[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 3 (Thursday, January 29, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S194-S199]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




               GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the United States completed a major round of 
international global climate change negotiations at Kyoto, Japan, on 
December 11, 1997. Senators and staff members from the Senate 
Monitoring Group, created by the Senate leadership in accord with the 
recommendation in Senate Resolution 98, adopted last July 25, 1997, 
were included on the U.S. delegation. The Senate was well represented 
at the talks. The chairman of the Monitoring Group, Senator Chuck 
Hagel, as well as Senators John Kerry, John Chafee, Joe Lieberman, Max 
Baucus, and Mike Enzi, dedicated considerable time and effort there to 
understand the issues being debated and to engage our negotiators on 
those issues. They have reported mixed results at the negotiations. The 
U.S., together with the other 39 industrialized nations, agreed to 
specific, legally binding targets for emissions of six greenhouse 
gases. The United States agreed to a numerical target of reducing 
greenhouse gases by 7 percent below 1990 during a budget period between 
2008 and 2012. According to the administration, this commitment is 
actually about a 3 percent reduction below the 1990 emissions level 
after other technical provisions of the protocol are included in the 
calculations. It should be noted, however, that the administration has 
not yet provided the economic analysis to demonstrate how their 
calculations result in a 3 percent reduction, rather than 7 percent.
  The rules of this U.N.-sponsored conference allow decisionmaking by 
consensus. Therefore, only those provisions not subject to major 
dispute were included in the final protocol, and one can say that the 
United States and all

[[Page S195]]

the other countries which approved the protocol arrived at in Kyoto did 
so without dissent and without taking actual votes on its provisions. 
Under these circumstances, it is understandable that in some cases only 
broad concepts could be included, with the devilish details deferred 
for later. There were a number of areas of achievement for the United 
States, and I commend the skill and persistence of our American 
negotiating team, led by Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat, for those 
successes. There were, however, some disappointing results, or even 
lack of results, and a number of important uncertainties that need to 
be resolved.
  My colleagues should understand that the negotiations at Kyoto are 
not perceived by the parties to be the end of the story--far from it. 
The next major meeting of the parties, so-called COP-4, will convene in 
Buenos Aires, Argentina, in November of this year, after the elections. 
In the interim, there will be one or two preliminary meetings, now 
scheduled to take place in Bonn, at which time, hopefully, further 
progress on the details of the general concepts agreed to at Kyoto, and 
on matters not yet resolved, might be made.
  I am far from satisfied with the results of the negotiations thus 
far, the goal of which is exceedingly ambitious for it is no less than 
to positively control man's impact on the Earth's climate. The dynamics 
of climate, the impact of man's influence on it, its timeframes and 
thresholds and danger points are still far from perfectly understood. 
It is still far from being perfectly understood. It is certainly 
understandable, then, that every goal sought was not totally achieved 
at Kyoto, and that further study and work are needed. Having said that, 
I believe that the consensus of most scientists who have examined the 
global warming issue, and certainly the large majority who have 
participated in the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, have concluded that the balance of evidence suggests that human 
activities are indeed having a discernible and unfavorable impact on 
global climate systems. I accept the proposition that the potential for 
serious climate disruption is real and that the global community must 
respond at an appropriate pace in accordance with scientific evidence 
as it its developing.

  Now, Mr. President, I am not a scientist, of course, and I am not a 
physicist. But as Benjamin Franklin said at the Constitutional 
Convention in 1787, ``I have lived a long time.'' I am seeing some 
changes in the weather system, in the climatic system. It seems to me, 
very clearly, that the summers are hotter and the winters, at some 
points, certainly are warmer, and that floods more often occur, that 
storms ravage parts of our country more often. There seem to be more 
droughts, more disasters that strike our land. And so I just sense that 
something is going on out there. I don't need any scientific evidence 
to impress that feeling upon me. But what the scientific evidence 
suggests is that, should global warming occur, by the time we have 
absolute confirmation that our planet is warming, it might well be too 
late to take preventative action. For this reason, I have been 
concerned about the threat of global warming, and I believe that it 
might be prudent to undertake cost-effective measures to deal with the 
risk of climate change as a form of a global insurance policy. However, 
it will do no good for the United States to take such steps alone.
  The Byrd-Hagel resolution was adopted by the Senate by a vote of 95-
0. It was adopted unanimously by the Senators who voted, and there were 
95 present.
  The results of the Kyoto talks did not satisfy--with reference to the 
Byrd-Hagel resolution--the two goals that were agreed upon, in the 
context of what I like to say was a unanimous Senate adoption of the 
Byrd-Hagel resolution. What were those two goals agreed upon in that 
resolution? I quote from the resolution:

       That it is the sense of the Senate that--(1) the United 
     States should not be a signatory to any protocol to, or other 
     agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention 
     on Climate Change of 1992, at negotiations in Kyoto in 
     December, 1997, or thereafter, which would--(A) mandate new 
     commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for 
     the annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other agreement 
     also mandates new specified scheduled commitments to limit or 
     reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing country 
     Parties within the same compliance Period, or (B) Would 
     result in serious harm to the economy of the United States.

  Let's read that again. This is what the Byrd-Hagel resolution said, 
and it was agreed to by a vote of 95-0 here in the Senate. This is what 
it said insofar as the operative words are concerned:

       That it is the sense of the Senate that--(1) the United 
     States should not be a signatory----

  Should not add its name.

     to any protocol to, or other agreement regarding, the United 
     Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992, at 
     negotiations in Kyoto in December, 1997, or thereafter, which 
     would--(A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce 
     greenhouse gas emissions for the annex I Parties, unless the 
     protocol or other agreement also mandates new specified 
     scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas 
     emissions for Developing country Parties within the same 
     compliance Period, or (B) Would result in serious harm to the 
     economy of the United States.
  Mr. President, the Kyoto protocol did not meet either of these two 
Senate standards.
  Regarding Developing Country commitments, part A, the developing 
countries, the so-called Group of 77 plus China, steadfastly and 
adamantly refused to accept binding commitments such as were entered 
into by the developed countries, the industrialized countries, or Annex 
I countries, in the Kyoto protocol. China made her position clear, and 
it was an unambiguous ``no''! That was China's answer. ``No.'' The 
standard response from the developing world to our concerns is to argue 
that the industrialized nations should make all of the reductions, 
because of the developed world's historically high levels of greenhouse 
gas emissions. The developing world also points to our relative wealth, 
and to their relative poverty, in arguing that we should shoulder the 
entire financial and economic burden of all reductions.
  But this argument is environmentally, and economically unsound. 
First, as I have previously noted, the emissions of the developing 
world will surpass those of the industrialized world in about 2015. 
After that point, the growth in developing world emissions is projected 
to overtake any emissions reductions that the industrialized world 
might make. China, herself--and China said ``no'' at Kyoto--will become 
the largest emitter of CO2, carbon dioxide, in the world during the 
first half of the next century, surpassing the United States.
  Second, I am concerned about the emissions from the most advanced of 
the developing nations, countries like China, India, Brazil, Argentina 
and Mexico, who are experiencing explosive growth, and who are on their 
way to joining the club of industrialized countries. Even a marginal 
and even an incremental increase in the standard of living for every 
resident of China will result in a huge increase in greenhouse 
emissions. While no one wants to deny the benefits of economic growth 
and higher standards of living to anyone around the world, it is 
imperative that China's economic growth be coupled with the 
responsibility for its impact on the global environment. Cleaner 
economic expansion is possible and must be expected. And it is easier 
to begin development with an eye toward the environmental situation 
than it is to take corrective action later.
  If progress is to be made this year in reaching a truly global 
agreement, it will occur only when the developing world realizes that 
it is at risk from the adverse consequences of climate change at least 
as much as we are. Most studies indicate that these nations are, in 
fact, at greater risk--at greater risk--than the advanced countries.
  Since atmospheric warming is a global problem, without the 
responsible action by key developing countries, we will not have a 
global solution, and we will not solve the global problem. It makes 
little sense for the developed countries to penalize themselves for an 
outcome which will be unsuccessful. As I wrote to the President on 
December 15, 1997, binding commitments for developing nations should be 
paced according to the ability of each country to achieve greenhouse 
gas emission limitations appropriate to its national circumstances and 
economic growth. These limitations could be gradually

