[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 3 (Thursday, January 29, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S194-S199]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the United States completed a major round of
international global climate change negotiations at Kyoto, Japan, on
December 11, 1997. Senators and staff members from the Senate
Monitoring Group, created by the Senate leadership in accord with the
recommendation in Senate Resolution 98, adopted last July 25, 1997,
were included on the U.S. delegation. The Senate was well represented
at the talks. The chairman of the Monitoring Group, Senator Chuck
Hagel, as well as Senators John Kerry, John Chafee, Joe Lieberman, Max
Baucus, and Mike Enzi, dedicated considerable time and effort there to
understand the issues being debated and to engage our negotiators on
those issues. They have reported mixed results at the negotiations. The
U.S., together with the other 39 industrialized nations, agreed to
specific, legally binding targets for emissions of six greenhouse
gases. The United States agreed to a numerical target of reducing
greenhouse gases by 7 percent below 1990 during a budget period between
2008 and 2012. According to the administration, this commitment is
actually about a 3 percent reduction below the 1990 emissions level
after other technical provisions of the protocol are included in the
calculations. It should be noted, however, that the administration has
not yet provided the economic analysis to demonstrate how their
calculations result in a 3 percent reduction, rather than 7 percent.
The rules of this U.N.-sponsored conference allow decisionmaking by
consensus. Therefore, only those provisions not subject to major
dispute were included in the final protocol, and one can say that the
United States and all
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the other countries which approved the protocol arrived at in Kyoto did
so without dissent and without taking actual votes on its provisions.
Under these circumstances, it is understandable that in some cases only
broad concepts could be included, with the devilish details deferred
for later. There were a number of areas of achievement for the United
States, and I commend the skill and persistence of our American
negotiating team, led by Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat, for those
successes. There were, however, some disappointing results, or even
lack of results, and a number of important uncertainties that need to
be resolved.
My colleagues should understand that the negotiations at Kyoto are
not perceived by the parties to be the end of the story--far from it.
The next major meeting of the parties, so-called COP-4, will convene in
Buenos Aires, Argentina, in November of this year, after the elections.
In the interim, there will be one or two preliminary meetings, now
scheduled to take place in Bonn, at which time, hopefully, further
progress on the details of the general concepts agreed to at Kyoto, and
on matters not yet resolved, might be made.
I am far from satisfied with the results of the negotiations thus
far, the goal of which is exceedingly ambitious for it is no less than
to positively control man's impact on the Earth's climate. The dynamics
of climate, the impact of man's influence on it, its timeframes and
thresholds and danger points are still far from perfectly understood.
It is still far from being perfectly understood. It is certainly
understandable, then, that every goal sought was not totally achieved
at Kyoto, and that further study and work are needed. Having said that,
I believe that the consensus of most scientists who have examined the
global warming issue, and certainly the large majority who have
participated in the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, have concluded that the balance of evidence suggests that human
activities are indeed having a discernible and unfavorable impact on
global climate systems. I accept the proposition that the potential for
serious climate disruption is real and that the global community must
respond at an appropriate pace in accordance with scientific evidence
as it its developing.
Now, Mr. President, I am not a scientist, of course, and I am not a
physicist. But as Benjamin Franklin said at the Constitutional
Convention in 1787, ``I have lived a long time.'' I am seeing some
changes in the weather system, in the climatic system. It seems to me,
very clearly, that the summers are hotter and the winters, at some
points, certainly are warmer, and that floods more often occur, that
storms ravage parts of our country more often. There seem to be more
droughts, more disasters that strike our land. And so I just sense that
something is going on out there. I don't need any scientific evidence
to impress that feeling upon me. But what the scientific evidence
suggests is that, should global warming occur, by the time we have
absolute confirmation that our planet is warming, it might well be too
late to take preventative action. For this reason, I have been
concerned about the threat of global warming, and I believe that it
might be prudent to undertake cost-effective measures to deal with the
risk of climate change as a form of a global insurance policy. However,
it will do no good for the United States to take such steps alone.
The Byrd-Hagel resolution was adopted by the Senate by a vote of 95-
0. It was adopted unanimously by the Senators who voted, and there were
95 present.
