[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 17 (Friday, February 27, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1150-S1152]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                            THE IRAQI CRISIS

  Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, I rise today to express my hope that the 
agreement reached by Secretary Annan in Iraq results in the end of a 
conflict that has plagued the international community over the past 
seven years--the failure of Saddam Hussein to live up to the terms that 
he agreed to following the invasion of Kuwait and his defeat in the 
Gulf War.
  If Saddam has truly experienced a change of heart and has decided to 
abandon the production and concealment of weapons of mass destruction, 
this agreement is a milestone; if this is just one more ploy to evade 
the destruction of his arsenal, then we remain on course for a showdown 
with Iraq.
  We all know Saddam Hussein's record. He invaded the sovereign nation 
of Kuwait. He used chemical weapons against Iran and against his own 
people. He used women and children as human shields to protect himself 
and his weapons of mass destruction. He is both a coward and a menace--
and that is a dangerous combination.
  At this time it is impossible to judge whether this deal will truly 
permit the UN weapons inspectors full and unfettered access. UNSCOM 
inspectors have always insisted that they need to be able to follow a 
trail wherever it leads them. They are not seeking access to a certain 
category of sites--they just need freedom to track the evidence. If 
this agreement permits them to do this and allows them to use whatever 
techniques are necessary, then the agreement is a step forward. The 
inspectors do not seal off buildings because they are ``cowboys,'' they 
do it because the Iraqi's were moving equipment out the back door as 
they entered the front.
  It would have been prudent for the Administration to have studied the 
plan, and clarified the details before it offered its support. But, as 
is the case with the lack of information to the Senate on the 
Administration's plan to bomb Iraq, prudence was apparently too much to 
expect.
  While I am reserving judgment on the Secretary General's agreement 
until the terms have been thoroughly explained, one positive immediate 
effect is that it has created a pause in the crisis. The Congress has a 
responsibility to the American people, and especially the men and women 
serving in our armed forces, to ensure that the Administration has 
clear objectives and a coherent policy in regard to Iraq. The use of 
air strikes against Iraq may have been averted in this instance, but 
given Saddam's track record of lies and deceit, I do not believe that 
this is the last time that we will be forced as a nation to confront 
him.
  We all witnessed the Administration's public relations offensive with 
Cabinet officials holding town hall meetings around the country to 
build public support for limited air strikes. Through these forums it 
has become painfully clear that the Administration

[[Page S1151]]

refuses--or perhaps more disturbingly--cannot consistently answer four 
basic questions: (1) What are the Administration's goals; (2) how will 
limited air strikes achieve those objectives; (3) what happens after 
the bombing stops; and (4) what is our endgame?
  First the Administration told us that the goal of the United States 
was to allow UNSCOM inspectors full and unfettered access to suspected 
storage sites for chemical and biological weapons. Then we were told 
that it was to make sure that Saddam would not be able to 
``reconstitute'' his nuclear, chemical and biological weapons 
production capabilities. But the Administration has failed to explain 
to the American people how air strikes will achieve these objectives.
  After a round of briefings in the Senate with Administration 
officials, the only thing that is clear is what US air strikes are not 
going to accomplish: they will not eliminate Iraq's stockpiles of 
chemical and biological weapons; they will not eliminate Iraq's 
capability to produce weapons of mass destruction; and they will not 
remove Iraq's rulers, who persist on a course of action which threatens 
international security and the welfare of their own people.
  The Administration's plan for ``substantial'' air strikes--which I 
suppose falls somewhere between ``pinprick'' and ``massive'' attacks--
may delay Saddam's capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction. 
Of course, many of the buildings where biological weapons are produced 
and stored are dual-use facilities--like hospitals and vaccine 
laboratories. There is also a danger that uncontrolled explosions of 
storage facilities could result in the release of toxic substances. So 
it is not a question of whether we are able to destroy these targets, 
but whether the resulting deaths of Iraqi civilians would prove 
counterproductive to our goals.
  In addition, Saddam has been playing a shell-game with chemical and 
biological weapons stockpiles. As General Zinni, commander-in-chief of 
the US central command acknowledged in December, ``we do not have a 
good sense of what he has and where he has it''; and we do not know the 
location of mobile missile sites.
  Unfortunately, Saddam does not need a huge production capacity or 
weapons stockpile to remain a threat. As a February 15 article in 
London's Sunday Telegraph noted, recent investigations of a tiny leak 
of anthrax from a Soviet facility in 1979 have documented 77 deaths, 
with animals killed up to 30 miles away, even though less than a gram 
of anthrax escaped.
  Even if the Administration allows the military to conduct a 
comprehensive air campaign which cripples Saddam's ability to produce 
weapons of mass destruction, it is highly unlikely that air strikes 
will result in UNSCOM inspectors being given unfettered access to 
suspect sites or will enhance our ability to contain Saddam.
  This brings us to the question of what happens after the bombing 
stops? The only proven way to effectively eliminate Iraq's chemical and 
biological weapons capacity is to have inspectors on the ground. As 
President Clinton remarked in an address last week to the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, UNSCOM inspectors,

