[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 19 (Tuesday, March 3, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1255-S1261]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Mr. MOYNIHAN (for himself, Mr. Kerry, and Ms. Moseley-Braun):
S. 1700. A bill to designate the headquarters building of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development in Washington, District of
Columbia, as the ``Rovert C. Weaver Federal Building''; to the
Committee on Environment and Public Works.
the robert c. weaver federal building designation act of 1997
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I rise to introduce legislation to name
the Housing and Urban Development (HUD) headquarters here in Washington
after Dr. Robert C. Weaver, adviser to three Presidents, director of
the NAACP, and the first African-American Cabinet Secretary. I am
pleased that Senators Kerry and Moseley-Braun are co-sponsors of my
bill. I would point out that Senator Kerry was poised to introduce
similar legislation; in fact, he sent out a Dear Colleague on the
subject last November. But he graciously deferred to me, and I am most
appreciative. Bob Weaver was my friend, dating back more than 40 years
to our service together in the Harriman administration. He passed away
last July at his home in New York City after spending his entire life
broadening opportunities for minorities in America. I think it is a
fitting tribute to name the HUD building after this great man.
Dr. Weaver began his career in government service as part of
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's ``Black Cabinet,'' an informal
advisory group promoting educational and job opportunities for blacks.
The Washington Post
[[Page S1256]]
called this work his greatest legacy, the dismantling of a deeply
entrenched system of racial segregation in America. Indeed it was.
Dr. Weaver was appointed Deputy Commissioner of Housing for New York
State in 1955, and later became State Rent Administrator with Cabinet
rank. It was during these years working for New York Governor Averell
Harriman that I first met Bob; I was Assistant to the Secretary to the
Governor and later, Acting Secretary.
Our friendship and collaboration continued under the Kennedy and
Johnson administrations. In 1960, he became the president of the NAACP,
and shortly thereafter would become a key adviser to President Kennedy
on civil rights. In 1961, Kennedy appointed Dr. Weaver to head the
Housing and Home Finance Agency, an entity that later became the
Department of Housing and Urban Development. In 1966, when President
Johnson elevated the agency to Cabinet rank, Dr. Weaver was, in
Johnson's phrase, ``the man for the job.'' He thus became its first
Secretary, and the first African-American to head a Cabinet agency.
Later, he and I served together on the Pennsylvania Avenue Commission.
Following his government service, Dr. Weaver was, among various other
academic pursuits, a professor at Hunter College, a member of the
School of Urban and Public Affairs at Carnegie-Mellon, a visiting
professor at Columbia Teacher's College and New York University's
School of Education, and the president of Baruch College in Manhattan.
When I became director of the Joint Center for Urban Studies at MIT and
Harvard, he generously agreed to be a member of the Board of Directors.
Dr. Weaver had earned his undergraduate, master's, and doctoral
degrees in economics from Harvard; he wrote four books on urban
affairs; and he was one of the original directors of the Municipal
Assistance Corporation, which designed the plan to rescue New York City
during its tumultuous financial crisis in the 1970s.
Last July, America--and Washington in particular (for he was a native
Washingtonian)--lost one of its innovators, one of its creators, one of
its true leaders. For Dr. Robert Weaver led not only with his words but
with his deeds. I was privileged to know him as a friend. He will be
missed but properly memorialized, I think, if we can pass this
legislation.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my bill, and a July 21,
1997 editorial in the Washington Post, and a July 19, 1997 obituary
from the New York Times be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
S. 1700
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. DESIGNATION OF ROBERT C. WEAVER FEDERAL BUILDING.
In honor of the first Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development, the headquarters building of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development located at 451 Seventh Street,
SW., in Washington, District of Columbia, shall be known and
designated as the ``Robert C. Weaver Federal Building''.
SEC. 2. REFERENCES.
Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper,
or other record of the United States to the building referred
to in section 1 shall be deemed to be a reference to the
``Robert C. Weaver Federal Building''.
____
[From the Washington Post, July 21, 1997]
Robert C. Weaver
Native Washingtonian Robert C. Weaver, who died on Thursday
in New York City at age 89, had a life of many firsts. Dr.
Weaver served as a college president, Cabinet secretary,
presidential adviser, chairman of the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People and as a director of
the Municipal Assistance Corp., which helped save New York
City from financial catastrophe. But his greatest legacy may
be the work he did, largely out of public view, to dismantle
a deeply entrenched system of racial segregation in America.
Before the landmark decade of civil rights advances in the
1960s, Dr. Weaver was one of a small group of African
American officials in the New Deal era who, as part of the
``Black Cabinet'' pressured President Franklin D. Roosevelt
to strike down racial barriers in government employment,
housing and education. It was a long way to come for the
Dunbar High School graduate who ran into racial
discrimination in the 1920s when he tried to join a union
fresh out of high school. Embittered by that experience, Bob
Weaver went on to Harvard (in the footsteps of his
grandfather, the first African American Harvard graduate in
dentistry) to earn his bachelor's, master's and doctorate in
economics. At another time in America, his university degrees
might have led to another career path. For Bob Weaver in
1932, however, those credentials--and his earlier job as a
college professor--made him an ``associate advisor on Negro
affairs'' in the U.S. Department of the Interior.
