[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 8 (Monday, February 9, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S466-S468]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
ESTABLISHING A CLEAR OBJECTIVE IN IRAQ
Mr. HAGEL. Mr. President, these are very serious times. The
administration and America face a complicated and dangerous dilemma in
Iraq. This dilemma must be approached from a framework of both our
short-term and long-term foreign policy objectives.
As the administration weighs its short-term options, including the
possibility of military action with regard to the situation in Iraq, I
believe it is very important that we in the Senate keep a steady focus
on the objective before we start playing out these other options.
We all know that any military action must have a clear objective. If
our Nation decides to risk the lives of young American men and women,
we must do so for a clear purpose, with a clear understanding of the
possible intended and unintended consequences and a reasonable
assurance of success.
Let us remember that the original objective in the Iraqi puzzle was
the full compliance by Saddam Hussein with the 1991 resolutions that
ended the Gulf war. Most important is Security Council Resolution 687,
adopted on April 3, 1991, which clearly spelled out Iraq's obligations
under the cease-fire agreement that ended the Gulf war. Those
obligations have the force of international law and still stand today.
This has been the U.N.'s primary focus and objective. It was Saddam
Hussein who created this current situation when he invaded Kuwait in
1990 and the world united against him. This is not the United States
and Great Britain against Iraq. This has been the civilized world
united against a pariah intent on developing and using weapons of mass
destruction.
We have sympathy for the Iraqi people. The U.N., led by the United
States, has provided millions of dollars in humanitarian aid for the
Iraqi people. But we must remember that Hussein used chemical weapons
against his own people and has starved his own people in his
clandestine and relentless pursuit of these weapons.
Time after time he has directly challenged the terms of his surrender
under the U.N. resolution. What he is now challenging is the resolve of
the world community to stand up to him.
The members of the international coalition that condemned his actions
in 1991 and fought against him must remember who is the guilty party
here; who is the guilty party. The guilty party is Saddam Hussein.
Just as the world stood united in terms of his surrender, it should
stand united and resolved in action against his defiance of those
terms. If he refuses to comply with U.N. Resolution 687, he will pay a
heavy price. And if Saddam Hussein offers his own people as sacrificial
lambs, their blood surely will be on his hands.
Mr. President, there is a growing chorus which suggests that perhaps
our short-term objective should be more than Saddam Hussein's full
compliance with U.N. Resolution 687, that our immediate short-term
objective should be to expel Saddam Hussein from Iraq, to sweep him
from the world stage. This kind of talk is very dangerous and inhibits
the administration's efforts as it seeks to reconstruct the 1991
coalition united against Saddam Hussein. Let us not be buffeted by the
winds of quick fixes, bombing raids and shortsightedness. Saddam
Hussein has cleverly framed this world debate as Iraq against the
United States. We must not play into his manipulative hands. This is
not the equation.
We all would like to eliminate the threat he poses to the civilized
world and that should be our long-term goal. That should be our long-
term goal. But for the moment we must not forget that from objectives
come actions, and from actions come consequences. Every objective
carries with it a different set of military options and will have very
real consequences. Actions always produce consequences and not always
the geopolitical consequences we expect. We must guard against the
short-term objective turning into a long-term unexpected problem.
After our lightning success in Desert Storm, I fear that we, as
Americans, may have been lulled into a false sense of believing that
modern wars can be fought relatively quickly and painlessly, with high-
tech weapons and very limited casualties. This is not the case, nor
will it ever be the case in warfare.
Those who believe that this greater short-term objective could be
accomplished without the use of a massive ground force are
underestimating the task.
We need to be aware of the ``law of unintended consequences.'' There
are always uncertainties in war. The consequences of any kind of
military undertaking are far-reaching. With the current tensions in
this region and the grim prospects for peace in the Middle East, this
area of the world could erupt like a tinder box. Whatever military
action might be taken against Saddam Hussein, it must be surgical, it
must be precise, and it must be focused and, above all, well thought
out. Other nations would undoubtedly seek to increase their spheres of
influence in the Middle East if our immediate objective was to
eliminate Saddam Hussein. If we were to escalate the level of our
short-term objective, would we create consequences just as, if not
more, dangerous to our national interests in the world than the
situation we currently face?
As painfully slow as this process seems to be moving, events can
unfold very quickly and uncontrollably. We cannot allow Saddam Hussein
to stampede us into precipitous actions. Remember how the Six Day War
began in 1967. Remember other events of this century that engulfed
nations in wider, larger, and more deadly conflicts than anyone could
have predicted.
I ask my colleagues in the Senate to keep this in mind when thinking
about how to respond to the present situation in Iraq. What chain of
events will we unleash with any action we take? Always the question
must be asked, what then happens? What happens next? Are we prepared to
not only answer this question but deal with the answer? Any short-term
action must fit into a long-term foreign policy objective.
