[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 19 (Tuesday, March 3, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1255-S1261]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

      By Mr. MOYNIHAN (for himself, Mr. Kerry, and Ms. Moseley-Braun):
  S. 1700. A bill to designate the headquarters building of the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development in Washington, District of 
Columbia, as the ``Rovert C. Weaver Federal Building''; to the 
Committee on Environment and Public Works.


     the robert c. weaver federal building designation act of 1997

  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I rise to introduce legislation to name 
the Housing and Urban Development (HUD) headquarters here in Washington 
after Dr. Robert C. Weaver, adviser to three Presidents, director of 
the NAACP, and the first African-American Cabinet Secretary. I am 
pleased that Senators Kerry and Moseley-Braun are co-sponsors of my 
bill. I would point out that Senator Kerry was poised to introduce 
similar legislation; in fact, he sent out a Dear Colleague on the 
subject last November. But he graciously deferred to me, and I am most 
appreciative. Bob Weaver was my friend, dating back more than 40 years 
to our service together in the Harriman administration. He passed away 
last July at his home in New York City after spending his entire life 
broadening opportunities for minorities in America. I think it is a 
fitting tribute to name the HUD building after this great man.
  Dr. Weaver began his career in government service as part of 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's ``Black Cabinet,'' an informal 
advisory group promoting educational and job opportunities for blacks. 
The Washington Post

[[Page S1256]]

called this work his greatest legacy, the dismantling of a deeply 
entrenched system of racial segregation in America. Indeed it was.
  Dr. Weaver was appointed Deputy Commissioner of Housing for New York 
State in 1955, and later became State Rent Administrator with Cabinet 
rank. It was during these years working for New York Governor Averell 
Harriman that I first met Bob; I was Assistant to the Secretary to the 
Governor and later, Acting Secretary.
  Our friendship and collaboration continued under the Kennedy and 
Johnson administrations. In 1960, he became the president of the NAACP, 
and shortly thereafter would become a key adviser to President Kennedy 
on civil rights. In 1961, Kennedy appointed Dr. Weaver to head the 
Housing and Home Finance Agency, an entity that later became the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development. In 1966, when President 
Johnson elevated the agency to Cabinet rank, Dr. Weaver was, in 
Johnson's phrase, ``the man for the job.'' He thus became its first 
Secretary, and the first African-American to head a Cabinet agency. 
Later, he and I served together on the Pennsylvania Avenue Commission.
  Following his government service, Dr. Weaver was, among various other 
academic pursuits, a professor at Hunter College, a member of the 
School of Urban and Public Affairs at Carnegie-Mellon, a visiting 
professor at Columbia Teacher's College and New York University's 
School of Education, and the president of Baruch College in Manhattan. 
When I became director of the Joint Center for Urban Studies at MIT and 
Harvard, he generously agreed to be a member of the Board of Directors.
  Dr. Weaver had earned his undergraduate, master's, and doctoral 
degrees in economics from Harvard; he wrote four books on urban 
affairs; and he was one of the original directors of the Municipal 
Assistance Corporation, which designed the plan to rescue New York City 
during its tumultuous financial crisis in the 1970s.
  Last July, America--and Washington in particular (for he was a native 
Washingtonian)--lost one of its innovators, one of its creators, one of 
its true leaders. For Dr. Robert Weaver led not only with his words but 
with his deeds. I was privileged to know him as a friend. He will be 
missed but properly memorialized, I think, if we can pass this 
legislation.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my bill, and a July 21, 
1997 editorial in the Washington Post, and a July 19, 1997 obituary 
from the New York Times be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                S. 1700

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. DESIGNATION OF ROBERT C. WEAVER FEDERAL BUILDING.

       In honor of the first Secretary of Housing and Urban 
     Development, the headquarters building of the Department of 
     Housing and Urban Development located at 451 Seventh Street, 
     SW., in Washington, District of Columbia, shall be known and 
     designated as the ``Robert C. Weaver Federal Building''.

     SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

       Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, 
     or other record of the United States to the building referred 
     to in section 1 shall be deemed to be a reference to the 
     ``Robert C. Weaver Federal Building''.
                                  ____


               [From the Washington Post, July 21, 1997]

                            Robert C. Weaver

       Native Washingtonian Robert C. Weaver, who died on Thursday 
     in New York City at age 89, had a life of many firsts. Dr. 
     Weaver served as a college president, Cabinet secretary, 
     presidential adviser, chairman of the National Association 
     for the Advancement of Colored People and as a director of 
     the Municipal Assistance Corp., which helped save New York 
     City from financial catastrophe. But his greatest legacy may 
     be the work he did, largely out of public view, to dismantle 
     a deeply entrenched system of racial segregation in America.
       Before the landmark decade of civil rights advances in the 
     1960s, Dr. Weaver was one of a small group of African 
     American officials in the New Deal era who, as part of the 
     ``Black Cabinet'' pressured President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
     to strike down racial barriers in government employment, 
     housing and education. It was a long way to come for the 
     Dunbar High School graduate who ran into racial 
     discrimination in the 1920s when he tried to join a union 
     fresh out of high school. Embittered by that experience, Bob 
     Weaver went on to Harvard (in the footsteps of his 
     grandfather, the first African American Harvard graduate in 
     dentistry) to earn his bachelor's, master's and doctorate in 
     economics. At another time in America, his university degrees 
     might have led to another career path. For Bob Weaver in 
     1932, however, those credentials--and his earlier job as a 
     college professor--made him an ``associate advisor on Negro 
     affairs'' in the U.S. Department of the Interior.
       Subsequent work as an educator, economist and national 
     housing expert--and behind-the-scenes recruitment of scores 
     of African Americans for public service--led to his 
     appointment as New York State rent administrator, making him 
     the first African American with state cabinet rank. President 
     John F. Kennedy appointed him to the highest federal post 
     ever occupied by an African American--the Housing and Home 
     Finance Agency. Despite the president's support, however, the 
     HHFA never made it to Cabinet status, because Dr. Weaver was 
     its administrator and southern legislators rebelled at the 
     thought of a black secretary. Years later President Lyndon 
     Johnson pushed through the Department of Housing and Urban 
     Development and named Robert Weaver to the presidential 
     Cabinet.
       For the nation, and Robert Weaver, the appointment was 
     another important first. For many other African Americans who 
     found lower barriers and increased opportunity in the last 
     third of the 20th century, Robert Weaver's legacy is lasting.
                                  ____


