[Congressional Record Volume 144, Number 3 (Thursday, January 29, 1998)]
[Senate]
[Pages S192-S194]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                                 BOSNIA

  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I asked for 30 minutes today because I 
think it is very important that we address an issue that will be coming 
before the Senate in the very near future. It is an issue that has been 
brought about by the President's pronouncement that he wants to keep 
our troops in Bosnia in an undefined mission for an undefined time.
  Mr. President, I think that would be a mistake for our country. I 
hope the Senate will focus on this issue. Indeed, I hope the American 
people will focus on this issue, because it is going to set a precedent 
that I think is very bad.

  I do not want to pull up stakes and leave Bosnia without doing it in 
a responsible way. I think America has that responsibility. But in fact 
many of us have asked the President to lay the groundwork with an 
established and clear mission that has a chance to succeed and a 
mission that has a finite term so that both our allies and any enemies 
of our cause would know exactly what to expect from America. But in 
fact both our allies and our adversaries could not possibly know what 
to expect from America because in fact America has said it is going to 
leave twice and we have not left. In fairness, we have not left because 
we have not laid a proper base to leave.
  What I am asking the President to consider and what I would ask the 
American people to consider is starting the process of an honorable and 
responsible approach to Bosnia which includes an honorable exit.
  Mr. President, we are looking at a time when our readiness is being 
called into question. In fact, if you look at all of the 
responsibilities that America has in the world, I think we are spending 
too much on Bosnia and therefore putting in jeopardy the security of 
the United States in the future and the future of our ability to 
respond to other places where America may have to respond even 
unilaterally. And, Mr. President, that is not what we should be doing.
  I think it is most important that America start with the issue of 
Bosnia,

[[Page S193]]

address it in the way that America should, and we must look at our 
overall responsibilities in the world.
  The Bosnia operation has already diverted nearly $8 billion from our 
national defense. A growing lament at the Pentagon among senior 
officers is that we are in danger of returning to the hollow military 
of the late 1970s. Let me list some of the indicators that demonstrate 
that our military is once again at risk.
  Last year, the military had its worst recruiting year since 1979. The 
Army failed to meet its objective to recruit infantry soldiers, the 
single most important specialty in the Army.
  A Senate Budget Committee investigator recently reported finding 
serious Army-wide personnel and readiness problems. At the National 
Training Center, where our troops go for advanced training, units 
rotating in typically come with a 60 percent shortage in mechanics and 
often a 50 percent shortage in infantry. These shortages were blamed on 
the fact that these personnel, especially the mechanics, are deployed 
abroad for missions such as Bosnia.
  More than 350 Air Force pilots turned down the $60,000 bonuses they 
would have received to remain in the cockpit another 5 years. A 29 
percent acceptance rate for the bonus compares with 59 percent last 
year and 81 percent in 1995. Mr. President, that is stark difference.
  The Air Force is finding, whatever the perks, it cannot hold on to 
its best pilots. Last year, about 500 pilots resigned, most of them 
lured to the airlines. This year, the number will top 700, and the Air 
Force says it is not able to train enough new pilots to replace them.
  Recently, a lack of critical parts for F-16 aircraft forced two 
fighter squadrons in Italy to cannibalize grounded aircraft to ensure 
they can continue to conduct the NATO peace enforcement mission over 
Bosnia.
  A Senate Budget Committee investigator also found that some small 
units are now being led by junior people because sergeants are off on 
peacekeeping duty. As a result, subunits, from basic squads on up, do 
not train with the leaders that they would go to war with, breaking the 
rule of ``train just as you would go to war.''
  Since 1991, the United States has cut its Armed Forces by about a 
third. It may be more difficult, more risky and possibly more costly to 
invade Iraq again now. We are going to debate and vote on a resolution 
today expressing our support for the President's strong actions toward 
Iraq. But the fact is, if anything went wrong, we would have to divert 
troops from every theater in the world to prevail. This is not the best 
situation considering the heavy responsibilities that we have in other 
parts of the world.

  Defense cuts of almost 50 percent over the last decade have put our 
security at risk. But this has been made worse by the diversion of U.S. 
resources and readiness in Bosnia and elsewhere. Policymakers in the 
Clinton administration have spent more time discussing Haiti than 
China, more on Bosnia than on missile defense. We are not developing a 
policy that is going to put our country in the best position to deal 
with the myriad of issues that will face this country and our security 
in the next century.
  The Clinton administration is missing a big-picture view of the world 
and the proper role for the United States. Our growing involvement in 
Bosnia is a very good example of that. Just last week, U.S. forces were 
directly involved in tracking down and capturing a war criminal who 
called himself ``the Serb Hitler.''
  The Dayton accords made apprehension of war criminals a priority. But 
those agreements also made it clear that this responsibility would be 
the responsibility of the parties to Dayton--civilian police and 
Government officials. In fact, less than 1 year ago the former NATO 
commander, George Joulwan, told the Congress this:

       The military are not policemen. And I think . . . the 
     proper responsibility rests on the parties. That is what 
     Dayton says . . . [I]f we are not careful we will go down 
     this slippery slope where the military will be put in the 
     position of hunting down war criminals. This is not within my 
     mandate.