Any short-term action that America takes must fit into a long-term
foreign policy objective. What is the administration's long-term
objective in Iraq? Do we have one? Or are we crafting a long-term
policy to justify short-term actions?
In the long term, I believe we need to be more creative in reviewing
our options against Saddam Hussein. We must not allow ourselves to get
caught up in the trap of doing something--anything--just because we
said we would and the world expects us to. Our options should be based
on what's right, what's achievable commensurate with the risk we are
willing to take with American lives and what will truly have an impact
in resolving the problem. And the problem is Saddam Hussein.
Mr. President, I am a little disturbed about reports over the weekend
quoting high-ranking administration officials and congressional leaders
saying such things as: We may have to face the reality that we will not
get U.N. inspection teams back into Iraq; any military action would be
to just slow Saddam Hussein down and we would have to keep going back
to bomb him again and again every so many months and years; and our
allies' support of us in Iraq may be tied to our future commitment to
NATO.
These are disconcerting remarks. We owe it to our country and the men
and
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women in uniform who will be called upon to fight a war, if that
decision is made, to do better than just bomb Saddam Hussein. First of
all, the military option alone will not work if we truly want a final
resolution of this problem. Some form of immediate military action may
well be required as part of an overall long-term solution but only a
part, only a part of a long-term solution.
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Reagan administration,
Richard Perle, in a Washington Post op-ed piece yesterday, listed a
series of political actions that could be taken along with any military
actions in Iraq. I believe Secretary Perle's analysis and general
recommendations should be taken seriously and I ask unanimous consent
that his article be printed in the Record following my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. HAGEL. I find that I am asking myself the unescapable question--
are we preparing to send our young men and women to war because we just
all expect that this is the thing to do because we don't know what else
to do?
That is not good enough. There is something very surreal about all
the war talk, and war preparation being played out in this matter of
fact tone on international TV with every talk show panelist in the
world presenting his or her theories and options on war in Iraq--when
most all of them have never been to war, prepared for war or understand
the first thing about the horrors of war.
Our national defense is the guarantor of our foreign policy. I don't
know if we have a long term policy on Iraq other than maintaining the
U.N. sanctions and enforcing the resolutions, but that's not a foreign
policy. If we are to commit America to war, it should be to enforce our
foreign policy--just going to war alone is not enough. We must have an
overall long term policy to enforce. The reason for war must be
connected to more than just short-term sanctions enforcement.
It is my opinion that if we exercise any military option it must be
accompanied by and attached to creative geopolitical elements of a
comprehensive policy toward Iraq--geopolitical elements such as
Secretary Perle listed yesterday. In the long run, how do we
realistically get rid of Saddam Hussein? That's the policy question we
should have been focused on over the last seven years. Sending America
to war with one ally is no policy. We can do better. We must do better.
Nations lead from their strength of purpose, self confidence, and
character. As President Teddy Roosevelt once said, ``The one
indispensable, requisite for both an individual and a nation is
character.'' Allies will follow us if they trust our word and our
policy. Bullying allies into submission for agreement is not
leadership.
With regard to the immediate situation in Iraq we need to remain
focused on the original objective--the full compliance by Saddam
Hussein with U.N. Resolution 687. We should not act out of frustration
or impatience. We have to stay focused on the objective and not
overstate--not overstate expectations to the American people or the
world.
For the mothers and fathers, sons and daughters, and loved ones of
our men and women in the Gulf--we must proceed with clear eyed realism,
not with emotionalism, not with revenge.
There are no good options. Saddam Hussein is intent on building the
most vile weapons in the history of man, weapons outlawed by nearly all
the countries of the world, and is openly defying the will of the
global community. He cannot go unchallenged.
Should diplomatic efforts fail, we will be forced to take additional
action to force Saddam Hussein to comply with the unanimous mandate of
the U.N. Security Council. As long as this action meets a clear
immediate objective, and the level of force is commensurate with that
objective, the American people will come together and be unified behind
the action taken.
In the future, the American people and the Congress must have a more
solid basis for our support. We cannot continue to ricochet from crisis
to crisis and call that foreign policy. Our nation must develop a long
term, coherent policy not only toward Iraq and Saddam Hussein, but
toward the entire Middle East. How are we prepared to deal with Iran?
How do we plan to help make meaningful and lasting progress in the
Middle East peace process? What are our foreign policy objectives with
regard to North Korea, China, Bosnia, Europe, Russia, Asia, and other
areas of the world? These policies must be clearly stated and clearly
understood by both our allies and our adversaries.
