[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 5 (Tuesday, February 3, 1998)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E66]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                  U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE PERSIAN GULF

                                 ______
                                 

                          HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                       Tuesday, February 3, 1998

  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I would like to bring to my colleagues' 
attention my monthly newsletter on foreign affairs from November 1997 
entitled U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf.
  I ask that this newsletter be printed in the Congressional Record.
  The newsletter follows:

                  U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf

       The United States has vital national interests in the 
     Persian Gulf: to maintain unrestricted access to Gulf energy 
     resources at tolerable prices, to prevent any power from 
     gaining control over them, and to ensure the security of 
     regional friends and allies.
       The crisis over UN weapons inspectors in Iraq highlights 
     the strain in U.S. policy. The policy of ``dual containment'' 
     of Iraq and Iran has not changed these defiant regimes, and 
     it is not sustainable. Seven years after the Gulf War, 
     friends and allies have little enthusiasm for open-ended UN 
     sanctions against Iraq. The U.S. threat to sanction firms 
     that invest in Iran's energy sector has caused rifts with 
     Europe. Key Arab states boycotted the U.S.-supported summit 
     in Qatar, but all Arab states will attend a December Islamic 
     summit in Iran. U.S. policy needs review.
       Iraq, a police state led by an unpredictable tyrant, still 
     threatens regional stability. Iraq is weaker than it was six 
     years ago, yet Saddam's grip is tighter. He is unchallenged 
     at home. The Arab-Israeli impasse, and the suffering of 
     Iraqis due to sanctions, enable Saddam to win Arab support. 
     Many of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have been 
     destroyed; but many have not, especially chemical and 
     biological weapons. Thus, the work of UN inspectors is far 
     from over. We will need highly intrusive inspections in Iraq 
     for years to come.
       Iran, with over 60 million people, confronts the U.S. and 
     the region with a challenge of great difficulty. The 18-year 
     break in U.S.-Iran ties means that mutual understanding is 
     poor. U.S. policy is to contain Iran because of its 
     opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process, its WMD 
     programs, and its support for terrorism. The present U.S. 
     policy of unilateral sanctions against Iran is not backed by 
     our European allies and is not working. Those sanctions have 
     been counterproductive in achieving U.S. goals.
       The Arab Gulf states host a large U.S. military presence, 
     rely on us for security, and are doing little for collective 
     self-defense. They are reluctant to support confrontation 
     with Iraq and Iran. With the exception of Kuwait, they resent 
     what they see as U.S. partiality toward Israel and hostility 
     toward Arabs and Muslims--in the West Bank and Gaza, Libya, 
     Sudan, Iraq, and Iran.
       Within the United States, there is strong support for 
     military deployments in the Gulf, which are seen as vital to 
     defending U.S. interests. Iran, and especially Iraq, remain 
     deeply unpopular, but there is little desire for war.
       How should U.S. policy change? First, the willingness of 
     Gulf states to stand with the U.S. will improve if we get the 
     Arab-Israeli peace process back on track. The greater the 
     momentum in the peace process, the stronger the support in 
     the Gulf for overall U.S. objectives.
       Second, we should state precisely U.S. objectives toward 
     Iraq, which have always lacked specificity. U.S. policy has 
     not been clear about whether Saddam should be removed and at 
     what point sanctions should be lifted. Our prime objective 
     should be to contain Iraq, because its weapons programs are a 
     threat to peace. If Saddam threatens his neighbors, or openly 
     pursues WMD, the U.S. should severely punish Iraq. To 
     maintain support for UN sanctions against Iraq and to 
     eliminate Iraq's WMD successfully, U.S. policy needs some 
     adjustment.
       We must make clear that our problem is not with Iraq's 
     people, but with the policies of its government. To lessen 
     the impact of sanctions on the Iraqi people, we should allow 
     them to get much more food and medicine, so long as the UN 
     can monitor end-use. We should support Iraq's territorial 
     integrity, and maintain sanctions until Iraq complies with 
     all UN resolutions. The U.S. should indicate its willingness 
     to help a new government in Iraq that abides by UN 
     resolutions. An Iraq that accepts international norms of 
     behavior should be allowed to return to the family of 
     nations.
       Third, the U.S. opposes many of Iran's policies, but does 
     not seek to oust its government. U.S. criticisms should focus 
     on the conduct of Iran's leadership, not on Iran's people and 
     certainly not on Islam. Our goal should be to change Iran's 
     unacceptable policies on terrorism, the people process, and 
     especially its quest for WMD.
       The U.S. and Iran need to cool the rhetoric, end mutual 
     demonization, explore better ties, and gradually establish a 
     reliable and authoritative dialogue. As Iran's policies 
     change, the U.S. should respond step-by-step--reducing 
     sanctions, permitting non-military trade, and allowing U.S. 
     firms into Iran.
       We should support the military containment of Iran. We 
     should push for full international inspections of Iran's 
     nuclear facilities and multilateral restrictions focused on, 
     and limited to, WMD and related technology.
       The U.S. should work to reduce differences with its allies 
     and develop new avenues for cooperation against Iran's 
     unacceptable behavior. Because Central Asia's energy 
     resources are becoming increasingly important, we should work 
     with our allies to secure access to them. In this process, we 
     should not automatically exclude commercial relations with 
     Iran. The U.S. needs more carrots in its policy toward Iran, 
     and Europe needs more sticks. We cannot guarantee success if 
     we work together, but we will surely fail if we do not.
       Finally, there must be no doubt that the U.S. plans to 
     remain in the Gulf. U.S. forces continue to be necessary, yet 
     we need balance between the military and civilian aspects of 
     our presence. The profile of the U.S. military in the region 
     has been reduced appropriately since the Khobar Towers 
     bombing last year, but we also need to strengthen political 
     and economic ties. More attention from senior U.S. officials 
     will help preserve the Gulf coalition and strengthen the U.S. 
     message about reform, accountability and openness in Gulf 
     societies.
       Conclusion. Peace and security in the Gulf are vitally 
     important to the U.S. national interest. For the immediate 
     future, Iraq and Iran will require constant, consistent and 
     balanced attention from U.S. policymakers. The task is 
     enormously difficult. Success will require close and 
     effective cooperation with friends and allies, and strong 
     American leadership.

     

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