[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 11 (Thursday, February 12, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S708-S716]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
IRAQ
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I believe that Senator Daschle will join me
on the floor shortly because he and I would like to, in effect, have a
joint statement with regard to Iraq because we want the message to be
unambiguous, very clear to America and to our allies around the world,
and to Iraq about our attitude and what our intentions are with regard
to this very important matter.
I just had a call from Senator John Warner, who is in Russia today
along with Senator Carl Levin. They are escorting Secretary of Defense
Bill Cohen. They have already been to six countries since they were in
Germany. I believe perhaps even the Senator from Arizona, the Presiding
Officer, was there. They have gone throughout the Arab world, and now
they are in Russia.
He tells me that he believes that when they return, Secretary Cohen
and the two Senators will bring a great deal of helpful information to
the Senate and to the American people about what they have heard in the
Arab world and what they have heard from our allies in those areas'
meetings. They believe that they will be able to answer some of the
very important questions that Senators have been asking.
So we will look forward to their return.
I had hoped that we could get to the point where we could pass a
resolution this week on Iraq. But we really developed some physical
problems, if nothing else. Senator Warner and Senator Levin would like
very much to be a part of the discussion about what the situation will
be and how we should proceed on Iraq. They would like to be here. And
other Senators are necessarily not going to be able to be here beyond
this afternoon.
So we have decided that the most important thing is not to move so
quickly but to make sure that we have had all the right questions asked
and answered and that we have available to us the latest information
about what is expected or what is going to be happening with our allies
in the world.
I was noting, I say to Senator Daschle, that I just talked to Senator
Warner in Russia, and he was telling me that Secretary Cohen and
Senator Warner and Senator Levin are looking forward to coming back and
giving us a full report on their trip to the Arab world. Now they are
in Russia today.
Mr. President, I have no doubt that the entire world is watching the
current crisis between Iraq and the international community unfold.
This is another showdown caused by Saddam Hussein.
The Iraqi dictator has decided that his weapons-of-mass-destruction
program is more important than the welfare of his own people. At a time
when we have been getting reports--in fact, we have seen children
suffering from malnutrition--this dictator has been building $1.5
billion in additional palaces. He has already endured 7 years of
sanctions so that he can develop biological, chemical, and nuclear
weapons --and the means to deliver them.
This is a very serious matter. For some time we--and I mean America
and our allies--have been working to develop a resolution on Iraq that
has broad bipartisan support and also one that would bring the
situation under control there by diplomatic efforts hoping to avoid
military action. But that has not happened yet.
I believe we are moving toward a consensus in the Senate on a number
of the key issues that must be addressed as we look to the future. And
here they are.
First of all, Saddam Hussein does pose a real threat to the region
and to
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the entire world. I believe the Senate recognizes that. I hope that the
American people recognize that. This is not a hypothetical danger that
has been dreamed up by some armchair strategists. There is a long track
record in this area of actions by Saddam Hussein. He poses a clear and
present danger without equal in the post-cold-war-world. He is
dangerous. He is a threat to his neighbors. He is a destabilizing force
in the whole region. And, yes, he is actually a threat all over the
world including the United States. This is a man who has already
invaded two of his neighbors. Iraq has used chemical weapons inside and
outside its borders. It has launched missiles against Saudi Arabia and
against Israel. Hussein tried to murder former President George Bush in
1993.
Now, we should not make any mistake and think that a military action,
if it comes to that, is going to rehabilitate Saddam Hussein or even
eliminate him. He does not have any desire to join the civilized world,
apparently, and he has shown that he can survive even when the whole
world has concerns with his conduct and has taken unified action to
stop his aggression.
Second, I think there is a consensus in the Senate that military
force is justified if diplomatic actions fail in responding to the
threat that Saddam Hussein poses. The threat is serious and our
response must be serious.
Now, any military force that is used does entail risks, to our
military, to our allies and even to our country if there is an attempt
at retaliation. The American people need to understand that, and we
need to think about it carefully. And we need to talk about the risks
that are involved. That is one reason why, when we bring up a
resolution, if it is necessary--and I assume it will be--we must make
sure that every Senator who wants to be heard can be heard.
I remember when we had a similar debate back in the early nineties. I
think some 80 Senators spoke. Now, this time we won't have 500,000
troops amassed on the ground ready to go in, but it is still a very
serious matter, and I want to make sure that we don't try to restrict
Senators. In fact, we could not. Senator Daschle knows if we asked
unanimous consent to bring this resolution up today and vote on it in 4
hours, we would not get it; the Senate is known for its deliberate
actions. And the longer I stay in the Senate, the more I have learned
to appreciate it. It does help to give us time to think about the
potential problems and the risks and the ramifications and to, frankly,
press the administration. I feel better this week than I did last week
because of the responses we are getting about how this is being thought
out and what would be the military action and what will be the long-
term plans to deal with Saddam Hussein. We are beginning to get some
answers now. I believe the administration is thinking harder about what
those answers should be because the Senate, Republicans and Democrats,
has raised these questions, not in a critical way, not in a threatening
way, but in an honest way of saying, have you thought about this? What
about this approach? Can we do more? I think that has served a very
positive purpose.
Some people have said to me, even back in my own State, ``This is not
a threat to us. Let them deal with that over there.'' Who? Who is going
to deal with it? If America does not lead, who is going to lead? Nobody
else.
Now, our allies can, should, and, I believe, will join us if action
is necessary. But we are going to have to lead the way. We are going to
have to make the tough decisions. And people need to understand that
this threat could even apply to us. While it may be a direct threat of
a Scud missile in the region with a chemical warhead even, it could
very easily be a threat to Paris or some city in the U.S. involving
anthrax that's been produced by Saddam Hussein.
These are terrible things to even think about, but you are dealing
with a person who has already used terrible actions against his own
people. And so he is not so far removed. We are the ones who have to
provide the direction. And we have to make sure people understand it is
a threat to the whole world.
