

which America could have an honorable exit. Hopefully, our European allies and our Russian allies who are there on the ground, as well, would be able to leave the country in the hands of its own people.

First, reconvene the Dayton parties for a progress check. Be willing to modify where it is necessary. Dayton was certainly brought about by people who want to do the right thing. It is not bad to say that we should come back together and assess where we are 2 years later and modify, if necessary. I think the administration could take the lead here.

Second, establish a civilian-led and operated police training task force. Establish a police training academy capable of graduating 500 police every quarter. A similar process was attempted in Haiti. General Joulwan was a strong supporter of this approach.

Third, establish the remaining ground troops as a combined joint task force in accordance with the President's own partnership for peace initiative, originally under American command, but to be turned over to allied command within a specific period of months. This should include significant participation by prospective NATO allies—Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary—as an opportunity to bear the burden of post-cold war European security.

Four, require the administration to make a supplemental appropriations request for Bosnia of a specified duration in advance of its spending the funds. Mr. President, this should not come from our defense budget. We cannot take from our defense readiness to the tune of \$3 billion a year and expect to be able to keep a military that has a quality of life that would continue to attract our best and brightest, and it most certainly should not take from our strategic defenses for the future.

Last, build a firewall between Bosnia operating funds and procurement and research and development funds. It is very important that we begin to look at letting the people of Bosnia have some form of self-determination. Without conditioning our continued troop commitment to Bosnia, I'm afraid we are trying to put a round peg in a square hole. We would be looking at American troops indefinitely. We would be looking at a never-ending commitment, and we would be taking resources that are vitally necessary for our own security and for our responsibilities around the world.

Mr. President, I think it is most important that we look at this issue of Bosnia and establish a policy that has a chance to succeed. If the President would do that, I would be the first in line to support the decision. As a matter of fact, I think keeping thousands of troops in a 30,000-troop enclave in Bosnia in perpetuity is not good military strategy and is not based on a policy that has a chance to succeed. Remember what General Shalikashvili said, and that is that having a defined

deadline is important to avoid mission creep. We have learned that before and we should not forget that lesson. I think it is important that we continue to reassess Bosnia because this is laying the predicate for our responsibilities and our actions in the world in the future.

I think it is possible to have a policy that has a chance to succeed with honorable American involvement. I think Americans will support a continued troop commitment if it has a chance to succeed. Teddy Roosevelt was right. He said "America must speak softly and carry a big stick." That is the role of a superpower. We don't have to shout. We do not have to have troops on the ground at every civil uprising around the world. If we do, we make enemies and we are in danger of doing that right now with the Serbs. We will become the focal point and the target of the hostilities and then we will be in a situation where we will have to defend ourselves. We need to step back and act like a superpower.

Once we make a commitment we must be willing to back it up and do what we say we are going to do. That is what is so important about acting firmly in Iraq. We must be a good and solid ally and we must be a feared and respected enemy. That is what a superpower should be. We must realize our place in the world. Make sure our defenses are strong. Make sure we are not dissipating our resources to such an extent that we will not be there when only we have the capacity to act.

I will close with a quote from John Quincy Adams when he was President, and it is still good today. "America well knows, that while once enlisting under other banners than her own, she will involve herself beyond extraction in all wars of interest and intrigue. The fundamental maxims of her policy would change from loyalty to force, wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or will be unfurled there will America's heart be. She goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is a well wisher to the freedom and independence of all."

Mr. President, it is most important that America not succumb to the penchant for wanting to go out and get involved in every conflict in the world but remember as a superpower we have a unique capability to bring warring parties to the table because we are not a party that is hostile to any nation. Mr. President, we could lose that special status that we have in the world if we do not remain strong within ourselves and we will not remain strong if we continue to dissipate our resources so that our own readiness and our own strategic capabilities are in any way diminished.

I ask my colleagues to help in working with the President and this administration to pursue an honorable policy with our allies in Bosnia, a policy that has a chance to succeed and respects the fact that when we put troops in harm's way it is under the most lim-

ited circumstances and only when there is a United States security issue before us. That is not the case in Bosnia. We must help the people of Bosnia but not with continued presence of thousands of troops on the ground when their place can be taken by the parties and the people who live in Bosnia and who we hope will live in peace with our guidance for the years to come.

I yield the floor and I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BURNS). The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I have an order at this time, is that correct?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct. The Senator from West Virginia shall be recognized for 45 minutes.

Mr. BYRD. I thank the Chair.

GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the United States completed a major round of international global climate change negotiations at Kyoto, Japan, on December 11, 1997. Senators and staff members from the Senate Monitoring Group, created by the Senate leadership in accord with the recommendation in Senate Resolution 98, adopted last July 25, 1997, were included on the U.S. delegation. The Senate was well represented at the talks. The chairman of the Monitoring Group, Senator CHUCK HAGEL, as well as Senators JOHN KERRY, JOHN CHAFEE, JOE LIEBERMAN, MAX BAUCUS, and MIKE ENZI, dedicated considerable time and effort there to understand the issues being debated and to engage our negotiators on those issues. They have reported mixed results at the negotiations. The U.S., together with the other 39 industrialized nations, agreed to specific, legally binding targets for emissions of six greenhouse gases. The United States agreed to a numerical target of reducing greenhouse gases by 7 percent below 1990 during a budget period between 2008 and 2012. According to the administration, this commitment is actually about a 3 percent reduction below the 1990 emissions level after other technical provisions of the protocol are included in the calculations. It should be noted, however, that the administration has not yet provided the economic analysis to demonstrate how their calculations result in a 3 percent reduction, rather than 7 percent.

The rules of this U.N.-sponsored conference allow decisionmaking by consensus. Therefore, only those provisions not subject to major dispute were included in the final protocol, and one can say that the United States and all

the other countries which approved the protocol arrived at in Kyoto did so without dissent and without taking actual votes on its provisions. Under these circumstances, it is understandable that in some cases only broad concepts could be included, with the devilish details deferred for later. There were a number of areas of achievement for the United States, and I commend the skill and persistence of our American negotiating team, led by Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat, for those successes. There were, however, some disappointing results, or even lack of results, and a number of important uncertainties that need to be resolved.

My colleagues should understand that the negotiations at Kyoto are not perceived by the parties to be the end of the story—far from it. The next major meeting of the parties, so-called COP-4, will convene in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in November of this year, after the elections. In the interim, there will be one or two preliminary meetings, now scheduled to take place in Bonn, at which time, hopefully, further progress on the details of the general concepts agreed to at Kyoto, and on matters not yet resolved, might be made.

I am far from satisfied with the results of the negotiations thus far, the goal of which is exceedingly ambitious for it is no less than to positively control man's impact on the Earth's climate. The dynamics of climate, the impact of man's influence on it, its timeframes and thresholds and danger points are still far from perfectly understood. It is still far from being perfectly understood. It is certainly understandable, then, that every goal sought was not totally achieved at Kyoto, and that further study and work are needed. Having said that, I believe that the consensus of most scientists who have examined the global warming issue, and certainly the large majority who have participated in the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, have concluded that the balance of evidence suggests that human activities are indeed having a discernible and unfavorable impact on global climate systems. I accept the proposition that the potential for serious climate disruption is real and that the global community must respond at an appropriate pace in accordance with scientific evidence as it is developing.

Now, Mr. President, I am not a scientist, of course, and I am not a physicist. But as Benjamin Franklin said at the Constitutional Convention in 1787, "I have lived a long time." I am seeing some changes in the weather system, in the climatic system. It seems to me, very clearly, that the summers are hotter and the winters, at some points, certainly are warmer, and that floods more often occur, that storms ravage parts of our country more often. There seem to be more droughts, more disasters that strike our land. And so I just sense that something is going on out

there. I don't need any scientific evidence to impress that feeling upon me. But what the scientific evidence suggests is that, should global warming occur, by the time we have absolute confirmation that our planet is warming, it might well be too late to take preventative action. For this reason, I have been concerned about the threat of global warming, and I believe that it might be prudent to undertake cost-effective measures to deal with the risk of climate change as a form of a global insurance policy. However, it will do no good for the United States to take such steps alone.

The Byrd-Hagel resolution was adopted by the Senate by a vote of 95-0. It was adopted unanimously by the Senators who voted, and there were 95 present.

The results of the Kyoto talks did not satisfy—with reference to the Byrd-Hagel resolution—the two goals that were agreed upon, in the context of what I like to say was a unanimous Senate adoption of the Byrd-Hagel resolution. What were those two goals agreed upon in that resolution? I quote from the resolution:

That it is the sense of the Senate that—(1) the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to, or other agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992, at negotiations in Kyoto in December, 1997, or thereafter, which would—(A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specified scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing country Parties within the same compliance Period, or (B) Would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States.

Let's read that again. This is what the Byrd-Hagel resolution said, and it was agreed to by a vote of 95-0 here in the Senate. This is what it said insofar as the operative words are concerned:

That it is the sense of the Senate that—(1) the United States should not be a signatory—

Should not add its name.

to any protocol to, or other agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992, at negotiations in Kyoto in December, 1997, or thereafter, which would—(A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specified scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing country Parties within the same compliance Period, or (B) Would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States.

