Congressional Record, Volume 144 Issue 29 (Tuesday, March 17, 1998)

[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 29 (Tuesday, March 17, 1998)]
[House]
[Pages H1181-H1192]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

URGING RESOLUTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and
agree to the resolution (H. Res.

[[Page H1182]]

364) urging the introduction and passage of a resolution on the human
rights situation in the People's Republic of China at the 54th session
of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, as amended.
The Clerk read as follows:

H. Res. 364

Whereas the State Department's Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices for 1997 state that ``[t]he Government [of
China] continued to commit widespread and well-documented
human rights abuses, in violation of internationally accepted
norms,'' including extrajudicial killings, the use of
torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, forced abortion and
sterilization, the sale of organs from executed prisoners,
and tight control over the exercise of the rights of freedom
of speech, press, and religion;
Whereas, according to the State Department, ``Serious human
rights abuses persisted in minority areas [controlled by the
Government of China], including Tibet and Xinjiang [East
Turkestan], where tight controls on religion and other
fundamental freedoms continued and, in some cases,
intensified [during 1997]'';
Whereas, according to the 1997 Country Reports, the
Government of China enforces its ``one-child policy'' using
coercive measures including severe fines of up to several
times the annual income of the average resident of China and
sometimes punishes nonpayment by destroying homes and
confiscating personal property;
Whereas, according to the 1997 Country Reports, as part of
the Chinese Government's continued attempts to expand state
control of religion, ``Police closed many `underground'
mosques, temples, and seminaries,'' and authorities ``made
strong efforts to crack down on the activities of the
unapproved Catholic and Protestant churches'' including the
use of detention, arrest, and ``reform-through-education''
sentences;
Whereas, although the 1997 Country Reports note several
``positive steps'' by the Chinese Government such as signing
the United Nations Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights and allowing the United Nations Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention to visit China, Assistant Secretary of
State John Shattuck has testified regarding those reports
that ``We do not see major changes [in the human rights
siguation in China]. We have not characterized China as
having demonstrated major changes in the period over the
course of the last year'';
Whereas, in 1990, 1992, and each year since then, the
United States has participated in an unsuccessful
multilateral effort to gain passage of a United Nations
Commission on Human Rights resolution addressing the human
rights situation in China;
Whereas the Government of China has mounted a diplomatic
campaign each year to defeat the resolution and has succeeded
in blocking commission consideration of such a resolution
each year except 1995, when the United States engaged in a
more aggressive effort to promote the resolution;
Whereas China's opposition to the resolution has featured
an attack on the principle of the universality of human
rights, which the United States, China, and 169 other
governments reaffirmed at the 1993 United Nations World
Conference on Human Rights;
Whereas on February 23, 1998, the European Union (EU)
agreed that neither the EU nor its member states would table
or cosponsor a resolution on the human rights situation in
China at the 54th Session of the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights;
Whereas on March 13, 1998, the Administration announced
that it would not seek passage of a resolution at the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights addressing the human
rights situation in China;
Whereas without United States leadership there is little
possibility of success for that resolution;
Whereas, in 1994, when the President announced his decision
to delink Most Favored Nation (MFN) status for China from
previously announced human rights conditions, the
Administration pledged that the United States would ``step up
its efforts, in cooperation with other states, to insist that
the United Nations Human Rights Commission pass a resolution
dealing with the serious human rights abuses in China'' as
part of the Administration's ``new human rights strategy'';
Whereas a failure vigorously to pursue the adoption of such
a resolution would constitute an abandonment of an important
component of the ``expanded multilateral agenda'' that the
Administration promised as part of its ``new human rights
strategy'' toward China; and
Whereas Chinese democracy advocate and former political
prisoner Wei Jingsheng has stated that ``[t]his [United
Nations Commission on Human Rights] resolution is a matter of
life and death for democratic reform in China'': Now,
therefore, be it
Resolved, That the House of Representatives--
(1) urges the President to reconsider his decision not to
press for passage of a resolution on human rights violations
in China at the 54th Session of the United Nations Commission
on Human Rights;
(2) expresses its profound regret that the European Union
will not table or cosponsor a resolution on human rights
violations in China at the 54th Session of the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights; and
(3) urges all members of the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights to support passage of a resolution on human
rights violations in China at the 54th Session of the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from New
Jersey (Mr. Smith) and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Davis) each will
control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr.Smith).
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I urge every member of this body to support House
Resolution 364. This strongly bipartisan resolution urges the
introduction and passage of a resolution on human rights in the
People's Republic of China at the 54th session of the U.N. Human Rights
Commission which began yesterday and runs to the 24th of next month.
If any government deserves to be the subject of a U.N. Human Rights
Commission resolution, the Beijing regime does. In its testimony before
my subcommittee last month, Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck
made it very clear that ``. . .the government of China continues to
commit widespread and well-documented abuses in all areas of human
rights.'' He also testified that there have not been any major
improvements in that situation during the last year.
As detailed in the State Department's country reports on human rights
practices in China, those abuses included extrajudicial killings, the
use of torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, forced abortion and
forced sterilization, the sale of organs from executed prisoners, and
tight controls over religion, speech, and press. Persecution in some
areas, such as the captive nations of Tibet and East Turkistan, even
intensified during the past year.
House Resolution 364 merely urges the administration to reconsider
and to do what it promised to do when it delinked MFN for China from
human rights considerations in 1994: ``. . . to insist that the U.N.
Human Rights Commission pass a resolution dealing with the serious
human rights abuses in China.''
However, this past weekend, the administration signaled that it is
backing away from that promise, just as it backed away from its
previous promise to link China's MFN status to respect for human
rights. In both cases, the retreat has not been justified by any
improvement in the Chinese government's human rights record. As a
matter of fact, it has gone backwards.
In explaining its decision not to seek a China resolution in Geneva,
the administration has highlighted the PRC's recent announcement that
it intended to sign the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. However, that rationale does not justify the President's latest
deference to the Beijing dictatorship for three basic reasons.
First, the Beijing regime regularly ignores its legal promises,
especially where human rights are concerned. The Constitution of the
PRC already guarantees freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of
association, of procession, and of demonstration, as well as the
freedom of religious belief and the freedom of ethnic minorities such
as the Tibetans and Uyghurs from discrimination and oppression.
According to the administration's own reporting, the Beijing regime
routinely and systematically violates those freedoms.
In a further example, China signed the U.N. Convention Against
Torture over a decade ago; but according to the State Department, and
other sources in human rights organizations, the Chinese government
continues to use torture against prisoners each and every day. Thus, in
return for its silence, the United States must demand real
improvements, not paper promises.
Second, experience demonstrates that ratification of the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights does not
guarantee genuine respect for human rights. Many of the most abusive
countries on the planet, including Iraq, North Korea, Nigeria, to name
a few, are parties to that convention.
Third and most important, by using convention ratification as an
excuse for the United States' inaction in Geneva, the administration
has set up an

[[Page H1183]]

explicit double standard benefitting the Beijing regime.
Yet, last year alone, the administration supported seven U.N. Human
Rights Commission resolutions concerning other countries that have
signed the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights:
Nigeria, Iran, Sudan, Iraq, Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia,
Yugoslavia, and Equatorial Guinea.
The unprecedented favors shown to the Beijing dictatorship suggest
that, in reality, the President's latest decision has little to do with
the convention and everything to do with dollars and cents.
Wei Jingsheng, Mr. Speaker, the great Chinese democracy advocate and
former prisoner of conscience, testified before my subcommittee just a
few weeks ago. He said that a U.N. Human Rights Commission resolution
at this time is a ``matter of life or death'' for the democratic reform
in China.
Last week, in an open letter urging the U.S. to support a China
resolution in Geneva, he explained that ``the success of the Chinese
government to silence the world community has serious consequences. It
is a massive blow to the Chinese people's determination to struggle for
human rights and democracy. They are left with the feeling that they
are being betrayed.''
Mr. Speaker, the President's decision this past weekend was, indeed,
a betrayal, a betrayal of the countless Chinese, Tibetans, and others
who suffer under the current regime, and a betrayal of our own
democratic and humanitarian ideals.
The United States' support for a U.N. human rights resolution is the
very least that we can do for the Chinese and the Tibetan peoples. If
the U.S. will not raise human rights violations in a forum dedicated
exclusively to human rights concerns, then where will we raise those
issues and how can we expect tyrants to heed our admonitions in private
when they know we will lack the will to speak about them in public?

{time} 1515

Notwithstanding his announcement this weekend, Mr. Speaker, I urge
the President, we urge collectively the President to honor his previous
pledge to support a China resolution at the U.N. Human Rights
Commission in Geneva. In the meantime, I urge my colleagues to support
passage of the resolution.

