[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 28 (Monday, March 16, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1970-S1976]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                  NOMINATION OF JUDGE MASSIAH-JACKSON

  Mr. HATCH. Madam President, Judge Massiah-Jackson has made the right 
decision in withdrawing her nomination to the Federal bench, given the 
strong bipartisan opposition from law enforcement groups, her 
demonstrated leniency in sentencing convicted criminals, and the 
Judiciary Committee's concerns about her lack of candor throughout the 
nomination process. I believe withdrawing the nomination was the right 
thing for her to do. Despite the fact that the committee afforded two 
hearings for this nominee, and gave her ample opportunity to answer 
criticisms of her record, her responses were found to be unconvincing. 
After having heard the nominee's testimony and having considered the 
information provided to the committee by law enforcement officials 
about her treatment of police officers in court and her flawed judicial 
rulings, I would not have voted to confirm this nominee to a lifetime 
appointment to the Federal bench.
  The events surrounding Judge Massiah-Jackson's nomination demonstrate 
the need for the Senate to scrutinize the President's nominees 
carefully. That is what we have been doing. This is not a numbers game. 
We have to look at these people very carefully. They are nominated and, 
if confirmed, are confirmed for lifetime positions. Some people say the 
closest thing to God put in this life is being put on the Federal 
bench, because nobody can criticize you under those circumstances once 
you make it there. So this particular nomination does demonstrate the 
need for scrutiny of any President's nominees.
  Unfortunately, I think many in the legal community do not understand 
the Senate's role in the confirmation process. The Constitution 
obligates the Senate to advise the President with respect to his choice 
in nominees and ultimately consent to their appointment. No one has the 
right to a Senate confirmation anymore than he or she has the right to 
be nominated by the President. Federal judges serve for what amounts to 
life terms. They wield enormous power in our society, power that must 
be exercised fairly and impartially. When the President sends us 
nominees who lack the necessary qualifications to be elevated to the 
Federal bench, the Senate's duty is to bring these deficiencies to 
light.
  In this case, given the bipartisan opposition of law enforcement and 
the nominee's problematic record, I believe withdrawal of the nominee 
was appropriate. But let me add, had this nominee come to a vote today, 
she would have been overwhelmingly defeated by both sides of the aisle. 
There were many Democrats who were going to vote against Massiah-
Jackson, and I think most all Republicans were going to vote against 
her as well. And there were reasons to do so with regard to this 
nomination.

[[Page S1971]]

  Having said that, let me just say that I was impressed with Massiah-
Jackson's family. It is clear that she is a nice woman. It is clear 
that her husband is a very nice man. Her two children whom she 
introduced to the committee looked as though they were just outstanding 
in every way. So I commend her for that, and I hope she has learned 
from this process that people in Philadelphia expect her to be tough on 
crime, to be tough on criminals, and to support the law enforcement 
people when they are right. When they are wrong, she should correct 
them and she should do so vociferously.
  But some of the things that were done really cast such a cloud over 
this nomination that we just could not vote for her in the end, so I 
was pleased that she did the right thing by withdrawing her nomination. 
I feel badly about it, because I believe her to be a nice person. I 
believe that she intends to be a very fine judge, and I commend her to 
work very hard to be that. Being a tough trial judge in Pennsylvania is 
a very great honor. The fact that she has not received consent to this 
nomination and this opportunity should not deter her from proving that 
she could be one of the best trial judges in the State of Pennsylvania 
if she wants to be. I certainly believe she is intelligent enough to 
be. My own personal belief is that she is good enough to be. But 
because of these problems in the past, she is going to have to redeem 
herself in the eyes of the law enforcement community.
  If Judge Massiah-Jackson takes out vengeance against the law 
enforcement community and those who have raised these issues, then she 
will have proven us even more right and she will have proven that the 
action of withdrawal here today was even more right than I believed it 
to have been. I hope she will treat all law enforcement officials with 
the respect that they are due when they appear before her court. I 
practiced law in Pennsylvania for a number of years and I tried a 
number of cases in front of the Common Pleas bench in Pittsburgh, and I 
have to say these are very important judgeships. She still has that 
judgeship. I wish her the best. I am counting on her doing the very 
best she can from here on in, and I have counted on her proving that 
those who have criticized her, though perhaps just at this time, it 
appears, can have faith in the future because of what she has tried to 
do.


