[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 19 (Tuesday, March 3, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1258-S1261]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. COVERDELL (for himself, Mrs. Feinstein, Mr. Helms, and Mr. 
        Hutchinson):
  S.J. Res. 42. A joint resolution to disapprove the certification of 
the President under section 490(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 regarding foreign assistance for Mexico during fiscal year 1998; 
to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
  S.J. Res. 43. A joint resolution to disapprove the certification of 
the President under section 490(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 regarding assistance for Mexico during fiscal year 1997, and to 
provide for the termination of the withholding of and opposition to 
assistance that results from the disapproval; to the Committee on 
Foreign Relations.


              mexico certification disapproval legislation

  Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, for the next few minutes I will make 
limited remarks prior to the introduction of two separate joint 
resolutions that deal with the administration's recent certification of 
Mexico dealing with the losing drug war, and that deal, in my judgment, 
was a more appropriate approach to this situation.
  Mr. President, I consider myself as a person somewhat surprised by 
the New York Times editorial of Saturday, February 28, 1998; the 
headline of the editorial, ``Certifiably Wrong On Mexico.''
  The Clinton administration does no favor to Mexico or its own 
credibility by certifying that Mexico is ``fully cooperating'' in the 
fight against drug trafficking. Compounding the damage, the White House 
Drug Policy Director, Barry McCaffrey, fatuously claims that Mexican 
cooperation is ``absolutely superlative.''
  According to this editorial,

       A more truthful assessment can be found in the Drug 
     Enforcement Administration's confidential evaluation, 
     described by Tim Golden in yesterday's Times. The DEA 
     concludes that ``the Government of Mexico has not 
     accomplished its counter-narcotic goals or succeeded in 
     cooperation with the U.S. Government.'' Mexican trafficking 
     has increased, the DEA notes, and the corruption of its 
     enforcement agencies ``continues unabated.''
       Though Washington finds it diplomatically inconvenient to 
     acknowledge, Mexico has a chronic problem with drug 
     traffickers who always seem to be able to secure the 
     political influence they need to avoid arrest and 
     prosecution. This drug corruption greases the flow of 
     narcotics into the United States. Mexico's drug networks span 
     the border, supplying cocaine, heroin, and marijuana to 
     American users.

  Mr. President, in a hearing last week, I indicated, along with 
Senator Feinstein of California, that we would be introducing 
resolutions, the purpose of which would be to change this course 
between the United States and Mexico on this matter. It would be our 
goal that the process would decertify Mexico on this matter with a 
Presidential waiver in the national interest in which I believe we both 
concur. This would be an honest appraisal of our circumstances.
  The problem with certifying is that it sends a message to the vast 
populations of the United States and of Mexico that this war is being 
won, that we have turned a corner, that things

[[Page S1259]]

are working out. That simply is not the case. I think it does a 
disservice to the entire population of both countries for us to send a 
message of victory when, indeed, the message is one of gravity and 
loss.
  This situation has grave consequences for the people of the United 
States. I have to say that the United States shares enormous 
responsibility in this struggle. My remarks are not intended to 
castigate or single out Mexico; quite to the contrary; I view them as a 
great ally. They are a great trading partner. We share this hemisphere. 
We have mutual goals--democratic goals. But neither country seems to 
want to face the fact that it is losing a precious struggle.
  In 1991, the drug interdiction budget for the United States was $2.03 
billion; today it is $1.44 billion. That is a dramatic reduction in our 
commitment. In 1992, the United States stopped, seized 440 kilograms of 
cocaine and marijuana a day; in 1995, it had been cut in half; we only 
stopped 205 kilograms of cocaine and marijuana per day.
  What does this all mean? In shorthand, it means that about 3 million 
teenagers aged 12-16 are using drugs today that weren't in 1991. To 
give an example, in 1991, 400,000 eighth-graders had used an illicit 
drug in the last year. In 1996 and 1997, that number rose to 920,000. 
In 10th grade, 600,000 had used a drug in 1991; in 1996 and 1997, it 
had doubled to 1.2 million children. In 12th grade, 600,000 in 1991; 
1.1 million, almost doubled again, in 1996 and 1997.
  So by not confronting this directly and honesty, we are all 
contributing to the accelerated rate of children using drugs and we are 
going to pay a price for this the likes of which we have never seen.
  I will yield to the Senator from California in just a moment, but 
first I quote a story of a top administrative official on this. It ran 
in the Phoenix papers.

