[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 10 (Wednesday, February 11, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S635-S638]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                             NUCLEAR ISSUES

  Mr. DOMENICI. Madam President, over the last few months, I have been 
speaking out regularly on a wide range of nuclear issues that confront 
our country and the world, issues that have not been carefully 
addressed to optimize the positive impacts of these technologies and to 
minimize their associated risks.
  As I began this statement, I noted that nuclear issues are not 
exactly the ones that most of us focus on to hear cheers of public 
support. Nuclear issues typically have been relegated to back burners 
or only to attacks that wildly inflate their risks.
  Based on strong encouragement that I have received from people like 
Senator Nunn, John Deutch, Allan Bromley, Edward Teller and others, I 
intend to continue to speak and to seek national dialog on a wide range 
of nuclear issues. In fact, I will invite each of my Senate colleagues 
to participate in a nuclear issues caucus focused on issues ranging 
from nuclear power and waste to nuclear stockpiles.
  My goal is that out of this dialog and out of a rebirth of critical 
thinking on the roles of nuclear technology, we can craft policies that 
better meet the needs of the Nation and better utilize the power of 
nuclear technologies. Let me give you the flavor of some of these 
issues that I assert need careful reexamination.
  First, in 1997, the United States decided to halt research into 
reprocessing mixed oxides, or commonly called MOX fuel, in the hope 
that it would curtail other countries' pursuit of these technologies. 
Other countries proceeded to follow their own best interests and 
technical judgments.
  Today, many other countries are reprocessing and using MOX fuel, 
mixed oxide fuel. Now the United States is unable to use these 
technologies to meet nonproliferation needs and has largely been left 
out of the international nuclear fuels cycle.
  I contend we made a mistake then. The reason we made the decision is 
false. We said it is so that no others will do this and create some 
risks. Others have assessed that there are no risks, or few, and they 
have proceeded.
  Let me move on to another example.
  Today, we regulate radiation to extremely low levels based on what we 
have chosen to call in this country the ``linear-no-threshold'' model 
of radiation effects. That model, basically, asserts that the least bit 
of radiation exposure increases the risk of cancer, but scientific 
evidence does not support that assumption. As a result, the United 
States spends billions of dollars each year cleaning up sites to levels 
within 5 percent of natural background radiation, even though natural 
background radiation varies by large amounts; in fact, by over three 
times just in the United States and much larger amounts if we look 
outside the Nation.
  On another issue, today, nuclear energy provides 20 percent of the 
electricity of our Nation. In 1996, nuclear energy reduced U.S. 
greenhouse gas emissions from electric utilities by 25 percent. Does 
that sound interesting to anyone? Nuclear electrically generated power 
reduced U.S. greenhouse gas emissions 25 percent. That means that we 
produce that electricity clean in terms of global warming emissions, 
and we did this without imposing taxes or other costly limitations on 
the use of carbon-based energy forms, some of the suggestions that are 
being made now about taxing those energy sources that do create 
greenhouse gases to minimize their impact by using less.
  On another issue, today, we focus on the creation of bilateral 
accords with Russia to size our nuclear stockpile, and we expend much 
energy debating the pros and cons of START II versus START III. 
Instead, I believe that the United States should move away from sizing 
its nuclear stockpile in accordance with bilateral accords with Russia. 
Instead, within the limitations of existing treaties, the United States 
should move to a ``threat-based stockpile,'' driven by the minimal 
stockpile size that meets credible threat evaluations.
  That is just another issue in the nuclear field that we ought to be 
addressing and debating and thinking about and listening to some 
experts on.
  Today, many of the weapons in our stockpile and in the stockpile of 
Russia are on hair-trigger alert. I believe that both nations should 
consider de-alerting their nuclear stockpiles and even consider 
eliminating the ground-based leg of the nuclear triad. And I know this 
may not be doable, and the discussion may reveal that it is not 
prudent. But it should be talked about.