                        FAIRNESS TO THE NOMINEE

  Madam President, it has been claimed that the process by which the 
Judiciary Committee has considered this nomination has been in some way 
unfair. I think that assertion is incorrect. In fact, the Committee has 
bent over backwards to ensure that this nominee has been treated 
appropriately.
  The Committee received this nomination on July 31st of last year. 
Senator Specter encouraged the Committee to hold a hearing on the 
nominee even before her paperwork or the background checks were 
completed. That background work was not finished until September 25. 
Shortly thereafter, at Senator Specter's request, a hearing on the 
nominee was scheduled for October 29th. Moreover, I did not object, nor 
did I attempt to intervene, in Senator Specter's decision to hold a 
field hearing in Philadelphia.
  In any event, the Committee held a hearing on the nominee on October 
29th. Although some on the Committee wanted to delay taking action on 
this nomination, at Senator Specter's insistence, we forged ahead. As a 
consequence, the nominee was reported out of Committee on November 6th 
of last year.
  Then, in a rather extraordinary turn of events, a bipartisan 
coalition of law enforcement groups organized to oppose this nominee. 
The Pennsylvania District Attorneys' Association, the Commonwealth 
Attorney General, the Fraternal Order of Police, the National 
Association of Police Officers and the Law Enforcement Alliance of 
America all mobilized to defeat this nominee. Through their efforts, 
the Committee became aware of a number of instances in which the 
nominee demonstrated hostility towards police officers and prosecutors. 
Indeed, the Committee came further to learn that the nominee had not 
been entirely forthcoming with the Committee. The number, and nature, 
of these allegations made it impossible for the Committee to turn a 
blind eye towards them.
  In an effort to be fair, however, the Committee took the unusual step 
of affording Judge Massiah-Jackson the opportunity to respond to these 
charges in a second hearing. Unfortunately, the nominee's testimony in 
that hearing was not particularly compelling--in fact was otherwise.
  Some have complained that this latest hearing was tilted against the 
nominee because she was asked about so-called new cases that she had 
been informed of only the night before.
  While I can understand those concerns, I would note that each of the 
cases reviewed were actually Judge Massiah-Jackson's. Indeed, many of 
the cases that were discussed should have been provided to the 
Committee by Judge Massiah-Jackson herself. Thus, I hardly think it 
fair to say that the Judiciary Committee was somehow disingenuous in 
asking the nominee about her own cases.
  In addition, claims have been made that the manner in which the 
Committee has received critical documents has worked to the nominee's 
disadvantage. While it is true that we have received documents in a 
hodge-podge manner, efforts have been made to ensure that the nominee 
was advised of cases that would be addressed. Moreover, I would again 
like to emphasize, that these are the nominee's cases.
  I would add that the Committee learned that Senator Specter was also 
conducting his own investigation into the nominee's record. According 
to the Philadelphia District Attorney's Association, Senator Specter, 
as is his right, requested numerous transcripts from their office. In 
an effort to keep the record straight and to provide all members access 
to the information, the Committee sent a bipartisan letter, signed by 
myself and Senator Leahy, to Senators Specter and Santorum requesting 
that they provide the Committee copies of all material relevant to 
Judge Massiah-Jackson's nomination.
  I think it is safe the say the new information that the Committee has 
received this past month has been troubling because of the concerns it 
raised about the nominee, but I think it is also fair to say that the 
documents have come to the Committee from a variety of sources, and in 
a confused manner. This allegedly new material includes not only follow 
up information requested by the Committee in order to fulfill its 
ongoing duty to the Senate to evaluate the nominee, but also 
unsolicited material such as trial transcripts, statistical information 
from various entities including the Department of Justice, the 
Pennsylvania District Attorneys' Association, the Philadelphia Bar 
Association, the Philadelphia Bar Association Special Review Committee, 
and other individuals.
  The Committee has had no control over the timing, or the manner in 
which it received these documents. I would just like to outline the 
process by which many of the more significant documents were received:
  The January 30, 1998, Report from the Pennsylvania District 
Attorney's Association, with attached statistical and case analysis, 
which the Committee received the week of February 2, 1998. This was the 
first formal submission from District Attorney's Office concerning this 
nominee. It was promptly distributed to all Committee members.
  A February 12, 1998, Report from the Special Review Committee of the 
Philadelphia Bar Association submission of in response to the District 
Attorney's document, which was received by the Committee February 13, 
1998, was copied and distributed that same day.
  The week of March 2, 1998, the Committee received word from Senator 
Specter's office that it had received material from Philadelphia 
District Attorney's Office. The Committee was unable to have immediate 
access to the materials because it was told that the materials were 
being analyzed by Senator Specter's staff. Only after the Committee 
insisted that it must have access to the material, and distribute it to 
the other members, including the Minority, did the Senator's staff 
provide access to a portion of the material. The Committee then had the 
portion--approximately \2/3\ of the material--copied. Because the 
Committee was unable to have access to the remainder of the material 
immediately,

[[Page S1972]]

it was forced to wait until several days, and only then was it able to 
have the rest of the material copied and distributed to the rest of the 
members of the committee.
  The March 6, 1998, Pennsylvania District Attorney's Association 
submission in response to the Philadelphia Bar Assoc., was received by 
senior Committee staff on Monday March 9, 1998, and distributed to 
members on Tuesday, March 10, 1998.
  On March 9, 1998, Committee received notice from Senator Specter's 
office that it had received more case material from Philadelphia 
District Attorney's Office. The Committee obtained copies of that 
material from Senator Specter's office, made copies and distributed it 
to the members. The Committee was later informed that this material was 
actually sent to Senator Specter's staff on Friday, March 6. The 
Committee as a whole received it some three days later.
  A March 10, 1998, Report from Philadelphia Bar Association with 
attachments was received on March 10, 1998, and was immediately 
distributed to members.
  On March 10, 1998, the Committee received a report from Department of 
Justice, which was immediately distributed to members.
  A Report dated March 11, 1998, from the Pennsylvania District 
Attorney's Association was submitted in response to a Philadelphia Bar 
Association submission. The material was submitted to senior staff on 
March 11, 1998, and distributed to the Committee on March 12, 1998.
  On March 12, 1998, copies of twenty new cases submitted by 
Philadelphia District Attorney's Office were received by the Committee. 
The Committee made arrangements to copy that material the same day, for 
distribution early the following day.
  In short, the collection of relevant information concerning this 
nomination has been trying and ad-hoc. We all share the frustration of 
having information presented to us at the last minute. Whether the 
information is exculpatory or further damaging, Senators have a right 
to be upset. However, it must be emphasized that, at least with respect 
to the cases, it is material within the nominee's control. After all, 
they are her cases we are discussing--many of which should have been 
provided to the Committee by the nominee herself. Indeed, concerned 
that Judge Massiah-Jackson had not been given the opportuntity to 
review adequately those cases presented during the second hearing, the 
final vote on the nomination was moved from last Thursday to this 
Tuesday, and the nominee was afforded the chance to respond, in 
writing, to any concerns expressed at the hearing. She availed herself 
of that opportunity, and provided the Committee with a written response 
to some of the allegations raised at the hearing. I find her responses 
wanting. In any event, while the process of receiving and distributing 
documents has certainly been aggravating at times, I do not think it 
has been particularly unfair to this nominee.
  I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the letter from 
Judge Frederica Massiah-Jackson, dated March 16, 1998, wherein she has 
withdrawn her nomination.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