       ``Our current interdiction efforts almost completely fail 
     to achieve our purpose of reducing the flow of cocaine, 
     heroin, and methamphetamines across the (Southwest) [the 
     Mexican] border,'' said Francis X. Kinney, director of 
     strategic planning for the Office of National Drug Control 
     Policy. . . .
       Kinney said the United States will continue to be overrun 
     by drug traffic at the U.S.-Mexican border unless it 
     emphasizes improved intelligence and high-tech screening 
     equipment. . .

  The last thing he said addresses the Senator from California:

       ``They [the Congress] want us to call it like it is, not to 
     be an apologist,'' alluding to the U.S. Congress.

  I think this gentleman is absolutely correct.
  Mr. President, I send a joint resolution to the desk and ask for its 
appropriate referral.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The joint resolution will be received and 
appropriately referred.
  Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I send another joint resolution to the 
desk and ask for its appropriate referral.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The joint resolution will be received and 
appropriately referred.
  Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, in concluding and yielding to the 
Senator from California, I just want to make it clear that the purpose 
of these two joint resolutions is to alter the course of our engagement 
in the drug war, principally as it relates to Mexico. Instead of 
certifying and saying, ``Here is a message of victory to the two 
peoples of the two Nations,'' it decertifies with a national security 
waiver and calls it like it is and refocuses our Governments and our 
people in a combined effort to win this battle and not lose it--to win 
it for the millions of children that are suffering, because we are 
losing it.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from 
Georgia, and I rise to join him in submitting these resolutions for 
disapproval of the President's decision to certify Mexico as fully 
cooperating with the United States in the fight against drug 
trafficking.
  Mr. President, as we all know, when the President made the same 
decision last year, it sparked an intense debate between the 
administration and what was in all probability a majority of Congress 
who did not believe that Mexico had earned certification. I have looked 
long and hard at the evidence that is available. I have received 
extensive briefings from law enforcement and intelligence officials. 
Anyone, I believe, who has received these same briefings would come to 
the conclusion I have reached, that once again the decision to certify 
Mexico is incorrect and not grounded in the facts.
  While Mexico has made some limited progress, there remain gaping 
holes in its counternarcotics effort. Whether due to inability or lack 
of political will, these failures badly undermine the urgent effort to 
keep the scourge of drugs off our streets. Regardless of America's 
demand problem, when the supply of drugs reaches the point where it 
comes in at literally tons each day, any demand program is 
extraordinarily difficult to sustain.
  Has Mexico cooperated in some areas? Of course. There are one or two 
new police units which seem to have trusting relationships with the 
DEA. New vetting procedures are beginning to be implemented in the 
hiring of new police officers. Mexico and the United States have agreed 
on a bilateral drug strategy, although it is a vaguely worded document 
that will take years to evaluate whether it has been successful and 
whether actions on the streets will follow this roundtable document.
  It can also be argued that pressure brought to bear on drug lord 
Amado Carrillo-Fuentes was responsible for driving him to seek refuge 
in another country--Chile--and very likely for his attempt to conceal 
his identity through plastic surgery. The surgery, of course, resulted 
in his death and the torture-murder of the entire surgical team. His 
organization, however, continues to operate, and a reign of violence 
has been unleashed as his would-be successors battle for control of his 
organization.
  But last year, Senator Coverdell and I laid out a number of key areas 
that we would use to judge whether or not Mexico has reached the 
standard of full cooperation. Sadly, our top law enforcement agencies 
indicate that none of these changes has produced significant results. 
There has been no demonstrable action on any--and I repeat ``any''--of 
the benchmarks outlined by Congress last year as key measurements of 
cooperation by Mexico: dismantlement of drug cartels, the arrest and 
prosecution of cartel leaders, the extradition of Mexican nationals on 
drug charges to the United States for prosecution, effective 
prosecution of corrupt officials, law enforcement cooperation, 
effective money laundering laws implemented, security of U.S. drug 
agents working in bilateral efforts in Mexico.
  Let me touch on each of these. The cartels in Mexico today are either 
as strong or stronger than they were a year ago. And despite much talk 
of cooperation, there has been no substantial progress by the 
Government of Mexico in developing prosecutable cases against the 
leaders of the major drug trafficking groups, even when these 
individuals have been identified by U.S. investigations and are made 
the subject of U.S. indictments.
  The scope of Mexican drug trafficking has increased significantly, 
along with the attendant violence, even against United States and 
Mexican law enforcement officials and informants. During 1997, DEA 
recorded in excess of 50 incidents of threats along the Southwest 
border. According to the information I have received, the Mexican 
Government has arrested and prosecuted few individuals in connection 
with these acts. None of the major cartels has been dismantled nor have 
their leaders been arrested.
  Take the Amado Carrillo-Fuentes organization. After the death of 
Amado Carrillo-Fuentes, there were numerous enforcement actions taken 
against his organization, but the intelligence was unproductive, 
leading to insignificant asset seizures and new arrests.
  On July 30, 1997, Mexican authorities detained a close associate of 
Carrillo-Fuentes, Manuel Bitar-Tafich, leading to seizure of $50 
million in the United States. However, because the Mexicans have not 
provided the needed documents to support the seizure in the United 
States, much of the money had to be returned. Bitar himself remains in 
custody, but there has been no movement on his case. While the Mexicans 
have reported seizing $52 million in Mexico, no documentation 
supporting this seizure has been provided to the U.S. Government.
  The Mexican Government arrested Noe Brito, a member of Carrillo-