I. Summary

China appears to be on the verge of ensuring that no
attempt is made ever again to censure its human rights
practices at the United Nations. It is an extraordinary feat
of diplomacy and an equally extraordinary capitulation on the
part of governments, particularly the United States and the
countries of the European Union, that claim to favor
multilateral initiatives as a way of exerting human rights
pressure. One of the few remaining international fora to
exert such pressure is the annual meeting of the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights in Geneva--in session this year
from March 10 to April 18--where countries with particularly
egregious human rights records can become the subject of
resolutions. Every year save one since 1990, the U.S. and the
E.U. have taken the lead, with support from Japan and other
governments, in sponsoring a resolution on China, and every
year save one, China has successfully blocked even debate on
the subject. The threat of a resolution, however, has itself
been an effective form of pressure, as illustrated by the
time and resources China has spent in trying to counter it.
This report is an analysis of China's diplomatic efforts
with respect to key members of the commission over the last
three years. It describes a pattern of aggressive lobbying by
Chinese officials, using economic and political
blandishments, that has worked to undermine the political
will in both developed and developing countries to hold
Beijing accountable in Geneva, coupled with procrastination
and passivity on the part of China's critics, the same
governments that have been such vocal proponents of
multilateralism.
The report suggests that countries concerned about human
rights in China should put more, not less effort into a
carefully constructed resolution at the U.N. Human Rights
Commission; that the process of fashioning a resolution and
lobbying for its passage is important, whether it ultimately
reaches the floor of the commission for debate or not; and
that ending all efforts on China at the U.N. Human Rights
Commission, as the U.S. and Europe seem to be considering,
will be seen in China as a triumph over the West's dominance
of international institutions and one that it may want to
follow up in fields other than human rights.
As this report went to press, the U.S. and the E.U. were
involved in diplomatic negotiations with China on a possible
package of limited steps or promises in exchange for dropping
a resolution this year and in subsequent years. The U.S. in
particular, seemed poised to accept any last-minute gestures
that China might make during Vice President Albert Gore's
trip to China in late March, midway through the commission's
deliberations. But the prospect of obtaining truly meaningful
improvements from Beijing on human rights would have been far
higher had there been a real threat of a coordinated, high-
level lobbying effort behind a resolution in Geneva, the work
on which would have had to have begun in September or October
1996. For the U.S. and E.U. to suggest at this late date that
a resolution cannot pass is a prophecy they have done their
utmost to make self-fulfilling.

background

A resolution on China at the commission is a curiously
potent tool for raising human rights issues, given that it is
an unenforceable statement that carries no penalties or
obligations. But as the product of the U.N., it has major
implications for a country's international image, and even to
table a resolution for discussion is considered by many
countries, China among them, as a major loss of face. But
China considers the U.N. Human Rights Commission an important
forum for other reasons as well, including as a vehicle for
countering Western ``hegemonism,'' particularly through
alliances with governments in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
During the 1996 session of the commission, Chinese diplomats
made clear that they saw an attempt to seek a resolution on
China as an example of this hegemonism, arguing that the
North used the commission as a one-way forum through which to
confront, judge, and interfere in the internal affairs of
developing countries while ignoring abuses in the U.S. and
Europe, and that the commission paid too much attention to
political and civil rights while neglecting economic, social,
and cultural rights and the right to development.\1\ In
addition to its value to China as a forum to challenge the
West, the commission has also become a useful vehicle to
play the U.S. off against its erstwhile European allies.
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Footnotes appear at end of report.
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Interest in using the U.N. Human Rights Commission as a
forum for criticizing China only emerged after the crackdown
in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Beginning in 1990, the annual
Geneva meetings were marked by efforts to table mildly worded
resolutions urging China to improve its human rights
practices and criticizing ongoing violations of international
standards. These efforts were defeated before the resolutions
could come up for debate by ``no-action'' motions brought by
one of China's friends on the commission--Pakistan could be
counted on in this regard. A ``no-action'' motion, if passed,
meant that the resolution died a quick death before ever
coming to debate and vote.
In March 1995, however, the ``no-action'' motion failed for
the first time. China's human rights record was debated, and
a resolution sponsored by the U.S. and the European Union
lost by only one vote when Russia unexpectedly cast its vote
in opposition. It was the closest China had ever come to
defeat. In April 1996, by contrast, China again successfully
blocked a resolution through the ``no-action'' procedure, by
a vote of twenty-seven to twenty with six abstentions. In the
year that elapsed between the two meetings, China's human
rights record had worsened, but its lobbying had improved and
the political will of its critics had weakened.
Visits between China and commission members between April
1996 and March 1997 resulted in more aid packages, new and
expanded trade contracts including foreign investment and
joint ventures, and promises of improved bilateral
cooperation on projects ranging from agriculture to nuclear
technology. While it is impossible to definitively document
the direct relationship between each visit or aid package and
the votes of individual commission members, an overall
pattern emerged that may help to explain China's success at
muzzling the commission. Clearly, in many countries, much
more was at stake than a Geneva vote, as Beijing sought to
boost its long-term political and economic relationships and
to weaken Taiwan's ties with some capitals. But a major
objective during this period was also to defeat the annual
Geneva effort.
In 1995 and in 1996, the importance of the outcome in
Geneva was clearly reflected in official statements. At the
conclusion of the 1995 voting, a foreign ministry spokesman
speaking on state radio ``expressed its [the Chinese
government's] admiration and gratitude to those countries
that supported China,'' and China's ambassador to the U.N. in
Geneva said the resolution was ``entirely a product of
political confrontation practiced by the West with ulterior
motives.'' \2\ After the 1996 vote, an article by the
official Chinese news agency Xinhau, entitled ``Failure of
Human Rights Resolution Hailed,'' gloated that the commission
``has again shot down a draft resolution against China,
marking another failure by the West to use human rights to
interfere in China's internal affairs. . . .'' \3\
From China's perspective, there were two relatively
balanced voting blocs on the commission, and a number of
crucial swing votes.\4\ One bloc consisted of Asian and
African states. The second was composed of western Europe and
North and Central America. The swing votes were to be found

[[Page H1184]]

among some of the new democracies of central Europe, the
former Soviet republics, large Latin American countries and a
handful of African and Asian nations. China courted them all
and pursued its efforts to divide Europe and the United
States.

II. The European Union and the United States

In 1995, the year the resolution lost by one vote, the U.S.
and E.U., which together with Japan were the resolution's co-
sponsors, began efforts to get other countries on board as
early as December 1994, when then U.S. National Security
Adviser Anthony Lake went to Zimbabwe, Gabon and Ethiopia.
The Geneva resolution was one of the issues on his agenda.
Geraldine Ferraro, then head of the U.S. delegation to the
commission, made calls to Latin American capitals.
After that close call, Chinese diplomats and government
officials seemed to intensify their efforts to underscore
that good economic relations with the world's largest country
would be fostered by decreasing pressure on human rights.
Overt Chinese pressure, of course, was not always needed:
European leaders were well aware that the competitive edge
with the Americans could be widened if human rights criticism
was left to the latter, especially when the U.S. was already
preoccupied with a struggle with China over intellectual
property rights and the annual debate over Most Favored
Nation status.
The first attempts to derail a resolution on China at the
1996 U.N. Human Rights Commission session took place in
Bangkok on March 1 and 2, 1996 when Chinese Premier Li Peng
met with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President
Jacques Chirac at the E.U.-Asia summit. With a US$2.1 billion
Airbus contract hanging in the balance and a visit to France
by Li Peng set for April, France took the lead in trying to
work out a deal whereby in exchange for a few concessions
from China, the E.U. and the U.S. would agree to drop the
resolution. The nature of the proposed concessions was never
made public but was rumored to include an agreement by China
to sign and ratify the two major international human rights
treaties, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: the release of some political prisoners; and
an invitation to U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Jose
Ayala Lasso, to visit China. Ratification without
reservations would indeed have been a useful step, but when
pressed to give a timetable for ratification, Beijing
reportedly backed off, and the deal fell through. Italy--then
in the presidency of the E.U.--was said to be leaning to the
French deal, as was Germany, which with bilateral trade of
$18 billion, was China's largest trading partner in Europe
and one of Europe's top investors in China. The Europeans did
not come on board until ten days after the commission session
opened, and then only reluctantly.
The resolution was doomed by a failure of will on the
American side as well. The United States was no more eager
than its European counterparts to earn China's opprobrium by
sponsoring a resolution, and, according to one source, a
deliberate decision was made within the Clinton
administration sometime in December 1995 to give the
resolution less attention that the year before, with the
result that lobbying was late, desultory and ultimately
unsuccessful.
Despite appeals on human rights in China and Tibet signed
by over 200 French legislators and scattered protests, Li
Peng's visit to Paris from April 9-13, just before the
commission vote, was hailed by Beijing as marking a
``watershed'' in its ties with France. Li Peng took the
opportunity to finalize the Airbus sale in what appeared to
be a deliberate slight to the U.S. government and the
American company Boeing, hitherto the largest supplier of
aircraft to China. In one reporter's words. China preferred
to deal with countries that ``don't lecture China about human
rights, don't threaten sanctions for the piracy of music,
videos and software and don't send their warships patrolling
the Taiwan Straits.'' \5\
Li Peng's trip to Europe was followed in July 1996 by a
six-nation swing by President Jiang Zemin through Europe and
Asia, aimed at closing business deals and enhancing Jiang
Zemin's international standing. An important side-effect, if
not a deliberate objective of these visits, was to erode the
willingness of some European countries to confront Beijing in
Geneva. The trip came on the heels of a Chinese threat to
impose economic sanctions on Germany in retaliation for a
conference on Tibet. The conference was sponsored by the
Friedrich Naumann Foundation, closely linked to
Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel's Free Democratic Party, and
was to be held in Germany in June in cooperation with the
Dalai Lama's government-in-exile. The row started over the
German government' proposal to provide a subsidy for the
conference. Under pressure, government funding was
withdrawn, but the conference went ahead with the support
of German politicians from all parties. The Chinese
government then forced the closure of the foundation's
Beijing office. In retaliation, German politicians
introduced a motion in the Bundestag criticizing China's
human rights record. China then withdrew an invitation to
German Foreign Minister Kinkel to visit Beijing.
When Beijing further warned that German business interests
in China could suffer, Bonn quickly scrambled to restore good
relations. In September the invitation was renewed, and
Kinkel went the following month. He did raise the cases of
political prisoners Wang Dan and Wei Jingsheng, but the real
story was that commercial relations with Germany were back on
track, for in November in Beijing, President Jiang and German
President Roman Herzog signed four agreements on financial
and technological cooperation. The last quarter of 1996 saw
multimillion dollar deals signed between China and Germany
companies, including a joint venture by Mercedes Benz in
Jiangsu province to produce buses; a joint venture by Kogel
Trailer to produce specialized auto vehicles; a joint venture
by Bayer AC and Shanghai Coating Company to produce iron
oxide pigments; and a US$6 billion investment in a
petrochemical plant by German chemical company BASF.
China also wooed other European countries. In June, Chen
Jinhua, head of China's State Planning Commission, visited
Italy. In Milan, he held meeting with leading Italian
financial and business interests, discussing how China's
ninth five-year plan would lead to the continued open up of
the economy to the outside world. Stressing the growth of
bilateral trade, which stood at a record US$ 5.18 billion in
1995, he noted China's potential as a huge market with
possibilities for increased Sino-Italian cooperation. In
September, Li Peng went to the Hague, just as the Netherlands
was poised to take over leadership of the E.U.; in October
Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini led a group of Italian
businessmen to Beijing on a ``good will'' visit; and in
November, Li Peng was back in Europe on a visit to Rome,
where he and his Italian counterpart pledged to encourage
Sino-Italian economic and trade ties.
Britian also worked to bolster its trade with China. When
Trade and Industry Secretary Ian Lang met with Minister of
Foreign Trade and Economic Development Wu Yi in Beijing in
September 1996, they agreed to set up working groups in the
chemical industry, aeronautics, and energy. In October, Li
Lanqing, a vice-premier and vice-chair of the State Council
(the equivalent of China's cabinet), traveled to London to
meet with Deputy Prime Minister Michael Heseltine, and in
November, the two countries signed a Memorandum of
Understanding on forming a Sino-U.K. Aerospace Equipment
Working Group to promote commercial and technical cooperation
in civil aviation.

