Latin America. 
     During the 1996 session of the commission, Chinese diplomats 
     made clear that they saw an attempt to seek a resolution on 
     China as an example of this hegemonism, arguing that the 
     North used the commission as a one-way forum through which to 
     confront, judge, and interfere in the internal affairs of 
     developing countries while ignoring abuses in the U.S. and 
     Europe, and that the commission paid too much attention to 
     political and civil rights while neglecting economic, social, 
     and cultural rights and the right to development.\1\ In 
     addition to its value to China as a forum to challenge the 
     West, the commission has also become a useful vehicle to 
     play the U.S. off against its erstwhile European allies.
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     Footnotes appear at end of report.
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       Interest in using the U.N. Human Rights Commission as a 
     forum for criticizing China only emerged after the crackdown 
     in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Beginning in 1990, the annual 
     Geneva meetings were marked by efforts to table mildly worded 
     resolutions urging China to improve its human rights 
     practices and criticizing ongoing violations of international 
     standards. These efforts were defeated before the resolutions 
     could come up for debate by ``no-action'' motions brought by 
     one of China's friends on the commission--Pakistan could be 
     counted on in this regard. A ``no-action'' motion, if passed, 
     meant that the resolution died a quick death before ever 
     coming to debate and vote.
       In March 1995, however, the ``no-action'' motion failed for 
     the first time. China's human rights record was debated, and 
     a resolution sponsored by the U.S. and the European Union 
     lost by only one vote when Russia unexpectedly cast its vote 
     in opposition. It was the closest China had ever come to 
     defeat. In April 1996, by contrast, China again successfully 
     blocked a resolution through the ``no-action'' procedure, by 
     a vote of twenty-seven to twenty with six abstentions. In the 
     year that elapsed between the two meetings, China's human 
     rights record had worsened, but its lobbying had improved and 
     the political will of its critics had weakened.
       Visits between China and commission members between April 
     1996 and March 1997 resulted in more aid packages, new and 
     expanded trade contracts including foreign investment and 
     joint ventures, and promises of improved bilateral 
     cooperation on projects ranging from agriculture to nuclear 
     technology. While it is impossible to definitively document 
     the direct relationship between each visit or aid package and 
     the votes of individual commission members, an overall 
     pattern emerged that may help to explain China's success at 
     muzzling the commission. Clearly, in many countries, much 
     more was at stake than a Geneva vote, as Beijing sought to 
     boost its long-term political and economic relationships and 
     to weaken Taiwan's ties with some capitals. But a major 
     objective during this period was also to defeat the annual 
     Geneva effort.
       In 1995 and in 1996, the importance of the outcome in 
     Geneva was clearly reflected in official statements. At the 
     conclusion of the 1995 voting, a foreign ministry spokesman 
     speaking on state radio ``expressed its [the Chinese 
     government's] admiration and gratitude to those countries 
     that supported China,'' and China's ambassador to the U.N. in 
     Geneva said the resolution was ``entirely a product of 
     political confrontation practiced by the West with ulterior 
     motives.'' \2\ After the 1996 vote, an article by the 
     official Chinese news agency Xinhau, entitled ``Failure of 
     Human Rights Resolution Hailed,'' gloated that the commission 
     ``has again shot down a draft resolution against China, 
     marking another failure by the West to use human rights to 
     interfere in China's internal affairs. . . .'' \3\
       From China's perspective, there were two relatively 
     balanced voting blocs on the commission, and a number of 
     crucial swing votes.\4\ One bloc consisted of Asian and 
     African states. The second was composed of western Europe and 
     North and Central America. The swing votes were to be found

[[Page H1184]]

     among some of the new democracies of central Europe, the 
     former Soviet republics, large Latin American countries and a 
     handful of African and Asian nations. China courted them all 
     and pursued its efforts to divide Europe and the United 
     States.

              II. The European Union and the United States

       In 1995, the year the resolution lost by one vote, the U.S. 
     and E.U., which together with Japan were the resolution's co-
     sponsors, began efforts to get other countries on board as 
     early as December 1994, when then U.S. National Security 
     Adviser Anthony Lake went to Zimbabwe, Gabon and Ethiopia. 
     The Geneva resolution was one of the issues on his agenda. 
     Geraldine Ferraro, then head of the U.S. delegation to the 
     commission, made calls to Latin American capitals.
       After that close call, Chinese diplomats and government 
     officials seemed to intensify their efforts to underscore 
     that good economic relations with the world's largest country 
     would be fostered by decreasing pressure on human rights. 
     Overt Chinese pressure, of course, was not always needed: 
     European leaders were well aware that the competitive edge 
     with the Americans could be widened if human rights criticism 
     was left to the latter, especially when the U.S. was already 
     preoccupied with a struggle with China over intellectual 
     property rights and the annual debate over Most Favored 
     Nation status.
       The first attempts to derail a resolution on China at the 
     1996 U.N. Human Rights Commission session took place in 
     Bangkok on March 1 and 2, 1996 when Chinese Premier Li Peng 
     met with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President 
     Jacques Chirac at the E.U.-Asia summit. With a US$2.1 billion 
     Airbus contract hanging in the balance and a visit to France 
     by Li Peng set for April, France took the lead in trying to 
     work out a deal whereby in exchange for a few concessions 
     from China, the E.U. and the U.S. would agree to drop the 
     resolution. The nature of the proposed concessions was never 
     made public but was rumored to include an agreement by China 
     to sign and ratify the two major international human rights 
     treaties, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
     Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
     Cultural Rights: the release of some political prisoners; and 
     an invitation to U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Jose 
     Ayala Lasso, to visit China. Ratification without 
     reservations would indeed have been a useful step, but when 
     pressed to give a timetable for ratification, Beijing 
     reportedly backed off, and the deal fell through. Italy--then 
     in the presidency of the E.U.--was said to be leaning to the 
     French deal, as was Germany, which with bilateral trade of 
     $18 billion, was China's largest trading partner in Europe 
     and one of Europe's top investors in China. The Europeans did 
     not come on board until ten days after the commission session 
     opened, and then only reluctantly.
       The resolution was doomed by a failure of will on the 
     American side as well. The United States was no more eager 
     than its European counterparts to earn China's opprobrium by 
     sponsoring a resolution, and, according to one source, a 
     deliberate decision was made within the Clinton 
     administration sometime in December 1995 to give the 
     resolution less attention that the year before, with the 
     result that lobbying was late, desultory and ultimately 
     unsuccessful.
       Despite appeals on human rights in China and Tibet signed 
     by over 200 French legislators and scattered protests, Li 
     Peng's visit to Paris from April 9-13, just before the 
     commission vote, was hailed by Beijing as marking a 
     ``watershed'' in its ties with France. Li Peng took the 
     opportunity to finalize the Airbus sale in what appeared to 
     be a deliberate slight to the U.S. government and the 
     American company Boeing, hitherto the largest supplier of 
     aircraft to China. In one reporter's words. China preferred 
     to deal with countries that ``don't lecture China about human 
     rights, don't threaten sanctions for the piracy of music, 
     videos and software and don't send their warships patrolling 
     the Taiwan Straits.'' \5\
       Li Peng's trip to Europe was followed in July 1996 by a 
     six-nation swing by President Jiang Zemin through Europe and 
     Asia, aimed at closing business deals and enhancing Jiang 
     Zemin's international standing. An important side-effect, if 
     not a deliberate objective of these visits, was to erode the 
     willingness of some European countries to confront Beijing in 
     Geneva. The trip came on the heels of a Chinese threat to 
     impose economic sanctions on Germany in retaliation for a 
     conference on Tibet. The conference was sponsored by the 
     Friedrich Naumann Foundation, closely linked to 
     Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel's Free Democratic Party, and 
     was to be held in Germany in June in cooperation with the 
     Dalai Lama's government-in-exile. The row started over the 
     German government' proposal to provide a subsidy for the 
     conference. Under pressure, government funding was 
     withdrawn, but the conference went ahead with the support 
     of German politicians from all parties. The Chinese 
     government then forced the closure of the foundation's 
     Beijing office. In retaliation, German politicians 
     introduced a motion in the Bundestag criticizing China's 
     human rights record. China then withdrew an invitation to 
     German Foreign Minister Kinkel to visit Beijing.
       When Beijing further warned that German business interests 
     in China could suffer, Bonn quickly scrambled to restore good 
     relations. In September the invitation was renewed, and 
     Kinkel went the following month. He did raise the cases of 
     political prisoners Wang Dan and Wei Jingsheng, but the real 
     story was that commercial relations with Germany were back on 
     track, for in November in Beijing, President Jiang and German 
     President Roman Herzog signed four agreements on financial 
     and technological cooperation. The last quarter of 1996 saw 
     multimillion dollar deals signed between China and Germany 
     companies, including a joint venture by Mercedes Benz in 
     Jiangsu province to produce buses; a joint venture by Kogel 
     Trailer to produce specialized auto vehicles; a joint venture 
     by Bayer AC and Shanghai Coating Company to produce iron 
     oxide pigments; and a US$6 billion investment in a 
     petrochemical plant by German chemical company BASF.
       China also wooed other European countries. In June, Chen 
     Jinhua, head of China's State Planning Commission, visited 
     Italy. In Milan, he held meeting with leading Italian 
     financial and business interests, discussing how China's 
     ninth five-year plan would lead to the continued open up of 
     the economy to the outside world. Stressing the growth of 
     bilateral trade, which stood at a record US$ 5.18 billion in 
     1995, he noted China's potential as a huge market with 
     possibilities for increased Sino-Italian cooperation. In 
     September, Li Peng went to the Hague, just as the Netherlands 
     was poised to take over leadership of the E.U.; in October 
     Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini led a group of Italian 
     businessmen to Beijing on a ``good will'' visit; and in 
     November, Li Peng was back in Europe on a visit to Rome, 
     where he and his Italian counterpart pledged to encourage 
     Sino-Italian economic and trade ties.
       Britian also worked to bolster its trade with China. When 
     Trade and Industry Secretary Ian Lang met with Minister of 
     Foreign Trade and Economic Development Wu Yi in Beijing in 
     September 1996, they agreed to set up working groups in the 
     chemical industry, aeronautics, and energy. In October, Li 
     Lanqing, a vice-premier and vice-chair of the State Council 
     (the equivalent of China's cabinet), traveled to London to 
     meet with Deputy Prime Minister Michael Heseltine, and in 
     November, the two countries signed a Memorandum of 
     Understanding on forming a Sino-U.K. Aerospace Equipment 
     Working Group to promote commercial and technical cooperation 
     in civil aviation.

