[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 4 (Monday, February 2, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S255-S257]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




SECRETARY JAMES R. SCHLESINGER'S STATEMENT BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE 
  ON ARMED SERVICES ON THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL 
                             DEFENSE PANEL

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I would like to take a few moments to 
address the comments made by James R. Schlesinger, the former Secretary 
of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, in his appearance last week before the Committee 
on Armed Services. The purpose of the hearing was to review the 
Quadrennial Defense Review of the Department of Defense, and the report 
of the National Defense Panel, in order to determine what measures are 
necessary to ensure our national security establishment is able to meet 
the threats of today and tomorrow.
  The testimony provided by Secretary Schlesinger was very sobering in 
that he provided the Committee with a clear picture of the crisis we 
are facing due to the imbalance between our foreign policy commitments 
and the diminished capabilities of our Armed Forces. In his own words, 
``By early in the next century, at the latest, we shall be obligated to 
spend far greater sums on procurement. Alternatively, we can watch the 
force structure itself age and erode--until it will no longer be 
capable of sustaining the ambitious foreign policy that we have 
embraced.''
  Mr. President, it is unfortunate that the entire Senate was not able 
to attend last week's hearing and discuss the problems outlined by 
Secretary Schlesinger. I believe it is important, especially at a time 
when the U.S. military may once again be called upon

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to protect our interests in the Persian Gulf, for all of the members to 
fully understand the extent to which our military capability has 
diminished in recent years, and the impact this will have upon our 
ability to pursue an aggressive foreign policy.
  Therefore, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the statement 
provided by Secretary Schlesinger to the Committee on Armed Services be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

  Statement of James Schlesinger Before the Armed Services Committee, 
   United States Senate, on the Report of the National Defense Panel 
                            January 29, 1998

       Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: You have requested 
     that I comment on the Report of the National Defense Panel 
     and, in particular, to develop further the discussion of 
     alternative strategies and alternative force structures. At 
     the outset, let me say that the Panel has done a commendable 
     job. Overall, its diagnosis of the emerging international 
     scene is excellent, its stress on the need for the 
     transformation of defense is correct. Many of its specific 
     recommendations are admirable. While I shall later comment to 
     some extent on alternative strategies, at the moment I simply 
     wish to state that the reticence of the Panel in the area of 
     alternative strategies and force structures is 
     understandable.
       For reasons I shall spell out, I sympathize with the Panel 
     on this point, for it was facing a formidable task. Quite 
     simply you can't get there, that desired point in the 21st 
     Century, from here--given the apparent fiscal limits. The 
     United States has a very ambitious foreign policy. It has 
     accepted the role of the world's principal stabilizing power, 
     the one universal power. Yet, there is no way that it can 
     sustain over time the force structure that the QDR calls 
     for--on three percent of the gross Domestic Product. That is 
     not a matter of analysis; that is simple arithmetic. To 
     fulfill our present commitments and to modernize the QDR 
     force for the more challenging years of the next century 
     would require four percent-plus of the GDP. That does not 
     appear a surprising sum for a nation that aspires to be the 
     sole universal power. Our present level of expenditure, 
     relative to GDP, is less than it was before Pearl Harbor.
       In this decade, we have been cushioned by allowing the 
     principal equipments, inherited from the Cold War years, to 
     age. Obviously such action is tolerable only in the short 
     run. We now spend some forty billion dollars a year on 
     procurement. Yet, the depreciation on our equipment--at 
     replacement costs--runs over a hundred billion dollars per 
     year. In brief, we have been enjoying an extended Procurement 
     Holiday. By early in the next century, at the latest, we 
     shall be obliged to spend far greater sums on procurement. 
     Alternatively, we can watch the force structure itself age 
     and erode--until it will no longer be capable of sustaining 
     the ambitious foreign policy that we have embraced.
       In the period around 2010, the Department of Defense 
     believes that a new peer-competitor of the United States 
     might emerge. It would be a time, according to present 
     assertions, that we now intend to expand NATO to include 
     portions of the former Soviet Union. It would be a time that 
     expenditures on entitlements programs would be escalating as 
     the baby-boom generation retires, and the budget is projected 
     to go into deficit. Yet, at that very time the effects of the 
     aging of major items of equipment and the erosion of our 
     military capabilities would become clear. Unless we alter our 
     present course, under those circumstances we would have no 
     prudent choice but to retrench on our foreign policy 
     objectives and commitments.
       Can we not shrink the present force structure--and thereby 
     provide more funds for modernization? In principal, we should 
     be able to do so, but in practice we would encounter vast 
     difficulties. The operations tempo of the Armed Forces is at 
     this time at an all time peak in peacetime. Force deployments 
     in the post-Cold War years have been far more frequent, of 
     substantially larger size, and of longer duration than in the 
     1980's. To be sure, the optempo of the Services could be 
     trimmed. We should certainly review the training regime of 
     the Services, which has not changed since the end of the Cold 
     War. With Goldwater-Nichols, the regional CINC's have piled 
     on additional requirements. We do need an overall review to 
     see whether so high an optempo is desirable. But, we 
     should recognize, given our present foreign policy 
     commitments, we can only trim rather than substantially 
     reduce the optempo. So long as that is the case, any 
     hankering substantially to reduce the force structure 
     remains unachievable.
       Quite rightly, the National Defense Panel points to the 
     growing strategic uncertainties of the early part of the 21st 
     Century, the possible emergence of a peer-competitor, the 
     serious arrears in funding the re-equipping of the forces, 
     the emerging (re-emerging) issue of homeland defense, the 
     need for space control, the need to incorporate the benefits 
     of the revolution in military affairs, in short, the need to 
     transform defense. It questions whether the two major-
     regional-conflicts measuring rod is realistic--or is just ``a 
     means of justifying current forces.'' It points to the 
     generally low-risk international environment of today. Quite 
     rightly, the Panel states that the ``priority must go to the 
     future.'' It argues that the pursuit of the two MRC strategy 
     consumes resources that could reduce the risk to our long-
     term security. given the budgetary limits, the Panel suggests 
     that we surrender the two-MRC standard. There are risks and 
     certain strategic questions that arise following such a path. 
     Yet, given the constraints, it is a plausible suggestion. 
     Nonetheless, at this time, the optempo of the Armed Forces 
     precludes a reduction of the force structure sufficiently 
     large to generate the funds for re-capitalizing the forces.
       The Panel recommends other means of generating funds within 
     the present budget. It correctly urges a further attack on 
     our excessive infrastructure--and urges the outsourcing of 
     some 600,000 positions in the DOD, including the 
     civilianizing of certain active military positions. I applaud 
     the further closing of bases and I am receptive to pushing 
     outsourcing as far as feasible. I note, however, that there 
     are still some 20 major domestic bases to be closed still 
     left from the BRAC of 1993. I note that most of the 
     reductions in civilian personnel under the quadrennial review 
     is based upon a base-closing exercise which the Congress has 
     already rejected. I note that base closings to this point 
     have generated less than $6 Billion in savings. Thus, 
     admirable as a further assault on our infrastructure may be, 
     it will not generate substantial additional savings to re-
     capitalize the Forces.
       Yet, the suggestion that we move more vigorously to 
     outsourcing is certainly correct. In the view of the doubts 
     and resistance that inevitably will occur, it will be many 
     years before the resources become available. Given the legal, 
     administrative, and political constraints, less is likely to 
     be obtained by these measures in the necessary time-frame 
     than both the Panel and I would wish.
       All in all, the transformation of defense is a meritorious, 
     if not an essential, objective. Yet, it is a far more 
     difficult task, given the resources available, than we are 
     ready to acknowledge. We are not dealing with a system at 
     rest, a garrison military like the pre-World War II German 
     Wehrmacht. The U.S. military now is always on the go, moving 
     around the world and conducting operations in dozens of 
     countries. To transform a force so active is a far more 
     arduous task. While we should embrace the objective, we 
     should also recognize the difficulties that stand in our 
     path.
       Mr. Chairman, let me now turn away from household tasks to 
     an examination of what the Panel describes as the ``cusp of a 
     military revolution.'' The opportunity for such a revolution 
     has been created by the immense technical advances in 
     computers, microelectronics, telecommunications, sensors, and 
     precision guided munitions. These new military technologies 
     were first unveiled in the Gulf War. Admittedly, the 
     conditions were ideal for exploitation of these new 
     technologies. It permitted our senior officers to have 
     dominant battlefield awareness, while Iraq's unfortunate 
     generals had limited ability to communicate and were largely 
     unaware of what was transpiring on the battlefield. However, 
     one element must be kept in mind: our showcasing of these 
     military technologies means that we will never again have the 
     element of surprise, nor will we again be able so easily to 
     exploit the advantages that these technologies offer. We 
     shall have to labor hard, as others acquire these 
     technologies, both to stay ahead and to exploit fully the 
     opportunities offered by them. When I say that we must work 
     hard, I mean that we must not be lulled into complacency by 
     such phrases as ``full spectrum dominance.'' There is no 
     guarantee of permanent American military dominance. Others 
     will be learning the capabilities of information warfare 
     and weapons of mass destruction. Thus ``eternal 
     vigilance'' remains essential.
       That leads me--all too briefly--into alternative strategies 
     and alternative force structures. You will understand, of 
     course, Mr. Chairman that I can only throw out a few brief 
     observations. A complete review would require far more time. 
     But it is essential that, as conditions change we continue to 
     seek alternative means to achieve military or national 
     goals--and to choose those means that achieve our goals most 
     effectively. I have dwelt upon the Gulf War as a watershed 
     event. The military establishments of many nations are busily 
     seeking to discern the lessons of the Gulf War.
       In this light I find it curious that the United States, 
     which developed, exploited, and revealed these new military 
     technologies in the Gulf War, has failed fully to grasp at 
     least one of the principal lessons from that war. The lesson 
     I refer to, that has not been fully absorbed, is the immense 
     success of the air offensive prior to and during the hundred 
     hour ground war. The six weeks of coordinated air attacks 
     prior to the launching of the counter offensive on the ground 
     significantly crippled the combat power of the Iraq forces--
     and continued to do that during the four days of the ground 
     war. Nonetheless, to date the U.S. military establishment has 
     failed to absorb the lessons of the immense success of the 
     air war into either doctrine or war plans. In touching on so 
     many issues, the Panel failed to note the centrality of this 
     issue of strategy. And the Air Force itself has been remiss. 
     For so many years it treated ``strategic'' and ``nuclear'' as 
     synonymous that it failed to analyze and articulate the 
     strategic role that Tac Air can play.
       Despite all our talk of jointness, the Services still have 
     yet to formulate a sufficiently shared vision of our military 
     future. Air