III. Latin America

Latin America was clearly a priority region for China if it
was to defeat a resolution at the 1996 commission session.
Next to Europe and North America, it was most likely to vote
against China. In some cases, this was due to history of
susceptibility to U.S. influence, in others to a democratic
transition from an abusive authoritarian past that made the
new democracies important allies in efforts to censure grave
abuses wherever they occurred. Many Latin American countries,
including Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Argentina, Peru and
Venezuela, also had serious strains in their bilateral
relations with China because of textile and garment
``dumping'' by the latter. Of all the countries in the
region, only Cuba and Peru consistently voted with China in
1995 and 1996, Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela abstained in
both years.
Top Chinese government and Party officials increased the
exchange of visits with Latin America leaders after the near
success of the 1995 resolution. In October 1995, Premier Li
Peng went to Mexico and Peru, signing trade and cooperation
agreements with both governments. Peru had abstained from all
China votes at the commission until 1995 when it voted in
favor of the no-action motion. As if to reinforce the
relationship, Luo Gan, secretary-general of the State
Council, went to Peru in March 1996 with the commission
already in session and pledged US$350,000 in aid and a loan
of US$70 million to be used toward China-Peru trade. The
sums were small, but the symbolism of South-South aid was
important. Peru again voted with China at the commission
in 1996. That August, the speaker of the Peruvian
parliament, visiting Beijing, said pointedly in the
context of a discussion on human rights that his country
did not interfere with China's internal affairs. High-
level exchanges also took place in 1995 with Brazil,
Chile, and Cuba.\6\
In June 1996, following the April vote in the Human Rights
Commission, Wu Yi went on a month-long tour of seven Latin
American countries, Argentina, Cuba, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay
and Chile, all but Peru to be members of the commission for
the coming year. In November 1996, Li Peng went back to Latin
America, visiting two members of the commission whose voting
records had been inconsistent, Brazil and Chile. Brazil was
key. Until 1996, it had abstained on all votes on China, in
April 1996, it voted against China's efforts to stop action
on a resolution. Li Peng's delegation specifically raised the
issue during the visit expressing unhappiness with the
Brazilian vote, and officials at the Brazilian Ministry of
Foreign Relations reportedly discussed the possibility of
abstaining on a no-action motion in 1997. The Chinese
premier's visit produced agreement on a consulate in Hong
Kong after July 1, 1997, on peaceful use of space technology
and on sustainable development initiatives. Trade issues were
also on the agenda.
Chile had voted with China in 1992, then abstained on all
votes until 1996 when it joined Brazil to vote against
China's efforts

[[Page H1185]]

to stop debate. During his November visit, Li Peng announced
tariff reductions of more than 10 percent on Chilean
agricultural goods and signed agreements on scientific and
technological cooperation in agricultural and aerospace. As
with Peru, the substance of the agreements between Chile and
China was less important than the political symbolism of Li
Peng's visit, and as with Brazil, the Geneva vote was almost
certainly on the agenda.
The presidents of Ecuador and Mexico and the foreign
minister of Uruguay all visited Beijing between May and
December 1996.\7\ Closer ties between China and Latin
America, as indicated by high-level exchanges, underscored
the fact that sponsors of a resolution critical of China
could not take the votes of Latin American members of the
commission for granted. They would have to undertake some
sustained lobbying, and apparently they did not.

IV. Africa

If the U.S. and Europe and other sponsors of a resolution
were serious about a multilateral initiative to exert
pressure on China, it was essential that they bring some
African members of the commission on board. Admittedly, it
would not have been an easy task, given Chinese diplomatic
initiatives and interests in the region, but save for some
modest measures in 1994 like U.S. National Security Adviser
Anthony Lake's discussions (see above), the sponsors put
little energy into finding support from African governments.
China, on the other hand, was energetic. Since the end of
the Cold War, it has seen African countries as critically
important allies, particularly in the United Nations, in the
struggle against American ``hegemonism.''\8\ With its
history of colonialism and the fact that for the North, it
had become the ``forgotten continent,'' Africa has been
viewed as a desirable partner in China's efforts to
``bypass'' the United States.\9\ In addition, China had a
strong interest in stepping up its diplomacy in the region
to counter Taiwan's aggressive campaign to expand ties
with some African states.
China embarked on a concerted diplomatic campaign in Africa
in mid-1995. Although the main objective may have been to
blunt Taiwan's influence, it may not be coincidental that the
campaign began after China lost a no-action motion and nearly
lost the resolution in Geneva in March 1995, or that the
countries singled out in this campaign were also for the most
part members of the commission.
In October-November 1995, well before the 1996 session of
the commission convened, Li Lanqing traveled to six central
and western African countries: Mali, Guinea, Senegal, Gabon,
Cameroon and Cote d'Ivoire. Of these, all but Senegal were
members of the commission. In November, Quao Shi, a leading
member of the Central Committee and chairman of Standing
Committee of China's National people's Congress (China's
parliament), went to Egypt, another key member of the
commission. All the countries included in these two visits
voted with China in the April 1996 ``no-action'' motion.
By contrast, from September 1995 to March 1996 there were
few high-level exchanges between the U.S. and African members
of the commission, and when they took place, China was not on
the agenda. Angolan president Dos Santos made a state visit
to Washington, D.C. on December 8, 1995, for example, but
amid the many issues on the U.S.-Angolan agenda, support for
a critical position in the U.N. toward China's human rights
practices was reportedly not one Madeleine Albright, then
U.S. ambassador to the U.N. visited Angola in January 1996,
but apparently made no effort to press for Angola's support
at the Human Rights Commission. Angola ranks fourth among
China's African trading partners and has consistently voted
with China at the Human Rights Commission. If the U.S. was
serious about generating international pressure on China
through the U.N., its officials would have seen the visits by
its officials as an opportunity to put multilateralism into
practice and raise the issue of a resolution in Geneva.
Ethiopia, a key member of the commission, exchanged visits
with European and American officials, with development
assistance and security the main issues at stake. German
President Herzog visited Ethiopia in January 1996, during
which he signed an aid agreement for the purchase and
transport of fertilizers, and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi
spent two days in Paris, meeting with the French prime
minister and with President Chirac. In neither case was there
any indication that the China vote was on the agenda, and a
source close to the U.S. delegation to Geneva told Human
Rights Watch that no attempt was made to lobby Ethiopia for
its vote.
China appeared to have stepped up its efforts to ensure a
similar victory in the 1997 session. Following the end of the
1996 commission meeting in April, all fifteen African members
of the commission sent or received high-ranking visitors from
China. In May 1996, according to Chinese reports, President
Jiang himself ``crossed a thousand mountains and rivers to
enhance friendship, deepen unity, and learn from the African
people.'' visiting a total of six countries as he covered the
continent ``from North to South, from east to West.'' Of the
six countries, four, Ethiopia, Egypt, Mali an Zimbabwe, were
members or about to become members of the commission. At a
meeting of the Organization of African States, Jiang stressed
that China would be an ally in Africa's drive to develop;
and, in fact, over twenty-three agreements and protocols on
Sino-African cooperation were signed in May alone. They
primarily provided for basic construction projects in
transport and energy.\10\
During meetings in Beijing in May 1996, two days before he
left for his African tour, President Jiang pledged economic
and military support for Mozambique, which rotated on to the
commission in time for the 1997 session, at the same time,
Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian discussed details of the
bilateral ties between the two nations' militaries and
provided Mozambique with quantities of new weapons. Sino-
Mozambiquan relations went into a tailspin in 1996 when China
abruptly pulled out of an agreement to build a new
parliament building. The visit in May was an effort to
repair relations but it could also help produce a pro-
China vote in the commission this March.
Jiang Zemin was present in Zimbabwe in May 1996 when
Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Wu Yi
signed agreements for US$10 million in grants and an
additional US$10 million in loans, as well as other
agreements on trade, reciprocal protection of investment and
technological and economic cooperation. Earlier an
agricultural group from China studied the possibilities of
importing cotton and tobacco from Zimbabwe. In 1995, the
first time Zimbabwe voted on a China resolution in Geneva, it
voted for the no-action motion and against the China
resolution; in 1996 it again voted in favor of no action on
China.
Following Jiang Zemin's May 1996 visit to Mali, China
signed agreements on economic and technological cooperation
during meetings in Beijing between Premier Li Peng and Mali's
president, and the Chinese vice-minister of agriculture
signed an agreement to assist Mali in building a number of
factories. In 1996, when Mali voted on the China question for
the first time, it voted in favor of the no-action motion.
Jiang Zemin also traveled to Ethiopia in May on a good will
visit during which four cooperation agreements were signed.
China-Ethiopian economic relations have been minimal compared
with China's relationships with other African countries.
Before Jiang's visit, Chinese journalists made much of an
Ethiopian irrigation project completed with help from thirty-
eight Chinese experts. In 1990, Ethiopia voted for a no-
action motion and then went off the commission until 1995,
when it voted in favor of the no-action motion but abstained
when the resolution itself was voted on. In 1996 it again
voted in favor of no action.
Algeria was already considered in the China camp. Jiang
Zemin and the president of Algeria met in Beijing in October
to discuss bilateral relations and to sign six documents
including one protecting and encouraging reciprocal
investment. Algeria has had a strong and continuous
relationship with China which helped with a heavy water
research reactor, and has been involved in irrigation,
agricultural, and research projects including a three-star
hotel in Algiers. In January 1997, Foreign Minister Qian
Qichen paid a quick visit to Algeria, meeting with the
foreign minister to discuss strengthening bilateral
cooperation.
Uganda became a member of the commission in time to vote
with China on the 1996 no-action motion. While the commission
was still meeting in April 1996, Li Zhaoxin, China's vice-
minister of foreign affairs, agreed to provide US$3.6 million
to cover the costs of a national stadium. In January 1997, at
the request of the Ugandan government, China agreed to send
technical personnel for two years to provide guidance in
connection with the stadium project.
Li Peng and the president of Gabon, meeting in Beijing in
August 1996, stressed the importance of their relationship
and their support for the rights of developing nations. Gabon
abstained in 1992 on a no-action motion but has since voted
solidly in the Chinese camp.
When Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Tian Zengpei met with
the Guinean Foreign Affairs Minister in Guinea in April while
the commission meeting was still in session, he thanked him
for Guinea's support on the human rights issue. Guinea, a new
member of the commission as of the 1996 session, voted for no
action on the China resolution.
During a visit to South Africa, China's largest trading
partner in Africa, in May 1996, Wu Yi negotiated promises of
expanded trade ties and reciprocal ``most favored nation
trading status.'' The importance of China to South Africa's
economy was underscored in December 1996 when President
Nelson Mandela abruptly abandoned diplomatic support for
Taiwan and recognized Beijing as the sole representative of
China.
Buhe, the vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress paid a goodwill visit to Benin in
December 1996. Although Benin had voted with China in 1996,
it abstained on both the no-action motion and the resolution
itself in 1995.
Both the timing and the high-profile nature of most of
these exchanges highlight the likely difficulties of getting
African countries to abstain on a China resolution, let alone
vote in favor, in 1997. If the U.S. and Europe had been
committed to seeing a resolution pass, both would have had to
have engaged in intensive lobbying beginning in late 1996.