                [From the New York Times, July 19, 1997]

         Robert C. Weaver, 89, First Black Cabinet Member, Dies

                           (By James Barron)

       Dr. Robert C. Weaver, the first Secretary of Housing and 
     Urban Development and the first black person appointed to the 
     Cabinet, died on Thursday at his home in Manhattan. He was 
     89.
       Dr. Weaver was also one of the original directors of the 
     Municipal Assistance Corporation, which was formed to rescue 
     New York City from financial crisis in the 1970's.
       ``He was a catalyst with the Kennedys and then with 
     Johnson, forging new initiatives in housing and education,'' 
     said Walter E. Washington, the first elected Mayor of the 
     nation's capital.
       A portly, pedagogical man who wrote four books on urban 
     affairs, Dr. Weaver had made a name for himself in the 1930's 
     and 1940's as an expert behind-the-scenes strategist in the 
     civil rights movement. ``Fight hard and legally,'' he said, 
     ``and don't blow your top.''
       As a part of the ``Black Cabinet'' in the administration of 
     President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Dr. Weaver was one of a 
     group of blacks who specialized in housing, education and 
     employment. After being hired as race relations advisers in 
     various Federal agencies, they pressured and persuaded the 
     White House to provide more jobs, better educational 
     opportunities and equal rights.
       Dr. Weaver began in 1933 as an aide to Interior Secretary 
     Harold L. Ickes. He later served as a special assistant in 
     the housing division of the Works Progress Administration, 
     the National Defense Advisory Commission, the War Production 
     Board and the War Manpower Commission.
       Shortly before the 1940 election, he devised a strategy 
     that defused anger among blacks about Stephen T. Early, 
     President Roosevelt's press secretary. Arriving at 
     Pennsylvania Station in New York, Early lost his temper when 
     a line of police officers blocked his way. Early knocked one 
     of the officers, who happened to be black, to the ground. As 
     word of the incident spread, a White House adviser put 
     through a telephone call to Dr. Weaver in Washington.
       The aide, worried that the incident would cost Roosevelt 
     the black vote, told Dr. Weaver to find the other black 
     advisers and prepare a speech that would appeal to blacks for 
     the President to deliver the following week.
       Dr. Weaver said he doubted that he could find anyone in the 
     middle of the night, even though most of the others in the 
     ``Black Cabinet'' had been playing poker in his basement when 
     the phone rang. ``And anyway,'' he said, ``I don't think a 
     mere speech will do it. What we need right now is something 
     so dramatic that it will make the Negro voters forget all 
     about Steve Early and the Negro cop too.''
       Within 48 hours, Benjamin O. Davis Sr. was the first black 
     general in the Army; William H. Hastie was the first black 
     civilian aide to the Secretary of War, and Campbell C. 
     Johnson was the first high-ranking black aide to the head of 
     the Selective Service.
       Robert Clifton Weaver was born on Dec. 29, 1907, in 
     Washington. His father was a postal worker and his mother--
     who he said influenced his intellectual development--was the 
     daughter of the first black person to graduate from Harvard 
     with a degree in dentistry. When Dr. Weaver joined the 
     Kennedy Administration, whose Harvard connections extended to 
     the occupant of the Oval Office, he held more Harvard 
     degrees--three, including a doctorate in economics--than 
     anyone else in the administration's upper ranks.
       In 1960, after serving as the New York State Rent 
     Commissioner, Dr. Weaver became the national chairman of the 
     National

[[Page S1257]]

     Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and 
     President Kennedy sought Dr. Weaver's advice on civil rights. 
     The following year, the President appointed him administrator 
     of the Housing and Home Finance Agency, a loose combination 
     of agencies that included the bureaucratic components of what 
     would eventually become H.U.D., including the Federal Housing 
     Administration to spur construction, the Urban Renewal 
     Administration to oversee slum clearance and the Federal 
     National Mortgage Association to line up money for new 
     housing.
       President Kennedy tried to have the agency raised to 
     Cabinet rank, but Congress balked. Southerners led an attack 
     against the appointment of a black to the Cabinet, and there 
     were charges that Dr. Weaver was an extremist. Kennedy 
     abandoned the idea of creating an urban affairs department.
       Five years later, when President Johnson revived the idea 
     and pushed it through Congress, Senators who had voted 
     against Dr. Weaver the first time around voted for him.
       Past Federal housing programs had largely dealt with 
     bricks-and-mortar policies. Dr. Weaver said Washington needed 
     to take a more philosophical approach. ``Creative federalism 
     stresses local initiative, local solutions to local 
     problems,'' he said.
       But, he added, ``where the obvious needs for action to meet 
     an urban problem are not being fulfilled, the Federal 
     Government has a responsibility at least to generate a 
     thorough awareness of the problem.''
       Dr. Weaver, who said that ``you cannot have physical 
     renewal without human renewal,'' pushed for better-looking 
     public housing by offering awards for design. He also 
     increased the amount of money for small businesses displaced 
     by urban renewal and revived the long-dormant idea of Federal 
     rent subsidies for the elderly.
       Later in his life, he was a professor of urban affairs at 
     Hunter College, was a member of the Visiting Committee at the 
     School of Urban and Public Affairs at Carnegie-Mellon 
     University and held visiting professorships at Columbia 
     Teachers' College and the New York University School of 
     Education. He also served as a consultant to the Ford 
     Foundation and was the president of Baruch College in 
     Manhattan in 1969.
       His wife, Ella, died in 1991. Their son, Robert Jr., died 
     in 1962.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I join Senator Moynihan in supporting his 
legislation to designate the headquarters building of the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development in Washington, D.C. as the ``Robert C. 
Weaver Federal Building.''
  Robert Weaver was a stalwart leader in the fight to build a society 
free from racial prejudice and discrimination. He spent his life in a 
pursuit of equality and a campaign to end all forms of discrimination 
based on race.
  Dr. Weaver was a member of ``the black cabinet'' which sought to 
ensure that the new government projects of the New Deal applied to and 
benefitted minority groups during the Roosevelt Administration. His 
personal crusade led for civil rights led to the selection of the first 
African-American to be a general in the Army, the naming of the first 
African-American to be a civilian aide to the Secretary of War, and the 
appointment of the first African-American to be a high-ranking aide to 
the head of the Selective Service.
  In 1955, Dr. Weaver began a long career in housing when he was 
appointed Deputy Commissioner of Housing for the State of New York. 
Later that year, he became the state rent administrator. In 1960, Dr. 
Weaver was selected to be the vice-chairman of the New York City 
Housing Redevelopment Board, a three-member body responsible for 
administering the city's urban renewal and moderate-income housing 
programs.
  Dr. Weaver's reputation as a skilled housing policy and program 
practitioner soon extended well beyond New York. President John K. 
Kennedy named Dr. Weaver as Administrator of the Federal Housing and 
Home Finance Agency, and President Lyndon Johnson nominated him to be 
the first Secretary of Housing and Urban Development when the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development was formed in 1966.
  Dr. Weaver's leadership and vision set the course for the future of 
the housing and urban redevelopment industries. Past Federal housing 
programs had focused largely on ``bricks-and-mortar'' policies, but Dr. 
Weaver believed that ``you cannot have physical renewal without human 
renewal.'' His principal concern was to raise the standard of urban 
housing and to move away from the bleak high rise projects that scarred 
the urban landscape and were the origins of many inner city social 
problems that were just beginning to be recognized. He used all of his 
various positions and considerable experience to advocate effective 
public programs to house all Americans and to revitalize communities.
  He was a true visionary who fought to expand the possibilities of all 
Americans. I can think of no better person to name the first building 
to house the Department of Housing and Urban Development than Dr. 
Robert Clifton Weaver, the first African-American Cabinet member in New 
York State, the first African-American member of a President's cabinet, 
and the federal government's first Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development. This tribute is even more fitting because Robert Weaver, 
along with then Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey and others, laid the 
cornerstone of this building during his tenure as Secretary.
                                 ______
                                 

                          By Mr. ROCKEFELLER:

  S. 1702. A bill to amend the Harmonized Tariff Schedule for the 
United States to change the special rate of duty on purified 
terephtalic acid imported from Mexico; to the Committee on Finance.


                 harmonized tariff schedule legislation

  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce this bill 
to amend Chapter 29 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United 
States to effect the immediate elimination of the special duty rate on 
Purified Terephthalic Acid (PTA) imports from Mexico in order that the 
United States polyester industry can remain competitive in the U.S. 
domestic market.
  We're faced with an ironic situation where a single American supplier 
is the source of substantial harm to the American polyester production 
industry and American workers. This is a highly unusual situation in 
which the American supplier has been able to remain a monopolistic 
producer of PTA, thus controlling the supply of the product and the 
price U.S. consumers must pay. By eliminating the tariff on PTA from 
Mexico, this legislation will place the U.S. PTA market on a level 
playing field with adequate supply and market dictated prices.
  PTA is the principal feedstock in producing polyethylene 
terephthalate (PET), a polyester resin produced in West Virginia by 
Shell Chemical. This feedstock, PTA, comprises nearly two thirds the 
cost of polyester production. PTA is produced for the U.S. merchant 
market by one sole supplier, who can control both the price and supply 
of PTA in the U.S. market. Because the NAFTA tariff makes PTA imports 
unaffordable, U.S. PET producers, like Shell, are limited domestically 
to only one source to meet their PTA needs. This domestic source is not 
providing PET buyers with sufficient quantities of PTA, nor at a 
competitive price. Subsequently, the combination of the NAFTA tariff on 
PTA and a single domestic merchant producer of PTA, the U.S. price for 
PTA is kept the highest in the world. As a result, U.S. polyester 
producers, like the one in West Virginia, operate in a closed, non-
competitive environment.
  Consequently, a tariff inversion is created which significantly harms 
U.S. PET production because PET imports made with cheaper, foreign PTA 
are subject to relatively low tariffs or none at all in the case of GSP 
countries. This tariff inversion exposes West Virginia's PET production 
and all U.S. polyester production to unfair competition from foreign 
competitors. Further, it prohibits any possibility for expansion and 
new job creation.
  I understand that the Office of the United States Trade 
Representative is currently negotiating with their Mexican counterparts 
various tariff eliminations under the Second Round of Accelerated 
Tariff Elimination under the North American Free Trade Agreement. The 
PTA tariff is under consideration. The elimination of the duty for PTA 
is supported by the majority of the U.S. PTA industry and Mexico.
  Shell's future economic viability in West Virginia is linked to the 
elimination of this tariff. If the tariff is not eliminated, the 
cutback in Shell polyester production could cost as many as 250 full-
time jobs that pay on average, $70,000 a year, including direct wages, 
benefits and retirement. Already 160 jobs have been lost since 1995 as 
a direct result of the economic disadvantage caused by this inequity. I 
would add that these jobs provide some of the highest paying salaries 
in my State.
  This lack of competitive domestic PTA pricing does not just cause 
harm

[[Page S1258]]

to my State of West Virginia--also at risk are nearly 3,500 workers 
employed by several U.S. polyester producers buying PTA across the 
country.
  I urge the Senate to act on this PTA tariff elimination bill so that 
West Virginians and other domestic workers and producers can fairly 
compete in this highly competitive global marketplace and to have the 
opportunity to expand U.S. operations when market conditions permit.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the bill 
be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1702

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. TEREPHTHALIC ACID.