Mr. President, the Kyoto protocol did not meet either of these two Senate standards.

Regarding Developing Country commitments, part A, the developing countries, the so-called Group of 77 plus China, steadfastly and adamantly refused to accept binding commitments such as were entered into by the developed countries, the industrialized countries, or Annex I countries, in the Kyoto protocol. China made her posi-

tion clear, and it was an unambiguous "no"! That was China's answer. "No." The standard response from the developing world to our concerns is to argue that the industrialized nations should make all of the reductions, because of the developed world's historically high levels of greenhouse gas emissions. The developing world also points to our relative wealth, and to their relative poverty, in arguing that we should shoulder the entire financial and economic burden of all reductions.

But this argument is environmentally, and economically unsound. First, as I have previously noted, the emissions of the developing world will surpass those of the industrialized world in about 2015. After that point, the growth in developing world emissions is projected to overtake any emissions reductions that the industrialized world might make. China, herself—and China said "no" at Kyoto—will become the largest emitter of CO₂, carbon dioxide, in the world during the first half of the next century, surpassing the United States.

Second, I am concerned about the emissions from the most advanced of the developing nations, countries like China, India, Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, who are experiencing explosive growth, and who are on their way to joining the club of industrialized countries. Even a marginal and even an incremental increase in the standard of living for every resident of China will result in a huge increase in greenhouse emissions. While no one wants to deny the benefits of economic growth and higher standards of living to anyone around the world, it is imperative that China's economic growth be coupled with the responsibility for its impact on the global environment. Cleaner economic expansion is possible and must be expected. And it is easier to begin development with an eye toward the environmental situation than it is to take corrective action later.

If progress is to be made this year in reaching a truly global agreement, it will occur only when the developing world realizes that it is at risk from the adverse consequences of climate change at least as much as we are. Most studies indicate that these nations are, in fact, at greater risk—at greater risk—than the advanced countries.

Since atmospheric warming is a global problem, without the responsible action by key developing countries, we will not have a global solution, and we will not solve the global problem. It makes little sense for the developed countries to penalize themselves for an outcome which will be unsuccessful. As I wrote to the President on December 15, 1997, binding commitments for developing nations should be paced according to the ability of each country to achieve greenhouse gas emission limitations appropriate to its national circumstances and economic growth. These limitations could be gradually

implemented. Whether such commitments are in fact appropriate and represent best effort by each nation, will not be difficult to discern. As the saying goes, we will know it when we see it. For the moment, there is nothing to be seen from the developing nation quarter. So, it will be the task of the Administration to bring those key greenhouse gas (GHG) emitting nations into legally binding commitments during the same compliance period that has been agreed upon by the advanced nations, that is, the period 2008–2012.

Mr. President, I also remain concerned about whether the agreement reached in Kyoto meets the second standard set by the Byrd-Hagel resolutions, S. Res. 98, namely, that its implementation would not result in serious harm to our economy. Since the impact of the agreement on the U.S. economy is not now clearly understood, we cannot rule out the likelihood of such damage. It is critical that our nation, and the Senate, understand the probable costs of these specific actions proposed to address global climate change, as well as the possible consequence of taking no action.

What is the cost? What is the cost, if no action is taken? What is the cost if certain actions are taken?

The administration has not yet presented a comprehensive economic analysis, sector by sector, regarding the impact of the Kyoto decision on our economy. Without such an assessment, understood in detail, the Kyoto agreement's impact on autos, on the coal industry, on steel, on aluminum, on cement, on the oil industry, on consumers, on builders, on people of varying income levels, there would be little sense in the Senate's even debating the protocol.

The lack of satisfaction on either count of the S. Res. 98 standards—as I say, there are two of them—means the Kyoto protocol fall short, and there would be virtually no chance of securing the approval of two-thirds of the Senate were the President to decide to submit it for such approval. The President has already indicated his agreement with this assessment, and I believe that he agrees that the decisions of the conference are just the first part of an ongoing work in progress which will continue over 1998 and perhaps beyond, until a comprehensive, effective, and understandable agreement is reached that would be worthy of Senate consideration.

On the positive side, the U.S. negotiating team deserves our commendation for sticking to certain central principles, which were incorporated into the protocol as agreed to in Kyoto. The negotiations were tough, grueling and long. Nonetheless, it was the United States, led by Under Secretary Eizenstat, that obtained agreement on many of our most important priorities, in direct contrast to the Europeans, who witnessed the rejection of almost all of their more draconian and economically harmful ideas.

The U.S. won some victories. What were they?

