[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 15 (Wednesday, February 25, 1998)]
[House]
[Pages H598-H609]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
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WITNESS PROTECTION AND INTERSTATE RELOCATION ACT OF 1997
Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules,
I call up House Resolution 366 and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:
H. Res. 366
Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this
resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule
XXIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the
Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of
the bill (H.R. 2181) to ensure the safety of witnesses and to
promote notification of the interstate relocation of
witnesses by States and localities engaging in that
relocation, and for other purposes. The first reading of the
bill shall be dispensed with. General debate shall be
confined to the bill and shall not exceed one hour equally
divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority
member of the Committee on the Judiciary. After general
debate the
[[Page H599]]
bill shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute
rule. The bill shall be considered by title rather than by
section. Each title shall be considered as read. During
consideration of the bill for amendment, the Chairman of the
Committee of the Whole may accord priority in recognition on
the basis of whether the Member offering an amendment has
caused it to be printed in the portion of the Congressional
Record designated for that purpose in clause 6 of rule XXIII.
Amendments so printed shall be considered as read. The
Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may: (1) postpone
until a time during further consideration in the Committee of
the Whole a request for a recorded vote on any amendment; and
(2) reduce to five minutes the minimum time for electronic
voting on any postponed question that follows another
electronic vote without intervening business, provided that
the minimum time for electronic voting on the first in any
series of questions shall be fifteen minutes. At the
conclusion of consideration of the bill for amendment the
Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with
such amendments as may have been adopted. The previous
question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and
amendments thereto to final passage without intervening
motion except one motion to recommit with or without
instructions.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Snowbarger). The gentleman from Florida
(Mr. Diaz-Balart) is recognized for one hour.
Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield
the customary 30 minutes to the gentlewoman from New York (Ms.
Slaughter), pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume.
During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the
purposes of debate only.
Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 366 is an open rule providing for the
consideration of H.R. 2181, the Witness Protection and Interstate
Relocation Act of 1997. The purpose of the legislation is to ensure the
safety of State witnesses and to promote the notification of the
interstate relocation of witnesses by States and localities engaging in
that relocation.
Resolution 366 provides for one hour of general debate, to be equally
divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of
the Committee on the Judiciary. The rule further provides that the bill
will be considered by title, with each title being considered as read.
The Chair is authorized by the rule to grant priority in recognition
to Members who have preprinted their amendments in the Congressional
Record prior to their consideration.
In addition, the rule allows for the Chairman of the Committee of the
Whole to postpone votes during the consideration of the bill, and to
reduce votes to 5 minutes on a postponed question if the vote follows a
15 minute vote.
Finally, the rule provides for one motion to recommit, with or
without instructions.
Mr. Speaker, I believe that this resolution is a fair rule. It is an
open rule for the thorough consideration of H.R. 2181, the Witness
Protection and Interstate Relocation Act of 1997.
H.R. 2181 is a step in the right direction, Mr. Speaker, to address
the very real problem of gang-related witness intimidation, which is an
increasingly frequent problem as gangs expand their influence and
membership beyond State lines.
In a recent survey, over half of the prosecutors in large
jurisdictions cited intimidation of witnesses as a major problem in
criminal proceedings.
This bill, among other things, establishes a new Federal offense for
traveling interstate with the intent to delay or influence the
testimony of a witness in a State criminal proceeding by bribery,
force, intimidation or threat.
In Florida, our department of law enforcement has identified the
presence of over 300 gangs with a membership of over 10,000, including
motorcycle gangs, street gangs, prison gangs, militia gangs and racist
gangs. However, of the current prison population in our State, less
than 2 percent of those behind bars were convicted as part of gang-
related crimes. Clearly it is very difficult to actually convict gang
members, especially when witnesses are reluctant to testify for fear of
retaliation in gang-related cases.
Witnesses in State proceedings are sometimes relocated to other
States. Currently no Federal law exists which requires the notification
of the State or local enforcement officials that a witness, sometimes
with a criminal record, has been relocated to this new jurisdiction.
This lack of notification has presented its share of serious
difficulties. This legislation, H.R. 2181, promotes coordination among
jurisdictions when a witness is relocated interstate.
It is my understanding that some Members may wish to offer germane
amendments to this bill, and, under this open rule, they will have
every opportunity to do so.
I would like to commend the gentleman from Florida (Mr. McCollum) for
his hard work on H.R. 2181, and would urge my colleagues to support
both this open rule and the underlying bill.
In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, this rule is a completely open rule. It
is obviously very fair. I urge its adoption.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the
customary 30 minutes, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this open rule and urge my
colleagues to support it so that all alternatives and potential
improvements to this legislation may be considered.
Law enforcement officials around the country report that gang-related
witness intimidation is now endemic in a growing number of areas.
Witnesses' refusal to testify is a major concern, because it undermines
the administration of justice, while simultaneously eroding public
confidence.
H.R. 2181 addresses the problem of gang-related witness intimidation
by establishing a Federal offense for traveling in interstate or
foreign commerce with the intent to delay or influence the testimony of
a witness in a State criminal proceeding.
Such intimidation is increasingly interstate in nature and now poses
a severe impediment nationally to the prosecution of violent street
gangs and drug-trafficking organizations.
In 1994, a survey of 192 prosecutors found that intimidation of
victims and witnesses was a major problem for 51 percent of the
prosecutors in large jurisdictions. That is over half. Prosecutors
interviewed for the 1996 National Institute of Justice Report on
Preventing Gang and Drug-Related Witness Intimidation estimated that
witness intimidation occurs in 75 to 100 percent of violent crimes
committed in neighborhoods with active street gangs. Increasingly,
gangs are promoting community-wide noncooperation through public
humiliation, assaults and even the murder of victims and witnesses.
This type of community-wide intimidation cannot be allowed to
undermine our judicial process by threatening our witnesses and our
juries. I strongly support the witness notification relocation
provisions in the legislation, as well as the goals of the witness
intimidation provisions.
But, nevertheless, despite the laudable goals of the bill, provisions
were included that allow for the death penalty for witness
intimidation. The committee voted 17 to 7 against an amendment that
would have deleted the death penalty provisions.
I find this death penalty provision troubling, because this past
February the American Bar Association passed a resolution declaring
that the system for administering the death penalty is unfair and lacks
adequate safeguards. The resolution declared that executions should be
stopped completely until a greater degree of fairness and due process
can be achieved.
My fear is that the proliferation of new death penalty offenses that
we keep churning out only works to guarantee that executions will
indeed become more haphazard. I do not oppose this open rule, however.
Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back
the balance of my time.
Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time,
and I move the previous question on the resolution.
The previous question was ordered.
The resolution was agreed to.
A motion to reconsider was laid upon the table.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Ewing). Pursuant to House Resolution 366
and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the
bill, H.R. 2181.
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In the Committee of the Whole
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole
[[Page H600]]
House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R.
2181) to ensure the safety of witnesses and to promote notification of
the interstate relocation of witnesses by States and localities
engaging in that relocation, and for other purposes, with Mr.
Snowbarger in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having
been read the first time.
Under the rule, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. McCollum) and a
member of the minority party each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. McCollum).
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, H.R. 2181, which is before us today, represents another
important step by this Congress to address the unacceptably high levels
of violent crime ravaging our country today. A lot of people do not
realize that when they read about or hear that the violent crime rate
in the country has come down the last two or three years, that it is
still as high as it is, and that is why when they turn on their
television sets at night and watch violence so much on that set, it is
not out of proportion, even though some critics want to say it is.
Back in 1960 there were about 165 violent crimes for every 100,000
people in our population. That is 165 for every 100,000 people. About 4
years ago, we reached a little height in terms of the total number of
violent crimes at about 685 violent crimes for every 100,000 people in
our population, a huge difference between 1961-65 and the 165.
Now that we have had a marginal decrease in the violent crime rate
over the past couple years, that is, down to the last year's figures of
about 630 violent crimes for every 100,000 people, still more than 4
times as many violent crimes committed in the last year in this country
per capita, per 100,000 in the population, as was the case in 1960. Way
too much.