       (a) In General.--Subheading 2917.36.00 of the harmonized 
     Tariff Schedule of the United States in amended by striking 
     ``1.8 cents/kg + 8.9% (MX)'' in the special rates of duty 
     subcolumn and inserting ``, MX'' in the parenthetical after 
     ``J''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section 
     applies to goods entered on or after the date that is 15 days 
     after the date of enactment of this Act.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mrs. BOXER (for herself and Mrs. Feinstein):
  S. 1703. A bill to provide for the conveyance of certain property 
from the United States to Stanislaus County, California; to the 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.


       the stanislaus county federal land conveyance act of 1998

  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce legislation 
providing for the conveyance of federal land to Stanislaus County, 
California. This bill is nearly identical to legislation passed by the 
House of Representatives last November.
  The land in question is known as the NASA Ames Research Center, Crows 
Landing Naval Air Facility. During World War II, Crows Landing was a 
flight training center encompassing 1,500 acres and containing two 
airstrips. Following the war, jurisdiction was transferred to NASA, 
which now no longer has any use for this facility. Right now, these 
airstrips are going to waste.
  Giving this land back to the county will promote economic growth and 
be an important asset to local development. While passage of this bill 
would greatly serve Stanislaus County, it would also permit NASA to 
retain the right to use the facility for aviation purposes. It creates 
a win-win situation for all involved.
  Crows Landing has greatly served this nation--first in the interest 
of national defense and then to the benefit of the space program. But 
now, it lies abandoned. We should follow the House and give this land 
back to the people of Stanislaus County.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1703

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Administrator.--The term ``Administrator'' means the 
     Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space 
     Administration.
       (2) Federal agency.--The term ``Federal agency'' has the 
     meaning given the term ``agency'' in section 555(1) of title 
     5, United States Code.
       (3) NASA.--The term ``NASA'' means the National Aeronautics 
     and Space Administration.

     SEC. 2. CONVEYANCE OF PROPERTY.

       As soon as practicable after the date of enactment of this 
     Act, the Administrator shall convey to Stanislaus County, 
     California, all right, title, and interest of the United 
     States in and to the property described in section 3.

     SEC. 3. PROPERTY DESCRIBED.

       The property to be conveyed pursuant to section 2 is--
       (1) the approximately 1,528 acres of land in Stanislaus 
     County, California, known as the ``NASA Ames Research Center, 
     Crows Landing Facility (formerly known as the Naval Auxiliary 
     Landing Field, Crows Landing)'';
       (2) all improvements on the land described in paragraph 
     (1); and
       (3) any other Federal property that is--
       (A) under the jurisdiction of NASA;
       (B) located on the land described in paragraph (1); and
       (C) designated by NASA to be transferred to Stanislaus 
     County, California.

     SEC. 4. TERMS.

       (a) Consideration.--The conveyance required by section 2 
     shall be without consideration other than that required by 
     this section.
       (b) Environmental Remediation.--
       (1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, the conveyance required by section 2 shall not relieve 
     any Federal agency of any responsibility under applicable law 
     for any environmental remediation of soil, groundwater, or 
     surface water.
       (2) Other remediation.--Any remediation of contamination, 
     other than that described in paragraph (1), within or related 
     to structures or fixtures on the property described in 
     section 3 shall be subject to negotiation to the extent 
     permitted by law.
       (c) Retained Right of Use; Terms and Conditions of 
     Transfer.--
       (1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the National 
     Aeronautics and Space Administration shall retain the right 
     to use for aviation activities, without consideration and on 
     other terms and conditions mutually acceptable to NASA and 
     Stanislaus County, California, the property described in 
     section 3.
       (2) Legislative jurisdiction.--The terms and conditions 
     referred to in paragraphs (1) and (3) may not include any 
     provision restricting the legislative jurisdiction of the 
     State of California over the property conveyed pursuant to 
     section 2.
       (3) Additional terms.--Subject to paragraph (2), the 
     Administrator may negotiate additional terms of the 
     conveyance required by section 2 to protect the interests of 
     the United States.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. COVERDELL (for himself, Mrs. Feinstein, Mr. Helms, and Mr. 
        Hutchinson):
  S.J. Res. 42. A joint resolution to disapprove the certification of 
the President under section 490(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 regarding foreign assistance for Mexico during fiscal year 1998; 
to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
  S.J. Res. 43. A joint resolution to disapprove the certification of 
the President under section 490(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 regarding assistance for Mexico during fiscal year 1997, and to 
provide for the termination of the withholding of and opposition to 
assistance that results from the disapproval; to the Committee on 
Foreign Relations.