First, free market mechanisms, called Emissions Trading and Joint Implementation, pushed strongly by the United States, were agreed to after difficult debate. This was a substantial American victory. The purpose of these mechanisms is to allow advanced nations and their industries to satisfy their requirement for emissions limitations by sharing, buying and selling credits internationally, and to fulfill part of their obligations by assisting developing nations in developing cleaner technologies and conservation. These mechanisms are based on the environmental reality that cutting greenhouse gases anywhere on earth reduces the global concentration of greenhouse gases virtually everywhere on our planet. It therefore makes economic sense to reduce those emissions wherever it is most cost effective to do so. Emissions trading will allow the industrialized nations to buy and sell credits that will be created by the most cost effective reductions of greenhouse gases. Through emissions trading, industrialized nations may transfer to, or acquire from, another country party emission reduction credits resulting from projects aimed at reducing greenhouse gases for the purpose of meeting its commitments under the treaty.

A further mechanism, called joint implementation, or the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), was included, at the urging of the U.S. negotiating team, by which industrialized countries can earn credits by contributing financially to projects in developing countries. These projects would involve industries and utilities in the developing world that are far less efficient than ours, and that create more pollution. By helping to bring polluting plants up to U.S. standards, industries can earn credits while sharing our pollution-reduction technologies and production processes. We can maximize our “bang for the buck,” by reducing greenhouse gases to a far greater degree than it would be possible in the U.S. alone, and earn credits for doing so, which would partially offset the cost of our reductions at home.

While we can applaud the inclusion of these market mechanisms in the Kyoto protocol, we do not yet know how they will work, to what extent they will be overlaid by bureaucracies with their own agendas. We should want the maximum freedom of action for American companies to make arrangements with foreign partners without an overbearing presence and pressure by international bureaucrats or bodies, because the role and rules of the game for private companies are central to the viability of any trading scheme. The robust development of market mechanisms that are flexible and give maximum freedom of choice and action by American industry is important. They will be needed if the United States can even hope to meet the emissions reductions targets it has agreed to at Kyoto.

Based on projections of the growth of emissions using current technologies and processes, the United States, in order to meet these goals, would have to reduce our overall GHG emissions more than 30 percent below where they would otherwise be in the 2008–2012 commitment period. Reducing projected emissions by a national figure of one-third does not seem plausible without a robust emissions trading and joint implementation framework.

The rules as to how these mechanisms will work will be the subject of negotiation, and American industry, the environmental community, and the Senate will be intensely interested in how they are developed. Because these market mechanisms could lower the cost of compliance with a treaty, I encourage the Administration to solicit the opinions and support of the business and environmental communities in this regard. Our business community is uniquely qualified to comment on this subject, and it is in the economic self interest of U.S. industry to assist in the creation of strong, robust, and flexible rules for emissions trading and joint implementation in order to lower the cost of implementing any climate change treaty which might be submitted to the Senate. Indeed, I hope that the Administration will provide its own concept of how these mechanisms should be implemented as soon as possible, so that support for this crucial set of procedures and rules can be developed.

There is also some controversy as to whether forest conservation projects will be allowed under the rules on these mechanisms. That is, for example, if an American company helps to preserve endangered forests or other natural carbon sinks in a developing country, it could earn credit for that activity. And I support that concept, but it was controversial in Kyoto. Senators need to hear from the Administration regarding whether such conservation projects will be included, or whether further negotiations are needed to include them.

A second major achievement by the American negotiating team in Kyoto was the inclusion of a provision allowing the purchase of emissions allowances from Russia, which will assist in lowering the cost of U.S. compliance to a protocol. This allowance is partly the result of the substantial downturn of the Russian economy in recent years. While this provision has been criticized as a kind of windfall, it is no different from a similar mechanism that has been insisted upon by the European Union, that is, the creation of a so-called European bubble, which allows all of Europe to reap the benefits of emissions reductions as the East German economy is modernized, and, in the United Kingdom, as the north sea gas fields came on line to supplant coal fired utilities.

The first budget period in the Kyoto agreement covers the years 2008–2012. This was strongly opposed by the European Union and the developing world as

being too weak, despite the fact that anything less would severely harm not only the U.S. economy, but also that of the Europeans. The 2008-2012 decision allows more time for smoother transitions by U.S. industry to the requirements included in the Kyoto protocol.

Decisions of the parties to the conference about protections for emissions originating from national security activities—such as U.S. bases abroad or U.S. forces on deployment, and U.S. forces in joint and multilateral task forces—were included in the discussion. As this is a matter of concern to many Senators, I shall ask later that an article from the January 1, 1998, Washington Post which elaborates on this point be included in the RECORD. I point out that no other negotiating team, from any other country, even included representatives from its defense ministries to Kyoto. Only the United States did this. Thus, our national security operations appear to have been protected in the accord.