In my view, the decisive use of force against Iraq coupled with the
long-term strategy to eliminate the threat entails less risks in the
long run than allowing Saddam Hussein's actions and ambitions to go
unchecked. You cannot do it when you are dealing with a situation like
this. In the words of former Secretary of State Jim Baker, ``The only
thing we shouldn't do is do nothing.'' We cannot allow that to be the
result or what we do is nothing.
The administration has agreed with us that funding for the operations
in and around Iraq require supplemental appropriations. We had very
grave concerns by the Senator from Alaska, Mr. Stevens, and Senator
Domenici about how much will this cost? How is it going to be paid for?
We cannot continue to say ``just take it out of your hide'' to the
Pentagon; it is having an effect on morale, quality of life, on
readiness and modernization. We already have a very high tempo for our
military men and women in the Navy and Air Force. We are satisfied that
they now have made a commitment that they are going to come up and ask
for funding for both these purposes, in Bosnia and, if necessary, in
Iraq. And these will be emergency requests so it will not come out of
necessary improvements in barracks or spare parts for aircraft, which
are very important.
There is a consensus on seriously examining now I believe long-term
policy options to increase the pressure on Saddam Hussein. The
administration and Congress and our allies all look forward to dealing
with a post-Saddam regime. But the question is how to get there.
That is intended not to be a threat or say we should violate the law;
it is intended to start the discussion, start the thinking about how
can we increase these pressures. And we have to have a strategy to deal
with whatever comes after the military option. Many things have been
suggested. Toughen sanctions--not loosen sanctions, toughen sanctions.
What about an embargo, what about expanding no-fly, no-drive zones?
What about the support of opposition forces?
There is a long list of suggestions, some that I will not even put in
the record here, but they are worth thinking about. Our model should be
the Reagan doctrine of rollback, not the Truman doctrine of containment
in this instance. And I don't mean that as critically as it sounds. It
is just that there are two different doctrines, and the doctrine here
should be rollback, not containment.
Despite our areas of agreement that we have clearly reached--Senator
Daschle and I have been working together making sure every word is
sanitized in the potential resolution--it is obvious we cannot get it
done this week for physical reasons as much as anything else. And I
remind my colleagues and the American people it was 5 months after
Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, 5 months before Congress passed a
resolution authorizing the use of force to expel him. In this case, we
have a bipartisan effort, trying to make sure that the right thing is
going to be done and that the right language is developed. Unlike what
we had in the early 1990's when the Speaker and majority leader were
working to defeat the administration's policy, you now have a Speaker
and a majority leader and the Democratic leader and the minority leader
in the House all working together with the administration to make sure
that the language is right and that the actions are right.
Yes, more time may be needed for diplomacy and more time to think
about the long-term plans, but a point will come when time will run out
and action must go forward. When that comes, when U.S. Armed Forces are
sent into harm's way, by the President of the United States, they will
have the backing of the Senate and the American people. If the
President makes the decision to deploy military force against the
threat posed by Iraq, America will be united, united and praying for
the safety of our men and women in uniform, united in hoping casualties
are kept to a minimum, and united in hoping for and supporting a
successful effort.
I just want to make that point clear today. Nobody should interpret
the fact that we don't vote on a resolution today as meaning that we
are not united in the fundamental principles. We are. But we want to
make sure that when we do take military action, we have thought about
all the ramifications and the resolution that we come up with will have
the involvement of
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100 Senators, with 100 Senators being present and voting, and that
every word is the appropriate word that reflects the best interests of
the American people.
So I am pleased to stand here this afternoon and make this statement
and to assure my colleagues that I will continue to work with every
Senator on both sides of the aisle to make sure we take the appropriate
action, if it is necessary, when we return week after next.
Mr. President, I yield the floor and I am looking forward to hearing
Senator Daschle's comments on this subject.
Mr. President, I observe the absence of a quorum momentarily.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Gorton). The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Democratic leader is recognized.
Mr. DASCHLE. I begin by complimenting the majority leader on his
remarks and on the manner in which he has conducted himself and his
leadership with regard to this issue. He has noted the strong desire on
the part of all four leaders in Congress to demonstrate with absolute
clarity the need for bipartisanship when it comes to sending as clear a
message as we can. His remarks and his actions have demonstrated that,
and I support fully his decision not to bring the resolution to the
floor today.
Obviously, there are times when matters of this import need to be
fully discussed and must by their nature involve every Senator. Two of
the most important Senators to provide contributions to this debate are
traveling on one of the most important missions related to this whole
exercise and cannot be with us today.
In addition to that, we continue to consult with colleagues on both
sides of the aisle in an effort to come up with the clearest and most
accurate statement with regard to the position to be expressed by the
Senate. So for all of those reasons and many others, Senator Lott and I
will continue to work with our colleagues and schedule a time that will
provide for the opportunity for all Senators to be heard and for debate
to take place on this very important matter.
But, so that there will be no misunderstanding, we come to the floor
today jointly--and we will be joined by several others--to speak with
one voice to condemn in the strongest possible terms Iraq's refusal to
comply with international law. To condemn Iraq's refusal to fulfill its
commitments to the international community. To send a clear message to
Saddam Hussein that American resolve to force Iraqi compliance with
international law and their own commitments is unwavering; to make
clear that U.S. national interests are threatened if Saddam Hussein is
allowed to thwart the international community's efforts to shut down
his development of weapons of mass destruction programs.
Although Senator Lott and I come from different political parties and
may differ on issues from time to time, there ought to be no mistake
about our position today. We stand united in sending the message to
Iraq that it has no option other than to comply with the terms of the
U.N. Security Council resolutions.
We have chosen to speak together today to send this important message
as the President and members of his Administration work diligently to
demonstrate to Iraq and the world the strength of our commitment to
international security. It is a demonstration of our resolve--which is
shared by the American people--that Iraq shall not be permitted to
develop and deploy an arsenal of frightening chemical and biological
weapons under any circumstances.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 requires Iraq to disclose and
destroy its weapons of mass destruction capabilities and to commit
unconditionally to never reviving those programs. Resolution 687
established the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to verify
Iraqi compliance with these provisions and required that international
economic sanctions against Iraq remain in place until those conditions
are met.