Subsequent work as an educator, economist and national
housing expert--and behind-the-scenes recruitment of scores
of African Americans for public service--led to his
appointment as New York State rent administrator, making him
the first African American with state cabinet rank. President
John F. Kennedy appointed him to the highest federal post
ever occupied by an African American--the Housing and Home
Finance Agency. Despite the president's support, however, the
HHFA never made it to Cabinet status, because Dr. Weaver was
its administrator and southern legislators rebelled at the
thought of a black secretary. Years later President Lyndon
Johnson pushed through the Department of Housing and Urban
Development and named Robert Weaver to the presidential
Cabinet.
For the nation, and Robert Weaver, the appointment was
another important first. For many other African Americans who
found lower barriers and increased opportunity in the last
third of the 20th century, Robert Weaver's legacy is lasting.
____
[From the New York Times, July 19, 1997]
Robert C. Weaver, 89, First Black Cabinet Member, Dies
(By James Barron)
Dr. Robert C. Weaver, the first Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development and the first black person appointed to the
Cabinet, died on Thursday at his home in Manhattan. He was
89.
Dr. Weaver was also one of the original directors of the
Municipal Assistance Corporation, which was formed to rescue
New York City from financial crisis in the 1970's.
``He was a catalyst with the Kennedys and then with
Johnson, forging new initiatives in housing and education,''
said Walter E. Washington, the first elected Mayor of the
nation's capital.
A portly, pedagogical man who wrote four books on urban
affairs, Dr. Weaver had made a name for himself in the 1930's
and 1940's as an expert behind-the-scenes strategist in the
civil rights movement. ``Fight hard and legally,'' he said,
``and don't blow your top.''
As a part of the ``Black Cabinet'' in the administration of
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Dr. Weaver was one of a
group of blacks who specialized in housing, education and
employment. After being hired as race relations advisers in
various Federal agencies, they pressured and persuaded the
White House to provide more jobs, better educational
opportunities and equal rights.
Dr. Weaver began in 1933 as an aide to Interior Secretary
Harold L. Ickes. He later served as a special assistant in
the housing division of the Works Progress Administration,
the National Defense Advisory Commission, the War Production
Board and the War Manpower Commission.
Shortly before the 1940 election, he devised a strategy
that defused anger among blacks about Stephen T. Early,
President Roosevelt's press secretary. Arriving at
Pennsylvania Station in New York, Early lost his temper when
a line of police officers blocked his way. Early knocked one
of the officers, who happened to be black, to the ground. As
word of the incident spread, a White House adviser put
through a telephone call to Dr. Weaver in Washington.
The aide, worried that the incident would cost Roosevelt
the black vote, told Dr. Weaver to find the other black
advisers and prepare a speech that would appeal to blacks for
the President to deliver the following week.
Dr. Weaver said he doubted that he could find anyone in the
middle of the night, even though most of the others in the
``Black Cabinet'' had been playing poker in his basement when
the phone rang. ``And anyway,'' he said, ``I don't think a
mere speech will do it. What we need right now is something
so dramatic that it will make the Negro voters forget all
about Steve Early and the Negro cop too.''
Within 48 hours, Benjamin O. Davis Sr. was the first black
general in the Army; William H. Hastie was the first black
civilian aide to the Secretary of War, and Campbell C.
Johnson was the first high-ranking black aide to the head of
the Selective Service.
Robert Clifton Weaver was born on Dec. 29, 1907, in
Washington. His father was a postal worker and his mother--
who he said influenced his intellectual development--was the
daughter of the first black person to graduate from Harvard
with a degree in dentistry. When Dr. Weaver joined the
Kennedy Administration, whose Harvard connections extended to
the occupant of the Oval Office, he held more Harvard
degrees--three, including a doctorate in economics--than
anyone else in the administration's upper ranks.
In 1960, after serving as the New York State Rent
Commissioner, Dr. Weaver became the national chairman of the
National
[[Page S1257]]
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and
President Kennedy sought Dr. Weaver's advice on civil rights.
The following year, the President appointed him administrator
of the Housing and Home Finance Agency, a loose combination
of agencies that included the bureaucratic components of what
would eventually become H.U.D., including the Federal Housing
Administration to spur construction, the Urban Renewal
Administration to oversee slum clearance and the Federal
National Mortgage Association to line up money for new
housing.
President Kennedy tried to have the agency raised to
Cabinet rank, but Congress balked. Southerners led an attack
against the appointment of a black to the Cabinet, and there
were charges that Dr. Weaver was an extremist. Kennedy
abandoned the idea of creating an urban affairs department.
Five years later, when President Johnson revived the idea
and pushed it through Congress, Senators who had voted
against Dr. Weaver the first time around voted for him.
Past Federal housing programs had largely dealt with
bricks-and-mortar policies. Dr. Weaver said Washington needed
to take a more philosophical approach. ``Creative federalism
stresses local initiative, local solutions to local
problems,'' he said.
But, he added, ``where the obvious needs for action to meet
an urban problem are not being fulfilled, the Federal
Government has a responsibility at least to generate a
thorough awareness of the problem.''
Dr. Weaver, who said that ``you cannot have physical
renewal without human renewal,'' pushed for better-looking
public housing by offering awards for design. He also
increased the amount of money for small businesses displaced
by urban renewal and revived the long-dormant idea of Federal
rent subsidies for the elderly.