         First Judicial District of Pennsylvania, Court of Common 
           Pleas, Judicial Chambers,
                                 Philadelphia, PA, March 16, 1998.
     Hon. William J. Clinton,
     President of the United States, Pennsyvlania Avenue, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President. It is with great regret--and personal 
     sadness--that I write to you today to ask that you withdraw 
     my nomination as a judge to the U.S. District Court for the 
     Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
       You honored me and my family greatly by selecting me to be 
     the first African American woman to sit on that court. I had 
     looked forward to my service there as the next step of my 
     public service to the city and citizens of Philadelphia, whom 
     I care about so deeply.
       After being found qualified to serve by the Specter-
     Santorum Judicial Selection Commission, the Department of 
     Justice, the FBI, the American Bar Association and the Senate 
     Judiciary Committee, I have recently been subject to an 
     unrelenting campaign of vilification and distortion as I 
     waited for a vote on my nomination by the full Senate.
       All of these mischaracterizations occurred when I lacked a 
     forum or platform from which to respond. Having finally been 
     accorded a hearing to respond to these charges last week, I 
     attempted to do so only to have hurled at me additional 
     ``new'' charges. I have now responded to these new charges 
     and believe the record has been set straight once again--at 
     least the record to which I have been given full opportunity 
     to respond.
       Today, however, the Senate is set to debate my nomination 
     for an unprecedented six hours--a process which will not 
     accord me any role or opportunity to set the record straight 
     yet one more time. I have been a fighter in what I believe 
     all my life, but allowing still more and more selective, one-
     sided and unsubstantiated charges to go unanswered in this 
     politicized environment is not acceptable to me after my long 
     journey.
       That journey has only reaffirmed for me the central belief 
     that our system of justice and the independence of this third 
     branch of government may be the most precious treasure 
     bequeathed to us by the Founding Fathers. I hold it dear and 
     will always try to do my part to ensure that the system works 
     for all coming before the bar of justice.
       Thank you again for standing by me and honoring me with 
     your nomination, with your trust and with your confidence.
       With sincere best wishes,
           Very truly yours,
                                     Frederica A. Massiah-Jackson.

  Mr. HATCH. Madam President, this is a letter written to the Honorable 
William J. Clinton. I am glad to have that in the Record.
  Again, I express my sorrow that it had to end this way, and I wish 
the very best to Judge Frederica Massiah-Jackson. I hope she will take 
this in a way that will be instructive, informative and, hopefully, 
helpful to her if she continues to serve on the highest trial court in 
the State of Pennsylvania, the Court of Common Pleas. I hope she will 
benefit from this experience instead of it being a detriment to her. If 
she will treat law enforcement officials fairly, if she will be tough 
on crime when it is clearly shown, and if she will be totally honest in 
her dealings on that bench, I have great belief that she will yet serve 
in many, many good ways the people of Pennsylvania.
  I wish her the best. I wish her family the best. And I, again, am 
sorry this has turned out this way, but I think it is the way it had to 
turn out under the circumstances.
  Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the 
Record the speech that I would have made had this nomination come to 
the floor and not been withdrawn. I feel it is incumbent upon me to do 
so because of Ms. Jackson's letter.
  There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

    Statement of Orrin G. Hatch in the United States Senate on the 
    Nomination of Judge Frederica Massiah-Jackson, February 10, 1998

       Mr. President, I rise today to discuss the record of Judge 
     Fredrica Massiah-Jackson, President Clinton's nominee to be a 
     United States District Court Judge for the Eastern District 
     of Pennsylvania.
       Judge Massiah-Jackson, who currently serves as a 
     Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas judge, was nominated by 
     President Clinton on July 31, 1997. The Judiciary Committee 
     initially held a hearing on Judge Massiah-Jackson's 
     nomination on October 29th of last year. She was reported 
     favorably out of the Committee on November 6th. I was one of 
     those voting to report her favorably to the floor. Since the 
     nominee was reported out of the Judiciary Committee, however, 
     certain allegations have been made regarding her fitness to 
     serve as a district court judge. In particular, questions 
     have arisen regarding the nominee's ability to weigh cases 
     impartially and to treat police officers and prosecutors 
     fairly.
       Before I turn to those criticisms, however, I would like to 
     state that I understand the difficulty of Judge Massiah-
     Jackson's situation and appreciate her willingness to have 
     appeared before the Judiciary Committee not just once, but 
     twice.
       I would further add that I am impressed with Judge Massiah-
     Jackson's numerous accomplishments. She appears to have a 
     lovely family and has plainly demonstrated a commitment to 
     the legal profession. For those accomplishments, I commend 
     her. Her family should be proud of her.
       Nevertheless, it is important to remember that fitness for 
     the federal bench is measured not solely by one's hard work, 
     or even by her facility with the law. After all, federal 
     judges are nominated by the President and confirmed by the 
     Senate for what amounts to life terms. They wield enormous 
     power in our society, power that must

[[Page S1973]]