  Today, both the United States and Russia are dismantling weapons, but 
both nations are storing the classified components, the so-called pits 
from the weapons, that would enable either nation to quickly rebuild 
its arsenals. We are in serious need of a fast-paced program to convert 
classified weapon components into unclassified shapes that are quickly 
placed under international verification. Then that material should be 
transformed into MOX--which I discussed earlier--MOX fuel for use in 
civilian reactors, again with due haste.
  There are some who have prejudged this and will instantly say, no. I 
am suggesting the time is now to have a thorough discussion of these 
kinds of issues, because we made some mistakes 15, 20 and 25 years ago 
when we made some of the decisions that now guide our course in this 
very, very difficult area that I just spoke of with reference to 
nuclear arsenal components.
  Today, high-level nuclear waste is stored in 41 States. Much of that 
is spent civilian reactor fuel that is saturating the storage capacity 
at many sites. The United States should move to interim storage of 
spent nuclear fuel while continuing to actively pursue permanent 
repository. In the years before that repository is sealed, there will 
be time to study alternatives to permanently burying the spent fuel 
with its large remaining energy potential. One of those alternatives 
for study should be a serious review of accelerator transmutation of 
waste technology.
  Today, another issue, irradiation of food products is rarely used. 
Nevertheless, there is convincing evidence of its benefits in 
curtailing foodborne illnesses. I commend the recent acceptance of 
irradiation for beef products by the Food and Drug Administration. It 
was a long time in coming, but it is finally here.
  Today, few low-level nuclear waste disposal facilities are operating 
in this country, jeopardizing many operations that rely on routine use 
of low-level radioactive materials. For example, the

[[Page S636]]

Federal Government continues its efforts to block the efforts of the 
State of California to build a low-level nuclear waste disposal 
facility at Ward Valley, CA.
  Today, joint programs with Russia are underway to protect Russian 
fissile materials and shift the activities of former Soviet weapons and 
their scientists into commercial projects. These programs should be 
expanded, not reduced. The President suggests that some should be 
reduced. I believe they should be expanded.
  These and other issues will all benefit from a careful reexamination 
of past policies relating to nuclear technologies. While some may 
continue to lament that the nuclear genie is out of the proverbial 
bottle, I am ready to focus on harnessing that genie as effectively and 
as fully as possible so that our citizens may gain the largest possible 
benefit from nuclear technologies.
  I have a more detailed statement that analyzes these issues and 
others. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record, not 
as if read, but merely as an adjunct to the speech which I have just 
given.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                               Statement

                     (By Senator Pete V. Domenici)