It means if you go to a 7-Eleven store, a convenience store, in the
evening to buy a carton of milk, it is 4 times more likely you are
going to get robbed or murdered or mugged or raped or whatever by an
assailant than it was back in 1960.
We cannot take the country back to 1960 in a lot of ways, but we
certainly should be able to take it back there in terms of the total
numbers of violent crimes per capita in this Nation.
It is absolutely outrageous that this is the case, and that is why we
have tried over the last year or two in this Congress to address those
issues. That is why we have the law that went into effect to encourage
the States to adopt truth in sentencing, to make those who commit
violent crimes serve at least the greater portion of their sentence,
the 85 percent rule, rather than in the last few years where it was at
about 33 or 34 percent of their sentences.
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That has been very successful, by the way, in over half the States
now, with a pool of money being offered to them to build more prisons
if they will agree to change their laws to make that truth-in-
sentencing requirement, so violent criminals serve at least 85 percent
of their sentences. That is why more than half of the States, to get
that pool of money, have changed their laws now and we have those laws
in place in those States. That is going to mean those who commit those
violent repeat crimes are going to be locked up for long periods of
time, not to be back out on the streets to commit the crimes.
We have also done some other things that are equally important in a
bill that passed this Congress, at least passed this House, this body,
last year, with regard to juvenile justice, where we are attempting to
get some consequences put in the juvenile justice laws of this Nation
very early on, so that those who commit misdemeanor crimes, spray
painting graffiti on a building as a teenager, or perhaps running over
a parking meter, breaking a store window, vandalizing the store,
whatever, get a chance to see that there are some consequences, be it
community service or otherwise. We have done an incentive grant program
to the States in this proposed legislation that is now pending in the
other body that would provide the States with additional resources if
they would simply make sure, and assure the Attorney General of the
United States, that they are putting consequences in some kinds of
punishment, from the very early misdemeanor crimes that juvenile
delinquents have, because we know most violent crimes proportionately
are committed by teenagers in their middle to later years of teenaged
life.
This is all part of a pattern, this bill today, H.R. 2181, to try to
get control over this extreme violence that is out here in our country
today. Yesterday we passed a bill in the House that would give some
real tough teeth to Federal laws with regard to gun use. Whenever there
is a violent crime committed using or in some way brandishing or
discharging a firearm, or if there is a drug trafficking crime at the
Federal level involving the possession or brandishing or discharging of
a firearm, if that is indeed the case, then if the bill that passed the
House becomes law, anyone who does that, in addition to whatever
sentence they get for the underlying crime they are committing, anybody
who does that is going to get 10 more years on for possession, 15 more
years on for brandishing, and 20 more years added onto their sentence
for the discharge of a firearm in connection with that crime.
Today H.R. 2181 is another step in that effort. It is another smart,
tough response to the problem of juvenile violent crime we are talking
about. It is the product of two hearings, this bill today, one which
was held in my home district of Orlando, Florida, with a great deal of
input from the Justice Department and the U.S. Marshals Service. It is
derived in part from a proposal in the President's juvenile crime bill
and it has strong bipartisan support.
Mr. Chairman, today there is a crisis emerging in our country.
Violent street gangs are intimidating and retaliating against witnesses
who have the courage to testify against them. In every major city in
America today the rule of law is under attack by violent street gangs
that are using violence and the threat of violence to silence those who
would help bring those who are criminals in those gangs to justice. The
stories of witnesses paying the ultimate price for their willingness to
testify are as tragic as they are numerous.
Eduardo Samaniego, a courageous 14-year-old from Pomona, California,
was one such victim. The son of a maintenance worker, Eduardo avoided
gangs, although they virtually engulfed his working class
neighborhoods. As much as possible he lived the life of a typical
adolescent, becoming a star Little League baseball player, and dreaming
of making the big leagues.
But one afternoon right in his own neighborhood Eduardo witnessed a
gang murder. To his parents great pride, he was one of only three
witnesses among approximately 15 who had observed the shooting who
agreed to testify. He spoke up firmly at the preliminary hearing, but
he never had a chance to testify at trial. Within a week Eduardo was
fatally shot in an alley near his home. Not surprisingly, the two other
witnesses subsequently refused to testify at trial.
The threatened violence and actual violence used by gangs against
such witnesses is by itself enough to demand action, but the spectacle
of violent street thugs getting away with undermining the
administration of justice in cities, counties, and States throughout
the country is simply intolerable. Sadly, their outrageous conduct has
already led to the erosion of public confidence in law enforcement and
our judicial system in too many communities, making community
cooperation even more difficult to obtain.
Intimidation of witnesses is on the rise around the country, with the
problem now endemic in a growing number of cities, cities as diverse as
Los Angeles, California, Des Moines, Iowa and Washington, D.C.
The tentacles of street gangs extend and even flourish behind bars.
Fear of retaliation is often fed by the belief that incarcerated gang
members will return quickly to the community life after serving brief
sentences and will be able while incarcerated to arrange for other gang
members to target potential witnesses. Meetings that I had of the
Subcommittee on Crime in the last Congress around the country with
various community leaders in five different sections of the country
reinforce
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the fact that indeed this was the case, that there is an awful lot of
crime being directed and conducted out of prisons today in this Nation,
far too much, and much of it is gang-related, and much of it involves
witness intimidation, to try to allow the person who is serving jail
time, who is the leader of the gang or the leader of organized crime in
that community, or drug trafficking crime, whatever, to get off the
hook or to get one of his compatriots off the hook.
The mere fact that a crime is gang-related can be sufficient to
prevent an entire neighborhood from cooperating. In New York City, a
local gang executed a man for a petty drug theft. The gang then
decapitated him and used his head as a soccer ball, kicking it around
in the street. This atrocity served the gang's purpose. According to
local law enforcement, the lack of cooperation by residents in this
neighborhood prevented law enforcement officials from solving nearly 30
homicides in 1994, and contributed to an atmosphere of rampant violence
in which an average of 8 gunshots occurred each night.
The traditional steps taken by State and local law enforcement to
counter the problem of witness intimidation continue to be helpful, but
these measures, which include requesting high bail, prosecuting witness
intimidation vigorously, and enhancing witness and victim protection
program services, are by themselves increasingly not enough.
As gangs have become more interstate in their operations and scope,
their ability and willingness to track down witnesses who have moved to
other States has increased. As a result, State and local law
enforcement officials such as those who testified in our June, 1997
Subcommittee on Crime hearing have called for a greater Federal role in
responding to interstate witness intimidation.
Title I of H.R. 2181 responds to this problem by establishing a
Federal offense for traveling in interstate or foreign commerce with
the intent to delay or influence the testimony of a witness in a State
criminal proceeding by bribery, force, intimidation, or threat. The
penalties provided for such an offense, in addition to fines, are
imprisonment for not more than 10 years if serious bodily injury
results, imprisonment for not more than 20 years, and if death results
from the offense, the sentence may be for any terms of years or for
life or the death penalty.
At our June 1997 subcommittee hearing a deputy district attorney from
Los Angeles County, Jennifer Snyder, provided compelling testimony
regarding the value of tough penalties for those who intimidate
witnesses.
When asked whether the penalties provided in this bill would have any
deterrent effect, and relying on the existing California State law for
what occurs in that State, she stated, ``Gang members know that it is
the death penalty to kill a witness. We have heard that in our wire
intercepts, we hear it in their casual conversations. They know the
difference between mad dogging, or staring at a witness, and what is
going to cost him if they actually go through with it and kill them. So
it does have an impact when you are talking about increasing the
punishment.''
In addition to establishing a new crime and tougher personalities
aimed at protecting witnesses, title II of the bill seeks to protect
witnesses by facilitating safe and effective witness protection
programs.
Witness protection programs are an indispensable tool in combating
violent crime. In cases involving drug trafficking and organized
criminal activity, prosecutors often must rely on the testimony of
witnesses who were involved in some facet of the illegal operation.
In order to encourage them to testify, the government may need to
offer protection when such witnesses are subject to retaliatory threats
by defendants.
As the subcommittee learned during its November 1996 field hearing,
the nature and sophistication of witness protection programs varies
widely. Some localities have no witness protection and relocation
capability. And even those that do have such capability vary
considerably. While most programs do not relocate witnesses out of
State, others, such as Puerto Rico's program, do so frequently.