                           III. Latin America

       Latin America was clearly a priority region for China if it 
     was to defeat a resolution at the 1996 commission session. 
     Next to Europe and North America, it was most likely to vote 
     against China. In some cases, this was due to history of 
     susceptibility to U.S. influence, in others to a democratic 
     transition from an abusive authoritarian past that made the 
     new democracies important allies in efforts to censure grave 
     abuses wherever they occurred. Many Latin American countries, 
     including Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Argentina, Peru and 
     Venezuela, also had serious strains in their bilateral 
     relations with China because of textile and garment 
     ``dumping'' by the latter. Of all the countries in the 
     region, only Cuba and Peru consistently voted with China in 
     1995 and 1996, Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela abstained in 
     both years.
       Top Chinese government and Party officials increased the 
     exchange of visits with Latin America leaders after the near 
     success of the 1995 resolution. In October 1995, Premier Li 
     Peng went to Mexico and Peru, signing trade and cooperation 
     agreements with both governments. Peru had abstained from all 
     China votes at the commission until 1995 when it voted in 
     favor of the no-action motion. As if to reinforce the 
     relationship, Luo Gan, secretary-general of the State 
     Council, went to Peru in March 1996 with the commission 
     already in session and pledged US$350,000 in aid and a loan  
     of US$70 million to be used toward China-Peru trade. The 
     sums were small, but the symbolism of South-South aid was 
     important. Peru again voted with China at the commission 
     in 1996. That August, the speaker of the Peruvian 
     parliament, visiting Beijing, said pointedly in the 
     context of a discussion on human rights that his country 
     did not interfere with China's internal affairs. High-
     level exchanges also took place in 1995 with Brazil, 
     Chile, and Cuba.\6\
       In June 1996, following the April vote in the Human Rights 
     Commission, Wu Yi went on a month-long tour of seven Latin 
     American countries, Argentina, Cuba, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay 
     and Chile, all but Peru to be members of the commission for 
     the coming year. In November 1996, Li Peng went back to Latin 
     America, visiting two members of the commission whose voting 
     records had been inconsistent, Brazil and Chile. Brazil was 
     key. Until 1996, it had abstained on all votes on China, in 
     April 1996, it voted against China's efforts to stop action 
     on a resolution. Li Peng's delegation specifically raised the 
     issue during the visit expressing unhappiness with the 
     Brazilian vote, and officials at the Brazilian Ministry of 
     Foreign Relations reportedly discussed the possibility of 
     abstaining on a no-action motion in 1997. The Chinese 
     premier's visit produced agreement on a consulate in Hong 
     Kong after July 1, 1997, on peaceful use of space technology 
     and on sustainable development initiatives. Trade issues were 
     also on the agenda.
       Chile had voted with China in 1992, then abstained on all 
     votes until 1996 when it joined Brazil to vote against 
     China's efforts

[[Page H1185]]

     to stop debate. During his November visit, Li Peng announced 
     tariff reductions of more than 10 percent on Chilean 
     agricultural goods and signed agreements on scientific and 
     technological cooperation in agricultural and aerospace. As 
     with Peru, the substance of the agreements between Chile and 
     China was less important than the political symbolism of Li 
     Peng's visit, and as with Brazil, the Geneva vote was almost 
     certainly on the agenda.
       The presidents of Ecuador and Mexico and the foreign 
     minister of Uruguay all visited Beijing between May and 
     December 1996.\7\ Closer ties between China and Latin 
     America, as indicated by high-level exchanges, underscored 
     the fact that sponsors of a resolution critical of China 
     could not take the votes of Latin American members of the 
     commission for granted. They would have to undertake some 
     sustained lobbying, and apparently they did not.