[[Page S1260]]

Fuentes' security apparatus. He was released, however, before the DEA 
was even allowed to interview him.
  The Arellano-Felix operation--the notorious cartel located just south 
of California in the Tijuana area--continues to operate with impunity. 
There have been several enforcement actions in 1997, but few resulted 
in significant results against the cartel's trafficking operations.
  On November 8, 1997, the Mexican Attorney General's Office arrested 
Arturo Everardo Paez-Martinez, a known cartel assassin. Paez is 
incarcerated in Mexico on the basis of a provisional U.S. arrest 
warrant but has not been extradited.

  On September 20, Mexico's counternarcotics unit reporting to the 
Attorney General arrested two men on weapons charges, who are known 
members of the ``Juniors,'' a group of young assassins recruited by the 
Arellano-Felix cartel. The Government of Mexico offered to extradite 
one of the men, but the United States had to turn down the offer due to 
lack of outstanding charges and evidence against him. This is an 
example of what results from a lack of cooperative law enforcement 
efforts.
  The Sonora Cartel. Miguel Angel Caro-Quintero heads his family's 
organization operating out of Sonora, Mexico. There are four 
outstanding warrants for him on smuggling, RICO statute, and conspiracy 
charges. He has been operating freely in Mexico since 1992. There are 
also provisional arrest warrants issued for both Miguel and Rafael 
Caro-Quintero.
  The Amezcua-Contreras brothers. The Amezcua-Contreras brothers' 
organization is believed to be the world's largest clandestine producer 
of methamphetamine. The organization procures huge quantities of the 
ephedrine in Thailand and India, which is supplied to laboratories in 
Mexico and California. The Amezcuas' methamphetamine is distributed in 
large cities across the United States. A U.S. law enforcement 
investigation, Operation META, concluded in December of 1997 with the 
arrest of 101 defendants, seizure of 133 pounds of methamphetamine, and 
the precursors to manufacture up to 540 pounds more, along with 1,100 
kilos of cocaine and over $2.25 million in assets.
  Mexican efforts against this organization have not met with great 
success:
  On November 10, 1997, the Mexican military's special vetted unit 
arrested Adan Amezcua at his ranch in Colima on gun charges, not on 
drug charges. He is the only Amezcua not under indictment in either the 
United States or Mexico. He remains in custody pending further 
investigations. The Government of Mexico has failed to indict or arrest 
any of the principal members of the Amezcua organization in Mexico.
  The DEA International Chemical Control Unit has supported elements of 
the Government of Mexico financially and logistically for numerous 
investigations of the Amezcuas, with little or no results. None of the 
investigations resulted in arrests or produced information that could 
be used in U.S. courts.
  Though Jesus and Luis Amezcua are currently under Federal indictment 
in the United States on a variety of charges, there are no provisional 
arrest warrants for them and they remain at large in Mexico.
  Extradition was a key benchmark and a test of cooperation. There have 
been no extraditions from Mexico to the United States of any Mexican 
nationals on drug charges--none.
  The identities of the leaders of the major criminal groups based in 
Mexico who control the flow of heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine to 
the United States have been known for several years. In fact, U.S. law 
enforcement agencies have built cases on and indicted in the United 
States virtually all of these cartel leaders. The Department of Justice 
has filed provisional arrest warrants for the most significant drug 
traffickers in Mexico. While several have been arrested, many others 
remain at large and none has been extradited to the United States.
  In the war against drugs, extradition of cartel leaders for trial and 
imprisonment in the United States is a key and indisputable beachhead 
in the war against drug trafficking. It is also a major benchmark of 
cooperation.
  In my view--and I know the view held by law enforcement in the United 
States--the drug lords operating in Mexico only fear extradition to the 
United States, where they know they will stand trial and face 
punishment commensurate with their crimes. The Mexican law enforcement 
institutions and legal system present no deterrent to their operations.
  That is why this Senate, many of my colleagues, and law enforcement 
officials have repeatedly said that the most meaningful measurement of 
real progress in drug cooperation with Mexico is if the major 
traffickers are apprehended and extradited to the United States.

  Provisional arrest warrants have been filed by the Department of 
Justice for the following major traffickers: Agustin Vasquez-Mendoza, 
Ramon Arellano-Felix, Rafael Caro-Quintero, Miguel Caro-Quintero, 
Vicente Carrillo-Fuentes, Eduardo Gonzalez-Quirarte, Oscar Malherbe, 
Arturo Paez-Martinez, Jaime Ladino-Avila, Jose Gerardo-Castro/Gonzalez-
Gutierez, William Brian Martin, Miguel Angel Martinez-Martinez, Antonio 
Hernandez-Acosta, and Miguel Felix Gallardo.