     be exercised fairly and impartially. The judicial role 
     demands that a judge be willing to uphold the Constitution 
     and abide by the rule of law. When an individual dons the 
     judicial robes and ascends the dais to assume her seat on a 
     federal court, she takes an oath to be impartial and to treat 
     all individuals--regardless of social status--fairly.
       As a consequence, no one has a right to Senate confirmation 
     any more than she has the right to be nominated by the 
     President. An important part of the Senate's responsibility 
     is to advise the President with respect to his choice in 
     nominees and ultimately to consent to their appointment. This 
     is a function I take seriously. In fact, I believe that every 
     member of this body takes his vote to confirm federal judges 
     seriously. And it is with this measure of seriousness and 
     deliberation that I approach the vote to confirm Judge 
     Massiah-Jackson.
       With that, I would like to address what I believe to be the 
     three issues with which I have significant concerns regarding 
     the nominee's record. First, I will discuss concerns about 
     her candor with the Committee. Second, I will address 
     allegations that she is particularly lenient in sentencing 
     convicted criminals. And finally, I would like to speak to 
     her animus towards prosecutors and police officers.
       Candor: First, I would like to explore the nominee's candor 
     before the Committee. During the Judiciary Committee's 
     background investigation of Judge Massiah-Jackson, we called 
     her attention to an article in the Philadelphia Dailey News. 
     In that article, it was reported that the nominee identified 
     two undercover officers in open court and warned the 
     spectators to watch out for them. The article generated 
     considerable interest because the nominee had acquitted a man 
     accused of possessing $400,000 worth of cocaine because she 
     did not believe the testimony of the police officers. It was 
     the second time Judge Massiah-Jackson had acquitted alleged 
     drug dealers apprehended by the same officers.
       In the earlier case, the undercover officers had testified 
     that they found two bundles of heroin on a table next to the 
     defendant. Judge Massiah-Jackson not only disbelieved the 
     testifying officer's statement, but she went one step 
     further. As the officers were leaving the courtroom, it was 
     reported that the judge told the assembled spectators to 
     ``take a good look at these guys [the undercover officers] 
     and be careful out there.'' [Philadelphia Dailey News (May 
     21, 1988)].
       Committee staff asked the nominee whether the circumstances 
     described in that article were true. The nominee told staff 
     that she simply did not recall the incident. Thereafter, she 
     was faxed a copy of the article and asked to provide the 
     Committee with a letter commenting on the article's 
     allegations. Although the Committee received the nominee's 
     letter, she utterly failed to address the incident with the 
     undercover police officers. At that time, at least, she did 
     not repeat her claim that she could not recall the incident. 
     Instead, she avoided discussing the incident altogether.
       At the nominee's initial confirmation hearing, she was 
     again directly questioned about this incident. Instead of 
     answering the question directly, she indicated merely that 
     she respected the role of law enforcement officers. She 
     neither claimed that she could not recall the incident, nor, 
     as she did most recently, state that she was actually 
     admonishing school children in the audience to be respectful 
     of police officers.
       Shortly after the hearing, the Committee again gave the 
     nominee the opportunity to respond to the allegations made in 
     the news article. In response to a written question, the 
     nominee changed her earlier claim that she could not recall 
     the incident. Instead, the nominee categorically denied ever 
     having warned spectators to beware of the undercover 
     officers. She stated--in writing--that:
       ``I have read the 1988 article and it is inaccurate. I 
     would not and did not make any such statement to the 
     spectators. I have great respect for law enforcement officers 
     who have very difficult jobs and work in dangerous 
     situations.'' [Follow-up questions p. 17].
       Now, given the fact that the undercover officers had not 
     previously come forward, I was unwilling to credit an 
     uncorroborated newspaper story over the nominee's direct 
     testimony. I did not believe it fair to derail a nomination 
     on the basis of a single, uncorroborated newspaper account.
       Following her initial hearing, however, the undercover 
     officers discussed in the article came forward and provided 
     written statements to the Committee refuting her 
     representations and corroborating the newspaper article. 
     Detective Sergeant Daniel Rodriguez, who actually testified 
     before Judge Massiah-Jackson, confirmed that the nominee said 
     to courtroom spectators: ``take a good look at these guys, 
     and be careful out there.'' Rodriguez further explained that 
     ``What the judge said jeopardized our ability to make buys. 
     And it put us in physical danger.'' Detective Terence Jones, 
     who also submitted a statement to the Committee, corroborated 
     Rodriguez's statement.
       Judge Massiah-Jackson, in her subsequent hearing, retreated 
     from her earlier denial that the event ever occurred and 
     instead claimed that in ``reconstructing the incident,'' she 
     now believes she was just talking to school children present 
     in the courtroom and that the officers most likely 
     misunderstood her comment. She further argued that she often 
     talked in such a manner to visiting students, hoping that 
     they would respect and acknowledge police officers.
       Regardless of whether the officers should have felt 
     concerned about their safety, I am troubled by two things: 
     First, that the nominee denied that the event had ever 
     occurred. If she had not remembered the event, she should 
     have simply said that. I am concerned that, when it appeared 
     to suit her, the nominee denied ever having made such a 
     statement.
       Second, I question her most recent assertion that she often 
     lectured school children visiting her court room. In fact, 
     Detective Rodriguez was to have appeared before Judge 
     Massiah-Jackson in a subsequent narcotics in case. In that 
     later case, the officer explained to the Assistant District 
     Attorney that Judge Massiah-Jackson had recently placed him 
     in danger by identifying him before a crowded courtroom. He 
     further noted that she had also identified his partner, who 
     was also in plain clothes and had not testified in the case. 
     The Assistant DA was sufficiently concerned by Judge Massiah-
     Jackson's behavior that she sought to have the nominee 
     recused. Although the nominee denied the Assistant DA's 
     recusal motion, she admitted, on the record that she does 
     tell criminal defendants to get a good look at undercover 
     police officers. Her exact quote was: ``I do say that to 
     certain defendants.'' [Commonwealth v. Ruiz, p. 4]. In other 
     words, the nominee did not claim then, as she does now, that 
     she routinely talked to school children in this fashion. 
     Rather, she explained on the record that she often told 
     ``certain defendants'' to watch out for undercover police 
     officers.
       The Newspaper article appears consistent with the officers' 
     understanding of the events that transpired in the nominee's 
     courtroom and with the nominee's statement in the record. 
     Indeed, the newspaper reported that the DA's office was so 
     ``concerned by some of the decisions made by the judge in 
     drug cases'' that it decided to ``begin reviewing drug cases 
     that come before Massiah-Jackson and decide, on a case by 
     case basis, whether to ask her to disqualify herself'' on the 
     ground of her inability to preside fairly. [Judge Overrules 
     Cops, Clears Suspect, Philadelphia Dailey News (May 21, 
     1988)]. I thus find the nominee's explanation for her 
     statements wanting. I doubt very much the DA's office was 
     sufficiently concerned to urge the nominee to recuse herself 
     in drug cases if all she was attempting to do was to connect 
     with school children.
       Unfortunately, this is not the only incident with which I 
     am convinced that the nominee did not provide the Committee 
     with complete information. As a routine matter, well before a 
     hearing is scheduled, judicial nominees who are presently 
     sitting judges are asked to provide the Committee with a list 
     of all of the cases in which they have been reversed. Judge 
     Massiah-Jackson, in response to that question, provided the 
     Committee with a list of 14 cases in which she had been 
     reversed. None of the cases she identified involved a 
     sentencing issue.
       At her hearing, concerned about her alleged leniency in 
     sentencing, Judge Massiah-Jackson was expressly asked whether 
     she had ever been reversed on a sentencing issue. She said 
     no. I took her answer at face value.
       After the hearing, the Committee again, in writing, whether 
     there were any other cases in which the nominee had been 
     reversed. In response, the nominee identified an additional 
     reversal which, due to her oversight, she had failed to 
     include in her original submission. Once again, however, the 
     newly discovered reversal did not involve a sentencing issue.
       Although the nominee brought no new reversals to the 
     Committee's attention, the Committee was subsequently 
     apprised of at least five additional cases in which the 
     nominee was reversed. Now, it is certainly possible that a 
     nominee could overlook a