       Over the last few months, I have been speaking out 
     regularly on a wide range of nuclear issues that confront our 
     nation--issues that have not been carefully addressed to 
     optimize the positive impacts of these technologies and to 
     minimize their associated risks.
       As I began these statements, I noted that nuclear issues 
     are not exactly the ones that most of us focus on to hear 
     cheers of public support. Nuclear issues typically have been 
     relegated to back burners, or only to attacks that wildly 
     inflate their risks.
       Based on the strong encouragement I've received from people 
     like Senator Nunn, John Deutch, Allan Bromley, and Edward 
     Teller, I intend to continue to seek national dialogue on a 
     wide range of nuclear issues. In fact, I will invite each of 
     my Senate Colleagues to participate in a Nuclear Issues 
     Caucus, focused on issues ranging from nuclear power and 
     waste to nuclear stockpile. My goal is that out of this 
     Caucus, and out of a rebirth of critical thinking on the 
     roles of nuclear technology, we can craft policies that 
     better meet the needs of the nation and better utilize the 
     power of nuclear technologies.
       Strategic national issues are always hard to discuss. In no 
     area has this been more evident during these last few decades 
     than in development of public policy involving energy, 
     growth, and the role of nuclear technologies.
       But as we leave the 20th Century, arguably the American 
     Century, and head for a new millennium, we truly need to 
     confront these strategic issues with careful logic and sound 
     science.
       We live in the dominant economic, military, and cultural 
     entity in the world. Our principles of government and 
     economics are increasingly becoming the principles of the 
     world.
       There are no secrets to our success, and there is no 
     guarantee that, in the coming century, we will be the 
     principal beneficiary of the seeds we have sown. There is 
     competition in the world and serious strategic issues facing 
     the United States cannot be overlooked.
       The United States--like the rest of the industrialized 
     world--is aging rapidly as our birth rates decline. Between 
     1995 and the year 2030, the number of people in the United 
     States over age 65 will double from 34 million to 68 million. 
     Just to maintain our standard of living, we need dramatic 
     increases in productivity as a larger fraction of our 
     population drops out of the workforce.
       By 2030, 30 percent of the population of the industrialized 
     nations will be over 60. The rest of the world--the countries 
     that today are ``under-industrialized''--will have only 16 
     percent of their population over age 60 and will be ready to 
     boom.
       As those nations build economies modeled after ours, there 
     will be intense competition for the resources that underpin 
     modern economies.
       When it comes to energy, we have a serious, strategic 
     problem. The United States currently consumer 25 percent of 
     the world's energy production. However, developing countries 
     are on track to increase their energy consumption by 48 
     percent between 1992 and 2010.
       The United States currently produces and imports raw energy 
     resources worth over $150 billion per year. Approximately $50 
     billion of that is imported oil or natural gas. We then 
     process that material into energy feedstocks such as 
     gasoline. Those feedstocks--the energy we consume in our 
     cars, factories, and electric plants--are worth $505 billion 
     per year.
       We debate defense policy every year, as we should. But we 
     don't debate energy policy, even though it costs twice as 
     much as our defense, other countries' consumption is growing 
     dramatically, and energy shortages are likely to be a prime 
     driver of future military challenges.
       Even when we've discussed energy independence in my quarter 
     century of Senate service, we've largely ignored public 
     debate on nuclear policies.
       At the same time, the anti-nuclear movement has conducted 
     their campaign in a way that has been tremendously appealing 
     to mass media. Scientists, used to the peer-reviewed ways of 
     scientific discourse, were unprepared to counter. They lost 
     the debate.
       Serious discussion about the role of nuclear energy in 
     world stability, energy independence, and national security 
     retreated into academia or classified sessions.
       Today, it is extraordinarily difficult to conduct a debate 
     on nuclear issues. Usually, the only thing produced is nasty 
     political fallout.
       My goal today is to share with you my perspective on 
     several aspects of our nuclear policy. I am counting on you 
     to join with me to encourage a careful, scientifically based, 
