[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 5 (Tuesday, February 3, 1998)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E63-E64]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                  PROMOTING DEMOCRACY AROUND THE WORLD

                                 ______
                                 

                          HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                       Tuesday, February 3, 1998

  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, the euphoria that greeted the end of the 
cold war, and the authoritarian regimes around the world that drew 
their strength from it, is fading as we face the reality of how 
difficult it is to instill democratic ideals and processes in emerging 
nations. Some critics have argued that elections have not brought 
freedom to many of these countries. Some have even gone so far as to 
suggest that a new kind of authoritarian government might be preferable 
to an elected one.
  I am not so pessimistic. In my judgment, what is useful at this point 
in the U.S. and international experience with democracy-building 
programs is to analyze which programs have proven useful in the long-
term process of reforming institutions and citizens' demands on their 
governments. Instead of giving up on democracy, we should support the 
democratic leaders--in government and civil society--who will lay the 
foundation for reforms in their countries.
  I would commend to my colleagues a January 26, 1998 Wall Street 
Journal article on this subject by Marc F. Plattner and Carl Gershman 
of the National Endowment for Democracy. The Endowment works creatively 
with non-governmental organizations in the U.S. and around the world to 
help build lasting democratic institutions that can protect fundamental 
freedoms. I am proud to be one of its strongest supporters.
  The article follows:

             [From the Wall Street Journal, Jan. 26, 1998]

                        Democracy Gets a Bum Rap

                (By Marc F. Plattner and Carl Gershman)

       Two recent articles--by Fareed Zakaria in Foreign Affairs 
     and by Robert Kaplan in The Atlantic Monthly--have given 
     voice to a growing pessimism about the global fortunes of 
     democracy. This gloom is no more well-founded than the 
     euphoria about democracy that prevailed just a few years ago. 
     For serious students of democracy have always known that it 
     is a difficult form of government to sustain: Setting up a 
     new democracy is much easier than getting it to perform well 
     or to endure.
       Two decades ago the world had only a few dozen democracies, 
     predominantly in Western Europe or countries populated 
     primarily by the descendants of Western Europeans. Citizens 
     of these countries enjoyed not only free and competitive 
     multiparty elections but also the rule of law and the 
     protection of individual liberties. Nearly all (India being 
     the most notable exception) had advanced industrial 
     economies, sizable middle classes and high literacy rates--
     characteristics that political scientists typically regarded 
     as ``prerequisites'' of successful democracy. Meanwhile, what 
     were then called the Second and Third Worlds were dominated 
     by other kinds of regimes (Marxist-Leninist, military, 
     single-party, etc.) that rejected multiparty elections.


                            Regimes Crumbled

       By the early 1990s this situation had changed dramatically, 
     as Marxist-Leninist, military and single-party regimes 
     crumbled and were mostly succeeded by regimes that at least 
     aspired to be democratic. Today, well over 100 states can 
     plausibly claim to have elected governments, including most 
     countries in Latin America, many in the post-Communist world 
     and a significant number in Asia and Africa.
       Outside Africa, surprisingly few of these regimes have 
     suffered outright reversions to authoritarianism. At the same 
     time, it has become clear that many of them, even among those 
     that hold unambiguously free and fair elections, fall short 
     of Western standards in protecting individual liberties and 
     adhering to the rule of law. As Larry Diamond, co-editor 
     of the Journal of Democracy, puts it, many of the new 
     regimes are ``electoral democracies'' but not ``liberal 
     democracies.'' Mr. Zakaria puts a more pessimistic spin on 
     a similar diagnosis in his article, entitled ``The Rise of 
     Illiberal Democracy.''
       The difference is more than semantic. Calling the emerging 
     democracies ``illiberal'' suggests that they constitute a new 
     threat to freedom. In fact, compared with the old regimes, 
     they represent a major gain for freedom, a new opening that 
     makes possible

