[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 10 (Wednesday, February 11, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S676-S677]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                            NATO ENLARGEMENT

  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I am pleased to report a very historic 
event that occurred today at the State Department at about 12 noon. The 
President of the United States, the Secretary of State, the Vice 
President, and the Foreign Ministers of the Czech Republic, Poland, and 
Hungary, were in attendance. At this event, the President signed an 
amendment to the Washington treaty--the NATO treaty--that has been or 
will shortly be delivered to the Senate asking that the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland become full members of NATO. This ceremony at the 
State Department completed the formal transmission from the President 
to this body for its advice and consent of the protocols of accession 
of those three countries into NATO.
  It was pointed out to me by the Vice President, as we were leaving 
the State Department ceremony, that it was this very day upon which the 
Yalta Conference ended some 50 years ago. It seems to me incredible 
that it is happening, but also that it has taken this long for to us 
rectify a serious historical error. At the ceremony, there were a 
number of things stated about why this was so important.
  We are moving very quickly this session to a momentous vote 
addressing America's security interests in Europe, which will not only 
affect us, but the next several generations of Americans. I refer to 
the addition of new allies to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
Recognizing that the protocols would be referred to the Foreign 
Relations Committee for its review,
  The committee, under Chairman Helms' leadership, has been holding a 
series of comprehensive hearings since October on the pros and cons of 
enlarging NATO.
  Beginning with Secretary of State Albright, we heard testimony from 
senior Clinton administration and former executive branch officers, 
retired ambassadors and generals, and distinguished academics and 
foreign policy experts--most in favor of, but some in opposition to 
expansion.
  The Committee also invited public testimony from all citizens 
concerned with this issue, welcoming veterans groups, scholars, and 
representatives of the American Baltic, Central and East European, and 
Jewish communities. Opinion among all witnesses ran four to one in 
favor of embracing the Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs as NATO allies.
  With the Protocols now in hand, the Committee will hold one more 
hearing with Secretary of State Albright, Secretary of Defense Cohen, 
and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Shelton on February 24.
  The following week, the Committee is expected to markup and vote on 
the Resolution of Ratification. I anticipate that the Committee will 
overwhelmingly recommend consideration of the Resolution by the full 
Senate. The Majority Leader has indicated that consideration should 
begin in March, after action on campaign finance reform.
  Mr. President, rather than giving a detailed statement now on the 
many benefits to America of NATO enlargement, I wish only to enunciate 
a few central themes upon which I will expand as Senate consideration 
of these vital protocols approaches.
  The first thesis is that, as NATO's leader, America must ensure the 
Alliance moves beyond its Cold War mission. The status quo is 
tantamount to declaring NATO a non-performing asset.
  Internally, NATO is already adapting to address different threats to 
peace, now that a massive military strike from the East is highly 
unlikely. The Alliance is placing smaller, smarter, more mobile forces 
under a streamlined command system with a new strategic concept. This 
will allow rapid action, including beyond the borders of NATO, such as 
our current mission in Bosnia.
  Enlargement is part of NATO's external transformation. This 
transformation is designed to widen the zone of stability, deter new 
threats of ethnic conflict, eliminate new divisions or ``zones of 
influence,'' and promote common action against weapons proliferation 
and transfer, terrorism, and organized crime. NATO's open door to 
expansion helps provide the confidence and inspiration for continued 
democratization and economic development in the former Soviet States 
and in Eastern and Central Europe.

  Admission of new allies is the most solemn in the spectrum of new 
security relationships NATO has undertaken throughout Europe and the 
former Soviet Union, since the admission of Spain, and prior to that, 
Germany, Greece and Turkey. In addition, NATO has developed unique 
partnerships with Russia and Ukraine, and has drawn former adversaries 
into a web of cooperation through what we refer to as the Partnership 
for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.
  The second thesis that I will be expounding on at a later time is 
that the costs of enlargement are real but manageable, and represent a 
bargain for the American people in terms of our security.
  NATO's own study of the Polish, Hungarian, and Czech contributions to 
our common defense rates them well worth the ten-year, one-and-a half 
billion dollar price tag. The U.S. share in this price will be roughly 
four hundred million dollars over ten years, or about forty million 
dollars per year.
  Most importantly, Secretary of State Albright noted in her testimony, 
that our Allies stated at the last NATO summit that the resources for 
enlargement will be found and that she will ensure that our allies pay 
their fair share--a very important requirement to be met in order to 
gain the support of our colleagues in the Senate.

  In the long-run, America has always found that common defense is 
cheaper defense. This is true certainly in financial, but even more so 
in the far more

[[Page S677]]

precious human resources the sixty million people and two hundred 
thousand troops Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic bring to our 
common security. This is not a question of whether the U.S. will trade 
Warsaw for Washington, or Budapest for Buffalo, but rather that the 
Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians are willing to assume the front line in 
America's forward defense of its shores.
  The third thesis is that our relations with Russia remain solid, 
productive, and cooperative, notwithstanding enlargement. Prophets of 
backlash have been disproven.
  Although few Russians are fond of NATO enlargement, policymakers in 
Moscow have accepted it. Moreover, no Russian with whom I met in 
Moscow--from Communist leader Zyuganov, to liberal leader Yavlinsky, to 
the nationalist retired General Lebed--believed that NATO enlargement 
constitutes a security threat to Russia.
  We have seem Russia ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention, renew 
efforts to ratify START II, send troops under overall U.S. command to 
implement peace in Bosnia, and work smoothly with NATO as an 
organization in the new Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council.
  But ultimately, Russia must understand that it has no veto over NATO 
actions, nor over the right of former Soviet satellites to freely 
choose their defense arrangements. I believe their actions demonstrate 
that they have come to terms--however grudgingly--with this fact.
  My fourth thesis is a caution. The consequences of a failure to 
embrace the Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs as new allies would be a 
disaster.
  This century has taught us that when Central Europeans are divorced 
from Western institutions of common defense, they are vulnerable to 
pressure and control by the great powers around them, and susceptible 
to insidious suspicions of their neighbors' intentions. This forces 
them to nationalize their defense policies, creating tension and 
instability
  Here, I would like to quote from Dr. Henry Kissinger's testimony to 
the Foreign Relations Committee on this very point. Dr. Kissinger's 
testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee on this very point was 
very, very enlightening, I thought.

       Kissinger warned: Basing European and Atlantic security on 
     a no man's land between Germany and Russia runs counter to 
     all historical experience, especially that of the interwar 
     period. It would bring about two categories of frontiers in 
     Europe, those that are potentially threatened but not 
     guaranteed, and those that are guaranteed but not threatened. 
     If America were to act to the defend the Oder [between 
     Germany and Poland] but not the Vistula [in Poland], 200 
     miles to the east, the credibility of all the existing NATO 
     guarantees would be gravely weakened.

  Madam President, I will close with a fifth and final thesis, and it 
is a moral one.
  For 40 years, the United States loudly proclaimed its solidarity with 
the captive nations of Central and Eastern Europe who were under the 
heel of communist oppressors. Now that most of them have cast off their 
shackles, it is our responsibility, in my view, to live up to our 
pledges to readmit them into the West through NATO and the European 
Union as they qualify.
  Just as NATO enlargements embraced Turkey, Greece, and West Germany 
several years before the European Union's precursors were yet in 
existence, so we should not hesitate to accept Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic now, even before their accession to the European Union.
  The habits of cooperation created by NATO membership can only help 
these nations as they prepare for economic integration into Europe and 
the West.
  I thank the Chair for listening and I yield the floor.

                          ____________________