There is currently no Federal law directly addressing the interstate
relocation of witnesses. As such, unless required by a State's own law
or by other agreement, programs are under no legal obligation to notify
local law enforcement officials and witnesses with criminal records who
are relocated interstate.
The potential problems associated with failing to provide
notification were highlighted by the June 15, 1996 incident in Osceola
County, Florida. On this occasion, Florida Highway Patrol officers and
plainclothes Puerto Rico police officers moving a witness narrowly
averted an altercation. The Florida troopers thought the officers from
Puerto Rico were criminals posing as FBI agents, while the officers
from Puerto Rico apparently thought the Florida troopers were assassins
sent to kill their witnesses.
As a result of this incident, the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement and the Puerto Rico Department of Justice entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding to regulate the relocation of witnesses
between the State and the Commonwealth. I am pleased to report that
there have been no incidences since this Memorandum of Understanding
was implemented.
Title II of this bill addresses the need for coordination among
jurisdictions when a witness is relocated interstate, by directing the
Attorney General to survey State and local protection programs with the
aim of making training available to those programs.
The Attorney General is also directed to promote coordination among
State and local interstate witness relocation programs, in part by
developing a model Memorandum of Understanding for interstate witness
relocation. This model Memorandum of Understanding is to include a
requirement that notice be provided to the jurisdiction to which the
relocation has been made in certain cases.
It is also noted that that particular notification has to be narrow.
You cannot just blanket notify everybody that might possibly be in law
enforcement or you do not protect your witnesses.
There needs to be a targeted method of doing that in order to provide
protection in those States where these witnesses are relocated for the
residents of those States because, often, these witnesses who are
relocated themselves are potentially very dangerous since they were
involved, often, in the underlying crime some way or another and are
being protected in order to get them to testify against somebody who is
perceived by the other State or jurisdiction's authorities to have
committed a more heinous crime or maybe be the organizer and the head
kingpin of that criminal enterprise.
Title II also authorizes the Attorney General to make grants under
the Byrne discretionary grant program to those jurisdictions that have
interstate witness relocation programs that have substantially followed
the Memorandum of Understanding in terms of how it has been structured
and proposed as a model.
Mr. Chairman, the two titles of this bill, taken together, represent
a strong commitment to protect witnesses in federal and State criminal
trials, and in doing so, to strengthen the criminal justice systems
around the country which are increasingly overwhelmed, particularly by
gang violence, but by violence generally.
Mr. Chairman, I have traveled through the drug source countries of
South America over the last three months, and I have seen the tragic
results of unchecked drug trafficking and violent crimes. I have seen
what happens when the rule of law is under siege. The tradition of
democratic self-government breaks down, and ordered liberty becomes a
thing of the past.
In the United States, we cannot tolerate such lawlessness directed
against our justice system. We must ensure that we have the right laws
and the right penalties in place to send an unmistakable message to
those who would subvert justice.
We must have the provisions in this bill which would provide for
very, very tough penalties, including an up to the death penalty where
murder occurs, for people across the State line to intimidate or kill a
witness to avoid their own conviction or the conviction of somebody in
their gang or somebody in their criminal enterprise.
We do not have that law now. It needs to be on the books, not only so
[[Page H602]]
that when that does occur we can see justice carried out for the ones
who perpetrate this crime, but in order to send the message, the
message to those who do talk, as Ms. Snyder, the Los Angeles County
prosecutor, told us, who do talk among themselves, whose wire
intercepts we have heard, who understand what the penalties and the
prices are. And when they understand it, they will be far less likely
to go over and do this kind of intimidation across State lines.
I want to thank the Justice Department and the Marshals Service for
their input into this much-needed bipartisan legislation.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
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Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. CONYERS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr.
McCollum) for that extensive review of the witness intimidation and
relocation bill. We can all support the notion that those who obstruct
our system of justice must be subject to penalties, and we can support
measures designed to make such conduct a Federal crime. If State lines
are crossed, which is along the lines of measures proposed in the
administration's juvenile justice bill, I think that this is also a
good thing to do.
May we also indicate our support for the need to collect information
regarding what States are doing in terms of relocating witnesses and
notifying other States of those relocations. We need Federal standards
for such programs, and I fully support witness relocation and
notification provisions contained in this bill. And if it were not for
the inclusion of the death penalty, I would support this legislation.
Recently, the Death Penalty Information Center issued a report
entitled ``Innocence and the Death Penalty: The increasing danger of
mistaken executions.'' This report described 16 instances since 1973 in
which condemned prisoners had to be released from death row because
mistakes had led to wrongful convictions. The figure represents more
than 1 percent of the approximately 6,000 people sentenced to death in
that period. And, of course, there are no measures to calculate the
number of innocent people actually executed.
Last year, the American Bar Association passed a resolution declaring
that the system for administering the death penalty in the United
States is unfair and lacks adequate safeguards. They further declared
that the executions should be stopped until a greater degree of
fairness and due process could be achieved.
So 25 years after the Furman vs. Georgia invalidation of the death
penalty in the Supreme Court, finding that the penalty was so wantonly
and so freakishly imposed that those being sentenced to die received
cruel and unusual punishment, I am sorry to say little has changed. The
death penalty is still inflicted upon a capriciously selected, random
handful. Moreover, the proliferation of new death penalty offenses only
works to guarantee that its imposition will even become more hazardous
and more capricious.
There is compelling evidence for many jurisdictions that the race of
the defendant is the primary factor governing the imposition of the
death sentence. In Georgia, the district attorney in one circuit sought
the death penalty in 29 cases, and in 23 of those 29 cases, the
defendant was African-American, although blacks made up only 44 percent
of the population.
Similar evidence is emerging under the Federal death penalty for drug
kingpins. Of the 37 defendants for whom the death penalty was sought
between 1988 and 1994, four were white, four were Hispanic, but 29 were
African-American.
Death sentences are even more frequently imposed when the victim is
white. Since 1977, more than 80 percent of the country's death penalty
cases have involved white victims, while about half of the homicides
committed each year in the United States involve black victims.
A study by Professor David Baldus at the University of Iowa of over
250,000 homicide cases in Georgia, which controlled for 230 nonracial
factors, found that a person accused of murdering a white was 4.3 times
more likely to be sentenced to death than a person accused of murdering
a black. Although fewer than 40 percent of Georgia homicide cases
involved white victims, 87 percent of all the cases in which a death
sentence was imposed involved white victims.
We are also concerned that the imposition of the death penalty has
become so routine that there is now immediate support for the addition
of this penalty whenever it is suggested. A death penalty attached to a
new crime is deemed unremarkable and seldom engenders serious debate or
discussion, and that is why I raise it on the floor with the measure
before us.
Given the overwhelming concerns of fairness and accuracy with which
the death penalty is imposed, combined with the lack of a proven
deterrent effect, it is my strong desire and intention to modify the
measure that is on the floor to contain a life sentence rather than the
death penalty.
Mr. Chairman, with that I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Indiana (Mr. Buyer), a member of the committee.
Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman from Florida
yielding to me.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 2181, which is to address the
very real problem of intimidation of witnesses. The instances of
intimidation across State lines is especially pronounced in gang and
drug cases, frustrating the ability of State and local authorities to
successfully prosecute these cases to include the Federal Government.
The intimidation of witnesses is specifically intended to undermine
and subvert our system of justice. I believe that it is an insult to
the integrity of the judicial system. Let me give an example.
The last case that I was involved with in the United States
Attorney's Office involved two Colombians charged with the distribution
of cocaine. Three of our witnesses were also witnesses in a State
collateral case, one of which was an informant who we had spoken to.
The following morning they were found in the kitchen of an apartment,
their hands tied behind their backs, washcloths stuffed in their
mouths, and the back of their heads were blown off with shotguns.
Mr. Chairman, I can share that in all other cases that these
individuals had been involved, not only in Federal cases, but also in
State cases, no one would step forward to testify. The intimidation was
very real and it was very effective. We never found out who actually
pulled the trigger and killed these people, but I would have enjoyed
having the opportunity to have prosecuted them.