The U.S. negotiating team was able to have included all six greenhouse gases, including three synthetic substitutes for ozone-depleting CFC's, which, while small in total volume, nonetheless have a significantly higher capability to trap heat, and over time will become more significant. There was strong resistance on the part of some nations to the inclusion of these three gases because of their utility in high technology, but the U.S. position prevailed in this matter as well, with the assent of significantly affected U.S. industries.

Despite these successes, there were, as I have indicated, some shortfalls. First, despite the best efforts of Ambassador Eizenstat and his very competent team, the United States was not able to get agreement on the Administration's goal of reducing U.S. emissions to the 1990 level. This was the overall target announced by President Clinton when he unveiled his policy toward the talks last October. The Europeans insisted upon a reduction of 15 percent below 1990 levels, and the developing world wanted an eventual reduction of 30 percent below 1990.

The final agreement includes a reduction target of 7 percent below 1990 for three greenhouse gases, and 7 percent below 1995 for the other three gases. In addition, a more generous definition of carbon sinks was included. The Administration calculates that the change to a 1995 baseline for three synthetic greenhouse gases, coupled with the inclusion of additional potential carbon sinks, results in an actual reduction target for the United States of approximately 3 percent below 1990 levels. This agreement, I note, should be viewed in the context of the broader negotiations. While the U.S. did not achieve its original goal of a flat reduction to 1990 levels, the final agreement of approximately 3 percent is a far cry from the 15 percent reduction demanded by the Europeans.

However, I have not yet seen any firm analysis as to how the Adminis-

tration computed its estimate of a 3 percent reduction once the 1995 baseline for 3 gases is included, and the more generous definitions of sinks. I still have not seen any hard numbers on how this estimate was calculated, or what the estimated impact of this reduction target would be on the U.S. economy.

So, the target cannot be evaluated as good, bad, or otherwise. The Senate will just have to withhold judgment. I hope that the economic case will be presented in detail at hearings that I know the committees of jurisdiction will be holding over the next few months. Good, sound answers are needed. The American people deserve to know what changes, if any, in their life styles will be required to meet the Kyoto commitments; what sacrifices, if any, will have to be made; what new technologies will need to be developed and put into place; what shifts in our national fuel mix would be contemplated; and many other questions dealing with national implementation of such commitments.

The details on the market mechanisms have not been worked out, and so we need to create the details of a regime for trading, technology transfer, and mutually-agreed-upon projects across the globe. How will such schemes evolve?

Third, the protocol leaves to the future such vital issues as compliance, monitoring, and enforcement measures. For a binding international system to be effective, it is elementary that it be fair and enforceable. Americans take their commitments seriously, and abide by their promises, but the same cannot always be said for all other parties. Therefore, a system of effective procedures that monitors the compliance of all parties with their obligations; and effective enforcement, presumably with some form of penalty system for compliance, are clearly required. The emissions trading credit system will be denominated in dollars, and the potential for fraud must be reduced to minimal levels for the system to work.

Fourth, the scientific community needs to conduct even more research into climate change. There are many unanswered questions as to the rate and effects of climate change. We do not yet know, for instance, the role of clouds, which seems to me to be rather fundamental. We do not know whether climate changes will be gradual or abrupt.

It is now up to the Administration to roll up its sleeves and map the road from here. First, the details of the concepts agreed to at Kyoto must be developed in close cooperation with the industrial and environmental and consumer groups that are affected. Second, a program is needed to demonstrate how the implementation of commitments we agreed to in Kyoto would be achieved, and what the effects throughout our economy may be.

As part of that program, the Administration is expected to propose a range

of tax incentives and research and development projects. I note that some of this R & D has already been completed, namely in the area of clean coal technology. Fifty percent of the power generated in this country comes from coal-fired boilers, and coal will continue as a significant factor in our energy mix for years to come. As a result of programs that I have actively supported for the last decade, a wide range of clean coal technologies has been developed that result in the more efficient burning of coal—which directly reduces carbon dioxide emissions. I note that these R & D projects were fifty percent cost-shared by industry. While this technology has been tested in some pilot projects, it continues to be expensive to install on a small scale. Only its widespread implementation will lower the per-unit cost of manufacturing and installing such clean coal units.