[[Page S1974]]

     case or two. What is troubling to me, however, is that among 
     those additional reversals brought to the Committee's 
     attention were at least two reversals on sentencing issues, 
     one of which, Commonwealth v. Easterling, was a reported 
     case. The other, Commonwealth v. Williams, presents a 
     particularly troubling picture. There, the defendant, in 
     attempting to take the victim's purse, viciously slashed the 
     victim with a straight razor. He pleaded guilty to robbery 
     and possession of an instrument of a crime. At sentencing, 
     however, the nominee not only miscalculated, to the 
     defendant's favor, the offense gravity score used to 
     determine the sentence, but also refused to apply the deadly 
     weapon enhancement provision of the Sentencing Guidelines. 
     When the prosecutor tried to bring the nominee's error to her 
     attention, she evidently accused him of being ``vindictive.'' 
     On appeal, the Superior Court found that she used the wrong 
     offense gravity score and erred in not applying the deadly 
     weapon enhancement.
       Now, I understand that the nominee has presided over a good 
     many trials, perhaps even thousands. But the nominee herself 
     testified that she thought her decisions had been appealed 
     only about 89 times, which is not unusual. The vast majority 
     of the cases that come before a judge sitting on the Court of 
     Common Pleas are not the sort that result in an appeal. 
     Ordinarily, they are cases that result in guilty pleas or 
     settlements. So when we talk about appeals, we are not 
     talking about an overwhelming number of cases.
       However, when asked specifically to provide the Committee 
     with each case in which she was reversed, the nominee failed 
     to inform the Committee of at least two sentencing cases--one 
     of which was publicly reported--in which she was reversed for 
     imposing too lenient a sentence. Her failure to report these 
     cases is particularly troubling in light of the fact that she 
     was asked on three separate occasions to report her reversals 
     and, in her testimony before the Committee, specifically 
     denied that she had ever been reversed on a sentencing issue.
       Leniency: In addition to these reversals for illegal 
     sentences, I would like to provide you with an example of why 
     I am so concerned about Judge Massiah-Jackson's ability to 
     weigh the facts fairly and her leniency in sentencing. Before 
     I speak to those concerns, however, I would like to say a 
     word about the claim that the nominee is in reality a tough 
     sentencer. I have been quite interested in the statistical 
     data presented in this case by both the Pennsylvania Bar 
     Association and the Pennsylvania District Attorney's 
     Association. Statistical duels must always be carefully 
     scrutinized. Nevertheless, provided they are used correctly, 
     statistics can be very revealing. I've taken a look at the 
     Philadelphia Bar Association's assertion that Judge Massiah-
     Jackson's conviction rate is actually higher than that of the 
     average Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas judge. I am 
     unpersuaded.
       The Bar Association's assertion is based on a basic error 
     in statistical analysis. The Bar Association took the 
     nominee's bench trial convictions as a percentage of her 
     overall dispositions. It found that, on average for the years 
     1984 through 1991, her conviction rate was 24%. In contrast, 
     it found the average conviction rate for Philadelphia Court 
     of Common Pleas judges during that period to be only 18%. 
     Under the Bar Association's analysis, Judge Massiah-Jackson 
     seems very tough on criminals. The Bar Association has made a 
     fundamental error, however.
       Overall dispositions include guilty pleas, jury trials, 
     bench trials, transfers, decisions not to prosecute and a 
     variety of other things. The category is a real mix. That 
     wouldn't present a problem if all judges had about the same 
     ratio of bench trials to overall dispositions. But they 
     don't. It was therefore an error to calculate bench trial 
     convictions as a percentage of overall dispositions.
       The bottom line is that Judge Massiah-Jackson has a high 
     bench trial conviction rate, because she has had a lot of 
     bench trials, not because she is tough on crime. For the same 
     reason, her bench trial acquittal rate is far above average 
     too.
       The proper thing to do in Judge Massiah-Jackson's case is 
     to compare bench trials to bench trials. A disposition as a 
     result of a bench trial, where no jury was involved, is 
     likely a more accurate measure of an individual judge's 
     leniency. When you do that, the picture completely changes. 
     During the relevant period, 64.6% of Judge Massiah-Jackson's 
     bench trials resulted in convictions, while 70.1% of 
     Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas bench trials did so. In 
     other words, the average Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas 
     judge convicts more often and acquits less often than Judge 
     Massiah-Jackson. If you look at bench trials only, you'll see 
     that her acquittal rate is really 18.4% higher than the 
     average acquittal rate for the Philadelphia Court of Common 
     Pleas. Her conviction rate is correspondingly lower.
       As a consequence, when scrutinized carefully, the 
     statistics show that Judge Massiah-Jackson is less inclined 
     than other judges on her court to convict after a bench 
     trial and more inclined to acquit. In reality, then, the 
     nominee is significantly more lenient than other 
     Philadelphia judges in her treatment of criminal 
     defendants.
       Regardless of the statistical claims that are made, I think 
     it is important to note the bi-partisan opposition that the 
     nominee has engendered among law enforcement personnel. I 
     think the people who work in the trenches--the prosecutors 
     and the police officers--have a better handle on this than we 
     can ever hope to have.
       In particular, a few cases serve well to illustrate this 
     point. I certainly do not have time to cover all the cases in 
     which the nominee is alleged to have been lenient in 
     sentencing, but I would like to offer a few examples that I 
     think illuminate her overall record.
       At the outset, I would note the frustrations of using 
     individual cases to characterize a nominee's record. It is 
     always difficult to accurately consider a nominee's overall 
     fitness for office when we are forced to rely on individual 
     cases. Nevertheless, when a nominee has been a judge for as 
     long as this nominee has, decided cases are important 
     indicators of how the nominee is likely to perform on the 
     federal bench. After a fairly exhaustive review of this 
     nominee's record when she sat on the criminal bench, I do not 
     believe that the case sampling we have analyzed distorts her 
     record. In fact, the 50 troublesome cases originally 
     identified by the District Attorneys' Association occurred 
     during a one year period in which the nominee rendered only 
     some 200 verdicts. Similarly, in a two-year period wherein 
     the nominee heard a total of 66 aggravated assault bench 
     trials, it was discovered that she convicted as charged only 
     15 times. She acquitted in 37 cases and found the defendant 
     not guilty of the more serious charge in 14 cases. Thus, I 
     think the several cases I will highlight today serve to 
     represent the nominee's overall leniency towards criminals 
     and her animosity towards law enforcement.
       In Commonwealth v. Johnson, for example, the defendant 
     brutally raped a ten year old girl. Following a jury trial, 
     the defendant was convicted of rape. Because the victim was 
     only ten years old, a mandatory minimum sentence of five 
     years applied. The nominee, however, had the discretion to 
     impose a minimum term of ten years. The prosecutor, planning 
     to argue in favor of a higher sentence, asked Judge Massiah-
     Jackson to order a presentence report and victim impact 
     statement. The nominee refused, however, stating ``What would 
     be the point of that?'' [Tr. 631-32]. She subsequently 
     sentenced the defendant to the mandatory minimum--only five 
     to ten years for raping a ten year old girl. The nominee 
     stated on the record that she would not have imposed the 
     sentence if it were not mandatory ``because I just don't 
     think the five to ten years is appropriate in this case even 
     assuming you were found guilty.'' [Tr. 9]. Perhaps the 
     saddest part of this story is that it did not end with Judge 
     Massiah-Jackson's exceptionally lenient sentence. 
     Unfortunately, this defendant was arrested only last year for 
     allegedly raping a nine year old boy.
       Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Freeman, the nominee again 
     demonstrated inappropriate leniency in sentencing. In that 
     case, the defendant shot and wounded the victim in the chest, 
     allegedly because the victim had laughed at him. Incredibly, 
     the nominee convicted the defendant of a misdemeanor instead 
     of felony aggravated assault. She sentenced the defendant to 
     only two to twenty-three months' imprisonment and then 
     immediately paroled him so that he did not have to serve 
     prison time. The felony charge would have had a mandatory 
     five to ten year prison term. Judge Massiah-Jackson explained 
     her decision stating that ``the victim had been drinking 
     before being shot and that [the defendant] had not been 
     involved in any other crime since the incident.'' How the 
     unarmed victim's drunkenness could have possibly mitigated 
     the defendant's sentence is beyond me.
       Finally, I would like briefly to address the nominee's 
     alleged bias against the state, and how that particularly 
     affects crime victims. In Commonwealth v. Hicks [549 A. 2d 
     1339 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1987)], for example, the defendant was 
     charged with robbery, theft, and aggravated assault, among 
     other things. At trial, the defense motioned for a 
     continuance because one of its witnesses, a police officer, 
     was not present. Defense counsel had asked the DA two days 
     prior to subpoena the officer as a favor. The DA subpoenaed 
     the officer, but he did not receive it. Judge Massiah-Jackson 
     did not believe that the DA had subpoenaed the officer. She 
     then recharacterized the officer as a State witness and 
     demanded the State drop the case. When the State refused to 
     do so, explaining that it was prepared to go to trial and 
     that the officer was not its witness, Judge Massiah-Jackson 
     dismissed the case purportedly because the State failed to 
     subpoena a defense witness. She then inaccurately entered in 
     the court record that the state was not ready to go to trial. 
     The appeals court reversed the decision stating it was 
     ``unable to determine the basis for the trial court's 
     decision,'' and that the trial court ``was unable to justify 
     its decision by citation to rule or law.''