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implemented. Whether such commitments are in fact appropriate and 
represent best effort by each nation, will not be difficult to discern. 
As the saying goes, we will know it when we see it. For the moment, 
there is nothing to be seen from the developing nation quarter. So, it 
will be the task of the Administration to bring those key greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emitting nations into legally binding commitments during the 
same compliance period that has been agreed upon by the advanced 
nations, that is, the period 2008-2012.
  Mr. President, I also remain concerned about whether the agreement 
reached in Kyoto meets the second standard set by the Byrd-Hagel 
resolutions, S. Res. 98, namely, that its implementation would not 
result in serious harm to our economy. Since the impact of the 
agreement on the U.S. economy is not now clearly understood, we cannot 
rule out the likelihood of such damage. It is critical that our nation, 
and the Senate, understand the probable costs of these specific actions 
proposed to address global climate change, as well as the possible 
consequence of taking no action.
  What is the cost? What is the cost, if no action is taken? What is 
the cost if certain actions are taken?
  The administration has not yet presented a comprehensive economic 
analysis, sector by sector, regarding the impact of the Kyoto decision 
on our economy. Without such an assessment, understood in detail, the 
Kyoto agreement's impact on autos, on the coal industry, on steel, on 
aluminum, on cement, on the oil industry, on consumers, on builders, on 
people of varying income levels, there would be little sense in the 
Senate's even debating the protocol.
  The lack of satisfaction on either count of the S. Res. 98 
standards--as I say, there are two of them--means the Kyoto protocol 
fall short, and there would be virtually no chance of securing the 
approval of two-thirds of the Senate were the President to decide to 
submit it for such approval. The President has already indicated his 
agreement with this assessment, and I believe that he agrees that the 
decisions of the conference are just the first part of an ongoing work 
in progress which will continue over 1998 and perhaps beyond, until a 
comprehensive, effective, and understandable agreement is reached that 
would be worthy of Senate consideration.
  On the positive side, the U.S. negotiating team deserves our 
commendation for sticking to certain central principles, which were 
incorporated into the protocol as agreed to in Kyoto. The negotiations 
were tough, grueling and long. Nonetheless, it was the United States, 
led by Under Secretary Eizenstat, that obtained agreement on many of 
our most important priorities, in direct contrast to the Europeans, who 
witnessed the rejection of almost all of their more draconian and 
economically harmful ideas.
  The U.S. won some victories. What were they?
  First, free market mechanisms, called Emissions Trading and Joint 
Implementation, pushed strongly by the United States, were agreed to 
after difficult debate. This was a substantial American victory. The 
purpose of these mechanisms is to allow advanced nations and their 
industries to satisfy their requirement for emissions limitations by 
sharing, buying and selling credits internationally, and to fulfill 
part of their obligations by assisting developing nations in developing 
cleaner technologies and conservation. These mechanisms are based on 
the environmental reality that cutting greenhouse gases anywhere on 
earth reduces the global concentration of greenhouse gases virtually 
everywhere on our planet. It therefore makes economic sense to reduce 
those emissions wherever it is most cost effective to do so. Emissions 
trading will allow the industrialized nations to buy and sell credits 