The results of the Kyoto talks did not satisfy--with reference to the
Byrd-Hagel resolution--the two goals that were agreed upon, in the
context of what I like to say was a unanimous Senate adoption of the
Byrd-Hagel resolution. What were those two goals agreed upon in that
resolution? I quote from the resolution:
That it is the sense of the Senate that--(1) the United
States should not be a signatory to any protocol to, or other
agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change of 1992, at negotiations in Kyoto in
December, 1997, or thereafter, which would--(A) mandate new
commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for
the annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other agreement
also mandates new specified scheduled commitments to limit or
reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing country
Parties within the same compliance Period, or (B) Would
result in serious harm to the economy of the United States.
Let's read that again. This is what the Byrd-Hagel resolution said,
and it was agreed to by a vote of 95-0 here in the Senate. This is what
it said insofar as the operative words are concerned:
That it is the sense of the Senate that--(1) the United
States should not be a signatory----
Should not add its name.
to any protocol to, or other agreement regarding, the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992, at
negotiations in Kyoto in December, 1997, or thereafter, which
would--(A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce
greenhouse gas emissions for the annex I Parties, unless the
protocol or other agreement also mandates new specified
scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas
emissions for Developing country Parties within the same
compliance Period, or (B) Would result in serious harm to the
economy of the United States.
Mr. President, the Kyoto protocol did not meet either of these two
Senate standards.
Regarding Developing Country commitments, part A, the developing
countries, the so-called Group of 77 plus China, steadfastly and
adamantly refused to accept binding commitments such as were entered
into by the developed countries, the industrialized countries, or Annex
I countries, in the Kyoto protocol. China made her position clear, and
it was an unambiguous ``no''! That was China's answer. ``No.'' The
standard response from the developing world to our concerns is to argue
that the industrialized nations should make all of the reductions,
because of the developed world's historically high levels of greenhouse
gas emissions. The developing world also points to our relative wealth,
and to their relative poverty, in arguing that we should shoulder the
entire financial and economic burden of all reductions.
But this argument is environmentally, and economically unsound.
First, as I have previously noted, the emissions of the developing
world will surpass those of the industrialized world in about 2015.
After that point, the growth in developing world emissions is projected
to overtake any emissions reductions that the industrialized world
might make. China, herself--and China said ``no'' at Kyoto--will become
the largest emitter of CO2, carbon dioxide, in the world during the
first half of the next century, surpassing the United States.
Second, I am concerned about the emissions from the most advanced of
the developing nations, countries like China, India, Brazil, Argentina
and Mexico, who are experiencing explosive growth, and who are on their
way to joining the club of industrialized countries. Even a marginal
and even an incremental increase in the standard of living for every
resident of China will result in a huge increase in greenhouse
emissions. While no one wants to deny the benefits of economic growth
and higher standards of living to anyone around the world, it is
imperative that China's economic growth be coupled with the
responsibility for its impact on the global environment. Cleaner
economic expansion is possible and must be expected. And it is easier
to begin development with an eye toward the environmental situation
than it is to take corrective action later.
If progress is to be made this year in reaching a truly global
agreement, it will occur only when the developing world realizes that
it is at risk from the adverse consequences of climate change at least
as much as we are. Most studies indicate that these nations are, in
fact, at greater risk--at greater risk--than the advanced countries.
Since atmospheric warming is a global problem, without the
responsible action by key developing countries, we will not have a
global solution, and we will not solve the global problem. It makes
little sense for the developed countries to penalize themselves for an
outcome which will be unsuccessful. As I wrote to the President on
December 15, 1997, binding commitments for developing nations should be
paced according to the ability of each country to achieve greenhouse
gas emission limitations appropriate to its national circumstances and
economic growth. These limitations could be gradually
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implemented. Whether such commitments are in fact appropriate and
represent best effort by each nation, will not be difficult to discern.
As the saying goes, we will know it when we see it. For the moment,
there is nothing to be seen from the developing nation quarter. So, it
will be the task of the Administration to bring those key greenhouse
gas (GHG) emitting nations into legally binding commitments during the
same compliance period that has been agreed upon by the advanced
nations, that is, the period 2008-2012.