Later in his life, he was a professor of urban affairs at
Hunter College, was a member of the Visiting Committee at the
School of Urban and Public Affairs at Carnegie-Mellon
University and held visiting professorships at Columbia
Teachers' College and the New York University School of
Education. He also served as a consultant to the Ford
Foundation and was the president of Baruch College in
Manhattan in 1969.
His wife, Ella, died in 1991. Their son, Robert Jr., died
in 1962.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I join Senator Moynihan in supporting his
legislation to designate the headquarters building of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development in Washington, D.C. as the ``Robert C.
Weaver Federal Building.''
Robert Weaver was a stalwart leader in the fight to build a society
free from racial prejudice and discrimination. He spent his life in a
pursuit of equality and a campaign to end all forms of discrimination
based on race.
Dr. Weaver was a member of ``the black cabinet'' which sought to
ensure that the new government projects of the New Deal applied to and
benefitted minority groups during the Roosevelt Administration. His
personal crusade led for civil rights led to the selection of the first
African-American to be a general in the Army, the naming of the first
African-American to be a civilian aide to the Secretary of War, and the
appointment of the first African-American to be a high-ranking aide to
the head of the Selective Service.
In 1955, Dr. Weaver began a long career in housing when he was
appointed Deputy Commissioner of Housing for the State of New York.
Later that year, he became the state rent administrator. In 1960, Dr.
Weaver was selected to be the vice-chairman of the New York City
Housing Redevelopment Board, a three-member body responsible for
administering the city's urban renewal and moderate-income housing
programs.
Dr. Weaver's reputation as a skilled housing policy and program
practitioner soon extended well beyond New York. President John K.
Kennedy named Dr. Weaver as Administrator of the Federal Housing and
Home Finance Agency, and President Lyndon Johnson nominated him to be
the first Secretary of Housing and Urban Development when the
Department of Housing and Urban Development was formed in 1966.
Dr. Weaver's leadership and vision set the course for the future of
the housing and urban redevelopment industries. Past Federal housing
programs had focused largely on ``bricks-and-mortar'' policies, but Dr.
Weaver believed that ``you cannot have physical renewal without human
renewal.'' His principal concern was to raise the standard of urban
housing and to move away from the bleak high rise projects that scarred
the urban landscape and were the origins of many inner city social
problems that were just beginning to be recognized. He used all of his
various positions and considerable experience to advocate effective
public programs to house all Americans and to revitalize communities.
He was a true visionary who fought to expand the possibilities of all
Americans. I can think of no better person to name the first building
to house the Department of Housing and Urban Development than Dr.
Robert Clifton Weaver, the first African-American Cabinet member in New
York State, the first African-American member of a President's cabinet,
and the federal government's first Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development. This tribute is even more fitting because Robert Weaver,
along with then Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey and others, laid the
cornerstone of this building during his tenure as Secretary.
______
By Mr. ROCKEFELLER:
S. 1702. A bill to amend the Harmonized Tariff Schedule for the
United States to change the special rate of duty on purified
terephtalic acid imported from Mexico; to the Committee on Finance.
harmonized tariff schedule legislation
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce this bill
to amend Chapter 29 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United
States to effect the immediate elimination of the special duty rate on
Purified Terephthalic Acid (PTA) imports from Mexico in order that the
United States polyester industry can remain competitive in the U.S.
domestic market.
We're faced with an ironic situation where a single American supplier
is the source of substantial harm to the American polyester production
industry and American workers. This is a highly unusual situation in
which the American supplier has been able to remain a monopolistic
producer of PTA, thus controlling the supply of the product and the
price U.S. consumers must pay. By eliminating the tariff on PTA from
Mexico, this legislation will place the U.S. PTA market on a level
playing field with adequate supply and market dictated prices.
PTA is the principal feedstock in producing polyethylene
terephthalate (PET), a polyester resin produced in West Virginia by
Shell Chemical. This feedstock, PTA, comprises nearly two thirds the
cost of polyester production. PTA is produced for the U.S. merchant
market by one sole supplier, who can control both the price and supply
of PTA in the U.S. market. Because the NAFTA tariff makes PTA imports
unaffordable, U.S. PET producers, like Shell, are limited domestically
to only one source to meet their PTA needs. This domestic source is not
providing PET buyers with sufficient quantities of PTA, nor at a
competitive price. Subsequently, the combination of the NAFTA tariff on
PTA and a single domestic merchant producer of PTA, the U.S. price for
PTA is kept the highest in the world. As a result, U.S. polyester
producers, like the one in West Virginia, operate in a closed, non-
competitive environment.
Consequently, a tariff inversion is created which significantly harms
U.S. PET production because PET imports made with cheaper, foreign PTA
are subject to relatively low tariffs or none at all in the case of GSP
countries. This tariff inversion exposes West Virginia's PET production
and all U.S. polyester production to unfair competition from foreign
competitors. Further, it prohibits any possibility for expansion and
new job creation.
I understand that the Office of the United States Trade
Representative is currently negotiating with their Mexican counterparts
various tariff eliminations under the Second Round of Accelerated
Tariff Elimination under the North American Free Trade Agreement. The
PTA tariff is under consideration. The elimination of the duty for PTA
is supported by the majority of the U.S. PTA industry and Mexico.
Shell's future economic viability in West Virginia is linked to the
elimination of this tariff. If the tariff is not eliminated, the
cutback in Shell polyester production could cost as many as 250 full-
time jobs that pay on average, $70,000 a year, including direct wages,
benefits and retirement. Already 160 jobs have been lost since 1995 as
a direct result of the economic disadvantage caused by this inequity. I
would add that these jobs provide some of the highest paying salaries
in my State.