                               IV. Africa

       If the U.S. and Europe and other sponsors of a resolution 
     were serious about a multilateral initiative to exert 
     pressure on China, it was essential that they bring some 
     African members of the commission on board. Admittedly, it 
     would not have been an easy task, given Chinese diplomatic 
     initiatives and interests in the region, but save for some 
     modest measures in 1994 like U.S. National Security Adviser 
     Anthony Lake's discussions (see above), the sponsors put 
     little energy into finding support from African governments.
       China, on the other hand, was energetic. Since the end of 
     the Cold War, it has seen African countries as critically 
     important allies, particularly in the United Nations, in the 
     struggle against American ``hegemonism.''\8\ With its 
     history of colonialism and the fact that for the North, it 
     had become the ``forgotten continent,'' Africa has been 
     viewed as a desirable partner in China's efforts to 
     ``bypass'' the United States.\9\ In addition, China had a 
     strong interest in stepping up its diplomacy in the region 
     to counter Taiwan's aggressive campaign to expand ties 
     with some African states.
       China embarked on a concerted diplomatic campaign in Africa 
     in mid-1995. Although the main objective may have been to 
     blunt Taiwan's influence, it may not be coincidental that the 
     campaign began after China lost a no-action motion and nearly 
     lost the resolution in Geneva in March 1995, or that the 
     countries singled out in this campaign were also for the most 
     part members of the commission.
       In October-November 1995, well before the 1996 session of 
     the commission convened, Li Lanqing traveled to six central 
     and western African countries: Mali, Guinea, Senegal, Gabon, 
     Cameroon and Cote d'Ivoire. Of these, all but Senegal were 
     members of the commission. In November, Quao Shi, a leading 
     member of the Central Committee and chairman of Standing 
     Committee of China's National people's Congress (China's 
     parliament), went to Egypt, another key member of the 
     commission. All the countries included in these two visits 
     voted with China in the April 1996 ``no-action'' motion.
       By contrast, from September 1995 to March 1996 there were 
     few high-level exchanges between the U.S. and African members 
     of the commission, and when they took place, China was not on 
     the agenda. Angolan president Dos Santos made a state visit 
     to Washington, D.C. on December 8, 1995, for example, but 
     amid the many issues on the U.S.-Angolan agenda, support for 
     a critical position in the U.N. toward China's human rights 
     practices was reportedly not one Madeleine Albright, then 
     U.S. ambassador to the U.N. visited Angola in January 1996, 
     but apparently made no effort to press for Angola's support 
     at the Human Rights Commission. Angola ranks fourth among 
     China's African trading partners and has consistently voted 
     with China at the Human Rights Commission. If the U.S. was 
     serious about generating international pressure on China 
     through the U.N., its officials would have seen the visits by 
     its officials as an opportunity to put multilateralism into 
     practice and raise the issue of a resolution in Geneva.
       Ethiopia, a key member of the commission, exchanged visits 
     with European and American officials, with development 
     assistance and security the main issues at stake. German 
     President Herzog visited Ethiopia in January 1996, during 
     which he signed an aid agreement for the purchase and 
     transport of fertilizers, and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi 
     spent two days in Paris, meeting with the French prime 
     minister and with President Chirac. In neither case was there 
     any indication that the China vote was on the agenda, and a 
     source close to the U.S. delegation to Geneva told Human 
     Rights Watch that no attempt was made to lobby Ethiopia for 
     its vote.
       China appeared to have stepped up its efforts to ensure a 
     similar victory in the 1997 session. Following the end of the 
     1996 commission meeting in April, all fifteen African members 
     of the commission sent or received high-ranking visitors from 
     China. In May 1996, according to Chinese reports, President 
     Jiang himself ``crossed a thousand mountains and rivers to 
     enhance friendship, deepen unity, and learn from the African 
     people.'' visiting a total of six countries as he covered the 
     continent ``from North to South, from east to West.'' Of the 
     six countries, four, Ethiopia, Egypt, Mali an Zimbabwe, were 
     members or about to become members of the commission. At a 
     meeting of the Organization of African States, Jiang stressed 
     that China would be an ally in Africa's drive to develop; 
     and, in fact, over twenty-three agreements and protocols on 
     Sino-African cooperation were signed in May alone. They 
     primarily provided for basic construction projects in 
     transport and energy.\10\
       During meetings in Beijing in May 1996, two days before he 
     left for his African tour, President Jiang pledged economic 
     and military support for Mozambique, which rotated on to the 
     commission in time for the 1997 session, at the same time, 
     Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian discussed details of the 
     bilateral ties between the two nations' militaries and 
     provided Mozambique with quantities of new weapons. Sino-
     Mozambiquan relations went into a tailspin in 1996 when China 
     abruptly pulled out of an agreement to build a new 
     parliament building. The visit in May was an effort to 
     repair relations but it could also help produce a pro-
     China vote in the commission this March.
       Jiang Zemin was present in Zimbabwe in May 1996 when 
     Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Wu Yi 
     signed agreements for US$10 million in grants and an 
     additional US$10 million in loans, as well as other 
     agreements on trade, reciprocal protection of investment and 
     technological and economic cooperation. Earlier an 
     agricultural group from China studied the possibilities of 
     importing cotton and tobacco from Zimbabwe. In 1995, the 
     first time Zimbabwe voted on a China resolution in Geneva, it 
     voted for the no-action motion and against the China 
     resolution; in 1996 it again voted in favor of no action on 
     China.
       Following Jiang Zemin's May 1996 visit to Mali, China 
     signed agreements on economic and technological cooperation 
     during meetings in Beijing between Premier Li Peng and Mali's 
     president, and the Chinese vice-minister of agriculture 
     signed an agreement to assist Mali in building a number of 
     factories. In 1996, when Mali voted on the China question for 
     the first time, it voted in favor of the no-action motion.
       Jiang Zemin also traveled to Ethiopia in May on a good will 
     visit during which four cooperation agreements were signed. 
     China-Ethiopian economic relations have been minimal compared 
     with China's relationships with other African countries. 
     Before Jiang's visit, Chinese journalists made much of an 
     Ethiopian irrigation project completed with help from thirty-
     eight Chinese experts. In 1990, Ethiopia voted for a no-
     action motion and then went off the commission until 1995, 
     when it voted in favor of the no-action motion but abstained 
     when the resolution itself was voted on. In 1996 it again 
     voted in favor of no action.
       Algeria was already considered in the China camp. Jiang 
     Zemin and the president of Algeria met in Beijing in October 
     to discuss bilateral relations and to sign six documents 
     including one protecting and encouraging reciprocal 
     investment. Algeria has had a strong and continuous 
     relationship with China which helped with a heavy water 
     research reactor, and has been involved in irrigation, 
     agricultural, and research projects including a three-star 
     hotel in Algiers. In January 1997, Foreign Minister Qian 
     Qichen paid a quick visit to Algeria, meeting with the 
     foreign minister to discuss strengthening bilateral 
     cooperation.
       Uganda became a member of the commission in time to vote 
     with China on the 1996 no-action motion. While the commission 
     was still meeting in April 1996, Li Zhaoxin, China's vice-
     minister of foreign affairs, agreed to provide US$3.6 million 
     to cover the costs of a national stadium. In January 1997, at 
     the request of the Ugandan government, China agreed to send 
     technical personnel for two years to provide guidance in 
     connection with the stadium project.
       Li Peng and the president of Gabon, meeting in Beijing in 
     August 1996, stressed the importance of their relationship 
     and their support for the rights of developing nations. Gabon 
     abstained in 1992 on a no-action motion but has since voted 
     solidly in the Chinese camp.
       When Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Tian Zengpei met with 
     the Guinean Foreign Affairs Minister in Guinea in April while 
     the commission meeting was still in session, he thanked him 
     for Guinea's support on the human rights issue. Guinea, a new 
     member of the commission as of the 1996 session, voted for no 
     action on the China resolution.
       During a visit to South Africa, China's largest trading 
     partner in Africa, in May 1996, Wu Yi negotiated promises of 
     expanded trade ties and reciprocal ``most favored nation 
     trading status.'' The importance of China to South Africa's 
     economy was underscored in December 1996 when President 
     Nelson Mandela abruptly abandoned diplomatic support for 
     Taiwan and recognized Beijing as the sole representative of 
     China.
       Buhe, the vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the 
     National People's Congress paid a goodwill visit to Benin in 
     December 1996. Although Benin had voted with China in 1996, 
     it abstained on both the no-action motion and the resolution 
     itself in 1995.
       Both the timing and the high-profile nature of most of 
     these exchanges highlight the likely difficulties of getting 
     African countries to abstain on a China resolution, let alone 
     vote in favor, in 1997. If the U.S. and Europe had been 
     committed to seeing a resolution pass, both would have had to 
     have engaged in intensive lobbying beginning in late 1996.

                     V. Central and Eastern Europe

       After March 1995, high-level Chinese officials logged 
     considerate mileage traveling to

[[Page H1186]]

     the Russian Federation and to two former Soviet republics, 
     Belarus and the Ukraine. All three countries were to be 1996 
     commission members. Belarus for the first time, and the 
     Ukraine for the first time since 1990.
       In 1995, after Russia helped to defeat a no-action motion, 
     its delegates switched their vote and the resolution itself 
     failed as a result. It seemed logical in 1996, that if China 
     were to avoid another near embarrassment, it would have to 
     guarantee Russia's vote on the no-action motion itself. Not 
     since 1990 had Russia voted to send a resolution to the 
     floor. Furthermore, it was generally agreed that the 
     Belarussian president, anxious for reunification with Russia, 
     would vote with Russia. Of course China had other political 
     and economic stakes in its relations with Central and Eastern 
     Europe that may have been the driving force behind much of 
     the activity outlined below; but with the Geneva vote so 
     important to Beijing, lining up commission members was a 
     likely factor.
       In June 1995, Li Peng visited all three states. During his 
     visit to Belarus, there was agreement on bilateral 
     cooperation in trade, science, technology, manufacturing, and 
     agriculture. In the Ukraine, he signed a note worth 8.5 
     million renminbi (approximately US$1.7 million) in economic 
     assistance. In August, as a follow-up to the June visits, the 
     vice-minister of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
     Cooperation (MOFTEC) led a trade delegation to the region.
       The direction of the visits reversed in September when the 
     vice-prime minister of Russia went to Beijing, followed in 
     November by a vice-minister from the Belarussian Ministry of 
     Foreign Economic Relations, and in December by the Ukrainian 
     president. During a meeting with Jiang Zemin, the two signed 
     a joint communique furthering bilateral economic and 
     political cooperation. In April 1996 while the Human Rights 
     Commission was in session, Qiao Shi, chairman of Standing 
     Committee on China's National People's Congress (parliament), 
     traveled to Moscow to meet with top Russian officials in 
     preparation for meetings later in the month with three 
     central Asian republics. That same month, China exchanged 
     ministerial visits with both Belarus and the Ukraine. At the 
     invitation of Qian Qichen, the Belarussian foreign minister 
     traveled to Beijing. During a meeting with Li Peng, he 
     thanked him for China's support of Belarus on international 
     issues and described as ``encouraging'' the 60 percent growth 
     in bilateral trade in 1995. Qiao Shi traveled to the Ukraine 
     for a four-day visit aimed at expanding cooperation between 
     the two countries. Shipbuilding, aircraft manufacturing and 
     instrument products were cited as industries for cooperation.
       In the wake of all this activity, Russia abstained and 
     Belarus and Ukraine voted with China in favor of no action on 
     the resolution at the 1996 commission session. Two days after 
     the vote, President Boris Yeltsin was warmly welcomed in 
     Beijing by Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, and Qiao Shi. The major 
     accomplishments of the meetings included an agreement signed 
     by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan 
     strengthening border confidence, a Sino-Russian joint 
     communique to serve as ``the principled basis for the two 
     countries' constructive partnership during the 21st century'' 
     \11\ and a dozen cooperation agreements, including ones on 
     intellectual property rights, cooperation on the peaceful use 
     of nuclear energy, and development for mutual prosperity. In 
     addition, representatives from both countries 
     discussed cooperation on military technologies. By 
     December 1996, when Li Peng visited Moscow, plans were 
     being laid for an April 1997 summit on security. At the 
     same time, Russia agreed to lend China US$2.5 billion for 
     nuclear power plant construction and to sell arms to 
     Beijing. And Li and Viktor Chernomyrdin discussed raising 
     bilateral trade volume and cooperation on large-scale 
     projects.
       In November, the Belarussian president told Li Lanqing 
     during his visit to Minsk that improving Belarus-Chinese 
     relations was of strategic importance to Belarus, adding that 
     he attached great importance to developing bilateral trade 
     and that he welcomed Chinese entrepreneurs willing to invest 
     in Belarus. The following month, the acting prime minister of 
     Belarus attended a signing ceremony in Beijing for agreements 
     on educational cooperation and on ensuring the quality of 
     exported and imported goods.
       A well-documented effort by the Chinese government to gain 
     support in the commission from central European countries 
     began before the 1994 vote. Poland, to the surprise of 
     delegation members themselves, members of Parliament, and 
     local human rights groups, abstained from voting on the no-
     action resolution instead of voting against it as it had the 
     year before. Instructions from the Polish Ministry of Foreign 
     Affairs had arrived just before the actual vote took place. 
     China had reportedly agreed to support Poland's effort to 
     gain a seat in the Security Council in exchange for the 
     abstention. A representative of the ministry later explained 
     to the Polish parliament that the vote had come about as a 
     result of a ``mistake'' by a junior official.
       In 1995, Li Peng wrote to Polish Prime Minister Pawlak to 
     thank him for his support in Geneva in 1994 and asked for 
     ``even more substantial support in 1995.'' The offer to 
     promote a Security Council seat was reiterated. After the 
     main Warsaw newspaper publicized the ``vote trade'' and media 
     pressure mounted, Poland's vote against the no-action 
     resolution helped to defeat it.
       Two other Central European countries on the 1997 commission 
     have received more attention from the U.S. and Europe than 
     from China, and the commission votes may reflect this. With 
     the exception of 1992 when it abstained, Bulgaria has voted 
     against China in the no-action motion, and the Czech 
     Republic, back on the commission after a hiatus of three 
     years, would be unlikely to succumb to Chinese pressure.

