[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 18 (Monday, March 2, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1186-S1187]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                             NATO EXPANSION

  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, my attention was called to an article, an 
op-ed article, in the New York Times for Wednesday, February 4, of this 
year entitled: ``NATO: A Debate Recast.'' It was authored by Howard 
Baker, Sam Nunn, Brent Scowcroft and Alton Frye.
  I read the article with great interest and asked the question of 
whether this had been inserted in the Record at the time it was 
written. I am informed that that was not the case, that it has not been 
put in the Record, not been called to the attention of the Members of 
the Senate.
  I call the attention of the Members in the Senate to this article 
because I

[[Page S1187]]

think it makes some very good points about NATO expansion. I 
particularly want to quote this one provision. These writers said:

       The Senate would be wise to link NATO and European Union 
     expansion. If that link is made, it is essential to stipulate 
     that admission to the European Union is not sufficient 
     qualification for entry into NATO. NATO should weigh any 
     future applicant against the contributions and burdens its 
     membership would entail. What is called for is a definite, if 
     not permanent, pause in this process.

  Mr. President, we soon will be, I assume, taking up the debate on 
NATO expansion. I do ask that Members pay attention to the words of our 
two former colleagues, Senator Baker and Senator Nunn; and also Brent 
Scowcroft, who was the National Security Advisor to Presidents Ford and 
Bush; and Alton Frye, who is senior fellow of the Council on Foreign 
Relations.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed 
in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                [From the New York Times, Feb. 4, 1998]

                         NATO: A Debate Recast

    (By Howard Baker, Jr., Sam Nunn, Brent Scowcroft and Alton Frye)

