[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 8 (Monday, February 9, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S466-S468]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                 ESTABLISHING A CLEAR OBJECTIVE IN IRAQ

  Mr. HAGEL. Mr. President, these are very serious times. The 
administration and America face a complicated and dangerous dilemma in 
Iraq. This dilemma must be approached from a framework of both our 
short-term and long-term foreign policy objectives.
  As the administration weighs its short-term options, including the 
possibility of military action with regard to the situation in Iraq, I 
believe it is very important that we in the Senate keep a steady focus 
on the objective before we start playing out these other options.
  We all know that any military action must have a clear objective. If 
our Nation decides to risk the lives of young American men and women, 
we must do so for a clear purpose, with a clear understanding of the 
possible intended and unintended consequences and a reasonable 
assurance of success.
  Let us remember that the original objective in the Iraqi puzzle was 
the full compliance by Saddam Hussein with the 1991 resolutions that 
ended the Gulf war. Most important is Security Council Resolution 687, 
adopted on April 3, 1991, which clearly spelled out Iraq's obligations 
under the cease-fire agreement that ended the Gulf war. Those 
obligations have the force of international law and still stand today.
  This has been the U.N.'s primary focus and objective. It was Saddam 
Hussein who created this current situation when he invaded Kuwait in 
1990 and the world united against him. This is not the United States 
and Great Britain against Iraq. This has been the civilized world 
united against a pariah intent on developing and using weapons of mass 
destruction.
  We have sympathy for the Iraqi people. The U.N., led by the United 
States, has provided millions of dollars in humanitarian aid for the 
Iraqi people. But we must remember that Hussein used chemical weapons 
against his own people and has starved his own people in his 
clandestine and relentless pursuit of these weapons.
  Time after time he has directly challenged the terms of his surrender 
under the U.N. resolution. What he is now challenging is the resolve of 
the world community to stand up to him.
  The members of the international coalition that condemned his actions 
in 1991 and fought against him must remember who is the guilty party 
here; who is the guilty party. The guilty party is Saddam Hussein.
  Just as the world stood united in terms of his surrender, it should 
stand united and resolved in action against his defiance of those 
terms. If he refuses to comply with U.N. Resolution 687, he will pay a 
heavy price. And if Saddam Hussein offers his own people as sacrificial 
lambs, their blood surely will be on his hands.
  Mr. President, there is a growing chorus which suggests that perhaps 
our short-term objective should be more than Saddam Hussein's full 
compliance with U.N. Resolution 687, that our immediate short-term 
objective should be to expel Saddam Hussein from Iraq, to sweep him 
from the world stage. This kind of talk is very dangerous and inhibits 
the administration's efforts as it seeks to reconstruct the 1991 
coalition united against Saddam Hussein. Let us not be buffeted by the 
winds of quick fixes, bombing raids and shortsightedness. Saddam 
Hussein has cleverly framed this world debate as Iraq against the 
United States. We must not play into his manipulative hands. This is 
not the equation.

  We all would like to eliminate the threat he poses to the civilized 
world and that should be our long-term goal. That should be our long-
term goal. But for the moment we must not forget that from objectives 
come actions, and from actions come consequences. Every objective 
carries with it a different set of military options and will have very 
real consequences. Actions always produce consequences and not always 
the geopolitical consequences we expect. We must guard against the 
short-term objective turning into a long-term unexpected problem.
  After our lightning success in Desert Storm, I fear that we, as 
Americans, may have been lulled into a false sense of believing that 
modern wars can be fought relatively quickly and painlessly, with high-
tech weapons and very limited casualties. This is not the case, nor 
will it ever be the case in warfare.
  Those who believe that this greater short-term objective could be 
accomplished without the use of a massive ground force are 
underestimating the task.
  We need to be aware of the ``law of unintended consequences.'' There 
are always uncertainties in war. The consequences of any kind of 
military undertaking are far-reaching. With the current tensions in 
this region and the grim prospects for peace in the Middle East, this 
area of the world could erupt like a tinder box. Whatever military 
action might be taken against Saddam Hussein, it must be surgical, it 
must be precise, and it must be focused and, above all, well thought 
out. Other nations would undoubtedly seek to increase their spheres of 
influence in the Middle East if our immediate objective was to 
eliminate Saddam Hussein. If we were to escalate the level of our 
short-term objective, would we create consequences just as, if not 
more, dangerous to our national interests in the world than the 
situation we currently face?
  As painfully slow as this process seems to be moving, events can 
unfold very quickly and uncontrollably. We cannot allow Saddam Hussein 
to stampede us into precipitous actions. Remember how the Six Day War 
began in 1967. Remember other events of this century that engulfed 
nations in wider, larger, and more deadly conflicts than anyone could 
have predicted.
  I ask my colleagues in the Senate to keep this in mind when thinking 
about how to respond to the present situation in Iraq. What chain of 
events will we unleash with any action we take? Always the question 
must be asked, what then happens? What happens next? Are we prepared to 
not only answer this question but deal with the answer? Any short-term 
action must fit into a long-term foreign policy objective.
  Any short-term action that America takes must fit into a long-term 
foreign policy objective. What is the administration's long-term 
objective in Iraq? Do we have one? Or are we crafting a long-term 
policy to justify short-term actions?
  In the long term, I believe we need to be more creative in reviewing 
our options against Saddam Hussein. We must not allow ourselves to get 
caught up in the trap of doing something--anything--just because we 
said we would and the world expects us to. Our options should be based 
on what's right, what's achievable commensurate with the risk we are 
willing to take with American lives and what will truly have an impact 
in resolving the problem. And the problem is Saddam Hussein.
  Mr. President, I am a little disturbed about reports over the weekend 
quoting high-ranking administration officials and congressional leaders 
saying such things as: We may have to face the reality that we will not 
get U.N. inspection teams back into Iraq; any military action would be 
to just slow Saddam Hussein down and we would have to keep going back 
to bomb him again and again every so many months and years; and our 
allies' support of us in Iraq may be tied to our future commitment to 
NATO.
  These are disconcerting remarks. We owe it to our country and the men 
and