                                VI. Asia

       Most Asian countries were already voting solidly with 
     China. In 1995 and 1996, the only countries that did not were 
     the three Asian democracies, Japan, the Philippines and 
     Korea. Japan has consistently voted in favor of a resolution; 
     the Republic of Korea has consistently abstained; and the 
     Philippines, which voted with China in 1992 before going off 
     the commission for two years, voted against China in 1995 
     after a territorial dispute with China flared up in the South 
     China Sea. In 1996, Korea and the Philippines abstained; both 
     were considered swing votes for 1997.
       Korea, which resumed diplomatic relations with China in 
     1992, has heavy economic stakes in China. The chaebol or 
     conglomerate Goldstar is expected to invest US$10 billion in 
     China by the year 2005, and Daewoo is planning to contribute 
     960 million renminbi (approximately US$120 million) to the 
     building of an expressway. Daewoo will participate in the 
     operation of the road for thirty years, after which it will 
     belong to Huangshan City, its Chinese partner. During Jiang 
     Zemin's visit to the Philippines in November 1996, China 
     promised to build two power plants and pledged bilateral 
     cooperation.
       Other important efforts in Asia included Jiang Zemin's 
     November-December 1996 goodwill tour South Asia with stops in 
     India, Pakistan, and Nepal.
       India has consistently voted with China, a reflection 
     perhaps of its own rejection of external human rights 
     pressure, especially on the sensitive issue of Kashmir. Sino-
     Indian relations, however, have also steadily improved since 
     the collapse of the Soviet Union. Foreign Minister Qian 
     Qichen accompanied President Jiang to India in November 
     1996 to promote bilateral relations in politics, trade, 
     economy, and culture. The primary issue among the two 
     regional powers was security, and an agreement was reached 
     on military zones on the Sino-Indian border.
       While in Nepal in early December 1996 to mark the twenty-
     fifth anniversary of King Birendra's ascension to the throne 
     of Nepal, Jiang Zemin witnessed the signing of a grant of 
     economic and technical assistance.
       In his December swing through Pakistan, a traditional ally 
     and leader of the efforts in the commission to prevent a 
     resolution on China from coming up for debate, Jiang Zemin 
     oversaw the signing of agreements on construction of a 
     hydroelectric power plan, environmental protection, drug 
     trafficking, and establishment of consulates, including 
     maintenance of Pakistan's consulate in Hong Kong. Pakistani 
     President Farooq Leghari noted that there was no difference 
     between Pakistan and China on Tibet, and Pakistan 
     ``completely supports China.'' He also stated how happy he 
     was that China would resume sovereignty over Hong Kong ``and 
     hoped for a peaceful joining of Taiwan with China as soon as 
     possible.'' \12\

                         VII. Waffling in 1997

       It was clear by November 1996 that sponsorship of a 
     resolution on China at the 1997 U.N. Human Rights Commission 
     was in for a rough ride. On November 24, at a debriefing 
     following President Clinton's meeting with Jiang Zemin at the 
     Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Manila, a 
     senior administration official said that ``the president said 
     that we want to maintain dialogue and cooperate on [human 
     rights], but on the present record we could not forgo 
     presenting [. . .] a resolution.'' The implication was clear: 
     any nominal gesture or open-ended promise on China's part 
     that could be interpreted as progress on human rights might 
     be enough to derail a resolution.
       The European Union played a similar game of delaying a 
     decision on the resolution by bouncing consideration of the 
     question from one E.U. body to another. When the E.U. Human 
     Rights Working Group (HRWG) could not reach a decision on 
     what to do about a resolution at its meeting on December 13, 
     1996, further consideration was delayed almost a month until 
     January 10 when the Political Affairs Working Group, with 
     representatives from all fifteen E.U. capitals, met in 
     Brussels. The meeting decided to refer the issue back to the 
     HRWG despite the fact that a straw poll of political 
     directors had found an overwhelming majority in favor of a 
     resolution and the HRWG had recommended that the E.U. move 
     quickly. Rather than taking a firm decision to exert pressure 
     through a resolution, the political affairs meeting discussed 
     a variety of ways of avoiding confrontation at the 
     commission, including pushing for consensus rather than 
     majority vote on resolutions and substitution of 
     investigations by the U.N. thematic mechanisms for commission 
     resolutions.\13\ Just as the HRWG was about to meet on 
     January 23, China suddenly proposed a human rights discussion 
     on February 14 around the edges of the Asia-Europe (ASEM) 
     foreign ministers' meeting in Singapore, providing some E.U. 
     countries with a pretext for delaying a decision once 
     more. (For months, the E.U. had been unsuccessful in 
     trying to schedule a formal E.U.-China human rights 
     dialogue, originally scheduled for October

[[Page H1187]]