     have uncovered and destroyed more weapons of mass destruction 
     capacity than was destroyed during the Gulf War . . . 
     [including] 40,000 chemical weapons, more than 100,000 
     gallons of chemical weapons agents, 48 operational missiles, 
     30 warheads specifically fitted for chemical and biological 
     weapons, and a massive biological weapons facility at Al 
     Hakam equipped to produce anthrax and other deadly agents.

  But 17 tons of biological growth agents, 600 tons of VX precursors 
and 4,000 tons of other chemical precursors remain unaccounted for. 
Iraq could have produced 200 tons of VX alone with this missing 
material. If, following the air strikes, Saddam denies permission for 
UNSCOM to conduct inspections, or if UNSCOM finds that it is not safe 
to proceed following the air strikes, then US actions will have 
jeopardized international security, not enhanced it.
  Furthermore, limited air strikes may extend rather than contain 
Saddam's power and influence in the region. We only have to look at the 
fact that the states most threatened by Saddam--the Arab nations in 
proximity to Iraq, with the exception of Kuwait--are not supporting US 
military action. Even Saudi Arabia, which we protected against invasion 
during the Gulf War, and our NATO ally Turkey have refused the use of 
air bases.
  The Arab nations are acting according to their own self-interest. 
They realize that Saddam is a threat to their national security, but 
they also recognize that limited US air strikes which fail to depose 
Saddam could leave them in an even more precarious position. The states 
neighboring Iraq have legitimate concerns that they could be 
destabilized if their populations rally around Saddam, who would be 
seen as a hero for standing up to the West.
  Saddam could gain further sympathy from those disaffected populations 
by opting out of the oil-for-food program. The entire sanctions regime 
could crumble, and Saddam could continue to increase his weapons 
program unfettered by multilateral sanctions. Efforts to promote 
democracy in the region would be jeopardized. Terrorism could be 
increased and exported to the United States.
  President Clinton asked a rhetorical question in his speech last week 
at the Pentagon: ``What if he (Saddam) fails to comply, and we fail to 
act?'' Well, I have a question for President Clinton, what if our air 
strikes only strengthen Saddam's power and eliminate any chance of 
finding and destroying his weapons of mass destruction?
  Administration officials have glibly answered that we will just bomb 
again. That is not a policy; that is not a strategy. It is a cop-out 
for poor planning and the lack of a comprehensive policy toward Iraq.
  How often can we bomb without mobilizing Muslim nations to stand by 
the people of Iraq? How often can we bomb without some form of 
retaliation from Iraq against our allies in the region, if not against 
the United States itself? This Administration talks in terms of limited 
strikes, but in war we must take into account the ``law of unintended 
consequences,'' and the threat of a regional conflict should not be 
dismissed.
  Which brings us to the subject of an endgame. When air strikes 
appeared imminent, I called Secretary General Kofi Annan and urged him 
to personally pursue a diplomatic solution. And I asked him at that 
time whether he had a message he would like to convey to the Senate. He 
responded that we should think through the endgame--what we will do 
after a military strike if we proceed to bomb Iraq. That is, I believe, 
sound advice.

  The Administration claims that it has a long-term strategy in Iraq--a 
strategy of containment. But I fail to see any connection between the 
Administration's short-term strategy of limited air strikes and its 
stated long-term goal of containing Saddam Hussein. As I said earlier, 
the best way to contain Saddam is to have weapons inspectors on the 
ground. Even when they are being impeded, their very presence makes it 
impossible for Saddam to engage in large-scale production of weapons of 
mass destruction. The Administration's proposed use of air strikes is 
therefore inconsistent with its stated long-term strategy of 
containment.
  Now, the Administration has stated that there are no good options for 
action against Iraq--and I agree. However, one of the reasons why there 
are no good options is the failure of this Administration to make an 
all-out effort over the past seven years to remove Saddam from power by 
establishing a power base for an alternative Iraqi government. Surely, 
this is an effort which could have secured allies in the region.
  According to news reports, by the end of 1996, both of the CIA's 
covert operations programs had been obliterated. One effort to recruit 
Iraqi officers, to try to provoke a military coup was apparently 
infiltrated by Iraqi double agents, and at least 100 officers were 
executed by Saddam for cooperating with Americans. Another effort to 
back the Iraqi National Congress in northern Iraq was abandoned by the 
US government and thousands were slaughtered when they mounted an 
offensive against Saddam Hussein.
  An article in the February 15 Los Angeles Times noted that the CIA 
team that was on the ground when the offensive started was recalled to 
the US when the acting Director of the CIA asked the FBI to conduct a 
criminal investigation as to whether five CIA officers involved in 
covert operations in

