[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 3 (Thursday, January 29, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S219-S221]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                        NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY ACT

  Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, in the Chamber this week and I am sure in 
the next week a number of my colleagues will be talking about a January 
31, 1998, deadline under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. And as I am sure 
my colleagues will know, there has been a recent flurry of newspaper 
ads and radio commercials indicating that was the deadline under the 
Nuclear Waste Policy Act for high-level nuclear waste to be accepted by 
the Department of Energy. I want to put those comments and those ads in 
some perspective so that no one should be misled by the assertions of 
the nuclear utility industry.
  The genesis of our current policy with respect to disposal of high-
level waste traces its origins to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. 
It is true that in that piece of legislation it was contemplated the 
Department of Energy would be in a position to accept high-level 
nuclear waste, that a period of characterization and study would 
ultimately send three sites to the President of the United States and 
the President would select one of those sites.
  I think it is important to mention at the outset that even in 1982 a 
number of Department of Energy experts were

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uncomfortable, indeed, some were skeptical, that the 1998 deadline 
could be met, but they were overruled by politicians and the Department 
of Energy and others.
  My colleagues know from my previous statements in the Chamber that 
this process, whatever its original intent may have been, was 
politicized immediately. Within the first few weeks after the 
legislation was enacted, States such as my own, and at that time the 
State that the distinguished occupant of the Chair represents, the 
State of Washington, the State of Texas, and others, were denied 
oversight funds as contemplated in the act and litigation was commenced 
to gather those funds.
  That was an ominous beginning of what later turned out to be an 
entirely political nonscientific process. The original law contemplated 
that the entire country would be examined and that, indeed, various 
types of geological formations would be considered for high-level 
nuclear waste, and as I have indicated previously that three sites 
would be chosen and the President of the United States would then make 
a final determination.
  None of that was to be. Shortly after the legislation was enacted, in 
the following year during the Presidential campaign one region of the 
country was assured it would not be considered for high-level nuclear 
waste. An internal memorandum within the Department of Energy indicated 
that another region would be excluded because of political opposition, 
and then the ultimate indignity came in 1987 with a piece of 
legislation that Nevadans will forever regard as the ``screw Nevada'' 
bill which completely altered the thrust of the process and said, look, 
we will choose one State, one site, and that will be the place that we 
will concentrate our efforts.
  That site was at Yucca Mountain. The utilities are now contending 
that because no site would be available in 1998 to accept all of the 
high-level nuclear waste, indeed, a crisis atmosphere exists, that 
there is a call for action and they have proposed an ill-conceived 
piece of legislation that is S. 104 in our Chamber and H.R. 1270 in the 
other Chamber.
  Let me emphasize that this is not a proposal favored by the 
scientific community through the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, 
a board established by act of Congress; it is not supported by the 
Department of Energy. It is the brainchild of the Nuclear Energy 
Institute, the overarching trade association that purports to advance 
the interests of nuclear utilities in America.

