[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 19 (Tuesday, March 3, 1998)]
[House]
[Pages H699-H700]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          SPEAKER'S TASK FORCE REPORT ON HONG KONG TRANSITION

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of 
January 21, 1997, the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter) is 
recognized during morning hour debates for 5 minutes.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, last March, Speaker Gingrich visited Asia. 
In the course of his visit to Hong Kong, he determined it would be 
appropriate to create a House task force to observe and report on the 
Hong Kong transition as it moved from colonial rule of the United 
Kingdom to become a separate but integral part of the People's Republic 
of China. He mandated that I chair that task force.
  We created a bipartisan task force of equal numbers from the 
membership of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the House 
Committee on International Relations, eight members total. The Speaker 
mandated that we visit Hong Kong and Beijing a minimum of every 6 
months and provide a quarterly report to the Congress on the 
transition, to let the People's Republic of China know that we are 
watching that transition and to thereby try to protect the freedoms 
that existed in Hong Kong before the transition. Interestingly, the 
Australian Parliament has a similar effort underway.
  In the first report of the Speaker's Task Force on the Hong Kong 
Transition, dated October 1, 1997, we reported that Hong Kong's 
reversion to China was characterized as ``so far, so good.'' Six months 
after the official reversion, that characterization still applies.

[[Page H700]]

  Two other members of the Task Force and I visited Hong Kong, Beijing, 
Shenzhen and Macau between December 13 and December 20 of last year, 
and our report is effective through December 31 of 1997.
  However, nearly all observers agree it is yet ``too early to tell'' 
whether Hong Kong will be greatly affected by the transition and/or 
whether the United States' significant interests in Hong Kong will be 
adversely affected. From all the perspectives both within and outside 
of Hong Kong, the very negative scenarios for Hong Kong which many had 
predicted thus far have not occurred. Undoubtedly, this is in part due 
to a determined effort by officials from the People's Republic of China 
to respect Hong Kong's autonomy under the ``one-country, two-systems'' 
formula. Despite the fact that the underlying reasons for China's 
stance remain the same, there is no assurance that the outcome from 
those objectives will still prevail.
  To date, the Hong Kong people seem to enjoy the same basic liberties 
and rights they enjoyed prior to the reversion. However, this is 
tempered by the abolition of the Legislative Council and its 
replacement by a provisional legislature which was ``selected,'' but 
not elected, by the people of Hong Kong.
  Most observers agree that Hong Kong and Beijing officials responsible 
for implementing the ``one-country, two-systems'' framework are on 
their best behavior. Yet one overriding concern remains, and I put that 
in the form of a question: Are Hong Kong officials subtly anticipating 
what Beijing desires and not in all instances vigorously pursuing the 
autonomy that they now have out of a fear that they will upset Beijing? 
That is the question.
  At least with regard to routine matters, Hong Kong governmental 
officials seem quick to assert their own autonomy. There is also some 
evidence that Hong Kong officials may be seeking to influence policies 
on the mainland. But on more sensitive issues such as President Jiang's 
interaction with protesters in Hong Kong not too long ago, Hong Kong 
officials may be attempting to put on a good face for Beijing.
  If such attempts to ``outroyal the queen'' are really occurring in 
Hong Kong, a subtle and seemingly invisible erosion of Hong Kong's 
economy could be happening without being fully discernible. That is a 
summary of what we concluded.
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to focus briefly on one other aspect of the 
Hong Kong transition which is of particular importance to America and 
being watched by this House, and I will say to my colleagues, the full 
report of this task force, our second quarterly report, will be found 
in the Extensions of Remarks for today, but that area is Hong Kong's 
customs autonomy.
  Mr. Speaker, I would say it is a promising start but too early to 
judge. Indicators suggest that Hong Kong is fully exercising its 
autonomy as a separate customs territory inside China. Law enforcement 
cooperation between Hong Kong police and Customs and U.S. Customs 
remains ``much the same,'' and, according to U.S. officials, there 
appears to be no change in the working relationship. Nevertheless, it 
is ``too early to judge'' whether long-term U.S. trade, security, and 
law enforcement interests in Hong Kong ultimately will be affected by 
the transition.
  In November, the U.S. Foreign Commercial Service performed 30 
postshipment verifications on export licenses and found only one or two 
questionable situations. Moreover, those questions were resolved with 
further inspection.
  A U.S. interagency team on export controls traveled to Hong Kong on 
January 12, 1998, as part of a bilateral cooperation agreement between 
Secretary of Commerce William Daley and Hong Kong Trade and Industry 
Secretary Denise Yue.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to look at our entire report. We 
are going to more fully examine the customs and export control issue, 
among others, when we present our third and fourth quarterly reports to 
the Congress of the United States. Again, our colleagues will find our 
second quarterly report fully presented in the Extensions of Remarks 
for today.

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