Congressional Record, Volume 143 Issue 159 (Wednesday, November 12, 1997)

[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 159 (Wednesday, November 12, 1997)]
[House]
[Pages H10646-H10660]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

IRAN MISSILE PROLIFERATION SANCTIONS ACT OF 1997

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the
bill (H.R. 2709) to impose certain sanctions on foreign persons who
transfer items contributing to Iran's efforts to acquire, develop, or
produce ballistic missiles, as amended.
The Clerk read as follows:

H.R. 2709

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
TITLE I--IRAN MISSILE PROLIFERATION SANCTIONS

SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the ``Iran Missile Proliferation
Sanctions Act of 1997''.

SEC. 102. REPORTS ON MISSILE PROLIFERATION TO IRAN.

(a) Reports.--Except as provided in subsection (c), the
President shall, at the times specified in subsection (b),
submit to the Committee on International Relations of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate a report identifying every foreign
person with respect to whom there is credible information
indicating that that person, on or after August 8, 1995--
(1)(A) transferred items on the MTCR Annex, or items that
the United States proposes for addition to the MTCR Annex,
that contributed to Iran's efforts to acquire, develop, or
produce ballistic missiles, or
(B) provided technical assistance or facilities which the
President deems to be of concern because of their direct
contribution to Iran's efforts to acquire, develop, or
produce ballistic missiles; or
(2)(A) attempted to transfer items on the MTCR Annex, or
items that the United States proposes for addition to the
MTCR Annex, that would have contributed to Iran's efforts to
acquire, develop, or produce ballistic missiles, or
(B) attempted to provide technical assistance or facilities
which the President deems to be of concern because of their
direct contribution to Iran's efforts to acquire, develop, or
produce ballistic missiles.
(b) Timing of Reports.--The reports under subsection (a)
shall be submitted not later than 30 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, not later than 180 days after such
date of enactment, not later than 1 year after such date of
enactment, and not later than the end of each 1-year period
thereafter.
(c) Exceptions.--Any foreign person who--
(1) was identified in a previous report submitted under
subsection (a) on account of a particular transfer,
transaction, or attempt,
(2) has engaged in a transfer or transaction that was the
basis for the imposition of sanctions with respect to that
person under section 73 of the Arms Export Control Act or
section 1604 of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of
1992,
(3) may have engaged in a transfer or transaction, or made
an attempt, that was the subject of a waiver under section
104, or
(4) has engaged in a transfer or transaction, or made an
attempt, on behalf of, or in concert with, the Government of
the United States,

is not required to be identified on account of that same
transfer, transaction, or attempt in any report submitted
thereafter under this section.
(d) Submission in Classified Form.--When the President
considers it appropriate, reports submitted under subsection
(a), or appropriate parts thereof, may be submitted in
classified form.

SEC. 103. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.

(a) Requirement To Impose Sanctions.--
(1) Requirement to impose sanctions.--The sanctions
described in subsection (b) shall be imposed on--
(A) any foreign person identified under subsection (a)(1)
of section 102 in a report submitted under that section, and
(B) any foreign person identified under subsection (a)(2)
of section 102 in a report submitted under that section, if
that person has been identified in that report or a previous
report as having made at least 1 other attempt described in
subsection (a)(2) of that section.
(2) Effective date of sanctions.--The sanctions shall be
effective--
(A) 30 days after the report triggering the sanction is
submitted, if the report is submitted on or before the date
required by section 102(b);
(B) 30 days after the date required by section 102(b) for
submitting the report, if the report triggering the sanction
is submitted within 30 days after that date; and
(C) on the date that the report triggering the sanction is
submitted, if that report is submitted more than 30 days
after the date required by section 102(b).
(b) Description of Sanctions.--The sanctions referred to in
subsection (a) that are to be imposed on a foreign person
described in that subsection are the following:
(1) Arms export sanction.--For a period of not less than 2
years, the United States Government shall not sell to that
person any item on the United States Munitions List as in
effect on August 8, 1995, and shall terminate sales to that
person of any defense articles, defense services, or design
and construction services under the Arms Export Control Act.
(2) Dual use sanction.--For a period of not less than 2
years, the authorities of section 6 of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 shall be used to prohibit the
export to that person of any goods or technology on the
control list established under section 5(c)(1) of that Act.
(3) United states assistance.--For a period of not less
than 2 years, the United States Government shall not provide
any assistance in the form of grants, loans, credits,
guarantees, or otherwise, to that person.

SEC. 104. WAIVER ON BASIS OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

(a) In General.--The President may waive the imposition of
any sanction that would otherwise be required under section
103 on any foreign person 15 days after the President
determines and reports to the Committee on International
Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate that, on the basis of
information provided by that person, or otherwise obtained by
the President, the President is persuaded that the person did
not, on or after August 8, 1995--
(1)(A) transfer items on the MTCR Annex, or items that the
United States proposes for addition to the MTCR Annex, that
contributed to Iran's efforts to acquire, develop, or produce
ballistic missiles, or
(B) provide technical assistance or facilities which the
President deems to be of concern because of their direct
contribution to Iran's efforts to acquire, develop, or
produce ballistic missiles; or
(2) attempt on more than one occasion--
(A) to transfer items on the MTCR Annex, or items that the
United States proposes for addition to the MTCR Annex, that
would have contributed to Iran's efforts to acquire, develop,
or produce ballistic missiles, or
(B) to provide technical assistance or facilities described
in paragraph (1)(B).
(b) Written Justification.--The determination and report of
the President under subsection (a) shall include a written
justification describing in detail--
(1) the credible information indicating that the person--
(A) transferred items described in section 102(a)(1)(A), or
provided technical assistance or facilities described in
section 102(a)(1)(B); or
(B) attempted to transfer items described in section
102(a)(1)(A), or attempted to provide technical assistance or
facilities described in section 102(a)(1)(B);
(2) the additional information which persuaded the
President that the person did not--
(A) transfer items described in section 102(a)(1)(A), or
provide technical assistance or facilities described in
section 102(a)(1)(B); or
(B) attempt to transfer items described in section
102(a)(1)(A), or attempt to provide technical assistance or
facilities described in section 102(a)(1)(B); and
(3) the analysis of the information supporting the
President's conclusion.
(c) Submission in Classified Form.--When the President
considers it appropriate, the determination and report of the
President

[[Page H10647]]

under subsection (a) and the written justification under
subsection (b), or appropriate parts thereof, may be
submitted in classified form.

SEC. 105. WAIVER ON BASIS OF NATIONAL SECURITY.

SEC. 106. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING ACTIONS BY
GOVERNMENT OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION.

As part of each report submitted under section 102, the
President shall include the following information with
respect to each foreign person identified in that report:
(1) A statement regarding whether the government of primary
jurisdiction over that person was aware of the activities
that were the basis for the identification of that person in
the report.
(2) If the government of primary jurisdiction was not aware
of the activities that were the basis for the identification
of that person in the report, an explanation of the reasons
why the United States Government did not inform that
government of those activities.
(3) If the government of primary jurisdiction was aware of
the activities that were the basis for the identification of
that person in the report, a description of the efforts, if
any, undertaken by that government to prevent those
activities, and an assessment of the effectiveness of those
efforts, including an explanation of why those efforts
failed.
(4) If the government of primary jurisdiction was aware of
the activities that were the basis for the identification of
that person in the report and failed to undertake effective
efforts to prevent those activities, a description of any
sanctions that have been imposed on that government by the
United States Government because of such failure.

SEC. 107. PURCHASE OF WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY.

(a) Sense of the Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress
that the President should exercise the authority granted to
him under section 504 of the Freedom for Russia and Emerging
Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992 (22
U.S.C. 5854)--
(1) to prevent the transfer of weapons-related material and
delivery systems to Iran through the purchase, barter, or
other acquisition of such material and delivery systems; and
(2) to prevent the transfer to Iran of scientific and
technical expertise with respect to such weapons-related
material and delivery systems.
(b) Availability of Amounts.--Amounts hereafter made
available, subject to the availability of appropriations, to
carry out chapter 11 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2295 et seq.; relating to assistance for
the independent states of the former Soviet Union) may be
used to carry out subsection (a).

SEC. 108. DEFINITIONS.

