[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 16 (Thursday, February 26, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1052-S1053]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                        THE U.N.-IRAQ AGREEMENT

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I listened with great interest yesterday to 
the comments of the majority leader on the agreement between the United 
Nations and Iraq. I did so particularly since I had come to the floor 
in the past and publicly credited him and complimented him for his 
forceful assertion the night of the State of the Union indicating we 
would stand united, Democrats and Republicans, in our opposition to 
Saddam Hussein. That was badly needed at the time. It was a 
statesmanlike thing to do, and it was applauded by all of us.
  But I must admit I was perplexed yesterday by the majority leader's 
comments. He seemed, in my view, Mr. President, to rush to judgment to 
engage in a pessimistic fatalism that I think permeated his remarks and 
I think are unwarranted.
  The majority leader is correct, based on what I heard yesterday, at 
least in one important respect, and that is the agreement between the 
United Nations and Iraq should be judged by whether it furthers 
American interests from our perspective. This is entirely consistent 
with the position taken by President Clinton. He and his national 
security team are in the process of making that judgment, which is: Is 
this agreement consistent with and does it further U.S. interests?
  The administration is seeking clarifications to the ambiguities in 
this very general agreement. It is using our formidable diplomatic 
muscle, Mr. President, to settle unanswered questions in our favor, as 
I speak. In contrast to the gloomy assessment presented by the Senate 
majority leader, things appear to be breaking our way so far, as we 
seek the proper interpretation of that agreement.
  Secretary General Kofi Annan has provided assurances on some of the 
key questions that have arisen in the accord.
  First, the new special team will be an integral part of UNSCOM and 
not a separate entity, as some worry.
  Second, the diplomats to be appointed to the new team will act as 
observers only. UNSCOM will retain operational control of the entire 
inspection process.
  Third, the head of the new special team within UNSCOM for inspecting 
Presidential sites will be an arms control expert with a solid track 
record in arms control. Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala, the current 
Undersecretary General for disarmament, who has recently completed a 
tour as Sri Lanka's ambassador to the United States, will be that 
person. He has played a key role in making the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty permanent. He and Ambassador Richard Butler have known each 
other for nearly 20 years, and they appear to be able to work together 
and respect one another.
  Fourth, UNSCOM and the Secretary General, not Iraq, will develop the 
procedures for inspecting the Presidential sites.
  Fifth, UNSCOM and Chairman Butler will retain their independence.
  Sixth, the reporting lines remain intact. The new team leader will 
report to Ambassador Butler, who, in turn, reports to the Security 
Council through the Secretary General, as UNSCOM's chairman has done 
since 1991.
  Finally, the new representative of the Secretary General in Baghdad 
will not have a direct role in the UNSCOM inspections process.
  If these assurances pan out, then this agreement will go a long way 
toward furthering the United States national interests.
  I have personally known the Secretary General, Kofi Annan, for many 
years, and I regard him as a man of his word. So I have no reason to 
doubt these assurances that have been made now on the record.
  For the sake of argument, let us assume that the Secretary General is 
attempting to deceive us, which I know he is not. In that case, I don't 
see that we have given up any of our options, even if that were his 
intention.

  We are not bound by this agreement. If it provides unworkable 
mechanisms to let UNSCOM do its job, or if it undermines the integrity 
of UNSCOM, we can and should walk away from it.
  The critics would have us believe that we are the ``helpless 
superpower,'' that we are bound by the terms of an agreement negotiated 
by an omnipotent United Nations. This simply does not conform with 
reality or square with the facts.
  We have a formidable armada assembled in the Persian Gulf poised to 
strike at a moment's notice. That armada can be called into service if 
the agreement falls short or if Saddam Hussein reneges on his 
commitments. The agreement does not in any way suspend our right to act 
unilaterally or multilaterally for that matter.
  Indeed, should the agreement be violated, the use of force would meet 
with, in my view, much less international opposition than it would have 
in the absence of an agreement.
  An allegation that I find particularly puzzling is that we have 
``subcontracted our foreign policy'' to the United Nations. Granted, it 
makes for a crisp sound bite that everybody will pick up, but like most 
sound bites, it lacks substance.
  Those who make this politically motivated charge seem to ignore that 
the Secretary General is acting according to specific guidelines issued 
by the Security Council. They seem to forget that the United States is 
in the Security Council and our Secretary of State, in particular, 
played a central role in preparing these guidelines.
  Would the critics have preferred the Russians and the French coming 
up with an agreement without our input, or the Secretary General acting 
on the basis of his own instincts? Or would they rather have him act on 
the basis of the red lines that we drew in the agreement as a member of 
the Security Council? Or to avoid subcontracting our foreign policy, 
would the critics have preferred our diplomats traveling to Baghdad?
  The charge also misses the fact that we have maintained support for 
our policy by acting within the bounds of the U.N. resolutions, which 
we crafted. We have not subcontracted; we have set the terms for Iraqi 
compliance.
  Throughout this crisis, the same critics have leveled exaggerated 
charges that we have precious little international support for our 
policy; yet, in the same breath they call for a course of action, such 
as toppling the regime, that would guarantee absolutely no 
international support and without the willingness to supply our 
military with

[[Page S1053]]

the force necessary to do that. It seems to me that this is a glaring 
contradiction in arguments made by the critics of President Clinton's 
approach. You can't have it both ways.
  I believe that the Presidents resolve in backing diplomacy with force 
has been vindicated. It has not been easy. He was subjected to 
criticism from those who wanted to go farther and those who wished he 
hadn't gone as far as he did. These critics make some valid arguments, 
but they fail to put any realistic alternatives forward. They also fail 
to recognize that their suggested course would entail far greater costs 
than the President's approach.
  In their rush to criticize the Clinton administration, the critics 
have gotten lost in the proverbial weeds. They have conjured up worst-
case scenarios and portrayed American options as being much more 
limited than they actually are.
  As the facts come in, the false picture they have painted is 
gradually being chipped way. The agreement moves us to a far more 
advantageous position than we were in before the crisis began. If Iraq 
implements the agreement, we will have access to all suspect weapons 
sites in Iraq for the first time. If Iraq refuses to comply this time 
around, then we will be in a much stronger position to justify our use 
of force, which I am convinced we will exercise.
  The bottom line, Mr. President, is that we have given up none of our 
options, while the agreement has very likely narrowed the options for 
Saddam Hussein.
  I yield the floor.

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