[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 20 (Wednesday, March 4, 1998)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E295]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




            THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY ACT OF 1998

                                 ______
                                 

                        HON. FORTNEY PETE STARK

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                        Wednesday, March 4, 1998

  Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, with the end of the cold war and the break-up 
of the Soviet Union, nuclear nonproliferation efforts continue to be a 
priority for United States. Many events have taken place which have 
strengthened nuclear nonproliferation efforts. The cornerstone of 
international nuclear nonproliferation, the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty (NPT), completed its 25-year lifespan in 1995 and was made 
permanent. The former Soviet states, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus 
have joined the NPT as non-weapons states and agreed to remove all 
nuclear materials from their territories.
  Although the international community has taken positive steps toward 
nonproliferation goals, new developments require scrutiny of current 
U.S. nonproliferation policy. Safety and security of nuclear weapons 
and materials in the former Soviet Union, the India-Pakistan arms race, 
North Korea's violations of the NPT, continuing suspicions about Iran's 
nuclear activities, and the availability of weapons-usable materials 
and technologies are leading reasons for concern.
  The breakup of the Soviet Union left an undetermined amount of 
nuclear materials scattered throughout the former Soviet territories. 
Large quantities of nuclear weapons, weapons materials, and technology 
in the former Soviet Union are all potential proliferation problems. 
There are terrifying reports that nuclear materials have been illegally 
stolen and transferred from Russia to rogue states. The sluggish 
economic conditions in Russia have provoked Russian nuclear and missile 
experts in accepting employment offers in rogue nations. And Russia 
isn't the only region of concern for the United States.
  Since the end of the cold war, North Korea has diverted plutonium to 
a secret bomb program, threatened to withdraw from the NPT and blocked 
inspections. North Korea currently has enough plutonium to build one or 
two bombs, but refuses to disclose the extent of its nuclear 
activities. Neither India nor Pakistan are a party to the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty--nor have they signed the Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty. Pakistan has acknowledged the capability to build at 
least one nuclear reactor while some experts believe it has enough 
enriched uranium for 10-15 weapons. Both India and Pakistan have combat 
aircraft that, with modifications, would be capable of delivering 
nuclear weapons. The U.S. continues to suspect Iran of using its 
civilian nuclear program as a pretense to establish the technical basis 
for a nuclear weapons option.
  Today, I am introducing legislation that will set forth a blueprint 
for accomplishing critical nonproliferation objectives. The bill, the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1998, establishes fourteen 
policy goals for the United States to pursue on nuclear arms control 
and nonproliferation. The arms control objectives are less important 
now for their own sake than for preventing nonproliferation. A 
comprehensive test ban, a global ban on the production of fissile 
material, verified dismantlement of United States and Russian nuclear 
weapons are measures that will help build international support for 
tough nonproliferation agreements, could cap the nuclear weapons 
programs of the threshold nuclear weapons states, and could reduce the 
chances of future theft or diversion of nuclear material from the 
former Soviet Union.
  Additionally, the United States must continue to support the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nonproliferation safeguards, 
tighten nuclear export controls in the United States and elsewhere, and 
increase the role of the U.N. Security council in enforcing 
international nonproliferation agreements. As we have recently 
experienced, these measures will help prevent terrorist leaders like 
Saddam Hussein from building a secret nuclear weapons program.
  Finally, the United States must make it clear that it will make no 
first use of nuclear weapons, that our nuclear weapons will only be 
used to deter nuclear attack. We should seek to have the other 
permanent members of the UN Security Council--who are also the other 
nuclear weapons states--adopt such a `no first use` policy and to 
pledge to assist any country which is party to the NPT and against 
which first-use of nuclear weapons is made. These positive and negative 
security assurances can help build crucial support among developing 
nations to sign onto the NPT. One the other hand, if the United States 
begins targeting third world countries with nuclear weapons, as some in 
the Pentagon might propose, it would give added rationale for those 
countries to build their own nuclear deterrents.
  Now, more than ever, the United States must set a firm standard in 
the nonproliferation arena. U.S. credibility and leadership in 
nonproliferation suffers when Washington subordinates nonproliferation 
to economic or other political considerations. None of the objectives 
in this bill will, on its own, stop proliferation. But by adopting a 
comprehensive nonproliferation policy, the United States can accomplish 
its overall goal of ending the further spread of nuclear weapons 
capability, rolling back proliferation where it has occurred, and 
preventing the use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world.

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