Such a strategy of violence intended to intimidate does have a
chilling impact on the system and I saw it firsthand. Opponents to this
bill believe that in such instances the death penalty should not be
used as the ultimate punishment. I disagree. The death penalty is
appropriate to those who would kill to undermine our judicial system
for their own personal gain.
Mr. Chairman, this intimidation does undermine and have a chilling
impact upon the judicial system. It is not healthy and I support this
bill.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Rogan), the newest member of the Committee on the
Judiciary.
Mr. ROGAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished gentleman from
Florida (Mr. McCollum), chairman of the subcommittee, not only for his
leadership on this particular issue, but for his eloquence in
presenting it before the House. In doing so, I wish also to thank and
congratulate the distinguished gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers),
our ranking member, for his articulate presentation today, and for the
dissenting views he and others put forth in the subcommittee report.
Although I do differ with the gentleman from Michigan in his opinion
respecting the death penalty, aside from this philosophical difference,
his statement respecting the merits of the bill itself is in line with
those of the subcommittee chairman.
Mr. Chairman, it is significant that all the members of the
subcommittee
[[Page H603]]
who heard this bill see a real need for this particular legislation.
Our differences are over the level of penalty that should be imposed
for the most egregious cases.
This bill strikes a particular chord with me, because before I
arrived in Congress I spent 10 years as both a criminal trial court
judge in Los Angeles County and as a member of the Los Angeles County
District Attorney's Office. Specifically, during my tenure in the
District Attorney's Office, I was assigned to what was called the hard-
core gang murder unit.
My job on a daily basis for a couple of years was prosecuting gang
cases, particularly gang murder cases. It was very common for members
of that unit like myself to carry over 20 open gang murder cases.
Mr. Chairman, those were extremely difficult cases to prosecute. The
difficulty did not come from the lack of ballistic evidence, because we
often had ballistic evidence. They were not difficult because we did
not have fingerprints. Often we had fingerprints. And the difficulty
did not come from a lack of witnesses. There were generally many
witnesses. The difficulty came in getting those witnesses who saw the
crime to come to court and testify. The whole trick to trying gang
cases was getting the witnesses into court to tell what they saw.
Generally speaking, when a violent crime occurred, in the excitement
of the moment or in the confusion when the police arrived, we often
could find a lot of people who were willing to tell the police exactly
what they saw, exactly what they heard, and identify the perpetrators.
But once the police crime scene tape came down, once the squad cars
left and once the detectives returned to the station, those witnesses
became victims within their own community--helpless to the intimidation
and threats from gang members. It did not take long for any of them to
find out what the bottom line was to their safety.
Mr. Chairman, there was a curious phenomenon from the time of the
crime until we empaneled the jury: a predictable loss of a witness'
memory. Often we would try to do whatever we could to accommodate these
witnesses, such as preparing to move them out of the neighborhood. But
even that became problematic, because the sophistication of gangs
throughout this country has become such that their boundaries are no
longer within a neighborhood or a city. Their sophistication and their
reach crosses State lines. That is why the current situation cries out
for the remedy being suggested by this legislation.
The need for this bill is uncontroverted from both sides, and that is
why I again congratulate and thank the gentleman from Florida, the
subcommittee chairman, for bringing this to the floor. Again I thank
the gentleman from Michigan, the ranking member, and the minority
members of the subcommittee, for their support for the bill in concept.
Mr. Chairman, this will make an incredible difference to those who
are on the front lines every single day trying to prosecute these cases
to make our neighborhoods safe, and for those who must live in these
areas. And I cannot emphasize enough to my colleagues what a difference
this bill will make once it is on the books. It will note of those
people who ought to be protected, those whom we call upon to do their
civic duty and go before the bar of justice to help convict dangerous
offenders. This will be a significant help to their level of comfort
and safety.
Ms. DeGETTE. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to express my regret that
H.R. 2181, the Witness Protection and Interstate Relocation Act,
expands the death penalty in federal law.
Members of this Congress have heard definitive testimony from law
enforcement officials that witness intimidation and coercion are
increasing at a disturbing rate. As the instance of intimidation rises
for gang-related and drug crimes, Congress must be responsive.
Witnesses need to feel confident that they will be removed and
protected from aggressors. Creating a series of new opportunities for
courts to impose the death penalty, however, is not the answer.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I rise to state my views on H.R. 2181,
the Witness Protection and Interstate Relocation Act of 1997.
While this bill includes many valuable provisions which would improve
States' witness protection and relocation programs, I cannot, in good
faith vote for final passage due to a provision currently in the bill.
My fellow colleagues, my moral and religious values prevent me from
voting for a bill which calls for imposition of the death penalty. I
believe those who commit serious crimes should be severely punished,
even to the extent of life imprisonment, but I do not believe in the
death penalty. I believe very strongly in the sanctity of life, and my
voting record consistently reflects this belief.
I hope that when this bill goes to conference the death penalty
provision is removed. I look forward to working with my colleagues on
both sides of the aisle to provide the States with the means to protect
witnesses who put their lives at risk to do the right thing and to set
strong and reasonable penalties for those who engage in witness
intimidation or obstruction of justice.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I support you in your efforts
to address the crisis of witness intimidation; however, I do have some
concerns. The problem of witness intimidation is a growing problem and
one that must be addressed by this Congress. In a growing number of
criminal cases around the United States, police and prosecutors are
unable to prosecute cases successfully because key witnesses refuse to
testify for fear of retaliation by defendants.
This problem is particularly acute in gang- or drug-related cases. In
fact, prosecutors report that the mere fact that a crime is gang-
related is often sufficient to ensure neighborhood silence. This
situation is frustrating for prosecutors because the absence of an
overt threat precludes the use of traditional responses to witness
intimidation.
It is hard not to sympathize with the witnesses to these crimes who
choose to remain silent out of fear of harm to themselves or their
loved ones. These are people who are surrounded daily by crime,
violence and death. They witness first-hand the horrors that the nation
sees only on the six-o'clock news. They know that the threat of
retaliation is not an idle one.
A 1994 survey of prosecutors found that 51 percent of prosecutors in
large jurisdictions and 43 percent of those in small jurisdictions,
identified intimidation of witnesses as a problem. Several prosecutors
interviewed for the 1996 National Institute of Justice Report,
``Preventing Gang- and Drug-Related Witness Intimidation,'' estimated
that witness intimidation occurs in 75 to 100 percent of the violent
crimes committed in neighborhoods with active street gangs.
This all points to the fact that witness intimidation is a very
serious concern because it undermines the administration of justice and
erodes public confidence in the justice system.
However, I do have some concerns about this legislation includes the
death penalty for witness intimidation that results in death. Recently,
the Death Penalty Information Center issued a report entitled
``Innocence and the Death Penalty: The Increasing Danger of Mistaken
Executions.'' This report describes 69 instances since 1973 in which
condemned prisoners had to be released from death row because mistakes
had led to wrongful convictions. This figure represents more than one
percent of the approximately 6,000 people sentenced to death in that
period. If an amendment is offered which would give a federal judge
discretion in removing an imposed death penalty sentence and commuting
it to life imprisonment when the facts do not support the imposition of
a death penalty, then my colleagues should support such an amendment.
This legislation addresses the problem of witness intimidation by
establishing a new federal offense for interstate travel to intimidate
a witness. It also requires that States which relocate witnesses into
other States notify law enforcement in the ``recipient'' state.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Chairman, I support the Witness Protection and
Interstate Relocation Act as passed by the House of Representatives
today. I voted for the bill because I believe protection of witnesses
is one of the most important principles of the judicial process. We
cannot tolerate interference or tampering with witnesses at any level
of the judicial process, and any effort the federal government can make
to ensure greater witness protection is a step in the right direction.
While I do not agree with some of the details of the bill, in my mind,
the importance of protecting witnesses, a cornerstone of our system of
justice, supersedes those concerns.
Mr. DEUTSCH. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of this
important legislation.
H.R. 2181 establishes meaningful guidelines for interstate witness
relocation procedures. The legislation will help avoid conflicts
between law enforcement agents of differing jurisdictions. In 1996,
Florida officials narrowly missed an armed conflict with Puerto Rican
agents who were protecting a witness in central Florida. This
legislation will ensure that state officials are fully aware of witness
relocation efforts in their communities so we can avoid the types of
problems we've experienced in Florida.