V. Central and Eastern Europe

After March 1995, high-level Chinese officials logged
considerate mileage traveling to

[[Page H1186]]

the Russian Federation and to two former Soviet republics,
Belarus and the Ukraine. All three countries were to be 1996
commission members. Belarus for the first time, and the
Ukraine for the first time since 1990.
In 1995, after Russia helped to defeat a no-action motion,
its delegates switched their vote and the resolution itself
failed as a result. It seemed logical in 1996, that if China
were to avoid another near embarrassment, it would have to
guarantee Russia's vote on the no-action motion itself. Not
since 1990 had Russia voted to send a resolution to the
floor. Furthermore, it was generally agreed that the
Belarussian president, anxious for reunification with Russia,
would vote with Russia. Of course China had other political
and economic stakes in its relations with Central and Eastern
Europe that may have been the driving force behind much of
the activity outlined below; but with the Geneva vote so
important to Beijing, lining up commission members was a
likely factor.
In June 1995, Li Peng visited all three states. During his
visit to Belarus, there was agreement on bilateral
cooperation in trade, science, technology, manufacturing, and
agriculture. In the Ukraine, he signed a note worth 8.5
million renminbi (approximately US$1.7 million) in economic
assistance. In August, as a follow-up to the June visits, the
vice-minister of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic
Cooperation (MOFTEC) led a trade delegation to the region.
The direction of the visits reversed in September when the
vice-prime minister of Russia went to Beijing, followed in
November by a vice-minister from the Belarussian Ministry of
Foreign Economic Relations, and in December by the Ukrainian
president. During a meeting with Jiang Zemin, the two signed
a joint communique furthering bilateral economic and
political cooperation. In April 1996 while the Human Rights
Commission was in session, Qiao Shi, chairman of Standing
Committee on China's National People's Congress (parliament),
traveled to Moscow to meet with top Russian officials in
preparation for meetings later in the month with three
central Asian republics. That same month, China exchanged
ministerial visits with both Belarus and the Ukraine. At the
invitation of Qian Qichen, the Belarussian foreign minister
traveled to Beijing. During a meeting with Li Peng, he
thanked him for China's support of Belarus on international
issues and described as ``encouraging'' the 60 percent growth
in bilateral trade in 1995. Qiao Shi traveled to the Ukraine
for a four-day visit aimed at expanding cooperation between
the two countries. Shipbuilding, aircraft manufacturing and
instrument products were cited as industries for cooperation.
In the wake of all this activity, Russia abstained and
Belarus and Ukraine voted with China in favor of no action on
the resolution at the 1996 commission session. Two days after
the vote, President Boris Yeltsin was warmly welcomed in
Beijing by Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, and Qiao Shi. The major
accomplishments of the meetings included an agreement signed
by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan
strengthening border confidence, a Sino-Russian joint
communique to serve as ``the principled basis for the two
countries' constructive partnership during the 21st century''
\11\ and a dozen cooperation agreements, including ones on
intellectual property rights, cooperation on the peaceful use
of nuclear energy, and development for mutual prosperity. In
addition, representatives from both countries
discussed cooperation on military technologies. By
December 1996, when Li Peng visited Moscow, plans were
being laid for an April 1997 summit on security. At the
same time, Russia agreed to lend China US$2.5 billion for
nuclear power plant construction and to sell arms to
Beijing. And Li and Viktor Chernomyrdin discussed raising
bilateral trade volume and cooperation on large-scale
projects.
In November, the Belarussian president told Li Lanqing
during his visit to Minsk that improving Belarus-Chinese
relations was of strategic importance to Belarus, adding that
he attached great importance to developing bilateral trade
and that he welcomed Chinese entrepreneurs willing to invest
in Belarus. The following month, the acting prime minister of
Belarus attended a signing ceremony in Beijing for agreements
on educational cooperation and on ensuring the quality of
exported and imported goods.
A well-documented effort by the Chinese government to gain
support in the commission from central European countries
began before the 1994 vote. Poland, to the surprise of
delegation members themselves, members of Parliament, and
local human rights groups, abstained from voting on the no-
action resolution instead of voting against it as it had the
year before. Instructions from the Polish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs had arrived just before the actual vote took place.
China had reportedly agreed to support Poland's effort to
gain a seat in the Security Council in exchange for the
abstention. A representative of the ministry later explained
to the Polish parliament that the vote had come about as a
result of a ``mistake'' by a junior official.
In 1995, Li Peng wrote to Polish Prime Minister Pawlak to
thank him for his support in Geneva in 1994 and asked for
``even more substantial support in 1995.'' The offer to
promote a Security Council seat was reiterated. After the
main Warsaw newspaper publicized the ``vote trade'' and media
pressure mounted, Poland's vote against the no-action
resolution helped to defeat it.
Two other Central European countries on the 1997 commission
have received more attention from the U.S. and Europe than
from China, and the commission votes may reflect this. With
the exception of 1992 when it abstained, Bulgaria has voted
against China in the no-action motion, and the Czech
Republic, back on the commission after a hiatus of three
years, would be unlikely to succumb to Chinese pressure.

