[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 17 (Friday, February 27, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1152-S1154]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                             NATO EXPANSION

  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, today I come to the floor of the Senate to 
visit with my colleagues about NATO and NATO expansion.
  Of all the responsibilities the Senate is called upon to exercise 
under our constitutional system, none is more momentous--and, in most 
cases, as irrevocable--as our advice and consent to the ratification of 
treaties and treaty revisions. One of the treaty questions the Senate 
will be facing in the near future is whether the North Atlantic 
Treaty--the NATO alliance--should be modified to include the former 
Warsaw Pact states of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Our 
decision on this matter will set the structure for security in Europe 
and the American role in it for years, perhaps decades, to come.
  I would like to commend the distinguished Chairmen of the Committee 
on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations for the 
thorough and thoughtful hearings they have held on this matter. 
However, in my discussions with a number of Senators, particularly 
those who, like myself, are not members of those committees, it is 
clear that many Senators have only begun to focus on the many 
interrelated issues that touch upon the matter of NATO expansion. 
Indeed, some of the issues--our relations with our allies, relations 
with the Russians, the implications for weapons proliferation, our 
policy toward Iraq--are shifting every day.
  For example, this week the distinguished Majority Leader spoke 
forcefully about his misgivings about the agreement reached between 
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and the Saddam Hussein regime in 
Iraq. Our entire policy in the region has been put on hold. It is well 
known that both France, a key NATO ally, and Russia, the obvious object 
of NATO expansion, strongly welcome this outcome. Will Saddam Hussein 
live up to this agreement? Many of us consider it unlikely. Will the 
United States return to the military option in a few weeks or months? I 
don't think any of us really yet know that. How will the Iraq crisis, 
what ever its outcome, affect our relations with both our allies and 
Russia? We do not yet know the impact of the realities of these events. 
How will the outcome affect the larger task of stemming the 
proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missile 
technology? We do not yet know. Not knowing the answers to these 
questions, are we prepared to make an irreversible decision on NATO 
expansion? I think not--at least not yet.
  In considering the implications just of the Iraq crisis, I bring to 
my colleagues' attention an op-ed by Mr. Thomas L. Friedman that 
appeared in the New York Times on February 17, before the Annan/Hussein 
deal. Mr. Friedman wrote:

       The U.S. should be doing everything it can to work with 
     Russia, not only on Iraq but to shrink Russia's own nuclear 
     arsenal, which is the greatest proliferation threat in the 
     world today. Attention shoppers: Russia has thousands of 
     weapons of mass destruction. It has hundreds of unemployed or 
     underemployed nuclear scientists. And it has only the loosest 
     controls over its nukes and nuclear materials, and it has a 
     signed nuclear arms reduction treaty with the U.S. that has 
     not been implemented. But instead of dealing with this 
     problem, the Clintonites are making it worse. They are 
     expanding NATO to counter a threat that doesn't exist--a 
     Russian invasion of Europe--and thus undermining America's 
     ability to work with Russia on the threat that does exist--
     Russia's loose nukes. ``Halting the proliferation of

[[Page S1153]]

     nuclear materials, missiles and technology is clearly our 
     number-one foreign policy challenge since the breakup of the 
     Soviet Empire,'' says former Senator Sam Nunn, who was the 
     expert in the Senate on this issue.
       ``But because it is number one, we should be measuring all 
     other policies by how they affect proliferation. Not only 
     does NATO expansion not help us deal with Russia on the 
     issue, it is counterproductive.''