that will be created by the most cost effective reductions of 
greenhouse gases. Through emissions trading, industrialized nations may 
transfer to, or acquire from, another country party emission reduction 
credits resulting from projects aimed at reducing greenhouse gases for 
the purpose of meeting its commitments under the treaty.
  A further mechanism, called joint implementation, or the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), was included, at the urging of the U.S. 
negotiating team, by which industrialized countries can earn credits by 
contributing financially to projects in developing countries. These 
projects would involve industries and utilities in the developing world 
that are far less efficient than ours, and that create more pollution. 
By helping to bring polluting plants up to U.S. standards, industries 
can earn credits while sharing our pollution-reduction technologies and 
production processes. We can maximize our ``bang for the buck,'' by 
reducing greenhouse gases to a far greater degree than it would be 
possible in the U.S. alone, and earn credits for doing so, which would 
partially offset the cost of our reductions at home.
  While we can applaud the inclusion of these market mechanisms in the 
Kyoto protocol, we do not yet know how they will work, to what extent 
they will be overlaid by bureaucracies with their own agendas. We 
should want the maximum freedom of action for American companies to 
make arrangements with foreign partners without an overbearing presence 
and pressure by international bureaucrats or bodies, because the role 
and rules of the game for private companies are central to the 
viability of any trading scheme. The robust development of market 
mechanisms that are flexible and give maximum freedom of choice and 
action by American industry is important. They will be needed if the 
United States can even hope to meet the emissions reductions targets it 
has agreed to at Kyoto. Based on projections of the growth of emissions 
using current technologies and processes, the United States, in order 
to meet these goals, would have to reduce our overall GHG emissions 
more than 30 percent below where they would otherwise be in the 2008-
2012 commitment period. Reducing projected emissions by a national 
figure of one-third does not seem plausible without a robust emissions 
trading and joint implementation framework.
  The rules as to how these mechanisms will work will be the subject of 
negotiation, and American industry, the environmental community, and 
the Senate will be intensely interested in how they are developed. 
Because these market mechanisms could lower the cost of compliance with 
a treaty, I encourage the Administration to solicit the opinions and 
support of the business and environmental communities in this regard. 
Our business community is uniquely qualified to comment on this 
subject, and it is in the economic self interest of U.S. industry to 
assist in the creation of strong, robust, and flexible rules for 
emissions trading and joint implementation in order to lower the cost 
of implementing any climate change treaty which might be submitted to 
the Senate. Indeed, I hope that the Administration will provide its own 
concept of how these mechanisms should be implemented as soon as 
possible, so that support for this crucial set of procedures and rules 
can be developed.
  There is also some controversy as to whether forest conservation 
projects will be allowed under the rules on these mechanisms. That is, 
for example, if an American company helps to preserve endangered 
forests or other natural carbon sinks in a developing country, it could 
earn credit for that activity. And I support that concept, but it was 
controversial in Kyoto. Senators need to hear from the Administration 
regarding whether such conservation projects will be included, or 
whether further negotiations are needed to include them.