  There is no science involved in this legislation. The utilities argue 
speciously that because the nuclear waste will not be available for 
shipment to a repository, indeed, there will be an enormous cost 
incurred by the Federal Government, that damage claims will approximate 
as much as $80 billion. This is totally specious, a fictitious number 
that is spun out of whole cloth. But the solution that has been 
advanced is much more disturbing and that is S. 104-H.R. 1270. This is 
a piece of legislation that would emasculate most of the environmental 
laws that have enjoyed bipartisan support for a quarter of a century, 
all in the interest of advancing the nuclear utilities' argument. It 
would create a temporary nuclear waste dump at the Nevada test site, a 
separate geographical location from Yucca Mountain which is where the 
permanent storage facility is currently being characterized.
  Now, make no mistake that if H.R. 1270 and S. 104 were enacted 
tomorrow, under no conceivable scenario could any shipments occur in 
this year or, indeed, for some years into the future.
  This interim storage proposal is not only a direct threat to the 
environmental legislation in this country. It would establish a health 
and safety standard for us in Nevada with respect to the level of 
radioactive emissions measured in millirems that would be 25 times the 
level allowed for safe drinking water. That standard is 4 millirems. By 
statute this legislation would propose that the acceptable standard for 
Nevadans, where this waste would be shipped, would be 25 times that 
level or 100 millirems. No conceivable argument in terms of sound 
public policy or science would justify such a legislative mandate.
  For those who feel, as I do, that progress is being made in balancing 
the budget, with the possibility of a budget surplus for the first time 
in nearly three decades, the utilities have crafted a very clever 
bailout provision. Under the terms of the 1982 act, for each kilowatt 
of nuclear power generated, there is a mill tax levied. That mill tax 
goes into a nuclear waste fund, and out of that fund would be the 
expenses of maintaining a high-level nuclear waste repository, an 
obligation which would go far beyond the current life expectancy of any 
currently operating utilities.
  Actuarial experts tell us that even under current law that fund is 
underfunded. That is to say that eventually the taxpayers are going to 
have to bail that fund out. At no time did the Nuclear Waste Trust Fund 
financial formula contemplate that it would also pay for a so-called 
temporary dump, the one that is contemplated in S. 104 and H.R. 1270, 
so an additional financial burden would be added.
  The utilities are not content, however, with destroying that part of 
the financial basis for the legislation. They would impose a cap or a 
limitation on the amount of money that could be paid into that fund 
that would approximate the amount of money spent the previous year from 
the nuclear waste fund for purposes of this act. Remember that 
currently that fund, the nuclear waste fund, is underfunded 
actuarially. They would further limit the amount that goes into the 
fund, an amount which is going to be necessary for decades ahead, well 
beyond the life of any nuclear utility. So, by adding the expense of a 
temporary waste dump, putting a cap on the amount of the fees that are 
paid into that fund, they guarantee that the American taxpayers will 
have to come up with tens, perhaps hundreds of millions of dollars from 
general taxpayer revenue in the outyears. That is simply financially 
irresponsible. Whatever one thinks of nuclear waste policy, we all 
ought to be able to agree that we ought not to build into legislation a 
financial time bomb which would begin ticking upon the enactment of 
this piece of legislation. This is a utility bailout provision and is 
bad policy.
  The nuclear utilities have litigated this issue. In November 1987 
they argue that the Department of Energy must, under the 1982 act, 
accept immediately delivery of the high-level nuclear waste. That was 
rejected by the Court. As I have indicated, the Court in deciding the 
case indicates that there is an appropriate remedy. I think all of us 
would fairly recognize that the utilities will incur some additional 
expense as a result of any additional storage capacity that they need 
to construct on site. So it is conceded by all that the utilities would 
be entitled to an offset; that is, a reduction in the amount of the 
mill tax levy paid into the nuclear waste trust fund. Indeed, Secretary 
Pena has initiated discussion along those lines. But the utilities have 
rejected that. They have rejected that because that's not what they 
want. They don't want fairness or an offset. What they want is a 
bailout, the provisions contained in this legislation, which shift the 
burden from the utilities to the American taxpayers in staggering 
amounts in the outyears.
  As I have indicated, the Department of Energy does not favor this 
legislation to establish a temporary waste dump at the Nevada test 
site. The Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board created by this 
Congress, comprised of scientists--parenthetically, none of them from 
my home State--reject the necessity for this action. We would, in 
effect, be transporting 77,000 tons of high-level nuclear waste to 
Nevada. That doesn't just get there miraculously. It would pass through 
43 States. Fifty million people live within a mile or less of the 
highway and rail shipment corridors--some of the largest cities in 
America. Accidents do happen. The potential could be catastrophic. We 
cannot be unmindful of the fact that in America today we face the 
threat of terrorist activity. Such was the tragedy of the World Trade 
Center in New York City, and we have seen other evidences of terrorist 
activity in our country. What an inviting target, 77,000 tons of high-
level nuclear waste being transported across the highways and rail 
corridors of America.
  Finally, the kind of storage that is contemplated at the Nevada test 
site in this so-called ``temporary'' facility is

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known as dry cask storage. That storage is currently available and in 
use in a number of the utilities in America today, on site, approved by 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission with a storage life of 100 years. So, 
if it is safe for Nevada, why would it not be safe to leave it at its 
current location--that technology has been approved--and to leave it 
there until such time as the ultimate issue is resolved of how to deal 
with this most dangerous and toxic substance known to mankind?
  For those who have followed this debate for a number of years, it 
will come as no surprise that the utilities again have raised this 
crisis potential or scenario. Two decades ago, before this Senator came 
to the Chamber, the nuclear power industry was seeking, once again, to 
try to get the Congress to enact legislation to remove the high-level 
waste from the reactor sites. That program was then known as the AFR 
program, away-from-reactor site. If one looks at the arguments in the 
1980s in which it was forecast that there would be a brownout, there 
would be a shortage of electricity in America, that all kinds of 
catastrophic things would happen to our economy--that was predicted by 
the mid-1980s if this legislation that was being proposed in the early 
eighties was not enacted. None of that far-fetched scenario came to be 
fact. In fact, no utility has suffered a brownout or a failure because 
of the absence of storage capacity. Many reactors have gone off line 
because they are no longer safe and others because they are not 
economically viable. That continues to be the case as recently as 
earlier this month with the reactor that is intended to be closed 
within the State of Illinois.
  So, there is storage capacity available on site through dry cask 
storage that avoids the necessity of moving 77,000 metric tons across 
the highways and rail systems of America, through 43 States, with all 
of the potential for risk and accident that is inherent in that kind of 
volume. There is no need to take action. That is the view of the 
scientific community. That is the view of the Department of Energy. And 
that is the view of the President, who has indicated, should this 
legislation reach his desk, he will veto it because it makes no sense 
in terms of policy.
  This is all about nuclear politics, not about nuclear energy policy. 
I urge my colleagues to be very careful when they listen to some of the 
advertisements that are currently airing on the radio and in the 
newspaper. The reality is that there is no crisis. We have been to this 
play before; same arguments, same results. Not necessary. Bad policy. 
And we should reject S. 104, H.R. 1270.
  I again express my appreciation to the distinguished senior Senator 
from Georgia for his courtesy and yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.

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