     re-examination of nuclear issues in the United States.
       I am going to tell you that we made some bad decisions in 
     the past that we have to change. Then I will tell you about 
     some decisions we need to make now.
       First, we need to recognize that the premises underpinning 
     some of our nuclear policy decisions are wrong. In 1977, 
     President Carter halted all U.S. efforts to reprocess spent 
     nuclear fuel and develop mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) for our 
     civilian reactors on the grounds that the plutonium was 
     separated during reprocessing. He feared that the separated 
     plutonium could be diverted and eventually transformed into 
     bombs. He argued that the United States should halt its 
     reprocessing program as an example to other countries in the 
     hope that they would follow suit.
       The premise of the decision was wrong. Other countries do 
     not follow the example of the United States if we make a 
     decision that other countries view as economically or 
     technically unsound. France, Great Britain, Japan, and Russia 
     all now have MOX fuel programs.
       This failure to address an incorrect premise has harmed our 
     efforts to deal with spent nuclear fuel and the disposition 
     of excess weapons material, as well as our ability to 
     influence international reactor issues.
       I'll cite another example of a bad decision. We regulate 
     exposure to low levels of radiation using a so-called 
     ``linear no-threshold'' model, the premise of which is that 
     there is no ``safe'' level of exposure.
       Our model forces us to regulate radiation to levels 
     approaching a few percent of natural background despite the 
     fact that natural background can vary by a factor of three 
     just within the United States.
       On the other hand, many scientists think that living cells, 
     after millions of years of exposure to naturally occurring 
     radiation, have adapted such that low levels of radiation 
     cause very little if any harm. In fact, there are some 
     studies that suggest exactly the opposite is true--that low 
     doses of radiation may even improve health.
       The truth is important. We spend over $5 billion each year 
     to clean contaminated DOE sites to levels below 5 percent of 
     background.
       In this year's Energy and Water Appropriations Act, we 
     initiated a ten year program to understand how radiation 
     affects genomes and cells so that we can really understand 
     how radiation affects living organisms. For the first time, 
     we will develop radiation protection standards that are based 
     on actual risk.
       Let me cite another bad decision. You may recall that 
     earlier this year, Hudson Foods recalled 25 million pounds of 
     beef, some of which was contaminated by E. Coli. The 
     Administration proposed tougher penalties and mandatory 
     recalls that cost millions.
       But, E. Coli bacteria can be killed by irradiation and that 
     irradiation has virtually no effect on most foods. 
     Nevertheless, irradiation isn't used much in this country, 
     largely because of opposition from some consumer groups that 
     question its safety.
       But there is no scientific evidence of danger. In fact, 
     when the decision is left up to scientists, they opt for 
     irradiation--the food that goes into space with our 
     astronauts is irradiated. And if you're interested in this 
     subject, a recent issue of the MIT Technology Review details 
     the advantages of irradiated food.
       I've talked about bad past decisions that haunt us today. 
     Now I want to talk about decisions we need to make today.
       The President has outlined a program to stabilize the U.S. 
     production of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases at 
     1990 levels by some time between 2008 and 2012. 
     Unfortunately, the President's goals are not achievable 
     without seriously impacting our economy.
       Our national laboratories have studied the issue. Their 
     report indicates that to get to the President's goals we 
     would have to impose a $50/ton carbon tax. That would result 
     in an increase of 12.5 cents/gallon for gas and 1.5 cents/
     kilowatt-hour for electricity--almost a doubling of the 
     current cost of coal or natural gas-generated electricity.
       What the President should have said is that we need nuclear 
     energy to meet his goal. After all, in 1996, nuclear power 
     plants prevented the emission of 147 million metric tons of 
     carbon, 2.5 million tons of nitrogen oxides, and 5 million 
     tons of sulfur dioxide. Our electric utilities' emissions of 
     those greenhouse gases were 25 percent lower than they would 
     have been if fossil fuels had been used instead of nuclear 
     energy.
       Ironically, the technology we are relying on to achieve the 
     benefits of nuclear energy