  These are all key lieutenants in either the Amezcua, Carrillo-
Fuentes, Caro-Quintero, or Arellano-Felix organizations. The Justice 
Department requested extradition of four of the above within the past 
year. The first two requests have been stalled or completely thwarted 
by Mexican courts.
  Last November, the United States and Mexico Attorneys General signed 
a protocol to the United States-Mexican Extradition Treaty that 
authorized temporary surrender of a convicted party to the other 
country to face drug charges. This is certainly a positive signal, but 
it has yet to be tested in practice.
  The bottom line is that, to date, there has not been a single 
extradition of a Mexican national to the United States on drug 
charges--not one.
  Corruption. Drug-related corruption is probably the single greatest 
obstacle that the United States faces in its global battle against 
international drug trafficking. Unfortunately, drug corruption in 
Mexico is so deeply rooted that it persists despite attempts to 
eradicate it.
  The level of drug corruption in Mexico continues unabated. According 
to the briefings I have received, virtually every investigation our law 
enforcement agencies conduct against major traffickers in Mexico 
uncovers significant corruption of law enforcement officials.
  Our own law enforcement agencies indicate that endemic corruption 
among Mexican law enforcement officials continually frustrates our 
effort to build cases against and to apprehend the most significant 
drug traffickers in Mexico, and it is the primary reason there has been 
no meaningful progress in drug law enforcement in Mexico.
  In the wake of the devastating disclosure that Mexico's own ``drug 
czar'' was on the payroll of Amado Carrillo-Fuentes, the Mexican 
Government dismantled the INCD, the Mexican counterpart to the DEA, and 
fired the majority of its employees.
  Unfortunately, many of those fired were ordered reinstated by Mexican 
courts.
  Additionally, of the 40 military officers arrested as part of the 
Gutierrez-Rebollo investigation, none has been brought to trial or 
convicted to date.
  The following cases indicate how deeply drug corruption has 
penetrated into Mexican institutions:
  Colonel Jose Luis Rubalcava, who had been Director of the Federal 
Judicial Anti-Drug Police under the INCD, was arrested on or about 
April 14, 1997 on charges in connection with 2.5 tons of cocaine seized 
in Sombrete, Mexico in 1995. This is the director for the Judicial 
Anti-Drug Police--2\1/2\ tons of cocaine.
  U.S. law enforcement officials speculate that bribery and corruption 
may have been behind the withdrawal of Baja state police protection 
from a Tijuana news editor prior to his November 27, 1997 attempted 
assassination. The editor had been putting public pressure on the issue 
of drug corruption.
  According to a December 1997 statement by Mexican Attorney General 
Madrazo, out of some 870 Federal agents dismissed on corruption charges 
in 1996, 700 have been rehired in either the PGR--the Mexican Attorney 
General's office--or at the state and local

[[Page S1261]]

level. The rehiring was done at the direction of the courts.
  If you cannot fire corrupt law enforcement officials, how can you 
fight drugs?
  The issue of prosecuting corrupt officials is important, because 
without fear of prosecution, there is little deterrence. Too often in 
Mexico, officials are fired, but never prosecuted.
  In 1997, there were only 3 corruption cases being prosecuted, 
including General Gutierrez. Another case involves the theft of 476 
kilograms of cocaine by 17 PGR officials, including an Army General in 
Sonora. The third involved a Judicial Police Comandante. The Mexican 
government has reportedly begun additional prosecutions, but many more 