Between 1987-1996, 83 witnesses have been relocated to Florida from
Puerto Rico
[[Page H604]]
alone. More than 1 out every 10 of these have a criminal record.
Without a formal process for notification and cooperation, we are
unknowingly jeopardizing the lives of innocent Americans and law
enforcement agents. This legislation will protect these citizens and
public safety officers.
There are serious questions about the appropriate procedures for
interstate relocation. I attempted to address these concerns when I
traveled to Puerto Rico last year and met with the Justice Minister to
craft an agreement between our two states. This was followed by the
first, and only, Memorandum of Understanding on interstate witness
relocation procedures.
This legislation will build on our efforts to facilitate coordination
between jurisdictions. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to join my colleagues,
Congressmen McCollum and Romero-Barcelo, in sponsoring this important
legislation and I urge its adoption.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from California
(Mr. Rogan) for his wise comments, and I yield back the balance of my
time.
The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.
Pursuant to the rule, the bill shall be considered under the 5-minute
rule by title, and each title shall be considered read.
The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may postpone until a time
during further consideration in the Committee of the Whole a request
for a recorded vote on any amendment, and may reduce to not less than 5
minutes the time for voting by electronic device on any postponed
question that immediately follows another vote by electronic device
without intervening business, provided that the time for voting by
electronic device on the first in any series of questions shall not be
less than 15 minutes.
The Clerk will designate section 1.
The text of section 1 is as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Witness Protection and
Interstate Relocation Act of 1997''.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there any amendments to section 1?
The Clerk will designate title I.
The text of title I is as follows:
TITLE I--GANG-RELATED WITNESS INTIMIDATION AND RETALIATION
SEC. 101. INTERSTATE TRAVEL TO ENGAGE IN WITNESS INTIMIDATION
OR OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE.
Section 1952 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections
(c) and (d), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:
``(b) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce
with intent by bribery, force, intimidation, or threat,
directed against any person, to delay or influence the
testimony of or prevent from testifying a witness in a State
criminal proceeding or by any such means to cause any person
to destroy, alter, or conceal a record, document, or other
object, with intent to impair the object's integrity or
availability for use in such a proceeding, and thereafter
engages or endeavors to engage in such conduct, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years,
or both; and if serious bodily injury (as defined in section
1365 of this title) results, shall be so fined or imprisoned
for not more than 20 years, or both; and if death results,
shall be so fined and imprisoned for any term of years or for
life, or both, and may be sentenced to death.''.
SEC. 102. CONSPIRACY PENALTY FOR OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
OFFENSES INVOLVING VICTIMS, WITNESSES, AND
INFORMANTS.
Section 1512 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``(j) Whoever conspires to commit any offense defined in
this section or section 1513 of this title shall be subject
to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense the
commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.''.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there any amendments to title I?
{time} 1330
Amendment Offered by Mr. Conyers
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Conyers:
Page 3, after line 14, insert the following:
SEC. 103. FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF DEATH SENTENCE
RECOMMENDATION.
(a) In General.--Section 3591(a) of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
``Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, a defendant who has
been found guilty of an offense described in section 1512(j)
or 1952(b) for which a sentence of death is provided shall
not be sentenced to death but shall be sentenced to life
imprisonment if court has any doubt that the defendant
actually committed the offense.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 3594 of title 18, United
States Code, is amended in the first sentence by inserting
``, subject to the second sentence of section 3591(a)''
before the period.
Mr. CONYERS (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the
Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Michigan?
There was no objection.
(Mr. CONYERS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, this amendment provides that in cases
where a jury has imposed the death sentence or death resulting from
witness intimidation, if a court has any doubt regarding the
defendant's guilt, the court shall sentence the defendant to life
imprisonment rather than death.
This amendment is offered because of the Supreme Court's decisions
regarding what has come to be known as ``actual innocence.''
Incredibly, the Supreme Court has held that actual innocence, without
proof of a violation of a defendant's constitutional rights, is not
enough to stop a death sentence.
In the case, only a few years back, of Herrera v. Collins, the Court
ruled that a death row inmate who presents belated evidence of
innocence is not ordinarily entitled to a new hearing before being
executed. In that case, Judge Rehnquist stated that the Federal habeas
courts sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation
of the Constitution, not to correct errors of fact.
According to the Supreme Court, newly discovered evidence has never
been regarded as a sufficient basis for the Federal Court relief in the
absence of some underlying constitutional violation. And that is
notwithstanding the finality of a death penalty. If a mistake has been
made, there is no way to undo it.
For the last 26 years, a little over 1 percent of the nearly 7,000
Americans sentenced to death have been released from death row after
new facts came to light indicating their innocence. This means that at
least 700 people who were sentenced to death were not guilty. In the
State of Illinois alone in the past few years no fewer than nine death
row inmates have been released after their innocence was proven.
While the system worked in these cases, if we ignore the fact that
many of these people were imprisoned wrongfully for many years, the
evidence that cleared these men turned up by accident and could well
have been discovered too late to halt their executions. This means that
although we do not know how many innocent people have been executed, we
do know that there are such people and that their numbers are
substantial.
This amendment is an accommodation to the irrevocable nature of the
death penalty. It provides that where doubt of guilt remains, the
opportunity to reverse the conviction on the basis of new evidence must
be preserved, and a death sentence obviously does not allow for this.
The effect of this provision, then, would allow the trial judge to
stop the imposition of the death penalty only in cases involving the
death of witnesses in those cases in which experience has shown the
greatest likelihood of erroneous conviction. In practice, this would
mean the judges would exclude the death penalty in cases that turned on
sometimes notoriously unreliable evidence of uncorroborated eye-witness
identifications on the bargained-for testimony of accomplices and
jailhouse informants.
The court would remain free to sentence the defendant to life
imprisonment without possibility of parole. Only the death penalty
would be precluded and only in cases where the judge, based on his
experience, could conclude that the possibility of miscarriage of
justice actually existed.
This amendment will not totally eliminate the possibility of error in
capital cases involving witness intimidation, but it would provide a
safety check, reducing the risk of sentencing innocent people to death.
No such safety mechanism exists now. The trial judge can only
determine whether the evidence is sufficient
[[Page H605]]
to convict and impose a death sentence. But as the law currently
stands, a judge has no power to protect the defendant against the
possibility of factual error by the jury.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers)
has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Conyers was allowed to proceed for 1
additional minute.)
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, the same is true on appeal. While
appellate courts must review the adequacy of the evidence and the
procedural regularity of the trial and sentencing, on appeal all
factual determinations must be made in the light most favorable to the
prosecution and appellate courts are powerless to reverse a death
sentence based on questionable but legally sufficient evidence unless
some harmful procedural error occurred at trial.
Only by means of this amendment will trial judges, in the limited
number of cases involving violations of this act, acquire the power to
ensure that the death penalty will not be imposed when the evidence
appears strong enough to convict but not strong enough to bet a life on
it.
Even those who in this Chamber do not oppose the death penalty, I do
not think they can be in favor of executing innocent people; and,
therefore, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the
amendment.
The death penalty has been debated on this floor many times, and I
respect the gentleman's views and philosophy on this subject differ
from mine considerably, but it is particularly poignant today, in light
of this bill and how the death penalty would be applied if this new
Federal crime were created and the issue of the death penalty
generally.
I think it is probably true to say that there is no more important
situation to have the deterrent effect of the death penalty than in
this case where we have witness intimidation.
The truth of it, so everybody understands this, and I will make it
very clear, the amendment the gentleman from Michigan is offering today
would prohibit the death penalty from applying in this legislation to
the witness intimidation cases where somebody crosses a State line and
kills somebody to prevent them from testifying.
Do we support, the question really should be, capital punishment for
vicious criminals who brutally kill bystanders who happen to have the
misfortune of witnessing a serious crime and are brave enough to come
forward and testify against the criminals? That is what we are talking
about in this legislation. If we vote for the amendment, we are voting
against the possibility of the death penalty for that provision.