[[Page S637]]

     is over twenty years old. No new reactors have been ordered 
     in this country for almost a quarter of a century, due at 
     least in part to extensive regulation and endless 
     construction delays--plus our national failure to address 
     high level waste.
       We have created an environment for nuclear energy in the 
     United States wherein it isn't viewed as a sound investment. 
     We need absolute safety, that's a given. But could we have 
     that safety through approaches that don't drive nuclear 
     energy out of consideration for new plants?
       The United States has developed the next generation of 
     nuclear power plants--which have been certified by the NRC 
     and are now being sold overseas. They are even safer than our 
     current models. Better yet, we have technologies under 
     development like passively safe reactors, lead-bismuth 
     reactors, and advanced liquid metal reactors that generate 
     less waste and are proliferation resistant.
       A recent report by Dr. John Holdren, done at the 
     President's request, calls for a sharply enhanced national 
     effort. It urges a ``properly focused R&D effort to see if 
     the problems plaguing fission energy can be overcome--
     economics, safety, waste, and proliferation.'' I have long 
     urged the conclusion of this report--that we dramatically 
     increase spending in these areas for reasons ranging from 
     reactor safety to non-proliferation.
       I have not overlooked that nuclear waste issues loom as a 
     roadblock to increased nuclear utilization. I will return to 
     that subject.
       For now, let me turn from nuclear power to nuclear weapons 
     issues.
       Our current stockpile is set by bilateral agreements with 
     Russia. Bilateral agreements make sense if we are certain who 
     our future nuclear adversaries will be and they are useful to 
     force a transparent build-down by Russia. But our next 
     nuclear adversary may not be Russia--we do not want to find 
     ourselves limited by a treaty with Russia in a conflict with 
     another entity.
       We need to decide what stockpile levels we really need for 
     our own best interests to deal with any future adversary.
       For that reason, I suggest that, within the limits imposed 
     by START II, the United States move away from further treaty 
     imposed limitations to what I call a ``threat-based 
     stockpile.''
       Based upon the threat I perceive right now, I think our 
     stockpile could be reduced. We need to challenge our military 
     planners to identify the minimum necessary stockpile size.
       At the same time, as our stockpile is reduced and we are 
     precluded from testing, we have to increase our confidence in 
     the integrity of the remaining stockpile and our ability to 
     reconstitute if the threat changes. Programs like science-
     based stockpile stewardship must be nurtured and supported 
     carefully.
       As we seriously review stockpile size, we should also 
     consider stepping back from the nuclear cliff by de-alerting 
     and carefully reexamining the necessity of the ground-based 
     leg of the nuclear triad.
       Costs certainly aren't the primary driver for our stockpile 
     size, but if some of the actions I've discussed were taken, 
     I'd bet that as a bonus we'd see some savings in the $30 
     billion we spend each year on the nuclear triad.
       Earlier I discussed the need to revisit some incorrect 
     premises that caused us to make bad decisions in the past. I 
     said that one of them, regarding reprocessing and MOX fuel, 
     may hamstring our efforts to permanently dismantle nuclear 
     weapons.
       The dismantlement of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons 
     in Russia and the United States has left both countries with 
     large inventories of perfectly machined classified components 
     that could allow each country to rapidly rebuild nuclear 
     arsenals.
       Both countries should set a goal of converting those excess 
     inventories into non-weapon shapes as quickly as possible. 
     The more permanent those transformations and the more 
     verification that can accompany the conversion of that 
     material, the better.
       Language in this year's Energy and Water Development 
     Appropriations Legislation that I developed clearly sets out 
     the importance of converting those shapes as part of an 
     integrated plutonium disposition program.
       Technical solutions exist. Pits can be transformed into 
     non-weapons shapes and weapon material can be burned in 
     reactors as MOX fuel--which, by the way, is what the National 
     Academy of Sciences has recommended. However, the proposal to 
     dispose of weapons plutonium as MOX runs into that old 
     premise that MOX is bad despite its widespread use by our 
     allies.
       I believe that MOX is the best technical solution. The 
     economics of the MOX solution, however, need further study. 
     Ideally, incentives can be developed to speed Russian 
     materials conversion while reducing the cost of the U.S. 
     effort. We need an appropriate approach for MOX to address 
     its economic challenges--perhaps something paralleling the 
     U.S.-Russian agreement on Highly Enriched Uranium.
       I said earlier that I would not advocate increased use of 
     nuclear energy and ignore the nuclear waste problem. The path 
     we've been following on Yucca Mountain sure isn't leading 
     anywhere very fast. I'm about ready to reexamine the whole 
     premise for Yucca Mountain.