  That is Gen. George Joulwan speaking.
  I joined with many of my colleagues in the Senate to oppose the 
decision to send our troops to Bosnia. One of our principal concerns 
was that, once there, our mission would be indefinite and it would lead 
to mission creep. We were bolstered in our concerns by former Secretary 
of Defense William Perry and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
Shalikashvili, who warned us that without a specific deadline for 
withdrawal, there would be the potential for expanding the mission.
  I am concerned that Secretary Perry's warnings are coming true. While 
we were in recess, the President announced that thousands of U.S. 
troops would remain in Bosnia after the June 30 deadline, and 
remembering that the Senate had unanimously endorsed that deadline of 
June 30, 1998, which his administration had established.
  After 240 U.S. Marines were killed in Lebanon in 1984, Defense 
Secretary Caspar Weinberger established six principles upon which the 
decision to send U.S. ground troops should be based. Here is what he 
said:

       The U.S. should not commit forces unless the engagement is 
     in our vital national interest. If we do commit forces, we 
     should have clearly defined political and military 
     objectives. We should know how those objectives can be 
     accomplished and we should send the appropriate forces to 
     complete the objectives. We must constantly reassess and 
     adjust our relationship between our objectives and forces if 
     necessary. The commitment of troops should be a last resort, 
     not the first.

  We have violated virtually every one of Cap Weinberger's principles 
in Bosnia. Bosnia was supposed to be a 1-year peacekeeping operation 
that would keep the factions apart until their own forces could come in 
and keep the peace from the ground up. They would have local elections 
and general elections for their national leadership. They would begin 
to resettle refugees.

  Two years have gone by since Dayton. I was in Brcko in August, one 
week before the eruption in Brcko in which U.S. troops were harmed. I 
was able to see how far we had come. It was my fourth trip to Bosnia, 
my sixth trip in 2 years to the whole region. I'm going back next week 
with other concerned Members of Congress.
  What I saw in Brcko was the resettling of refugees who did not even 
meet their neighbors from the other factions, even though they were 
living next door to each other. The atrocities committed right there in 
Brcko against thousands of Muslims are as bad as anything I have ever 
heard reported from the Nazi atrocities in World War II, and yet we are 
trying to say come and live together in the American way. I have called 
this an attempt to Americanize the Balkans--multiethnic neighborhoods 
which we, thank goodness, do have in America--but forcing people to do 
this so prematurely could be antipeaceful. I think it is going to 
prolong the uprisings if we try to force this before the people 
themselves are ready, before the wounds have healed from the atrocities 
that have been committed.
  That is why I have suggested that perhaps it would be better to take 
one step in between. Let the peace settle in. Let the economic 
development start. The geographic regions established by the conflict 
and endorsed by the Dayton accords are nearly 90 percent homogenous. 
The Bosnian state is 90 percent Muslim. Srpska, the Serb part of 
Bosnia, is 95 percent Serb. Croatia is almost exclusively Croatian.
  Within these divisions they are beginning to be able to have a 
semblance of government, but they are not going to get economic 
stability if forced refugee settlement continues to cause further 
conflict.
  The ``elections'' that they held last year were elections in which 
the voters came in under armed guard. They voted for people who cannot 
live there. They left under armed guard and the people elected cannot 
serve. They are themselves exiles from the regions they ``represent.'' 
We have declared that a victory. Mr. President, people elected by 
voters under armed guard, and the people elected are not even living 
there is not what I consider an election in our sense of the word.
  There are other things that I hope we consider in trying to have a 
positive approach to the situation we face today. There are a variety 
of conditions that I suggest would lay a ground work for a peaceful 
situation in Bosnia, that would allow them to begin to grow and build 
in economic stability, and in