I have had many conversations with representatives of the coal and utility industry about various approaches that could be used to encourage the construction of clean coal units, as well as the need to continue research and development. I urge the Administration to also discuss these issues with coal-fired utilities, and to support a variety of such initiatives. We should also be concerned about the huge number of coal-fired power plants that China is projected to build during the next two decades, and we should consider initiatives to encourage China and the other big emitters to use only the most efficient and effective clean coal technology.

Mr. President, the canvas that was created at Kyoto is only partly painted in. It is a work in progress, and there is ample time to do the job right.

I hope that the President will not sign his name to the protocol at this point. There is plenty of time to do that over the next year. Let us wait and see what the next November meeting will produce and what can be accomplished in the meantime. I am concerned that if the President signs this protocol at this point, it will compromise his flexibility in dealing with the developing countries over the next year. There is plenty of time to sign. The developing countries might misinterpret the signature of the President on the protocol at this time. They may think: "Oh, you see, he has talked tough, but he is signing his name." And they may be induced thereby to hold out and to more stubbornly resist, more stubbornly resist taking actions and committing themselves to join with developed countries in a specific regime to provide a global solution.

I have outlined what I think are the commendable series of achievements by our negotiators in the face of rather hostile negotiating partners from both the developing world and the European Union. Much remains to be done. The goal of the negotiations is the most challenging ever conceived and undertaken in the international environmental area. The glass may not be even

half full, but the forum for filling it with the most palatable liquid we can fashion is available throughout this year and beyond that, if we have but the tenacity and the imagination and the will to persevere.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Washington Post article and my December 16, 1997 letter to President Clinton be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Jan. 1, 1998]

KYOTO PACT INCLUDES A PENTAGON EXEMPTION—ARMED FORCES PERMITTED TO POLLUTE DURING SOME OVERSEAS MISSIONS

(By Joby Warrick)

The global warming treaty negotiated in Japan last month could lead to tougher pollution controls on everything from mopeds to Mack trucks, but at least one major emitter has managed to reserve its right to pollute: the Pentagon.

A little-noticed provision in the treaty gives the armed forces of any country a free pass to emit greenhouse gases during certain overseas military operations, an exemption secured by U.S. negotiators in the final hours of the Kyoto climate summit despite objections from Iraq and Russia.

The exemption was pushed through, at the Defense Department's insistence, to ensure that international police actions and humanitarian missions remain unfettered by future curbs on fossil-fuel emissions, administration sources said. The climate treaty, which must be ratified by national governments to become law, would force the world's developed countries to sharply reduce their output of greenhouse gases over the next two decades or face sanctions.

"It was the one issue the Pentagon cared most about, and we did well on it," said a U.S. official who participated in the talks.

The exemption is spelled out in two sentences of a technical paper that was ratified Dec. 11, at the close of the all-night negotiating session that produced the world's first binding agreement on combating global warming. One sentence says fossil fuels used by ships and aircraft in "international transport" cannot be counted against a country. The other sentence exempts all "multilateral operations" conducted under a United Nations umbrella.

In practice, the exclusions would apply to military vessels headed toward overseas staging areas or participating in such operations as the recent relief mission to Somalia or the U.S.-led war against Iraq.

The exemptions offer obvious benefits for the United States, which is both the world's only superpower and the largest single emitter of greenhouse gases. But U.S. negotiators said they were motivated mainly by a desire to eliminate a potential alliance-breaker. In the future, they said, countries might refuse to join the United States in sending armies to world hot spots if it meant blowing their limits on greenhouse gas emissions.

"We didn't want to create a disincentive for future humanitarian operations," said one military source who spoke on the condition of anonymity.

In fighting for the exemption, the Clinton administration also may have been seeking to deny Republican critics a potent weapon in their battle to defeat the accord. For several months leading up to the Kyoto summit, conservative groups had argued that a global warming treaty would undermine national security by weakening military training.

The idea of a military exemption was first floated by U.S. negotiators in October at a

U.N. conference in Bonn, Germany, where it drew initial skepticism from some European allies. When debated at the 159-nation Kyoto conference, the proposal was strongly protested by Iraq—and, initially, by Russia.

Iraq, one of the few nations to experience the full brunt of the kind of U.N.-sponsored "multilateral operation" the American plan envisions, could have blocked the proposal under conference rules that require all decisions to be approved by consensus. But in a bit of diplomatic sleight-of-hand, the conference chairman gavelled the rules through after the Iraqi delegation had left the conference room.

U.S. environmental groups, which have generally applauded the Kyoto agreement, complain that the exemption is overly broad because it applies to commercial international carriers as well as military ships and planes. Climate negotiators left for a future conference the complicated task of apportioning responsibility for emissions by commercial airlines.

"It's a pretty big loophole," the Natural Resources Defense Council's Dan Lashof said.