This lack of competitive domestic PTA pricing does not just cause
harm
[[Page S1258]]
to my State of West Virginia--also at risk are nearly 3,500 workers
employed by several U.S. polyester producers buying PTA across the
country.
I urge the Senate to act on this PTA tariff elimination bill so that
West Virginians and other domestic workers and producers can fairly
compete in this highly competitive global marketplace and to have the
opportunity to expand U.S. operations when market conditions permit.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the bill
be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 1702
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. TEREPHTHALIC ACID.
(a) In General.--Subheading 2917.36.00 of the harmonized
Tariff Schedule of the United States in amended by striking
``1.8 cents/kg + 8.9% (MX)'' in the special rates of duty
subcolumn and inserting ``, MX'' in the parenthetical after
``J''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section
applies to goods entered on or after the date that is 15 days
after the date of enactment of this Act.
______
By Mrs. BOXER (for herself and Mrs. Feinstein):
S. 1703. A bill to provide for the conveyance of certain property
from the United States to Stanislaus County, California; to the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
the stanislaus county federal land conveyance act of 1998
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce legislation
providing for the conveyance of federal land to Stanislaus County,
California. This bill is nearly identical to legislation passed by the
House of Representatives last November.
The land in question is known as the NASA Ames Research Center, Crows
Landing Naval Air Facility. During World War II, Crows Landing was a
flight training center encompassing 1,500 acres and containing two
airstrips. Following the war, jurisdiction was transferred to NASA,
which now no longer has any use for this facility. Right now, these
airstrips are going to waste.
Giving this land back to the county will promote economic growth and
be an important asset to local development. While passage of this bill
would greatly serve Stanislaus County, it would also permit NASA to
retain the right to use the facility for aviation purposes. It creates
a win-win situation for all involved.
Crows Landing has greatly served this nation--first in the interest
of national defense and then to the benefit of the space program. But
now, it lies abandoned. We should follow the House and give this land
back to the people of Stanislaus County.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 1703
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Administrator.--The term ``Administrator'' means the
Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration.
(2) Federal agency.--The term ``Federal agency'' has the
meaning given the term ``agency'' in section 555(1) of title
5, United States Code.
(3) NASA.--The term ``NASA'' means the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration.
SEC. 2. CONVEYANCE OF PROPERTY.
As soon as practicable after the date of enactment of this
Act, the Administrator shall convey to Stanislaus County,
California, all right, title, and interest of the United
States in and to the property described in section 3.
SEC. 3. PROPERTY DESCRIBED.
The property to be conveyed pursuant to section 2 is--
(1) the approximately 1,528 acres of land in Stanislaus
County, California, known as the ``NASA Ames Research Center,
Crows Landing Facility (formerly known as the Naval Auxiliary
Landing Field, Crows Landing)'';
(2) all improvements on the land described in paragraph
(1); and
(3) any other Federal property that is--
(A) under the jurisdiction of NASA;
(B) located on the land described in paragraph (1); and
(C) designated by NASA to be transferred to Stanislaus
County, California.
SEC. 4. TERMS.
(a) Consideration.--The conveyance required by section 2
shall be without consideration other than that required by
this section.
(b) Environmental Remediation.--
(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the conveyance required by section 2 shall not relieve
any Federal agency of any responsibility under applicable law
for any environmental remediation of soil, groundwater, or
surface water.
(2) Other remediation.--Any remediation of contamination,
other than that described in paragraph (1), within or related
to structures or fixtures on the property described in
section 3 shall be subject to negotiation to the extent
permitted by law.
(c) Retained Right of Use; Terms and Conditions of
Transfer.--
(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration shall retain the right
to use for aviation activities, without consideration and on
other terms and conditions mutually acceptable to NASA and
Stanislaus County, California, the property described in
section 3.
(2) Legislative jurisdiction.--The terms and conditions
referred to in paragraphs (1) and (3) may not include any
provision restricting the legislative jurisdiction of the
State of California over the property conveyed pursuant to
section 2.
(3) Additional terms.--Subject to paragraph (2), the
Administrator may negotiate additional terms of the
conveyance required by section 2 to protect the interests of
the United States.
______
By Mr. COVERDELL (for himself, Mrs. Feinstein, Mr. Helms, and Mr.
Hutchinson):
S.J. Res. 42. A joint resolution to disapprove the certification of
the President under section 490(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 regarding foreign assistance for Mexico during fiscal year 1998;
to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
S.J. Res. 43. A joint resolution to disapprove the certification of
the President under section 490(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 regarding assistance for Mexico during fiscal year 1997, and to
provide for the termination of the withholding of and opposition to
assistance that results from the disapproval; to the Committee on
Foreign Relations.
mexico certification disapproval legislation
Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, for the next few minutes I will make
limited remarks prior to the introduction of two separate joint
resolutions that deal with the administration's recent certification of
Mexico dealing with the losing drug war, and that deal, in my judgment,
was a more appropriate approach to this situation.
Mr. President, I consider myself as a person somewhat surprised by
the New York Times editorial of Saturday, February 28, 1998; the
headline of the editorial, ``Certifiably Wrong On Mexico.''