       The looming Senate debate over NATO enlargement marks a 
     historic encounter between good intentions and sound 
     strategy. Despite momentum toward admitting three more 
     members--Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic--the 
     fundamental interests at stake demand probing examination of 
     the specific candidacies, the approach that has brought the 
     alliance to this fateful juncture and the troubling 
     implications of that approach. Along with many who have 
     worked to build a strong NATO, we harbor grave reservations 
     about the pending expansion and the direction it points.
       Far from being a cold war relic, NATO should be the 
     cornerstone of an evolving security order in Europe. It 
     provides the infrastructure and experience indispensable to 
     coping with instabilities--Bosnia today, and other 
     troublespots tomorrow. NATO is vital to insuring arms control 
     and maintaining the kind of industrial base that provides a 
     solid defense. Perhaps most important, NATO provides the 
     institutional home for coalitions to meet crises beyond 
     Europe.
       But a cornerstone is not a sponge. The function of a 
     cornerstone is to protect its own integrity to support a 
     wider security structure, not to dissipate its cohesion by 
     absorbing members and responsibilities beyond prudent limits. 
     A powerful NATO undergirds other institutions, including the 
     Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the 
     Western European Union. It makes possible the Partnership for 
     Peace to promote cooperation among countries that are not 
     NATO members.
       The rush to expand the alliance has put the cart before the 
     horse. Advocates and skeptics of NATO enlargement agree that 
     the transformation of Europe's security structure should be 
     related to the transformation of its economy. As James Baker, 
     the former Secretary of State, has testified, European Union 
     membership ``is just as important as membership in NATO for 
     the countries involved,'' and ``we must make clear that NATO 
     membership for the countries of Central Europe is not a 
     substitute for closer economic ties to the E.U.''
       In our view, it would have been preferable not to invite 
     more countries to join NATO. At the very least, it would be 
     desirable for the European Union to proceed with its planned 
     expansion before NATO completes the acceptance of the new 
     members.
       The European Union has now decided to begin negotiations 
     with six aspirants, including the three candidates NATO is 
     considering. Linking NATO expansion to the expansion of the 
     European Union would accomplish several things:
       It would underscore the connection between Europe's 
     security and its economy--and offer certification that 
     entrants to NATO could afford to meet its defense 
     obligations.
       It would permit the Partnership for Peace to demonstrate 
     that it should be the proper association for countries 
     outside NATO. So long as the option to join NATO remains 
     open, it utterly undercuts the partnership as the preferred 
     mode of cooperation.
       It would allow the United States and Russia to focus on the 
     gravest security problem still before us, the formidable 
     hangover of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. 
     The cooperative framework provided by the NATO-Russia 
     Founding Act may be useful, but frictions over NATO distract 
     Moscow and Washington from profound common dangers. Even if 
     everything goes right in expanding NATO, we will have 
     misplaced our priorities during a critical window of 
     opportunity to gain Russian cooperation in controlling 
     nuclear arsenals and preventing proliferation. Russian 
     antagonism is sure to grow if the alliance extends ever 
     closer to Russian territory.
       The Senate would be wise to link NATO and European Union 
     expansion. If that link is made, it is essential to stipulate 
     that admission to the European Union is not sufficient 
     qualification for entry into NATO. NATO should weigh any 
     future applicant against the contributions and burdens its 
     membership would entail. What is called for is a definite, if 
     not permanent, pause in this process.
       By leading the charge for NATO expansion, the Clinton 
     Administration may well elicit hasty proposals and 
     considerable pressure to admit other countries. Other Central 
     and East European countries are hoping that they, too, will 
     soon be welcomed into allied ranks.
       But a military alliance is not a club, and the 
     Administration's rhetoric and policy risk converting NATO 
     into an organization in which obligations are diluted and 
     action is enfeebled. Pursuing that path may simultaneously 
     spur Russian animosity and weaken the alliance's capability 
     to contain it, if required. William Perry, the former Defense 
     Secretary, and Warren Christopher, the former Secretary of 
     State, acknowledge the problematic situation in which the 
     country finds itself. In their words, ``there is no consensus 
     on the wisdom of the path taken so far by the alliance and 
     spearheaded by the Clinton Administration.''
       While Mr. Perry and Mr. Christopher state that NATO should 
     remain open ``in principle,'' they contend that no additional 
     members should be designated until the three current 
     candidates ``are fully prepared to bear the responsibilities 
     of membership and have been integrated into the alliance.'' 
     That reads to us like advice to slow this train down. We are 
     in accord with that view, and with their argument that NATO 
     should make the experience of Partnership for Peace 
     membership for non-NATO members ``as similar as possible to 
     the experience of NATO membership.''
       We are dubious, however, that consensus can be found on the 
     Administration's premise that NATO should be receptive to 
     many additional members. That is a prescription for 
     destroying the alliance. It guarantees future discord with 
     present allies, few of whom are prepared to follow the 
     Clinton policy to its logical end, the inclusion of Russia.
       The task is to build a security structure in which Russia 
     assumes a place commensurate with its geostrategic importance 
     and its progress toward democracy and a market economy. With 
     due respect, those campaigning to expand NATO confuse the 
     longer term challenge of shaping a comprehensive security 
     system with our continuing responsibility to sustain a robust 
     NATO as our principal security bulwark.
       The question confronting the Senate is not only whether to 
     enlarge NATO, but how, when and on what terms. The imperative 
     now is for the Senate to bring to bear the independent 
     assessment mandated by the Constitution. In that assessment 
     it has several options, including linking alliance expansion 
     with enlargement of the European Union and laying down a 
     marker against an excessively elastic NATO.
       The Senate has constructive leverage to shape a wiser 
     outcome than simple acquiescence in the President's plan. The 
     widespread grumble that ``NATO expansion is a bad idea whose 
     time has come'' is no basis for policy. This is not a dose of 
     medicine one can swallow and be done with. It is a 
     fundamental extension of American security guarantees, an 
     ill-defined invitation for new members unrelated either to 
     military threats or military capabilities.
       A final caution to the Administration: It is no service to 
     candor or consensus to invoke the shadow of Versailles, 
     implying that resistance to NATO enlargement would be 
     comparable to Senate rejection of the League of Nations. One 
     doubts that senators will respond well to overdrawn 
     analogies. As John Maynard Keynes noted at the time, the 
     central failure of Versailles lay in the fatal miscalculation 
     of how to deal with a demoralized former adversary. That, 
     above all, is the error we must not repeat.

  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I believe we are in morning business, is 
that correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

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