              mexico certification disapproval legislation

  Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, for the next few minutes I will make 
limited remarks prior to the introduction of two separate joint 
resolutions that deal with the administration's recent certification of 
Mexico dealing with the losing drug war, and that deal, in my judgment, 
was a more appropriate approach to this situation.
  Mr. President, I consider myself as a person somewhat surprised by 
the New York Times editorial of Saturday, February 28, 1998; the 
headline of the editorial, ``Certifiably Wrong On Mexico.''
  The Clinton administration does no favor to Mexico or its own 
credibility by certifying that Mexico is ``fully cooperating'' in the 
fight against drug trafficking. Compounding the damage, the White House 
Drug Policy Director, Barry McCaffrey, fatuously claims that Mexican 
cooperation is ``absolutely superlative.''
  According to this editorial,

       A more truthful assessment can be found in the Drug 
     Enforcement Administration's confidential evaluation, 
     described by Tim Golden in yesterday's Times. The DEA 
     concludes that ``the Government of Mexico has not 
     accomplished its counter-narcotic goals or succeeded in 
     cooperation with the U.S. Government.'' Mexican trafficking 
     has increased, the DEA notes, and the corruption of its 
     enforcement agencies ``continues unabated.''
       Though Washington finds it diplomatically inconvenient to 
     acknowledge, Mexico has a chronic problem with drug 
     traffickers who always seem to be able to secure the 
     political influence they need to avoid arrest and 
     prosecution. This drug corruption greases the flow of 
     narcotics into the United States. Mexico's drug networks span 
     the border, supplying cocaine, heroin, and marijuana to 
     American users.

  Mr. President, in a hearing last week, I indicated, along with 
Senator Feinstein of California, that we would be introducing 
resolutions, the purpose of which would be to change this course 
between the United States and Mexico on this matter. It would be our 
goal that the process would decertify Mexico on this matter with a 
Presidential waiver in the national interest in which I believe we both 
concur. This would be an honest appraisal of our circumstances.
  The problem with certifying is that it sends a message to the vast 
populations of the United States and of Mexico that this war is being 
won, that we have turned a corner, that things

[[Page S1259]]

are working out. That simply is not the case. I think it does a 
disservice to the entire population of both countries for us to send a 
message of victory when, indeed, the message is one of gravity and 
loss.
  This situation has grave consequences for the people of the United 
States. I have to say that the United States shares enormous 
responsibility in this struggle. My remarks are not intended to 
castigate or single out Mexico; quite to the contrary; I view them as a 
great ally. They are a great trading partner. We share this hemisphere. 
We have mutual goals--democratic goals. But neither country seems to 
want to face the fact that it is losing a precious struggle.
  In 1991, the drug interdiction budget for the United States was $2.03 
billion; today it is $1.44 billion. That is a dramatic reduction in our 
commitment. In 1992, the United States stopped, seized 440 kilograms of 
cocaine and marijuana a day; in 1995, it had been cut in half; we only 
stopped 205 kilograms of cocaine and marijuana per day.
  What does this all mean? In shorthand, it means that about 3 million 
teenagers aged 12-16 are using drugs today that weren't in 1991. To 
give an example, in 1991, 400,000 eighth-graders had used an illicit 
drug in the last year. In 1996 and 1997, that number rose to 920,000. 
In 10th grade, 600,000 had used a drug in 1991; in 1996 and 1997, it 
had doubled to 1.2 million children. In 12th grade, 600,000 in 1991; 
1.1 million, almost doubled again, in 1996 and 1997.
  So by not confronting this directly and honesty, we are all 
contributing to the accelerated rate of children using drugs and we are 
going to pay a price for this the likes of which we have never seen.
  I will yield to the Senator from California in just a moment, but 
first I quote a story of a top administrative official on this. It ran 
in the Phoenix papers.

       ``Our current interdiction efforts almost completely fail 
     to achieve our purpose of reducing the flow of cocaine, 
     heroin, and methamphetamines across the (Southwest) [the 
     Mexican] border,'' said Francis X. Kinney, director of 
     strategic planning for the Office of National Drug Control 
     Policy. . . .
       Kinney said the United States will continue to be overrun 
     by drug traffic at the U.S.-Mexican border unless it 
     emphasizes improved intelligence and high-tech screening 
     equipment. . .

  The last thing he said addresses the Senator from California:

       ``They [the Congress] want us to call it like it is, not to 
     be an apologist,'' alluding to the U.S. Congress.