The Clinton administration does no favor to Mexico or its own
credibility by certifying that Mexico is ``fully cooperating'' in the
fight against drug trafficking. Compounding the damage, the White House
Drug Policy Director, Barry McCaffrey, fatuously claims that Mexican
cooperation is ``absolutely superlative.''
According to this editorial,
A more truthful assessment can be found in the Drug
Enforcement Administration's confidential evaluation,
described by Tim Golden in yesterday's Times. The DEA
concludes that ``the Government of Mexico has not
accomplished its counter-narcotic goals or succeeded in
cooperation with the U.S. Government.'' Mexican trafficking
has increased, the DEA notes, and the corruption of its
enforcement agencies ``continues unabated.''
Though Washington finds it diplomatically inconvenient to
acknowledge, Mexico has a chronic problem with drug
traffickers who always seem to be able to secure the
political influence they need to avoid arrest and
prosecution. This drug corruption greases the flow of
narcotics into the United States. Mexico's drug networks span
the border, supplying cocaine, heroin, and marijuana to
American users.
Mr. President, in a hearing last week, I indicated, along with
Senator Feinstein of California, that we would be introducing
resolutions, the purpose of which would be to change this course
between the United States and Mexico on this matter. It would be our
goal that the process would decertify Mexico on this matter with a
Presidential waiver in the national interest in which I believe we both
concur. This would be an honest appraisal of our circumstances.
The problem with certifying is that it sends a message to the vast
populations of the United States and of Mexico that this war is being
won, that we have turned a corner, that things
[[Page S1259]]
are working out. That simply is not the case. I think it does a
disservice to the entire population of both countries for us to send a
message of victory when, indeed, the message is one of gravity and
loss.
This situation has grave consequences for the people of the United
States. I have to say that the United States shares enormous
responsibility in this struggle. My remarks are not intended to
castigate or single out Mexico; quite to the contrary; I view them as a
great ally. They are a great trading partner. We share this hemisphere.
We have mutual goals--democratic goals. But neither country seems to
want to face the fact that it is losing a precious struggle.
In 1991, the drug interdiction budget for the United States was $2.03
billion; today it is $1.44 billion. That is a dramatic reduction in our
commitment. In 1992, the United States stopped, seized 440 kilograms of
cocaine and marijuana a day; in 1995, it had been cut in half; we only
stopped 205 kilograms of cocaine and marijuana per day.
What does this all mean? In shorthand, it means that about 3 million
teenagers aged 12-16 are using drugs today that weren't in 1991. To
give an example, in 1991, 400,000 eighth-graders had used an illicit
drug in the last year. In 1996 and 1997, that number rose to 920,000.
In 10th grade, 600,000 had used a drug in 1991; in 1996 and 1997, it
had doubled to 1.2 million children. In 12th grade, 600,000 in 1991;
1.1 million, almost doubled again, in 1996 and 1997.
So by not confronting this directly and honesty, we are all
contributing to the accelerated rate of children using drugs and we are
going to pay a price for this the likes of which we have never seen.
I will yield to the Senator from California in just a moment, but
first I quote a story of a top administrative official on this. It ran
in the Phoenix papers.
``Our current interdiction efforts almost completely fail
to achieve our purpose of reducing the flow of cocaine,
heroin, and methamphetamines across the (Southwest) [the
Mexican] border,'' said Francis X. Kinney, director of
strategic planning for the Office of National Drug Control
Policy. . . .
Kinney said the United States will continue to be overrun
by drug traffic at the U.S.-Mexican border unless it
emphasizes improved intelligence and high-tech screening
equipment. . .
The last thing he said addresses the Senator from California:
``They [the Congress] want us to call it like it is, not to
be an apologist,'' alluding to the U.S. Congress.
I think this gentleman is absolutely correct.
Mr. President, I send a joint resolution to the desk and ask for its
appropriate referral.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The joint resolution will be received and
appropriately referred.
Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I send another joint resolution to the
desk and ask for its appropriate referral.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The joint resolution will be received and
appropriately referred.
Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, in concluding and yielding to the
Senator from California, I just want to make it clear that the purpose
of these two joint resolutions is to alter the course of our engagement
in the drug war, principally as it relates to Mexico. Instead of
certifying and saying, ``Here is a message of victory to the two
peoples of the two Nations,'' it decertifies with a national security
waiver and calls it like it is and refocuses our Governments and our
people in a combined effort to win this battle and not lose it--to win
it for the millions of children that are suffering, because we are
losing it.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from
Georgia, and I rise to join him in submitting these resolutions for
disapproval of the President's decision to certify Mexico as fully
cooperating with the United States in the fight against drug
trafficking.
Mr. President, as we all know, when the President made the same
decision last year, it sparked an intense debate between the
administration and what was in all probability a majority of Congress
who did not believe that Mexico had earned certification. I have looked
long and hard at the evidence that is available. I have received
extensive briefings from law enforcement and intelligence officials.
Anyone, I believe, who has received these same briefings would come to
the conclusion I have reached, that once again the decision to certify
Mexico is incorrect and not grounded in the facts.
While Mexico has made some limited progress, there remain gaping
holes in its counternarcotics effort. Whether due to inability or lack
of political will, these failures badly undermine the urgent effort to
keep the scourge of drugs off our streets. Regardless of America's
demand problem, when the supply of drugs reaches the point where it
comes in at literally tons each day, any demand program is
extraordinarily difficult to sustain.