The Iraqi government has repeatedly and deliberately impeded UNSCOM's
attempts to ensure that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs are
destroyed. The Iraqis have consistently thwarted UNSCOM's efforts to
conduct their inspections unhindered--despite clear concerns about
Iraq's remaining chemical and biological weapons capabilities. UNSCOM
personnel have served admirably under extremely difficult, and often
dangerous, conditions. In the face of concerted Iraqi intimidation and
deception, UNSCOM has discovered numerous violations of U.N. Security
Council resolutions requiring an end to Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction programs. In fact, more Iraqi chemical and biological
weapons have been destroyed as a result of UNSCOM's inspections than
during all of Operation Desert Storm.
Iraq's actions pose a serious and continued threat to international
peace and security. It is a threat we must address. Saddam is a proven
aggressor who has time and again turned his wrath on his neighbors and
on his own people. Iraq is not the only nation in the world to possess
weapons of mass destruction, but it is the only nation with a leader
who has used them against his own people.
It is essential that a dictator like Saddam not be allowed to evade
international strictures and wield frightening weapons of mass
destruction. As long as UNSCOM is prevented from carrying out its
mission, the effort to monitor Iraqi compliance with Resolution 687
becomes a dangerous shell game. Neither the United States nor the
global community can afford to allow Saddam Hussein to continue on this
path.
Secretaries Albright and Cohen, in their trips to the Persian Gulf
and elsewhere, are sending the important message that, while the United
States certainly prefers a diplomatic course, we are willing to use
force to block Iraq's ability to develop and use an arsenal of chemical
and biological weapons if diplomatic efforts do not achieve this
result. While there are clear differences among the leaders they have
talked with, they have found unanimity on at least 2 issues.
First, U.N. weapons inspectors must have unfettered access to suspect
Iraqi sites. Second, Saddam Hussein is solely responsible for creating
this crisis by not adhering to the Security Council resolutions in the
first place.
The foreign ministers of the 6-member Gulf Cooperation Council--Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar--stated
this most clearly just yesterday:
The current crisis is a direct result of Baghdad's
reluctance to cooperate with United Nations weapons
inspectors and its determination to defy the will of the
international community with respect to the elimination of
its arsenal of weapons of mass destruction . . . The only
solution to spare the people of Iraq additional hardship and
dangers is the Iraqi regime's implementation of the U.N.
resolutions which it had previously accepted.
The United States continues to exhaust all diplomatic efforts to
reverse the Iraqi threat. But absent immediate Iraqi compliance with
Resolution 687, the security threat doesn't simply persist--it worsens.
Saddam Hussein must understand that the United States has the resolve
to reverse that threat by force, if force is required And, I must say,
it has the will.
Secretary Albright sent the message in its purest form: ``Saddam does
not have a menu of choices, he has one: Iraq must comply with the U.N.
Security Council resolutions and provide U.N. inspectors with the
unfettered access they need to do their job.''
We are here today to affirm that we and the American people stand
with the President and the international community in an effort to end
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs and preserve our vital
national and international security interests.
The Senate has been working on a concurrent resolution expressing
Congress's concern about Iraq's refusal to cooperate with U.N. weapons
inspectors and urging the President to respond to this threat. In doing
so, the Senate has grappled with some of the very difficult issues
surrounding Congress's role in the decision to use military force.
Perhaps too much had been made of the differences among Members of
Congress about exactly how to approach this problem. That is
understandable. There are always ways
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in which to change the wording. But there is no way in which to change
the message. The message is fundamentally and unequivocally clear, the
most important message of all. Iraq must comply. There is no choice. We
stand united in our determination to do whatever is necessary to
achieve our goal. Iraq must comply. The United States has the resolve
to ensure that compliance and we stand united today in an effort to
articulate that very clear message as loudly, as unequivocally, and in
as much of a bipartisan way as we can.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, no one should doubt for a moment the
resolve of the United States to respond with force, if necessary, to
Iraq's continued flagrant violation of United Nations Security Council
resolutions.
Vigorous diplomacy has been pursued over the past three months, but,
thus far, Saddam Hussein has shown that he has no interest in a
peaceful solution on anything other than his own terms. We cannot allow
this tyrant to prevail over the will of the international community.
Our national security would be seriously compromised by a failure to
stand up to the challenge he has confronted us with.
Our strategic objective is to contain Saddam Hussein and curtail his
ability to produce the most deadly weapons known to mankind--weapons
that he has unleashed with chilling alacrity against his own people.
Left unchecked, Saddam Hussein would in short order be in a position to
threaten and blackmail our regional allies, our troops, and, indeed,
our nation.
Let me take just a moment to recount how we have come to the point
where military force may be employed in the near future.
For nearly seven years, Iraq has engaged in a cat and mouse game with
the international inspectors that comprise the United Nations Special
Commission. It has obstructed UNSCOM from fulfilling its mandate to
monitor, investigate, and destroy Iraq's capacity to produce weapons of
mass destruction.
In spite of Iraq's tenacious efforts at concealment and obstruction,
UNSCOM has uncovered and destroyed more weapons of mass destruction
than were destroyed during the entire gulf war. UNSCOM has revealed
Iraqi lie after Iraqi lie.
Last October, Iraq threatened to expel all American members of the
special commission. Ambassador Richard Butler, the chairman of UNSCOM,
responded appropriately by withdrawing all inspectors rather than
having his staff of professionals segregated on the basis of their
nationality.
The ensuing stand-off led to diplomatic intervention by Russia.
Eventually, Iraq relented by allowing UNSCOM back into the country.
But the central issue of unconditional and unfettered access by
UNSCOM was left unresolved. Ambassador Butler visited Baghdad in
December to try to resolve this issue, but to no avail.
Then, last month, Iraq refused to cooperate with a team of inspectors
investigating Iraq's efforts at concealment. It made preposterous
charges that the American head of the team, Scott Ritter, was a spy.
During a subsequent visit by Ambassador Butler, Iraq struck a defiant
note. It vowed never to open so-called ``presidential and sovereign
sites'' to inspection. In a recent speech, Saddam Hussein stated his
decision to expel UNSCOM by May 20 if sanctions remain in place.