cases need to be brought to trial in order to have any deterrent 
effect.


                      law enforcement cooperation

  This is where the rubber hits the road in counternarcotics 
cooperation, not in agreements reached at the political level. 
Unfortunately, law enforcement cooperation from Mexico has been 
severely lacking.
  It is encouraging to hear from DEA that there are now some Mexican 
officials with whom they believe they can build a trusting 
relationship.
  A key aspect of this institution-building process is vetting, leading 
to the development and professionalization of the new drug enforcement 
unit, the Special Prosecutor's Office for Crimes Against Health.
  This vetting process could go a long way toward providing U.S. law 
enforcement officials with the level of trust in their counterparts 
necessary for an effective bi-lateral effort, but it is still in its 
infancy, and even some officials who have been ``vetted'' have 
subsequently been arrested in connection with traffickers. So while 
this effort is critically important, it is not evidence of full 
cooperation by a long shot.
  More telling however, is the state of affairs with the much-vaunted 
Bilateral Border Task Forces located in Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez and 
Matamoros. Each Task Forces was supposed to include Mexican agents, and 
two agents each from DEA, FBI, and the U.S. Customs Service. But, 
regretfully, the Task Forces are not operational because some Mexican 
agents, and even comandantes, have been under suspicion of, or arrested 
for, ties to criminal organizations.
  The old Task Forces were dismantled after the arrest of General 
Gutierrez-Rebollo and have been rebuilt since then. But the Mexican 
government for a long time did not provide the promised funding, 
leaving DEA to carry the full cost, which they did until September of 
last year.
  Additionally, the issue of personal security for U.S. agents working 
with the Bilateral Task Forces in Mexico has not been resolved and, as 
a result, the task forces are not operational and will not be until the 
security issue is resolved.
  The bottom line is that the task forces cannot function properly 
without DEA and other federal law enforcement agents working side by 
side with their Mexican counterparts, as is the case with similar units 
in Colombia and Peru. This critical joint working relationship is made 
impossible by Mexican policies that do not allow for adequate 
immunities or physical security for U.S. Special Agents while working 
in Mexico.
  A related problem for the Task Forces is the low quality of 
intelligence provided by Mexico. To my knowledge there have been no 
meaningful intelligence leads from Mexican agents to their American 
counterparts leading to a single significant seizure of drugs coming 
into this country.
  Intelligence sharing simply does not flow north.
  U.S. law enforcement officials indicate that Mexico's drug 
intelligence facilities located near the Task Forces are manned by non-
vetted, non-law enforcement civilians and military staff and have only 
produced leads from telephone intercepts on low-level traffickers. To 
date, none of the electronic intercepts conducted by the Task Forces 
have produced a prosecutable drug case in Mexican courts against any 
major Mexican criminal organization.
  To its credit, the Organized Crime Unit does have several major on-
going investigations underway. But only 140 of the planned 280 
prosecutors, investigators and support personnel have been hired, and 
only 25 have been ``super-vented.'' Again, this unit is promising, but 
it is still too early to tell whether it will maintain the integrity, 
or have the staffing, training and resources to be effective partners 
in the war against drugs.