Has Mexico cooperated in some areas? Of course. There are one or two
new police units which seem to have trusting relationships with the
DEA. New vetting procedures are beginning to be implemented in the
hiring of new police officers. Mexico and the United States have agreed
on a bilateral drug strategy, although it is a vaguely worded document
that will take years to evaluate whether it has been successful and
whether actions on the streets will follow this roundtable document.
It can also be argued that pressure brought to bear on drug lord
Amado Carrillo-Fuentes was responsible for driving him to seek refuge
in another country--Chile--and very likely for his attempt to conceal
his identity through plastic surgery. The surgery, of course, resulted
in his death and the torture-murder of the entire surgical team. His
organization, however, continues to operate, and a reign of violence
has been unleashed as his would-be successors battle for control of his
organization.
But last year, Senator Coverdell and I laid out a number of key areas
that we would use to judge whether or not Mexico has reached the
standard of full cooperation. Sadly, our top law enforcement agencies
indicate that none of these changes has produced significant results.
There has been no demonstrable action on any--and I repeat ``any''--of
the benchmarks outlined by Congress last year as key measurements of
cooperation by Mexico: dismantlement of drug cartels, the arrest and
prosecution of cartel leaders, the extradition of Mexican nationals on
drug charges to the United States for prosecution, effective
prosecution of corrupt officials, law enforcement cooperation,
effective money laundering laws implemented, security of U.S. drug
agents working in bilateral efforts in Mexico.
Let me touch on each of these. The cartels in Mexico today are either
as strong or stronger than they were a year ago. And despite much talk
of cooperation, there has been no substantial progress by the
Government of Mexico in developing prosecutable cases against the
leaders of the major drug trafficking groups, even when these
individuals have been identified by U.S. investigations and are made
the subject of U.S. indictments.
The scope of Mexican drug trafficking has increased significantly,
along with the attendant violence, even against United States and
Mexican law enforcement officials and informants. During 1997, DEA
recorded in excess of 50 incidents of threats along the Southwest
border. According to the information I have received, the Mexican
Government has arrested and prosecuted few individuals in connection
with these acts. None of the major cartels has been dismantled nor have
their leaders been arrested.
Take the Amado Carrillo-Fuentes organization. After the death of
Amado Carrillo-Fuentes, there were numerous enforcement actions taken
against his organization, but the intelligence was unproductive,
leading to insignificant asset seizures and new arrests.
On July 30, 1997, Mexican authorities detained a close associate of
Carrillo-Fuentes, Manuel Bitar-Tafich, leading to seizure of $50
million in the United States. However, because the Mexicans have not
provided the needed documents to support the seizure in the United
States, much of the money had to be returned. Bitar himself remains in
custody, but there has been no movement on his case. While the Mexicans
have reported seizing $52 million in Mexico, no documentation
supporting this seizure has been provided to the U.S. Government.
The Mexican Government arrested Noe Brito, a member of Carrillo-
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Fuentes' security apparatus. He was released, however, before the DEA
was even allowed to interview him.
The Arellano-Felix operation--the notorious cartel located just south
of California in the Tijuana area--continues to operate with impunity.
There have been several enforcement actions in 1997, but few resulted
in significant results against the cartel's trafficking operations.
On November 8, 1997, the Mexican Attorney General's Office arrested
Arturo Everardo Paez-Martinez, a known cartel assassin. Paez is
incarcerated in Mexico on the basis of a provisional U.S. arrest
warrant but has not been extradited.
On September 20, Mexico's counternarcotics unit reporting to the
Attorney General arrested two men on weapons charges, who are known
members of the ``Juniors,'' a group of young assassins recruited by the
Arellano-Felix cartel. The Government of Mexico offered to extradite
one of the men, but the United States had to turn down the offer due to
lack of outstanding charges and evidence against him. This is an
example of what results from a lack of cooperative law enforcement
efforts.
The Sonora Cartel. Miguel Angel Caro-Quintero heads his family's
organization operating out of Sonora, Mexico. There are four
outstanding warrants for him on smuggling, RICO statute, and conspiracy
charges. He has been operating freely in Mexico since 1992. There are
also provisional arrest warrants issued for both Miguel and Rafael
Caro-Quintero.
The Amezcua-Contreras brothers. The Amezcua-Contreras brothers'
organization is believed to be the world's largest clandestine producer
of methamphetamine. The organization procures huge quantities of the
ephedrine in Thailand and India, which is supplied to laboratories in
Mexico and California. The Amezcuas' methamphetamine is distributed in
large cities across the United States. A U.S. law enforcement
investigation, Operation META, concluded in December of 1997 with the
arrest of 101 defendants, seizure of 133 pounds of methamphetamine, and
the precursors to manufacture up to 540 pounds more, along with 1,100
kilos of cocaine and over $2.25 million in assets.
Mexican efforts against this organization have not met with great
success:
On November 10, 1997, the Mexican military's special vetted unit
arrested Adan Amezcua at his ranch in Colima on gun charges, not on
drug charges. He is the only Amezcua not under indictment in either the
United States or Mexico. He remains in custody pending further
investigations. The Government of Mexico has failed to indict or arrest
any of the principal members of the Amezcua organization in Mexico.
The DEA International Chemical Control Unit has supported elements of
the Government of Mexico financially and logistically for numerous
investigations of the Amezcuas, with little or no results. None of the
investigations resulted in arrests or produced information that could
be used in U.S. courts.