The United Nations Security Council has repeatedly condemned Iraq's
non-compliance. Since October of last year, on seven separate
occasions, the Security Council has demanded that Iraq fulfill its
obligations.
But Saddam Hussein has made clear that it is more important to him to
retain the capacity to produce weapons of mass destruction than it is
to comply with the resolutions that would allow sanctions to be lifted.
Once again he has proven what little regard he has for the suffering of
his people.
The international community has exhibited enormous patience with
Iraq. But that patience has reached its limit.
Time has run out. If Iraq does not comply immediately and
unconditionally with United Nations Security Council resolutions
demanding unfettered access for U.N. weapons inspectors, I believe that
President Clinton will have no choice but to order the use of air
power.
Unfortunately, we have learned over the past several years that the
Iraqi Government, and more specifically its leader, only seem to
understand the blunt language of force.
In recent weeks, several questions and criticisms have been raised
with respect to President Clinton's policy. I would like to take a
moment to respond to some of these comments.
Questions have been asked about our objectives. The objectives have
been defined precisely. They are to curtail and delay Saddam Hussein's
capacity to produce and deliver weapons of mass destruction and his
ability to threaten his neighbors. We have been told by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff that a military plan has been developed that would
fulfill these objectives.
In a sense, the international coalition now assembling forces in the
Persian Gulf will accomplish through the use of force what UNSCOM would
be doing were it allowed to do its job. Secretary Cohen has told us
that there is no substitute for having UNSCOM on the ground, but we are
left with little choice if UNSCOM is prevented from carrying out its
duties.
When the objectives have been explained, the next question that
arises is what are the next steps. But this question is based upon the
flawed premise that the use of force reflects a new policy. In fact,
the use of force for the purposes outlined by the President is an
integral part of the long-standing policy of containing Iraq.
Containment is a very unsatisfying policy at an emotional level. It
lacks finality and it requires patience and staying power. But it meets
our strategic objective of preventing Iraq from threatening our
national security interests.
Containment is the best of three bad options available to us. The
other two options would be to do nothing, or to send in several hundred
thousand ground troops to occupy Iraq. Neither of these policies is
viable.
Doing nothing would encourage Iraqi defiance and lead to a complete
collapse of the constraints that have been placed upon Iraqi behavior
since the end of the gulf war. It would be the surest way to
rehabilitate Saddam Hussein.
Just as unpalatable is the prospect of sending in several hundred
thousand ground troops to change the Iraqi regime. I believe that there
is little support for such an operation in the Congress or the public.
It would also raise a series of questions:
Would we be prepared to occupy and rebuild Iraq over a period of
several years?
Would we be prepared for the real possibility that a march on Baghdad
might lead Saddam Hussein to unleash his weapons of mass destruction?
Would any other nation support us for an action that is clearly
outside the bounds of security council resolutions? To this point those
resolutions have provided the basis for all U.S. military action
against Iraq since the gulf war.
In the end, the only policy that stands up to scrutiny is that of
containment, which the Clinton administration has followed and the Bush
administration before it followed.
Finally, another question that has arisen is whether the President
should obtain specific authorization to use force. I believe that the
President would be wise to obtain such authorization.
The executive branch contends that it already has sufficient legal
authority, under Public Law 102-1--the use of force resolution passed
by Congress before the gulf war. The argument, as I understand it, may
be summarized as follows:
In Public Law 102-1, Congress authorized the President to use United
States Armed Forces:
``Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678.
Security Council Resolution 678, passed by the Council in November,
1990, authorized members of the United Nations to ``use all necessary
means to uphold and implement Resolution 660 (1990) (The resolution
which called for Iraqi forces to leave Kuwait) and all subsequent
relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in
the [Persian Gulf] area.''
Following the gulf war, in April, 1991, the Security Council passed
Resolution 687, which set the terms of the cease-
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fire and required Iraq to accept the destruction or removal, under
international supervision, of its weapons of mass destruction. By its
terms, it reaffirmed Resolution 678, and all prior council resolutions
regarding Iraq.
Because Security Council Resolution 678 provided broad authority for
nations to enforce ``all subsequent relevant resolutions'' and ``to
restore peace and security in the area,'' and, because peace and
security has not been restored to the Persian Gulf--indeed, Iraq is
currently in violation of the cease-fire resolution--then the
resolutions from 1990 and 1991, both by the Security Council and
Congress, the administration contends, would still have legal force.
Moreover, Congress has never modified or repealed Public Law 102-1,
so absent further congressional action, and absent the restoration of
peace and security to the gulf, the President still has the legal
authority to use military action against Iraq. Or so the
administration's argument goes.
As a strong advocate of Congress exercising its powers under the
Constitution in authorizing the use of force, I must admit to some
skepticism about this theory. In my own research of the question, I
have consulted several eminent constitutional scholars. My conclusion
is that the administration's argument may be legally tenable--if barely
so--and would probably be sustained in a court of law.
But merely because the position may be legally sufficient--and the
courts are notoriously deferential to the executive in matters of war
and peace (if they agree to consider the case at all)--I do not believe
it would be wise precedent, or wise policy, of the President to proceed
with renewed military action against Iraq without a clear
authorization, newly enacted by this Congress. Indeed, because the
question is a close one--and because we have a different President than
we did in 1991, and a significant change in the membership of Congress
since that time--it would be prudent for President Clinton to seek a
new expression of legal authorization from Congress.
Mr. President, we should all hope for a genuine diplomatic solution
to this stand-off, but no one should doubt our resolve to use force if
it becomes necessary.
We have little choice in this matter. Important principles and vital
national interests are at stake.
First and foremost, an Iraq left free to develop weapons of mass
destruction would pose a grave threat to our national security. The
current regime in Iraq has repeatedly demonstrated its aggressive
tendencies toward its neighbors. It has also displayed a callous
willingness to use chemical weapons to achieve its aims.
Recently, we have heard chilling reports of possible biological
weapons experiments on humans. An UNSCOM Inspector has spoken of
information that points to a secret biological weapons production
facility. And Ambassador Richard Butler has told us that Iraq could
well have missile warheads filled with anthrax capable of striking Tel
Aviv.