Believe me, just as the prosecuting attorney in Los Angeles said,
that I mentioned, Ms. Snyder, in my opening statement on this bill,
there is an understanding among those in the street gangs who are doing
this witness intimidation and who do cross State lines and have people
killed to keep them from testifying. There is an understanding about
what the punishment is. And if the death penalty is there, they are far
less likely to do it.
We all know the overwhelming majority of the American public supports
capital punishment. For as long as I have been a Member of this body,
the House has consistently voted in favor of the death penalty.
Mr. Chairman, there is good reason for this record of strong support.
The death penalty is the just punishment for the most heinous of
crimes, and there are few crimes more heinous than the murder of a
witness. Such murders destroy the lives of the victim and the victim's
family and rock the very foundations of the criminal justice system.
It is absolutely essential that the possibility of the death penalty
exist in this situation. How else will we deter a drug gang member who
faces the possibility of a long prison term from killing a critical
witness called to testify against him? If the death penalty is not an
option, such criminals assume that they have nothing to lose if they
kill witnesses. They face no greater punishment if they get caught. We
cannot sit idly by and let it occur. That is why gang prosecutors so
strongly support the death penalty provisions in this bill.
Let me say we have heard a lot of about the imposition of the death
penalty in America. A few facts, I think, might set the record
straight.
The death penalty is actually rarely used in comparison to the number
of murders in this country. Less than one-tenth of 1 percent of all
murderers are executed. Less than one-tenth of 1 percent of all
murderers are executed.
Death penalties are imposed with extraordinary care and accuracy.
There is no evidence whatsoever that anyone truly innocent has been
executed since the Supreme Court reinstated the death penalty in 1976.
While I respect the statistics the gentleman from Michigan raised a
moment ago with regard to the fact that there are some people who have
been put on death row who have been ultimately exonerated, they were
not executed, obviously.
And there is a long period of time for appeal. The average time for
appeal in this Nation has been about 10 years. We hope with the change
in the habeas corpus laws we passed last year it will get down to 4 to
6 years. But it is a long period of time.
If somebody is truly innocent, there is going to be plenty of time
for them to get off death row. It is not as though it were occurring
right before the sentence was being carried out.
The average time a convicted murderer sits on death row before they
are executed, as I said, is 10 years.
In 1996, there was a total of 3,219 prisoners on death row; and only
45 were executed.
Among the offenders on death row, 66 percent had at least one prior
felony conviction and almost 10 percent had a previous murder
conviction. Forty-two percent were on probation, parole or supervised
release at the time they committed the crime which landed them on death
row.
Studies by anti-death penalty scholars, including last year's report
by the Death Penalty Information Center, or a highly publicized 1987
study from Stanford Law Review, failed to sufficiently confirm that one
innocent person had been executed. In fact, both studies showed that
innocent individuals were released, as I said earlier, well before
their executions.
There are many other facts about capital punishment that we could
discuss but time does not permit me today.
Let me conclude by saying on this amendment, Mr. Chairman, that it
should be defeated. When gang members can joke about killing snitches,
we know America is in trouble. If we strip the death penalty from this
bill, Congress will take a dangerous step closer to turning America's
criminal justice system over to brute force rather than to the rule of
law.
I urge my colleagues to vote against this amendment. Leave the death
penalty in in this bill. It is as important or more important than in
any other provision of Federal law to have the death penalty for those
who cross States lines to intimidate and to actually kill a witness who
otherwise would testify.
The message is important, the deterrent message; and, obviously, the
execution itself, in some cases, is certainly as justified as in any
other heinous crime.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. McCollum)
has expired.
(On request of Mr. Conyers, and by unanimous consent, Mr. McCollum
was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. McCOLLUM. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman very much for
yielding.
The only two points I wanted to bring up is this is not about whether
we are for or against the death penalty. This amendment is to make sure
that, if the court has any doubt that the defendant actually committed
the offense, the court would be allowed to suspend the sentence of
death and provide a sentence of life imprisonment.
And with reference to the gentleman's observation that there is no
evidence that any person that has been executed was innocent, it is
pretty hard after the execution to ask people to continue to look for
evidence that the execution was wrong. We know
[[Page H606]]
that they were on death row and we have saved them because the effort
and the energies persisted while they were alive.
So I would not want the gentleman to conclude from the fact that we
have not proven that people executed were in fact innocent turns on the
fact that they were in fact guilty. That is a pretty long stretch.
{time} 1345
Those were the two points in his refutation I wanted to bring forth.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, if I could reclaim my time, I do want to
address that. I am glad he pointed it out to me. The point about any
doubt is what bothers me in his amendment more than anything else. He
has suggested that a person shall be sentenced to life imprisonment if
the court has any doubt. As the gentleman knows, the rule of law with
regard to this matter is reasonable doubt now, not any doubt
whatsoever. I think by passing this, he effectively means there will be
no death penalty when he puts out any doubt. It is very difficult to
come up with cases where that standard would be applicable and it would
be I think an extraordinary change in the law that exists in all other
death penalty cases to my knowledge in the Nation, let alone here in
the Federal system, to have the contingency of this as any doubt as
opposed to reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt is the current standard,
which he would not need an amendment to do as the gentleman knows. I
oppose this. I think he has cleverly drawn this. I respect why he has
done it. Again he and I philosophically differ. But I think it is
clever by one too much. Effectively it would end the death penalty or
not allow it in most of the cases, or at least in a great many of them
that would be involved in the prosecution under this bill. I think my
remarks earlier were equally applicable regardless of the subtlety of
this point he is making which is true and technically correct.
I thank the gentleman for allowing me the additional time, but I
again strongly oppose this amendment and urge its defeat because we
need an ordinary, everyday, plain vanilla death penalty provision in
here if we are going to deter gangs from going across State lines and
intimidating people and witnesses, especially the death penalty part
applying when they kill somebody when they do that, kill a potential
witness.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers).
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Recorded Vote
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 113,
noes 300, not voting 17, as follows:
[Roll No. 20]
AYES--113
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Baldacci
Barrett (WI)
Becerra
Berman
Blumenauer
Bonior
Brown (CA)
Brown (OH)
Carson
Clay
Clayton
Clyburn
Conyers
Coyne
Cummings
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
Dixon
Ehlers
Engel
Eshoo
Evans
Fattah
Filner
Frank (MA)
Furse
Goodling
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hall (OH)
Hamilton
Hastings (FL)
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hoekstra
Hooley
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Johnson (WI)
Johnson, E. B.
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind (WI)
Kleczka
Klug
Kucinich
LaFalce
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lowey
Maloney (NY)
Markey
Martinez
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McDermott
McGovern
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Millender-McDonald
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Nadler
Neal
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Owens
Pappas
Paul
Payne
Rahall
Rangel
Rivers
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sawyer
Scott
Serrano
Skaggs
Slaughter
Stabenow
Stark
Stokes
Stupak
Thompson
Thurman
Tierney
Torres
Towns
Velazquez
Vento
Waters
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Weygand
Wise
Yates
NOES--300
Aderholt
Andrews
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baesler
Baker
Ballenger
Barcia
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Bentsen
Bereuter
Berry
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop
Blagojevich
Bliley
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Borski
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady
Bryant
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Canady
Cannon
Cardin
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Christensen
Clement
Coble
Coburn
Collins
Combest
Condit
Cook
Cooksey
Costello
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Cubin
Cunningham
Danner
Davis (FL)
Davis (VA)
Deal
DeLay
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Dooley
Doolittle
Doyle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Edwards
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Ensign
Etheridge
Everett
Ewing
Farr
Fawell
Fazio
Foley
Forbes
Fossella
Fowler
Fox
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Goode
Goodlatte
Gordon
Goss
Graham
Granger
Green
Greenwood
Hall (TX)
Hansen
Harman
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Hefley
Herger
Hill
Hilleary
Hinojosa
Hobson
Holden
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Jefferson
Jenkins
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kasich
Kelly
Kim
King (NY)
Kingston
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Lampson
Lantos
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lipinski
Livingston
LoBiondo
Lofgren
Lucas
Maloney (CT)
Manton
Manzullo
Mascara
Matsui
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McIntyre
McKeon
Menendez
Metcalf
Miller (FL)
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Morella
Murtha
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nussle
Ortiz
Oxley
Packard
Pallone
Parker
Pascrell
Pastor
Pease
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pickett
Pitts
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Redmond
Regula
Reyes
Riley
Roemer
Rogan
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Rothman
Roukema
Royce
Ryun
Salmon
Sanchez
Sandlin
Sanford
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer, Dan
Schaffer, Bob
Schumer
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherman
Shimkus
Shuster
Sisisky
Skeen
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Smith, Adam
Smith, Linda
Snowbarger
Snyder
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Spratt
Stearns
Stenholm
Strickland
Stump
Sununu
Talent
Tanner
Tauscher
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thornberry
Thune
Tiahrt
Traficant
Turner
Upton
Visclosky
Walsh
Wamp
Watkins
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Wexler
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wolf
Woolsey
Wynn
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NOT VOTING--17
Brown (FL)
DeLauro
Ford
Gejdenson
Gonzalez
Kennelly
Klink
Luther
Mica
Miller (CA)
Paxon
Pelosi
Poshard
Riggs
Rodriguez
Schiff
Smith (NJ)
{time} 1408
Messrs. BOB SCHAFFER of Colorado, CLEMENT and PETERSON of
Pennsylvania changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Mr. SCOTT and Mr. HOEKSTRA changed their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
personal explanation
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I regret that I missed two votes
pertaining to H.R. 2181, the Witness Protection and Interstate
Protection and Interstate Relocation Act and H.R. 1544, the Federal
Agency Compliance Act. At the time I was attending the funeral of
former Connecticut governor and Senator Abraham Ribicoff. If I had been
here, I would have voted yes on Roll Call #19 and yes on Roll Call #20.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further amendments to title I?
