[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 16 (Thursday, February 26, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1064-S1065]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                          AVOIDING WAR IN IRAQ

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, the agreement signed by UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan and Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz has 
averted, for at least the time being, the use of military force against 
Iraq.
  Contrary to the statements of some Members of Congress, I do not 
believe this signifies that the President of the United States has 
subcontracted the nation's foreign policy to the United Nations. 
Rather, I believe the President, who has said he would use force as a 
last resort, had good reason, indeed an obligation, to delay while the 
Secretary General sought a diplomatic resolution of this crisis.
  I also believe the agreement, while not perfect, deserves the support 
of the international community, including the United States, and I say 
that even if, as many predict, Saddam violates this agreement as he has 
every other agreement since the end of the Gulf War.
  I have said repeatedly that force cannot be justified until every 
diplomatic option has been exhausted. The agreement obtained by the 
Secretary General shows that we have not yet reached that point.
  Seven years ago the United States led a military coalition of Western 
and Arab nations to force Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to withdraw 
from Kuwait. The United States invested an enormous amount in the Gulf 
War. 246 American soldiers lost their lives. Since then, we have 
maintained the no-fly zone and provided humanitarian relief to Iraqi 
Kurds who have been brutalized repeatedly by Saddam Hussein's army.
  The Gulf War ended when Iraq signed a cease-fire agreement, in which 
Iraq agreed to promptly disclose and destroy its entire arsenal of 
weapons of mass destruction. Shortly thereafter, the UN Security 
Council adopted Resolution 687, which clearly described Iraq's 
obligations under the cease-fire agreement. Those obligations have the 
force of international law. Subsequent resolutions have reaffirmed the 
need for complete Iraqi compliance.
  Since that time, Saddam Hussein has systematically reneged on his 
commitments under the cease-fire agreement. He and his government have 
repeatedly denied the UN weapons inspectors access to sites they sought 
to inspect and which they have every right to inspect.
  In his speech last Tuesday, President Clinton described the numerous 
instances that the Iraqis have lied about their chemical and biological 
weapons programs, and revised their reports describing what they 
possess only after their lies were exposed. Any number of times the 
inspectors have closed in on a suspicious site only to be refused 
access, or to see an Iraqi truck drive away in an obvious attempt to 
hide incriminating evidence.
  If Saddam Hussein had nothing to hide, why would he have gone to such 
lengths to prevent the UN inspectors from doing their job, particularly 
since there is no way the UN sanctions will be lifted as long as the 
Iraqis fail to cooperate fully with the weapons inspectors? There is no 
doubt that since 1991, Saddam Hussein has squandered his country's 
resources to maintain his capacity to produce and stockpile chemical 
and biological weapons.
  That history of deception is what brought us to the brink of war. The 
agreement obtained by the Secretary General reaffirms, at least on 
paper, Iraq's obligations regarding the UN inspectors. It also gives 
Iraq some basis to hope that the sanctions could eventually be lifted.
  Had the Secretary General failed, the missiles and bombs might 
already be raining down on Iraq. We would have had to expect American 
casualties. Out of hundreds or thousands of sorties, some American 
pilots may well have been shot down and taken prisoner. Iraqi civilian 
casualties were predicted to number in the thousands.
  While there is no doubt that we can do tremendous damage to Iraq's 
military capabilities, war is fraught with uncertainties. Victory can 
be bitter sweet, and short-lived. Those who have taken the Secretary 
General to task should explain what gives them confidence that more 
would have been achieved through bombing. Do they really believe that 
the lives of thousands of innocent people are not worth the time it 
takes to test the agreement? Are they prepared to refight the Gulf War, 
with ground troops, to get rid of Saddam? I seriously doubt it.
  I fully agree with the President that nothing short of free, full and 
unfettered access for UNSCOM must be our objective. I have been deeply 
concerned, however, that the use of military force would not achieve 
that objective, and that it might well cause the inspectors, who have 
been doing 90 percent of their job without interference, to be barred 
from Iraq entirely.
  Then we would know even less about his arsenal of biological and 
chemical weapons, while Saddam Hussein emerges defiant and victorious 
in the Arab world for having successfully stood up to the military 
might of the United States. Damaging Iraq's facilities is a poor 
substitute for Iraq's compliance with the terms of the cease-fire 
agreement, if that can be achieved by other means.
  Having said that, I am not against using force under any 
circumstances. Nor do I believe that we can achieve our objectives in 
Iraq without the credible threat of force, because it is the only thing 
Saddam Hussein understands. The Secretary General suggested as much 
himself, although he used the words of a diplomat. But if it is as 
likely as not that force will not coerce Saddam to permit full access 
for UNSCOM, and that it could even result in an end to inspections in 
addition to thousands of civilian casualties, and enhance Saddam's 
standing in the Arab world. This may show again that it would have been 
wrong to give up on diplomacy.
  It is elementary that diplomacy requires flexibility, just as it 
requires creative thinking. Both, I am sad to say, have been in short 
supply during this crisis. I was not prepared to support the use of 
force against Iraq prior to the Secretary General's trip to Baghdad 
because I was not convinced