An asymmetric capability of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons
gives an otherwise weak country the power to intimidate and blackmail.
We risk sending a dangerous signal to other would-be proliferators if
we do not respond decisively to Iraq's transgressions. Conversely, a
firm response would enhance deterrence and go a long way toward
protecting our citizens from the pernicious threat of proliferation.
Second, a failure to uphold United Nations resolutions would diminish
the credibility of the Security Council. As much as we might like to
deal with every threat we face on our own, in reality it is impractical
and unrealistic. Instinctively, we all know that we are much better off
when we have the support of the international community when facing
common threats.
But in order for the Security Council to respond effectively to
threats to international peace and security that might arise in the
future, it is important that those who would violate the will of the
international community pay a steep price for their actions. Iraq
offers an important test case for the Security Council. Capitulating to
Iraqi defiance could spell a dismal future for the Security Council in
handling the central matters of international peace and security for
which it was created.
I hope that the Russians, French, and Chinese keep in mind that it is
not in their interest to see the authority of the Security Council
diminished.
It is difficult to overstate the stakes involved.
Fateful decisions will be made in the days and weeks ahead. At issue
is nothing less than the fundamental question of whether or not we can
keep the most lethal weapons known to mankind out of the hands of an
unreconstructed tyrant and aggressor who is in the same league as the
most brutal dictators of this century.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I, too, want to commend our two
leaders for working together on this very important issue. I think all
of us believe that it is our responsibility, as the U.S. Senate, to
work in a bipartisan way with the President of the United States on an
issue as grave as attacking another country and sending our troops into
harm's way. I believe the administration will work with this Congress
and I believe we will have a comfort level that there is a plan and
that our troops will be sent on a mission that is very clear. That is
what this is all about.
The message we are sending to Saddam Hussein today is clear: You may
either join the community of nations, abide by the resolutions of the
United Nations, or there will be serious consequences. I don't know
anyone who disagrees with that proposition.
We have often debated the importance of international arms control
agreements, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty among others. What is clear is that without the resolve
of the international community to enforce these standards, they are
meaningless. Saddam Hussein has threatened the peace in the Middle East
before. His people have suffered mightily for it. But even at that time
he did not deploy weapons of mass destruction. We cannot provide him a
second chance.
International inspectors have concluded that he is continuing to
develop an arsenal of these horrible weapons. He has used them in the
past, so why wouldn't we believe that he would use them again, unless
he is stopped? Just to put this in perspective, when you talk about
chemical weapons or biological weapons, someone may say, ``So, what is
that? Does that make that much difference? Is that really something
that could harm the neighbors of Iraq, or harm the people of any other
country?''
Anthrax is one of these weapons. A few pounds--think of what that is.
It's something that is about this big. A few pounds of anthrax could
wipe out a city the size of Washington, DC. We know that Saddam Hussein
has the capability to produce this type of weapon. We know he has Scud
missiles, we have seen them. Put that on top of a Scud missile and what
does that do to the security of the neighbors of Iraq?
Chemical or biological agents could be introduced into the water
supply of any city and kill thousands of people. That is the kind of
weapon we are talking about. So, if you are talking about, is this
really an issue? Is this something that we need to stop? I just ask
you, if a few pounds of this kind of agent can kill the inhabitants of
a city the size of Washington, DC, who in the world is safe, if someone
is manufacturing these and has used them on innocent people before?
The United States led in the gulf war. We will lead again. And we
will do so with the support of the American people. We are going to
stand against nuclear, chemical or biological weapons in the hands of
someone so irresponsible as Saddam Hussein, who has a record that is
known of killing innocent people. We look for support from the
international community as we had it in Desert Storm, and as I hope we
can count on for the future.
We must not let there be a doubt of the resolve of the American
people. Saddam Hussein must know that we speak with one voice. We need
the resumption of inspections, for Saddam Hussein to show that he wants
to be a part of the international community. Military force is
justified as part of an overall strategy. Our leader has said that.
What Congress will be looking
[[Page S713]]
for, what the American people will be looking for from the President
and his advisers, is an overall strategy so we know what we are looking
at, what our troops are going to be asked to do; so that we can provide
our troops with all the means they need to do the job and the
protection they need when they are in the field.
I hope that part of an overall strategy will be the beginning of the
communication directly with the people of Iraq, with the good and
decent people who have fled the country, to say we want to support you
and we want you to know that the weapons that are being held could be
totally deadly to you, to your children, and to the people that live
throughout the country of Iraq. What we want to do is make that a safe
area so the people will be free and so they can join the community of
nations for a lasting peace in the Middle East. Our forces are
prepared. They will be capable of dealing a harsh lesson once again. I
hope it will not be necessary.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I want to express my personal gratitude
to the Senate majority leader, to the Senate Democratic leader, to my
colleague from Texas who has just spoken for their eloquent statements,
but really more for the unmistakable message that they send, which is
that there are ultimately times of conflict abroad that involve the
vital interests of the United States, as the current situation in Iraq
does, no Democrats, no Republicans, only Americans standing side by
side in support of the Commander in Chief and all those Americans in
uniform who serve under him.
That, I hope, is the message that will be heard in Baghdad, most
importantly. If the Commander in Chief of the United States decides
that military force is necessary to be employed against Iraq, the
overwhelming majority of Members of the U.S. Senate will stand strongly
behind him and behind those American personnel in uniform who will
carry out that policy.
Mr. President, the statements of the majority leader and the
Democratic leader are the finest examples of bipartisanship and
statesmanship. They remind us, though there may be disagreements in
this Chamber on partisan lines, that, again, when challenged, when it
comes to America's vital interests abroad, we will stand together above
party lines.
The administration has been very accessible, very forthcoming in
consulting with both Houses of Congress about the challenge that Saddam
Hussein and Iraq represent to us and to the security of our allies in
the region and our soldiers in the region and of the world in general.
I think we have to express our appreciation to the administration for
that dialog that continues.
