[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 17 (Friday, February 27, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1173-S1175]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                  NATO EXPANSION MORATORIUM CONDITION

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President I wish to associate myself with other 
colleagues who have risen today to address the importance of the issue 
of NATO expansion. For almost a year's time now, I have expressed 
publicly, both in this country and in Europe, my deep reservations 
about the proposed expansion of this alliance. I listened carefully to 
a briefing about the remarks of my colleagues today, and I wish to 
associate myself with their remarks because I think this body must 
spend whatever time it feels is necessary to carefully analyze this 
question.
  NATO was put in place at a historic moment in our history. I always 
credit President Harry Truman for his foresight, together with that of 
others, regarding the importance of this wonderful, absolutely 
magnificent, military alliance that has exceeded, in every way, the 
expectations of its founders. Unquestionably, in this Senator's mind, 
and I think in the minds of many, we averted a military confrontation 
with the former Soviet Union as a consequence of the NATO treaty. I 
think that the basic tensions that existed in Europe at that time exist 
today, although not at the same level of intensity.
  There has always been a measure of instability between the major 
powers on the continent and indeed with Great Britain. The United 
States has fulfilled, I think, quietly, nevertheless effectively, a 
strong, steady hand on those competitive forces amongst those

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very ancient nations--certainly ancient in terms of the 200-plus-year 
history of this country--as they have struggled in terms of economic 
competition and, indeed, tragically in military confrontations in years 
past.
  My father served in World War I in France as a doctor. That was the 
first time that the United States really responded militarily by going 
to that continent. And then, of course, World War II is very clear in 
the memories of all. So those are just two examples.
  So, Mr. President, I rise today as in executive session to submit for 
the Record a condition that I will seek to attach to the Resolution of 
Ratification, the U.S. Senate's procedure under the ``advice and 
consent'' clause of the U.S. Constitution, to facilitate the proposed 
NATO expansion.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the condition be printed in 
the Record at this point.
  There being no objection, the text of the amendment was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