[[Page E64]]

     the gradual institutionalization of democratic practices and 
     liberties. The new pessimists criticize the simplistic view 
     that elections are sufficient to make a country free. But 
     they commit the same fallacy, failing to recognize that 
     democratization is a process of transition, not an instant 
     transformation to a new order.
       The new pessimists seem inclined to rush to the judgment 
     that elections are the primary cause of the problems 
     besetting the new democracies, and to believe that the 
     holding of all those elections is a product of U.S. policy. 
     Both these propositions are false.
       The problem with elections, it is said, is that they 
     empower majorities that may favor policies motivated by 
     ethnic or religious intolerance or by short-term economic 
     interests. This is a danger, but what is the alternative? The 
     critics tend to suggest some version of what might be called 
     ``liberal nondemocracy''--an unelected government that 
     preserves political stability, promotes economic development, 
     observes the rule of law and generally respects the rights of 
     its subjects.
       In theory such a benevolently authoritarian government 
     might be preferable to a corrupt and illiberal democracy. But 
     where can we find one in the real world? The critics cite 
     very few contemporary examples. Mr. Kaplan lavishes praise on 
     the temporary, technocratic government of Pakistan's 
     appointed premier Moeen Qureshi, named to the post after the 
     army forced out his elected predecessor in 1993. Mr. Qureshi 
     served for just three months--hardly a model for long-term 
     stability or widespread emulation. Mr. Zakaria's prime 
     examples are 19th-century European constitutional monarchies 
     that restricted suffrage and Hong Kong under British rule--
     not exactly a practical vision as we look toward the 21st 
     century.
       Proponents of liberal nondemocracy fail to recognize that 
     there is a reason why electoral democracy and liberalism, 
     though sometimes at odds, usually tend to be found together. 
     Liberalism derives from the view that individuals are by 
     nature free and equal, and thus that they can be legitimately 
     governed only on the basis of consent. The historical 
     working-out of this principle inevitably ``democratized'' 
     Europe's constitutional monarchies, just as it later 
     undermined colonialism. Even if ``first liberalism, then 
     democracy'' were the preferred historical sequence, today a 
     nondemocratic government would be hard put to find a solid 
     basis for its ligitimacy--and thus also for its stability--
     while it goes about the task of liberalization.
       Moreover, the new pessimists overlook the close connection 
     between elections and rights. Elections, if they are to be 
     free and fair, require the observance of a substantial body 
     of rights--freedom of association and expression, for 
     example, and equal access to the media. The pessimists 
     fear that elections will undermine rights by legitimizing 
     illiberal regimes. But elections, if they are truly 
     competitive, tend to arouse citizens to insist upon their 
     rights and upon the accountability of elected officials. 
     The process makes government more subject to public 
     scrutiny.
       The spread of democracy abroad is the result not of 
     American policy or propaganda, but of demands by peoples 
     worldwide. Whether this demand springs from human nature or 
     from global communications and the unparalleled current 
     prestige of democracy, people almost everywhere want to have 
     a say about who their rulers are. On what basis shall we deny 
     them? Mr. Kaplan suggests that electoral democracy is somehow 
     responsible for the problems of places like Russia, 
     Afghanistan and Africa today. This is plainly absurd. If 
     democracy is the problem, why wasn't Africa flourishing 
     during the 1970s and 1980s, when the continent had but a 
     handful of democracies?


                        Elections Are Not Enough

       None of this is meant to deny the important--though hardly 
     unfamiliar--insight that elections are not enough. Many of 
     the new democracies have performed poorly with respect to 
     accountability, the rule of law and the protection of 
     individual rights. Helping electoral democracies become 
     liberal democracies is certainly in the interests both of the 
     U.S. and of the countries that we assist.
       But we are more likely to provide such assistance if we 
     view elections as an opportunity to work for the expansion of 
     rights, rather than an obstacle to it. As countries lacking 
     the usual prerequisites attempt to liberalize and improve 
     their democracies, it would be foolish not to expect serious 
     problems. But it would be even greater folly to believe that 
     authoritarianism is the solution.

     

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