[[Page S1152]]

Iraq were plotting to kill Saddam--charges, by the way, that were later 
dropped. Now this had a chilling effect on covert activity in Iraq, 
raising concerns as to whether this Administration is serious about 
getting rid of Saddam Hussein.
  I do not support Congressional efforts to overturn the Executive 
Order forbidding the assassination of foreign leaders. However, there 
is sufficient flexibility for covert operations to succeed in removing 
Saddam from power and those efforts must be promoted.
  As I stated before, I am pleased that Secretary General Annan 
succeeded in reaching an agreement with Saddam Hussein. Even if this 
agreement unravels, it has afforded Congress an opportunity to debate 
the Administration's policy toward Iraq.
  We must demand that the Administration come forward with a clear 
explanation of its strategy and tactics. We must condemn the 
Administration for refusing to give a codeword briefing to Senators on 
targeting strategy--only later did we read an outline of this strategy 
on the front page of The New York Times.
  As pressure to bomb Iraq was mounting, I remained convinced that 
further diplomatic efforts should be explored. There seemed to be a 
``rush to bomb.'' As I said earlier, I called Secretary General Annan 
before the Administration agreed to his trip and asked him to go to 
Baghdad and speak to Saddam.
  I let Ambassador Richardson know that I would support a solution 
allowing representatives of the permanent members of the Security 
Council accompany UNSCOM inspectors, as long as UNSCOM was not impeded 
or compromised in any way.
  While I applaud the Secretary General's initiative, I have been 
appalled by the failure of the UN as an organization, and the Security 
Council in particular, to support enforcement of the UN resolutions. It 
is the greatest of ironies that this Administration is sending American 
men and women to risk their lives to uphold UN Resolution 687. This is 
a UN Security Council Resolution, but three out of the five permanent 
members oppose the use of force. France is more concerned with being 
able to sell Iraqi oil, China wants to buy the oil, and Russia seeks to 
be paid the $6 billion it is owed by Iraq. Only Britain is standing by 
the United States.
  There may come a time when the United States has to use force against 
Iraq to protect our national security. We cannot subcontract our 
national security policy to the United Nations. When, and if, that time 
comes, I hope that this Administration will let our armed forces do its 
job without one hand tied behind its back. And we should send a clear 
message to the ``Butcher of Baghdad'': If chemical or biological 
weapons are used anywhere in the world, and there is even the most 
tenuous link to Iraq, the full force of the United States will be used 
against him.
  Mr. President, in an excellent speech on the situation in Iraq, 
Senator Roberts of Kansas cited the words uttered 30 years ago by 
Senator Richard Russell, the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee 
during the Vietnam War. I think that it is appropriate for me to once 
again repeat those words on the Senate floor. He said:

       I for one am not afraid of the old fashioned term, victory. 
     We hear a great deal about limited wars, but I would point 
     out that there is no such thing as a limit on actual combat 
     in which our men our engaged. While it is a sound policy to 
     have limited objectives, we should not expose our men to 
     unnecessary hazards in pursuing them.

  And Senator Russell also made the following pledge:

       As for me, my fellow Americans, I shall never knowingly 
     support a policy of sending even a single American boy 
     overseas to risk his life in combat unless the entire 
     civilian population and wealth of our country--all that we 
     have and all that we are--is to bear a commensurate 
     responsibility in giving him the fullest support and 
     protection of which we are capable.
       It is inconsistent with our history, tradition and 
     fundamental principles to commit American boys on far flung 
     battlefields if we are to follow policies that deny them full 
     support because we are afraid of increasing the risk of those 
     who stay at home.
       It is a confession of moral weakness on the part of this 
     country not to take any steps that are necessary to fully 
     diminish the fighting power of our enemies.'

  Mr. President, I urge my colleagues and the Administration to hear 
those words--they have as much relevance today as when they were first 
uttered in this chamber.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. CHAFEE. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bond). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent I be allowed to 
proceed as in morning business for up to 15 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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