     1996). But China offered no human rights concessions or 
     gestures during the meeting, according to diplomatic 
     sources.
       The U.S. also refused to commit itself to the one 
     multilateral initiative that might have exerted real pressure 
     on China, with officials reiterating that Sino-U.S. relations 
     could not be ``held hostage'' to human rights concerns and 
     that a decision about sponsorship would be made ``when the 
     time came.'' During the U.S. Senate hearing on January 8, 
     1997 to confirm Madeleine Albright as secretary of state, 
     Albright went so far as to imply that China's previous record 
     was of no import, what counted was ``in the remaining weeks'' 
     how China ``approach[ed] that situation'' and whether any 
     changes took place. Different administration officials gave 
     the same message: the U.S. position would be determined based 
     on China's actions between ``now''--and ``now'' became later 
     and later--and the time of the commission vote. A week after 
     Albright's confirmation hearing, the Chinese government 
     warned of complications in the bilateral relationship if the 
     U.S. pressed on rights issues.\14\ No concrete promises or 
     assurances resulted from a visit to Beijing on January 30-31 
     by a low-level delegation from the National Security Council 
     and the State Department, aimed at exploring the 
     possibilities for a human rights breakthrough.
       On January 21, the Clinton administration moved to ensure 
     consistency in the U.S.-E.U. position. A diplomatic demarche 
     circulated to E.U. members in Brussels stated that ``we are 
     continuing to talk with the Chinese about what meaningful 
     concrete steps they might take to avoid confrontation in 
     Geneva,'' and it suggested that to make compliance easier, 
     the E.U. ask China for the same minimal concessions: releases 
     of prisoners with medical problems, resumption of discussions 
     on prison visits, and signing and submitting to the National 
     People's Congress for ratification the International Covenant 
     on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant 
     on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The U.S. did state 
     its willingness to cosponsor a resolution if China's 
     performance did not improve but did not set a time frame or 
     deadline for making a formal decision. President Clinton 
     himself went further, stating at his January 24 press 
     conference that there was no need to press China on human 
     rights because the current government would, like the Berlin 
     Wall, eventually fall.\15\
       Six days later, the Clinton administration was back to 
     justify no decision in terms of seeking improvements. On 
     January 30, Secretary Albright relayed that message when she 
     met in Washington with Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van Micrlo 
     and Sir Leon Britian, vice-president of the European 
     Commission and a strong supporter of commercial 
     diplomacy.\16\ Given the deterioration of human rights in 
     China across the board over the past year, however, trying to 
     seek ``improvements'' in the few months before the commission 
     meetings began was disingenuous at best.
       Secretary Albright's visit to Beijing on February 24--just 
     prior to Deng Xiaoping's funeral--provided another 
     opportunity to avoid a resolution, pending the outcome of her 
     high-level discussions with Jiang Zemin, Li Peng and other 
     senior officials. A report in the New York Times, published 
     the day she arrived in Beijing, outlined the possible 
     elements of a deal, although the administration vehemently 
     denied the story's suggestion that a bargain was imminent, it 
     did not dispute the other details.\17\ Albright left Beijing, 
     empty-handed but noting that breakthroughs before had not 
     come during high-level visits but often several weeks or 
     months afterwards, so as not to give the impression that 
     foreign pressure had been involved.
       Three days after her visit, however, a Chinese Foreign 
     Ministry spokesman announced that China was giving ``positive 
     consideration'' to signing the two major international human 
     rights agreements, the International Covenant on Civil and 
     Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, 
     Social and Cultural Rights. However, he went on to say, ``as 
     to when we would join, that is entirely our own affair.'' It 
     is worth noting that in November 1993, China had announced 
     that it was giving ``positive consideration'' to access to 
     its prisons by the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
     not long afterwards, negotiations with the ICRC came to a 
     standstill.
       But two days after the February 27 statement on the 
     covenants, China announced that it had agreed to ``resume our 
     contact [with the ICRC] after a two-year hiatus.'' \18\ An 
     ICRC spokesman noted that these were ``talks about talks to 
     begin talks.'' The only element of a deal that had not been 
     announced by China by the end of February, then, was the 
     release of key dissidents.
       It was left to Vice President Gore to try to close any deal 
     during his late March visit. Meanwhile the E.U. had met in 
     Brussels on February 24 and decided to put off any decision 
     on a resolution, waiting instead for the outcome of 
     Albright's trip. Immediately following Gore's visit, 
     Australian Prime Minister John Howard is due in Beijing, as 
     are Canada's foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy (in April), and 
     French President Jacque Chirac (in May).
       While the E.U. and the U.S. were procrastinating, the U.N. 
     High Commissioner for Human Rights Jose Ayala Lasso announced 
     on February 10, before the sudden announcement of his 
     resignation, that he had received and accepted in principle 
     an invitation from China to visit. The timing of the 
     invitation was clearly an effort to try to undermine the 
     already dim prospects for a successful resolution by 
     demonstrating China's openness to cooperation on human rights 
     with the U.N.

                            VIII. Conclusion

       For the last two years, the diplomacy surrounding a China 
     resolution at the U.N. Human Rights Commission has been 
     marked by a sorry lack of will and outright hypocrisy on the 
     part of those countries that purport to defend human rights. 
     The U.S. and E.U. member governments in particular have 
     watched in near-silence as penalties for dissent in China 
     steadily increased. The one tool that even U.S. and European 
     critics of a vocal human rights policy were willing to 
     support was a resolution in Geneva because it was by 
     definition multilateral and less damaging, it was thought, to 
     bilateral relations.
       But by 1997, American and European leaders appeared ready 
     to take any promise the Chinese government was willing to 
     make as evidence of progress on human rights and as a pretext 
     for backing out of a resolution. At the same time, it had 
     ensured that no such resolution could ever pass by holding 
     off so long on the lobbying needed to build support at the 
     commission even as China was engaged in steady and effective 
     lobbying of its own. The U.S. and Europe have sent a clear 
     message that powerful countries will be allowed to abuse 
     international standards with impunity. That signal is a 
     disservice to the United Nations and to the cause of human 
     rights.

                               footnotes

     \1\ See, for example, the statements of Chinese diplomats in 
     press releases issued by the U.N. Commission for Human Rights 
     during its 1996 session: Wu Jianmin in Press Release HR/CN/
     96/03, March 19, 1996, p. 4 and Zhang Jun in Press Release 
     HR/CN/96/13, March 26, 1996, p. 4.
     \2\ Washington Post, ``U.N. Rights Panel Votes Down Measure 
     Censuring China,'' March 9, 1995.
     \3\ ``Failure of UN Human Rights Resolution Hailed,'' Xinhua, 
     April 24, 1996, in FBIS, CHI-96-081.
     \4\ Commission members serve for three-year terms, but may 
     serve more than one term.
     \5\ David Sanger, ``Two Roads to China: Nice and Not So 
     Nice--Boeing's Strategy is Appeasement; Microsoft Growls,'' 
     New York Times, June 9, 1996.
     \6\ Li Ruihuan, chairman of the National Committee of the 
     Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) 
     and often suggested as a possible successor to Li Peng, went 
     to Cuba in June 1995, followed by a nine-day trip by Fidel 
     Castro to China in December, his first visit ever.
     \7\ Li Peng met with the president of Ecuador in May and with 
     the foreign minister of new commission member Uruguay in 
     October. (In June, Uruguay had hosted Wu Yi and a trade 
     delegation. In its previous three years on the commission, 
     1992-94, Uruguay had abstained on the China no-action votes.) 
     Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon met with 
     Jiang Zemin in November 1996.
     \8\ ``Profit and Prejudice: China in Africa,'' China News 
     Analysis, No. 1574, December 15, 1996, p. 6.
     \9\ ``Profit and Prejudice: China in Africa,'' China News 
     Analysis, No. 1574, December 15, 1996, p. 6.
     \10\ ``Profit and Prejudice: China in Africa,'' China News 
     Analysis, No. 1574, December 15, 1996, p. 3.
     \11\ ``Yelstin Adviser Stresses Importance of Upcoming 
     Visit,'' Xinhua, April 22, 1996; in FBIS-CHI-96-080, April 
     24, 1996.
     \12\ ``Spokesman on Jiang Zemin Visit,'' The News 
     (Islamabad), December 2, 1996, Foreign Broadcast Information 
     Service, FBIS-CHI-96-232.
     \13\ The U.N. thematic mechanisms include, among others, the 
     Special Rapporteurs on Torture; Summary and Arbitrary 
     Execution; Religious Intolerance; Freedom of Expression; 
     Independence of the Judiciary; Violence Against Women; and 
     Sale of Children, as well as Working Groups on Disappearances 
     and Arbitrary Detention. At China's invitation, the Special 
     Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance visited in November 1994. 
     Not only have none of his recommendations been implemented, 
     but religious repression in China has intensified in the two 
     years since the visit. Negotiations for a visit by the 
     Working Group on Arbitrary Detention are ongoing.
     \14\ ``Mutual Respect Needed,'' China Daily (English language 
     version), January 15, 1997, p. 4.
     \15\ ``I don't think there is any way that anyone who 
     disagrees with that in China can hold back that [liberty], 
     just as eventually the Berlin Wall fell. I just think it's 
     inevitable.'' Quoted from his press conference in Jim Mann, 
     ``Clinton's `Berlin Wall' Theory on China Steeped in 
     Paradoxes,'' Washington Post, February 12, 1997.
     \16\ South China Morning Post, ``Rights Action Urged to Avoid 
     Censure,'' January 30, 1997.
     \17\ Patrick E. Tyler, ``U.S. and Chinese Seen Near a Deal on 
     Human Rights,'' New York Times, February 24, 1997.
     \18\ Patrick E. Tyler, ``China and Red Cross Agree to New 
     Talks on Jail Visits,'' New York Times, March 1, 1997.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. DAVIS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume, and I rise in support of this resolution, as amended. The 
resolution before the House, as amended, urges the administration to 
reconsider the decision made this weekend as to whether to pursue a 
resolution of the upcoming meeting in Geneva of the United Nations 
Human Rights Commission. Two concerns I would like to express about the 
resolution before I further express my support for the resolution.
  The first is the European Union has gone on record as having made a 
decision not to cosponsor or introduce such a resolution in this 
upcoming meeting. I think it is terribly important, as our country 
continues to assert its leadership in the goal in which we all share, 
which is to advance the issue of human rights in China and around the 
world, we recognize that the resolutions that we support are those that 
we want to

