[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 160 (Thursday, November 13, 1997)]
[House]
[Pages H10950-H10951]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




OMITTED FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD OF WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1997, 
                   DURING CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 2709

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  (Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions 
Act of 1997 is intended to close loopholes in our counterproliferation 
laws in order to address a matter of critical concern to our national 
security, the risk that Iran may soon obtain from firms in Russia and 
elsewhere the capability of producing its own medium and long-range 
ballistic missiles.
  This legislation enjoys extremely strong support on both sides of the 
aisle. At last count, over 263 Members had asked to be listed as 
cosponsors, including both the Speaker, Mr. Gingrich, and the 
Democratic leader, Mr. Gephardt. A companion measure in the Senate has 
84 cosponsors, led by the Senate majority leader, Mr. Lott, and by Mr. 
Lieberman of Connecticut.
  The urgency for this legislation is apparent from press reports. For 
more

[[Page H10951]]

than a year, our Government has been in constant dialog with the 
Russian leadership regarding Russian assistance to the Iranian 
ballistic missile program. The meetings have been going on, more talks 
are scheduled, more summits are held, yet the Iranian military 
continues to make rapid progress in developing long-range missiles with 
critically needed assistance from Russian firms. Unless something 
happens soon, according to press reports, Iran is likely to achieve the 
ability to produce its own ballistic missiles within less than 1 year.
  It is now time for the Congress to say that enough is enough. We need 
to back up our rhetoric on nonproliferation with meaningful action. 
With this legislation, we will be giving Russian firms compelling 
reasons not to trade with Iran. The sanctions which this legislation 
threatens to impose will force those firms to choose between their 
short-term profits from dealing with Iran and potentially far more 
lucrative long-term economic relations with our own Nation.
  To make certain that the President takes a careful look at this 
legislation, the amendment before us also adds to our Iranian sanctions 
measure the text of Senate 610, the Chemical Weapons Convention 
Implementation Act of 1997, which passed the Senate unanimously earlier 
this year. Unlike the Chemical Weapons Convention itself, which was 
controversial in the Senate, the implementing legislation is strongly 
supported all across the political spectrum, from the administration to 
Senators such as John Kyl and Jesse Helms who have led the fight 
against the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  Mr. Speaker, in the 1980's the world stood by as Saddam Hussein built 
up the Iraqi arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. This bill will 
help make certain that Iran does not follow the example of its 
neighbors in Iraq and become the next threat to international 
stability. Accordingly, I urge my colleagues to join in support of this 
measure.
  Mr. Speaker, the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997 is 
intended to close loopholes in our counter-proliferation laws in order 
to address a matter of critical concern to our national security--the 
risk that Iran may soon obtain from firms in Russia and elsewhere the 
capability to produce its own medium and long-range ballistic missiles.
  This legislation enjoys extremely strong support on both sides of the 
aisle. At last count, 263 Members had asked to be listed as cosponsors, 
including both the Speaker, Mr. Gingrich, and the Democratic Leader, 
Mr. Gephardt. A companion measure in the Senate currently has 84 
cosponsors, led by the Senate Majority Leader, Mr. Lott, and by Mr. 
Lieberman of Connecticut.
  Once implemented, this bill will help to stop the scourge of missile 
proliferation that directly threatens our troops and our allies 
throughout Europe and Asia. It will help the Administration in its 
efforts to stop Russian institutes and research facilities from 
assisting Iran's medium and long range missile program, and will defuse 
the growing Iranian missile threat in the Persian Gulf and the Middle 
East.
  The urgency for this legislation is apparent from recent press 
accounts regarding the status of Iran's ballistic missile program. For 
more than a year, our government has been in a constant dialog with the 
Russian leadership on the issue of Russian assistance to the Iranian 
ballistic missile program.
  On April 14 of this year in a letter to Senator McConnell, the 
President assured the Congress that the Administration will ``continue 
to engage the Russians at the highest levels on this sensitive subject 
to prevent any transfer or cooperation inconsistent with Russian 