VI. Asia

Most Asian countries were already voting solidly with
China. In 1995 and 1996, the only countries that did not were
the three Asian democracies, Japan, the Philippines and
Korea. Japan has consistently voted in favor of a resolution;
the Republic of Korea has consistently abstained; and the
Philippines, which voted with China in 1992 before going off
the commission for two years, voted against China in 1995
after a territorial dispute with China flared up in the South
China Sea. In 1996, Korea and the Philippines abstained; both
were considered swing votes for 1997.
Korea, which resumed diplomatic relations with China in
1992, has heavy economic stakes in China. The chaebol or
conglomerate Goldstar is expected to invest US$10 billion in
China by the year 2005, and Daewoo is planning to contribute
960 million renminbi (approximately US$120 million) to the
building of an expressway. Daewoo will participate in the
operation of the road for thirty years, after which it will
belong to Huangshan City, its Chinese partner. During Jiang
Zemin's visit to the Philippines in November 1996, China
promised to build two power plants and pledged bilateral
cooperation.
Other important efforts in Asia included Jiang Zemin's
November-December 1996 goodwill tour South Asia with stops in
India, Pakistan, and Nepal.
India has consistently voted with China, a reflection
perhaps of its own rejection of external human rights
pressure, especially on the sensitive issue of Kashmir. Sino-
Indian relations, however, have also steadily improved since
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Foreign Minister Qian
Qichen accompanied President Jiang to India in November
1996 to promote bilateral relations in politics, trade,
economy, and culture. The primary issue among the two
regional powers was security, and an agreement was reached
on military zones on the Sino-Indian border.
While in Nepal in early December 1996 to mark the twenty-
fifth anniversary of King Birendra's ascension to the throne
of Nepal, Jiang Zemin witnessed the signing of a grant of
economic and technical assistance.
In his December swing through Pakistan, a traditional ally
and leader of the efforts in the commission to prevent a
resolution on China from coming up for debate, Jiang Zemin
oversaw the signing of agreements on construction of a
hydroelectric power plan, environmental protection, drug
trafficking, and establishment of consulates, including
maintenance of Pakistan's consulate in Hong Kong. Pakistani
President Farooq Leghari noted that there was no difference
between Pakistan and China on Tibet, and Pakistan
``completely supports China.'' He also stated how happy he
was that China would resume sovereignty over Hong Kong ``and
hoped for a peaceful joining of Taiwan with China as soon as
possible.'' \12\

VII. Waffling in 1997

It was clear by November 1996 that sponsorship of a
resolution on China at the 1997 U.N. Human Rights Commission
was in for a rough ride. On November 24, at a debriefing
following President Clinton's meeting with Jiang Zemin at the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Manila, a
senior administration official said that ``the president said
that we want to maintain dialogue and cooperate on [human
rights], but on the present record we could not forgo
presenting [. . .] a resolution.'' The implication was clear:
any nominal gesture or open-ended promise on China's part
that could be interpreted as progress on human rights might
be enough to derail a resolution.
The European Union played a similar game of delaying a
decision on the resolution by bouncing consideration of the
question from one E.U. body to another. When the E.U. Human
Rights Working Group (HRWG) could not reach a decision on
what to do about a resolution at its meeting on December 13,
1996, further consideration was delayed almost a month until
January 10 when the Political Affairs Working Group, with
representatives from all fifteen E.U. capitals, met in
Brussels. The meeting decided to refer the issue back to the
HRWG despite the fact that a straw poll of political
directors had found an overwhelming majority in favor of a
resolution and the HRWG had recommended that the E.U. move
quickly. Rather than taking a firm decision to exert pressure
through a resolution, the political affairs meeting discussed
a variety of ways of avoiding confrontation at the
commission, including pushing for consensus rather than
majority vote on resolutions and substitution of
investigations by the U.N. thematic mechanisms for commission
resolutions.\13\ Just as the HRWG was about to meet on
January 23, China suddenly proposed a human rights discussion
on February 14 around the edges of the Asia-Europe (ASEM)
foreign ministers' meeting in Singapore, providing some E.U.
countries with a pretext for delaying a decision once
more. (For months, the E.U. had been unsuccessful in
trying to schedule a formal E.U.-China human rights
dialogue, originally scheduled for October

[[Page H1187]]

1996). But China offered no human rights concessions or
gestures during the meeting, according to diplomatic
sources.
The U.S. also refused to commit itself to the one
multilateral initiative that might have exerted real pressure
on China, with officials reiterating that Sino-U.S. relations
could not be ``held hostage'' to human rights concerns and
that a decision about sponsorship would be made ``when the
time came.'' During the U.S. Senate hearing on January 8,
1997 to confirm Madeleine Albright as secretary of state,
Albright went so far as to imply that China's previous record
was of no import, what counted was ``in the remaining weeks''
how China ``approach[ed] that situation'' and whether any
changes took place. Different administration officials gave
the same message: the U.S. position would be determined based
on China's actions between ``now''--and ``now'' became later
and later--and the time of the commission vote. A week after
Albright's confirmation hearing, the Chinese government
warned of complications in the bilateral relationship if the
U.S. pressed on rights issues.\14\ No concrete promises or
assurances resulted from a visit to Beijing on January 30-31
by a low-level delegation from the National Security Council
and the State Department, aimed at exploring the
possibilities for a human rights breakthrough.
On January 21, the Clinton administration moved to ensure
consistency in the U.S.-E.U. position. A diplomatic demarche
circulated to E.U. members in Brussels stated that ``we are
continuing to talk with the Chinese about what meaningful
concrete steps they might take to avoid confrontation in
Geneva,'' and it suggested that to make compliance easier,
the E.U. ask China for the same minimal concessions: releases
of prisoners with medical problems, resumption of discussions
on prison visits, and signing and submitting to the National
People's Congress for ratification the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The U.S. did state
its willingness to cosponsor a resolution if China's
performance did not improve but did not set a time frame or
deadline for making a formal decision. President Clinton
himself went further, stating at his January 24 press
conference that there was no need to press China on human
rights because the current government would, like the Berlin
Wall, eventually fall.\15\
Six days later, the Clinton administration was back to
justify no decision in terms of seeking improvements. On
January 30, Secretary Albright relayed that message when she
met in Washington with Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van Micrlo
and Sir Leon Britian, vice-president of the European
Commission and a strong supporter of commercial
diplomacy.\16\ Given the deterioration of human rights in
China across the board over the past year, however, trying to
seek ``improvements'' in the few months before the commission
meetings began was disingenuous at best.
Secretary Albright's visit to Beijing on February 24--just
prior to Deng Xiaoping's funeral--provided another
opportunity to avoid a resolution, pending the outcome of her
high-level discussions with Jiang Zemin, Li Peng and other
senior officials. A report in the New York Times, published
the day she arrived in Beijing, outlined the possible
elements of a deal, although the administration vehemently
denied the story's suggestion that a bargain was imminent, it
did not dispute the other details.\17\ Albright left Beijing,
empty-handed but noting that breakthroughs before had not
come during high-level visits but often several weeks or
months afterwards, so as not to give the impression that
foreign pressure had been involved.
Three days after her visit, however, a Chinese Foreign
Ministry spokesman announced that China was giving ``positive
consideration'' to signing the two major international human
rights agreements, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights. However, he went on to say, ``as
to when we would join, that is entirely our own affair.'' It
is worth noting that in November 1993, China had announced
that it was giving ``positive consideration'' to access to
its prisons by the International Committee of the Red Cross,
not long afterwards, negotiations with the ICRC came to a
standstill.
But two days after the February 27 statement on the
covenants, China announced that it had agreed to ``resume our
contact [with the ICRC] after a two-year hiatus.'' \18\ An
ICRC spokesman noted that these were ``talks about talks to
begin talks.'' The only element of a deal that had not been
announced by China by the end of February, then, was the
release of key dissidents.
It was left to Vice President Gore to try to close any deal
during his late March visit. Meanwhile the E.U. had met in
Brussels on February 24 and decided to put off any decision
on a resolution, waiting instead for the outcome of
Albright's trip. Immediately following Gore's visit,
Australian Prime Minister John Howard is due in Beijing, as
are Canada's foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy (in April), and
French President Jacque Chirac (in May).
While the E.U. and the U.S. were procrastinating, the U.N.
High Commissioner for Human Rights Jose Ayala Lasso announced
on February 10, before the sudden announcement of his
resignation, that he had received and accepted in principle
an invitation from China to visit. The timing of the
invitation was clearly an effort to try to undermine the
already dim prospects for a successful resolution by
demonstrating China's openness to cooperation on human rights
with the U.N.

VIII. Conclusion

For the last two years, the diplomacy surrounding a China
resolution at the U.N. Human Rights Commission has been
marked by a sorry lack of will and outright hypocrisy on the
part of those countries that purport to defend human rights.
The U.S. and E.U. member governments in particular have
watched in near-silence as penalties for dissent in China
steadily increased. The one tool that even U.S. and European
critics of a vocal human rights policy were willing to
support was a resolution in Geneva because it was by
definition multilateral and less damaging, it was thought, to
bilateral relations.
But by 1997, American and European leaders appeared ready
to take any promise the Chinese government was willing to
make as evidence of progress on human rights and as a pretext
for backing out of a resolution. At the same time, it had
ensured that no such resolution could ever pass by holding
off so long on the lobbying needed to build support at the
commission even as China was engaged in steady and effective
lobbying of its own. The U.S. and Europe have sent a clear
message that powerful countries will be allowed to abuse
international standards with impunity. That signal is a
disservice to the United Nations and to the cause of human
rights.

