[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 15 (Wednesday, February 25, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Page S960]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ AVERTED
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, it now appears that U.S. military action
against Iraq will not be undertaken in the near future. All Americans,
and I'm sure people all around the world, are pleased when military
force can be avoided, when our men and women in uniform are not put in
harm's way, and when innocent civilian lives are not put at risk.
But we must be clear: We cannot afford peace at any price--peace that
could lead to a much more difficult conflict later on down the road.
It is always possible to get a deal if you give enough away. The
central issue with regard to Iraq is whether an agreement furthers
American interests.
The deal negotiated by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan with Iraq
does not adequately address the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. After
years of denying that Saddam Hussein had any right to determine the
scope of inspections or the makeup of inspection teams, this agreement
codifies his ability to do both. It is, to quote one diplomat, ``the
beginning of the unraveling of the inspection process.'' This accord
sets up a new inspection regime under the control of the Secretary
General of the so-called ``eight palace residences.'' He appoints
``senior diplomats'' to the group. He names the head of the group.
And it is not clear to me, although others I am sure are getting
clarification on this, who that person would be. Would it be one of the
UNSCOM inspectors? Would it be some diplomat?
The group will have its own rules. And we don't know exactly what
they are because they have not yet been developed. I know questions are
being asked about this by Ambassador Richardson. I know he is trying to
get clarifications. I also know that he is concerned about what he is
learning.
The Secretary General is calling the shots. The United States is not.
Secretary Albright earlier this week objected to my characterization of
this episode as ``contracting out U.S. foreign policy.'' With all due
respect, I stand by that comment, because it appears that in fact is
what has happened.
Because of the central role of the U.N. Secretary General, it is
important to understand his approach and his conclusions.
Before and after his mission to Baghdad, Secretary General Annan
stopped in Paris. He briefed the French government before he met
personally, as I understand it, with any senior U.S. official. I find
if of great concern that the French are, frankly, accorded a privilege
denied to the United States.
The Secretary General has now briefed the Security Council and the
press on his trip.
Let's look at what he has said. ``Saddam can be trusted.'' ``I think
I can do business with him.'' ``I think he was serious.'' These are all
direct quotes. The Secretary General told reporters he spent the
weekend building a ``human relationship'' with Saddam Hussein.
The Secretary General thinks that he can trust the man who has
invaded his neighbors, who has used chemical weapons ten times, and who
tried to assassinate former President George Bush. This is folly. I
cannot understand why the Clinton Administration would place trust in
someone devoted to building a ``human relationship'' with a mass
murdered.
According to the Washington Post, Secretary General Annan described
UNSCOM inspectors ``as `cowboys' who had thrown their weight around and
behaved irresponsibly.'' He also ``passed along without comment on
Iraqi complaint--denied by [UNSCOM] as a paranoid delusion--that some
of the most aggressive U.N. inspectors were seeking to hunt down Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein so he could be assassinated . . .''
The Secretary General of the U.N. starts describing the inspectors as
``cowboys,'' when, as a matter of fact, I had the impression, and it
was universally agreed, that they had been very professional. These are
people with expertise on biological and chemical weapons. These are
people that have come from the international atomic agencies. They know
what they are doing. Mr. Butler, the Brit, was in charge of the
inspectors, has been very diligent, and very circumspect. As a matter
of fact, I understand that one of the most aggressive and most
effective inspectors is a Russian. Why in the world would the Secretary
General use this kind of wording? Why would he come up with, or even
pass along, this ridiculous suggestion that they were being used to
hunt down Saddam Hussein?
These comments are outrageous. They reflect someone bent on
appeasement--not someone determined to make the United Nations
inspection regime work effectively.
The Secretary General has greatly harmed the credibility of the
United Nations by cutting what appears to be a special deal with the
most flagrant violator of United Nations resolutions, probably in
history. Instead of standing on principle, he sat with the
unprincipled--and gave him what he wanted.
The United States has not yet formally announced its support for the
deal negotiated by Secretary General Annan. It is not too late to
reject a deal if it leaves Saddam Hussein rejoicing and leaves UNSCOM
out in the cold.
I yield the floor, Mr. President.
Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I wanted to make some remarks about
the situation in Iraq as well.
Is this a time that has been set aside within the MilCon debate, or
should I ask consent?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair would entertain a request from the
Senator that she might proceed as if in morning business.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. President. I ask unanimous consent to
proceed as if in morning business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
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