  I think this gentleman is absolutely correct.
  Mr. President, I send a joint resolution to the desk and ask for its 
appropriate referral.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The joint resolution will be received and 
appropriately referred.
  Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I send another joint resolution to the 
desk and ask for its appropriate referral.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The joint resolution will be received and 
appropriately referred.
  Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, in concluding and yielding to the 
Senator from California, I just want to make it clear that the purpose 
of these two joint resolutions is to alter the course of our engagement 
in the drug war, principally as it relates to Mexico. Instead of 
certifying and saying, ``Here is a message of victory to the two 
peoples of the two Nations,'' it decertifies with a national security 
waiver and calls it like it is and refocuses our Governments and our 
people in a combined effort to win this battle and not lose it--to win 
it for the millions of children that are suffering, because we are 
losing it.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from 
Georgia, and I rise to join him in submitting these resolutions for 
disapproval of the President's decision to certify Mexico as fully 
cooperating with the United States in the fight against drug 
trafficking.
  Mr. President, as we all know, when the President made the same 
decision last year, it sparked an intense debate between the 
administration and what was in all probability a majority of Congress 
who did not believe that Mexico had earned certification. I have looked 
long and hard at the evidence that is available. I have received 
extensive briefings from law enforcement and intelligence officials. 
Anyone, I believe, who has received these same briefings would come to 
the conclusion I have reached, that once again the decision to certify 
Mexico is incorrect and not grounded in the facts.
  While Mexico has made some limited progress, there remain gaping 
holes in its counternarcotics effort. Whether due to inability or lack 
of political will, these failures badly undermine the urgent effort to 
keep the scourge of drugs off our streets. Regardless of America's 
demand problem, when the supply of drugs reaches the point where it 
comes in at literally tons each day, any demand program is 
extraordinarily difficult to sustain.
  Has Mexico cooperated in some areas? Of course. There are one or two 
new police units which seem to have trusting relationships with the 
DEA. New vetting procedures are beginning to be implemented in the 
hiring of new police officers. Mexico and the United States have agreed 
on a bilateral drug strategy, although it is a vaguely worded document 
that will take years to evaluate whether it has been successful and 
whether actions on the streets will follow this roundtable document.
  It can also be argued that pressure brought to bear on drug lord 
Amado Carrillo-Fuentes was responsible for driving him to seek refuge 
in another country--Chile--and very likely for his attempt to conceal 
his identity through plastic surgery. The surgery, of course, resulted 
in his death and the torture-murder of the entire surgical team. His 
organization, however, continues to operate, and a reign of violence 
has been unleashed as his would-be successors battle for control of his 
organization.
  But last year, Senator Coverdell and I laid out a number of key areas 
that we would use to judge whether or not Mexico has reached the 
standard of full cooperation. Sadly, our top law enforcement agencies 
indicate that none of these changes has produced significant results. 
There has been no demonstrable action on any--and I repeat ``any''--of 
the benchmarks outlined by Congress last year as key measurements of 
cooperation by Mexico: dismantlement of drug cartels, the arrest and 
prosecution of cartel leaders, the extradition of Mexican nationals on 
drug charges to the United States for prosecution, effective 
prosecution of corrupt officials, law enforcement cooperation, 
effective money laundering laws implemented, security of U.S. drug 
agents working in bilateral efforts in Mexico.
  Let me touch on each of these. The cartels in Mexico today are either 
as strong or stronger than they were a year ago. And despite much talk 
of cooperation, there has been no substantial progress by the 
Government of Mexico in developing prosecutable cases against the 
leaders of the major drug trafficking groups, even when these 
individuals have been identified by U.S. investigations and are made 
the subject of U.S. indictments.
  The scope of Mexican drug trafficking has increased significantly, 
along with the attendant violence, even against United States and 
Mexican law enforcement officials and informants. During 1997, DEA 
recorded in excess of 50 incidents of threats along the Southwest 
border. According to the information I have received, the Mexican 
Government has arrested and prosecuted few individuals in connection 
with these acts. None of the major cartels has been dismantled nor have 
their leaders been arrested.
  Take the Amado Carrillo-Fuentes organization. After the death of 
Amado Carrillo-Fuentes, there were numerous enforcement actions taken 
against his organization, but the intelligence was unproductive, 
leading to insignificant asset seizures and new arrests.
  On July 30, 1997, Mexican authorities detained a close associate of 
Carrillo-Fuentes, Manuel Bitar-Tafich, leading to seizure of $50 
million in the United States. However, because the Mexicans have not 
provided the needed documents to support the seizure in the United 
States, much of the money had to be returned. Bitar himself remains in 
custody, but there has been no movement on his case. While the Mexicans 
have reported seizing $52 million in Mexico, no documentation 
supporting this seizure has been provided to the U.S. Government.
  The Mexican Government arrested Noe Brito, a member of Carrillo-

[[Page S1260]]

Fuentes' security apparatus. He was released, however, before the DEA 
was even allowed to interview him.
  The Arellano-Felix operation--the notorious cartel located just south 
of California in the Tijuana area--continues to operate with impunity. 
There have been several enforcement actions in 1997, but few resulted 
in significant results against the cartel's trafficking operations.
  On November 8, 1997, the Mexican Attorney General's Office arrested 
Arturo Everardo Paez-Martinez, a known cartel assassin. Paez is 
incarcerated in Mexico on the basis of a provisional U.S. arrest 
warrant but has not been extradited.

  On September 20, Mexico's counternarcotics unit reporting to the 
Attorney General arrested two men on weapons charges, who are known 
members of the ``Juniors,'' a group of young assassins recruited by the 
Arellano-Felix cartel. The Government of Mexico offered to extradite 
one of the men, but the United States had to turn down the offer due to 
lack of outstanding charges and evidence against him. This is an 
example of what results from a lack of cooperative law enforcement 
efforts.
  The Sonora Cartel. Miguel Angel Caro-Quintero heads his family's 
organization operating out of Sonora, Mexico. There are four 
outstanding warrants for him on smuggling, RICO statute, and conspiracy 
charges. He has been operating freely in Mexico since 1992. There are 
also provisional arrest warrants issued for both Miguel and Rafael 
Caro-Quintero.
  The Amezcua-Contreras brothers. The Amezcua-Contreras brothers' 
organization is believed to be the world's largest clandestine producer 
of methamphetamine. The organization procures huge quantities of the 
ephedrine in Thailand and India, which is supplied to laboratories in 
Mexico and California. The Amezcuas' methamphetamine is distributed in 
large cities across the United States. A U.S. law enforcement 
investigation, Operation META, concluded in December of 1997 with the 
arrest of 101 defendants, seizure of 133 pounds of methamphetamine, and 
the precursors to manufacture up to 540 pounds more, along with 1,100 
kilos of cocaine and over $2.25 million in assets.
  Mexican efforts against this organization have not met with great 
success:
  On November 10, 1997, the Mexican military's special vetted unit 
arrested Adan Amezcua at his ranch in Colima on gun charges, not on 
drug charges. He is the only Amezcua not under indictment in either the 
United States or Mexico. He remains in custody pending further 
investigations. The Government of Mexico has failed to indict or arrest 
any of the principal members of the Amezcua organization in Mexico.
  The DEA International Chemical Control Unit has supported elements of 
the Government of Mexico financially and logistically for numerous 
investigations of the Amezcuas, with little or no results. None of the 
investigations resulted in arrests or produced information that could 
be used in U.S. courts.
  Though Jesus and Luis Amezcua are currently under Federal indictment 
in the United States on a variety of charges, there are no provisional 
arrest warrants for them and they remain at large in Mexico.
  Extradition was a key benchmark and a test of cooperation. There have 
been no extraditions from Mexico to the United States of any Mexican 
nationals on drug charges--none.
  The identities of the leaders of the major criminal groups based in 
Mexico who control the flow of heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine to 
the United States have been known for several years. In fact, U.S. law 
enforcement agencies have built cases on and indicted in the United 
States virtually all of these cartel leaders. The Department of Justice 
has filed provisional arrest warrants for the most significant drug 
traffickers in Mexico. While several have been arrested, many others 
remain at large and none has been extradited to the United States.
  In the war against drugs, extradition of cartel leaders for trial and 
imprisonment in the United States is a key and indisputable beachhead 
in the war against drug trafficking. It is also a major benchmark of 
cooperation.
  In my view--and I know the view held by law enforcement in the United 
States--the drug lords operating in Mexico only fear extradition to the 
United States, where they know they will stand trial and face 
punishment commensurate with their crimes. The Mexican law enforcement 
institutions and legal system present no deterrent to their operations.
  That is why this Senate, many of my colleagues, and law enforcement 
officials have repeatedly said that the most meaningful measurement of 
real progress in drug cooperation with Mexico is if the major 
traffickers are apprehended and extradited to the United States.