government policy and contrary to its assurances to us.''
  However, several months--and many meetings--later, on September 11, 
State Department Spokesman Jim Foley noted that ``We're very concerned 
by reports indicating that Russian entitles may have provided * * * 
missile assistance to Iran. * * * While we appreciate * * * assurances 
[from the Russian government], we remain disturbed by the discrepancy 
between these assurances and reports of Russian firms cooperating with 
Iran.''
  The meetings go on, more talks are scheduled, more summits are held, 
yet the Iranian military continues to make rapid progress in developing 
long range missiles with critically-needed assistance from Russian 
firms. Unless something happens soon, according to press reports, Iran 
is likely to achieve the ability to produce its own ballistic missiles 
within less than a year.
  It is now time for the Congress to say that enough is enough. We need 
to back up our rhetoric on nonproliferation with meaningful action. 
With the adoption of this bill, we will close the loopholes in our 
existing sanctions laws, and help the Administration convince the 
Russian government to act decisively to crack down on their cash-
strapped institutes and firms.
  Equally important, with this legislation we will give those Russian 
institutes and firms compelling reasons not to trade with Iran. The 
sanctions this legislation threatens to impose will force those firms 
to choose between short-term profits from dealing with Iran and 
potentially far more lucrative long-term economic relations with our 
own Nation. Under this legislation, firms that sell missile technology 
to Iran will be denied all arms export licenses, all dual use export 
licenses, and all U.S. foreign assistance for at least two years.
  Now it is well-known that the Administration does not support this 
legislation. As is almost always the case, they would rather deal with 
proliferation to Iran through quiet diplomacy rather than through 
meaningful sanctions legislation.
  To make certain that the President takes a careful look at this 
legislation, the amendment before us adds to our Iranian sanctions 
measure the text of S. 610, the ``Chemical Weapons Convention 
Implementation Act of 1997'', which passed the Senate unanimously 
earlier this year. Unlike the Chemical Weapons Convention itself, which 
was very controversial in the Senate, the implementing legislation is 
strongly supported all across the political spectrum, from the 
Administration to Senators such as Jon Kyl and Jesse Helms, who led the 
fight against the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  There is one technical point with regard to the text of S. 610--now 
title II of H.R. 2709--that Chairman Hyde of our Judiciary Committee 
has asked me make.
  Section 603 of S. 610--which appears as section 273 of H.R. 2709--
replaces the exceptions to the automatic stay in paragraphs (4) and (5) 
of 11 U.S.C. 362(b) with both a broader exemption for governmental 
units and explicit language embracing organizations exercising 
authority under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Although Members of 
this body were not involved in crafting this provision, we view it as 
important for the legislative history to emphasize that the new 
paragraph (4) relates only to enforcement of police and regulatory 
power--a term which cannot appropriately be given an expansive 
construction for purposes of interpreting the new Bankruptcy Code 
language. The automatic stay, for example, will continue to apply to 
the post-petition collection of pre-petition taxes because such 
collection efforts are not exercises of police and regulatory power 
within the meaning of new paragraph (4) of Bankruptcy Code section 
362(b). The language of section 603 of S. 610--now section 273 of H.R. 
2709--also explicitly excludes the enforcement of a money judgment--an 
exclusion designed to ensure that an exemption from the automatic stay 
cannot successfully be asserted for such an enforcement effort.
  Because enactment of S. 610 is an Administration priority, and 
because it is something that we in the House will ultimately pass in 
any event, we have linked it to H.R. 2709 in hopes that the two 
measures can be enacted together.
  Mr. Speaker, in the 1980s, the world stood by as Saddam Hussein built 
up his arsenal of weapons of mass destruction and the recent events in 
that country indicate that we have yet to identify and uncover a number 
of these weapons. We cannot afford to pay any less attention to Iran as 
it shows every indication that it is fully prepared to use its 
petrodollars to purchase weapons systems that will threaten its 
neighbors and endanger our forces throughout the Persian Gulf region.
  Your support for this bill will help to ensure that Iran does not 
follow the example of its neighbor and become the next threat to 
international stability.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

                          ____________________