What is at stake in Iraq today? For one, something that might be
considered quaint in some quarters, meaningless in other quarters,
international agreements are at stake, agreements to end the gulf war,
promises made by Saddam Hussein about allowing inspections which would
enable us--the world--to guarantee that he was keeping his promises to
disarm, a request justifiably made by the victorious forces in
Operation Desert Storm and required of those who were vanquished in
that conflict. So it is the integrity of these agreements, in the first
instance, that is at stake.
Secondly, there are consequences, which is the threat that Saddam
Hussein will use those weapons of mass destruction that we know he has;
that he will use the ballistic missile, the delivery system capacity to
deliver those weapons of mass destruction that we know he has in
rudiment and is developing even further.
We know, as one of my colleagues said a moment ago--I believe it was
Senator Daschle--unlike other leaders in the world, including
dictatorial leaders of rogue nations who possess weapons of mass
destruction, this particular leader, Saddam Hussein, has used those
weapons against his neighbor, Iran, in the Iran-Iraq war in the
eighties, and against the Kurdish population of his own country.
So our anger, our anxiety, our unease, our judgment that we have
vital interests at stake is not theoretical. It is based on a course of
behavior by this particular leader of this particular nation. We went
through the entire cold war with enormous amounts of nuclear power in
our hands and in the hands of the Soviet leaders, but there was, in the
end, a kind of understanding based on a strange form of civilized
premise, which is that those weapons would not ultimately be used, and
they were not ultimately used. I don't think we can reach that same
conclusion about this leader based on his own course of behavior.
There is a way in which there is a line to be drawn in this case,
just as we drew a line in the post-cold-war-world, when Saddam invaded
Kuwait and threatened our neighbors and vital economic interests and
energy supplies in that region and we acted, reacted and reacted
forcefully and rolled him back. Just as in Bosnia, we saw ethnic
conflict could divide Europe and create broader conflict there, and we
acted and stopped it. So, too, in this case, we are called upon to show
that we are willing to draw a line, a preventive line, against those
who possess weapons of mass destruction--chemical and biological; some
have called them the poor nations' nuclear weapons--that we will draw a
line and say we won't tolerate it. We are going to act to impose a
regime of promises to disarm and if those promises are not kept, the
international community will act to enforce them.
We have vital interests at stake in the region. We have thousands of
soldiers there within range of these weapons of Saddam Hussein. We have
allies in the region in the moderate Arab nations and in Israel, and we
have vital economic interests in the oil supply in that region.
Mr. President, the fact is that all of those interests, all that we
have at stake there--international promises made by Saddam as a
condition to the end of the cold war, the threat of weapons of mass
destruction and delivery systems, the vital interests in the region,
the necessity to draw a line against the use of chemical and biological
poisons, which all of the military experts tell us will characterize
and intensify the security threats to our region and most of the rest
of the world in the next century--all of those threats are not just to
the United States, they are surely to our allies in the region and are
to most of the rest of the world.
That is perhaps why so many nations have come to our side as we face
the reality that the United Nations, not the United States, tell us of
the refusal of Saddam Hussein to allow the inspections that he promised
and, therefore, the fact that we have gone now more than 5 months with
those sites uninspected and day by day the threat rises.
That is why our closest and most steadfast ally, Britain, have joined
us, are ready to stand and fly side by side with us. But they are not
alone. Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, Bahrain, Kuwait, Israel and
a growing number of others are prepared to join us.
As much as we are heartened by this support, we don't see the same
range of the coalition that we had leading up to the gulf war. Maybe
that is understandable because the threat that the current crisis poses
is not as immediate and accomplished, it is mostly imminent. In 1990,
Saddam Hussein invaded his neighbor Kuwait and threatened Saudi Arabia
and the rest of the Persian Gulf states, oil-producing states. In that
circumstance, with a danger that was real and experienced, it was
easier to assemble the broad-based coalition that we did.
Today, the threat may not be as clear to other nations of the world,
but its consequences are even more devastating potentially than the
real threat, than the realized pain of the invasion of Kuwait in 1990,
because the damage that can be inflicted by Saddam Hussein and Iraq,
under his leadership, with weapons of mass destruction is incalculable;
it is enormous.
Therefore, I hope, though the circumstance may not be as clear, that
other nations that have not yet forcefully expressed their willingness
to stand with us and Britain and the other allies I mentioned will come
to an understanding of that. It has been my hope all along that if the
United States continued to lead, as we have, that the full range of
coalition allies would, once again, stand by our side.
I always remember the Biblical evocation which is, if the sound of
the
[[Page S714]]
trumpet is not clear, then who will follow in battle? If the sound of
the trumpet is clear, then I hope that the widest range of other
nations in the world will follow into battle, if that is necessary, not
simply to follow our leadership, but because their vital interests are
at stake, in the resolution of this problem.
Mr. President, I think the administration has made clear, and that is
why I believe there is broad support for the possible attacks that may
occur on Iraq, that its goals here are limited. If air attacks occur,
these are not acts of revenge, these are not punitive acts which have
no meaning. These would be acts and attacks that are aimed at
accomplishing what the inspections were supposed to accomplish, that
are aimed at accomplishing what the gulf war cease-fire agreement was
supposed to accomplish, which is the diminution and ultimately the
elimination of Iraq's capacity to wage chemical, biological or nuclear
war against its neighbors or ultimately anyone in the world. That
limited goal may not satisfy some people, but it is a reasonable goal
at this time, and it is a goal that I think ultimately and effectively
will enjoy the broadest support in the U.S. Senate.
Mr. President, there are those who say, ``Well, what next? What if
this doesn't work?'' I am confident it will work. When I say it will
work, I mean I have the confidence the United States military has the
capacity to strike at Iraq in a way that will, in fact, incapacitate,
debilitate, postpone the ability of that country under Saddam Hussein
to inflict damage on its neighbors with weapons of mass destruction. So
that goal will be accomplished.
I think the question of what is next is an appropriate topic of
discussion. Some people say we should pull back and wait and see what,
in that initial time of that military strike, if it occurs, it will
gain us, to see whether diplomacy can work again, to see if we can
build the fullness of the coalition and again confront Saddam with the
opportunity to comply with the promises he previously made.