footnotes

\1\ See, for example, the statements of Chinese diplomats in
press releases issued by the U.N. Commission for Human Rights
during its 1996 session: Wu Jianmin in Press Release HR/CN/
96/03, March 19, 1996, p. 4 and Zhang Jun in Press Release
HR/CN/96/13, March 26, 1996, p. 4.
\2\ Washington Post, ``U.N. Rights Panel Votes Down Measure
Censuring China,'' March 9, 1995.
\3\ ``Failure of UN Human Rights Resolution Hailed,'' Xinhua,
April 24, 1996, in FBIS, CHI-96-081.
\4\ Commission members serve for three-year terms, but may
serve more than one term.
\5\ David Sanger, ``Two Roads to China: Nice and Not So
Nice--Boeing's Strategy is Appeasement; Microsoft Growls,''
New York Times, June 9, 1996.
\6\ Li Ruihuan, chairman of the National Committee of the
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)
and often suggested as a possible successor to Li Peng, went
to Cuba in June 1995, followed by a nine-day trip by Fidel
Castro to China in December, his first visit ever.
\7\ Li Peng met with the president of Ecuador in May and with
the foreign minister of new commission member Uruguay in
October. (In June, Uruguay had hosted Wu Yi and a trade
delegation. In its previous three years on the commission,
1992-94, Uruguay had abstained on the China no-action votes.)
Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon met with
Jiang Zemin in November 1996.
\8\ ``Profit and Prejudice: China in Africa,'' China News
Analysis, No. 1574, December 15, 1996, p. 6.
\9\ ``Profit and Prejudice: China in Africa,'' China News
Analysis, No. 1574, December 15, 1996, p. 6.
\10\ ``Profit and Prejudice: China in Africa,'' China News
Analysis, No. 1574, December 15, 1996, p. 3.
\11\ ``Yelstin Adviser Stresses Importance of Upcoming
Visit,'' Xinhua, April 22, 1996; in FBIS-CHI-96-080, April
24, 1996.
\12\ ``Spokesman on Jiang Zemin Visit,'' The News
(Islamabad), December 2, 1996, Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, FBIS-CHI-96-232.
\13\ The U.N. thematic mechanisms include, among others, the
Special Rapporteurs on Torture; Summary and Arbitrary
Execution; Religious Intolerance; Freedom of Expression;
Independence of the Judiciary; Violence Against Women; and
Sale of Children, as well as Working Groups on Disappearances
and Arbitrary Detention. At China's invitation, the Special
Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance visited in November 1994.
Not only have none of his recommendations been implemented,
but religious repression in China has intensified in the two
years since the visit. Negotiations for a visit by the
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention are ongoing.
\14\ ``Mutual Respect Needed,'' China Daily (English language
version), January 15, 1997, p. 4.
\15\ ``I don't think there is any way that anyone who
disagrees with that in China can hold back that [liberty],
just as eventually the Berlin Wall fell. I just think it's
inevitable.'' Quoted from his press conference in Jim Mann,
``Clinton's `Berlin Wall' Theory on China Steeped in
Paradoxes,'' Washington Post, February 12, 1997.
\16\ South China Morning Post, ``Rights Action Urged to Avoid
Censure,'' January 30, 1997.
\17\ Patrick E. Tyler, ``U.S. and Chinese Seen Near a Deal on
Human Rights,'' New York Times, February 24, 1997.
\18\ Patrick E. Tyler, ``China and Red Cross Agree to New
Talks on Jail Visits,'' New York Times, March 1, 1997.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my
time.
Mr. DAVIS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume, and I rise in support of this resolution, as amended. The
resolution before the House, as amended, urges the administration to
reconsider the decision made this weekend as to whether to pursue a
resolution of the upcoming meeting in Geneva of the United Nations
Human Rights Commission. Two concerns I would like to express about the
resolution before I further express my support for the resolution.
The first is the European Union has gone on record as having made a
decision not to cosponsor or introduce such a resolution in this
upcoming meeting. I think it is terribly important, as our country
continues to assert its leadership in the goal in which we all share,
which is to advance the issue of human rights in China and around the
world, we recognize that the resolutions that we support are those that
we want to

[[Page H1188]]

win and going into this particular meeting of the U.N. without the
support of the European Union could spell disaster in that regard.
The second point to note again is that the administration has made a
decision, and that is not to pursue a resolution in this upcoming
meeting. Therefore, this resolution before the House today would have
been more appropriate to have been brought up last week. The
administration has acted. The resolution before the House, as amended,
urges the administration to reconsider that decision, but it is
unfortunate we are a little behind the curve in that regard.
On balance I think it is necessary for the United States to send a
very strong message to China and to the rest of the world that we are
concerned about the plight of human rights in China and our resolve in
that regard is stronger than ever. People in China, including the
government and leadership, need to make no mistake about it. Americans
care very deeply about human rights in China. Our ability to have a
decent relationship with China will continue to be circumscribed as
long as the Chinese government continues to abuse its citizens. I plan
to vote for this resolution and urge my colleagues to do the same.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes and 30 seconds to the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Pelosi).
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the
time. I thank the committee for its hard work in bringing this
resolution to the floor. Indeed, as my colleague the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Davis) mentioned, the President announced a decision last
Friday, and he said that we were behind the curve. I think indeed that
the White House, anticipating a strong vote in this body, tried to
preempt the actions of the House of Representatives, knowing that the
Senate voted 95 to 5 in favor of this resolution. The administration
wanted to cut us off at the pass, and that is why we are not late but
they took the action that they did.
Nonetheless, I commend the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith), the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Davis), the gentleman from Indiana (Mr.
Hamilton), the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter), and all those
who worked to put this resolution together for the administration to
reconsider its ill-advised decision, and for the following reasons.
First of all, Mr. Speaker, it would be a very sad, sad occurrence
that in this, the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, that we would give a victory to the authoritarian regime
in China by not pursuing a resolution condemning China's human rights
practices at the U.N. Human Rights Commission. There is no real
progress to report on stated pieces of the administration's human
rights policy, including, and these are the criteria the administration
uses, ensuring access to Chinese prisons for the International Red
Cross, promoting a dialogue between his holiness the Dalai Lama and the
Chinese government and obtaining the release of political and religious
prisoners. The Clinton administration has hung its decision on the slim
reed of the agreement by China, the announcement by China to sign the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. How can it be
that this administration would say that because the Chinese say they
would sign this document we would not pursue the resolution at the U.N.
when the U.S. itself has taken action at the same venue, the same
commission, against Nigeria, Iran, Sudan, Iraq, Rwanda, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, Yugoslavia and Equatorial Guinea. These countries
signed that covenant and the administration, recognizing that that
signature is not of itself worth much unless there is ratification and
implementation, has in the past pursued a resolution against, for
condemnation against these countries at the same venue.
When President Clinton delinked trade and human rights in 1994, he
said very, very specifically that he would pursue the issue at the
Human Rights Commission, that he would use multilateral fora, including
the U.N. commission, and would press, would press for the passage of a
resolution, appointed a rapporteur to report on China's human rights
violation.
When my colleague says we would like to select fights that we can
win, I would beg respectfully to differ. To the people in China and
many of their representatives in the dissident community, both in China
and in the U.S., namely, for one, Wei Jingsheng, have said that it is
very, very important for the U.S. to continue to push for this; whether
we win or lose, the Chinese people must know that we stand with them.
He has himself said, I urge, this is from Wei Jingsheng, many members
in this body fought for his release from prison, we had hoped it would
not be exile from his country, as the Chinese have executed, but
release from prison and the ability to speak freely in China. But
nonetheless the exiled Wei Jingsheng says, in a letter to Members of
Congress, I urge my friends in the United States Congress to clearly
show the Chinese people the basic values of the American people. I urge
my friends to pass a clear resolution calling upon your Representatives
and the Commission for Human Rights in Geneva to hold fast in their
position. It is not only for the sake of the American people, but for
the whole of humankind. The values of democracy, freedom and human
rights far exceed the value of money.
He further says, many Chinese, Wei Jingsheng further says, many
Chinese people regard the Human Rights Commission in Geneva as a
barometer to measure the support given by the international community
to the Chinese people in their struggle for human rights and freedom.
In addition to the voice of the dissidents in support of this
resolution, in addition to the promise made by President Clinton to
pursue this resolution when he delinked, in addition to the fact that
this is the 50th anniversary of the universal declaration of human
rights, I urge my colleagues to support this resolution urging the
administration to reconsider because the basis of their decision was
the Chinese promise to support this other convention, to sign this
other convention.
I call to my colleagues' attention, and they may have seen it, I hope
so, over the weekend in the newspapers the reports that the Chinese
government, that we all remember when President Jiang Zemin was here,
he and President Clinton had as the crowning glory, the moment of their
summit the agreement by the Chinese that they would no longer sell
technology for weapons of mass destruction to Iran. On the strength of
that agreement, that written agreement, the Clinton administration
recently certified that on the basis of promises, not performance, that
the Chinese were in accord, in compliance with the accords in terms of
the nuclear arena and that would allow business in the United States to
sell nuclear technology to China. Already the Chinese have violated
that agreement. When they were caught, the administration tried to
hold, to prevent that information, as I mentioned, the Chinese
government in violation of a signed agreement with President Clinton,
which was the flagship issue of the summit, in violation of that the
Chinese government was transferring the technology to the Iranian
government, a lifetime supply of materials for the enrichment of
uranium. When the Chinese were caught the administration tried to
suppress the information to make sure nobody found out about it. When
it was made public, the administration declared victory and said, look,
we stopped the Chinese from doing what they said they were not going to
do in the first place.
The point is their agreements mean nothing. We have to urge the
administration to reconsider its decision. I urge my colleagues to vote
aye.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for her
very strong statement.
I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York
(Mr. Solomon), who has been a leader on human rights in China for many,
many years.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New Jersey who
for 18 years has led a fight on this floor trying to help people who
are oppressed across this world with human rights violations. I thank
the gentleman from Tampa, Florida, who replaced a very good friend of
mine, Sam Gibbons, for his remarks as well. As always, we thank the
gentlewoman from California. She is a real leader in the fight to try
and make the lives of other people throughout this world better.