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have Mr. Friedman's essay 
be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the essay was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                   Foreign Affairs; Madeleine's Folly

                        (By Thomas L. Friedman)

       With a U.S. bombing of Iraq now increasingly likely, the 
     question being raised by those uneasy with such a strike is: 
     What is the endgame? Is America just throwing its weight 
     around to punish Saddam Hussein?
       The answer is really very simple. It comes down to two 
     words: weapons proliferation. If Iraq--already a repeat user 
     of poison gas--is able to snub its nose at the U.N. weapons 
     inspectors, then the world's ability to fight the 
     proliferation of weapons of mass destruction elsewhere would 
     be fundamentally compromised. Libya and its friends would all 
     be less afraid to develop germ weapons and nukes. We would 
     all end up in a much more dangerous world. That's why Saddam 
     has to be stopped.
       But it is precisely because stemming weapons proliferation 
     should be the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy in the post-
     cold-war era that the Clinton Administration's policy of NATO 
     expansion is so stupid. The U.S. should be doing everything 
     it can to work with Russia, not only on Iraq but to shrink 
     Russia's own nuclear arsenal, which is the greatest 
     proliferation threat in the world today. Attention shoppers: 
     Russia has thousands of weapons of mass destruction. It has 
     hundreds of unemployed or underemployed nuclear scientists. 
     And it has only the loosest controls over its nukes and 
     nuclear materials, and it has a signed nuclear arms reduction 
     treaty with the U.S. that has not been implemented.
       But instead of dealing with this problem, the Clintonites 
     are making it worse. They are expanding NATO to counter a 
     threat that doesn't exist--a Russian invasion of Europe--and 
     thus undermining America's ability to work with Russia on the 
     threat that does exist--Russia's loose nukes.
       ``Halting the proliferation of nuclear materials, missiles 
     and technology is clearly our number-one foreign policy 
     challenge since the breakup of the Soviet Empire,'' says 
     former Senator Sam Nunn, who was the expert in the Senate on 
     this issue. ``But because it is number one, we should be 
     measuring all other policies by how they affect 
     proliferation. Not only does NATO expansion not help us deal 
     with Russia on this issue, it is counterproductive.''
       The Clinton team has never had an integrated foreign 
     policy. It treats Iraq and NATO expansion as if they were 
     totally disconnected. One day Secretary of State Albright 
     gives a speech telling Russia that NATO is moving right up to 
     the Baltic-Russian border. The next day she complains that 
     Russia isn't being helpful on Iraq. Gosh, I wonder why not?
       ``Thanks to NATO expansion, we have convinced the Russian 
     political elite that they are not our partner and that their 
     security is not as important to us as the security of the 
     Czechs,'' says Jack Matlock, President Reagan's Ambassador to 
     Moscow.
       We are already paying a price for this. NATO expansion has 
     prompted Russia's Parliament to stall its ratification of the 
     Start 2 nuclear arms reduction treaty, which would shrink 
     Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals from around 7,000 apiece to 
     3,500 apiece. That's 3,500 fewer Russian nukes pointed at us. 
     But the deal has been frozen by NATO expansion. If the 
     Clinton team loses the Start 2 treaty, in order to add the 
     Czechs to NATO, it will go down as one of the greatest 
     blunders in the history of U.S. foreign policy: Madeleine's 
     folly.
       As Mr. Matlock notes, the more we expand NATO, ``the less 
     willing Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy is to work with us 
     on cooperative measures'' to keep its atomic scientists 
     constructively employed--so they don't end up in Iraq and 
     Iran--and the less willing Russia's military is to let us in 
     to help it better control and destroy its nuclear materials.
       Moreover, if Ms. Albright is serious about extending NATO 
     to the Baltic States, the only way NATO can possibly defend 
     them is with nukes. Baltic membership in NATO will, 
     therefore, only encourage Russia to continue altering its 
     defense doctrine--moving to a greater reliance on nuclear 
     weapons for defense, on more of a hair trigger, because the 
     closer NATO gets to Russia's border the less warning time 
     Moscow will have. But don't worry, sleep well, Latvia will be 
     in NATO.
       The Clintonites are rightly ready to go to war with Iraq to 
     halt the spread of weapons in the Middle East. But their 
     expansion of NATO will only increase the threat of 
     proliferation in Russia--where there are a lot more weapons, 
     under a lot less control, and all pointed at us.