Others, and I number myself among this group, are very skeptical of
that policy. Diplomacy is always preferable to the use of force, and
yet, I myself remain profoundly skeptical that an acceptable diplomatic
resolution to this conflict is possible.
It is a painful and sad conclusion, but it is based not on animus
toward that country, certainly not animus toward the people of Iraq,
but it is based on the record. The record I need not cite in detail,
but we know about the violent way in which Saddam Hussein seized power
in Iraq, eliminating those of his fellow Iraqis who were in his way,
about the violent and dictatorial way in which he has ruled. Life
doesn't matter when you stand in the way of him; of the means that he
used to conduct the war against Iran, including weapons of mass
destruction; of his invasion of Kuwait; of his flaunting of the very
agreements he made to end the gulf war; of the taunting of the
international community that he represents today.
Mr. President, if this were a domestic situation, a political
situation, and we were talking about criminal law in this country, we
have something in our law called ``three strikes and you are out,''
three crimes and you get locked up for good because we have given up on
you. I think Saddam Hussein has had more than three strikes in the
international, diplomatic, strategic and military community. So I have
grave doubts that a diplomatic solution is possible here.
What I and some of the Members of the Senate hope for is a longer-
term policy based on the probability that an acceptable diplomatic
solution is not possible, which acknowledges as the central goal the
changing of the regime in Iraq to bring to power a regime with which we
and the rest of the world can have trustworthy relationships. That is
not going to be simple. It is not going to come overnight. It involves
an effort to work with Iraqi opposition to Saddam Hussein, to use some
of the same methods that were used in the cold war, something as simple
and yet as effective as Radio Free Europe which spoke so powerfully to
the hopes and dreams of people who lived so long under the tyranny of
the Soviets, the Communists, and do the same for the people who live
under the tyranny of Saddam Hussein, to work with our allies to build
the kind of alternative that will raise our hopes for peace in that
region of the world.
Those discussions about what may follow an air attack on Iraq are
important. They are not easy. They deserve to be debated.
For now I think what is most important is that people of both parties
have come together on the floor of the Senate to speak to this
challenge to international law, to America's vital interests, and to
say, directly or indirectly, ``Mr. President, if you, as Commander in
Chief, act in this circumstance, in this crisis, you and the troops who
serve under you will have broad bipartisan support in the U.S.
Senate.''
I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.
(At the request of Mr. Daschle, the following statement was ordered
to be printed in the Record.)
iraq's threat to international peace and security
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I want to express my support for
President Clinton, in consultation with Congress and consistent with
the United States Constitution and laws, taking necessary and
appropriate actions to respond effectively to the threat posed by
Iraq's refusal to end its weapons of mass destruction programs.
I am presently in Moscow accompanying Secretary of Defense William
Cohen on a trip that has taken us to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, the
United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain.
I believe that it would be useful to briefly review some of the
historical record relating to Iraq's compliance with United Nations
Security Council resolutions leading up to the present crisis.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 660 of August 2, 1990,
condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and demanded that it withdraw
its forces from Kuwait. The Security Council's Resolution 678 of
November 29, 1990, affirmed by Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991,
authorized the use of all necessary means to restore international
peace and security. During this period and up to the actual use of
force by the United States-led coalition, there were a series of
diplomatic efforts to convince the government of Saddam Hussein to
withdraw from Kuwait. But Saddam Hussein didn't get it.
Following the Gulf War, the Security Council continued the economic
and weapons sanctions on Iraq that were imposed after it invaded
Kuwait. The Security Council conditioned the lifting of the sanctions
on Iraq's accepting the destruction, removal or rendering harmless,
under international supervision, of its nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons programs and all ballistic missiles with a range
greater than 150 kilometers. Despite the crippling international
economic sanctions that have been imposed on his country by the
international community, Saddam Hussein still didn't get it.
In recognition of the need to reduce the harm to the Iraqi people
that were caused by Saddam Hussein's misadventures, the Security
Council on August 15, 1991, in Resolution 706, authorized the sale of
Iraqi oil for the dual purpose of the payment of claims against Iraq
and for the purchase of foodstuffs, medicines, materials and supplies
for essential civilian humanitarian needs. That authorization was made
subject to the Security Council's approval of a plan for such sales and
for international monitoring and supervision to assure their equitable
distribution in all regions of Iraq and to all categories of the Iraqi
civilian population. But Saddam Hussein rejected the plan. It wasn't
until a Memorandum of Understanding on the plan was signed by Iraq and
the United Nations on May 20, 1996, and after several additional months
of contentious negotiations on implementation details, that Iraq
finally began pumping oil on December 10, 1996. That was more than 5
years after the Security Council authorized such action. Saddam Hussein
still didn't get it.
There were several major confrontations between Iraq and the
international community over access for United Nations Special
Commission on Iraq or UNSCOM inspectors between May 1991 and June 1993.
That pattern of confrontation was repeated on numerous occasions from
March 1996 to October 1997. Since that time, the situation worsened
until Iraq agreed that
[[Page S715]]
UNSCOM could return to Iraq unconditionally. Although UNSCOM
inspections resumed on November 21, 1997, access was denied to
presidential palaces and many other sites, and in mid-January 1998, an
inspection team headed by an American was blocked. By the way, there
are many dozens of these palaces. Some have grounds as large as
Washington D.C. They are suspect weapons of mass destruction sites as
long as access is denied.
And so we have reached the present moment in time in which Iraq is
blocking the UNSCOM inspectors from performing their mission on behalf
of the international community. Saddam Hussein still doesn't get it.
Mr. President, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan stated it
well at a press conference on February 2 when he said:
I think no one in the Council is pushing for the use of
force in the first instance. All those who are talking about
it are looking at it as a last resort. We hope that President
Saddam Hussein, for the sake of the Iraqi people, who have
suffered so much, will listen to the messages that are being
taken to him by these senior envoys from Russia, from France,
from people in the region, leaders in the region and
elsewhere, and really avoid taking his people through another
confrontation. They don't need it; the region doesn't need
it; and the world certainly can do without it. And so,
hopefully, the leadership will have the courage, the wisdom
and the concern for its own people to take us back from the
brink.