  A second major achievement by the American negotiating team in Kyoto 
was the inclusion of a provision allowing the purchase of emissions 
allowances from Russia, which will assist in lowering the cost of U.S. 
compliance to a protocol. This allowance is partly the result of the 
substantial downturn of the Russian economy in recent years. While this 
provision has been criticized as a kind of windfall, it is no different 
from a similar mechanism that has been insisted upon by the European 
Union, that is, the creation of a so-called European bubble, which 
allows all of Europe to reap the benefits of emissions reductions as 
the East German economy is modernized, and, in the United Kingdom, as 
the north sea gas fields came on line to supplant coal fired utilities.
  The first budget period in the Kyoto agreement covers the years 2008-
2012. This was strongly opposed by the European Union and the 
developing world as

[[Page S197]]

being too weak, despite the fact that anything less would severely harm 
not only the U.S. economy, but also that of the Europeans. The 2008-
2012 decision allows more time for smoother transitions by U.S. 
industry to the requirements included in the Kyoto protocol.
  Decisions of the parties to the conference about protections for 
emissions originating from national security activities--such as U.S. 
bases abroad or U.S. forces on deployment, and U.S. forces in joint and 
multilateral task forces--were included in the discussion. As this is a 
matter of concern to many Senators, I shall ask later that an article 
from the January 1, 1998, Washington Post which elaborates on this 
point be included in the Record. I point out that no other negotiating 
team, from any other country, even included representatives from its 
defense ministries to Kyoto. Only the United States did this. Thus, our 
national security operations appear to have been protected in the 
accord.
  The U.S. negotiating team was able to have included all six 
greenhouse gases, including three synthetic substitutes for ozone-
depleting CFC's, which, while small in total volume, nonetheless have a 
significantly higher capability to trap heat, and over time will become 
more significant. There was strong resistance on the part of some 
nations to the inclusion of these three gases because of their utility 
in high technology, but the U.S. position prevailed in this matter as 
well, with the assent of significantly affected U.S. industries.
  Despite these successes, there were, as I have indicated, some 
shortfalls. First, despite the best efforts of Ambassador Eizenstat and 
his very competent team, the United States was not able to get 
agreement on the Administration's goal of reducing U.S. emissions to 
the 1990 level. This was the overall target announced by President 
Clinton when he unveiled his policy toward the talks last October. The 
Europeans insisted upon a reduction of 15 percent below 1990 levels, 
and the developing world wanted an eventual reduction of 30 percent 
below 1990.
  The final agreement includes a reduction target of 7 percent below 
1990 for three greenhouse gases, and 7 percent below 1995 for the other 
three gases. In addition, a more generous definition of carbon sinks 
was included. The Administration calculates that the change to a 1995 
baseline for three synthetic greenhouse gases, coupled with the 
inclusion of additional potential carbon sinks, results in an actual 
reduction target for the United States of approximately 3 percent below 
1990 levels. This agreement, I note, should be viewed in the context of 
the broader negotiations. While the U.S. did not achieve its original 
goal of a flat reduction to 1990 levels, the final agreement of 
approximately 3 percent is a far cry from the 15 percent reduction 
demanded by the Europeans.
  However, I have not yet seen any firm analysis as to how the 
Administration computed its estimate of a 3 percent reduction once the 
1995 baseline for 3 gases is included, and the more generous 
definitions of sinks. I still have not seen any hard numbers on how 
this estimate was calculated, or what the estimated impact of this 
reduction target would be on the U.S. economy.
  So, the target cannot be evaluated as good, bad, or otherwise. The 
Senate will just have to withhold judgment. I hope that the economic 
case will be presented in detail at hearings that I know the committees 
of jurisdiction will be holding over the next few months. Good, sound 
answers are needed. The American people deserve to know what changes, 
if any, in their life styles will be required to meet the Kyoto 
commitments; what sacrifices, if any, will have to be made; what new 
technologies will need to be developed and put into place; what shifts 
in our national fuel mix would be contemplated; and many other 
questions dealing with national implementation of such commitments.