[[Page S467]]

women in uniform who will be called upon to fight a war, if that 
decision is made, to do better than just bomb Saddam Hussein. First of 
all, the military option alone will not work if we truly want a final 
resolution of this problem. Some form of immediate military action may 
well be required as part of an overall long-term solution but only a 
part, only a part of a long-term solution.
  Former Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Reagan administration, 
Richard Perle, in a Washington Post op-ed piece yesterday, listed a 
series of political actions that could be taken along with any military 
actions in Iraq. I believe Secretary Perle's analysis and general 
recommendations should be taken seriously and I ask unanimous consent 
that his article be printed in the Record following my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. HAGEL. I find that I am asking myself the unescapable question--
are we preparing to send our young men and women to war because we just 
all expect that this is the thing to do because we don't know what else 
to do?
  That is not good enough. There is something very surreal about all 
the war talk, and war preparation being played out in this matter of 
fact tone on international TV with every talk show panelist in the 
world presenting his or her theories and options on war in Iraq--when 
most all of them have never been to war, prepared for war or understand 
the first thing about the horrors of war.
  Our national defense is the guarantor of our foreign policy. I don't 
know if we have a long term policy on Iraq other than maintaining the 
U.N. sanctions and enforcing the resolutions, but that's not a foreign 
policy. If we are to commit America to war, it should be to enforce our 
foreign policy--just going to war alone is not enough. We must have an 
overall long term policy to enforce. The reason for war must be 
connected to more than just short-term sanctions enforcement.
  It is my opinion that if we exercise any military option it must be 
accompanied by and attached to creative geopolitical elements of a 
comprehensive policy toward Iraq--geopolitical elements such as 
Secretary Perle listed yesterday. In the long run, how do we 
realistically get rid of Saddam Hussein? That's the policy question we 
should have been focused on over the last seven years. Sending America 
to war with one ally is no policy. We can do better. We must do better.
  Nations lead from their strength of purpose, self confidence, and 
character. As President Teddy Roosevelt once said, ``The one 
indispensable, requisite for both an individual and a nation is 
character.'' Allies will follow us if they trust our word and our 
policy. Bullying allies into submission for agreement is not 
leadership.
  With regard to the immediate situation in Iraq we need to remain 
focused on the original objective--the full compliance by Saddam 
Hussein with U.N. Resolution 687. We should not act out of frustration 
or impatience. We have to stay focused on the objective and not 
overstate--not overstate expectations to the American people or the 
world.
  For the mothers and fathers, sons and daughters, and loved ones of 
our men and women in the Gulf--we must proceed with clear eyed realism, 
not with emotionalism, not with revenge.
  There are no good options. Saddam Hussein is intent on building the 
most vile weapons in the history of man, weapons outlawed by nearly all 
the countries of the world, and is openly defying the will of the 
global community. He cannot go unchallenged.
  Should diplomatic efforts fail, we will be forced to take additional 
action to force Saddam Hussein to comply with the unanimous mandate of 
the U.N. Security Council. As long as this action meets a clear 
immediate objective, and the level of force is commensurate with that 
objective, the American people will come together and be unified behind 
the action taken.
  In the future, the American people and the Congress must have a more 
solid basis for our support. We cannot continue to ricochet from crisis 
to crisis and call that foreign policy. Our nation must develop a long 
term, coherent policy not only toward Iraq and Saddam Hussein, but 
toward the entire Middle East. How are we prepared to deal with Iran? 
How do we plan to help make meaningful and lasting progress in the 
Middle East peace process? What are our foreign policy objectives with 
regard to North Korea, China, Bosnia, Europe, Russia, Asia, and other 
areas of the world? These policies must be clearly stated and clearly 
understood by both our allies and our adversaries.
  As I said in the beginning, these are serious times. These are 
difficult times. There are no easy answers, only tough challenges and 
tough questions. They require serious solutions to serious questions 
from serious people. America is up to the task.
  I yield the floor.