Though Jesus and Luis Amezcua are currently under Federal indictment
in the United States on a variety of charges, there are no provisional
arrest warrants for them and they remain at large in Mexico.
Extradition was a key benchmark and a test of cooperation. There have
been no extraditions from Mexico to the United States of any Mexican
nationals on drug charges--none.
The identities of the leaders of the major criminal groups based in
Mexico who control the flow of heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine to
the United States have been known for several years. In fact, U.S. law
enforcement agencies have built cases on and indicted in the United
States virtually all of these cartel leaders. The Department of Justice
has filed provisional arrest warrants for the most significant drug
traffickers in Mexico. While several have been arrested, many others
remain at large and none has been extradited to the United States.
In the war against drugs, extradition of cartel leaders for trial and
imprisonment in the United States is a key and indisputable beachhead
in the war against drug trafficking. It is also a major benchmark of
cooperation.
In my view--and I know the view held by law enforcement in the United
States--the drug lords operating in Mexico only fear extradition to the
United States, where they know they will stand trial and face
punishment commensurate with their crimes. The Mexican law enforcement
institutions and legal system present no deterrent to their operations.
That is why this Senate, many of my colleagues, and law enforcement
officials have repeatedly said that the most meaningful measurement of
real progress in drug cooperation with Mexico is if the major
traffickers are apprehended and extradited to the United States.
Provisional arrest warrants have been filed by the Department of
Justice for the following major traffickers: Agustin Vasquez-Mendoza,
Ramon Arellano-Felix, Rafael Caro-Quintero, Miguel Caro-Quintero,
Vicente Carrillo-Fuentes, Eduardo Gonzalez-Quirarte, Oscar Malherbe,
Arturo Paez-Martinez, Jaime Ladino-Avila, Jose Gerardo-Castro/Gonzalez-
Gutierez, William Brian Martin, Miguel Angel Martinez-Martinez, Antonio
Hernandez-Acosta, and Miguel Felix Gallardo.
These are all key lieutenants in either the Amezcua, Carrillo-
Fuentes, Caro-Quintero, or Arellano-Felix organizations. The Justice
Department requested extradition of four of the above within the past
year. The first two requests have been stalled or completely thwarted
by Mexican courts.
Last November, the United States and Mexico Attorneys General signed
a protocol to the United States-Mexican Extradition Treaty that
authorized temporary surrender of a convicted party to the other
country to face drug charges. This is certainly a positive signal, but
it has yet to be tested in practice.
The bottom line is that, to date, there has not been a single
extradition of a Mexican national to the United States on drug
charges--not one.
Corruption. Drug-related corruption is probably the single greatest
obstacle that the United States faces in its global battle against
international drug trafficking. Unfortunately, drug corruption in
Mexico is so deeply rooted that it persists despite attempts to
eradicate it.
The level of drug corruption in Mexico continues unabated. According
to the briefings I have received, virtually every investigation our law
enforcement agencies conduct against major traffickers in Mexico
uncovers significant corruption of law enforcement officials.
Our own law enforcement agencies indicate that endemic corruption
among Mexican law enforcement officials continually frustrates our
effort to build cases against and to apprehend the most significant
drug traffickers in Mexico, and it is the primary reason there has been
no meaningful progress in drug law enforcement in Mexico.
In the wake of the devastating disclosure that Mexico's own ``drug
czar'' was on the payroll of Amado Carrillo-Fuentes, the Mexican
Government dismantled the INCD, the Mexican counterpart to the DEA, and
fired the majority of its employees.
Unfortunately, many of those fired were ordered reinstated by Mexican
courts.
Additionally, of the 40 military officers arrested as part of the
Gutierrez-Rebollo investigation, none has been brought to trial or
convicted to date.
The following cases indicate how deeply drug corruption has
penetrated into Mexican institutions:
Colonel Jose Luis Rubalcava, who had been Director of the Federal
Judicial Anti-Drug Police under the INCD, was arrested on or about
April 14, 1997 on charges in connection with 2.5 tons of cocaine seized
in Sombrete, Mexico in 1995. This is the director for the Judicial
Anti-Drug Police--2\1/2\ tons of cocaine.
U.S. law enforcement officials speculate that bribery and corruption
may have been behind the withdrawal of Baja state police protection
from a Tijuana news editor prior to his November 27, 1997 attempted
assassination. The editor had been putting public pressure on the issue
of drug corruption.
According to a December 1997 statement by Mexican Attorney General
Madrazo, out of some 870 Federal agents dismissed on corruption charges
in 1996, 700 have been rehired in either the PGR--the Mexican Attorney
General's office--or at the state and local
[[Page S1261]]
level. The rehiring was done at the direction of the courts.
If you cannot fire corrupt law enforcement officials, how can you
fight drugs?
The issue of prosecuting corrupt officials is important, because
without fear of prosecution, there is little deterrence. Too often in
Mexico, officials are fired, but never prosecuted.
In 1997, there were only 3 corruption cases being prosecuted,
including General Gutierrez. Another case involves the theft of 476
kilograms of cocaine by 17 PGR officials, including an Army General in
Sonora. The third involved a Judicial Police Comandante. The Mexican
government has reportedly begun additional prosecutions, but many more
cases need to be brought to trial in order to have any deterrent
effect.
law enforcement cooperation
This is where the rubber hits the road in counternarcotics
cooperation, not in agreements reached at the political level.