  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, in the same vein, one of our colleagues, 
the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire, Mr. Gregg, made the same 
point on the floor February 12, and I thought it was worth noting, 
especially because it came, again, before the Annan-Hussein agreement:

       But in the area of Russia, for example, this administration 
     appears to think that they can go to the [Russians] and 
     demand that Russia follow our policies in Iraq and insist on 
     their support on Iraq, but at the same time this 
     administration proposes an expansion of NATO. You have to 
     recognize, if you were a Russian leader, you would find a 
     certain irony in a request that was coupled in that 
     terminology. Because, of course, an expansion of NATO, 
     especially to Poland, is an expansion that can only be viewed 
     in Russia with some concern and possibly viewed by some as an 
     outright threat . . . So you can understand that Russia might 
     view a push to expand NATO at the same time as we are asking 
     them to support us in Iraq as being inconsistent and a bit 
     ironic. And it reflects, unfortunately, I think, this 
     administration's failure to understand the linkage--and 
     linkage is the right term--between working with a nation like 
     Russia and our capacity to do things in the Middle East and 
     moving forward with the NATO expansion at the exact same 
     time. Yet, if you were to listen to the leadership of this 
     administration, they will tell you that there is no 
     relationship, they have no overlap on those two issues. Of 
     course, that is just not true, and that is one of the main 
     reasons we are having problems with Russia [today].

  In case anyone in this country has missed it, the Russians have not. 
They understand the linkage, even if the Clinton administration does 
not seem to understand it. On February 24, Vladimir Lukin, Moscow's 
former Ambassador to the United States and now the chairman of the 
Duma's Committee on International Affairs, commented:

       It would be a big mistake if the United States was offended 
     by Russian policy toward Iraq or another country . . . 
     Russia's policy toward Iraq is not only Russia's policy--we 
     coincide with many other countries, including U.S. allies . . 
     . The problem is whether Russia is considered part of the 
     Atlantic community or not.

  Now remember, I am quoting the Russian chairman of the Committee on 
International Affairs of the Duma.
  He says, again:

       The problem is whether Russia is considered part of the 
     Atlantic community or not. Russia will have to decide how it 
     is being considered--as an equal partner or as an outsider. 
     NATO enlargement is isolating Russia. What is the choice for 
     us? Only to be an outsider.

  He also goes on to say:

       Not a hostile outsider, but still an outsider. It is a 
     danger. We will become stronger, and we are still a nuclear 
     power. It is a danger to us and a danger to you--

  Meaning the United States.

       A few years ago there was the idea of partnership, now 
     there is a strong hesitation in the United States.

  Mr. President, that's the linkage you are missing, that's the linkage 
many of us are concerned about as it relates to current policy.
  The point here, as I have noted at some length, is just one ongoing 
aspect of this very complex issue which we have hardly begun to assess. 
This is just one aspect, but there are others, no less troublesome, 
which I will only mention briefly.
  The Baltic States: What is the nature of our commitment to admit 
these States? What are the ramifications?
  Our European partners: Why are we so passive to our allies' bald 
insistence that they intend to bear very little of the costs of 
expansion? As our distinguished former colleagues Howard Baker and Sam 
Nunn raised the matter in their recent essay in the New York Times:

       Advocates and skeptics of NATO enlargement alike agree that 
     the transformation of Europe's security structure should be 
     related to the transformation of the economy. As James Baker, 
     the former Secretary of State, has testified, European Union 
     membership ``is just as important as membership in NATO for 
     the countries involved,'' and ``we must make clear that NATO 
     membership for the countries of Central Europe is not a 
     substitute for closer economic ties to the European Union.''

  So then, why are we taking the first step in a reintegration that is 
not primarily a question of security--since there is no credible 
threat--while our European allies, who together have greater resources 
to help their neighbors than the United States, continue to play what 
can only be said to be a secondary role?
  The ``New NATO'': Republicans, in particular, should be very 
concerned about the words of President Clinton upon signing of the 
Founding Act in May of 1997. He says:

       We are building a new NATO. It will remain the strongest 
     alliance in history, with smaller, more flexible forces, 
     prepared to provide for our defense, but also trained for 
     peacekeeping.