Mr. President, this crisis is due entirely to the actions of Saddam
Hussein. He alone is responsible. We all wish that diplomacy will cause
him to back down but history does not give me cause for optimism that
Saddam Hussein will finally get it.
Mr. President, Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction programs
and the means to deliver them are a menace to international peace and
security. They pose a threat to Iraq's neighbors, to U.S. forces in the
Gulf region, to the world's energy supplies, and to the integrity and
credibility of the United Nations Security Council.
Mr. President, as I noted earlier, I have visited a number of
countries in the Middle East with Secretary Cohen. In each country, we
have met with the head of state. We've had a series of very positive
meetings in every country. We're very confident that the support that
is needed and has been requested from these countries would be
forthcoming if diplomatic efforts fail to get Saddam Hussein to comply
and if there is a military strike. They all say, in various ways,
basically the same thing--he must comply with U.N. Security Council
resolutions and, if he fails to comply and if there is military action,
the responsibility is his and his alone since he has the key to a
peaceful solution, which is compliance with the U.N. resolutions. And
we are assured privately that we will have their support if diplomatic
efforts fail and if military action is necessary.
Mr. President, yesterday the Gulf Cooperation Council at the
Ministerial level issued a statement concerning the Iraqi crisis. I ask
that the text of the statement by printed in the Record at the
conclusion of my remarks. That statement included the following and I
quote:
The Ministerial Council has stressed that the current
crisis is created by the Iraqi regime alone as a result of
its non-cooperation with the international inspectors and its
challenge to the will of the international community. This
non-cooperation threatens Iraq with severe dangers. The
Council expresses its conviction that responsibility for the
result of this crisis falls on the Iraqi regime itself.
Further, General Zinni, the Commander in Chief of the Central Command
(CINCENT), has personally advised us that, in his professional opinion,
the United States has the support from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf
nations needed to meet the requirements of the CINCCENT plan to execute
a successful military operation, should it be necessary.
Mr. President, the use of military force is a measure of last resort.
The best choice of avoiding it will be if Saddam Hussein understands he
has no choice except to open up to UNSCOM inspections and destroy his
weapons of mass destruction. The use of military force may not result
in that desired result but it will serve to degrade Saddam Hussein's
ability to develop weapons of mass destruction and to threaten
international peace and security. Although not as useful as inspection
and destruction, it is still a worthy goal.
The statement follows:
Gulf Cooperation Council
The dangerous circumstances and the critical situation the
region is witnessing, which has resulted from the crisis
which the Iraqi regime has created with the international
inspectors belonging to the special committee assigned the
task of destroying Iraqi WMD, and by refusing to cooperate
with the international inspectors while not allowing them to
carry out their duties by imposing conditions and creating
obstacles represents a clear violation of the Security
Council resolutions related to Iraq's aggression on the state
of Kuwait.
The Ministerial Council has discussed these developments
and what they involve in terms of actual dangers which
threaten the security and stability of the region.
The Ministerial Council notes the international community's
consensus and its insistence on Iraq implementing the
Security Council resolutions in full; it places the
responsibility for the delays in implementing those
resolutions on Iraq. These delays will lead to continuation
of the sanctions imposed on Iraq under which the Iraqi people
suffer. The GCC people are concerned by this suffering and
place the responsibility for it on the Iraqi regime alone.
The Ministerial Council has stressed that the current
crisis is created by the Iraqi regime alone as a result of
its non-cooperation with the international inspectors and its
challenge to the will of the international community. This
non-cooperation threatens Iraq with sever dangers. The
council expresses its conviction that responsibility for the
result of this crisis falls on the Iraqi regime itself. The
council also stresses that it is not reasonable or acceptable
anymore that the Iraqi regime takes unilateral measures to
complicate conditions which threaten it with more severe and
dangerous consequences while at the same time placing the
responsibility for such measures on the Arab nation and the
international community.
Bearing in mind that the council has not abandoned and
continues to support any peaceful approach, the severe
results from what might happen are to be borne by the Iraqi
regime alone. In spite of the numerous efforts which a number
of Arab and international parties have exerted to convince
Iraq to retreat from its position by allowing the
international inspectors to carry out their duties without
any hindrance or condition, the Iraqi regime has continued
with its intransigence. Not caring about the dangerous
consequences which could result from this stance.
And in this tense environment, which presages dangers, the
council expresses its belief that the only way to save the
Iraqi people from the dangers and suffering to which they
have been subjected is by the Iraqi regime implementing the
resolutions which the international community has reached by
consensus and which Iraq has accepted, in accordance with the
program of this special commission the implementation of
which no one has disputed.
In order to avoid the Iraqi brotherly people being
subjected to the dangerous consequences of this crisis, the
council asks the Iraqi regime to yield to the efforts made to
implement all the commitments asked of it by removing the
barriers/obstacles which it has imposed on the tasks of the
international inspectors in preparation for reducing the
sanctions and lifting the suffering of the Iraqi brotherly
people.
The council stresses again its firm stance on the need to
preserve the independence and sovereignty of Iraq, its
territorial integrity and its regional security. The council
has decided to continue communications between the member
countries to follow the developments and this session will
remain open.
Mr. BYRD addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia, under the
previous order, has 30 minutes. The Senator from Maine was here before
he was. Will he let her----
Mr. BYRD. I am seeking recognition first.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia is recognized.
Mr. BYRD. Now, if the distinguished Senator from Maine would prefer
to go ahead, I would be happy to await her.
Ms. COLLINS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Does the Senator from West Virginia yield?
Mr. BYRD. I just wanted to establish my right under the rules--which
I sought recognition. The fact that another Senator has been here does
not mean anything under the rules, but I am happy to yield and have the
Senator proceed.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized for not
to exceed 10 minutes.
Ms. COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. President. And I thank the Senator from
West Virginia for his courtesy.
(The remarks of Ms. Collins pertaining to the introduction of S. 1648
are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills
and Joint Resolutions.'')
[[Page S716]]
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence
of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be
permitted to proceed in morning business until the Senator from West
Virginia comes to the floor to give his statement. I ask unanimous
consent for only 5 minutes or until such time as the Senator arrives.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
____________________