For the purposes of this title--
(1) the terms ``foreign person'' and ``person'' mean--
(A) a natural person that is an alien;
(B) a corporation, business association, partnership,
society, trust, or any other nongovernmental entity,
organization, or group, that is organized under the laws of a
foreign country or has its principal place of business in a
foreign country;
(C) any foreign governmental entity operating as a business
enterprise; and
(D) any successor or subsidiary of any entity described in
subparagraph (B) or (C);
(2) the term ``government of primary jurisdiction'' means--
(A) in the case of a natural person, the foreign government
of the country of which the person is a citizen or national;
(B) in the case of an entity described in subparagraph (B)
of paragraph (1), the foreign government of the country in
which the entity has its principal place of business, or the
foreign government under whose laws that entity is organized;
and
(C) in the case of a foreign governmental entity described
in subparagraph (C) of paragraph (1), the foreign government
of which that entity is a part; and
(3) the term ``MTCR Annex'' has the meaning given that term
in section 11B(c)(4) of the Export Administration Act of 1979
(50 U.S.C. 2410b(c)(4)).
TITLE II--CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION

SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the ``Chemical Weapons
Convention Implementation Act of 1997''.

SEC. 202. TABLE OF CONTENTS.

The table of contents for this title is as follows:

Sec. 201. Short title.
Sec. 202. Table of contents.
Sec. 203. Definitions.

Subtitle A--General Provisions

Sec. 211. Designation of United States National Authority.
Sec. 212. No abridgement of constitutional rights.
Sec. 213. Civil liability of the United States.

Subtitle B--Penalties for Unlawful Activities Subject to the
Jurisdiction of the United States

Chapter 1--Criminal and Civil Penalties

Sec. 221. Criminal and civil provisions.

Chapter 2--Revocations of Export Privileges

Sec. 222. Revocations of export privileges.

Subtitle C--Inspections

Sec. 231. Definitions in the subtitle.
Sec. 232. Facility agreements.
Sec. 233. Authority to conduct inspections.
Sec. 234. Procedures for inspections.
Sec. 235. Warrants.
Sec. 236. Prohibited acts relating to inspections.
Sec. 237. National security exception.
Sec. 238. Protection of constitutional rights of contractors.
Sec. 239. Annual report on inspections.
Sec. 240. United States assistance in inspections at private
facilities.

Subtitle D--Reports

Sec. 251. Reports required by the United States National Authority.
Sec. 252. Prohibition relating to low concentrations of schedule 2 and
3 chemicals.
Sec. 253. Prohibition relating to unscheduled discrete organic
chemicals and coincidental byproducts in waste streams.
Sec. 254. Confidentiality of information.
Sec. 255. Recordkeeping violations.

Subtitle E--Enforcement

Sec. 261. Penalties.
Sec. 262. Specific enforcement.
Sec. 263. Expedited judicial review.

Subtitle F--Miscellaneous Provisions

Sec. 271. Repeal.
Sec. 272. Prohibition.
Sec. 273. Bankruptcy actions.

SEC. 203. DEFINITIONS.

In this title:
(1) Chemical weapon.--The term ``chemical weapon'' means
the following, together or separately:
(A) A toxic chemical and its precursors, except where
intended for a purpose not prohibited under this title as
long as the type and quantity is consistent with such a
purpose.
(B) A munition or device, specifically designed to cause
death or other harm through toxic properties of those toxic
chemicals specified in subparagraph (A), which would be
released as a result of the employment of such munition or
device.
(C) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in
connection with the employment of munitions or devices
specified in subparagraph (B).
(2) Chemical weapons convention; convention.--The terms
``Chemical Weapons Convention'' and ``Convention'' mean the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction, opened for signature on January 13, 1993.
(3) Key component of a binary or multicomponent chemical
system.--The term ``key component of a binary or
multicomponent chemical system'' means the precursor which
plays the most important role in determining the toxic
properties of the final product and reacts rapidly with other
chemicals in the binary or multicomponent system.
(4) National of the united states.--The term ``national of
the United States'' has the same meaning given such term in
section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)).
(5) Organization.--The term ``Organization'' means the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
(6) Person.--The term ``person'', except as otherwise
provided, means any individual, corporation, partnership,
firm, association, trust, estate, public or private
institution, any State or any political subdivision thereof,
or any political entity within a State, any foreign
government or nation or any agency, instrumentality or
political subdivision of any such government or nation, or
other entity located in the United States.
(7) Precursor.--
(A) In general.--The term ``precursor'' means any chemical
reactant which takes part at any stage in the production by
whatever method of a toxic chemical. The term includes any
key component of a binary or multicomponent chemical system.
(B) List of precursors.--Precursors which have been
identified for the application of verification measures under
Article VI of the Convention are listed in schedules
contained in the Annex on Chemicals of the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
(8) Purposes not prohibited by this title.--The term
``purposes not prohibited by this title'' means the
following:
(A) Peaceful purposes.--Any peaceful purpose related to an
industrial, agricultural, research, medical, or
pharmaceutical activity or other activity.
(B) Protective purposes.--Any purpose directly related to
protection against toxic

[[Page H10648]]

chemicals and to protection against chemical weapons.
(C) Unrelated military purposes.--Any military purpose of
the United States that is not connected with the use of a
chemical weapon and that is not dependent on the use of the
toxic or poisonous properties of the chemical weapon to cause
death or other harm.
(D) Law enforcement purposes.--Any law enforcement purpose,
including any domestic riot control purpose and including
imposition of capital punishment.
(9) Technical secretariat.--The term ``Technical
Secretariat'' means the Technical Secretariat of the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
established by the Chemical Weapons Convention.
(10) Schedule 1 chemical agent.--The term `Schedule 1
chemical agent' means any of the following, together or
separately:
(A) O-Alkyl (C10, incl. cycloalkyl)
alkyl
(Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-phosphonofluoridates
(e.g. Sarin: O-Isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate Soman:
O-Pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridate).
(B) O-Alkyl (C10, incl. cycloalkyl)
N,N-dialkyl
(Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-phosphoramidocyanidates
(e.g. Tabun: O-Ethyl N,N-dimethyl phosphoramidocyanidate).
(C) O-Alkyl (H or C10, incl.
cycloalkyl) S-2-dialkyl
(Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-aminoethyl alkyl
(Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonothiolates and corresponding
alkylated or protonated salts
(e.g. VX: O-Ethyl S-2-diisopropylaminoethyl methyl
phosphonothiolate).
(D) Sulfur mustards:
2-Chloroethylchloromethylsulfide
Mustard gas: (Bis(2-chloroethyl)sulfide
Bis(2-chloroethylthio)methane
Sesquimustard: 1,2-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)ethane
1,3-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-propane
1,4-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-butane
1,5-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-pentane
Bis(2-chloroethylthiomethyl)ether
O-Mustard: Bis(2-chloroethylthioethyl)ether.
(E) Lewisites:
Lewisite 1: 2-Chlorovinyldichloroarsine
Lewisite 2: Bis(2-chlorovinyl)chloroarsine
Lewisite 3: Tris (2-clorovinyl)arsine.
(F) Nitrogen mustards:
HN1: Bis(2-chloroethyl)ethylamine
HN2: Bis(2-chloroethyl)methylamine
HN3: Tris(2-chloroethyl)amine.
(G) Saxitoxin.
(H) Ricin.
(I) Alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonyldifluorides
e.g. DF: Methylphosphonyldifluoride.
(J) O-Alkyl (H or C10, incl.
cycloalkyl)O-2-dialkyl
(Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-aminoethyl alkyl
(Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonites and corresponding
alkylated or protonated salts
e.g. QL: O-Ethyl O-2-diisopropylaminoethyl
methylphosphonite.
(K) Chlorosarin: O-Isopropyl methylphosphonochloridate.
(L) Chlorosoman: O-Pinacolyl methylphosphonochloridate.
(11) Schedule 2 chemical agent.--The term `Schedule 2
chemical agent' means the following, together or separately:
(A) Amiton: O,O-Diethyl S-[2-(diethylamino)ethyl]
phosphorothiolate and corresponding alkylated or protonated
salts.
(B) PFIB: 1,1,3,3,3-Pentafluoro-2-(trifluoromethyl)-1-
propene.
(C) BZ: 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate
(D) Chemicals, except for those listed in Schedule 1,
containing a phosphorus atom to which is bonded one methyl,
ethyl or propyl (normal or iso) group but not further carbon
atoms,
e.g. Methylphosphonyl dichloride Dimethyl methylphosphonate
Exemption: Fonofos: O-Ethyl S-phenyl
ethylphosphonothiolothionate.
(E) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphoramidic
dihalides.
(F) Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) N,N-dialkyl (Me, Et, n-
Pr or i-Pr)-phosphoramidates.
(G) arsenic trichloride.
(H) 2,2-Diphenyl-2-hydroxyacetic acid.
(I) Quinuclidine-3-ol.
(J) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethyl-2-
chlorides and corresponding protonated salts.
(K) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethane-2-ols
and corresponding protonated salts
Exemptions: N,N-Dimethylaminoethanol and corresponding
protonated salts N,N-Diethylaminoethanol and corresponding
protonated salts.
(L) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethane-2-thiols
and corresponding protonated salts.
(M) Thiodiglycol: Bis(2-hydroxyethyl)sulfide.
(N) Pinacolyl alcohol: 3,3-Dimethylbutane-2-ol.
(12) Schedule 3 chemical agent.--The term `Schedule 3
chemical agent' means any the following, together or
separately:
(A) Phosgene: carbonyl dichloride.
(B) Cyanogen chloride.
(C) Hydrogen cyanide.
(D) Chloropicrin: trichloronitromethane.
(E) Phosphorous oxychloride.
(F) Phosphorous trichloride.
(G) Phosphorous pentachloride.
(H) Trimethyl phosphite.
(I) Triethyl phosphite.
(J) Dimethyl phosphite.
(K) Diethyl phosphite.
(L) Sulfur monochloride.
(M) Sulfur dichloride.
(N) Thionyl chloride.
(O) Ethyldiethanolamine.
(P) Methyldiethanolamine.
(Q) Triethanolamine.
(13) Toxic chemical.--
(A) In general.--The term ``toxic chemical'' means any
chemical which through its chemical action on life processes
can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm
to humans or animals. The term includes all such chemicals,
regardless of their origin or of their method of production,
and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in
munitions or elsewhere.
(B) List of toxic chemicals.--Toxic chemicals which have
been identified for the application of verification measures
under Article VI of the Convention are listed in schedules
contained in the Annex on Chemicals of the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
(14) United states.--The term ``United States'' means the
several States of the United States, the District of
Columbia, and the commonwealths, territories, and possessions
of the United States and includes all places under the
jurisdiction or control of the United States, including--
(A) any of the places within the provisions of paragraph
(41) of section 40102 of title 49, United States Code;
(B) any civil aircraft of the United States or public
aircraft, as such terms are defined in paragraphs (17) and
(37), respectively, of section 40102 of title 49, United
States Code; and
(C) any vessel of the United States, as such term is
defined in section 3(b) of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement
Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1903(b)).
(15) Unscheduled discrete organic chemical.--The term
``unscheduled discrete organic chemical'' means any chemical
not listed on any schedule contained in the Annex on
Chemicals of the Convention that belongs to the class of
chemical compounds consisting of all compounds of carbon,
except for its oxides, sulfides, and metal carbonates.
Subtitle A--General Provisions