[[Page H1188]]

win and going into this particular meeting of the U.N. without the 
support of the European Union could spell disaster in that regard.
  The second point to note again is that the administration has made a 
decision, and that is not to pursue a resolution in this upcoming 
meeting. Therefore, this resolution before the House today would have 
been more appropriate to have been brought up last week. The 
administration has acted. The resolution before the House, as amended, 
urges the administration to reconsider that decision, but it is 
unfortunate we are a little behind the curve in that regard.
  On balance I think it is necessary for the United States to send a 
very strong message to China and to the rest of the world that we are 
concerned about the plight of human rights in China and our resolve in 
that regard is stronger than ever. People in China, including the 
government and leadership, need to make no mistake about it. Americans 
care very deeply about human rights in China. Our ability to have a 
decent relationship with China will continue to be circumscribed as 
long as the Chinese government continues to abuse its citizens. I plan 
to vote for this resolution and urge my colleagues to do the same.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes and 30 seconds to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Pelosi).
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time. I thank the committee for its hard work in bringing this 
resolution to the floor. Indeed, as my colleague the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Davis) mentioned, the President announced a decision last 
Friday, and he said that we were behind the curve. I think indeed that 
the White House, anticipating a strong vote in this body, tried to 
preempt the actions of the House of Representatives, knowing that the 
Senate voted 95 to 5 in favor of this resolution. The administration 
wanted to cut us off at the pass, and that is why we are not late but 
they took the action that they did.
  Nonetheless, I commend the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith), the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Davis), the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. 
Hamilton), the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter), and all those 
who worked to put this resolution together for the administration to 
reconsider its ill-advised decision, and for the following reasons.
  First of all, Mr. Speaker, it would be a very sad, sad occurrence 
that in this, the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, that we would give a victory to the authoritarian regime 
in China by not pursuing a resolution condemning China's human rights 
practices at the U.N. Human Rights Commission. There is no real 
progress to report on stated pieces of the administration's human 
rights policy, including, and these are the criteria the administration 
uses, ensuring access to Chinese prisons for the International Red 
Cross, promoting a dialogue between his holiness the Dalai Lama and the 
Chinese government and obtaining the release of political and religious 
prisoners. The Clinton administration has hung its decision on the slim 
reed of the agreement by China, the announcement by China to sign the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. How can it be 
that this administration would say that because the Chinese say they 
would sign this document we would not pursue the resolution at the U.N. 
when the U.S. itself has taken action at the same venue, the same 
commission, against Nigeria, Iran, Sudan, Iraq, Rwanda, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Yugoslavia and Equatorial Guinea. These countries 
signed that covenant and the administration, recognizing that that 
signature is not of itself worth much unless there is ratification and 
implementation, has in the past pursued a resolution against, for 
condemnation against these countries at the same venue.
  When President Clinton delinked trade and human rights in 1994, he 
said very, very specifically that he would pursue the issue at the 
Human Rights Commission, that he would use multilateral fora, including 
the U.N. commission, and would press, would press for the passage of a 
resolution, appointed a rapporteur to report on China's human rights 
violation.
  When my colleague says we would like to select fights that we can 
win, I would beg respectfully to differ. To the people in China and 
many of their representatives in the dissident community, both in China 
and in the U.S., namely, for one, Wei Jingsheng, have said that it is 
very, very important for the U.S. to continue to push for this; whether 
we win or lose, the Chinese people must know that we stand with them.
  He has himself said, I urge, this is from Wei Jingsheng, many members 
in this body fought for his release from prison, we had hoped it would 
not be exile from his country, as the Chinese have executed, but 
release from prison and the ability to speak freely in China. But 
nonetheless the exiled Wei Jingsheng says, in a letter to Members of 
Congress, I urge my friends in the United States Congress to clearly 
show the Chinese people the basic values of the American people. I urge 
my friends to pass a clear resolution calling upon your Representatives 
and the Commission for Human Rights in Geneva to hold fast in their 
position. It is not only for the sake of the American people, but for 
the whole of humankind. The values of democracy, freedom and human 
rights far exceed the value of money.
  He further says, many Chinese, Wei Jingsheng further says, many 
Chinese people regard the Human Rights Commission in Geneva as a 
barometer to measure the support given by the international community 
to the Chinese people in their struggle for human rights and freedom.
  In addition to the voice of the dissidents in support of this 
resolution, in addition to the promise made by President Clinton to 
pursue this resolution when he delinked, in addition to the fact that 
this is the 50th anniversary of the universal declaration of human 
rights, I urge my colleagues to support this resolution urging the 
administration to reconsider because the basis of their decision was 
the Chinese promise to support this other convention, to sign this 
other convention.
  I call to my colleagues' attention, and they may have seen it, I hope 
so, over the weekend in the newspapers the reports that the Chinese 
government, that we all remember when President Jiang Zemin was here, 
he and President Clinton had as the crowning glory, the moment of their 
summit the agreement by the Chinese that they would no longer sell 
technology for weapons of mass destruction to Iran. On the strength of 
that agreement, that written agreement, the Clinton administration 
recently certified that on the basis of promises, not performance, that 
the Chinese were in accord, in compliance with the accords in terms of 
the nuclear arena and that would allow business in the United States to 
sell nuclear technology to China. Already the Chinese have violated 
that agreement. When they were caught, the administration tried to 
hold, to prevent that information, as I mentioned, the Chinese 
government in violation of a signed agreement with President Clinton, 
which was the flagship issue of the summit, in violation of that the 
Chinese government was transferring the technology to the Iranian 
government, a lifetime supply of materials for the enrichment of 
uranium. When the Chinese were caught the administration tried to 
suppress the information to make sure nobody found out about it. When 
it was made public, the administration declared victory and said, look, 
we stopped the Chinese from doing what they said they were not going to 
do in the first place.
  The point is their agreements mean nothing. We have to urge the 
administration to reconsider its decision. I urge my colleagues to vote 
aye.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for her 
very strong statement.
  I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York 
(Mr. Solomon), who has been a leader on human rights in China for many, 
many years.
  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New Jersey who 
for 18 years has led a fight on this floor trying to help people who 
are oppressed across this world with human rights violations. I thank 
the gentleman from Tampa, Florida, who replaced a very good friend of 
mine, Sam Gibbons, for his remarks as well. As always, we thank the 
gentlewoman from California. She is a real leader in the fight to try 
and make the lives of other people throughout this world better.

[[Page H1189]]

  Mr. Speaker, I reluctantly support this resolution today. I say 
reluctantly because quite frankly it is a shame, quite frankly it is a 
scandal that we have to be here at all exhorting our President to do 
something that he should be doing without us even asking. Our 
President, continuing his five-year unrequited love affair with these 
butchers of Beijing, has abandoned the pursuit of improved human rights 
in China at the U.N. and that is just so sad. So it falls to us here in 
this Congress to pass this resolution today calling on the President to 
do the right thing. It is embarrassing, Mr. Speaker.
  Once again China's human rights record continues to offend the decent 
people in this world and everyone admits it; everyone, that is, except 
the Clinton administration and some unbelievably cowardly governments 
in Europe who all they want is the almighty dollar. And what a shame 
that is. Mr. Speaker, a couple of weeks ago, several Members and I had 
a meeting with Richard Gere. Members know who he is; he is a Hollywood 
celebrity. He is the cochairman though of the International Campaign 
for Tibet. Mr. Gere, who travels to the Tibetan refugee camps in India 
frequently and was with me in Taiwan just a couple of weeks ago, told 
us how in 1994, when President Clinton shamefully delinked human rights 
from trade with China, Communist prison guards began immediately 
beating prisoners telling them that no one was going to help them now. 
That is not Jerry Solomon saying that. That was Richard Gere who 
strongly campaigned for the President and is sorry that he did because 
of actions like this.
  Unfortunately, we can be sure that the same vile brutality is now 
taking place in the wake of President Clinton's and the European 
Union's and the U.N.'s gutless decision not to censure China for its 
colossal human rights violations. That is why we are here today on this 
floor. That is why the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith) introduced 
this resolution, and that is why everybody better come over to this 
floor and they better pass it unanimously.
  Mr. DAVIS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the 
gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague and 
friend, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Davis), who has been kind 
enough to join me in serving with the Congressional Children's Caucus, 
and so I know his commitment to the question of equality, human rights 
and social justice. Let me acknowledge the gentlewoman from California 
(Ms. Pelosi) as well for continuing this fight for simply humanity in 
China. The gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), I thank him also for 
his leadership. I would like this debate to be perceived as a 
bipartisan debate and really less so about whether Congress is behind 
the eight ball as to whether or not we in this body, the chief 
lawmaking body for this Nation, go on record for a most solemn and 
important statement and argument.
  I happen to have been one who with great trepidation voted for the 
MFN, the most-favored-nation, based upon the many strong arguments that 
had been made that if you continue to expose a nation to opportunity, 
to democracy, to the respect of human rights, you would see gradually 
those changes coming about.