Mr. President, I also remain concerned about whether the agreement
reached in Kyoto meets the second standard set by the Byrd-Hagel
resolutions, S. Res. 98, namely, that its implementation would not
result in serious harm to our economy. Since the impact of the
agreement on the U.S. economy is not now clearly understood, we cannot
rule out the likelihood of such damage. It is critical that our nation,
and the Senate, understand the probable costs of these specific actions
proposed to address global climate change, as well as the possible
consequence of taking no action.
What is the cost? What is the cost, if no action is taken? What is
the cost if certain actions are taken?
The administration has not yet presented a comprehensive economic
analysis, sector by sector, regarding the impact of the Kyoto decision
on our economy. Without such an assessment, understood in detail, the
Kyoto agreement's impact on autos, on the coal industry, on steel, on
aluminum, on cement, on the oil industry, on consumers, on builders, on
people of varying income levels, there would be little sense in the
Senate's even debating the protocol.
The lack of satisfaction on either count of the S. Res. 98
standards--as I say, there are two of them--means the Kyoto protocol
fall short, and there would be virtually no chance of securing the
approval of two-thirds of the Senate were the President to decide to
submit it for such approval. The President has already indicated his
agreement with this assessment, and I believe that he agrees that the
decisions of the conference are just the first part of an ongoing work
in progress which will continue over 1998 and perhaps beyond, until a
comprehensive, effective, and understandable agreement is reached that
would be worthy of Senate consideration.
On the positive side, the U.S. negotiating team deserves our
commendation for sticking to certain central principles, which were
incorporated into the protocol as agreed to in Kyoto. The negotiations
were tough, grueling and long. Nonetheless, it was the United States,
led by Under Secretary Eizenstat, that obtained agreement on many of
our most important priorities, in direct contrast to the Europeans, who
witnessed the rejection of almost all of their more draconian and
economically harmful ideas.
The U.S. won some victories. What were they?
First, free market mechanisms, called Emissions Trading and Joint
Implementation, pushed strongly by the United States, were agreed to
after difficult debate. This was a substantial American victory. The
purpose of these mechanisms is to allow advanced nations and their
industries to satisfy their requirement for emissions limitations by
sharing, buying and selling credits internationally, and to fulfill
part of their obligations by assisting developing nations in developing
cleaner technologies and conservation. These mechanisms are based on
the environmental reality that cutting greenhouse gases anywhere on
earth reduces the global concentration of greenhouse gases virtually
everywhere on our planet. It therefore makes economic sense to reduce
those emissions wherever it is most cost effective to do so. Emissions
trading will allow the industrialized nations to buy and sell credits
that will be created by the most cost effective reductions of
greenhouse gases. Through emissions trading, industrialized nations may
transfer to, or acquire from, another country party emission reduction
credits resulting from projects aimed at reducing greenhouse gases for
the purpose of meeting its commitments under the treaty.
A further mechanism, called joint implementation, or the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM), was included, at the urging of the U.S.
negotiating team, by which industrialized countries can earn credits by
contributing financially to projects in developing countries. These
projects would involve industries and utilities in the developing world
that are far less efficient than ours, and that create more pollution.
By helping to bring polluting plants up to U.S. standards, industries
can earn credits while sharing our pollution-reduction technologies and
production processes. We can maximize our ``bang for the buck,'' by
reducing greenhouse gases to a far greater degree than it would be
possible in the U.S. alone, and earn credits for doing so, which would
partially offset the cost of our reductions at home.
While we can applaud the inclusion of these market mechanisms in the
Kyoto protocol, we do not yet know how they will work, to what extent
they will be overlaid by bureaucracies with their own agendas. We
should want the maximum freedom of action for American companies to
make arrangements with foreign partners without an overbearing presence
and pressure by international bureaucrats or bodies, because the role
and rules of the game for private companies are central to the
viability of any trading scheme. The robust development of market
mechanisms that are flexible and give maximum freedom of choice and
action by American industry is important. They will be needed if the
United States can even hope to meet the emissions reductions targets it
has agreed to at Kyoto. Based on projections of the growth of emissions
using current technologies and processes, the United States, in order
to meet these goals, would have to reduce our overall GHG emissions
more than 30 percent below where they would otherwise be in the 2008-
2012 commitment period. Reducing projected emissions by a national
figure of one-third does not seem plausible without a robust emissions
trading and joint implementation framework.
The rules as to how these mechanisms will work will be the subject of
negotiation, and American industry, the environmental community, and
the Senate will be intensely interested in how they are developed.