[[Page H1189]]

Mr. Speaker, I reluctantly support this resolution today. I say
reluctantly because quite frankly it is a shame, quite frankly it is a
scandal that we have to be here at all exhorting our President to do
something that he should be doing without us even asking. Our
President, continuing his five-year unrequited love affair with these
butchers of Beijing, has abandoned the pursuit of improved human rights
in China at the U.N. and that is just so sad. So it falls to us here in
this Congress to pass this resolution today calling on the President to
do the right thing. It is embarrassing, Mr. Speaker.
Once again China's human rights record continues to offend the decent
people in this world and everyone admits it; everyone, that is, except
the Clinton administration and some unbelievably cowardly governments
in Europe who all they want is the almighty dollar. And what a shame
that is. Mr. Speaker, a couple of weeks ago, several Members and I had
a meeting with Richard Gere. Members know who he is; he is a Hollywood
celebrity. He is the cochairman though of the International Campaign
for Tibet. Mr. Gere, who travels to the Tibetan refugee camps in India
frequently and was with me in Taiwan just a couple of weeks ago, told
us how in 1994, when President Clinton shamefully delinked human rights
from trade with China, Communist prison guards began immediately
beating prisoners telling them that no one was going to help them now.
That is not Jerry Solomon saying that. That was Richard Gere who
strongly campaigned for the President and is sorry that he did because
of actions like this.
Unfortunately, we can be sure that the same vile brutality is now
taking place in the wake of President Clinton's and the European
Union's and the U.N.'s gutless decision not to censure China for its
colossal human rights violations. That is why we are here today on this
floor. That is why the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith) introduced
this resolution, and that is why everybody better come over to this
floor and they better pass it unanimously.
Mr. DAVIS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the
gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague and
friend, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Davis), who has been kind
enough to join me in serving with the Congressional Children's Caucus,
and so I know his commitment to the question of equality, human rights
and social justice. Let me acknowledge the gentlewoman from California
(Ms. Pelosi) as well for continuing this fight for simply humanity in
China. The gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), I thank him also for
his leadership. I would like this debate to be perceived as a
bipartisan debate and really less so about whether Congress is behind
the eight ball as to whether or not we in this body, the chief
lawmaking body for this Nation, go on record for a most solemn and
important statement and argument.
I happen to have been one who with great trepidation voted for the
MFN, the most-favored-nation, based upon the many strong arguments that
had been made that if you continue to expose a nation to opportunity,
to democracy, to the respect of human rights, you would see gradually
those changes coming about.

{time} 1530

It would have been interesting to be a fly on the wall during the
tumultuous debates regarding the Soviet Bloc, and then as we saw the
Berlin Wall fall and the rejoicing of democracy in those parts of the
world.
I am hoping and would hope most of us would like to believe that we
have that kind of trend moving forward in China. Sadly, as time goes
on, I am believing that more is needed, and I certainly think the
United Nations resolution dealing with the question of human rights was
more than appropriate.
So I join my colleagues on this day of Saint Patrick, as I am wearing
green for that special occasion, the patron saint who realized how
important it was in his life and in his time that Christianity was
being blocked in Ireland. We have many faiths now. We have many views
now in this world that is becoming smaller and smaller. Why is China
blocking those who may differ with the government? Where is China's
patron saint?
I truly believe that the United States Congress has its right and its
responsibility to be the patron saint of a country that refuses to
acknowledge its place at the world table, and that is with the dignity
of human rights.
So, Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of House Resolution 364, and I
believe that the resolution on the human rights situation in the
People's Republic of China at the 54th session of the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights should be passed.
I know that physically the United States can do little to relieve the
suffering of people of other nations at the hands of their own
government. In fact, China has said that to us on a regular basis.
However, we, as Members of this representative body on behalf of the
American people, can voice concerns regarding human rights and argue
for our government to take a stand. We must argue when policies are
inconsistent with our own interests of simple human justice.
The State Department's country records reports on human rights
practices for 1997 states that the Government of China continues to
commit widespread and well-documented human rights abuses in violation
of internationally accepted norms, including extrajudicial killings,
the use of torture, arbitrary arrests, detention, forced abortion and
sterilization, the sale of organs from executed prisoners, which, by
the way, was reported in the newspaper today again, and tight control
over the exercise of rights of freedom of speech, press and religion.
With this in mind, this body must and should encourage the President
to reconsider his decision. I believe it is important that we
reconsider the decision that was offered just a time a while ago. I
believe it is likewise important that we stand on the side of history
and continue to fight for human rights and human justice.
It is evident from the leadership of the peace movement and others
who have said that the offering and debating of this resolution at the
annual U.N. Human Rights Commission in Geneva advances human rights in
China and Tibet. And we must stand by that argument. China in the past
has shown a willingness to respond to the concerns of the United States
regarding human rights, and I believe that this resolution will make
progress in that area.
Therefore, I strongly encourage my colleagues to support this House
resolution and recognize that today we stand on behalf of those who
deserve human rights and justice in China. Where is China's patron
saint? We need that person and that saint now.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of House Resolution 364, which urges
the introduction and passage of a resolution on the human rights
situation in the People's Republic of China at the 54th Session of the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights
I know that physically the United States can do little to relieve the
suffering of people in other nations at the hands of their own
governments. However, we as members of this representative body on the
behalf of the American people can voice concerns regarding human rights
policies which are inconsistent with our own interest and values.
The State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
1997 state that the Government of China continues to commit widespread
and well-documented human rights abuses, in violation of
internationally accepted norms, including extrajudicial killings, the
use of torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, forced abortion and
sterilization, the sale of organs from executed prisoners, and tight
control over the exercise of rights of freedom of speech, press, and
religion.
With this in mind this body must and should encourage the President
to reconsider his decision announced just a few days ago not to press
for a resolution on human rights violations in China and Tibet at the
54th Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.
History is on the side of action in this debate on whether or not to
press for a resolution at the upcoming United Nations meeting on human
rights. We know that the release last year of Chinese dissident Wei
Jingsheng after the U.S.-China summit and just before Chinese Justice
Minister Xiao Yang arrived in Washington for talks with U.S. officials
came as a result of pressure from the United States.
It is evident from what Wei Jingsheng and others have said that
offering and debating this resolution at the annual U.N. Human

[[Page H1190]]

Rights Commission in Geneva advances human rights in China and Tibet.
In the past the Government of China has made some improvements in human
rights just before the annual Human Rights Commission consideration of
a China resolution.
We know that conditions for political prisoners improve when the
resolution is being debated and they deteriorate when the resolve of
the United States weakens.
The United States has stayed the course since 1990 participating in
multilateral efforts to gain passage of a United Nations Commission on
Human Rights resolution addressing the human rights situation in China.
We should not at this point retreat from our position regarding the
need to improve human rights in China.
China in the past has shown a willingness to respond to the concerns
of the United States regarding human rights, and I believe that this
resolution will make progress in that area. Therefore, I strongly
encourage my colleagues to support of House Resolution 364.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may
consume to the distinguished gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), the
chairman of the full Committee on International Relations.
(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.Res. 364, and
I want to commend the chairman of the Subcommittee on International
Operations and Human Rights, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith),
and the ranking minority member of his committee, the gentleman from
California (Mr. Lantos), for crafting this resolution and bringing it
before us at this time.
I also want to commend the distinguished chairman of our Subcommittee
on Asia and the Pacific, the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter),
and the distinguished chairman of our Committee on Rules, the gentleman
from New York (Mr. Solomon), for their strong support of the measure;
in addition to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), who has
been an activist for human rights in China.
In response to Beijing's announcement last week that it would sign
the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the
administration's desire to send President Clinton off to China on a
Presidential visit, the Clinton administration has reported that it
will not sponsor a China human rights resolution in Geneva. This is
distressing to many of us. The President should reconsider his
reluctance to underscore our Nation's opposition to China's consistent
violations of human rights.
To say the least, Beijing's track record of living up to its promises
have not been very impressive. Last October, for example, President
Jiang Zemin signed another key treaty, the Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, but the National People's Congress, now in session
in Beijing, has not taken any action thus far to ratify that agreement.
In addition, Beijing has agreed to end the sale of nuclear and
ballistic missile technology to nations that are linked to terrorism,
but their sales continue. They continue to this very day.
Before the President visits China, he really should know when its
leaders are going to sign, ratify and implement both of these
covenants. The President also needs to know when Beijing will amend its
1993 state security law and when it will abolish administrative
detention, including the use of reeducation through labor.
The President also needs to know when Beijing will review the
sentences of more than 2,000 who have been convicted as
counterrevolutionary offenders with a view towards releasing
unconditionally those who are in prison.
And before the President's visit to China, he should be assured that
the government in Beijing are going to give regular access to Tibet and
to East Turkestan by U.N. and private independent human rights
monitors. He should also wait until the Communist government has ended
or eased its registration requirements on religious activities and that
it is taking concrete steps to protect freedom of association with
Chinese workers.
Accordingly, I join with my colleagues in urging this administration
and the President to reconsider their reluctance to sponsor the Geneva
resolution and to put off the Presidential visit until we see some
progress in those critical areas. I urge my colleagues to fully support
H.Res. 364.
Mr. DAVIS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi).
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
I wanted to make one additional point, Mr. Speaker, and that is to
address the issue of the European Community not supporting the
resolution this year. That decision by the EU does not bind the member
states of the EU, and it is possible that some of those countries would
support the resolution, and I certainly hope so, but it would require
leadership on the part of the United States.
I wanted to make the point that Wei Jingsheng has driven home to us,
and that is that as we are considering this resolution, and many of my
colleagues feel much more comfortable dealing with human rights in
China at the Human Rights Commission, and I think that is very
appropriate, and this is not the time to talk about trade issues or
MFN, however Wei Jingsheng would want me to say what he has told me
over and over again, and that is that the huge trade deficit, $50
billion this year, that the Chinese enjoys with the U.S., it is a
surplus to them, is money that they spend buying, buying, in Europe and
other countries that are represented at the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights, buying support.
They have effectively silenced any voices for support for this
resolution, and they do it with our own money. How even more necessary
for us to take leadership at the Commission.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds,
before yielding to the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on
Asia and the Pacific to make one additional point.
I think it is very important to point out that the Chinese
Government, and Human Rights Watch Asia has done a very fine job in
chronicling this, country by country, went out and sought members of
the Human Rights Commission in Geneva and provided favors to those
governments, money, building supplies, all kinds of materiel in order
to buy out those countries from supporting the human rights resolution
last year.
I would ask at the appropriate time that that be made a part of the
Record so that Members can see how the Chinese Government methodically
was able to silence its critics.
Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman
from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter), the very distinguished chairman of the
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.
(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New Jersey for
yielding me this time.
As an original cosponsor of H. Res. 364, this Member rises in strong
support of this resolution which urges the introduction and passage of
a resolution on the human rights situation in the People's Republic of
China at the U.N. Human Rights Commission in Geneva. The Commission
began its annual session on March 16th.
This administration seems to believe strongly in using the United
Nations where appropriate. This is the appropriate place for the human
rights abuses in China to be brought to the attention of the world
community. I regret the fact that it is not going to be pursued by the
administration.
The resolution we have before us today, crafted by the gentleman from
New Jersey, with input from many people, including this Member, quotes
from the State Department Human Rights Report of 1997 noting that the
Government of China continued to commit widespread and well-documented
human rights abuses, which included extrajudicial killings, torture,
forced abortion and sterilization, as well as expanded attempts to
control religion.
Certainly Beijing is annoyed that year after year the United States
has raised this issue at the U.N. Human Rights Commission. But for many
in this body who are genuinely interested in Sino-American relations,
human rights is an entirely appropriate U.S. concern. Thus, this Member
regrets that late last week the administration decided not to press for
a U.N. resolution censuring China for human rights

