[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 15 (Wednesday, February 25, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1033-S1034]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                     THE EVOLVING SITUATION IN IRAQ

  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I want to address the evolving situation 
relating to Iraq and talk briefly about the circumstances surrounding 
the agreement reached between Secretary General Annan and Iraq as we 
know them now. I am concerned about some of the comments made in the 
media and on the floor about the situation in Iraq. I think it is 
important to review the situation as the President, Secretary of State, 
Secretary of Defense, National Security Adviser and the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff have laid out in the last 24 hours.
  First, with respect to what we are seeking, from the outset of this 
crisis the fundamental goal of the United States has been very simple. 
The goal has simply been to assure that UNSCOM has unconditional and 
unfettered access to all suspect sites as called for in the U.N. 
Security Council resolutions. Period; that's it. All we needed was 
simply an opportunity to visit sites that we think are suspect.
  We were denied that, which triggered this whole affair, beginning, as 
everyone now knows, several months ago. Diplomacy, backed by the threat 
to use overwhelming force if required, has moved us forward and closer 
to achieving that goal. There can be no doubt that the presence of a 
military force of the magnitude that is currently in the gulf had 
everything to do with the fact that we now have an agreement. General 
Secretary Annan has said that. Others have noted it. There is no 
question that the combination of diplomacy and military force gave us 
the opportunity to bring about this agreement over the last 72 hours.
  Iraq precipitated this crisis, as we all know, by trying to avoid its 
obligations under the Security Council resolutions. It attempted to 
dictate to the international community where UNSCOM could hold 
inspections, the manner in which they could be conducted, and the 
length of time that they would continue. Iraq's effort has failed. We 
were clear about what we were seeking: Unfettered access. Iraq 
objected. Iraq obfuscated. Iraq clearly was at fault in not allowing 
access to the sites in question. Diplomacy was used, force backed up 
that diplomacy, and the results are now in hand.
  Let's look at what we have achieved with this agreement. The 
government of Iraq has made a written commitment to provide immediate, 
unrestricted, unconditional access for the UNSCOM inspectors to all 
suspected sites. So, regardless of the rhetoric, regardless of whether 
it was framed in exactly the way we might have it framed, what matters 
is the bottom line. What matters is what is now to be the order. And 
the order is very clear. The order is to provide immediate, 
unrestricted, unconditional access for inspectors to all suspected 
sites. If fully implemented, this commitment will allow UNSCOM to 
fulfill its mission: First, to find and destroy all of Iraq's chemical, 
biological and nuclear weapons; second, to find and destroy the 
missiles that could deliver these weapons; and, third, to institute a 
system for long-term monitoring to make sure Iraq doesn't do it again.
  This commitment applies to all sites anywhere in the country, 
including eight so-called ``Presidential Sites'' that have now been 
precisely delineated, as well as the so-called sensitive sites that 
until now Iraq has tried to claim were off limits to UNSCOM. Any and 
all of these sites are subject to repeat visits. There are no deadlines 
to complete the work. In short, for the first time Iraq has committed 
explicitly to open every site throughout the country to weapons 
inspectors. Again, that has been our bottom line. That will continue to 
be our bottom line. And we now have it in writing that Iraq will agree.

[[Page S1034]]

  For the eight ``Presidential Sites'', the agreement allows diplomats 
to accompany the UNSCOM inspectors, and that is acceptable if the 
inspectors are free to conduct rigorous and professional inspections. 
All other sites will be open to inspection under the existing UNSCOM 
procedures. The Secretary General has assured us that UNSCOM Chairman 
Butler remains in charge of UNSCOM and all weapons inspections. He has 
also made that abundantly clear to the Iraqis themselves.

  Questions have been raised about the Memorandum Of Understanding 
between Annan and Iraq. There are issues that still need clarification 
and we want to clarify them, notably with respect to the inspection 
procedures for the eight ``Presidential Sites''. The United States has 
made clear that we expect all aspects of this agreement to reinforce 
the fundamental requirement that the investigators be permitted to 
carry out their inspections in a rigorous and professional manner.
  We have received important assurances from the Secretary General that 
clarify aspects of the MOU, notably with regard to the eight 
``Presidential Sites''. UNSCOM and Chairman Butler will preserve their 
independence. The special team for the ``Presidential Sites'' will be 
part of UNSCOM. The team leader will be an UNSCOM Commissioner who is 
an expert in Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, chosen by the Secretary 
General and UNSCOM Chairman Butler. The special team leader will report 
to Chairman Butler. The diplomats will be observers only, with UNSCOM 
retaining operational control. Procedures for these inspections will be 
developed by UNSCOM and the Secretary General, not by Iraq. And, as has 
been the case since 1991, Chairman Butler will continue to report to 
the Security Council through the Secretary General.
  So, the more clarification we get, the better the agreement looks, 
the clearer the understanding we have about the success of this effort. 
The bottom line is that we have access in Iraq that we didn't have last 
week at this time.
  So what is next? We support a U.N. Security Council resolution that 
will make it clear to Iraq that any violation of its commitments would 
have the most serious consequences. That would be a useful but not 
necessary signal from the international community. We also need to test 
and verify Saddam's intent. In the days and weeks ahead, UNSCOM must 
robustly test and verify this commitment. It is one thing to have it in 
language. It is one thing rhetorically to agree. It's another thing to 
allow it to occur. Failure to allow UNSCOM to get on with its job would 
have serious consequences. The United States will keep its military 
forces in the gulf at a high state of preparedness while we see if Iraq 
lives up to its commitment that it has signed.
  The United States remains resolved to secure, by whatever means 
necessary, Iraq's full compliance with its commitment to destroy its 
weapons of mass destruction. So again, it will be diplomacy backed up 
by force. So long as diplomacy works, force will not be necessary. At 
the very moment diplomacy appears not to be working, force will be 
employed. So, let there be no mistake. This is not a question of 
breathing room. This is not a question of simply delaying and somehow, 
then, obviating the need for the use of force should it be required. It 
will be there.
  Iraq's commitments are an important step forward, but only if matched 
by its compliance. They have made an important step forward in word. 
Now they must step forward in deed. As the President has said, ``the 
proof is in the testing.''
  This agreement can be a win-win. Either Iraq implements the agreement 
or it does not. If it does, the weapons inspectors will for the first 
time have unrestricted, unconditional access to all suspect sites in 
Iraq with no limits on the numbers of visits or deadlines to complete 
their work. If Iraq does not cooperate and we need to take action, we 
are in a stronger position internationally than ever. After two crises 
provoked by Iraq in 4 months, the international community has certainly 
lost its patience and will not stomach another bout of Iraqi defiance. 
And there will be no doubt in anyone's mind about who will be 
responsible for those consequences.
  This agreement is backed up by an immediate test that Saddam Hussein 
will either clearly pass or clearly fail. Our response will be swift. 
It will be strong. It will be certain.
  So, Mr. President, we have made great progress on paper over the last 
72 hours. Again, I give credit to the United Nations Secretary General 
Annan, to the administration, to all of those responsible for bringing 
us to this point. I respect the President's decision and believe it was 
the correct one, to keep our forces there, because, as we say, there is 
only one option for Saddam Hussein: Comply with his agreement. Allow 
access. Allow us the opportunity to complete our work.

  Mr. President, I yield the floor.

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