Because these market mechanisms could lower the cost of compliance with
a treaty, I encourage the Administration to solicit the opinions and
support of the business and environmental communities in this regard.
Our business community is uniquely qualified to comment on this
subject, and it is in the economic self interest of U.S. industry to
assist in the creation of strong, robust, and flexible rules for
emissions trading and joint implementation in order to lower the cost
of implementing any climate change treaty which might be submitted to
the Senate. Indeed, I hope that the Administration will provide its own
concept of how these mechanisms should be implemented as soon as
possible, so that support for this crucial set of procedures and rules
can be developed.
There is also some controversy as to whether forest conservation
projects will be allowed under the rules on these mechanisms. That is,
for example, if an American company helps to preserve endangered
forests or other natural carbon sinks in a developing country, it could
earn credit for that activity. And I support that concept, but it was
controversial in Kyoto. Senators need to hear from the Administration
regarding whether such conservation projects will be included, or
whether further negotiations are needed to include them.
A second major achievement by the American negotiating team in Kyoto
was the inclusion of a provision allowing the purchase of emissions
allowances from Russia, which will assist in lowering the cost of U.S.
compliance to a protocol. This allowance is partly the result of the
substantial downturn of the Russian economy in recent years. While this
provision has been criticized as a kind of windfall, it is no different
from a similar mechanism that has been insisted upon by the European
Union, that is, the creation of a so-called European bubble, which
allows all of Europe to reap the benefits of emissions reductions as
the East German economy is modernized, and, in the United Kingdom, as
the north sea gas fields came on line to supplant coal fired utilities.
The first budget period in the Kyoto agreement covers the years 2008-
2012. This was strongly opposed by the European Union and the
developing world as
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being too weak, despite the fact that anything less would severely harm
not only the U.S. economy, but also that of the Europeans. The 2008-
2012 decision allows more time for smoother transitions by U.S.
industry to the requirements included in the Kyoto protocol.
Decisions of the parties to the conference about protections for
emissions originating from national security activities--such as U.S.
bases abroad or U.S. forces on deployment, and U.S. forces in joint and
multilateral task forces--were included in the discussion. As this is a
matter of concern to many Senators, I shall ask later that an article
from the January 1, 1998, Washington Post which elaborates on this
point be included in the Record. I point out that no other negotiating
team, from any other country, even included representatives from its
defense ministries to Kyoto. Only the United States did this. Thus, our
national security operations appear to have been protected in the
accord.
The U.S. negotiating team was able to have included all six
greenhouse gases, including three synthetic substitutes for ozone-
depleting CFC's, which, while small in total volume, nonetheless have a
significantly higher capability to trap heat, and over time will become
more significant. There was strong resistance on the part of some
nations to the inclusion of these three gases because of their utility
in high technology, but the U.S. position prevailed in this matter as
well, with the assent of significantly affected U.S. industries.
Despite these successes, there were, as I have indicated, some
shortfalls. First, despite the best efforts of Ambassador Eizenstat and
his very competent team, the United States was not able to get
agreement on the Administration's goal of reducing U.S. emissions to
the 1990 level. This was the overall target announced by President
Clinton when he unveiled his policy toward the talks last October. The
Europeans insisted upon a reduction of 15 percent below 1990 levels,
and the developing world wanted an eventual reduction of 30 percent
below 1990.
The final agreement includes a reduction target of 7 percent below
1990 for three greenhouse gases, and 7 percent below 1995 for the other
three gases. In addition, a more generous definition of carbon sinks
was included. The Administration calculates that the change to a 1995
baseline for three synthetic greenhouse gases, coupled with the
inclusion of additional potential carbon sinks, results in an actual
reduction target for the United States of approximately 3 percent below
1990 levels. This agreement, I note, should be viewed in the context of
the broader negotiations. While the U.S. did not achieve its original
goal of a flat reduction to 1990 levels, the final agreement of
approximately 3 percent is a far cry from the 15 percent reduction
demanded by the Europeans.
However, I have not yet seen any firm analysis as to how the
Administration computed its estimate of a 3 percent reduction once the
1995 baseline for 3 gases is included, and the more generous
definitions of sinks. I still have not seen any hard numbers on how
this estimate was calculated, or what the estimated impact of this
reduction target would be on the U.S. economy.