       We're on a course to bury all our spent nuclear fuel, 
     despite the fact that a spent nuclear fuel rod still has 60-
     75% of its energy content--and despite the fact that Nevadans 
     need to be convinced that the material will not create a 
     hazard for over 100,000 years.
       Reprocessing, even limited reprocessing, could help 
     mitigate the potential hazards in a repository, and could 
     help us recover the energy content of the spent fuel. Current 
     economics may argue against reprocessing based on present-day 
     fuel prices, but now we seem to be stuck with that old 
     decision to never reprocess, quite independent of any 
     economic arguments.
       For Yucca Mountain, I propose we use interim storage now, 
     while we continue to actively advance toward the permanent 
     repository. In addition to collecting the nation's spent 
     nuclear fuel in one well secured facility, far from 
     population centers, interim storage also allows us to keep 
     our options open.
       Those options might lead to attractive alternatives to the 
     current ideas for a permanent repository in the years before 
     we seal the repository. Incidentally, 65 Senators and 307 
     Representatives agreed with the importance of interim 
     storage, but the Administration has only threatened to veto 
     any such progress and has shown no willingness to discuss 
     alternatives.
       Let me highlight one attractive option. A group from 
     several of our largest companies, using technologies 
     developed at three of our national laboratories and from 
     Russian institutes and their nuclear navy, discussed with me 
     an approach to use spent nuclear fuel for electrical 
     generation. They use an accelerator, not a reactor, so there 
     is never any critical assembly.
       There is minimal processing, but carefully done so that 
     weapons-grade materials are never separated or available for 
     potential diversion. Further, this isn't reprocessing in the 
     sense of repeatedly recirculating fissile materials back into 
     new reactor fuel--this is a system that integrates some 
     processing with the final disposition.
       When they get done, only a little material goes into a 
     repository--but now the half lives are changed so that it's a 
     hazard for perhaps 300 years--a far cry from 100,000 years. 
     The industrial group believes that the sale of electricity 
     can go a long way toward offsetting the cost of the system, 
     so this process might not add large costs to our present 
     repository solution. Furthermore, it would dramatically 
     reduce any real or perceived risks with our present path. 
     This approach, Accelerator Transmutation of Waste, is an area 
     I want to see investigated aggressively.
       I still haven't touched on all the issues embedded in 
     maximizing our nation's benefit from nuclear technologies, 
     and I can't do that without a much longer speech.
       For example, I haven't discussed the increasingly desperate 
     need in the country for low level waste facilities like Ward 
     Valley in California. In California, important medical and 
     research procedures are at risk because the Administration 
     continues to block the State government from fulfilling their 
     responsibilities to care for low level waste.
       And I haven't touched on the tremendous window of 
     opportunity that we now have in the former Soviet Union to 
     expand programs that protect nuclear material from moving 
     onto the black market or to shift the activities of former 
     Soviet weapons scientists onto commercial projects. Along 
     with Senators Nunn and Lugar, I've led the charge for these 
     programs. Those are programs directly in our national 
     interest. I know that some national leaders still think of 
     these programs as foreign aid, I believe they are sadly 
     mistaken.
       We are realizing some of the benefits of nuclear 
     technologies today, but only a fraction of what we could 
     realize:
       Nuclear weapons, for all their horror, brought to an end 50 
     years of world-wide wars in which 60 million people died.
       Nuclear power is providing about 20% of our electricity 
     needs now and many of our citizens enjoy healthier longer 
     lives through improved medical procedures that depend on 
     nuclear processes.
       But we aren't tapping the full potential of the nucleus for 
     additional benefits. In the process, we are short-changing 
     our citizens.
       I hope in these remarks that I have demonstrated my concern 
     for careful reevaluation of many ill-conceived fears, 
     policies and decisions that have seriously constrained our 
     use of nuclear technologies.
       My intention is to lead a new dialogue with serious 
     discussion about the full range of nuclear technologies. I 
     intend to provide national leadership to overcome barriers.
       While some may continue to lament that the nuclear genie is 
     out of his proverbial bottle, I'm ready to focus on 
     harnessing that genie as effectively and fully as possible, 
     for the largest set of benefits for our citizens.

  Mr. DOMENICI. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LEAHY. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEAHY. Madam President, first, I wish to thank my good friend 
from Indiana--I know he is about to speak--for allowing me to continue 
just for a very few minutes as though in morning

[[Page S638]]

business. And I ask unanimous consent for that purpose.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________