[[Page S1065]]

that there had been a serious attempt at creative diplomacy. In fact, I 
was concerned about the apparent inflexibility of the administration, 
not on the question of access for the UN inspectors which I do not 
believe can be compromised, but on other issues such as the sale of oil 
so Iraq has some realistic hope of being able to meet its obligations 
under the cease-fire agreement, which include compensation for Kuwait 
and Israel.
  I was also concerned that administration assertions that the embargo 
would not be lifted until Saddam Hussein is removed from power, as 
desirable as that is, were inconsistent with the cease-fire agreement, 
and gave the Iraqi Government little reason to even attempt to comply.
  The Secretary General's initiative showed that a degree of 
flexibility and creative thinking can prevent bloodshed. While Saddam 
has shown many times that he is ruthless and untrustworthy, that is not 
a reason to abandon diplomacy as long as there is a glimmer of hope. It 
may produce a better outcome. That is worth finding out.
  Or it may not. Saddam has not agreed to anything different than he 
had before and the agreement is devoid of details on several important 
points. There is uncertainty about which facilities are ``presidential 
sites,'' and the procedures for inspections of such sites have yet to 
be determined.
  There are concerns that the agreement could undercut the independence 
of UNSCOM if its authority is shifted to a commission named by the 
Secretary General. However, according to Secretary of State Albright, 
the Secretary General has assured her that Richard Butler, the current 
head of UNSCOM, will remain in charge.
  There are unresolved questions about the role of the diplomats who 
are to accompany the inspectors. UNSCOM's success has been a result of 
its independence, and that absolutely must be preserved, both for 
purposes of its activities in Iraq and for inspections elsewhere. The 
wrong precedent here could come back to haunt us years from now 
somewhere else. The proof will be in the interpretation, and whether or 
not UNSCOM is able to do its job without physical or political 
interference.
  Whether the use of force would be justified, or wise, if the 
agreement fails I will leave for another day. But we should remember 
that despite all the destruction leveled on Iraq during the Gulf War, 
it was not enough to prevent Saddam Hussein from defying the 
international community and using every trick in the book to rebuild 
his military arsenal.
  If we bomb Iraq again, he would be right back at it, claiming victory 
for standing up to the US, but no longer under the watchful eye of 
UNSCOM's cameras. Then what would we do, after we are blamed for 
causing more innocent deaths on top of the Iraqi victims of the embargo 
for which we are deemed primarily responsible?
  How do we avoid being back in the same situation in six months or a 
year? What about the risk of exposing our forces to poison gas or 
biological toxins, which might be inadvertently released in a bombing 
attack?
  How do we weigh the risks of further damaging our relations with the 
Arab world, and with Russia? If we cannot get rid of Saddam, what is 
our long-term policy? Or are we prepared to do what it takes to get rid 
of him?
  These questions need answers, especially if Saddam breaks his word 
again and the President decides to use force. If that day comes I would 
urge him, as others have done, to first seek authorization from the 
Congress.
  This is not a situation where the United States is facing imminent 
attack. It is not the type of situation that was contemplated by the 
War Powers Act, when the President could single-handedly involve the 
country in a war for a limited period of time because there was not 
adequate time for the Congress to declare war. There would be time. The 
Congress has that responsibility. Some Members of Congress would duck 
that responsibility and put it all on the President. That is not why we 
are here. We owe it to the American people to speak.
  The use of force on this scale, under the circumstances contemplated 
here, would have grave consequences for the American people, for our 
entire country. Likewise, the failure to use force if Iraq again 
violates the cease-fire agreement could have lasting implications for 
the international community's efforts to deter the manufacture and use 
of chemical and biological weapons and to uphold international law. For 
these and other reasons, the Congress should fully debate these issues 
and render its own judgment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington.
  Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as if in 
morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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