SEC. 211. DESIGNATION OF UNITED STATES NATIONAL AUTHORITY.

(a) Designation.--Pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article VII of
the Chemical Weapons Convention, the President shall
designate the Department of State to be the United States
National Authority.
(b) Purposes.--The United States National Authority shall--
(1) serve as the national focal point for effective liaison
with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
and other States Parties to the Convention; and
(2) implement the provisions of this title in coordination
with an interagency group designated by the President
consisting of the Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of
Defense, Secretary of Energy, the Attorney General, and the
heads of agencies considered necessary or advisable by the
President.
(c) Director.--The Secretary of State shall serve as the
Director of the United States National Authority.
(d) Powers.--The Director may utilize the administrative
authorities otherwise available to the Secretary of State in
carrying out the responsibilities of the Director set forth
in this title.
(e) Implementation.--The President is authorized to
implement and carry out the provisions of this title and the
Convention and shall designate through Executive order which
agencies of the United States shall issue, amend, or revise
the regulations in order to implement this title and the
provisions of the Convention. The Director of the United
States National Authority shall report to the Congress on the
regulations that have been issued, implemented, or revised
pursuant to this section.

SEC. 212. NO ABRIDGEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.

No person may be required, as a condition for entering into
a contract with the United States or as a condition for
receiving any benefit from the United States, to waive any
right under the Constitution for any purpose related to this
title or the Convention.

SEC. 213. CIVIL LIABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES.

(a) Claims for Taking of Property.--
(1) Jurisdiction of courts of the united states.--
(A) United states court of federal claims.--The United
States Court of Federal Claims shall, subject to subparagraph
(B), have jurisdiction of any civil action or claim against
the United States for any taking of property without just
compensation that occurs by reason of the action of any
officer or employee of the Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons, including any member of an inspection
team of the Technical Secretariat, or by reason of the action
of any officer or employee of the United States pursuant to
this title or the Convention. For purposes of this
subsection, action taken pursuant to or under the color of
this title or the Convention shall be deemed to be action
taken by the United States for a public purpose.
(B) District courts.--The district courts of the United
States shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the
United States Court of Federal Claims, of any civil action or
claim described in subparagraph (A) that does not exceed
$10,000.

[[Page H10649]]