The Clerk will designate title II.
The text of title II is as follows:
TITLE II--WITNESS RELOCATION AND SAFETY
SEC. 201. WITNESS RELOCATION SURVEY AND TRAINING PROGRAM.
(a) Survey.--The Attorney General shall survey all State
and selected local witness protection and relocation programs
to determine the extent and nature of such programs and the
training needs of those programs. Not later than 270 days
after the date of the
[[Page H607]]
enactment of this section, the Attorney General shall report
the results of this survey to Congress.
(b) Training.--Based on the results of such survey, the
Attorney General shall make available to State and local law
enforcement agencies training to assist those law enforcement
agencies in developing and managing witness protection and
relocation programs.
(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to carry out subsections (a) and (b) for
fiscal year 1998 not to exceed $500,000.
SEC. 202. FEDERAL-STATE COORDINATION AND COOPERATION
REGARDING NOTIFICATION OF INTERSTATE WITNESS
RELOCATION.
(a) Attorney General To Promote Interstate Coordination.--
The Attorney General shall engage in activities, including
the establishment of a model Memorandum of Understanding
under subsection (b), which promote coordination among State
and local witness interstate relocation programs.
(b) Model Memorandum of Understanding.--The Attorney
General shall establish a model Memorandum of Understanding
for States and localities that engage in interstate witness
relocation. Such a model Memorandum of Understanding shall
include a requirement that notice be provided to the
jurisdiction to which the relocation has been made by the
State or local law enforcement agency that relocates a
witness to another State who has been arrested for or
convicted of a crime of violence as described in section 16
of title 18, United States Code.
(c) Byrne Grant Assistance.--The Attorney General is
authorized to expend up to 10 percent of the total amount
appropriated under section 511 of subpart 2 of part E of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 for
purposes of making grants pursuant to section 510 of that Act
to those jurisdictions that have interstate witness
relocation programs and that have substantially followed the
model Memorandum of Understanding.
(d) Guidelines and Determination of Eligibility.--The
Attorney General shall establish guidelines relating to the
implementation of subsection (c) and shall determine,
consistent with such guidelines, which jurisdictions are
eligible for grants under subsection (c).
SEC. 203. BYRNE GRANTS.
Section 501(b) of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 is amended--
(1) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (25);
(2) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (26) and
inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(27) developing and maintaining witness security and
relocation programs, including providing training of
personnel in the effective management of such programs.''.
SEC. 204. DEFINITION.
As used in this title, the term ``State'' includes the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and any other
commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there any amendments to title II?
Amendment Offered by Mr. Scott
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order on the
amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Scott:
Page 3, line 4, insert the following before the quotation
mark:
``When considering whether to inflict the death penalty for
a violation of this section, the jury shall consider, as a
mitigating factor, whether the evidence, although sufficient
to permit a finding of guilt, does not completely remove all
doubt about the defendant's guilt.''
Page 3, line 14, insert the following before the quotation
mark:
``When considering whether to inflict the death penalty for
a violation of this section, the jury shall consider, as a
mitigating factor, whether the evidence, although sufficient
to permit a finding of guilt, does not completely remove all
doubt about the defendant's guilt.''
The CHAIRMAN. That is an amendment to title I, and we have gone
beyond title I at this point.
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment
be considered in order.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Virginia?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Florida reserve his point of
order?
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my point of order.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia (Mr.
Scott).
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, this amendment is on the same lines as the
previous amendments. This amendment also provides a safeguard against
executing innocent people. Unlike the last amendment, however, which
allowed the judge to void the decision by the jury, this amendment
simply proposes a way for the jury to consider the possibility of the
defendant's innocence.
I offer this amendment to exclude the death penalty as an option
whenever the evidence does not foreclose all doubt regarding a
defendant's guilt.
In 1988, the Supreme Court held that a defendant has no
constitutional right to have a capital sentencing jury consider as a
reason not to impose the death penalty the possibility that the
defendant may be innocent. This means that if the jurors are to
consider the possibility of error as a reason to vote against imposing
the death penalty, the law must explicitly provide for such
consideration.
Under current law, the jurors are told to consider a long list of
specific mitigating factors as reasons not to sentence a defendant to
death. These factors can include that the defendant is mentally ill,
youthful, under duress or suffered impaired capacity at the time of the
crime. The law does not, however, require the jury to consider the most
basic reason of all for worrying against the imposition of death, the
possibility the defendant is actually not guilty of the crime for which
he has been convicted. The amendment would add residual doubt to the
list of mitigating factors a citizen jury can consider.
{time} 1415
The amendment provides that the jury may consider any doubt that the
defendant committed the offense, notwithstanding that such doubt may
initially not be considered to constitute reasonable doubt.
This amendment should be unobjectionable, even to my colleagues
opposed to the death penalty. This does not take away anything from the
power of the trier of fact, nor does it overturn a trier of fact's
determination. This amendment merely instructs the jury to consider,
among other mitigating and aggravating factors that they already
consider, whether the jury has remaining doubts as to whether the
defendant is actually the perpetrator of the crime.
Again, this amendment will not stop innocent people from winding up
on death row or even being executed. It will, however, offer another
check, another way for us to say hold on, we better be certainly sure
that a person committed an offense before we sentence him or her to
death, at least in cases arising from violations of this particular
statute.
This extra safeguard, I think, is certainly desirable, in light of
the consequences. When you vote on this amendment, remember that since
1976, 66 inmates have been freed from death row based on strong
evidence of their innocence. I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of
the amendment.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I equally and strongly oppose this amendment, as I did
the one before this offered by the gentleman from Michigan. The
amendment, while clear in its nature, is one which effectively destroys
the death penalty provisions in this bill and sets a different course
for the consideration of whether to impose the death penalty or not
from any other law of this Nation that I am aware of, either State or
Federal.
What it does effectively is to say that you have to completely remove
all doubt before you impose a death penalty. It is given as a
mitigating factor, which sounds innocent enough, but what happens in a
criminal trial when you get to the sentencing phase on the death
penalty under Federal law is that under the Supreme Court ruling and
under the legislation that has been established since the court several
years ago overturned the death penalty as unconstitutional, there has
been a way to reestablish it, and that way involves a weighing of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances that are put forward for
consideration with regard to the death penalty.
There is very precise statutory language constructs in Federal law
with regard to this. There are listings of what those aggravating
factors are and what those mitigating factors might be, and here is
what you produce to the jury or to the deciding court.
In this particular case, what the gentleman from Virginia is trying
to do is to suggest that the burden gets a lot higher for the
prosecution seeking the
[[Page H608]]
death penalty in a witness intimidation murder case; again, one of
those cases which I think is the most heinous of all crimes, where you
are intimidating a witness and trying to prevent him or her from being
able to testify to get a conviction in a major gang-related case or an
organized crime or otherwise case.
Well, gosh knows, when that situation occurs, murdering the witness
is the strongest form possible of intimidation. Not only does it
intimidate, obviously eliminating that witness altogether, but it
intimidates other witnesses, which is what this legislation is all
about, by sending an extraordinarily strong message. We are trying to
send one equally strong or stronger back that says look, if you go
across a state line and kill a witness, you are going to get the death
penalty for doing that.
Well, what is happening here though is because under the gentleman
from Virginia's construct, you would add another mitigating factor that
says to whoever is deciding this, before you can give the death penalty
after the conviction has occurred of killing a witness in an
intimidation across the state line matter, you have got to have removed
completely all doubt. It does not say just all doubt, it says
completely remove all doubt of the defendant's guilt.
Let me tell you, there are example after example where somebody could
interject some spurious, rather simplistic type of evidence, that would
allow some doubt to exist. I think some doubt exists in lots and lots
of cases where the death penalty is imposed.
For example, you can have a whole stack of evidence over here of the
crime and that somebody did it, but you can have a single witness come
in and say gee, Sam is my best friend and he was with me drinking last
night.
Does that create reasonable doubt, when you have got all this other
evidence outweighing it on the other side in the guilt or innocence or
sentencing phase? The answer is no, it does not create reasonable
doubt. But if it is a jury instruction or an instruction under the law
to the court on the death penalty, it could create some doubt, however
tiny, however small that is, which would effectively mean that in
virtually any case, anybody could drum up somebody to walk in and give
an alibi, even though there is overwhelming evidence they committed the
heinous crime for which they are getting the death penalty or might get
the death penalty. Then you would not be able to say, a decider of the
death penalty, the sentence, could not say that all doubt had been
completely removed, which is what is required by the gentleman from
Virginia.
So the bottom line is, the gentleman's amendment is just as
pernicious as the previous one. It effectively eliminates the death
penalty for those who would commit the crimes for which it is intended
that they receive the death penalty in witness intimidation, witness
murder, in this bill that is before us today.
I urge strongly the defeat of this amendment. It is a killer
amendment in the true sense of the word, in that it eliminates the
death penalty teeth of this bill, and it needs to be defeated.
Mr. WATT of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last
word.
Mr. Chairman, let me just submit to my colleagues that what would be
pernicious is not the provisions of this amendment. What would be
pernicious is if our country put somebody to death, and then found that
what they were being put to death for was untrue. And that has been
happening more and more recently with the advent of new technological
advances, such as the advances in DNA research. We are able now to go
back 20 or 30 years and find out that people have in fact been put to
death by our country, by our system of criminal justice, for a crime
that they did not commit. That is what is pernicious.
This amendment has nothing to do with the burden of proof. The burden
of proof is whether you are guilty or innocent. In our system of
justice, that burden of proof is, in a criminal case, beyond a
reasonable doubt.
This amendment goes to what is considered after there has been a
determination of guilt or innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. It goes
to what you consider in determining whether there is a death penalty
assessed, whether you put somebody to death.
So this is not about the burden of proof on guilt or innocence; this
is about what you consider in deciding whether someone should be put to
death by our criminal justice system.
Simply put, the amendment says if there is one iota of doubt, if
there is any doubt about it, the jury which is considering whether to
put a person to death or not ought to be able to take that into
account. That is all it says.
I submit that is a very reasonable proposition. The notion that we
are doing something un-American by trying to remove any doubt before we
use the official forces of the government to put a citizen to death is
surprising to me.
I think this amendment is imminently reasonable. I encourage my
colleagues to support it. It is not pernicious, it is just plain good
sense.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott).
The amendment was rejected.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to title II of the bill?
There being no further amendments, under the rule, the Committee
rises.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
Lazio of New York) having assumed the chair, Mr. Snowbarger, Chairman
of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported
that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R.
2181) to ensure the safety of witnesses and to promote notification of
the interstate relocation of witnesses by States and localities
engaging in that relocation, and for other purposes, pursuant to House
Resolution 366, he reported the bill back to the House.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is
ordered.
The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were-- yeas 366,
nays 49, answered ``present'' 1, not voting 14, as follows:
[Roll No. 21]
YEAS--366
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Aderholt
Allen
Andrews
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baesler
Baker
Baldacci
Ballenger
Barcia
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Becerra
Bentsen
Bereuter
Berman
Berry
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop
Blagojevich
Bliley
Blumenauer
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Borski
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady
Bryant
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Canady
Cannon
Cardin
Carson
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Christensen
Clement
Coble
Coburn
Collins
Combest
Condit
Cook
Cooksey
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Cubin
Cunningham
Danner
Davis (FL)
Davis (VA)
Deal
DeFazio
DeLauro
DeLay
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Doolittle
Doyle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
Engel
English
Ensign
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Everett
Ewing
Farr
Fawell
Fazio
Filner
Foley
Forbes
Fossella
Fowler
Fox
Frank (MA)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gallegly
Ganske
Gejdenson
Gekas
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Goode
Goodlatte
Goodling
Gordon
Goss
Graham
Granger
Green
Greenwood
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hall (TX)
Hamilton
Hansen
Harman
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Hefley
Hefner
Herger
Hill
Hilleary
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hobson
Hoekstra
Holden
Hooley
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Jenkins
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (WI)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kasich
Kelly
Kennedy (MA)
[[Page H609]]
Kennelly
Kildee
Kim
Kind (WI)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kleczka
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Lampson
Lantos
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Leach
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lipinski
Livingston
LoBiondo
Lofgren
Lowey
Lucas
Maloney (CT)
Maloney (NY)
Manton
Manzullo
Markey
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McIntyre
McKeon
McNulty
Meehan
Menendez
Metcalf
Millender-McDonald
Miller (FL)
Minge
Moakley
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Morella
Murtha
Myrick
Neal
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nussle
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Oxley
Packard
Pallone
Pappas
Parker
Pascrell
Pastor
Pease
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pickett
Pitts
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Quinn
Radanovich
Rahall
Ramstad
Redmond
Regula
Reyes
Riggs
Riley
Rodriguez
Roemer
Rogan
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Rothman
Roukema
Royce
Ryun
Salmon
Sanders
Sandlin
Sanford
Sawyer
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer, Dan
Schaffer, Bob
Schumer
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherman
Shimkus
Shuster
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skeen
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Smith, Adam
Smith, Linda
Snowbarger
Snyder
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Spratt
Stearns
Stenholm
Strickland
Stump
Stupak
Sununu
Talent
Tanner
Tauscher
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thompson
Thornberry
Thune
Thurman
Tiahrt
Tierney
Torres
Traficant
Turner
Upton
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Walsh
Wamp
Watkins
Watts (OK)
Waxman
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Wexler
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wise
Wolf
Woolsey
Wynn
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NAYS--49
Barrett (WI)
Bonior
Brown (CA)
Brown (OH)
Clay
Clayton
Clyburn
Conyers
Cox
Cummings
Davis (IL)
DeGette
Delahunt
Fattah
Furse
Hastings (FL)
Hilliard
Jackson (IL)
Kennedy (RI)
Kilpatrick
LaFalce
Lewis (GA)
Martinez
McDermott
McGovern
McKinney
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Mink
Mollohan
Oberstar
Owens
Paul
Payne
Rangel
Rivers
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Scott
Serrano
Stabenow
Stark
Stokes
Towns
Waters
Watt (NC)
Weygand
Yates
ANSWERED ``PRESENT''--1
Kucinich
NOT VOTING--14
Brown (FL)
Ford
Gonzalez
Hall (OH)
Klink
Luther
Mica
Miller (CA)
Nadler
Paxon
Pelosi
Poshard
Sanchez
Schiff
{time} 1446
Mr. McGOVERN and Ms. WATERS changed their vote from ``yea'' to
``nay.''
So the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________