[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 24 (Tuesday, March 10, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1676-S1677]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                           LOSING OUR WAY II

  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, in earlier remarks, I indicated a number 
of problems in our domestic drug control efforts. I intend now to 
highlight some of the problems in our international control efforts. 
Many past problems in this area have been documented in testimony 
before the House and Senate and in reports issued by the Congress. Let 
me give just a few highlights of recent issues that speak of deep 
problems.
  I am concerned that the Administration seems only too willing to give 
drug producing pariah states a pass. Recently Senator Helms and I wrote 
the Secretary of State on North Korea. We wanted to know why, with 
indications that the Government of North Korea is implicated in drug 
production, that there was not more effort to confront this pariah 
state. The response was that we don't know enough. Well, why don't we 
know enough? Basically because we are not asking the questions. We are 
not putting our collection assets on the problem.
  This is one way of avoiding confronting North Korea on drug 
trafficking. This is a country apparently whose only two cash crops are 
nuclear weapons and illegal drugs. Yet, we ignore their drug activities 
and provide them help with nuclear materials. This is not the only 
dictatorship and enemy of the United States that this Administration is 
declining to confront for drug production and trafficking.
  During the recent recess, the Administration pulled another rabbit 
out of its hat. In the process, it once again showed its disregard for 
both requirements in law and for consulting with Congress. Mr. 
President, most members are probably not aware that the Administration 
has dropped Syria from the countries that we certify on drugs. The 
rationale the Administration offers for this move, done without 
consulting with Congress or Israel, is that what drug production there 
is in Syria does not affect the United States. That is not, of course, 
what last year's International Narcotics Control Strategy report, the 
Administration's own report, said. It is not what presidential 
certification notices have said. It is not what the Israelis report. It 
does not accord with the realities of international drug trafficking 
and the nature of the activities of organized criminal gangs. But 
there's more to the story. The Administration says it made this 
decision strictly on interpreting the law. In its reading of the law, 
the Administration argues that Congress did not mean to include 
countries like Syria where production is not coming to the United 
States. That is a singular interpretation, however.
  I have here a copy of an interpretation by the Senate Legislative 
Council's office pointing out where the Administration's reading of the 
law is in error. I also note that the Administration undertook this 
significant change in policy based on the legal opinion of a single 
State Department lawyer. They did this without consulting with anyone 
in Congress. And, in my view, they did it by not complying with the 
law.
  What all this means is empty gestures that send useless signals to 
pariah states. The fact that it does this by using U.S. drug policy as 
the throw away issue tells us a lot about how seriously this 
Administration takes our international counter-drug efforts.
  The law requires the Administration to submit to Congress each 
November 1 the list of countries to be considered for certification. My 
staff reminded the State Department of this requirement in late 
October. It became clear, however, that Administration officials had no 
intention of meeting that requirement. Only under pressure did they 
finally get the paperwork up here, 10 days late. This tardiness was in 
spite of the fact that they promised not to be late, after having been 
weeks late in 1996. And they were weeks late then even after Congress 
gave them an extra month to get the list up here. This list, as I say, 
was late. I note also, that in being late, the Administration submitted 
it just days before the Congress recessed. That is, it submitted a 
document that contained a controversial decision without consultation 
or the opportunity for serious discussion.

[[Page S1677]]