As I said in the beginning, these are serious times. These are
difficult times. There are no easy answers, only tough challenges and
tough questions. They require serious solutions to serious questions
from serious people. America is up to the task.
I yield the floor.
Exhibit 1
February 9, 1998
This Time, Help Iraqis to Get Rid of Saddam's Regime
(By Richard Perle; The Washington Post)
The immediate provocation is Saddam Hussein's defiant
attachment to weapons of mass destruction and his
interference with UN inspectors charged with finding and
eliminating them. Given the prospect of chemical and
biological weapons in his murderous hands, military action is
long overdue.
But the more fundamental threat is Saddam Hussein himself.
As long as he remains in power, it is idle to believe that
this threat can be contained.
That is why even a massive bombing campaign will fail--
unless it is part of an overall strategy to destroy his
regime by helping the nascent democratic opposition to
transform itself into Iraq's new government.
America, alone if necessary, should encourage, recognize,
help finance, arm and protect with airpower a provisional
government broadly representative of all the people of Iraq.
Such a program would not be easy. But it has a better
chance and is a worthier contender than yet another failed
effort to organize an anti-Saddam Hussein conspiracy among
retired Iraqi generals, or another round of inconclusive air
strikes.
There is no repeat, no--chance that even a carefully
conceived and well-executed bombing campaign would eliminate
the arsenal of chemical and biological weapons (and the
capacity to make more of them) that Saddam has hidden away.
There is a real danger that an inadequate bombing campaign,
especially if it appeared decisive, would be quickly followed
by calls from other nations to lift the UN sanctions on the
grounds that the danger was over. This would be the ultimate
example of winning the battle and losing the war.
A serious Western policy toward Iraq would be aimed at the
destruction of Saddam's regime through a combination of
military and political measures--with the political measures
every bit as important as the military ones.
Chief among these would be open support for the Iraqi
National Congress, an umbrella opposition group in which all
elements of Iraqi society are represented.
To be effective, support for the Iraqi opposition should be
comprehensive: support given them in the past has been
hopelessly inadequate. In fact, help for the Iraqi
opposition, administered in an inept, halfhearted and
ineffective way by the CIA, has been the political equivalent
of the insubstantial, pinprick air strikes conducted against
targets in Iraq in recent years.
A serious political program would entail five elements:
Washington should, first, recognize the democratic
opposition as the legitimate, provisional government and
support its claim to Iraq's seat at the United Nations.
It should begin to disburse to the provisional government
some of the billions of Iraqi assets frozen after the Kuwait
invasion.
It should lift the sanctions on the territory (now
principally in the north but likely to spread) not under
Saddam Hussein's control. This would catapult these areas
into significant economic growth and attract defectors from
within Iraq. Much of Iraq's oil lies in areas that Saddam
cannot now control or over which he would quickly lose
control if an opposition government were established there.
It should assist the opposition in taking its message to
the Iraqi people by making radio and television transmitters
available to them.
It must be prepared to give logistical support and military
equipment to the opposition and to use airpower to defend it
in the territory it controls.
This is what should have been done in August 1996 when
Saddam's troops and secret police moved into northern Iraq
and murdered hundreds of supporters of the opposition Iraqi
National Congress. Shamefully, America stood by while people
it had supported were lined up and summarily executed.
Skeptics will argue that the Iraqi National Congress is too
frail a reed on which to base a strategy for eliminating
Saddam. It is indeed a small corps (of perhaps a few
thousand); it would need to rally significant popular
support. But it has been steadfast in its principled
opposition to Saddam, consistent in its democratic ambitions,
and, when given the chance, able to establish itself in a
significant area of Iraqi territory.
[[Page S468]]
It has earned American support by the sacrifices of its
members. And with American backing it has a chance.
It would be neither wise nor necessary to send ground
forces into Iraqi when patriotic Iraqis are willing to fight
to liberate their own country.
I would not want to be in Saddam's tanks in the narrow
defiles of northern Iraq, or in parts of the south, when U.S.
airpower commands the skies.
This strategy aims at eliciting a full-blown insurrection,
taking off from territory Saddam does not control and
spreading as his opponents find security and opportunity in
joining with others who wish to liberate Iraq.
There can be no guarantee that it will work. But what is
guaranteed not to work is a quick-fix air campaign that
leaves him in power.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for 15
minutes in morning business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I want to begin by thanking my colleague from
Nebraska for the eloquent remarks that he just made, to say that I
totally agree with his analysis of the situation. He is a student of
this, both because of his committee assignments and the way in which he
has dedicated himself to study these issues. I think he has contributed
significantly to the debate that we in Congress are going to have to
have on this subject. I commend him for devoting that time this morning
to this important subject.
I would like to speak to a different subject today.
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