[[Page S1975]]

       Her animus against police officers is similarly evident in 
     Commonwealth v. Nesmith, [Opinion No. 2954 (June 26, 1995), 
     aff'd, (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)], where the defendant, while 
     speeding in his car, hit a woman, stopped to observe that she 
     was lying injured in the street, and then left the scene.
       As the defendant fled the scene, one of the victim's 
     relatives chased after him. After driving several blocks, the 
     defendant stopped his car and attempted to flee on foot when 
     the victim's relative confronted him. As the two men began to 
     fight, the defendant's relatives jumped in the fight and beat 
     the victim's relative unmercifully with fists and bottles. 
     The victim's relative, whose head was split open, was taken 
     to the hospital for his injuries.
       The hit and run occurred shortly after the defendant had 
     been released from prison on parole for an unrelated assault. 
     In that case, the victim sustained severe injuries, including 
     broken legs, back and pelvis. After a bench trial, Judge 
     Massiah-Jackson convicted the defendant of aggravated 
     assault, simple assault, reckless endangerment, criminal 
     conspiracy, and leaving the scene of an accident. She advised 
     the defendant that if he paid $3700 in restitution to the 
     victims, the Court would find the restitution a ``mitigating 
     factor'' at sentencing, even though the sentencing guidelines 
     called for ``a lengthy period of incarceration.'' (R. at 139-
     140a). The State objected to any leniency at sentencing, but 
     Judge Massiah-Jackson, all but ignoring the victim's 
     injuries, responded, ``The only behavior here is this is a 
     traffic accident case.'' (R. at 143a).
       Despite the fact that the defendant had numerous prior 
     convictions, including 8 adult convictions, and that the 
     recommended guideline sentencing range was 38-54 months, the 
     nominee sentenced the defendant to only two years probation 
     for the aggravated assault. In justifying her excessive 
     departure from the guideline range, the nominee cited the 
     defendant's cooperation in making restitution over a three 
     year period and the fact that the defendant was not a danger 
     to the public. She claimed that the defendant's actions were 
     ``not really criminal. He had merely been involved in a car 
     accident.'' She further opined that the defendant's prior 
     arrests might have been due to police officers like Officer 
     Houck [Huck] who unlawfully stopped the defendant. (R. at 
     216-220a).
       It took the defendant three years to pay the restitution 
     amount of $3,700. During this period, the defendant alleged 
     to the Court that the arresting officer in his case, Officer 
     Houck, had been ``harassing'' him and had stopped him on 
     several occasions. Judge Massiah-Jackson was extremely 
     concerned and asked if there was anything she could do for 
     the defendant. She even offered to ``write a letter to the 
     commander of the 39th District.'' (R. at 161a). In contrast, 
     the DA had no knowledge of any harassment and reminded the 
     judge that she had not even heard from the police officer. 
     Judge Massiah-Jackson asked the DA to speak with the officer 
     to find out what had happened.
       Without corroborating the allegations, the judge then 
     directed her attention back to the convicted defendant, again 
     expressing concern for his plight and distrust for law 
     enforcement saying the following: ``It won't be Houck next 
     time, it will be someone else and they'll say, `Oh, I didn't 
     know anything about it.' And we'll find you on the streets 
     somewhere and that's what will happen. That's what will 
     happen.'' (R. at 162a). Judge Massiah-Jackson told the 
     defendant he did not have to explain anything to her because 
     she knew ``what's going on'' and understood it ``very well.'' 
     (R. at 166a).
       At the next court appearance, the DA subpoenaed Officer 
     Houck to explain the so-called harassing incidents to the 
     Court. The officer explained that he had indeed stopped the 
     defendant because the defendant was driving recklessly 
     without a license. (R. at 174a). But the nominee refused to 
     believe the officer. Judge Massiah-Jackson instead found the 
     defendant's uncorroborated story to be credible, and warned 
     Officer Houck that: ``[i]f any harm comes to Mr. Nesmith or 
     his family or his friends, then the commissioner will be sent 
     a copy of this transcript and I'll volunteer to be a fact 
     witness against you.'' (R. at 187a) (Emphasis added).
       This statement is outrageous. The nominee appears to be 
     suggesting that the officer might at some point harm the 
     defendant or his family. Judge Massiah-Jackson then 
     admonished the DA stating the DA would be an ``accomplice in 
     whatever may or may not happen to Mr. Nesmith'' because the 
     DA had subpoenaed Officer Houck. When the DA reminded the 
     Court that she subpoenaed Officer Houck only because the 
     Court had asked her to do so, Judge Massiah-Jackson said 
     nothing.
       At her second hearing, the nominee inexplicably said she 
     volunteered to be a ``fact witness'' for the defendant 
     because she could not be a character witness. She failed to 
     explain her refusal to credit the officer's account over that 
     of an oft-convicted defendant.
       Finally, in a case that demonstrates troubling disregard 
     for a crime victim, as well as the State, in Commonwealth v. 
     Lafferty, Nos. 3883-3888 (Feb. Term 1988), the nominee was 
     notified prior to trial that the defendant and victim in a 
     rape case may have had AIDS. Judge Massiah-Jackson responded 
     ``Why are we having a trial? We are talking about life 
     expectancy of three years for both of them. What difference? 
     What kind of punishment can we give [the defendant]? * * * 