[[Page S1154]]


  As we know, peacekeeping, in some people's eyes, can be considered 
offensive actions.
  I go on to quote:

       It will work closely with other nations that share our 
     hopes and values and interests through the Partnership for 
     Peace. It will be an alliance directed no longer against a 
     hostile bloc of nations, but instead designed to advance the 
     security of every democracy in Europe--NATO's old members, 
     new members and nonmembers alike.

  Mr. President, I certainly hope this doesn't mean what it sounds like 
it means--the end of NATO as a defensive alliance and its 
transformation into a regional peacekeeping organization. Will the 
``new NATO'' exist to protect its members--or to engage in many Bosnia-
like missions all over Central and Eastern Europe?
  Now let me speak briefly of costs. To say the least, there is a great 
deal of skepticism over the question of how much this is going to cost 
the American taxpayer and whether the very low estimates now being 
given by the administration are, in any way, credible. I note that we 
have not even begun to discuss how much of the costs accruing to the 
new allies will end up being billed to the United States. For example, 
in May of 1997, ABC News quoted the American Ambassador to Hungary to 
the effect that the American share of buying new planes for the 
Hungarian Force ``will be perhaps 20 percent to 25 percent'' of the 
cost of that ``at most.''
  How about 30 percent or how about 40 percent? We don't know. That 
hasn't been negotiated. But what this administration is saying is that 
we will play a substantial role in the diversity of military equipment 
for these new partners in NATO.
  So how much is the real cost? And, again, shouldn't we know before we 
are asked to vote?
  In closing, Mr. President, let me emphasize that I do not believe we 
are yet ready in this Senate to give this matter the full debate that 
it deserves and that we must hear on this issue. If we had to vote on 
NATO expansion on the basis of the information we now have, I would 
vote no, and I know that there are many others in this body who would 
vote no.
  I look forward to a full, detailed and lengthy debate on the issue at 
the appropriate time. The appropriate time is when the Senate is fully 
knowledgeable on the issue of NATO expansion as they take up one of 
their most important constitutional responsibilities: the advice and 
consent on these critical issues. I yield the floor.
  Mr. Chafee addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.
  Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in 
morning business for 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I commend the Senator from Idaho for his 
thoughtful comments. He started his comments by saying that this is a 
matter to which many of the Senators have not given very thorough 
consideration, and I think that is accurate. I certainly fall into that 
category.

  I am not on either of the major committees that deal with the 
expansion of NATO. Like all Senators, I am busy with this or that. It 
seems to me very wise that we all give this matter some thorough 
consideration. It is my understanding that the majority leader is 
anxious to bring up the NATO expansion legislation quite soon.
  I just want to say, speaking for just this Senator, I certainly 
haven't concentrated on it. I look forward to reading the op-ed piece--
I believe it was an op-ed piece--that Senator Baker and others worked 
on.
  All I can say is, I am grateful for the comments that the Senator 
from Idaho made, because it is wise for all of us--I personally haven't 
made up my mind on this. I am astonished that I haven't been lobbied, 
not that my vote is a key vote on it, but on this matter, the former 
Senator from New Hampshire came by to see me. He is very concerned. I 
am speaking of Senator Humphrey, a former Senator from New Hampshire. 
He is very concerned about the expansion of NATO. I think he presented 
some good arguments on it. Perhaps he has also spoken with the Senator 
from Idaho.
  Again, I thank the Senator for his thoughts.
  Mr. CRAIG. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. CHAFEE. I certainly will.
  Mr. CRAIG. I thank the chairman for those comments. One of the 
measurements I always use on issues of this gravity and importance, and 
especially if I do not know a great deal about them, is when there are 
men and women on both sides of the issue whom I respect, it demands 
that I begin to review it in great detail. That is what I am hearing 
from the Senator, that when you have the likes of Howard Baker, and a 
former Secretary of State, and you have Sam Nunn and a good many others 
on the other side of the issue who are certainly knowledgeable, I think 
it is time for the Senate to focus and for our colleagues to begin to 
try to deal with this issue, and that is why I am here. I thank the 
Senator for his comments.
  Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Frist). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.

                          ____________________