It might have been even bigger. The Clinton administration considered exempting armed forces from the rules altogether, but then rejected the idea. The reason, sources said, was the Defense Department's remarkably strong performance in cutting its own emissions over the past decade—an achievement attributed both to military downsizing and improvements in energy efficiency.

Unless the Pentagon's gains are factored in, they said, the United States might have a much tougher time meeting its obligations for reducing emissions.

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,

Washington, DC, December 16, 1997.

Hon. WILLIAM J. CLINTON,

President of the United States,

The White House, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am writing to commend the skill and persistence with which your negotiators, Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat and his team, represented the United States at the recently concluded climate conference in Kyoto, Japan. I view the decisions of the conference as the first part of an ongoing work in progress which should continue in Buenos Aires next fall and finally, hopefully, culminate in an effective global treaty to control greenhouse gases.

While I await an official, comprehensive report from your Administration on the details and economic impacts of the Kyoto agreement, I would like to share a few observations at the outset of this important post-Kyoto period. I believe that the potential for serious climate disruption is real and that the global community must respond at an appropriate pace in accordance with scientific evidence. Ambassador Eizenstat has indicated that a number of key U.S. priorities were agreed to at the negotiations, including emissions trading and voluntary projects between industrialized and developing countries; reduction targets for man-made emissions of all greenhouse gases; incentives for worldwide forest preservation; and incentives for early emissions reduction. These are the direct result of American proposals, and are milestones on the road to cost-effective restrictions of greenhouse gas emissions on a global basis. These features are intended to reduce economic dislocations and maximize the use of new technologies and free market mechanisms.

However, of paramount concern is that the agreement reached in Kyoto does not meet the first standard set by the Senate in S. Res. 98, namely that the biggest emitters in the developing world have not yet agreed to

binding commitments to be executed together with the industrialized nations. Such commitments should be paced together according to the ability of each country to achieve greenhouse gas emission limitations appropriate to its national circumstances and economic growth, and could be gradually implemented. In the absence of simultaneous legally binding commitments by key developing countries to grow in an environmentally sound way, there will not be an effective restriction of worldwide greenhouse gas emissions. Consequently, there would be little prospect of treaty approval in the U.S. Senate.

I am also concerned about whether the agreement meets the second standard set by S. Res. 98, that its implementation would not result in serious harm to our economy. Since the impact of the agreement on the U.S. economy is not now clearly understood, we cannot yet rule out the possibility of such damage. It is critical that our nation understands the probable costs of these specific actions proposed to address global climate change, as well as the probable consequences of taking no action.

Given the incomplete nature of the Kyoto agreement, I believe that it would be prudent for you to withhold your signature until a more comprehensive treaty is arrived at which would be more deserving of Senate approval. Nevertheless, with these caveats, a major new beginning has been achieved in addressing the long-term problem of global warming. I look forward to receiving the commitment of nations such as China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Korea, and Argentina to join us in this effort in the near future.

Many on both sides of this issue have been quick to register their displeasure with the Kyoto agreement. It has been denounced by some environmentalists for not going far enough, and by some in industry for going too far. While it is regrettable that we were not able to reach an agreement with the developing world in Kyoto, it seems clear that we did gain acceptance on a number of important U.S. objectives. Therefore, I recognize that this is a worthwhile work in progress, and that a durable and effective solution to global climate protection, one which provides sustained economic growth and clean development for all countries, will require a step-by-step approach. I welcome the announcement by the Administration that you consider the Kyoto agreement to be but the first step in a framework or architecture to continue the negotiations, on the basis that this is a global problem requiring global solutions.

I look forward to working with the Administration as the process of negotiating an acceptable international agreement proceeds over the next year.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT C. BYRD.

Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DEWINE). The Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, at the outset I congratulate our distinguished colleague, Senator BYRD, for, as usual, a very erudite and well-thought-out statement. When I entered the Chamber, I saw Senator BYRD speaking, and I saw a thick sheaf of papers. I was glad to have the opportunity to listen to Senator BYRD's presentation because he is more than the conscience of the Senate; he is the intellect of the Senate and a great tribute to this body. So I congratulate Senator BYRD.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator. I could deliver a very appropriate encomium. I could say many appropriate things with respect to the ability of the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania. He is a great friend of mine. I have tremendous respect for his knowledge in the field of law, and I always listen when he speaks. I thank him for his very kind and overly charitable remarks.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague for that reply. I have been in this body, now, going on 18 years. Senator BYRD and I have been able to maintain a long, unguarded border between southern Pennsylvania and West Virginia because we maintain that friendship between the two States.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.

Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair.

(The remarks of Mr. SPECTER pertaining to the introduction of S. Res. 170 are located in today's RECORD under "Submission of Concurrent and Senate Resolutions.")

EXTENSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, before concluding, I have been asked by the leader to seek unanimous consent that the period of morning business be extended to 12:45, with Senators permitted under this request to speak for up to 5 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida.

Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for up to 10 minutes, for purposes of introduction of legislation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. GRAHAM. I thank the Chair.

(The remarks of Mr. GRAHAM pertaining to the introduction of S. 1585 are located in today's RECORD under "Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.")

Mr. HOLLINGS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed to speak as in morning business until the appointed hour of 12:45.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

STOP LOOTING SOCIAL SECURITY TRUST FUND

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, the thrust of President Clinton's State of

the Union address was "save Social Security first." The quickest way to save Social Security is to stop looting Social Security. Over the years, we have looted the Social Security trust fund with wild abandon; we owe it to the tune of some \$631 billion right this minute. It should be a \$631 billion surplus. But actually, since Congress has expended it on foreign aid, defense, food stamps, and other programs in order to appear fiscally responsible, there is a deficit in Social Security.

I see now from the Congressional Budget Office, and I take it from the President's budget to be submitted next Monday, that the CBO, along with the Congress and the President, is prepared, again, to go forward with this nonsense of a unified budget. The unified budget is a fraud. It allows Congress to spend money but get credit for not spending money. Only here do fiscally irresponsible people get a good government award.

Let's think back a minute on President Lyndon Johnson, because the consensus is, "President Johnson changed government accounting procedures and created the concept and introduced the use of a unified budget, and that is how he got a surplus." This is false; false. I was present during that time; I was there with George Mahon, chairman of the Appropriations Committee. We asked if we could cut \$5 billion to achieve a total budget of \$178 billion for the Great Society and the Vietnam War. Can you imagine that? We funded the Great Society and the War with just \$178 billion. And where are we today? Today the budget is \$1.7 trillion. During LBJ's presidency, we balanced the budget with a surplus of \$3.2 billion. The Social Security trust fund then only amounted to \$300 million. So President Johnson balanced the budget without trust funds and without a unified deficit.

What really happened was that Wilbur Mills of the Ways and Means Committee, who was running for President up in New Hampshire, said to the American people: "Oh, we have so much money in that Social Security fund; I will give you a 10-percent COLA." Then along came President Nixon and he said, "If he will give you 10, I will give you 15 percent."

We started draining the fund during the seventies. By 1980-1981—when I was chairman of the Budget Committee—we could see we were going to have a horrendous deficit in Social Security. So we formed the Greenspan commission, and we issued a report that recommended not only to impose a higher tax for Social Security to balance the Social Security budget, but more particularly to build up a trust fund for the Presiding Officer.

Now, old men like Senator THURMOND and I are going to get our Social Security money. But I don't know that younger Americans are going to get theirs. The fact of the matter is that

according to the Greenspan Commission, baby boomers were to be cared for with Social Security through the year 2056. To show that, I ask unanimous consent that section 21 be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE UNIFIED BUDGET

(21) A majority of the members of the National Commission recommends that the operations of the OASI, DI, HI, and SMI Trust Funds should be removed from the unified budget. Some of those who do not support this recommendation believe that the situation would be adequately handled if the operations of the Social Security program were displayed within the present unified Federal budget as a separate budget function, apart from other income security programs.

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, section 21 says take Social Security off the unified budget and record it as a separate trust fund.

I also ask unanimous consent that section 13301 of the Budget Act be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SUBTITLE C—SOCIAL SECURITY

SEC. 13301. OFF-BUDGET STATUS OF OASDI TRUST FUNDS

(a) Exclusion of Social Security from all budgets.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the receipts and disbursements of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund and the Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund shall not be counted as new budget authority, outlays, receipts, or deficit or surplus for purposes of—

(1) the budget of the United States Government as submitted by the President,

(2) the congressional budget, or

(3) the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.

(b) Exclusions of Social Security from congressional budget.—Section 301(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is amended by adding at the end the following: "The concurrent resolution shall not include the outlays and revenue totals of the old age, survivors, and disability insurance program established under title II of the Social Security Act or the related provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 in the surplus or deficit totals required by this subsection or in any . . ."

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I got that reported out of the Budget Committee, and President George Walker Herbert Bush signed it into law on November 5, 1990: "Thou shalt not use the Social Security trust fund." But, Mr. President, Congress today totally ignores it. Here is the economic budget outlook for fiscal year 1999. I ask unanimous consent that this table 2 be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: