[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 21 (Thursday, March 5, 1998)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E317-E318]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




           VICE PRESIDENT TO MEET WITH RUSSIAN PRIME MINISTER

                                 ______
                                 

                           HON. JERRY WELLER

                              of illinois

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, March 5, 1998

  Mr. WELLER. Mr. Speaker, on Tuesday, March 10, 1998, Vice President 
Al Gore will be meeting with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin 
here in Washington. As a co-chairman of the House Republican Israel 
Caucus, I believe Russia's continued transfers of missile technology 
and expertise to Iran is a serious concern. At the current rate of 
transfer, Iran could have the ability to produce ballistic missiles 
capable of striking targets in Israel and parts of Europe and Asia 
within a year. I think the Prime Minister's visit is a great 
opportunity to force our Administration to confront the Government of 
Russia on this issue.
  I'd like to share for the Record a copy of a letter that will be sent 
to Vice President Gore. In addition to expressing our serious concerns 
about the issue, it also includes some very tough questions that we 
would like the Vice President to ask of Prime Minister Chernomyrdin.

                                Congress of the United States,

                                    Washington, DC, March 4, 1998.
     Hon. William Clinton,
     President of the United States,
     The White House, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: On the eve of Vice President Al Gore's 
     very important meeting with Russian Prime Minister Viktor 
     Chernomyrdin, we write to you to express our continuing 
     concerns about Russian transfers of missile technology and 
     expertise to Iran. At this time, we feel the need to 
     reemphasize to you our strong opposition to such activities 
     and to express to you our concerns regarding your 
     administration's policies in dealing with this critical 
     situation.
       As we have expressed to you in the past, Congress believes 
     that the activities of Russian entities which are engaged in 
     such transfers threaten our national security interests. If 
     the current flow of technology and expertise from Russia to 
     Iran continues unabated, Iran could have an indigenous 
     capability to produce a ballistic missile that could strike 
     at American interests in the Middle East, including our close 
     ally Israel, as well as parts of Europe and Asia.
       We believe that your administration needs to do more to 
     address this issue. Under the ``Gore-McCain'' Iran/Iraq Arms 
     Nonproliferation Act of 1992, you are required to sanction 
     foreign governments or entities which knowingly supply Iran 
     with advanced conventional weaponry or technology that could 
     contribute to their acquisition of weapons of mass 
     destruction. In addition, since Russia is a signatory to the 
     Missile Technology Control Regime, and since such technology 
     transfers are in violation of this accord, further sanctions 
     are called for under the Arms Export Control Act and the 
     Export Administration Act.
       The Government of Russia needs to understand that the 
     United States will not stand idly by as entities under 
     Russian authority assist a rogue nation in acquiring weapons 
     of mass destruction. Despite the resolution issued by Prime 
     Minister Chernomyrdin earlier this year, which did not 
     legally restrict such transfers but rather stipulated that 
     Russian firms ``should refrain'' from such transfers, U.S. 
     intelligence reports indicate that Russian entities have 
     signed contracts with Iran to help produce liquid-fueled 
     ballistic missiles such as the SS-4. There is also evidence 
     that the sale of high-technology laser equipment and other 
     supplies needed for the manufacture and testing of missiles 
     has been negotiated. Beyond the technology transfers, 
     thousands of Russian scientists, engineers and technicians 
     are reported to be operating in Iran as advisors.
       In light of the failure of the Government of Russia to stop 
     these transfers, Congress felt compelled to introduce the 
     Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act last fall. This 
     legislation, which has passed the House of Representatives 
     and currently has 82 cosponsors in the Senate, would 
     sanction those entities engaged in the transfer of 
     technologies to Iran.
       Mr. President, we are gravely concerned about this 
     situation. We would appreciate your administration's 
     assessment regarding current Russian procedures to stop such 
     transfers.
       The Administration has been reluctant until now to impose 
     sanctions on Russian entities involved in providing Iran with 
     missile technology even through existing law requires such 
     sanctions. While we cannot expect the Russian government to 
     be 100% effective in stopping the flow of missile technology 
     and expertise to Iran, we can, and must, expect 100% effort. 
     But, how are we to judge whether Russia is sincerely seeking 
     an end to its cooperation with Iran or merely doing enough to 
     prevent the imposition of American sanctions? Specifically, 
     to allay our skepticism about Russian intentions, we would 
     expect to see real evidence of Russian action. We are 
     requesting that on our behalf you ask the following questions 
     of Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and provide us with his 
     answers as soon as possible.
       Why hasn't the Government of Russia passe a law to 
     strengthen their decree which restricts the transfers of such 
     technologies and expertise to Iran? Are there legal actions 
     which could be sought against those entities that continue to 
     engage in such activities? How soon can we expect a law to be 
     enacted?
       What concrete evidence has the Government of Russia 
     provided that contracts and intelligence cooperation between 
     Russia and Iran are ceasing and programs being terminated?

[[Page E318]]

       Has the Russian leadership spoken out forcefully in public 
     against the transfer of Russian missile technology? Have any 
     entities participating in the transfer of technology been 
     arrested for their involvement?
       Have the Russians begun to put in place an effective export 
     control regime? Is there any evidence that Russian efforts 
     are having an impact on Iran's procurement efforts?
       Mr. President, we believe that the time for good will has 
     ended. If Prime Minister Chernomyrdin does not provide the 
     United States with concrete evidence proving that his country 
     has taken a serious initiative to prevent the transfer of 
     such technologies, then we must act.
       Thank you for your consideration on this very important 
     matter. We anxiously anticipate your reply.
           Sincerely,

           

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