  Not only did the Administration not seek to consult on this important 
issue before the decision, it delayed action to avoid accountability 
after the decision. What next? Having ignored North Korea and having 
given Syria a wink, can we expect the Administration to certify Iran? 
Don't laugh. That was under consideration. The Administration cannot 
confirm significant changes in Iran's drug control efforts, but it was 
prepared to take Iran's word on the matter. It was only when J.C. Watts 
and I and several other Members of Congress blew the whistle on this 
that the idea was dropped. What was going on here? Why all the sneaking 
around? Iran suggests more cultural exchanges and the Administration 
plans to certify them as doing the right stuff on drugs. Once again, we 
are going to use our drug control policy to make gestures to our sworn 
enemies. What is wrong with this picture? Do these steps, this lack of 
consultation, suggest a deficit of seriousness on drugs?
  There's more. The Administration has also been mounting an effort to 
deconstruct the annual certification process. With all the 
misinformation being floated around about that process, it may be hard 
for the public and members of Congress to get at the facts. Let me just 
make a couple of points. Certification is about accountability. It is 
about expecting the Administration and governments in the major drug 
producing and transiting countries to take drug control seriously. It 
is about establishing standards to measure that seriousness. It is 
about expecting the Administration to then report on compliance with 
those standards to the Congress and the public. Let me note also, that 
recent and past polls indicate that the public supports tough 
standards. The Administration, however, it trying to undo this. For an 
Administration that has a record of avoiding accountability standards, 
this should come as no surprise. This is yet another area where the 
Administration is mounting an effort to weaken or disregard performance 
measures.
  But let me continue. On the issues I deal with on the International 
Drug Caucus, I see an Administration that doesn't follow through. Let 
me give just one case in point. This concerns nominations. The 
important post of the Assistant Secretary of State for International 
Narcotics Control remains vacant. We have yet to see a nomination. It 
has been vacant for many months. The post of Commissioner of Customs 
remains vacant. On this latter point, however, I am happy to see some 
movement, at last. Still, that critical post has been vacant for over 
six months.
  I also note that the Office of National Drug Control Policy has 
recently asked Congress to give them new presidential appointment 
positions. But the important post of Demand Reduction Deputy has not 
seen a qualified nominee in several years. It is vacant. The critical 
post of Supply Reduction Deputy has been empty since the Administration 
took office in 1993. These are the two most important posts in that 
office. Vacant. Unqualified candidates. Inaction. This is the legacy.
  The Administration also continues to send mixed signals to our 
partners in Latin America on drug control. Leaving aside the retreat on 
certification, the Administration cannot seem to get clear on its 
priorities. There are a number of examples, but I'll stick to one. In 
1994, the Administration almost destroyed one of our most important 
information-sharing programs with Peru. This program enabled the 
closing of the drug smuggling air bridge. Congress stepped in to 
prevent the cutoff of information to this highly effective program.
  Today, the major declines in coca cultivation in Peru--almost 45 
percent in two years--are directly attributable to that information-
sharing program that the Congress rescued. Now, the traffickers are 
seeking to circumvent that program by flying through Brazil. Brazil is 
prepared to cooperate, but the Administration cannot get its act 
together to make this program happen. What's more, I have learned that 
some in the Administration are once again in the process of considering 
pulling the plug on this not only in Brazil but in Peru and Colombia. 
If this happens, we will throw away all our recent gains. If this is 
not enough, the whole counter-drug program in the region is in 
disarray. It lacks a coherence or consistent oversight and strategic 
vision. But this is not the only place we see a lack of comprehensive 
thinking.
  There is a similar problem on our own borders. Over the past few 
years, I have supported efforts to increase our ability to police our 
borders. This has meant more funding on the Southwest Border and in 
Puerto Rico. The problem, however, is that there is no coherent vision 
coming from the Administration. What I have repeatedly asked for is a 
more comprehensive concept for the whole southern tier. We keep seeing 
plans for this place or that place. Now we hear plans about sealing the 
Southwest Border with technological wonders. We know, however, that the 
traffickers adjust to our control efforts. Thus, if we focus here, they 
shift over there. And they can shift faster.
  As a recent Christian Science Monitor piece notes, we're seeing Miami 
Vice two. The traffickers are moving back into the Caribbean and south 
Florida. We need, therefore, a plan that does not create trafficking 
opportunities in one area while trying to foreclose them some place 
else.
  But we don't see this. Instead, we see plans that rob Peter to pay 
Paul. Or we see another version of data slicing that I noted in my 
earlier remarks. The Administration is now double counting increases in 
the Border Patrol as contributions to the drug war. While INS and the 
Border Patrol have some responsibilities in the drug area, this is not 
their primary duty. Yet they are counted in drug spending. The primary 
responsibility at the border falls to U.S. Customs. And what is 
happening here? The Administration continues to under fund agents, 
inspectors, and intelligence support on our southern tier. Further, to 
strengthen the presence on the Southwest Border, the Administration 
robbed positions in U.S. Customs from Miami and New York and elsewhere. 
The result? We now see more trafficking in south Florida. It's time to 
stop this piecemeal approach and develop a comprehensive southern tier 
strategy. This will require not only more serious thinking but a look 
at the resources necessary to make our borders more secure. I, for one, 
will be looking for such an effort.

  Problems at our borders and incoherence in thinking in dealing with 
our international partners are not the limits to the inconsistency we 
see.
  I have been calling on the Administration to offer proposals for how 
to deal with the problem of international organized crime. A plan for 
bringing together comprehensive international efforts to disrupt the 
organizations most responsible for drug trafficking. To date we have 
seen nothing. The proposals are late. Sound familiar?
  From these various accounts, it should be clear that we have a drug 
policy in name only. What we have is a collection of things with a 
price tag attached. We do not see accountability. What we do see is 
increasing drug use among our kids. What we do not have is the 
coherence Congress has asked for and the public has right to expect. We 
need better not just more.
  With this in mind, I have proposed, separately, several initiatives 
to improve our drug efforts. I will be following up on those proposals.
  I have gone on at this length to make it clear to my colleagues and 
the public that we need a lot of work on our national drug control 
strategy. Above all, we need seriousness of purpose and consistent 
follow through. We need to know where we're going. Otherwise, we will 
continue to wander around, lost, on roads that take us nowhere.

                          ____________________