  Provisional arrest warrants have been filed by the Department of 
Justice for the following major traffickers: Agustin Vasquez-Mendoza, 
Ramon Arellano-Felix, Rafael Caro-Quintero, Miguel Caro-Quintero, 
Vicente Carrillo-Fuentes, Eduardo Gonzalez-Quirarte, Oscar Malherbe, 
Arturo Paez-Martinez, Jaime Ladino-Avila, Jose Gerardo-Castro/Gonzalez-
Gutierez, William Brian Martin, Miguel Angel Martinez-Martinez, Antonio 
Hernandez-Acosta, and Miguel Felix Gallardo.

  These are all key lieutenants in either the Amezcua, Carrillo-
Fuentes, Caro-Quintero, or Arellano-Felix organizations. The Justice 
Department requested extradition of four of the above within the past 
year. The first two requests have been stalled or completely thwarted 
by Mexican courts.
  Last November, the United States and Mexico Attorneys General signed 
a protocol to the United States-Mexican Extradition Treaty that 
authorized temporary surrender of a convicted party to the other 
country to face drug charges. This is certainly a positive signal, but 
it has yet to be tested in practice.
  The bottom line is that, to date, there has not been a single 
extradition of a Mexican national to the United States on drug 
charges--not one.
  Corruption. Drug-related corruption is probably the single greatest 
obstacle that the United States faces in its global battle against 
international drug trafficking. Unfortunately, drug corruption in 
Mexico is so deeply rooted that it persists despite attempts to 
eradicate it.
  The level of drug corruption in Mexico continues unabated. According 
to the briefings I have received, virtually every investigation our law 
enforcement agencies conduct against major traffickers in Mexico 
uncovers significant corruption of law enforcement officials.
  Our own law enforcement agencies indicate that endemic corruption 
among Mexican law enforcement officials continually frustrates our 
effort to build cases against and to apprehend the most significant 
drug traffickers in Mexico, and it is the primary reason there has been 
no meaningful progress in drug law enforcement in Mexico.
  In the wake of the devastating disclosure that Mexico's own ``drug 
czar'' was on the payroll of Amado Carrillo-Fuentes, the Mexican 
Government dismantled the INCD, the Mexican counterpart to the DEA, and 
fired the majority of its employees.
  Unfortunately, many of those fired were ordered reinstated by Mexican 
courts.
  Additionally, of the 40 military officers arrested as part of the 
Gutierrez-Rebollo investigation, none has been brought to trial or 
convicted to date.
  The following cases indicate how deeply drug corruption has 
penetrated into Mexican institutions:
  Colonel Jose Luis Rubalcava, who had been Director of the Federal 
Judicial Anti-Drug Police under the INCD, was arrested on or about 
April 14, 1997 on charges in connection with 2.5 tons of cocaine seized 
in Sombrete, Mexico in 1995. This is the director for the Judicial 
Anti-Drug Police--2\1/2\ tons of cocaine.
  U.S. law enforcement officials speculate that bribery and corruption 
may have been behind the withdrawal of Baja state police protection 
from a Tijuana news editor prior to his November 27, 1997 attempted 
assassination. The editor had been putting public pressure on the issue 
of drug corruption.
  According to a December 1997 statement by Mexican Attorney General 
Madrazo, out of some 870 Federal agents dismissed on corruption charges 
in 1996, 700 have been rehired in either the PGR--the Mexican Attorney 
General's office--or at the state and local

[[Page S1261]]

level. The rehiring was done at the direction of the courts.
  If you cannot fire corrupt law enforcement officials, how can you 
fight drugs?
  The issue of prosecuting corrupt officials is important, because 
without fear of prosecution, there is little deterrence. Too often in 
Mexico, officials are fired, but never prosecuted.
  In 1997, there were only 3 corruption cases being prosecuted, 
including General Gutierrez. Another case involves the theft of 476 
kilograms of cocaine by 17 PGR officials, including an Army General in 
Sonora. The third involved a Judicial Police Comandante. The Mexican 
government has reportedly begun additional prosecutions, but many more 
cases need to be brought to trial in order to have any deterrent 
effect.


