[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 14 (Tuesday, February 24, 1998)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E197-E198]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




    SECRETARY OF STATE ALBRIGHT PRESENTS A CONVINCING CASE FOR NATO 
                               EXPANSION

                                 ______
                                 

                            HON. TOM LANTOS

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                       Tuesday, February 24, 1998

  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, during the district work period that is just 
ending, the Foreign MInisters of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic were here in Washington to present jointly the case for the 
accession of these three countries to the North Altantic Treaty--
Boleslaw Geremek of Poland, Laszlo Kovacs of Hungary, and Jaroslaw 
Sedivy of the Czech Republic. While the chief diplomats of these three 
countries were here in Washington, they met with our colleagues in the 
Senate and with some of our colleagues here in the House. Also during 
the past week, the President formally submitted to the Senate for 
ratification the documents for the admission of these three countries 
to NATO.
  I welcome, Mr. Speaker, the President's decision which was affirmed 
by the heads of government of the other fifteen NATO member countries 
at Madrid in July of last year to invite the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
and Poland to become full members of NATO. The admission of these three 
Central European states to NATO is the next critical step in healing 
the division of Europe that came about at the end of World War II. As 
we face the uncertainties of the post-Cold War world, it is critical 
that the new democratic states of Central and Eastern Europe have the 
opportunity to join the North Atlantic community of nations--action 
which will give them the sense of security that will permit them to 
consolidate the gains of democracy and economic market reform.
  Mr. Speaker, two weeks ago, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright 
spoke at a conference of the New Atlantic Initiative here in 
Washington, and joining her on this occasion were the three visiting 
foreign ministers from Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. In that 
address, Secretary Albright made the case for the expansion of NATO 
clearly and convincingly. I ask that excerpts of her outstanding 
remarks be placed in the Record, and I urge my colleagues to give and 
give thoughtful consideration to her comments.

  Remarks of Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright Before the New 
  Atlantic Initiative Conference in Washington, D.C., February 9, 1998

       Thank you very much. * * * Let me welcome my colleague 
     Foreign Ministers Geremek, Kovacs, Mikhailova and Sedivy to 
     Washington. And let me thank John O'Sullivan, Jeffrey Gedmin 
     and everyone at the New Atlantic Initiative for all you have 
     done to strengthen America's partnership with its friends and 
     allies in Europe, old new new. * * *
       These old and new organizations in Europe are part of a 
     truly hopeful global trend that our country has done more 
     than any other to shape. In every part of the world, we have 
     encouraged the growth of institutions that bring nations 
     closer together around basic principles of democracy, free 
     markets, respect for the law and a commitment to peace.
       America's place and I believe, correctly--is at the center 
     of this emerging international system. And our challenge is 
     to see that the connections around the center, between 
     regions and among the most prominent nations, are strong and 
     dynamic, resilient and sure. But it is equally our goal to 
     ensure that the community we are building is open to all 
     those nations, large and small, distant and near, that are 
     willing to play by its rules.
       There was a time not long ago when we did not see this as 
     clearly as we do today. Until World War II, we didn't really 
     think that most of the world was truly part of our world. 
     This attitude even applied to the half of Europe that lay 
     east of Germany and Austria. Central Europe and Eastern 
     Europe was once a quaint, exotic mystery to most Americans. 
     We wondered at King Zog of Albania; we puzzled about Admiral 
     Horthy, ruler of landlocked Hungary; we laughed with the Marx 
     Brothers as they sang ``Hail, Hail Fredonia.''
       Jan Masaryk, the son of Czechoslovakia's first president, 
     used to tell a story about a U.S. Senator who asked him, 
     ``How's your father; does he still play the violin?'' To 
     which Jan replied, ``Sir, I fear you are making a small 
     mistake. You are perhaps thinking of Paderewski and not 
     Masaryk. Paderewski plays piano, not the violin, and was 
     president not of Czechoslovakia, but of Poland. Of our 
     presidents, Benes was the only one who played. But he played 
     neither the violin nor the piano, but football. In all other 
     respects, your information is correct.''
       It took the horror of World War II and the Holocaust to get 
     across the message that this region mattered; that it was the 
     battleground and burial ground for Europe's big powers; that 
     the people of Paris and London could neither be safe nor free 
     as long as the people of Warsaw and Riga and Sofia were 
     robbed of their independence, sent away in box cars, and 
     gunned down in forests.
       President Bush certainly understood this when, after the 
     fall of the Berlin Wall, he inspired us to seek a Europe 
     whole and free. And President Clinton understood it when, in 
     1993, he set in motion a process that would bring that ideal 
     to life.
       Part of our challenge was to adapt NATO to master the 
     demands of the world not as it has been, but as it is and 
     will be. This meant adopting a new strategic concept, 
     streamlining NATO's commands, accepting new missions and 
     asking our European allies to accept new responsibilities. It 
     also meant welcoming Europe's new democracies as partners, 
     and some eventually as members, in a way that preserves 
     NATO's integrity and strength. For NATO, like any 
     organization, is defined not just by its mission, but by its 
     makeup. The preeminent security institution in an undivided 
     Europe cannot maintain the Iron Curtain as its permanent 
     eastern frontier.
       And so last July, after three years of careful study, 
     President Clinton and his fellow NATO leaders invited three 
     new democracies--Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic--to 
     join our alliance, while holding the door open to others. 
     This month, Canada and Denmark became the first NATO members 
     to ratify the admission of our future central European 
     allies. On Wednesday, President Clinton will send the 
     instruments of ratification to the United States Senate.
       The strategic rationale for this policy is straightforward. 
     First, a larger NATO will make us safer by expanding the area 
     of Europe where wars do not happen. By making it clear that 
     we will fight, if necessary, to defend our new allies, we 
     make it less likely that we will ever be called upon to do 
     so. It is true that no part of Europe faces an immediate 
     threat of armed attack. But this does not mean we face no 
     dangers in Europe. There is the obvious risk of ethnic 
     conflict. There is the growing threat posed by rogue states 
     with dangerous weapons. There are still questions about the 
     future of Russia.
       And while we cannot know what other dangers might arise in 
     ten or 20 or 50 years from now, we know enough from history 
     and human experience to believe that a grave threat, if 
     allowed to arise, would arise. Whatever the future may hold, 
     it will not be in our interest to have a group of vulnerable, 
     excluded nations sitting in the heart of Europe. It will be 
     in our interest to have a vigorous and larger alliance with 
     those European democracies that share our values and our 
     determination to defend them.
       A second reason why enlargement passes the test of national 
     interest is that it will make NATO stronger and more 
     cohesive. Our Central European friends are passionately 
     committed to NATO. Experience has taught them to believe in a 
     strong American role in Europe. They will add strategic depth 
     to NATO, not to mention 200,000 troops. Their forces have 
     risked their lives alongside ours from the Gulf War to 
     Bosnia. Without the bases Hungary has already provided to 
     NATO, our troops could not have deployed to Bosnia as safely 
     as they did. Here are three qualified European democracies 
     that want us to let them be good allies. We can and should 
     say yes.