[[Page S194]]

which America could have an honorable exit. Hopefully, our European 
allies and our Russian allies who are there on the ground, as well, 
would be able to leave the country in the hands of its own people.
  First, reconvene the Dayton parties for a progress check. Be willing 
to modify where it is necessary. Dayton was certainly brought about by 
people who want to do the right thing. It is not bad to say that we 
should come back together and assess where we are 2 years later and 
modify, if necessary. I think the administration could take the lead 
here.
  Second, establish a civilian-led and operated police training task 
force. Establish a police training academy capable of graduating 500 
police every quarter. A similar process was attempted in Haiti. General 
Joulwan was a strong supporter of this approach.
  Third, establish the remaining ground troops as a combined joint task 
force in accordance with the President's own partnership for peace 
initiative, originally under American command, but to be turned over to 
allied command within a specific period of months. This should include 
significant participation by prospective NATO allies--Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary--as an opportunity to bear the burden of post-cold 
war European security.
  Four, require the administration to make a supplemental 
appropriations request for Bosnia of a specified duration in advance of 
its spending the funds. Mr. President, this should not come from our 
defense budget. We cannot take from our defense readiness to the tune 
of $3 billion a year and expect to be able to keep a military that has 
a quality of life that would continue to attract our best and 
brightest, and it most certainly should not take from our strategic 
defenses for the future.

  Last, build a firewall between Bosnia operating funds and procurement 
and research and development funds. It is very important that we begin 
to look at letting the people of Bosnia have some form of self-
determination. Without conditioning our continued troop commitment to 
Bosnia, I'm afraid we are trying to put a round peg in a square hole. 
We would be looking at American troops indefinitely. We would be 
looking at a never-ending commitment, and we would be taking resources 
that are vitally necessary for our own security and for our 
responsibilities around the world.
  Mr. President, I think it is most important that we look at this 
issue of Bosnia and establish a policy that has a chance to succeed. If 
the President would do that, I would be the first in line to support 
the decision. As a matter of fact, I think keeping thousands of troops 
in a 30,000-troop enclave in Bosnia in perpetuity is not good military 
strategy and is not based on a policy that has a chance to succeed. 
Remember what General Shalikashvili said, and that is that having a 
defined deadline is important to avoid mission creep. We have learned 
that before and we should not forget that lesson. I think it is 
important that we continue to reassess Bosnia because this is laying 
the predicate for our responsibilities and our actions in the world in 
the future.
  I think it is possible to have a policy that has a chance to succeed 
with honorable American involvement. I think Americans will support a 
continued troop commitment if it has a chance to succeed. Teddy 
Roosevelt was right. He said ``America must speak softly and carry a 
big stick.'' That is the role of a superpower. We don't have to shout. 
We do not have to have troops on the ground at every civil uprising 
around the world. If we do, we make enemies and we are in danger of 
doing that right now with the Serbs. We will become the focal point and 
the target of the hostilities and then we will be in a situation where 
we will have to defend ourselves. We need to step back and act like a 
superpower.
  Once we make a commitment we must be willing to back it up and do 
what we say we are going to do. That is what is so important about 
acting firmly in Iraq. We must be a good and solid ally and we must be 
a feared and respected enemy. That is what a superpower should be. We 
must realize our place in the world. Make sure our defenses are strong. 
Make sure we are not dissipating our resources to such an extent that 
we will not be there when only we have the capacity to act.
  I will close with a quote from John Quincy Adams when he was 
President, and it is still good today. ``America well knows, that while 
once enlisting under other banners than her own, she will involve 
herself beyond extraction in all wars of interest and intrigue. The 
fundamental maxims of her policy would change from loyalty to force, 
wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or will be 
unfurled there will America's heart be. She goes not abroad in search 
of monsters to destroy. She is a well wisher to the freedom and 
independence of all.''
  Mr. President, it is most important that America not succumb to the 
penchant for wanting to go out and get involved in every conflict in 
the world but remember as a superpower we have a unique capability to 
bring warring parties to the table because we are not a party that is 
hostile to any nation. Mr. President, we could lose that special status 
that we have in the world if we do not remain strong within ourselves 
and we will not remain strong if we continue to dissipate our resources 
so that our own readiness and our own strategic capabilities are in any 
way diminished.
  I ask my colleagues to help in working with the President and this 
administration to pursue an honorable policy with our allies in Bosnia, 
a policy that has a chance to succeed and respects the fact that when 
we put troops in harm's way it is under the most limited circumstances 
and only when there is a United States security issue before us. That 
is not the case in Bosnia. We must help the people of Bosnia but not 
with continued presence of thousands of troops on the ground when their 
place can be taken by the parties and the people who live in Bosnia and 
who we hope will live in peace with our guidance for the years to come.
  I yield the floor and I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Burns). The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I have an order at this time, is that 
correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct. The Senator from West 
Virginia shall be recognized for 45 minutes.
  Mr. BYRD. I thank the Chair.

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