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     power is not just an ancillary to the ground 
     counteroffensive. If we have air superiority, it too can 
     attrit enemy ground forces. And it can do so at a far lower 
     cost in American blood. All this potentially has major 
     implications for budgets and force structure. It is ironical 
     that those who comment upon--and sometimes complain--that 
     sixty percent of the procurement budget goes to Tac Air, have 
     not fully grasped the potential advantages that that confers. 
     It raises a question, for instance, whether the allocation 
     between platforms and munitions is the right one. Given the 
     military significance of precision-guided munitions, one 
     wonders whether it is wise to allow our inventories to be as 
     low as they are. (The Committee may wish to check what kind 
     of a dent the air war against the Bosnian Serbs in 1995 or 
     (what may be) the forthcoming military operations against 
     Iraq put into our inventory of precision guided weapons.) It 
     is a regrettable fact that, if inventories are constrained 
     and are expected to be limited, that in itself may alter 
     military plans--in a way that makes them less effective. The 
     size of inventories is also a choice.
       An issue of at least equal importance that we have not yet 
     thought through is what dependence on these newly-available 
     military technologies may do to our vulnerability. Not only 
     is the United States more dependent upon these technologies 
     than any other nation, its extraordinary military leverage 
     now comes from these technologies. That makes us more 
     vulnerable to all of those stratagems that fall under the 
     rubric of information warfare.
       That underscores at least two things. First, it is 
     essential for the United States to continue to forge ahead of 
     other nations, not only in the exploitation of information 
     warfare, but in defensive measures. Other nations are now 
     industriously studying how to exploit information warfare. 
     The secret is now out.
       Second, we must continuously examine whether or not we are 
     becoming overly dependent on these new technologies in a way 
     that might create a critical vulnerability. If these 
     technologies are essential as force multipliers, 
     neutralization by others of our exploitation of these 
     technologies would place us at an immediate disadvantage. We 
     must, therefore, examine to what extent we should hedge 
     against such a vulnerability. Such hedging could be costly. 
     To hedge against the neutralization of force multipliers, one 
     can maintain larger forces. But if one were totally to hedge, 
     one would forfeit the cost benefits (though not the benefits 
     in effectiveness) embodied in the revolution in military 
     affairs.
       I close by reminding the Members of the Committee of the 
     longer-term problems of sustaining our military advantages 
     and thereby sustaining our ambitious foreign policy. The 
     Department of State has recently stated (in response to 
     Russian complaints about our indifference to their sphere of 
     influence in the ``Near Abroad'') that the Department of 
     State states that the United States does not acknowledge the 
     legitimacy of spheres of influence. That presumably applies 
     only to other countries, since the United States, as the 
     single universal power, regards all the outside world as its 
     sphere of influence. Yet, if we are unable to sustain our 
     military forces and sustain our military advantages into the 
     21st Century, despite the ambitions of our foreign policy, we 
     would be obliged to retreat.
       Mr. Chairman, I thank you and the Members of the Committee 
     for your attention. I would be pleased to answer any 
     questions that you may have.

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