     What's the purpose of the trial long range?'' (R. 3-4). When 
     the State suggested that it may as well tell everyone who is 
     HIV positive that they can do whatever they want because they 
     will not be prosecuted, Judge Massiah-Jackson responded, 
     ``It's just a thought.''
       Based on the Court's extended diatribe on why AIDS 
     defendants cost the State too much money, the State motioned 
     for the judge to recuse herself. (R. at 13). Judge Massiah-
     Jackson denied the motion stating the DA had not articulated 
     any specific reason warranting recusal and initially denied 
     that the State had a right to appeal the recusal. (R. at 16). 
     Although the prosecution pleaded with the court to allow it 
     to try the case before another judge that same day to avoid 
     the lengthy delay of an appeal, Judge Massiah-Jackson refused 
     to allow another judge to hear the case and forced the State 
     to appeal her denial of recusal. (R. at 34). She then reduced 
     the defendant's bail to assure his immediate release pending 
     appeal.
       The victim died while the appeal was pending. The appeal 
     was withdrawn and it went to trial before Judge Massiah-
     Jackson. Despite the Commonwealth's evidence which include:
       (1) the deceased victim's prior testimony that the 
     defendant had broken into her house, awakened her, raped her, 
     and beat her when she tried to escape;
       (2) the victim's taped 911 call to police reporting the 
     rape;
       (3) police photographs of the victim's injuries after the 
     rape; and
       (4) the emergency room medical report.
       Judge Massiah-Jackson found the defendant not guilty of 
     rape, not guilty of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, 
     and not guilty of aggravated assault. She convicted him only 
     of simple assault and sentenced him to 1 year probation. 
     Although the victim is no longer with us, the defendant is 
     still alive today.
       Conclusion: I believe these cases represent a troubling 
     pattern of undue leniency towards criminal defendants and 
     hostility towards the state. The Pennsylvania District 
     Attorney's Association presented the Committee with over 70 
     separate cases detailing the nominee's troubling record. In a 
     submission to the Judiciary Committee, the Pennsylvania Bar 
     Association noted that the nominee presided over ``confused 
     and tragic cases.'' Indeed, it was pointed out during our 
     Committee hearings that North Philadelphia, where the nominee 
     sits, is, sadly, plagued by crime, drugs, and the terrible 
     human toll those tragic social ills take. Yet it is those 
     citizens laboring in the shadow of rampant crime who would 
     benefit most when our laws are applied and criminal conduct 
     is appropriately dealt with.
       I am disappointed to say that information that has emerged 
     since the Judiciary Committee held its initial hearing on 
     this nominee strongly suggests to me that she was somewhat 
     less than candid with the Committee, is lenient in sentencing 
     convicted offenders, and has demonstrated a certain degree of 
     unfairness with respect to the police officers and 
     prosecutors. Indeed, since the Committee's vote, it has been 
     virtually deluged with letters from prosecutors and law 
     enforcement agencies in Pennsylvania that document a 
     disturbing pattern of open hostility toward the law 
     enforcement community. These condemnations have been bi-
     partisan and overwhelming. In fact, I have never seen such 
     widespread opposition to a nominee from the law enforcement 
     community.
       To date we have received letters from the Attorney General 
     of Pennsylvania, the Philadelphia and the National Fraternal 
     Orders of Police, the National Association of Police 
     Organizations, the Law Enforcement Alliance of America, the 
     Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association, and letters by 
     numerous District Attorneys around the state including one 
     from Lynn Abraham, District Attorney for Philadelphia. Each 
     of these letters expresses opposition to this nominee's 
     appointment because of her record of hostility to 
     prosecutors, law enforcement and victims of crime. The 
     Fraternal Order of Police, in an open letter to President 
     Clinton and the Judiciary Committee declared that: ``Judge 
     Massiah-Jackson consistently parades her anti-police bias by 
     using her power and authority as a judge to belittle, harass, 
     and threaten law enforcement officers who appear in her 
     court. Her contempt for prosecutors appearing before her is 
     so rancorous that a broad grassroots effort has been led by 
     members of her own political party to oppose her elevation to 
     the federal judiciary.'' I cannot turn a blind eye to such 
     allegations.
       Some of the nominee's supporters have asserted that law 
     enforcement has attempted to distort her record. But it seems 
     to me that the most expedient path here was for law 
     enforcement to speak out in support of the nominee. They are 
     the ones who will have to continue to appear before Judge 
     Massiah-Jackson if her nomination is defeated. Thus, they 
     have a great deal to lose in this process. Recognizing the 
     political risks law enforcement had to take to oppose this 
     nominee, I commend them for their willingness to come forward 
     and do what they believed to be the right thing.
       While her candidacy was in Committee, I resolved my serious 
     misgivings about Judge Massiah-Jackson's nomination in her 
     favor. My decision in Committee, however, was based largely 
     on the representations made by the nominee, both in answer to 
     the written questions and at her initial hearing. In my 
     opinion, these recent developments call the nominee's 
     statements before the Committee into serious question and 
     oblige me to change my vote. After having heard the