So, the target cannot be evaluated as good, bad, or otherwise. The
Senate will just have to withhold judgment. I hope that the economic
case will be presented in detail at hearings that I know the committees
of jurisdiction will be holding over the next few months. Good, sound
answers are needed. The American people deserve to know what changes,
if any, in their life styles will be required to meet the Kyoto
commitments; what sacrifices, if any, will have to be made; what new
technologies will need to be developed and put into place; what shifts
in our national fuel mix would be contemplated; and many other
questions dealing with national implementation of such commitments.
The details on the market mechanisms have not been worked out, and so
we need to create the details of a regime for trading, technology
transfer, and mutually-agreed-upon projects across the globe. How will
such schemes evolve?
Third, the protocol leaves to the future such vital issues as
compliance, monitoring, and enforcement measures. For a binding
international system to be effective, it is elementary that it be fair
and enforceable. Americans take their commitments seriously, and abide
by their promises, but the same cannot always be said for all other
parties. Therefore, a system of effective procedures that monitors the
compliance of all parties with their obligations; and effective
enforcement, presumably with some form of penalty system for
compliance, are clearly required. The emissions trading credit system
will be denominated in dollars, and the potential for fraud must be
reduced to minimal levels for the system to work.
Fourth, the scientific community needs to conduct even more research
into climate change. There are many unanswered questions as to the rate
and effects of climate change. We do not yet know, for instance, the
role of clouds, which seems to me to be rather fundamental. We do not
know whether climate changes will be gradual or abrupt.
It is now up to the Administration to roll up its sleeves and map the
road from here. First, the details of the concepts agreed to at Kyoto
must be developed in close cooperation with the industrial and
environmental and consumer groups that are affected. Second, a program
is needed to demonstrate how the implementation of commitments we
agreed to in Kyoto would be achieved, and what the effects throughout
our economy may be.
As part of that program, the Administration is expected to propose a
range of tax incentives and research and development projects. I note
that some of this R & D has already been completed, namely in the area
of clean coal technology. Fifty percent of the power generated in this
country comes from coal-fired boilers, and coal will continue as a
significant factor in our energy mix for years to come. As a result of
programs that I have actively supported for the last decade, a wide
range of clean coal technologies has been developed that result in the
more efficient burning of coal--which directly reduces carbon dioxide
emissions. I note that these R & D projects were fifty percent cost-
shared by industry. While this technology has been tested in some pilot
projects, it continues to be expensive to install on a small scale.
Only its widespread implementation will lower the per-unit cost of
manufacturing and installing such clean coal units.
I have had many conversations with representatives of the coal and
utility industry about various approaches that could be used to
encourage the construction of clean coal units, as well as the need to
continue research and development. I urge the Administration to also
discuss these issues with coal-fired utilities, and to support a
variety of such initiatives. We should also be concerned about the huge
number of coal-fired power plants that China is projected to build
during the next two decades, and we should consider initiatives to
encourage China and the other big emitters to use only the most
efficient and effective clean coal technology.
Mr. President, the canvas that was created at Kyoto is only partly
painted in. It is a work in progress, and there is ample time to do the
job right.
I hope that the President will not sign his name to the protocol at
this point. There is plenty of time to do that over the next year. Let
us wait and see what the next November meeting will produce and what
can be accomplished in the meantime. I am concerned that if the
President signs this protocol at this point, it will compromise his
flexibility in dealing with the developing countries over the next
year. There is plenty of time to sign. The developing countries might
misinterpret the signature of the President on the protocol at this
time. They may think: ``Oh, you see, he has talked tough, but he is
signing his name.'' And they may be induced thereby to hold out and to
more stubbornly resist, more stubbornly resist taking actions and
committing themselves to join with developed countries in a specific
regime to provide a global solution.