                               Exhibit 1


                            February 9, 1998

          This Time, Help Iraqis to Get Rid of Saddam's Regime

                (By Richard Perle; The Washington Post)

       The immediate provocation is Saddam Hussein's defiant 
     attachment to weapons of mass destruction and his 
     interference with UN inspectors charged with finding and 
     eliminating them. Given the prospect of chemical and 
     biological weapons in his murderous hands, military action is 
     long overdue.
       But the more fundamental threat is Saddam Hussein himself. 
     As long as he remains in power, it is idle to believe that 
     this threat can be contained.
       That is why even a massive bombing campaign will fail--
     unless it is part of an overall strategy to destroy his 
     regime by helping the nascent democratic opposition to 
     transform itself into Iraq's new government.
       America, alone if necessary, should encourage, recognize, 
     help finance, arm and protect with airpower a provisional 
     government broadly representative of all the people of Iraq.
       Such a program would not be easy. But it has a better 
     chance and is a worthier contender than yet another failed 
     effort to organize an anti-Saddam Hussein conspiracy among 
     retired Iraqi generals, or another round of inconclusive air 
     strikes.
       There is no repeat, no--chance that even a carefully 
     conceived and well-executed bombing campaign would eliminate 
     the arsenal of chemical and biological weapons (and the 
     capacity to make more of them) that Saddam has hidden away.
       There is a real danger that an inadequate bombing campaign, 
     especially if it appeared decisive, would be quickly followed 
     by calls from other nations to lift the UN sanctions on the 
     grounds that the danger was over. This would be the ultimate 
     example of winning the battle and losing the war.
       A serious Western policy toward Iraq would be aimed at the 
     destruction of Saddam's regime through a combination of 
     military and political measures--with the political measures 
     every bit as important as the military ones.
       Chief among these would be open support for the Iraqi 
     National Congress, an umbrella opposition group in which all 
     elements of Iraqi society are represented.
       To be effective, support for the Iraqi opposition should be 
     comprehensive: support given them in the past has been 
     hopelessly inadequate. In fact, help for the Iraqi 
     opposition, administered in an inept, halfhearted and 
     ineffective way by the CIA, has been the political equivalent 
     of the insubstantial, pinprick air strikes conducted against 
     targets in Iraq in recent years.
       A serious political program would entail five elements:
       Washington should, first, recognize the democratic 
     opposition as the legitimate, provisional government and 
     support its claim to Iraq's seat at the United Nations.
       It should begin to disburse to the provisional government 
     some of the billions of Iraqi assets frozen after the Kuwait 
     invasion.
       It should lift the sanctions on the territory (now 
     principally in the north but likely to spread) not under 
     Saddam Hussein's control. This would catapult these areas 
     into significant economic growth and attract defectors from 
     within Iraq. Much of Iraq's oil lies in areas that Saddam 
     cannot now control or over which he would quickly lose 
     control if an opposition government were established there.
       It should assist the opposition in taking its message to 
     the Iraqi people by making radio and television transmitters 
     available to them.
       It must be prepared to give logistical support and military 
     equipment to the opposition and to use airpower to defend it 
     in the territory it controls.
       This is what should have been done in August 1996 when 
     Saddam's troops and secret police moved into northern Iraq 
     and murdered hundreds of supporters of the opposition Iraqi 
     National Congress. Shamefully, America stood by while people 
     it had supported were lined up and summarily executed.
       Skeptics will argue that the Iraqi National Congress is too 
     frail a reed on which to base a strategy for eliminating 
     Saddam. It is indeed a small corps (of perhaps a few 
     thousand); it would need to rally significant popular 
     support. But it has been steadfast in its principled 
     opposition to Saddam, consistent in its democratic ambitions, 
     and, when given the chance, able to establish itself in a 
     significant area of Iraqi territory.

[[Page S468]]

       It has earned American support by the sacrifices of its 
     members. And with American backing it has a chance.
       It would be neither wise nor necessary to send ground 
     forces into Iraqi when patriotic Iraqis are willing to fight 
     to liberate their own country.
       I would not want to be in Saddam's tanks in the narrow 
     defiles of northern Iraq, or in parts of the south, when U.S. 
     airpower commands the skies.
       This strategy aims at eliciting a full-blown insurrection, 
     taking off from territory Saddam does not control and 
     spreading as his opponents find security and opportunity in 
     joining with others who wish to liberate Iraq.
       There can be no guarantee that it will work. But what is 
     guaranteed not to work is a quick-fix air campaign that 
     leaves him in power.

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for 15 
minutes in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I want to begin by thanking my colleague from 
Nebraska for the eloquent remarks that he just made, to say that I 
totally agree with his analysis of the situation. He is a student of 
this, both because of his committee assignments and the way in which he 
has dedicated himself to study these issues. I think he has contributed 
significantly to the debate that we in Congress are going to have to 
have on this subject. I commend him for devoting that time this morning 
to this important subject.
  I would like to speak to a different subject today.

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