[[Page H1191]]

abuses, citing that the Beijing Government is gradually changing it is
progressive practices and may be ready to make new releases of
political dissidents. That may be a correct conclusion. I hope it is.
But I do believe it is the wrong approach.
I think we use this Human Rights Commission forum whenever
appropriate. And while it is true that during the past year China has
made some concessions, such as the release of dissident Wei Jingsheng
from prison, this Member urges the administration to continue to press
China on human rights even if the U.N. meeting in China, very
unfortunately, is not to be the forum by the choosing of this
administration.
As the Members of this body are aware, this Member supports
engagement with the People's Republic of China. This year's summit
represented expanded engagement of the PRC, which this Member believes
will successfully promote Democratic ideals and standards throughout
this country. That said, this does not mean that we should remain
silent regarding human rights abuses in China.
The gentlewoman from California has brought up the European
Commission and the European Union, and I think that is entirely
appropriate. They say we are not going to pursue this in the U.N. Human
Rights Commission because we believe in constructive engagement. Well,
so do I, and so do many Members of this body, and so do the
administrations of both parties, but that does not mean that we fail to
use the U.N. Human Rights Commission.
I think it is a shameful lack of courage on the part of the
Commission. I am talking about the European Commission and the European
Union. It is true, as the gentlewoman said, that members are free to go
their own way and support and introduce such a resolution before the
U.N. Human Rights Commission. Denmark had the courage to do that last
year. China threatened repercussions on Denmark when they took that
stance, and perhaps they delivered on that. But I do not think that
should be any excuse for the lack of courage on the part of the
Europeans in this respect. And they are very quick to give us advice
gratuitously. Let it be said that this Member, and I think many Members
of this body, are discouraged and very upset with their decision.
This resolution, therefore, is an important statement on the part of
the U.S. House of Representatives. It puts, through H.Res. 364, us on
record that the very real human rights questions and concerns that the
American people have raised regarding the PRC are certainly voiced in
this body.
This Member again commends the author of the resolution, the
distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on International Operations
and Human Rights, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith), for this
initiative. He has pursued it previously, as already mentioned.
This Member also thanks the distinguished chairman of the Committee
on International Relations, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman),
for assisting us in moving this initiative in such an expeditious
manner.
Mr. Speaker, I urge all Members to vote for the adoption of H.Res.
364.
Mr. DAVIS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds to
thank my good friend from Nebraska, the chairman of the Subcommittee on
Asia and the Pacific. He is very much involved on a day-to-day basis
with what is going on in China. We have worked cooperatively on this
resolution. He had some very useful text changes, and we thank him for
that.
I wanted to thank the chairman of the full committee, the gentleman
from New York (Mr. Gilman), who is always a great friend of human
rights; the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi); and I want to
thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos), my ranking member of
the subcommittee, and all the Members who have helped forge this
legislation.
Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today as an original cosponsor of
H. Res. 364, a resolution urging the President to secure passage of a
resolution on China's human rights record at the annual meeting of the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) this month in Geneva.
During the past eight years, the United States Government has
participated in nearly all of the annual efforts to pass a resolution
at the UNCHR addressing the Chinese Government's human rights policies.
This pressure has generated limited but important results, such as the
Chinese government's signing of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights and inviting the U.N. Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention to visit last October.
I have long believed that we should press for improvements in the
human rights situation in China through the use of multilateral forums
such as the UNCHR, bilateral negotiations, and other mechanisms such as
the annual debate over renewing Most-Favored-Nation status for China.
Critics of the annual debate on Most-Favored-Nation status for China,
however, have argued that removal of MFN trade treatment for China is
an instrument too blunt for the task at hand. They have urged that in
place of U.S. unilateral action the U.S. should pursue efforts to
ensure a multilateral approach to influence Beijing's human rights
practices. When the Administration decided in 1994 to delink the MFN
issue from human rights considerations, the President acknowledged that
the multilateral dimension of our engagement on human rights in China
remained critical. At that time, he stated that ``the U.S. should step
up efforts, in cooperation with other states, to insist that the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights pass a resolution dealing with the serious
human rights abuses in China.''
To that end, earlier this year I wrote to the President with
Democratic Whip David Bonior and Representative Nancy Pelosi to urge
that the United States Government sponsor and actively lobby for a
resolution on China's human rights record at this month's meeting of
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. In our letter, we argued that it
would be a serious mistake, given the wide scale and continuing human
rights abuses in China and Tibet, to remove that pressure before China
takes concrete steps to comply with international standards. These
steps must include significant improvement in China's overall human
rights practices, including granting freedom of speech, association,
and religion; enacting major legal reforms, including repealing state
security laws and abolishing all so-called ``counter-revolutionary''
crimes; releasing political prisoners; acting to protect freedom of
association for workers; and opening up Tibet to human rights monitors.
I was extremely disappointed to learn on Friday that the
Administration has decided against pressing for passage of a resolution
on China's human rights practices at the U.N. Commission later this
month. Failure to press for passage of a resolution will seriously
undermine our efforts to influence Chinese human rights policies and
represents a step backwards in our efforts to advance the cause of
freedom across the globe.
In making its announcement, the Administration noted that China
intends to sign the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, which would bring about improved multilateral oversight of
China's human rights practices. While I agree that China's
participation in this Covenant will be a significant achievement if it
follows through on its commitment, it does not adequately substitute
for the annual review and dialogue provided by the U.N. Human rights
Commission. After China's first year of participation under this
Covenant, its human rights practices will be subject to international
oversight only once every five years.
We must regularly review China's record in this area to continually
draw international attention to its flagrant abuses of human rights.
Only through such a review can we hope to sustain the momentum
necessary to have any hope for meaningful and systematic changes in
China's behavior. Examination of China's human rights practices only
once every five years is insufficient to create any real momentum for
change. In fact, this will best serve the Chinese Government's interest
by keeping these issues out of public debate most of the time.
Furthermore, I am deeply concerned that a failure by the United
States to take a leading role on this issue at this crucial juncture
would bolster efforts made by China in recent years to eliminate all
international comment on its human rights practices, and would further
fuel China's efforts to weaken the definition of basic universal human
rights and the mechanisms designed to protect them.
It would be particularly disappointing on the fiftieth anniversary of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights if China should succeed in
its efforts to escape the scrutiny of the one international body
mandated to protect and promote human rights. The U.N. Commission on
Human Rights is one of the few instruments by which the international
community has the opportunity to voice concern about human rights
practices around the world. Lack of action at the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights would greatly undermine multilateral pressure on the
Chinese government.

[[Page H1192]]

I hope the President will reconsider his decision not to lead efforts
at the U.N. Human Rights Commission later this month, and I urge all
Members to support the adoption of this resolution.

General Leave

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that
all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and
extend their remarks on House Resolution 364.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Barrett of Nebraska). Is there objection
to the request of the gentleman from New Jersey?
There was no objection.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my
time.

{time} 1545

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Barrett of Nebraska). The question is on
the motion offered by the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith) that
the House suspend the rules and agree to the resolution, H. Res. 364,
as amended.
The question was taken.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and
nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 5 of rule I and the
Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this motion will be
postponed.

____________________