  The details on the market mechanisms have not been worked out, and so 
we need to create the details of a regime for trading, technology 
transfer, and mutually-agreed-upon projects across the globe. How will 
such schemes evolve?
  Third, the protocol leaves to the future such vital issues as 
compliance, monitoring, and enforcement measures. For a binding 
international system to be effective, it is elementary that it be fair 
and enforceable. Americans take their commitments seriously, and abide 
by their promises, but the same cannot always be said for all other 
parties. Therefore, a system of effective procedures that monitors the 
compliance of all parties with their obligations; and effective 
enforcement, presumably with some form of penalty system for 
compliance, are clearly required. The emissions trading credit system 
will be denominated in dollars, and the potential for fraud must be 
reduced to minimal levels for the system to work.
  Fourth, the scientific community needs to conduct even more research 
into climate change. There are many unanswered questions as to the rate 
and effects of climate change. We do not yet know, for instance, the 
role of clouds, which seems to me to be rather fundamental. We do not 
know whether climate changes will be gradual or abrupt.
  It is now up to the Administration to roll up its sleeves and map the 
road from here. First, the details of the concepts agreed to at Kyoto 
must be developed in close cooperation with the industrial and 
environmental and consumer groups that are affected. Second, a program 
is needed to demonstrate how the implementation of commitments we 
agreed to in Kyoto would be achieved, and what the effects throughout 
our economy may be.
  As part of that program, the Administration is expected to propose a 
range of tax incentives and research and development projects. I note 
that some of this R & D has already been completed, namely in the area 
of clean coal technology. Fifty percent of the power generated in this 
country comes from coal-fired boilers, and coal will continue as a 
significant factor in our energy mix for years to come. As a result of 
programs that I have actively supported for the last decade, a wide 
range of clean coal technologies has been developed that result in the 
more efficient burning of coal--which directly reduces carbon dioxide 
emissions. I note that these R & D projects were fifty percent cost-
shared by industry. While this technology has been tested in some pilot 
projects, it continues to be expensive to install on a small scale. 
Only its widespread implementation will lower the per-unit cost of 
manufacturing and installing such clean coal units.
  I have had many conversations with representatives of the coal and 
utility industry about various approaches that could be used to 
encourage the construction of clean coal units, as well as the need to 
continue research and development. I urge the Administration to also 
discuss these issues with coal-fired utilities, and to support a 
variety of such initiatives. We should also be concerned about the huge 
number of coal-fired power plants that China is projected to build 
during the next two decades, and we should consider initiatives to 
encourage China and the other big emitters to use only the most 
efficient and effective clean coal technology.
  Mr. President, the canvas that was created at Kyoto is only partly 
painted in. It is a work in progress, and there is ample time to do the 
job right.
  I hope that the President will not sign his name to the protocol at 
this point. There is plenty of time to do that over the next year. Let 
us wait and see what the next November meeting will produce and what 
can be accomplished in the meantime. I am concerned that if the 
President signs this protocol at this point, it will compromise his 
flexibility in dealing with the developing countries over the next 
year. There is plenty of time to sign. The developing countries might 
misinterpret the signature of the President on the protocol at this 
time. They may think: ``Oh, you see, he has talked tough, but he is 
signing his name.'' And they may be induced thereby to hold out and to 
more stubbornly resist, more stubbornly resist taking actions and 
committing themselves to join with developed countries in a specific 
regime to provide a global solution.
  I have outlined what I think are the commendable series of 
achievements by our negotiators in the face of rather hostile 
negotiating partners from both the developing world and the European 
Union. Much remains to be done. The goal of the negotiations is the 
most challenging ever conceived and undertaken in the international 
environmental area. The glass may not be even

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half full, but the forum for filling it with the most palatable liquid 
we can fashion is available throughout this year and beyond that, if we 
have but the tenacity and the imagination and the will to persevere.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Washington Post 
article and my December 16, 1997 letter to President Clinton be printed 
in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                [From the Washington Post, Jan. 1, 1998]

  Kyoto Pact Includes a Pentagon Exemption--Armed Forces Permitted to 
                 Pollute During Some Overseas Missions

                           (By Joby Warrick)