I have outlined what I think are the commendable series of
achievements by our negotiators in the face of rather hostile
negotiating partners from both the developing world and the European
Union. Much remains to be done. The goal of the negotiations is the
most challenging ever conceived and undertaken in the international
environmental area. The glass may not be even
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half full, but the forum for filling it with the most palatable liquid
we can fashion is available throughout this year and beyond that, if we
have but the tenacity and the imagination and the will to persevere.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Washington Post
article and my December 16, 1997 letter to President Clinton be printed
in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Washington Post, Jan. 1, 1998]
Kyoto Pact Includes a Pentagon Exemption--Armed Forces Permitted to
Pollute During Some Overseas Missions
(By Joby Warrick)
The global warming treaty negotiated in Japan last month
could lead to tougher pollution controls on everything from
mopeds to Mack trucks, but at least one major emitter has
managed to reserve its right to pollute: the Pentagon.
A little-noticed provision in the treaty gives the armed
forces of any country a free pass to emit greenhouse gases
during certain overseas military operations, an exemption
secured by U.S. negotiators in the final hours of the Kyoto
climate summit despite objections from Iraq and Russia.
The exemption was pushed through, at the Defense
Department's insistence, to ensure that international police
actions and humanitarian missions remain unfettered by future
curbs on fossil-fuel emissions, administration sources said.
The climate treaty, which must be ratified by national
governments to become law, would force the world's developed
countries to sharply reduce their output of greenhouse gases
over the next two decades or face sanctions.
``It was the one issue the Pentagon cared most about, and
we did well on it,'' said a U.S. official who participated in
the talks.
The exemption is spelled out in two sentences of a
technical paper that was ratified Dec. 11, at the close of
the all-night negotiating session that produced the world's
first binding agreement on combating global warming. One
sentence says fossil fuels used by ships and aircraft in
``international transport'' cannot be counted against a
country. The other sentence exempts all ``multilateral
operations'' conducted under a United Nations umbrella.
In practice, the exclusions would apply to military vessels
headed toward overseas staging areas or participating in such
operations as the recent relief mission to Somalia or the
U.S.-led war against Iraq.
The exemptions offer obvious benefits for the United
States, which is both the world's only superpower and the
largest single emitter of greenhouse gases, But U.S.
negotiators said they were motivated mainly by a desire to
eliminate a potential alliance-breaker. In the future, they
said, countries might refuse to join the United States in
sending armies to world hot spots if it meant blowing their
limits on greenhouse gas emissions.
``We didn't want to create a disincentive for future
humanitarian operations,'' said one military source who spoke
on the condition of anonymity.
In fighting for the exemption, the Clinton administration
also may have been seeking to deny Republican critics a
potent weapon in their battle to defeat the accord. For
several months leading up to the Kyoto summit, conservative
groups had argued that a global warming treaty would
undermine national security by weakening military training.
The idea of a military exemption was first floated by U.S.
negotiators in October at a U.N. conference in Bonn, Germany,
where it drew initial skepticism from some European allies.
When debated at the 159-nation Kyoto conference, the proposal
was strongly protested by Iraq--and, initially, by Russia.
Iraq, one of the few nations to experience the full brunt
of the kind of U.N.-sponsored ``multilateral operation'' the
American plan envisions, could have blocked the proposal
under conference rules that require all decisions to be
approved by consensus. But in a bit of diplomatic sleight-of-
hand, the conference chairman gaveled the rules through after
the Iraqi delegation had left the conference room.
U.S. environmental groups, which have generally applauded
the Kyoto agreement, complain that the exemption is overly
broad because it applies to commercial international carriers
as well as military ships and planes. Climate negotiators
left for a future conference the complicated task of
apportioning responsibility for emissions by commercial
airlines.
``It's a pretty big loophole,'' the Natural Resources
Defense Council's Dan Lashof said.
It might have been even bigger. The Clinton administration
considered exempting armed forces from the rules altogether,
but then rejected the idea. The reason, sources said, was the
Defense Department's remarkably strong performance in cutting
its own emissions over the past decade--an achievement
attributed both to military downsizing and improvements in
energy efficiency.
Unless the Pentagon's gains are factored in, they said, the
United States might have a much tougher time meeting its
obligations for reducing emissions.
____
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC, December 16, 1997.
Hon. William J. Clinton,
President of the United States,
The White House, Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. President: I am writing to commend the skill and
persistence with which your negotiators, Ambassador Stuart
Eizenstat and his team, represented the United States at the
recently concluded climate conference in Kyoto, Japan. I view
the decisions of the conference as the first part of an
ongoing work in progress which should continue in Buenos
Aires next fall and finally, hopefully, culminate in an
effective global treaty to control greenhouse gases.