       At the appropriate place in the resolution, insert the 
     following:
       (  ) United states policy regarding further expansion of 
     nato.--Prior to the date of ratification of the Protocols by 
     the United States, the President shall certify to the Senate 
     that it is the policy of the United States not to encourage, 
     participate in, or agree to any further expansion in the 
     membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
     for a period of at least three years beginning on the date of 
     entry into force of the last of the Protocols to the North 
     Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the 
     Czech Republic to enter into force.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I would like to thank my distinguished 
colleague, Senator Moynihan, from New York from being my principal co-
sponsor. Throughout he has been a consistent supporter of this 
objective and will be the principal Member from the other side of the 
aisle as I work this amendment among our body.
  Let me also say thanks for the very important contributions of 
Senator Bingaman. He serves on the Senate Armed Services Committee with 
me. He is a broad-based thinker on national security issues, and he 
will be joining us as we seek to get the support of our colleagues.
  As I stated throughout last year, 1997, and continuing this year, I 
publicly have spoken here and in Europe regarding my deep concerns over 
the proposed expansion of NATO by admitting Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic, which is the current proposal.
  I believe these accessions are not in the security interests of the 
NATO alliance. My detailed reasons against are to be found in earlier 
statements.
  In the course of the ratification debate, I will work with colleagues 
in opposition to the ratification of these three nations. I view my 
amendment, however, as supportive of our shared goals, and in no way 
should it be viewed as a concession on my part in my opposition or an 
indication that I accept the accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic as a fait accompli. But I have had this amendment in mind, and 
I have spoken about it. I discussed it at length at the Wehrkunde 
conference a few weeks ago when I was privileged to be in the company 
of the Secretary of Defense and the delegation from the Senate that was 
headed by Senator McCain, one of our most valued Members in areas of 
national defense. I am not suggesting that either of those persons 
share my view, but I did at that time express it very clearly to a 
number of persons attending that conference.
  This condition does not affect the three nations currently under 
consideration for NATO membership--Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic. Rather it focuses on the future by requiring a ``strategic 
pause'' of 3 years before proceeding with any further expansion of NATO 
membership.
  As to my reasons for opposition to NATO expansion, I start from the 
basic premise that NATO has been the most successful military alliance 
in the history of the United States, perhaps, in the history of the 
world. NATO has surpassed all of the expectations of its founders, 
keeping peace in Europe for almost 50 years and emerging victorious in 
the cold war. In my view, NATO remains a vital, effective military 
alliance which will continue--in its present form--to be the bedrock of 
U.S. security policy in Europe.
  In his biography, Harry Truman cited NATO, together with the Marshall 
plan, as the greatest achievements of his Presidency. The Senate should 
not do anything to undermine his legacy or the effectiveness of this 
great alliance.
  The condition I am introducing today is straightforward. It requires 
the President to certify ``that it is the policy of the United States 
not to encourage, participate in, or agree to any further expansion in 
the membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for a 
period of at least three years'' beginning on the date of entry into 
force of the last of the Protocols of Accession of Poland, Hungary and 
the Czech Republic.
  Why is this condition necessary? Assuming the Protocols of Accession 
are approved by all 16 nations, this condition would give NATO an 
opportunity to begin to integrate the first three new members and 
assess the impact of this first round of expansion before proceeding to 
any future rounds.
  There are many unanswered questions concerning this first round of 
expansion.
  What will the true costs of expansion be for current and new members? 
Estimates have ranged from a low of $1.5 billion over 10 years to a 
high of $125 billion over the same timeframe. What is the U.S. share of 
this cost and will our current allies fairly share the burdens of 
expansion?
  How long will it take for these new nations to modernize their 
militaries to the point where they can make a positive contribution to 
the security of the alliance? NATO's 10-year cost time line indicates 
that NATO is planning on at least a decade of modernization and 
integration efforts. Do we really want to add additional burdens to 
that ambitious plan?
  On a related issue, Thursday's ``Washington Post'' carried an article 
entitled, ``Poland Unable to Perform All NATO Tasks.'' Citing 
``budgetary shortfalls,'' the Polish Defense Ministry announced that 
Poland would only be able to meet 70% of its expected military roles 
within NATO upon accession. What is interesting about this story is not 
the military shortfalls--which many of us anticipated--but the fact 
that these shortfalls are being revealed as NATO is currently going 
through the process of assessing the military capabilities of these 
three nations and establishing force goals for them. This is a process 
which will not be completed until late spring or early summer--months 
after the Senate is being asked to act on these Protocols.
  I am led to the inevitable conclusion that we are being asked to act 
on the vital issue of NATO expansion in an information vacuum. In an 
October 1997 statement to the Senate Budget Committee, Susan Eisenhower 
addressed this issue with a frightening analogy: ``If ratification is 
to be voted on now or in the next session, it would be as if an air 
traffic control agent had cleared a plane for take-off, knowing full 
well that the crew on board had filed several contradictory flight 
plans, didn't know when or if they'd pick up other passengers, and 
weren't even sure that their landing gear worked.''
  Returning to my series of questions: How will the Russians react to 
the reality of NATO expansion eastward? While I agree that the Russians 
should not be placed in a position of dictating United States or NATO 
policy, we must factor into this equation the reaction of the only 
nation on earth that possesses the military capability to destroy our 
nation.
  Will the American people support the use of U.S. troops to defend 
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and possibly more nations in 
Central and Eastern Europe? Or are our security commitments being 
stretched too thin?

  Time alone will answer these questions. We should not rush forward 
with a follow-on expansion round beginning in April 1999, immediately 
after these first three new members take their seat at the table. We 
need to know the impact of this first round on the alliance and not 
allow ourselves to be swayed by political reasons to rush ahead, 
uninformed.
  I well remember the NATO debates of the 1980's when Senator 
Mansfield, former majority leader, led the charge to withdraw our 
troops from Europe. Other picked up his mantle when he departed the 
Senate. Almost annually, those of us who supported NATO were

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summoned to come to the floor and defend the U.S. troop commitment to 
NATO. I fear that we could see a repeat of those times if we do not 
proceed cautiously with NATO expansion, and ensure that any expansion 
has the full support of the American people who will ultimately bear 
the burden for these added security commitments.
  In a June 1997 report entitled, ``NATO Expansion: A Bridge to the 
Nineteenth Century,'' Professor Michael Mandelbaum expressed these 
concerns in the following way:

       When the American public decides that an international 
     commitment has been extended under false pretenses, or that 
     such a commitment is more expensive than its government has 
     promised, or that whatever the government has promised the 
     cost of the commitment is too high, it tends to withdraw its 
     support, which causes the commitment in question to collapse.

