[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 3 (Thursday, January 29, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S219-S221]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY ACT
Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, in the Chamber this week and I am sure in
the next week a number of my colleagues will be talking about a January
31, 1998, deadline under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. And as I am sure
my colleagues will know, there has been a recent flurry of newspaper
ads and radio commercials indicating that was the deadline under the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act for high-level nuclear waste to be accepted by
the Department of Energy. I want to put those comments and those ads in
some perspective so that no one should be misled by the assertions of
the nuclear utility industry.
The genesis of our current policy with respect to disposal of high-
level waste traces its origins to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982.
It is true that in that piece of legislation it was contemplated the
Department of Energy would be in a position to accept high-level
nuclear waste, that a period of characterization and study would
ultimately send three sites to the President of the United States and
the President would select one of those sites.
I think it is important to mention at the outset that even in 1982 a
number of Department of Energy experts were
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uncomfortable, indeed, some were skeptical, that the 1998 deadline
could be met, but they were overruled by politicians and the Department
of Energy and others.
My colleagues know from my previous statements in the Chamber that
this process, whatever its original intent may have been, was
politicized immediately. Within the first few weeks after the
legislation was enacted, States such as my own, and at that time the
State that the distinguished occupant of the Chair represents, the
State of Washington, the State of Texas, and others, were denied
oversight funds as contemplated in the act and litigation was commenced
to gather those funds.
That was an ominous beginning of what later turned out to be an
entirely political nonscientific process. The original law contemplated
that the entire country would be examined and that, indeed, various
types of geological formations would be considered for high-level
nuclear waste, and as I have indicated previously that three sites
would be chosen and the President of the United States would then make
a final determination.
None of that was to be. Shortly after the legislation was enacted, in
the following year during the Presidential campaign one region of the
country was assured it would not be considered for high-level nuclear
waste. An internal memorandum within the Department of Energy indicated
that another region would be excluded because of political opposition,
and then the ultimate indignity came in 1987 with a piece of
legislation that Nevadans will forever regard as the ``screw Nevada''
bill which completely altered the thrust of the process and said, look,
we will choose one State, one site, and that will be the place that we
will concentrate our efforts.
That site was at Yucca Mountain. The utilities are now contending
that because no site would be available in 1998 to accept all of the
high-level nuclear waste, indeed, a crisis atmosphere exists, that
there is a call for action and they have proposed an ill-conceived
piece of legislation that is S. 104 in our Chamber and H.R. 1270 in the
other Chamber.
Let me emphasize that this is not a proposal favored by the
scientific community through the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board,
a board established by act of Congress; it is not supported by the
Department of Energy. It is the brainchild of the Nuclear Energy
Institute, the overarching trade association that purports to advance
the interests of nuclear utilities in America.
There is no science involved in this legislation. The utilities argue
speciously that because the nuclear waste will not be available for
shipment to a repository, indeed, there will be an enormous cost
incurred by the Federal Government, that damage claims will approximate
as much as $80 billion. This is totally specious, a fictitious number
that is spun out of whole cloth. But the solution that has been
advanced is much more disturbing and that is S. 104-H.R. 1270. This is
a piece of legislation that would emasculate most of the environmental
laws that have enjoyed bipartisan support for a quarter of a century,
all in the interest of advancing the nuclear utilities' argument. It
would create a temporary nuclear waste dump at the Nevada test site, a
separate geographical location from Yucca Mountain which is where the
permanent storage facility is currently being characterized.
Now, make no mistake that if H.R. 1270 and S. 104 were enacted
tomorrow, under no conceivable scenario could any shipments occur in
this year or, indeed, for some years into the future.
This interim storage proposal is not only a direct threat to the
environmental legislation in this country. It would establish a health
and safety standard for us in Nevada with respect to the level of
radioactive emissions measured in millirems that would be 25 times the
level allowed for safe drinking water. That standard is 4 millirems. By
statute this legislation would propose that the acceptable standard for
Nevadans, where this waste would be shipped, would be 25 times that
level or 100 millirems. No conceivable argument in terms of sound
public policy or science would justify such a legislative mandate.
For those who feel, as I do, that progress is being made in balancing
the budget, with the possibility of a budget surplus for the first time
in nearly three decades, the utilities have crafted a very clever
bailout provision. Under the terms of the 1982 act, for each kilowatt
of nuclear power generated, there is a mill tax levied. That mill tax
goes into a nuclear waste fund, and out of that fund would be the
expenses of maintaining a high-level nuclear waste repository, an
obligation which would go far beyond the current life expectancy of any
currently operating utilities.
Actuarial experts tell us that even under current law that fund is
underfunded. That is to say that eventually the taxpayers are going to
have to bail that fund out. At no time did the Nuclear Waste Trust Fund
financial formula contemplate that it would also pay for a so-called
temporary dump, the one that is contemplated in S. 104 and H.R. 1270,
so an additional financial burden would be added.