[[Page E198]]

       A third reason to support a larger NATO is that the very 
     promise of it has given the nations of Central and Eastern 
     Europe an incentive to solve their own problems. Aspiring 
     allies have strengthened democratic institutions; made sure 
     soldiers serve civilians, not the other way around; and 
     resolved virtually every old ethnic and border dispute in the 
     region.
       I have been a student of Central European history, and I 
     have lived some of it myself. When I see Romanians and 
     Hungarians building a real friendship after centuries of 
     enmity; when I see Poles, Ukrainians and Lithuanians forming 
     joint military units after years of suspicion; when I see 
     Czechs and Germans overcoming decades of mistrust; when I see 
     Central Europeans confident enough to improve their political 
     and economic ties with Russia, I know something amazing is 
     happening. NATO is doing for Europe's east precisely what it 
     did for Europe's west after World War II.
       I know that there are serious critics who have had 
     legitimate concerns about our policy. We have grappled with 
     many of the same concerns. Some revolve around the cost of a 
     larger NATO, which will be real. But NATO has now approved 
     estimates which make clear that the costs will be 
     manageable, that they will be met, and that they will be 
     shared fairly.
       I certainly understand the concern some have expressed 
     about Russian opposition to a larger NATO. But as Secretary 
     of State, I can tell you that Russia's disagreement on this 
     issue has not in any way hurt our ability to work together on 
     other issues. On the contrary; we have made progress on arms 
     control; Russia now has a permanent relationship with NATO; 
     it has improved its ties with the Baltic states, even as 
     those nations have made clear their desire to join NATO. 
     Russia has a better relationship with Central Europe now than 
     at any time in history; and the differences we still have 
     with Russia would certainly not disappear if we suddenly 
     changed our minds about enlargement.
       We need to keep Russia's objections in perspective. They 
     are the product of old misperceptions about NATO and old ways 
     of thinking about its former satellites. Instead of changing 
     our policies to accommodate Russia's outdated fears, we need 
     to concentrate on encouraging Russia's more modern 
     aspirations.
       Others have argued that we should let the European Union do 
     the job of reuniting Europe, or at least tell Central 
     European countries that they cannot join NATO until they join 
     the EU. I want the EU to expand as rapidly as possible. But 
     the EU is not in the business of providing security; NATO is. 
     And we saw in Bosnia what a difference that makes.
       As for tying membership in one institution to membership in 
     another, it is not in America's interest to subordinate 
     critical security decisions of NATO to another institution. 
     We are a leader in NATO; we're not even members of the EU. 
     The qualifications for joining the EU are vastly different 
     from the qualifications for becoming a member of NATO. 
     Forcing the two processes to move in lockstep makes no sense, 
     neither for the EU nor for NATO.
       Others ask why we need to enlarge NATO when we already have 
     NATO's Partnership for Peace. When the Partnership for Peace 
     was established in 1994, I went to Central Europe with 
     General Shalikashvili and with my good friend, Charles Gati, 
     who is with us here today, to explain its purpose. I can tell 
     you the Partnership was never intended to be an alternative 
     to a larger NATO. On the contrary, it has always provided 
     both the opportunity to cooperate with NATO, and a program 
     for preparing to join. That is why so many nations have 
     participated in it so enthusiastically, whether they aspire 
     to membership or not. If we want the Partnership to thrive, 
     the last thing we should do is to tell some of its members 
     that they can never be allies, no matter how much progress 
     they make.
       NATO is a military alliance, not a social club; but neither 
     is it an in-bred aristocracy. That is one reason why today 
     every NATO ally agrees that NATO doors must remain open after 
     the first three new allies join. Let us be clear--we have 
     made no decisions about who the next members of NATO should 
     be or when they might join. But let us also have some 
