[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 18 (Monday, March 2, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1186-S1187]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NATO EXPANSION
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, my attention was called to an article, an
op-ed article, in the New York Times for Wednesday, February 4, of this
year entitled: ``NATO: A Debate Recast.'' It was authored by Howard
Baker, Sam Nunn, Brent Scowcroft and Alton Frye.
I read the article with great interest and asked the question of
whether this had been inserted in the Record at the time it was
written. I am informed that that was not the case, that it has not been
put in the Record, not been called to the attention of the Members of
the Senate.
I call the attention of the Members in the Senate to this article
because I
[[Page S1187]]
think it makes some very good points about NATO expansion. I
particularly want to quote this one provision. These writers said:
The Senate would be wise to link NATO and European Union
expansion. If that link is made, it is essential to stipulate
that admission to the European Union is not sufficient
qualification for entry into NATO. NATO should weigh any
future applicant against the contributions and burdens its
membership would entail. What is called for is a definite, if
not permanent, pause in this process.
Mr. President, we soon will be, I assume, taking up the debate on
NATO expansion. I do ask that Members pay attention to the words of our
two former colleagues, Senator Baker and Senator Nunn; and also Brent
Scowcroft, who was the National Security Advisor to Presidents Ford and
Bush; and Alton Frye, who is senior fellow of the Council on Foreign
Relations.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed
in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the New York Times, Feb. 4, 1998]
NATO: A Debate Recast
(By Howard Baker, Jr., Sam Nunn, Brent Scowcroft and Alton Frye)
The looming Senate debate over NATO enlargement marks a
historic encounter between good intentions and sound
strategy. Despite momentum toward admitting three more
members--Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic--the
fundamental interests at stake demand probing examination of
the specific candidacies, the approach that has brought the
alliance to this fateful juncture and the troubling
implications of that approach. Along with many who have
worked to build a strong NATO, we harbor grave reservations
about the pending expansion and the direction it points.
Far from being a cold war relic, NATO should be the
cornerstone of an evolving security order in Europe. It
provides the infrastructure and experience indispensable to
coping with instabilities--Bosnia today, and other
troublespots tomorrow. NATO is vital to insuring arms control
and maintaining the kind of industrial base that provides a
solid defense. Perhaps most important, NATO provides the
institutional home for coalitions to meet crises beyond
Europe.
But a cornerstone is not a sponge. The function of a
cornerstone is to protect its own integrity to support a
wider security structure, not to dissipate its cohesion by
absorbing members and responsibilities beyond prudent limits.
A powerful NATO undergirds other institutions, including the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the
Western European Union. It makes possible the Partnership for
Peace to promote cooperation among countries that are not
NATO members.
The rush to expand the alliance has put the cart before the
horse. Advocates and skeptics of NATO enlargement agree that
the transformation of Europe's security structure should be
related to the transformation of its economy. As James Baker,
the former Secretary of State, has testified, European Union
membership ``is just as important as membership in NATO for
the countries involved,'' and ``we must make clear that NATO
membership for the countries of Central Europe is not a
substitute for closer economic ties to the E.U.''
In our view, it would have been preferable not to invite
more countries to join NATO. At the very least, it would be
desirable for the European Union to proceed with its planned
expansion before NATO completes the acceptance of the new
members.
The European Union has now decided to begin negotiations
with six aspirants, including the three candidates NATO is
considering. Linking NATO expansion to the expansion of the
European Union would accomplish several things:
It would underscore the connection between Europe's
security and its economy--and offer certification that
entrants to NATO could afford to meet its defense
obligations.
It would permit the Partnership for Peace to demonstrate
that it should be the proper association for countries
outside NATO. So long as the option to join NATO remains
open, it utterly undercuts the partnership as the preferred
mode of cooperation.
It would allow the United States and Russia to focus on the
gravest security problem still before us, the formidable
hangover of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.
The cooperative framework provided by the NATO-Russia
Founding Act may be useful, but frictions over NATO distract
Moscow and Washington from profound common dangers. Even if
everything goes right in expanding NATO, we will have
misplaced our priorities during a critical window of
opportunity to gain Russian cooperation in controlling
nuclear arsenals and preventing proliferation. Russian
antagonism is sure to grow if the alliance extends ever
closer to Russian territory.
The Senate would be wise to link NATO and European Union
expansion. If that link is made, it is essential to stipulate
that admission to the European Union is not sufficient
qualification for entry into NATO. NATO should weigh any
future applicant against the contributions and burdens its
membership would entail. What is called for is a definite, if
not permanent, pause in this process.
By leading the charge for NATO expansion, the Clinton
Administration may well elicit hasty proposals and
considerable pressure to admit other countries. Other Central
and East European countries are hoping that they, too, will
soon be welcomed into allied ranks.
But a military alliance is not a club, and the
Administration's rhetoric and policy risk converting NATO
into an organization in which obligations are diluted and
action is enfeebled. Pursuing that path may simultaneously
spur Russian animosity and weaken the alliance's capability
to contain it, if required. William Perry, the former Defense
Secretary, and Warren Christopher, the former Secretary of
State, acknowledge the problematic situation in which the
country finds itself. In their words, ``there is no consensus
on the wisdom of the path taken so far by the alliance and
spearheaded by the Clinton Administration.''
While Mr. Perry and Mr. Christopher state that NATO should
remain open ``in principle,'' they contend that no additional
members should be designated until the three current
candidates ``are fully prepared to bear the responsibilities
of membership and have been integrated into the alliance.''
That reads to us like advice to slow this train down. We are
in accord with that view, and with their argument that NATO
should make the experience of Partnership for Peace
membership for non-NATO members ``as similar as possible to
the experience of NATO membership.''
We are dubious, however, that consensus can be found on the
Administration's premise that NATO should be receptive to
many additional members. That is a prescription for
destroying the alliance. It guarantees future discord with
present allies, few of whom are prepared to follow the
Clinton policy to its logical end, the inclusion of Russia.
The task is to build a security structure in which Russia
assumes a place commensurate with its geostrategic importance
and its progress toward democracy and a market economy. With
due respect, those campaigning to expand NATO confuse the
longer term challenge of shaping a comprehensive security
system with our continuing responsibility to sustain a robust
NATO as our principal security bulwark.
The question confronting the Senate is not only whether to
enlarge NATO, but how, when and on what terms. The imperative
now is for the Senate to bring to bear the independent
assessment mandated by the Constitution. In that assessment
it has several options, including linking alliance expansion
with enlargement of the European Union and laying down a
marker against an excessively elastic NATO.
The Senate has constructive leverage to shape a wiser
outcome than simple acquiescence in the President's plan. The
widespread grumble that ``NATO expansion is a bad idea whose
time has come'' is no basis for policy. This is not a dose of
medicine one can swallow and be done with. It is a
fundamental extension of American security guarantees, an
ill-defined invitation for new members unrelated either to
military threats or military capabilities.
A final caution to the Administration: It is no service to
candor or consensus to invoke the shadow of Versailles,
implying that resistance to NATO enlargement would be
comparable to Senate rejection of the League of Nations. One
doubts that senators will respond well to overdrawn
analogies. As John Maynard Keynes noted at the time, the
central failure of Versailles lay in the fatal miscalculation
of how to deal with a demoralized former adversary. That,
above all, is the error we must not repeat.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I believe we are in morning business, is
that correct?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
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