The utilities are not content, however, with destroying that part of
the financial basis for the legislation. They would impose a cap or a
limitation on the amount of money that could be paid into that fund
that would approximate the amount of money spent the previous year from
the nuclear waste fund for purposes of this act. Remember that
currently that fund, the nuclear waste fund, is underfunded
actuarially. They would further limit the amount that goes into the
fund, an amount which is going to be necessary for decades ahead, well
beyond the life of any nuclear utility. So, by adding the expense of a
temporary waste dump, putting a cap on the amount of the fees that are
paid into that fund, they guarantee that the American taxpayers will
have to come up with tens, perhaps hundreds of millions of dollars from
general taxpayer revenue in the outyears. That is simply financially
irresponsible. Whatever one thinks of nuclear waste policy, we all
ought to be able to agree that we ought not to build into legislation a
financial time bomb which would begin ticking upon the enactment of
this piece of legislation. This is a utility bailout provision and is
bad policy.
The nuclear utilities have litigated this issue. In November 1987
they argue that the Department of Energy must, under the 1982 act,
accept immediately delivery of the high-level nuclear waste. That was
rejected by the Court. As I have indicated, the Court in deciding the
case indicates that there is an appropriate remedy. I think all of us
would fairly recognize that the utilities will incur some additional
expense as a result of any additional storage capacity that they need
to construct on site. So it is conceded by all that the utilities would
be entitled to an offset; that is, a reduction in the amount of the
mill tax levy paid into the nuclear waste trust fund. Indeed, Secretary
Pena has initiated discussion along those lines. But the utilities have
rejected that. They have rejected that because that's not what they
want. They don't want fairness or an offset. What they want is a
bailout, the provisions contained in this legislation, which shift the
burden from the utilities to the American taxpayers in staggering
amounts in the outyears.
As I have indicated, the Department of Energy does not favor this
legislation to establish a temporary waste dump at the Nevada test
site. The Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board created by this
Congress, comprised of scientists--parenthetically, none of them from
my home State--reject the necessity for this action. We would, in
effect, be transporting 77,000 tons of high-level nuclear waste to
Nevada. That doesn't just get there miraculously. It would pass through
43 States. Fifty million people live within a mile or less of the
highway and rail shipment corridors--some of the largest cities in
America. Accidents do happen. The potential could be catastrophic. We
cannot be unmindful of the fact that in America today we face the
threat of terrorist activity. Such was the tragedy of the World Trade
Center in New York City, and we have seen other evidences of terrorist
activity in our country. What an inviting target, 77,000 tons of high-
level nuclear waste being transported across the highways and rail
corridors of America.
Finally, the kind of storage that is contemplated at the Nevada test
site in this so-called ``temporary'' facility is
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known as dry cask storage. That storage is currently available and in
use in a number of the utilities in America today, on site, approved by
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission with a storage life of 100 years. So,
if it is safe for Nevada, why would it not be safe to leave it at its
current location--that technology has been approved--and to leave it
there until such time as the ultimate issue is resolved of how to deal
with this most dangerous and toxic substance known to mankind?
For those who have followed this debate for a number of years, it
will come as no surprise that the utilities again have raised this
crisis potential or scenario. Two decades ago, before this Senator came
to the Chamber, the nuclear power industry was seeking, once again, to
try to get the Congress to enact legislation to remove the high-level
waste from the reactor sites. That program was then known as the AFR
program, away-from-reactor site. If one looks at the arguments in the
1980s in which it was forecast that there would be a brownout, there
would be a shortage of electricity in America, that all kinds of
catastrophic things would happen to our economy--that was predicted by
the mid-1980s if this legislation that was being proposed in the early
eighties was not enacted. None of that far-fetched scenario came to be
fact. In fact, no utility has suffered a brownout or a failure because
of the absence of storage capacity. Many reactors have gone off line
because they are no longer safe and others because they are not
economically viable. That continues to be the case as recently as
earlier this month with the reactor that is intended to be closed
within the State of Illinois.
So, there is storage capacity available on site through dry cask
storage that avoids the necessity of moving 77,000 metric tons across
the highways and rail systems of America, through 43 States, with all
of the potential for risk and accident that is inherent in that kind of
volume. There is no need to take action. That is the view of the
scientific community. That is the view of the Department of Energy. And
that is the view of the President, who has indicated, should this
legislation reach his desk, he will veto it because it makes no sense
in terms of policy.
This is all about nuclear politics, not about nuclear energy policy.
I urge my colleagues to be very careful when they listen to some of the
advertisements that are currently airing on the radio and in the
newspaper. The reality is that there is no crisis. We have been to this
play before; same arguments, same results. Not necessary. Bad policy.
And we should reject S. 104, H.R. 1270.
I again express my appreciation to the distinguished senior Senator
from Georgia for his courtesy and yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
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