                      law enforcement cooperation

  This is where the rubber hits the road in counternarcotics 
cooperation, not in agreements reached at the political level. 
Unfortunately, law enforcement cooperation from Mexico has been 
severely lacking.
  It is encouraging to hear from DEA that there are now some Mexican 
officials with whom they believe they can build a trusting 
relationship.
  A key aspect of this institution-building process is vetting, leading 
to the development and professionalization of the new drug enforcement 
unit, the Special Prosecutor's Office for Crimes Against Health.
  This vetting process could go a long way toward providing U.S. law 
enforcement officials with the level of trust in their counterparts 
necessary for an effective bi-lateral effort, but it is still in its 
infancy, and even some officials who have been ``vetted'' have 
subsequently been arrested in connection with traffickers. So while 
this effort is critically important, it is not evidence of full 
cooperation by a long shot.
  More telling however, is the state of affairs with the much-vaunted 
Bilateral Border Task Forces located in Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez and 
Matamoros. Each Task Forces was supposed to include Mexican agents, and 
two agents each from DEA, FBI, and the U.S. Customs Service. But, 
regretfully, the Task Forces are not operational because some Mexican 
agents, and even comandantes, have been under suspicion of, or arrested 
for, ties to criminal organizations.
  The old Task Forces were dismantled after the arrest of General 
Gutierrez-Rebollo and have been rebuilt since then. But the Mexican 
government for a long time did not provide the promised funding, 
leaving DEA to carry the full cost, which they did until September of 
last year.
  Additionally, the issue of personal security for U.S. agents working 
with the Bilateral Task Forces in Mexico has not been resolved and, as 
a result, the task forces are not operational and will not be until the 
security issue is resolved.
  The bottom line is that the task forces cannot function properly 
without DEA and other federal law enforcement agents working side by 
side with their Mexican counterparts, as is the case with similar units 
in Colombia and Peru. This critical joint working relationship is made 
impossible by Mexican policies that do not allow for adequate 
immunities or physical security for U.S. Special Agents while working 
in Mexico.
  A related problem for the Task Forces is the low quality of 
intelligence provided by Mexico. To my knowledge there have been no 
meaningful intelligence leads from Mexican agents to their American 
counterparts leading to a single significant seizure of drugs coming 
into this country.
  Intelligence sharing simply does not flow north.
  U.S. law enforcement officials indicate that Mexico's drug 
intelligence facilities located near the Task Forces are manned by non-
vetted, non-law enforcement civilians and military staff and have only 
produced leads from telephone intercepts on low-level traffickers. To 
date, none of the electronic intercepts conducted by the Task Forces 
have produced a prosecutable drug case in Mexican courts against any 
major Mexican criminal organization.
  To its credit, the Organized Crime Unit does have several major on-
going investigations underway. But only 140 of the planned 280 
prosecutors, investigators and support personnel have been hired, and 
only 25 have been ``super-vented.'' Again, this unit is promising, but 
it is still too early to tell whether it will maintain the integrity, 
or have the staffing, training and resources to be effective partners 
in the war against drugs.


                              enforcement

  Mexico's seizures of cocaine have increased from 23.6 metric tons in 
1996 to 34.9 metric tons in 1997--although that is still far below the 
average of 45 metric tons in 1991-1993. Marijuana seizures did reach an 
all-time high.
  Unfortunately, seizures of heroin, methamphetamine, and ephedrine are 
all down sharply. Heroin seizures fell from 363 kilograms to 115 
kilograms. Methamphetamine seizures fell from 172 kilograms to only 39 
kilograms. Ephedrine seizures fell dramatically from 6,697 kilograms to 
only 608 kilograms.
  Drug related arrests declined from an already low 11,283 to 10,622, 
barely a third of the number arrested in 1992. Less than half as many 
weapons were seized in 1997 (1,892) as in 1996 (4,335).
  In another crucial enforcement area, Mexico's new money-laundering 
statutes have yet to be fully enforced, and have not resulted in any 
successful prosecutions yet. Mexico has decided to make violations of 
new banking regulations non-criminal violations, which severely 
undercuts the deterrent factor.
  Mexico's Organized Crime Statute has yet to be fully implemented. The 
Government of Mexico has advised that the lack of judicial support and 
known judicial corruption have frustrated implementation of the wire 
intercept aspects of the law.
  But let us be honest with ourselves. The statute asks the President 
to certify that a country has ``cooperated fully'' with the United 
States. If Mexico has cooperated in three or four areas, and not 
cooperated in ten or twelve others, can we really call that full 
cooperation. Of course not. At best, we should say that Mexico has 
cooperated partially with the United States in counternarcotics 
efforts. But full cooperation? It's not even close.
  We must make an honest assessment. To those who dislike the 
certification statute, I quote again from the New York Times editorial 
``* * * as long as certification remains on the books, the 
Administration has a duty to report truthfully to Congress and the 
American people. It has failed to do so in the case of Mexico.''
  So in the wake of the President's decision to certify Mexico, I 
believe we in Congress have no choice but to try to pass a resolution 
of disapproval. If possible, we will pass one with a waiver of 
sanctions. But if not, we will have to vote on the straight resolution 
of disapproval. We have until March 28 to decide.
  Mr. President, we must make an honest assessment of full cooperation, 
and there is only one way to assess full cooperation, and it is on the 
streets. It is with extradition. It is with arrest of cartel leaders. 
It is with letting our DEA agents who work the Mexican side of the 
border have their security--meaning beyond. You cannot send them across 
the border without a mechanism to protect them. None of this is 
happening today.
  The big, highly touted drug agreement, which I read, talks about the 
size and shape of the table. There are no specifics.
  In view of this, I urge decertification with a waiver.

                          ____________________