[[Page S1976]]

     nominee's testimony last week and having reviewed and 
     considered the information that has been provided to the 
     Committee by law enforcement officials about her conduct on 
     the bench, her alleged bias against law enforcement, her 
     flawed judicial rulings, and, above all, her apparent lack of 
     candor with the Committee, I cannot in good conscience 
     continue to give her the benefit of the doubt. I have the 
     highest personal regard for Senator Specter, who has ably 
     promoted her candidacy, but I now do not believe that Judge 
     Massiah-Jackson should be confirmed to a position on the 
     federal bench. I take no pleasure in voting against this 
     nominee. She has obviously accomplished much in her life. 
     Nevertheless, the Constitution obligates me to evaluate this 
     nominee with an eye toward determining whether she will 
     uphold the Constitution and whether she will abide by the 
     judicial oath to ``administer justice without respect to 
     persons . . . And impartially discharge all the duties 
     incumbent [upon a federal judge].'' I am not now convinced 
     that she can abide by that oath and thus I feel obligated to 
     cast my vote against her.
  Mr. HATCH. I yield the floor.
  Mr. SESSIONS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama is recognized.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Madam President, I thank the distinguished Senator from 
Utah, the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, for his 
leadership in this matter and in so many other matters. He is an 
outstanding legal scholar, an outstanding lawyer, a man of integrity, 
ability, and fairness who works extraordinarily hard to make sure 
everyone who comes before the committee has a thorough opportunity to 
express themselves and to defend themselves, and that others who have 
information to share are allowed to do so.
  I think it was an extraordinary event that he allowed a second 
hearing to be held for the Massiah-Jackson nomination. That was a very 
fair thing to do. I agree with the distinguished chairman that it is a 
good idea and a good thing that this nomination has been withdrawn.
  Ms. Frederica Massiah-Jackson has a number of problems with her 
nomination. I would just like to make a few points about the process 
and about her nomination.
  District Attorney Lynne Abraham, a Democrat in Philadelphia, who has 
served a number of years, and has also served on the judicial bench in 
Pennsylvania with Judge Massiah-Jackson, wrote us a letter saying that 
she had not opposed or commented on nominees of any kind before, but 
she wrote a letter stating she felt that she should do so on this 
occasion.
  Among other things, she said:

       This nominee's judicial service is replete with instances 
     of demonstrated leniency toward criminals, an adversarial 
     attitude toward police and disrespect toward prosecutors 
     unmatched by any other present or former jurist with whom I 
     am familiar.

  That was a letter written reluctantly and in sadness, but a letter I 
think she felt she had to share with us. Her opinion was shared by the 
District Attorneys Association in Pennsylvania, the Fraternal Order of 
Police, and the National Fraternal Order of Police.
  We were also presented a list of 50 cases in which we were given 
detailed statements of sentences and judicial rulings by this judge, 
prepared by district attorneys who had no obligation to do that but did 
so because they were concerned about it. Those cases have been around 
here for well over a month and have never really been effectively 
rebutted. So I think to say the newly uncovered twenty cases were 
somehow critical in this matter is not really accurate. I think the new 
cases were additional troublesome matters, but the whole list of cases 
previously submitted were quite troubling also.
  Just briefly, Madam President, while I am relieved that this 
nomination has been withdrawn, I think it shows fully why the Senate 
should carefully and thoroughly examine judicial nominees. 
Specifically, I thank Senator John Ashcroft, who is here today, and 
Senator Strom Thurmond for placing a temporary hold on this nomination 
after it was voted out of the Judiciary Committee by a 12-to-6 vote 
last fall.
  At that time, this nomination was moving toward confirmation last 
fall. It is a classic example of why the Judiciary Committee and the 
Senate as a whole should deliberately screen judicial nominees. 
President Clinton has suggested that the Senate should speed up 
confirmation of Federal judges. With all due respect, the Massiah-
Jackson nomination demonstrates why the Senate should confirm Federal 
judges at a fair but careful pace.
  Judge Massiah-Jackson's nomination was reported out of the Judiciary 
Committee with approximately a dozen other judicial nominees at the end 
of last year. There was an effort to confirm these judges quickly 
before the year ended. Without Senator Ashcroft's and Senator 
Thurmond's temporary holds, this nominee would have been confirmed, I 
have no doubt. If this had happened, it would have been unfortunate, 
because many of Judge Jackson's unacceptable decisions had not yet been 
uncovered.

  In addition, as of last fall, the above-mentioned law enforcement 
organizations had not studied this nominee's record in detail. In fact, 
when Judge Massiah-Jackson's nomination was reported out of committee, 
none of these groups formally opposed the nomination. In fact, Senator 
Specter held a hearing in Pennsylvania to allow people to state 
objections. He gave them an opportunity to do so, but none came forth 
at that time. Without Senator Ashcroft's and Senator Thurmond's hold, 
this nominee would have been confirmed, in all probability, before her 
record had been adequately examined.
  A Federal judgeship is a lifetime appointment. The confirmation 
process is the only chance to review a judicial nominee's 
qualifications. The confirmation process is literally the point of no 
return. Unlike State judges, Federal judges cannot be recalled or voted 
from office. This is why it is so vitally important for the Senate to 
carefully fulfill its constitutional duty to advise and consent to the 
President's nominees. Judge Learned Hand, referring to the lack of 
control over federal judges, once said, ``They can't fired us. They 
can't even dock our pay.''
  A Federal judge has extraordinary power. Many of those powers involve 
decisionmaking authority that is absolutely unreviewable on appeal. For 
example, if a judge, at the conclusion of a prosecutor's case, 
dismisses the case and grants a judgment of acquittal to a defendant, 
that is the same as a jury verdict of acquittal, and the Government 
cannot appeal. Such directed verdicts simply cannot be appealed. So I 
think it is important that this process be allowed to work, and it did 
work. I believe that Judge Massiah-Jackson will have the opportunity as 
a State judge to demonstrate her abilities and skills there, to 
continue to serve the people of Pennsylvania.
  I was impressed with her demeanor and courtesy and the way she 
handled herself at her hearing, but I do feel like the just conclusion 
was reached.
  Madam President, that is the conclusion of my remarks. I yield the 
floor.
  Mr. ASHCROFT addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri is recognized.
  Mr. ASHCROFT. May I inquire as to the state of the proceedings.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. We are in a period for morning business, with 
statements limited to 10 minutes.
  Mr. ASHCROFT. I ask unanimous consent that I be able to speak for up 
to 15 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. ASHCROFT. Thank you.

                          ____________________