                              {time}  1530

  It would have been interesting to be a fly on the wall during the 
tumultuous debates regarding the Soviet Bloc, and then as we saw the 
Berlin Wall fall and the rejoicing of democracy in those parts of the 
world.
  I am hoping and would hope most of us would like to believe that we 
have that kind of trend moving forward in China. Sadly, as time goes 
on, I am believing that more is needed, and I certainly think the 
United Nations resolution dealing with the question of human rights was 
more than appropriate.
  So I join my colleagues on this day of Saint Patrick, as I am wearing 
green for that special occasion, the patron saint who realized how 
important it was in his life and in his time that Christianity was 
being blocked in Ireland. We have many faiths now. We have many views 
now in this world that is becoming smaller and smaller. Why is China 
blocking those who may differ with the government? Where is China's 
patron saint?
  I truly believe that the United States Congress has its right and its 
responsibility to be the patron saint of a country that refuses to 
acknowledge its place at the world table, and that is with the dignity 
of human rights.
  So, Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of House Resolution 364, and I 
believe that the resolution on the human rights situation in the 
People's Republic of China at the 54th session of the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights should be passed.
  I know that physically the United States can do little to relieve the 
suffering of people of other nations at the hands of their own 
government. In fact, China has said that to us on a regular basis. 
However, we, as Members of this representative body on behalf of the 
American people, can voice concerns regarding human rights and argue 
for our government to take a stand. We must argue when policies are 
inconsistent with our own interests of simple human justice.
  The State Department's country records reports on human rights 
practices for 1997 states that the Government of China continues to 
commit widespread and well-documented human rights abuses in violation 
of internationally accepted norms, including extrajudicial killings, 
the use of torture, arbitrary arrests, detention, forced abortion and 
sterilization, the sale of organs from executed prisoners, which, by 
the way, was reported in the newspaper today again, and tight control 
over the exercise of rights of freedom of speech, press and religion.
  With this in mind, this body must and should encourage the President 
to reconsider his decision. I believe it is important that we 
reconsider the decision that was offered just a time a while ago. I 
believe it is likewise important that we stand on the side of history 
and continue to fight for human rights and human justice.
  It is evident from the leadership of the peace movement and others 
who have said that the offering and debating of this resolution at the 
annual U.N. Human Rights Commission in Geneva advances human rights in 
China and Tibet. And we must stand by that argument. China in the past 
has shown a willingness to respond to the concerns of the United States 
regarding human rights, and I believe that this resolution will make 
progress in that area.
  Therefore, I strongly encourage my colleagues to support this House 
resolution and recognize that today we stand on behalf of those who 
deserve human rights and justice in China. Where is China's patron 
saint? We need that person and that saint now.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of House Resolution 364, which urges 
the introduction and passage of a resolution on the human rights 
situation in the People's Republic of China at the 54th Session of the 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights
  I know that physically the United States can do little to relieve the 
suffering of people in other nations at the hands of their own 
governments. However, we as members of this representative body on the 
behalf of the American people can voice concerns regarding human rights 
policies which are inconsistent with our own interest and values.
  The State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 
1997 state that the Government of China continues to commit widespread 
and well-documented human rights abuses, in violation of 
internationally accepted norms, including extrajudicial killings, the 
use of torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, forced abortion and 
sterilization, the sale of organs from executed prisoners, and tight 
control over the exercise of rights of freedom of speech, press, and 
religion.
  With this in mind this body must and should encourage the President 
to reconsider his decision announced just a few days ago not to press 
for a resolution on human rights violations in China and Tibet at the 
54th Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.
  History is on the side of action in this debate on whether or not to 
press for a resolution at the upcoming United Nations meeting on human 
rights. We know that the release last year of Chinese dissident Wei 
Jingsheng after the U.S.-China summit and just before Chinese Justice 
Minister Xiao Yang arrived in Washington for talks with U.S. officials 
came as a result of pressure from the United States.
  It is evident from what Wei Jingsheng and others have said that 
offering and debating this resolution at the annual U.N. Human

[[Page H1190]]

Rights Commission in Geneva advances human rights in China and Tibet. 
In the past the Government of China has made some improvements in human 
rights just before the annual Human Rights Commission consideration of 
a China resolution.
  We know that conditions for political prisoners improve when the 
resolution is being debated and they deteriorate when the resolve of 
the United States weakens.
  The United States has stayed the course since 1990 participating in 
multilateral efforts to gain passage of a United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights resolution addressing the human rights situation in China. 
We should not at this point retreat from our position regarding the 
need to improve human rights in China.
  China in the past has shown a willingness to respond to the concerns 
of the United States regarding human rights, and I believe that this 
resolution will make progress in that area. Therefore, I strongly 
encourage my colleagues to support of House Resolution 364.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may 
consume to the distinguished gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), the 
chairman of the full Committee on International Relations.
  (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.Res. 364, and 
I want to commend the chairman of the Subcommittee on International 
Operations and Human Rights, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith), 
and the ranking minority member of his committee, the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Lantos), for crafting this resolution and bringing it 
before us at this time.
  I also want to commend the distinguished chairman of our Subcommittee 
on Asia and the Pacific, the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter), 
and the distinguished chairman of our Committee on Rules, the gentleman 
from New York (Mr. Solomon), for their strong support of the measure; 
in addition to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), who has 
been an activist for human rights in China.
  In response to Beijing's announcement last week that it would sign 
the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the 
administration's desire to send President Clinton off to China on a 
Presidential visit, the Clinton administration has reported that it 
will not sponsor a China human rights resolution in Geneva. This is 
distressing to many of us. The President should reconsider his 
reluctance to underscore our Nation's opposition to China's consistent 
violations of human rights.
  To say the least, Beijing's track record of living up to its promises 
have not been very impressive. Last October, for example, President 
Jiang Zemin signed another key treaty, the Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, but the National People's Congress, now in session 
in Beijing, has not taken any action thus far to ratify that agreement.
  In addition, Beijing has agreed to end the sale of nuclear and 
ballistic missile technology to nations that are linked to terrorism, 
but their sales continue. They continue to this very day.
  Before the President visits China, he really should know when its 
leaders are going to sign, ratify and implement both of these 
covenants. The President also needs to know when Beijing will amend its 
1993 state security law and when it will abolish administrative 
detention, including the use of reeducation through labor.
  The President also needs to know when Beijing will review the 
sentences of more than 2,000 who have been convicted as 
counterrevolutionary offenders with a view towards releasing 
unconditionally those who are in prison.
  And before the President's visit to China, he should be assured that 
the government in Beijing are going to give regular access to Tibet and 
to East Turkestan by U.N. and private independent human rights 
monitors. He should also wait until the Communist government has ended 
or eased its registration requirements on religious activities and that 
it is taking concrete steps to protect freedom of association with 
Chinese workers.
  Accordingly, I join with my colleagues in urging this administration 
and the President to reconsider their reluctance to sponsor the Geneva 
resolution and to put off the Presidential visit until we see some 
progress in those critical areas. I urge my colleagues to fully support 
H.Res. 364.
  Mr. DAVIS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi).
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  I wanted to make one additional point, Mr. Speaker, and that is to 
address the issue of the European Community not supporting the 
resolution this year. That decision by the EU does not bind the member 
states of the EU, and it is possible that some of those countries would 
support the resolution, and I certainly hope so, but it would require 
leadership on the part of the United States.
  I wanted to make the point that Wei Jingsheng has driven home to us, 
and that is that as we are considering this resolution, and many of my 
colleagues feel much more comfortable dealing with human rights in 
China at the Human Rights Commission, and I think that is very 
appropriate, and this is not the time to talk about trade issues or 
MFN, however Wei Jingsheng would want me to say what he has told me 
over and over again, and that is that the huge trade deficit, $50 
billion this year, that the Chinese enjoys with the U.S., it is a 
surplus to them, is money that they spend buying, buying, in Europe and 
other countries that are represented at the U.N. Commission on Human 
Rights, buying support.
  They have effectively silenced any voices for support for this 
resolution, and they do it with our own money. How even more necessary 
for us to take leadership at the Commission.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds, 
before yielding to the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Asia and the Pacific to make one additional point.
  I think it is very important to point out that the Chinese 
Government, and Human Rights Watch Asia has done a very fine job in 
chronicling this, country by country, went out and sought members of 
the Human Rights Commission in Geneva and provided favors to those 
governments, money, building supplies, all kinds of materiel in order 
to buy out those countries from supporting the human rights resolution 
last year.
  I would ask at the appropriate time that that be made a part of the 
Record so that Members can see how the Chinese Government methodically 
was able to silence its critics.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman 
from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter), the very distinguished chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.
  (Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New Jersey for 
yielding me this time.
  As an original cosponsor of H. Res. 364, this Member rises in strong 
support of this resolution which urges the introduction and passage of 
a resolution on the human rights situation in the People's Republic of 
China at the U.N. Human Rights Commission in Geneva. The Commission 
began its annual session on March 16th.
  This administration seems to believe strongly in using the United 
Nations where appropriate. This is the appropriate place for the human 
rights abuses in China to be brought to the attention of the world 
community. I regret the fact that it is not going to be pursued by the 
administration.
  The resolution we have before us today, crafted by the gentleman from 
New Jersey, with input from many people, including this Member, quotes 
from the State Department Human Rights Report of 1997 noting that the 
Government of China continued to commit widespread and well-documented 
human rights abuses, which included extrajudicial killings, torture, 
forced abortion and sterilization, as well as expanded attempts to 
control religion.
  Certainly Beijing is annoyed that year after year the United States 
has raised this issue at the U.N. Human Rights Commission. But for many 
in this body who are genuinely interested in Sino-American relations, 
human rights is an entirely appropriate U.S. concern. Thus, this Member 
regrets that late last week the administration decided not to press for 
a U.N. resolution censuring China for human rights