While I await an official, comprehensive report from your
Administration on the details and economic impacts of the
Kyoto agreement, I would like to share a few observations at
the outset of this important post-Kyoto period. I believe
that the potential for serious climate disruption is real and
that the global community must respond at an appropriate pace
in accordance with scientific evidence. Ambassador Eizenstat
has indicated that a number of key U.S. priorities were
agreed to at the negotiations, including emissions trading
and voluntary projects between industrialized and developing
countries; reduction targets for man-made emissions of all
greenhouse gases; incentives for worldwide forest
preservation; and incentives for early emissions reduction.
These are the direct result of American proposals, and are
milestones on the road to cost-effective restrictions of
greenhouse gas emissions on a global basis. These features
are intended to reduce economic dislocations and maximize the
use of new technologies and free market mechanisms.
However, of paramount concern is that the agreement reached
in Kyoto does not meet the first standard set by the Senate
in S. Res. 98, namely that the biggest emitters in the
developing world have not yet agreed to binding commitments
to be executed together with the industrialized nations. Such
commitments should be paced together according to the ability
of each country to achieve greenhouse gas emission
limitations appropriate to its national circumstances and
economic growth, and could be gradually implemented. In the
absence of simultaneous legally binding commitments by key
developing countries to grow in an environmentally sound way,
there will not be an effective restriction of worldwide
greenhouse gas emissions. Consequently, there would be little
prospect of treaty approval in the U.S. Senate.
I am also concerned about whether the agreement meets the
second standard set by S. Res. 98, that its implementation
would not result in serious harm to our economy. Since the
impact of the agreement on the U.S. economy is not now
clearly understood, we cannot yet rule out the possibility of
such damage. It is critical that our nation understands the
probable costs of these specific actions proposed to address
global climate change, as well as the probable consequences
of taking no action.
Given the incomplete nature of the Kyoto agreement, I
believe that it would be prudent for you to withhold your
signature until a more comprehensive treaty is arrived at
which would be more deserving of Senate approval.
Nevertheless, with these caveats, a major new beginning has
been achieved in addressing the long-term problem of global
warming. I look forward to receiving the commitment of
nations such as China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Korea,
and Argentina to join us in this effort in the near future.
Many on both sides of this issue have been quick to
register their displeasure with the Kyoto agreement. It has
been denounced by some environmentalists for not going far
enough, and by some in industry for going too far. While it
is regrettable that we were not able to reach an agreement
with the developing world in Kyoto, it seems clear that we
did gain acceptance on a number of important U.S. objectives.
Therefore, I recognize that this is a worthwhile work in
progress, and that a durable and effective solution to global
climate protection, one which provides sustained economic
growth and clean development for all countries, will require
a step-by-step approach. I welcome the announcement by the
Administration that you consider the Kyoto agreement to be
but the first step in a framework or architecture to continue
the negotiations, on the basis that this is a global problem
requiring global solutions.
I look forward to working with the Administration as the
process of negotiating an acceptable international agreement
proceeds over the next year.
Sincerely yours,
Robert C. Byrd.
Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DeWine). The Senator from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, at the outset I congratulate our
distinguished colleague, Senator Byrd, for, as usual, a very erudite
and well-thought-out statement. When I entered the Chamber, I saw
Senator Byrd speaking, and I saw a thick sheaf of papers. I was glad to
have the opportunity to listen to Senator Byrd's presentation because
he is more than the conscience of the Senate; he is the intellect of
the Senate and a great tribute to this body. So I congratulate Senator
Byrd.
[[Page S199]]
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator. I could
deliver a very appropriate encomium. I could say many appropriate
things with respect to the ability of the distinguished Senator from
Pennsylvania. He is a great friend of mine. I have tremendous respect
for his knowledge in the field of law, and I always listen when he
speaks. I thank him for his very kind and overly charitable remarks.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague for
that reply. I have been in this body, now, going on 18 years. Senator
Byrd and I have been able to maintain a long, unguarded border between
southern Pennsylvania and West Virginia because we maintain that
friendship between the two States.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.
Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair.
(The remarks of Mr. Specter pertaining to the introduction of S. Res.
170 are located in today's Record under ``Submission of Concurrent and
Senate Resolutions.'')
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