(2) Notification.--Any person intending to bring a civil
action pursuant to paragraph (1) shall notify the United
States National Authority of that intent at least one year
before filing the claim in the United States Court of Federal
Claims. Action on any claim filed during that one-year period
shall be stayed. The one-year period following the
notification shall not be counted for purposes of any law
limiting the period within which the civil action may be
commenced.
(3) Initial steps by united states government to seek
remedies.--During the period between a notification pursuant
to paragraph (2) and the filing of a claim covered by the
notification in the United States Court of Federal Claims,
the United States National Authority shall pursue all
diplomatic and other remedies that the United States National
Authority considers necessary and appropriate to seek redress
for the claim including, but not limited to, the remedies
provided for in the Convention and under this title.
(4) Burden of Proof.--In any civil action under paragraph
(1), the plaintiff shall have the burden to establish a prima
facie case that, due to acts or omissions of any official of
the Organization or any member of an inspection team of the
Technical Secretariat taken under the color of the
Convention, proprietary information of the plaintiff has been
divulged or taken without authorization. If the United States
Court of Federal Claims finds that the plaintiff has
demonstrated such a prima facie case, the burden shall shift
to the United States to disprove the plaintiff's claim. In
deciding whether the plaintiff has carried its burden, the
United States Court of Federal Claims shall consider, among
other things--
(A) the value of proprietary information;
(B) the availability of the proprietary information;
(C) the extent to which the proprietary information is
based on patents, trade secrets, or other protected
intellectual property;
(D) the significance of proprietary information; and
(E) the emergence of technology elsewhere a reasonable time
after the inspection.
(b) Tort Liability.--The district courts of the United
States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions for
money damages for any tort under the Constitution or any
Federal or State law arising from the acts or omissions of
any officer or employee of the United States or the
Organization, including any member of an inspection team of
the Technical Secretariat, taken pursuant to or under color
of the Convention or this title.
(c) Waiver of Sovereign Immunity of the United States.--In
any action under subsection (a) or (b), the United States may
not raise sovereign immunity as a defense.
(d) Authority for Cause of Action.--
(1) United states actions in united states district
court.--Notwithstanding any other law, the Attorney General
of the United States is authorized to bring an action in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia
against any foreign nation for money damages resulting from
that nation's refusal to provide indemnification to the
United States for any liability imposed on the United States
by virtue of the actions of an inspector of the Technical
Secretariat who is a national of that foreign nation acting
at the direction or the behest of that foreign nation.
(2) United states actions in courts outside the united
states.--The Attorney General is authorized to seek any and
all available redress in any international tribunal for
indemnification to the United States for any liability
imposed on the United States by virtue of the actions of an
inspector of the Technical Secretariat, and to seek such
redress in the courts of the foreign nation from which the
inspector is a national.
(3) Actions brought by individuals and businesses.--
Notwithstanding any other law, any national of the United
States, or any business entity organized and operating under
the laws of the United States, may bring a civil action in a
United States District Court for money damages against any
foreign national or any business entity organized and
operating under the laws of a foreign nation for an
unauthorized or unlawful acquisition, receipt, transmission,
or use of property by or on behalf of such foreign national
or business entity as a result of any tort under the
Constitution or any Federal or State law arising from acts or
omissions by any officer or employee of the United States or
any member of an inspection team of the Technical Secretariat
taken pursuant to or under the color of the Convention or
this title.
(e) Recoupment.--
(1) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to
recoup all funds withdrawn from the Treasury of the United
States in payment for any tort under Federal or State law or
taking under the Constitution arising from the acts or
omissions of any foreign person, officer, or employee of the
Organization, including any member of an inspection team of
the Technical Secretariat, taken under color of the Chemical
Weapons Convention or this title.
(2) Sanctions on foreign companies.--
(A) Imposition of sanctions.--The sanctions provided in
subparagraph (B) shall be imposed for a period of not less
than ten years upon--
(i) any foreign person, officer, or employee of the
Organization, including any member of an inspection team of
the Technical Secretariat, for whose actions or omissions the
United States has been held liable for a tort or taking
pursuant to this title; and
(ii) any foreign person or business entity organized and
operating under the laws of a foreign nation which knowingly
assisted, encouraged or induced, in any way, a foreign person
described in clause (i) to publish, divulge, disclose, or
make known in any manner or to any extent not authorized by
the Convention any United States confidential business
information.
(B) Sanctions.--
(i) Arms export transactions.--The United States Government
shall not sell to a person described in subparagraph (A) any
item on the United States Munitions List and shall terminate
sales of any defense articles, defense services, or design
and construction services to a person described in
subparagraph (A) under the Arms Export Control Act.
(ii) Sanctions under export administration act of 1979.--
The authorities under section 6 of the Export Administration
Act of 1979 shall be used to prohibit the export of any goods
or technology on the control list established pursuant to
section 5(c)(1) of that Act to a person described in
subparagraph (A).
(iii) International financial assistance.--The United
States shall oppose any loan or financial or technical
assistance by international financial institutions in
accordance with section 701 of the International Financial
Institutions Act to a person described in subparagraph (A).
(iv) Export-import bank transactions.--The United States
shall not give approval to guarantee, insure, or extend
credit, or to participate in the extension of credit to a
person described in subparagraph (A) through the Export-
Import Bank of the United States.
(v) Private bank transactions.--Regulations shall be issued
to prohibit any United States bank from making any loan or
providing any credit to a person described in subparagraph
(A).
(vi) Blocking of assets.--The President shall take all
steps necessary to block any transactions in any property
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in which a
person described in subparagraph (A) has any interest
whatsoever, for the purpose of recouping funds in accordance
with the policy in paragraph (1).
(vii) Denial of landing rights.--Landing rights in the
United States shall be denied to any private aircraft or air
carrier owned by a person described in subparagraph (A)
except as necessary to provide for emergencies in which the
safety of the aircraft or its crew or passengers is
threatened.
(3) Sanctions on foreign governments.--
(A) Imposition of sanctions.--Whenever the President
determines that persuasive information is available
indicating that a foreign country has knowingly assisted,
encouraged or induced, in any way, a person described in
paragraph (2)(A) to publish, divulge, disclose, or make known
in any manner or to any extent not authorized by the
Convention any United States confidential business
information, the President shall, within 30 days after the
receipt of such information by the executive branch of
Government, notify the Congress in writing of such
determination and, subject to the requirements of paragraphs
(4) and (5), impose the sanctions provided under subparagraph
(B) for a period of not less than five years.
(B) Sanctions.--
(i) Arms export transactions.--The United States Government
shall not sell a country described in subparagraph (A) any
item on the United States Munitions List, shall terminate
sales of any defense articles, defense services, or design
and construction services to that country under the Arms
Export Control Act, and shall terminate all foreign military
financing for that country under the Arms Export Control Act.
(ii) Denial of certain licenses.--Licenses shall not be
issued for the export to the sanctioned country of any item
on the United States Munitions List or commercial satellites.
(iii) Denial of assistance.--No appropriated funds may be
used for the purpose of providing economic assistance,
providing military assistance or grant military education and
training, or extending military credits or making guarantees
to a country described in subparagraph (A).
(iv) Sanctions under export administration act of 1979.--
The authorities of section 6 of the Export Administration Act
of 1979 shall be used to prohibit the export of any goods or
technology on the control list established pursuant to
section 5(c)(1) of that Act to a country described in
subparagraph (A).
(v) International financial assistance.--The United States
shall oppose any loan or financial or technical assistance by
international financial institutions in accordance with
section 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act
to a country described in subparagraph (A).
(vi) Termination of assistance under foreign assistance act
of 1961.--The United States shall terminate all assistance to
a country described in subparagraph (A) under the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, except for urgent humanitarian
assistance.
(vii) Private bank transactions.--The United States shall
not give approval to guarantee, insure, or extend credit, or
participate in the extension of credit through the Export-
Import Bank of the United States to a country described in
subparagraph (A).
(viii) Private bank transactions.--Regulations shall be
issued to prohibit any United

[[Page H10650]]

States bank from making any loan or providing any credit to a
country described in subparagraph (A).
(ix) Denial of landing rights.--Landing rights in the
United States shall be denied to any air carrier owned by a
country described in subparagraph (A), except as necessary to
provide for emergencies in which the safety of the aircraft
or its crew or passengers is threatened.
(4) Suspension of sanctions upon recoupment by payment.--
Sanctions imposed under paragraph (2) or (3) may be suspended
if the sanctioned person, business entity, or country, within
the period specified in that paragraph, provides full and
complete compensation to the United States Government, in
convertible foreign exchange or other mutually acceptable
compensation equivalent to the full value thereof, in
satisfaction of a tort or taking for which the United States
has been held liable pursuant to this title.
(5) Waiver of sanctions on foreign countries.--The
President may waive some or all of the sanctions provided
under paragraph (3) in a particular case if he determines and
certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate that such waiver is necessary to protect the national
security interests of the United States. The certification
shall set forth the reasons supporting the determination and
shall take effect on the date on which the certification is
received by the Congress.
(6) Notification to congress.--Not later than five days
after sanctions become effective against a foreign person
pursuant to this title, the President shall transmit written
notification of the imposition of sanctions against that
foreign person to the chairmen and ranking members of the
Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate.
(f) Sanctions for Unauthorized Disclosure of United States
Confidential Business Information.--The Secretary of State
shall deny a visa to, and the Attorney General shall exclude
from the United States any alien who, after the date of
enactment of this Act--
(1) is, or previously served as, an officer or employee of
the Organization and who has willfully published, divulged,
disclosed, or made known in any manner or to any extent not
authorized by the Convention any United States confidential
business information coming to him in the course of his
employment or official duties, or by reason of any
examination or investigation of any return, report, or record
made to or filed with the Organization, or any officer or
employee thereof, such practice or disclosure having resulted
in financial loses or damages to a United States person and
for which actions or omissions the United States has been
found liable of a tort or taking pursuant to this title;
(2) traffics in United States confidential business
information, a proven claim to which is owned by a United
States national;
(3) is a corporate officer, principal, shareholder with a
controlling interest of an entity which has been involved in
the unauthorized disclosure of United States confidential
business information, a proven claim to which is owned by a
United States national; or
(4) is a spouse, minor child, or agent of a person
excludable under paragraph (1), (2), or (3).
(g) United States Confidential Business Information
Defined.--In this section, the term ``United States
confidential business information'' means any trade secrets
or commercial or financial information that is privileged and
confidential--
(1) including--
(A) data described in section 234(e)(2) of this Act,
(B) any chemical structure,
(C) any plant design process, technology, or operating
method,
(D) any operating requirement, input, or result that
identifies any type or quantity of chemicals used, processed,
or produced, or
(E) any commercial sale, shipment, or use of a chemical, or
(2) as described in section 552(b)(4) of title 5, United
States Code,

and that is obtained--
(i) from a United States person; or
(ii) through the United States Government or the conduct of
an inspection on United States territory under the
Convention.
Subtitle B--Penalties for Unlawful Activities Subject to the
Jurisdiction of the United States

CHAPTER 1--CRIMINAL AND CIVIL PENALTIES

SEC. 221. CRIMINAL AND CIVIL PROVISIONS.

(a) In General.--Part I of title 18, United States Code, is
amended by inserting after chapter 11A the following new
chapter:

``CHAPTER 11B--CHEMICAL WEAPONS

``Sec.
``229. Prohibited activities.
``229A. Penalties.
``229B. Criminal forfeitures; destruction of weapons.
``229C. Individual self-defense devices.
``229D. Injunctions.
``229E. Requests for military assistance to enforce prohibition in
certain emergencies.
``229F. Definitions.