                              enforcement

  Mexico's seizures of cocaine have increased from 23.6 metric tons in 
1996 to 34.9 metric tons in 1997--although that is still far below the 
average of 45 metric tons in 1991-1993. Marijuana seizures did reach an 
all-time high.
  Unfortunately, seizures of heroin, methamphetamine, and ephedrine are 
all down sharply. Heroin seizures fell from 363 kilograms to 115 
kilograms. Methamphetamine seizures fell from 172 kilograms to only 39 
kilograms. Ephedrine seizures fell dramatically from 6,697 kilograms to 
only 608 kilograms.
  Drug related arrests declined from an already low 11,283 to 10,622, 
barely a third of the number arrested in 1992. Less than half as many 
weapons were seized in 1997 (1,892) as in 1996 (4,335).
  In another crucial enforcement area, Mexico's new money-laundering 
statutes have yet to be fully enforced, and have not resulted in any 
successful prosecutions yet. Mexico has decided to make violations of 
new banking regulations non-criminal violations, which severely 
undercuts the deterrent factor.
  Mexico's Organized Crime Statute has yet to be fully implemented. The 
Government of Mexico has advised that the lack of judicial support and 
known judicial corruption have frustrated implementation of the wire 
intercept aspects of the law.
  But let us be honest with ourselves. The statute asks the President 
to certify that a country has ``cooperated fully'' with the United 
States. If Mexico has cooperated in three or four areas, and not 
cooperated in ten or twelve others, can we really call that full 
cooperation. Of course not. At best, we should say that Mexico has 
cooperated partially with the United States in counternarcotics 
efforts. But full cooperation? It's not even close.
  We must make an honest assessment. To those who dislike the 
certification statute, I quote again from the New York Times editorial 
``* * * as long as certification remains on the books, the 
Administration has a duty to report truthfully to Congress and the 
American people. It has failed to do so in the case of Mexico.''
  So in the wake of the President's decision to certify Mexico, I 
believe we in Congress have no choice but to try to pass a resolution 
of disapproval. If possible, we will pass one with a waiver of 
sanctions. But if not, we will have to vote on the straight resolution 
of disapproval. We have until March 28 to decide.
  Mr. President, we must make an honest assessment of full cooperation, 
and there is only one way to assess full cooperation, and it is on the 
streets. It is with extradition. It is with arrest of cartel leaders. 
It is with letting our DEA agents who work the Mexican side of the 
border have their security--meaning beyond. You cannot send them across 
the border without a mechanism to protect them. None of this is 
happening today.
  The big, highly touted drug agreement, which I read, talks about the 
size and shape of the table. There are no specifics.
  In view of this, I urge decertification with a waiver.

                          ____________________