       The global warming treaty negotiated in Japan last month 
     could lead to tougher pollution controls on everything from 
     mopeds to Mack trucks, but at least one major emitter has 
     managed to reserve its right to pollute: the Pentagon.
       A little-noticed provision in the treaty gives the armed 
     forces of any country a free pass to emit greenhouse gases 
     during certain overseas military operations, an exemption 
     secured by U.S. negotiators in the final hours of the Kyoto 
     climate summit despite objections from Iraq and Russia.
       The exemption was pushed through, at the Defense 
     Department's insistence, to ensure that international police 
     actions and humanitarian missions remain unfettered by future 
     curbs on fossil-fuel emissions, administration sources said. 
     The climate treaty, which must be ratified by national 
     governments to become law, would force the world's developed 
     countries to sharply reduce their output of greenhouse gases 
     over the next two decades or face sanctions.
       ``It was the one issue the Pentagon cared most about, and 
     we did well on it,'' said a U.S. official who participated in 
     the talks.
       The exemption is spelled out in two sentences of a 
     technical paper that was ratified Dec. 11, at the close of 
     the all-night negotiating session that produced the world's 
     first binding agreement on combating global warming. One 
     sentence says fossil fuels used by ships and aircraft in 
     ``international transport'' cannot be counted against a 
     country. The other sentence exempts all ``multilateral 
     operations'' conducted under a United Nations umbrella.
       In practice, the exclusions would apply to military vessels 
     headed toward overseas staging areas or participating in such 
     operations as the recent relief mission to Somalia or the 
     U.S.-led war against Iraq.
       The exemptions offer obvious benefits for the United 
     States, which is both the world's only superpower and the 
     largest single emitter of greenhouse gases, But U.S. 
     negotiators said they were motivated mainly by a desire to 
     eliminate a potential alliance-breaker. In the future, they 
     said, countries might refuse to join the United States in 
     sending armies to world hot spots if it meant blowing their 
     limits on greenhouse gas emissions.
       ``We didn't want to create a disincentive for future 
     humanitarian operations,'' said one military source who spoke 
     on the condition of anonymity.
       In fighting for the exemption, the Clinton administration 
     also may have been seeking to deny Republican critics a 
     potent weapon in their battle to defeat the accord. For 
     several months leading up to the Kyoto summit, conservative 
     groups had argued that a global warming treaty would 
     undermine national security by weakening military training.
       The idea of a military exemption was first floated by U.S. 
     negotiators in October at a U.N. conference in Bonn, Germany, 
     where it drew initial skepticism from some European allies. 
     When debated at the 159-nation Kyoto conference, the proposal 
     was strongly protested by Iraq--and, initially, by Russia.
       Iraq, one of the few nations to experience the full brunt 
     of the kind of U.N.-sponsored ``multilateral operation'' the 
     American plan envisions, could have blocked the proposal 
     under conference rules that require all decisions to be 
     approved by consensus. But in a bit of diplomatic sleight-of-
     hand, the conference chairman gaveled the rules through after 
     the Iraqi delegation had left the conference room.
       U.S. environmental groups, which have generally applauded 
     the Kyoto agreement, complain that the exemption is overly 
     broad because it applies to commercial international carriers 
     as well as military ships and planes. Climate negotiators 
     left for a future conference the complicated task of 
     apportioning responsibility for emissions by commercial 
     airlines.
       ``It's a pretty big loophole,'' the Natural Resources 
     Defense Council's Dan Lashof said.
       It might have been even bigger. The Clinton administration 
     considered exempting armed forces from the rules altogether, 
     but then rejected the idea. The reason, sources said, was the 
     Defense Department's remarkably strong performance in cutting 
     its own emissions over the past decade--an achievement 
     attributed both to military downsizing and improvements in 
     energy efficiency.
       Unless the Pentagon's gains are factored in, they said, the 
     United States might have a much tougher time meeting its 
     obligations for reducing emissions.
                                  ____

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                                  Committee on Appropriations,