[[Page H1191]]

abuses, citing that the Beijing Government is gradually changing it is 
progressive practices and may be ready to make new releases of 
political dissidents. That may be a correct conclusion. I hope it is. 
But I do believe it is the wrong approach.
  I think we use this Human Rights Commission forum whenever 
appropriate. And while it is true that during the past year China has 
made some concessions, such as the release of dissident Wei Jingsheng 
from prison, this Member urges the administration to continue to press 
China on human rights even if the U.N. meeting in China, very 
unfortunately, is not to be the forum by the choosing of this 
administration.
  As the Members of this body are aware, this Member supports 
engagement with the People's Republic of China. This year's summit 
represented expanded engagement of the PRC, which this Member believes 
will successfully promote Democratic ideals and standards throughout 
this country. That said, this does not mean that we should remain 
silent regarding human rights abuses in China.
  The gentlewoman from California has brought up the European 
Commission and the European Union, and I think that is entirely 
appropriate. They say we are not going to pursue this in the U.N. Human 
Rights Commission because we believe in constructive engagement. Well, 
so do I, and so do many Members of this body, and so do the 
administrations of both parties, but that does not mean that we fail to 
use the U.N. Human Rights Commission.
  I think it is a shameful lack of courage on the part of the 
Commission. I am talking about the European Commission and the European 
Union. It is true, as the gentlewoman said, that members are free to go 
their own way and support and introduce such a resolution before the 
U.N. Human Rights Commission. Denmark had the courage to do that last 
year. China threatened repercussions on Denmark when they took that 
stance, and perhaps they delivered on that. But I do not think that 
should be any excuse for the lack of courage on the part of the 
Europeans in this respect. And they are very quick to give us advice 
gratuitously. Let it be said that this Member, and I think many Members 
of this body, are discouraged and very upset with their decision.
  This resolution, therefore, is an important statement on the part of 
the U.S. House of Representatives. It puts, through H.Res. 364, us on 
record that the very real human rights questions and concerns that the 
American people have raised regarding the PRC are certainly voiced in 
this body.
  This Member again commends the author of the resolution, the 
distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on International Operations 
and Human Rights, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith), for this 
initiative. He has pursued it previously, as already mentioned.
  This Member also thanks the distinguished chairman of the Committee 
on International Relations, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), 
for assisting us in moving this initiative in such an expeditious 
manner.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge all Members to vote for the adoption of H.Res. 
364.
  Mr. DAVIS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds to 
thank my good friend from Nebraska, the chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Asia and the Pacific. He is very much involved on a day-to-day basis 
with what is going on in China. We have worked cooperatively on this 
resolution. He had some very useful text changes, and we thank him for 
that.
  I wanted to thank the chairman of the full committee, the gentleman 
from New York (Mr. Gilman), who is always a great friend of human 
rights; the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi); and I want to 
thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos), my ranking member of 
the subcommittee, and all the Members who have helped forge this 
legislation.
  Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today as an original cosponsor of 
H. Res. 364, a resolution urging the President to secure passage of a 
resolution on China's human rights record at the annual meeting of the 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) this month in Geneva.
  During the past eight years, the United States Government has 
participated in nearly all of the annual efforts to pass a resolution 
at the UNCHR addressing the Chinese Government's human rights policies. 
This pressure has generated limited but important results, such as the 
Chinese government's signing of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights and inviting the U.N. Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention to visit last October.
  I have long believed that we should press for improvements in the 
human rights situation in China through the use of multilateral forums 
such as the UNCHR, bilateral negotiations, and other mechanisms such as 
the annual debate over renewing Most-Favored-Nation status for China.
  Critics of the annual debate on Most-Favored-Nation status for China, 
however, have argued that removal of MFN trade treatment for China is 
an instrument too blunt for the task at hand. They have urged that in 
place of U.S. unilateral action the U.S. should pursue efforts to 
ensure a multilateral approach to influence Beijing's human rights 
practices. When the Administration decided in 1994 to delink the MFN 
issue from human rights considerations, the President acknowledged that 
the multilateral dimension of our engagement on human rights in China 
remained critical. At that time, he stated that ``the U.S. should step 
up efforts, in cooperation with other states, to insist that the U.N. 
Commission on Human Rights pass a resolution dealing with the serious 
human rights abuses in China.''
  To that end, earlier this year I wrote to the President with 
Democratic Whip David Bonior and Representative Nancy Pelosi to urge 
that the United States Government sponsor and actively lobby for a 
resolution on China's human rights record at this month's meeting of 
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. In our letter, we argued that it 
would be a serious mistake, given the wide scale and continuing human 
rights abuses in China and Tibet, to remove that pressure before China 
takes concrete steps to comply with international standards. These 
steps must include significant improvement in China's overall human 
rights practices, including granting freedom of speech, association, 
and religion; enacting major legal reforms, including repealing state 
security laws and abolishing all so-called ``counter-revolutionary'' 
crimes; releasing political prisoners; acting to protect freedom of 
association for workers; and opening up Tibet to human rights monitors.
  I was extremely disappointed to learn on Friday that the 
Administration has decided against pressing for passage of a resolution 
on China's human rights practices at the U.N. Commission later this 
month. Failure to press for passage of a resolution will seriously 
undermine our efforts to influence Chinese human rights policies and 
represents a step backwards in our efforts to advance the cause of 
freedom across the globe.
  In making its announcement, the Administration noted that China 
intends to sign the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, which would bring about improved multilateral oversight of 
China's human rights practices. While I agree that China's 
participation in this Covenant will be a significant achievement if it 
follows through on its commitment, it does not adequately substitute 
for the annual review and dialogue provided by the U.N. Human rights 
Commission. After China's first year of participation under this 
Covenant, its human rights practices will be subject to international 
oversight only once every five years.
  We must regularly review China's record in this area to continually 
draw international attention to its flagrant abuses of human rights. 
Only through such a review can we hope to sustain the momentum 
necessary to have any hope for meaningful and systematic changes in 
China's behavior. Examination of China's human rights practices only 
once every five years is insufficient to create any real momentum for 
change. In fact, this will best serve the Chinese Government's interest 
by keeping these issues out of public debate most of the time.
  Furthermore, I am deeply concerned that a failure by the United 
States to take a leading role on this issue at this crucial juncture 
would bolster efforts made by China in recent years to eliminate all 
international comment on its human rights practices, and would further 
fuel China's efforts to weaken the definition of basic universal human 
rights and the mechanisms designed to protect them.
  It would be particularly disappointing on the fiftieth anniversary of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights if China should succeed in 
its efforts to escape the scrutiny of the one international body 
mandated to protect and promote human rights. The U.N. Commission on 
Human Rights is one of the few instruments by which the international 
community has the opportunity to voice concern about human rights 
practices around the world. Lack of action at the U.N. Commission on 
Human Rights would greatly undermine multilateral pressure on the 
Chinese government.

[[Page H1192]]

  I hope the President will reconsider his decision not to lead efforts 
at the U.N. Human Rights Commission later this month, and I urge all 
Members to support the adoption of this resolution.


                             General Leave

  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that 
all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and 
extend their remarks on House Resolution 364.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Barrett of Nebraska). Is there objection 
to the request of the gentleman from New Jersey?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my 
time.

                              {time}  1545

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Barrett of Nebraska). The question is on 
the motion offered by the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith) that 
the House suspend the rules and agree to the resolution, H. Res. 364, 
as amended.
  The question was taken.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and 
nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 5 of rule I and the 
Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this motion will be 
postponed.

                          ____________________