``Sec. 229. Prohibited activities

``(a) Unlawful Conduct.--Except as provided in subsection
(b), it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly--
``(1) to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, transfer
directly or indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own,
possess, or use, or threaten to use, any chemical weapon; or
``(2) to assist or induce, in any way, any person to
violate paragraph (1), or to attempt or conspire to violate
paragraph (1).
``(b) Exempted Agencies and Persons.--
``(1) In general.--Subsection (a) does not apply to the
retention, ownership, possession, transfer, or receipt of a
chemical weapon by a department, agency, or other entity of
the United States, or by a person described in paragraph (2),
pending destruction of the weapon.
``(2) Exempted persons.--A person referred to in paragraph
(1) is--
``(A) any person, including a member of the Armed Forces of
the United States, who is authorized by law or by an
appropriate officer of the United States to retain, own,
possess, transfer, or receive the chemical weapon; or
``(B) in an emergency situation, any otherwise nonculpable
person if the person is attempting to destroy or seize the
weapon.
``(c) Jurisdiction.--Conduct prohibited by subsection (a)
is within the jurisdiction of the United States if the
prohibited conduct--
``(1) takes place in the United States;
``(2) takes place outside of the United States and is
committed by a national of the United States;
``(3) is committed against a national of the United States
while the national is outside the United States; or
``(4) is committed against any property that is owned,
leased, or used by the United States or by any department or
agency of the United States, whether the property is within
or outside the United States.

``Sec. 229A. Penalties

``(a) Criminal Penalties.--
``(1) In general.--Any person who violates section 229 of
this title shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for
any term of years, or both.
``(2) Death penalty.--Any person who violates section 229
of this title and by whose action the death of another person
is the result shall be punished by death or imprisoned for
life.
``(b) Civil Penalties.--
``(1) In general.--The Attorney General may bring a civil
action in the appropriate United States district court
against any person who violates section 229 of this title
and, upon proof of such violation by a preponderance of the
evidence, such person shall be subject to pay a civil penalty
in an amount not to exceed $100,000 for each such violation.
``(2) Relation to other proceedings.--The imposition of a
civil penalty under this subsection does not preclude any
other criminal or civil statutory, common law, or
administrative remedy, which is available by law to the
United States or any other person.
``(c) Reimbursement of Costs.--The court shall order any
person convicted of an offense under subsection (a) to
reimburse the United States for any expenses incurred by the
United States incident to the seizure, storage, handling,
transportation, and destruction or other disposition of any
property that was seized in connection with an investigation
of the commission of the offense by that person. A person
ordered to reimburse the United States for expenses under
this subsection shall be jointly and severally liable for
such expenses with each other person, if any, who is ordered
under this subsection to reimburse the United States for the
same expenses.

``Sec. 229B. Criminal forfeitures; destruction of weapons

``(a) Property Subject to Criminal Forfeiture.--Any person
convicted under section 229A(a) shall forfeit to the United
States irrespective of any provision of State law--
``(1) any property, real or personal, owned, possessed, or
used by a person involved in the offense;
``(2) any property constituting, or derived from, and
proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the
result of such violation; and
``(3) any of the property used in any manner or part, to
commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such violation.

The court, in imposing sentence on such person, shall order,
in addition to any other sentence imposed pursuant to section
229A(a), that the person forfeit to the United States all
property described in this subsection. In lieu of a fine
otherwise authorized by section 229A(a), a defendant who
derived profits or other proceeds from an offense may be
fined not more than twice the gross profits or other
proceeds.
``(b) Procedures.--
``(1) General.--Property subject to forfeiture under this
section, any seizure and disposition thereof, and any
administrative or judicial proceeding in relation thereto,
shall be governed by subsections (b) through (p) of section
413 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 853), except that any reference under
those subsections to--
``(A) `this subchapter or subchapter II' shall be deemed to
be a reference to section 229A(a); and
``(B) `subsection (a)' shall be deemed to be a reference to
subsection (a) of this section.
``(2) Temporary restraining orders.--
``(A) In general.--For the purposes of forfeiture
proceedings under this section, a temporary restraining order
may be entered

[[Page H10651]]

upon application of the United States without notice or
opportunity for a hearing when an information or indictment
has not yet been filed with respect to the property, if, in
addition to the circumstances described in section 413(e)(2)
of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970 (21 U.S.C. 853(e)(2)), the United States demonstrates
that there is probable cause to believe that the property
with respect to which the order is sought would, in the event
of conviction, be subject to forfeiture under this section
and exigent circumstances exist that place the life or health
of any person in danger.
``(B) Warrant of seizure.--If the court enters a temporary
restraining order under this paragraph, it shall also issue a
warrant authorizing the seizure of such property.
``(C) Applicable procedures.--The procedures and time
limits applicable to temporary restraining orders under
section 413(e) (2) and (3) of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 853(e) (2) and
(3)) shall apply to temporary restraining orders under this
paragraph.
``(c) Affirmative Defense.--It is an affirmative defense
against a forfeiture under subsection (b) that the property--
``(1) is for a purpose not prohibited under the Chemical
Weapons Convention; and
``(2) is of a type and quantity that under the
circumstances is consistent with that purpose.
``(d) Destruction or Other Disposition.--The Attorney
General shall provide for the destruction or other
appropriate disposition of any chemical weapon seized and
forfeited pursuant to this section.
``(e) Assistance.--The Attorney General may request the
head of any agency of the United States to assist in the
handling, storage, transportation, or destruction of property
seized under this section.
``(f) Owner Liability.--The owner or possessor of any
property seized under this section shall be liable to the
United States for any expenses incurred incident to the
seizure, including any expenses relating to the handling,
storage, transportation, and destruction or other disposition
of the seized property.

``Sec. 229C. Individual self-defense devices

``Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit
any individual self-defense device, including those using a
pepper spray or chemical mace.

``Sec. 229D. Injunctions

``The United States may obtain in a civil action an
injunction against--
``(1) the conduct prohibited under section 229 or 229C of
this title; or
``(2) the preparation or solicitation to engage in conduct
prohibited under section 229 or 229D of this title.

``Sec. 229E. Requests for military assistance to enforce
prohibition in certain emergencies

``The Attorney General may request the Secretary of Defense
to provide assistance under section 382 of title 10 in
support of Department of Justice activities relating to the
enforcement of section 229 of this title in an emergency
situation involving a chemical weapon. The authority to make
such a request may be exercised by another official of the
Department of Justice in accordance with section 382(f)(2) of
title 10.

``Sec. 229F. Definitions

``In this chapter:
``(1) Chemical weapon.--The term `chemical weapon' means
the following, together or separately:
``(A) A toxic chemical and its precursors, except where
intended for a purpose not prohibited under this chapter as
long as the type and quantity is consistent with such a
purpose.
``(B) A munition or device, specifically designed to cause
death or other harm through toxic properties of those toxic
chemicals specified in subparagraph (A), which would be
released as a result of the employment of such munition or
device.
``(C) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly
in connection with the employment of munitions or devices
specified in subparagraph (B).
``(2) Chemical weapons convention; convention.--The terms
`Chemical Weapons Convention' and `Convention' mean the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction, opened for signature on January 13, 1993.
``(3) Key component of a binary or multicomponent chemical
system.--The term `key component of a binary or
multicomponent chemical system' means the precursor which
plays the most important role in determining the toxic
properties of the final product and reacts rapidly with other
chemicals in the binary or multicomponent system.
``(4) National of the united states.--The term `national of
the United States' has the same meaning given such term in
section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)).
``(5) Person.--The term `person', except as otherwise
provided, means any individual, corporation, partnership,
firm, association, trust, estate, public or private
institution, any State or any political subdivision thereof,
or any political entity within a State, any foreign
government or nation or any agency, instrumentality or
political subdivision of any such government or nation, or
other entity located in the United States.
``(6) Precursor.--
``(A) In general.--The term `precursor' means any chemical
reactant which takes part at any stage in the production by
whatever method of a toxic chemical. The term includes any
key component of a binary or multicomponent chemical system.
``(B) List of precursors.--Precursors which have been
identified for the application of verification measures under
Article VI of the Convention are listed in schedules
contained in the Annex on Chemicals of the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
``(7) Purposes not prohibited by this chapter.--The term
`purposes not prohibited by this chapter' means the
following:
``(A) Peaceful purposes.--Any peaceful purpose related to
an industrial, agricultural, research, medical, or
pharmaceutical activity or other activity.
``(B) Protective purposes.--Any purpose directly related to
protection against toxic chemicals and to protection against
chemical weapons.
``(C) Unrelated military purposes.--Any military purpose of
the United States that is not connected with the use of a
chemical weapon or that is not dependent on the use of the
toxic or poisonous properties of the chemical weapon to cause
death or other harm.
``(D) Law enforcement purposes.--Any law enforcement
purpose, including any domestic riot control purpose and
including imposition of capital punishment.
``(8) Toxic chemical.--
``(A) In general.--The term `toxic chemical' means any
chemical which through its chemical action on life processes
can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm
to humans or animals. The term includes all such chemicals,
regardless of their origin or of their method of production,
and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in
munitions or elsewhere.
``(B) List of toxic chemicals.--Toxic chemicals which have
been identified for the application of verification measures
under Article VI of the Convention are listed in schedules
contained in the Annex on Chemicals of the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
``(9) United states.--The term `United States' means the
several States of the United States, the District of
Columbia, and the commonwealths, territories, and possessions
of the United States and includes all places under the
jurisdiction or control of the United States, including--
``(A) any of the places within the provisions of paragraph
(41) of section 40102 of title 49;
``(B) any civil aircraft of the United States or public
aircraft, as such terms are defined in paragraphs (17) and
(37), respectively, of section 40102 of title 49; and
``(C) any vessel of the United States, as such term is
defined in section 3(b) of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement
Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1903(b)).''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Weapons of mass destruction.--Section 2332a of title
18, United States Code, is amended--
(A) by striking ``Sec. 2332a. Use of weapons of mass
destruction'' and inserting ``Sec. 2332a. Use of certain
weapons of mass destruction'';
(B) in subsection (a), by inserting ``(other than a
chemical weapon as that term is defined in section 229F)''
after ``weapon of mass destruction''; and
(C) in subsection (b), by inserting ``(other than a
chemical weapon (as that term is defined in section 229F))''
after ``weapon of mass destruction''.
(2) Table of chapters.--The table of chapters for part I of
title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after
the item for chapter 11A the following new item:

``11B. Chemical Weapons......................................229''.....

(c) Repeals.--The following provisions of law are repealed:
(1) Section 2332c of title 18, United States Code, relating
to chemical weapons.
(2) In the table of sections for chapter 113B of title 18,
United States Code, the item relating to section 2332c.

CHAPTER 2--REVOCATIONS OF EXPORT PRIVILEGES

SEC. 222. REVOCATIONS OF EXPORT PRIVILEGES.

If the President determines, after notice and an
opportunity for a hearing in accordance with section 554 of
title 5, United States Code, that any person within the
United States, or any national of the United States located
outside the United States, has committed any violation of
section 229 of title 18, United States Code, the President
may issue an order for the suspension or revocation of the
authority of the person to export from the United States any
goods or technology (as such terms are defined in section 16
of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App.
2415)).
Subtitle C--Inspections

SEC. 231. DEFINITIONS IN THE SUBTITLE.

(a) In General.--In this subtitle, the terms ``challenge
inspection'', ``plant site'', ``plant'', ``facility
agreement'', ``inspection team'', and ``requesting state
party'' have the meanings given those terms in Part I of the
Annex on Implementation and Verification of the Chemical
Weapons Convention. The term ``routine inspection'' means an
inspection, other than an ``initial inspection'', undertaken
pursuant to Article VI of the Convention.
(b) Definition of Judge of the United States.--In this
subtitle, the term ``judge of the United States'' means a
judge or magistrate judge of a district court of the United
States.

[[Page H10652]]

SEC. 232. FACILITY AGREEMENTS.

(a) Authorization of Inspections.--Inspections by the
Technical Secretariat of plants, plant sites, or other
facilities or locations for which the United States has a
facility agreement with the Organization shall be conducted
in accordance with the facility agreement. Any such facility
agreement may not in any way limit the right of the owner or
operator of the facility to withhold consent to an inspection
request.
(b) Types of Facility Agreements.--
(1) Schedule two facilities.--The United States National
Authority shall ensure that facility agreements for plants,
plant sites, or other facilities or locations that are
subject to inspection pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article VI
of the Convention are concluded unless the owner, operator,
occupant, or agent in charge of the facility and the
Technical Secretariat agree that such an agreement is not
necessary.
(2) Schedule three facilities.--The United States National
Authority shall ensure that facility agreements are concluded
for plants, plant sites, or other facilities or locations
that are subject to inspection pursuant to paragraph 5 or 6
of Article VI of the Convention if so requested by the owner,
operator, occupant, or agent in charge of the facility.
(c) Notification Requirements.--The United States National
Authority shall ensure that the owner, operator, occupant, or
agent in charge of a facility prior to the development of the
agreement relating to that facility is notified and, if the
person notified so requests, the person may participate in
the preparations for the negotiation of such an agreement. To
the maximum extent practicable consistent with the
Convention, the owner and the operator, occupant or agent in
charge of a facility may observe negotiations of the
agreement between the United States and the Organization
concerning that facility.
(d) Content of Facility Agreements.--Facility agreements
shall--
(1) identify the areas, equipment, computers, records,
data, and samples subject to inspection;
(2) describe the procedures for providing notice of an
inspection to the owner, occupant, operator, or agent in
charge of a facility;
(3) describe the timeframes for inspections; and
(4) detail the areas, equipment, computers, records, data,
and samples that are not subject to inspection.

SEC. 233. AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT INSPECTIONS.

(a) Prohibition.--No inspection of a plant, plant site, or
other facility or location in the United States shall take
place under the Convention without the authorization of the
United States National Authority in accordance with the
requirements of this subtitle.
(b) Authority.--
(1) Technical secretariat inspection teams.--Any duly
designated member of an inspection team of the Technical
Secretariat may inspect any plant, plant site, or other
facility or location in the United States subject to
inspection pursuant to the Convention.
(2) United states government representatives.--The United
States National Authority shall coordinate the designation of
employees of the Federal Government to accompany members of
an inspection team of the Technical Secretariat and, in doing
so, shall ensure that--
(A) a special agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
as designated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
accompanies each inspection team visit pursuant to paragraph
(1);
(B) no employee of the Environmental Protection Agency or
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration accompanies
any inspection team visit conducted pursuant to paragraph
(1); and
(C) the number of duly designated representatives shall be
kept to the minimum necessary.
(3) Objections to individuals serving as inspectors.--
(A) In general.--In deciding whether to exercise the right
of the United States under the Convention to object to an
individual serving as an inspector, the President shall give
great weight to his reasonable belief that--
(i) such individual is or has been a member of, or a
participant in, any group or organization that has engaged
in, or attempted or conspired to engage in, or aided or
abetted in the commission of, any terrorist act or activity;
(ii) such individual has committed any act or activity
which would be a felony under the laws of the United States;
or
(iii) the participation of such individual as a member of
an inspection team would pose a risk to the national security
or economic well-being of the United States.
(B) Not subject to judicial review.--Any objection by the
President to an individual serving as an inspector, whether
made pursuant to this section or otherwise, shall not be
reviewable in any court.

SEC. 234. PROCEDURES FOR INSPECTIONS.

(a) Types of Inspections.--Each inspection of a plant,
plant site, or other facility or location in the United
States under the Convention shall be conducted in accordance
with this section and section 235, except where other
procedures are provided in a facility agreement entered into
under section 232.
(b) Notice.--
(1) In general.--An inspection referred to in subsection
(a) may be made only upon issuance of an actual written
notice by the United States National Authority to the owner
and to the operator, occupant, or agent in charge of the
premises to be inspected.
(2) Time of Notification.--The notice for a routine
inspection shall be submitted to the owner and to the
operator, occupant, or agent in charge within six hours of
receiving the notification of the inspection from the
Technical Secretariat or as soon as possible thereafter.
Notice for a challenge inspection shall be provided at any
appropriate time determined by the United States National
Authority. Notices may be posted prominently at the plant,
plant site, or other facility or location if the United
States is unable to provide actual written notice to the
owner, operator, or agent in charge of the premises.
(3) Content of notice.--
(A) In general.--The notice under paragraph (1) shall
include all appropriate information supplied by the Technical
Secretariat to the United States National Authority
concerning--
(i) the type of inspection;
(ii) the basis for the selection of the plant, plant site,
or other facility or location for the type of inspection
sought;
(iii) the time and date that the inspection will begin and
the period covered by the inspection; and
(iv) the names and titles of the inspectors.
(B) Special rule for challenge inspections.--In the case of
a challenge inspection pursuant to Article IX of the
Convention, the notice shall also include all appropriate
evidence or reasons provided by the requesting state party to
the Convention for seeking the inspection.
(4) Separate notices required.--A separate notice shall be
provided for each inspection, except that a notice shall not
be required for each entry made during the period covered by
the inspection.
(c) Credentials.--The head of the inspection team of the
Technical Secretariat and the accompanying employees of the
Federal government shall display appropriate identifying
credentials to the owner, operator, occupant, or agent in
charge of the premises before the inspection is commenced.
(d) Timeframe for Inspections.--Consistent with the
provisions of the Convention, each inspection shall be
commenced and completed with reasonable promptness and shall
be conducted at reasonable times, within reasonable limits,
and in a reasonable manner.
(e) Scope.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in a warrant issued
under section 235 or a facility agreement entered into under
section 232, an inspection conducted under this subtitle may
extend to all things within the premises inspected (including
records, files, papers, processes, controls, structures and
vehicles) related to whether the requirements of the
Convention applicable to such premises have been complied
with.
(2) Exception.--Unless required by the Convention, no
inspection under this subtitle shall extend to--
(A) financial data;
(B) sales and marketing data (other than shipment data);
(C) pricing data;
(D) personnel data;
(E) research data;
(F) patent data;
(G) data maintained for compliance with environmental or
occupational health and safety regulations; or
(H) personnel and vehicles entering and personnel and
personal passenger vehicles exiting the facility.
(f) Sampling and Safety.--
(1) In general.--The Director of the United States National
Authority is authorized to require the provision of samples
to a member of the inspection team of the Technical
Secretariat in accordance with the provisions of the
Convention. The owner or the operator, occupant or agent in
charge of the premises to be inspected shall determine
whether the sample shall be taken by representatives of the
premises or the inspection team or other individuals present.
No sample collected in the United States pursuant to an
inspection permitted by this title may be transferred for
analysis to any laboratory outside the territory of the
United States.
(2) Compliance with regulations.--In carrying out their
activities, members of the inspection team of the Technical
Secretariat and representatives of agencies or departments
accompanying the inspection team shall observe safety
regulations established at the premises to be inspected,
including those for protection of controlled environments
within a facility and for personal safety.
(g) Coordination.--The appropriate representatives of the
United States, as designated, if present, shall assist the
owner and the operator, occupant or agent in charge of the
premises to be inspected in interacting with the members of
the inspection team of the Technical Secretariat.

SEC. 235. WARRANTS.

(a) In General.--The United States Government shall seek
the consent of the owner or the operator, occupant, or agent
in charge of the premises to be inspected prior to any
inspection referred to in section 304(a). If consent is
obtained, a warrant is not required for the inspection. The
owner or the operator, occupant, or agent in charge of the

[[Page H10653]]

premises to be inspected may withhold consent for any reason
or no reason. After providing notification pursuant to
subsection (b), the United States Government may seek a
search warrant from a United States magistrate judge.
Proceedings regarding the issuance of a search warrant shall
be conducted ex parte, unless otherwise requested by the
United States Government.
(b) Routine Inspections.--
(1) Obtaining administrative search warrants.--For any
routine inspection conducted on the territory of the United
States pursuant to Article VI of the Convention, where
consent has been withheld, the United States Government shall
first obtain an administrative search warrant from a judge of
the United States. The United States Government shall provide
to the judge of the United States all appropriate information
supplied by the Technical Secretariat to the United States
National Authority regarding the basis for the selection of
the plant site, plant, or other facility or location for the
type of inspection sought. The United States Government shall
also provide any other appropriate information available to
it relating to the reasonableness of the selection of the
plant, plant site, or other facility or location for the
inspection.
(2) Content of affidavits for administrative search
warrants.--The judge of the United States shall promptly
issue a warrant authorizing the requested inspection upon an
affidavit submitted by the United States Government showing
that--
(A) the Chemical Weapons Convention is in force for the
United States;
(B) the plant site, plant, or other facility or location
sought to be inspected is required to report data under
subtitle D of this title and is subject to routine inspection
under the Convention;
(C) the purpose of the inspection is--
(i) in the case of any facility owned or operated by a non-
Government entity related to Schedule 1 chemical agents, to
verify that the facility is not used to produce any Schedule
1 chemical agent except for declared chemicals; quantities of
Schedule 1 chemicals produced, processed, or consumed are
correctly declared and consistent with needs for the declared
purpose; and Schedule 1 chemicals are not diverted or used
for other purposes;
(ii) in the case of any facility related to Schedule 2
chemical agents, to verify that activities are in accordance
with obligations under the Convention and consistent with the
information provided in data declarations; and
(iii) in the case of any facility related to Schedule 3
chemical agents and any other chemical production facility,
to verify that the activities of the facility are consistent
with the information provided in data declarations;
(D) the items, documents, and areas to be searched and
seized;
(E) in the case of a facility related to Schedule 2 or
Schedule 3 chemical agents or unscheduled discrete organic
chemicals, the plant site has not been subject to more than 1
routine inspection in the current calendar year, and, in the
case of facilities related to Schedule 3 chemical agents or
unscheduled discrete organic chemicals, the inspection will
not cause the number of routine inspections in the United
States to exceed 20 in a calendar year;
(F) the selection of the site was made in accordance with
procedures established under the Convention and, in
particular--
(i) in the case of any facility owned or operated by a non-
Government entity related to Schedule 1 chemical agents, the
intensity, duration, timing, and mode of the requested
inspection is based on the risk to the object and purpose of
the Convention by the quantities of chemical produced, the
characteristics of the facility and the nature of activities
carried out at the facility, and the requested inspection,
when considered with previous such inspections of the
facility undertaken in the current calendar year, shall not
exceed the number reasonably required based on the risk to
the object and purpose of the Convention as described above;
(ii) in the case of any facility related to Schedule 2
chemical agents, the Technical Secretariat gave due
consideration to the risk to the object and purpose of the
Convention posed by the relevant chemical, the
characteristics of the plant site and the nature of
activities carried out there, taking into account the
respective facility agreement as well as the results of the
initial inspections and subsequent inspections; and
(iii) in the case of any facility related to Schedule 3
chemical agents or unscheduled discrete organic chemicals,
the facility was selected randomly by the Technical
Secretariat using appropriate mechanisms, such as
specifically designed computer software, on the basis of two
weighting factors: (I) equitable geographical distribution of
inspections; and (II) the information on the declared sites
available to the Technical Secretariat, related to the
relevant chemical, the characteristics of the plant site, and
the nature of activities carried out there;
(G) the earliest commencement and latest closing dates and
times of the inspection; and
(H) the duration of inspection will not exceed time limits
specified in the Convention unless agreed by the owner,
operator, or agent in charge of the plant.
(3) Content of warrants.--A warrant issued under paragraph
(2) shall specify the same matters required of an affidavit
under that paragraph. In addition to the requirements for a
warrant issued under this paragraph, each warrant shall
contain, if known, the identities of the representatives of
the Technical Secretariat conducting the inspection and the
observers of the inspection and, if applicable, the
identities of the representatives of agencies or departments
of the United States accompanying those representatives.
(4) Challenge inspections.--
(A) Criminal search warrant.--For any challenge inspection
conducted on the territory of the United States pursuant to
Article IX of the Chemical Weapons Convention, where consent
has been withheld, the United States Government shall first
obtain from a judge of the United States a criminal search
warrant based upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and describing with particularity the place to
be searched and the person or things to be seized.
(B) Information provided.--The United States Government
shall provide to the judge of the United States--
(i) all appropriate information supplied by the Technical
Secretariat to the United States National Authority regarding
the basis for the selection of the plant site, plant, or
other facility or location for the type of inspection sought;
(ii) any other appropriate information relating to the
reasonableness of the selection of the plant, plant site, or
other facility or location for the inspection;
(iii) information concerning--

(I) the duration and scope of the inspection;
(II) areas to be inspected;
(III) records and data to be reviewed; and
(IV) samples to be taken;

(iv) appropriate evidence or reasons provided by the
requesting state party for the inspection;
(v) any other evidence showing probable cause to believe
that a violation of this title has occurred or is occurring;
and
(vi) the identities of the representatives of the Technical
Secretariat on the inspection team and the Federal Government
employees accompanying the inspection team.
(C) Content of warrant.--The warrant shall specify--
(i) the type of inspection authorized;
(ii) the purpose of the inspection;
(iii) the type of plant site, plant, or other facility or
location to be inspected;
(iv) the areas of the plant site, plant, or other facility
or location to be inspected;
(v) the items, documents, data, equipment, and computers
that may be inspected or seized;
(vi) samples that may be taken;
(vii) the earliest commencement and latest concluding dates
and times of the inspection; and
(viii) the identities of the representatives of the
Technical Secretariat on the inspection teams and the Federal
Government employees accompanying the inspection team.

SEC. 236. PROHIBITED ACTS RELATING TO INSPECTIONS.

It shall be unlawful for any person willfully to fail or
refuse to permit entry or inspection, or to disrupt, delay,
or otherwise impede an inspection, authorized by this title.

SEC. 237. NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTION.

Consistent with the objective of eliminating chemical
weapons, the President may deny a request to inspect any
facility in the United States in cases where the President
determines that the inspection may pose a threat to the
national security interests of the United States.