     humility before the future.
       How many people--even in this room of experts--predicted in 
     1949 that Germany would so soon be a member of the Alliance? 
     Who could have known in 1988 that in just ten years, members 
     of the old Warsaw Pact would be in a position to join NATO? 
     Who can tell today what Europe will look like in even a few 
     years? We should not erect artificial roadblocks today that 
     will prevent qualified nations from contributing to NATO 
     tomorrow.
       This Administration opposes any effort in the Senate to 
     mandate a pause in the process of NATO enlargement. This 
     would be totally unnecessary, since the Senate would, in any 
     case, need to give its advice and consent to any new round of 
     enlargement. It would also harm American interests by 
     surrendering our leverage and flexibility, fracturing the 
     consensus NATO has reached on its open door, and diminishing 
     the incentive Central European countries now have to 
     cooperate with the Alliance.
       Some critics have said NATO enlargement would draw a 
     destabilizing dividing line in Europe. A larger NATO with an 
     open door will not. One round of enlargement with a mandated 
     pause would. President Clinton and I will keep on addressing 
     these concerns, and others, in the days ahead. The debate has 
     been joined, and it will continue.
       But already an extraordinary coalition has come together to 
     say NATO enlargement is right and smart for America. It 
     includes American veterans, who do not want their country to 
     have to fight another war in Europe; American business, which 
     understands the link between security and prosperity; 
     American labor, which aided freedom's victory in Europe and 
     wants it to endure. It includes every living former Secretary 
     of State, a half a dozen former National Security Advisors 
     and five Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs.
       The debate about a larger NATO might easily have provided 
     an opportunity for skeptics to praise isolationism. Instead, 
     it has given the American people and the Congress an 
     opportunity to bury it. And I have confidence that is what 
     will happen.
       If the Senate says yes to a larger NATO--and I believe it 
     will--that will be a vote for continued American engagement 
     in Europe. It will be a signal that America will defend its 
     values, protect its interests, stand by its allies and keep 
     its word.
       We'll need that same spirit to prevail when the Congress 
     faces its other foreign policy tests this year. For example, 
     the President and I are asking the Congress to pay what our 
     country owes to the International Monetary Fund and to the 
     United Nations. At issue is a very simple question. Will we 
     stand alone in the face of crises from Gulf to Rwanda to 
     Indonesia, asking American soldiers to take all the risks and 
     American taxpayers to pay all the bills? Or will we support 
     organizations that allow us to share the burdens of 
     leadership with others? This is not least an issue in our 
     relationship with Europe. When we challenge our allies to 
     meet their responsibilities to us, it hurts our case when we 
     are seen as not meeting ours. . . .
       It is my great hope that Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
     Republic will be part of a transatlantic partnership that is 
     not only broader, but deeper as well; a partnership that is a 
     force for peace from the Middle East to Central Africa; a 
     partnership that has overcome barriers to trade across the 
     Atlantic; a partnership strong enough to protect the 
     environment and defeat international crime; a partnership 
     that is united in its effort to stop the spread of weapons of 
     mass destruction, the overriding security interest of our 
     time.
       However old or new the challenges we face, there is still 
     one relationship that more than any other will determine 
     whether we meet them successfully, and that is our 
     relationship with Europe. The transatlantic partnership is 
     our strategic base--the drivewheel of progress on every 
     world-scale issue when we agree, and the brake when we do 
     not.
       In cultivating that partnership and extending it to those 
     free nations that were too long denied its benefits, I pledge 
     my continued best efforts, and respectfully solicit all of 
     yours.

     

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