Unfortunately, law enforcement cooperation from Mexico has been
severely lacking.
It is encouraging to hear from DEA that there are now some Mexican
officials with whom they believe they can build a trusting
relationship.
A key aspect of this institution-building process is vetting, leading
to the development and professionalization of the new drug enforcement
unit, the Special Prosecutor's Office for Crimes Against Health.
This vetting process could go a long way toward providing U.S. law
enforcement officials with the level of trust in their counterparts
necessary for an effective bi-lateral effort, but it is still in its
infancy, and even some officials who have been ``vetted'' have
subsequently been arrested in connection with traffickers. So while
this effort is critically important, it is not evidence of full
cooperation by a long shot.
More telling however, is the state of affairs with the much-vaunted
Bilateral Border Task Forces located in Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez and
Matamoros. Each Task Forces was supposed to include Mexican agents, and
two agents each from DEA, FBI, and the U.S. Customs Service. But,
regretfully, the Task Forces are not operational because some Mexican
agents, and even comandantes, have been under suspicion of, or arrested
for, ties to criminal organizations.
The old Task Forces were dismantled after the arrest of General
Gutierrez-Rebollo and have been rebuilt since then. But the Mexican
government for a long time did not provide the promised funding,
leaving DEA to carry the full cost, which they did until September of
last year.
Additionally, the issue of personal security for U.S. agents working
with the Bilateral Task Forces in Mexico has not been resolved and, as
a result, the task forces are not operational and will not be until the
security issue is resolved.
The bottom line is that the task forces cannot function properly
without DEA and other federal law enforcement agents working side by
side with their Mexican counterparts, as is the case with similar units
in Colombia and Peru. This critical joint working relationship is made
impossible by Mexican policies that do not allow for adequate
immunities or physical security for U.S. Special Agents while working
in Mexico.
A related problem for the Task Forces is the low quality of
intelligence provided by Mexico. To my knowledge there have been no
meaningful intelligence leads from Mexican agents to their American
counterparts leading to a single significant seizure of drugs coming
into this country.
Intelligence sharing simply does not flow north.
U.S. law enforcement officials indicate that Mexico's drug
intelligence facilities located near the Task Forces are manned by non-
vetted, non-law enforcement civilians and military staff and have only
produced leads from telephone intercepts on low-level traffickers. To
date, none of the electronic intercepts conducted by the Task Forces
have produced a prosecutable drug case in Mexican courts against any
major Mexican criminal organization.
To its credit, the Organized Crime Unit does have several major on-
going investigations underway. But only 140 of the planned 280
prosecutors, investigators and support personnel have been hired, and
only 25 have been ``super-vented.'' Again, this unit is promising, but
it is still too early to tell whether it will maintain the integrity,
or have the staffing, training and resources to be effective partners
in the war against drugs.
enforcement
Mexico's seizures of cocaine have increased from 23.6 metric tons in
1996 to 34.9 metric tons in 1997--although that is still far below the
average of 45 metric tons in 1991-1993. Marijuana seizures did reach an
all-time high.
Unfortunately, seizures of heroin, methamphetamine, and ephedrine are
all down sharply. Heroin seizures fell from 363 kilograms to 115
kilograms. Methamphetamine seizures fell from 172 kilograms to only 39
kilograms. Ephedrine seizures fell dramatically from 6,697 kilograms to
only 608 kilograms.
Drug related arrests declined from an already low 11,283 to 10,622,
barely a third of the number arrested in 1992. Less than half as many
weapons were seized in 1997 (1,892) as in 1996 (4,335).
In another crucial enforcement area, Mexico's new money-laundering
statutes have yet to be fully enforced, and have not resulted in any
successful prosecutions yet. Mexico has decided to make violations of
new banking regulations non-criminal violations, which severely
undercuts the deterrent factor.
Mexico's Organized Crime Statute has yet to be fully implemented. The
Government of Mexico has advised that the lack of judicial support and
known judicial corruption have frustrated implementation of the wire
intercept aspects of the law.
But let us be honest with ourselves. The statute asks the President
to certify that a country has ``cooperated fully'' with the United
States. If Mexico has cooperated in three or four areas, and not
cooperated in ten or twelve others, can we really call that full
cooperation. Of course not. At best, we should say that Mexico has
cooperated partially with the United States in counternarcotics
efforts. But full cooperation? It's not even close.
We must make an honest assessment. To those who dislike the
certification statute, I quote again from the New York Times editorial
``* * * as long as certification remains on the books, the
Administration has a duty to report truthfully to Congress and the
American people. It has failed to do so in the case of Mexico.''
So in the wake of the President's decision to certify Mexico, I
believe we in Congress have no choice but to try to pass a resolution
of disapproval. If possible, we will pass one with a waiver of
sanctions. But if not, we will have to vote on the straight resolution
of disapproval. We have until March 28 to decide.
Mr. President, we must make an honest assessment of full cooperation,
and there is only one way to assess full cooperation, and it is on the
streets. It is with extradition. It is with arrest of cartel leaders.
It is with letting our DEA agents who work the Mexican side of the
border have their security--meaning beyond. You cannot send them across
the border without a mechanism to protect them. None of this is
happening today.
The big, highly touted drug agreement, which I read, talks about the
size and shape of the table. There are no specifics.
In view of this, I urge decertification with a waiver.
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