  That is my biggest fear with NATO expansion--that it could undermine 
the American public's support for NATO itself.
  I believe the 3-year timeframe contained in this condition is a 
reasonable one. It is long enough for NATO to have made a reasonable 
assessment of the impact of the first round, but it is not so long as 
to remove hope from future aspirants to NATO membership. Many have 
advocated a longer moratorium. My good friend and former colleague Sam 
Nunn, when he was still in the Senate, recommended a 10-year pause 
between rounds.
  Senator Nunn recently joined with Senator Baker, General Scowcroft, 
and Alton Frye in an excellent op-ed regarding NATO expansion entitled, 
``NATO: A Debate Recast.'' They join me in a call for caution on any 
further rounds of expansion. According to this article, ``NATO should 
be the cornerstone of an evolving security order in Europe . . . But a 
cornerstone is not a sponge. The function of a cornerstone is to 
protect its own integrity to support a wider security structure, not to 
dissipate its cohesion by absorbing members and responsibilities beyond 
prudent limits.'' They recommend a ``definite, if not permanent, 
pause'' in the process of expansion.
  Former Secretaries Perry and Christopher also recently joined the 
ranks of those urging caution regarding further expansion of the 
alliance. I do not want to misrepresent their position--they clearly 
state that the door should remain open to membership for all 
Partnership for Peace nations. However, they argue that ``no additional 
nations should be designated for admission until the three countries 
now in the NATO queue (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) are 
fully prepared to bear the responsibilities of membership and have been 
fully integrated into the alliance military and political structures.'' 
While they do not endorse the idea of a mandated pause, they clearly 
believe that the process should be slowed down. I agree.
  I urge my colleagues to join me in this endeavor to inject an element 
of caution into U.S. policy on this important issue.
  I also want to add that in the course of my trip to Europe two weeks 
ago with the Secretary of Defense, we visited Russia. We visited with 
the Defense Minister, Marshall Sergeyev, and the Foreign Minister, and 
we had a very valuable session with about eight members of the Russian 
Duma. NATO expansion was their No. 1 area of concern regarding the 
relationship between the United States and Russia today. That 
relationship, in the minds of many, is deteriorating--deteriorating at 
the very time when we are making a number of collaborative efforts to 
try to lessen not only tensions that still remain between our two 
nations but in furtherance of the recognition that the world can become 
a more peaceful and a more secure place if Russia and the United States 
join in many areas to provide that peaceful security.
  For example, Bosnia. Today there is a contingent of professional 
Russian military serving alongside U.S. forces and those of our allied 
nations. That is a most historic first.
  While in Russia with the Secretary of Defense, we went to visit 
facilities which are utilizing moneys authorized and appropriated by 
the U.S. Senate, and Congress as a whole, again directed towards 
lessening the tensions between these two nations in the area of nuclear 
weapons.
  We saw, for example, where American taxpayer dollars paid for 
equipment which the Russians are now using to dismantle, in accordance 
with framework of treaties, nuclear weapons in a safe manner using 
technology which originated here in the United States and supplemented 
by technology in Russia. There is only really one major threat to the 
security of this country that always hangs above all others; that is, 
that Russia still possesses, and for the foreseeable future will 
possess, a nuclear arsenal that could devastate our Nation. I am not 
suggesting in any way that we are not making progress toward the 
lessening of tensions, but it remains there. Of course, beneath that is 
the threat of spreading knowledge relating to weapons of mass 
destruction. Much of that knowledge is leaking out of the former Soviet 
Union, today Russia, as to how to manufacture those weapons.
  I think that we should address in the context of the expansion 
argument the concerns of the Russian Duma, or the Russian leadership, 
regarding this expansion and how it might affect our relationship with 
Russia at this critical point in time.
  This valuable NATO alliance has been with us for over a half a 
century. I don't suggest that we spend the next half century 
considering this expansion issue, but certainly the several months that 
we need can be allocated to the important debate that will take place 
in this Chamber, maybe a time less than several months, but certainly 
not this rush of schedule that we are on now.
  So I raise these issues today because the distinguished chairman of 
the Foreign Relations Committee, I understand, intends to have a markup 
next week. I think, in fairness to him and to the colleagues on that 
committee and to other Senators, I and others should express these 
concerns in a timely fashion today.
  Mr. President, that concludes my remarks.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent that I be 
permitted to speak for up to 10 minutes, prior to adjournment. 
Understanding, therefore, that I am all that stands between the Chamber 
and adjournment, I will try to speak less than 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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