                                Washington, DC, December 16, 1997.
     Hon. William J. Clinton,
     President of the United States,
     The White House, Washington, D.C.
       Dear Mr. President: I am writing to commend the skill and 
     persistence with which your negotiators, Ambassador Stuart 
     Eizenstat and his team, represented the United States at the 
     recently concluded climate conference in Kyoto, Japan. I view 
     the decisions of the conference as the first part of an 
     ongoing work in progress which should continue in Buenos 
     Aires next fall and finally, hopefully, culminate in an 
     effective global treaty to control greenhouse gases.
       While I await an official, comprehensive report from your 
     Administration on the details and economic impacts of the 
     Kyoto agreement, I would like to share a few observations at 
     the outset of this important post-Kyoto period. I believe 
     that the potential for serious climate disruption is real and 
     that the global community must respond at an appropriate pace 
     in accordance with scientific evidence. Ambassador Eizenstat 
     has indicated that a number of key U.S. priorities were 
     agreed to at the negotiations, including emissions trading 
     and voluntary projects between industrialized and developing 
     countries; reduction targets for man-made emissions of all 
     greenhouse gases; incentives for worldwide forest 
     preservation; and incentives for early emissions reduction. 
     These are the direct result of American proposals, and are 
     milestones on the road to cost-effective restrictions of 
     greenhouse gas emissions on a global basis. These features 
     are intended to reduce economic dislocations and maximize the 
     use of new technologies and free market mechanisms.
       However, of paramount concern is that the agreement reached 
     in Kyoto does not meet the first standard set by the Senate 
     in S. Res. 98, namely that the biggest emitters in the 
     developing world have not yet agreed to binding commitments 
     to be executed together with the industrialized nations. Such 
     commitments should be paced together according to the ability 
     of each country to achieve greenhouse gas emission 
     limitations appropriate to its national circumstances and 
     economic growth, and could be gradually implemented. In the 
     absence of simultaneous legally binding commitments by key 
     developing countries to grow in an environmentally sound way, 
     there will not be an effective restriction of worldwide 
     greenhouse gas emissions. Consequently, there would be little 
     prospect of treaty approval in the U.S. Senate.
       I am also concerned about whether the agreement meets the 
     second standard set by S. Res. 98, that its implementation 
     would not result in serious harm to our economy. Since the 
     impact of the agreement on the U.S. economy is not now 
     clearly understood, we cannot yet rule out the possibility of 
     such damage. It is critical that our nation understands the 
     probable costs of these specific actions proposed to address 
     global climate change, as well as the probable consequences 
     of taking no action.
       Given the incomplete nature of the Kyoto agreement, I 
     believe that it would be prudent for you to withhold your 
     signature until a more comprehensive treaty is arrived at 
     which would be more deserving of Senate approval. 
     Nevertheless, with these caveats, a major new beginning has 
     been achieved in addressing the long-term problem of global 
     warming. I look forward to receiving the commitment of 
     nations such as China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Korea, 
     and Argentina to join us in this effort in the near future.
       Many on both sides of this issue have been quick to 
     register their displeasure with the Kyoto agreement. It has 
     been denounced by some environmentalists for not going far 
     enough, and by some in industry for going too far. While it 
     is regrettable that we were not able to reach an agreement 
     with the developing world in Kyoto, it seems clear that we 
     did gain acceptance on a number of important U.S. objectives. 
     Therefore, I recognize that this is a worthwhile work in 
     progress, and that a durable and effective solution to global 
     climate protection, one which provides sustained economic 
     growth and clean development for all countries, will require 
     a step-by-step approach. I welcome the announcement by the 
     Administration that you consider the Kyoto agreement to be 
     but the first step in a framework or architecture to continue 
     the negotiations, on the basis that this is a global problem 
     requiring global solutions.
       I look forward to working with the Administration as the 
     process of negotiating an acceptable international agreement 
     proceeds over the next year.
           Sincerely yours,
                                                   Robert C. Byrd.

  Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DeWine). The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, at the outset I congratulate our 
distinguished colleague, Senator Byrd, for, as usual, a very erudite 
and well-thought-out statement. When I entered the Chamber, I saw 
Senator Byrd speaking, and I saw a thick sheaf of papers. I was glad to 
have the opportunity to listen to Senator Byrd's presentation because 
he is more than the conscience of the Senate; he is the intellect of 
the Senate and a great tribute to this body. So I congratulate Senator 
Byrd.

[[Page S199]]

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator. I could 
deliver a very appropriate encomium. I could say many appropriate 
things with respect to the ability of the distinguished Senator from 
Pennsylvania. He is a great friend of mine. I have tremendous respect 
for his knowledge in the field of law, and I always listen when he 
speaks. I thank him for his very kind and overly charitable remarks.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague for 
that reply. I have been in this body, now, going on 18 years. Senator 
Byrd and I have been able to maintain a long, unguarded border between 
southern Pennsylvania and West Virginia because we maintain that 
friendship between the two States.
  THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.
  Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair.
  (The remarks of Mr. Specter pertaining to the introduction of S. Res. 
170 are located in today's Record under ``Submission of Concurrent and 
Senate Resolutions.'')

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