SEC. 238. PROTECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CONTRACTORS.

(a) The Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C.
403 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

``SEC. 39. PROTECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
CONTRACTORS.

``(a) Prohibition.--A contractor may not be required, as a
condition for entering into a contract with the Federal
Government, to waive any right under the Constitution for any
purpose related to Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation
Act of 1997 or the Chemical Weapons Convention (as defined in
section 203 of such Act.)
``(b) Construction.--Nothing in subsection (a) shall be
construed to prohibit an executive agency from including in a
contract a clause that requires the contractor to permit
inspections for the purpose of ensuring that the contractor
is performing the contract in accordance with the provisions
of the contract.''.
(b) The table of contents in section 1(b) of such Act is
amended by adding at the end the following:

``Sec. 39. Protection of constitutional rights of contractors.''.

SEC. 239. ANNUAL REPORT ON INSPECTIONS.

(a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President
shall submit a report in classified and unclassified form to
the appropriate congressional committees on inspections made
under the Convention during the preceding year.
(b) Content of Reports.--Each report shall contain the
following information for the reporting period:
(1) The name of each company or entity subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States reporting data pursuant to
subtitle D of this title.
(2) The number of inspections under the Convention
conducted on the territory of the United States.

[[Page H10654]]

(3) The number and identity of inspectors conducting any
inspection described in paragraph (2) and the number of
inspectors barred from inspection by the United States.
(4) The cost to the United States for each inspection
described in paragraph (2).
(5) The total costs borne by United States business firms
in the course of inspections described in paragraph (2).
(6) A description of the circumstances surrounding
inspections described in paragraph (2), including instances
of possible industrial espionage and misconduct of
inspectors.
(7) The identity of parties claiming loss of trade secrets,
the circumstances surrounding those losses, and the efforts
taken by the United States Government to redress those
losses.
(8) A description of instances where inspections under the
Convention outside the United States have been disrupted or
delayed.
(c) Definition.--The term ``appropriate congressional
committees'' means the Committee on the Judiciary, the
Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on the
Judiciary, the Committee on International Relations, and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.

SEC. 240. UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE IN INSPECTIONS AT PRIVATE
FACILITIES.

(a) Assistance in Preparation for Inspections.--At the
request of an owner of a facility not owned or operated by
the United States Government, or contracted for use by or for
the United States Government, the Secretary of Defense may
assist the facility to prepare the facility for possible
inspections pursuant to the Convention.
(b) Reimbursement Requirement.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the
owner of a facility provided assistance under subsection (a)
shall reimburse the Secretary for the costs incurred by the
Secretary in providing the assistance.
(2) Exception.--In the case of assistance provided under
subsection (a) to a facility owned by a person described in
subsection (c), the United States National Authority shall
reimburse the Secretary for the costs incurred by the
Secretary in providing the assistance.
(c) Owners Covered by United States National Authority
Reimbursements.--Subsection (b)(2) applies in the case of
assistance provided to the following:
(1) Small business concerns.--A small business concern as
defined in section 3 of the Small Business Act.
(2) Domestic producers of schedule 3 or unscheduled
discrete organic chemicals.--Any person located in the United
States that--
(A) does not possess, produce, process, consume, import, or
export any Schedule 1 or Schedule 2 chemical; and
(B) in the calendar year preceding the year in which the
assistance is to be provided, produced--
(i) more than 30 metric tons of Schedule 3 or unscheduled
discrete organic chemicals that contain phosphorous, sulfur,
or fluorine; or
(ii) more than 200 metric tons of unscheduled discrete
organic chemicals.
Subtitle D--Reports

SEC. 251. REPORTS REQUIRED BY THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL
AUTHORITY.

(a) Regulations on Recordkeeping.--
(1) Requirements.--The United States National Authority
shall ensure that regulations are prescribed that require
each person located in the United States who produces,
processes, consumes, exports, or imports, or proposes to
produce, process, consume, export, or import, a chemical
substance that is subject to the Convention to--
(A) maintain and permit access to records related to that
production, processing, consumption, export, or import of
such substance; and
(B) submit to the Director of the United States National
Authority such reports as the United States National
Authority may reasonably require to provide to the
Organization, pursuant to subparagraph 1(a) of the Annex on
Confidentiality of the Convention, the minimum amount of
information and data necessary for the timely and efficient
conduct by the Organization of its responsibilities under the
Convention.
(2) Rulemaking.--The Director of the United States National
Authority shall ensure that regulations pursuant to this
section are prescribed expeditiously.
(b) Coordination.--
(1) Avoidance of duplication.--To the extent feasible, the
United States Government shall not require the submission of
any report that is unnecessary or duplicative of any report
required by or under any other law. The head of each Federal
agency shall coordinate the actions of that agency with the
heads of the other Federal agencies in order to avoid the
imposition of duplicative reporting requirements under this
title or any other law.
(2) Definition.--As used in paragraph (1), the term
``Federal agency'' has the meaning given the term ``agency''
in section 551(1) of title 5, United States Code.

SEC. 252. PROHIBITION RELATING TO LOW CONCENTRATIONS OF
SCHEDULE 2 AND 3 CHEMICALS.

(a) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
this title, no person located in the United States shall be
required to report on, or to submit to, any routine
inspection conducted for the purpose of verifying the
production, possession, consumption, exportation,
importation, or proposed production, possession, consumption,
exportation, or importation of any substance that contains
less than--
(1) 10 percent concentration of a Schedule 2 chemical; or
(2) 80 percent concentration of a Schedule 3 chemical.
(b) Standard for Measurement of Concentration.--The percent
concentration of a chemical in a substance shall be measured
on the basis of volume or total weight, which measurement
yields the lesser percent.

SEC. 253. PROHIBITION RELATING TO UNSCHEDULED DISCRETE
ORGANIC CHEMICALS AND COINCIDENTAL BYPRODUCTS
IN WASTE STREAMS.

(a) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
this title, no person located in the United States shall be
required to report on, or to submit to, any routine
inspection conducted for the purpose of verifying the
production, possession, consumption, exportation,
importation, or proposed production, possession, consumption,
exportation, or importation of any substance that is--
(1) an unscheduled discrete organic chemical; and
(2) a coincidental byproduct of a manufacturing or
production process that is not isolated or captured for use
or sale during the process and is routed to, or escapes, from
the waste stream of a stack, incinerator, or wastewater
treatment system or any other waste stream.

SEC. 254. CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION.

(a) Freedom of Information Act Exemption for Certain
Convention Information.--Except as provided in subsection (b)
or (c), any confidential business information, as defined in
section 213(g), reported to, or otherwise acquired by, the
United States Government under this title or under the
Convention shall not be disclosed under section 552(a) of
title 5, United States Code.
(b) Exceptions.--
(1) Information for the technical secretariat.--Information
shall be disclosed or otherwise provided to the Technical
Secretariat or other states parties to the Chemical Weapons
Convention in accordance with the Convention, in particular,
the provisions of the Annex on the Protection of Confidential
Information.
(2) Information for congress.--Information shall be made
available to any committee or subcommittee of Congress with
appropriate jurisdiction upon the written request of the
chairman or ranking minority member of such committee or
subcommittee, except that no such committee or subcommittee,
and no member and no staff member of such committee or
subcommittee, shall disclose such information or material
except as otherwise required or authorized by law.
(3) Information for enforcement actions.--Information shall
be disclosed to other Federal agencies for enforcement of
this title or any other law, and shall be disclosed or
otherwise provided when relevant in any proceeding under this
title or any other law, except that disclosure or provision
in such a proceeding shall be made in such manner as to
preserve confidentiality to the extent practicable without
impairing the proceeding.
(c) Information Disclosed in the National Interest.--
(1) Authority.--The United States Government shall disclose
any information reported to, or otherwise required by the
United States Government under this title or the Convention,
including categories of such information, that it determines
is in the national interest to disclose and may specify the
form in which such information is to be disclosed.
(2) Notice of disclosure.--
(A) Requirement.--If any Department or agency of the United
States Government proposes pursuant to paragraph (1) to
publish or disclose or otherwise provide information exempt
from disclosure under subsection (a), the United States
National Authority shall, unless contrary to national
security or law enforcement needs, provide notice of intent
to disclose the information--
(i) to the person that submitted such information; and
(ii) in the case of information about a person received
from another source, to the person to whom that information
pertains.
The information may not be disclosed until the expiration of
30 days after notice under this paragraph has been provided.
(B) Proceedings on objections.--In the event that the
person to which the information pertains objects to the
disclosure, the agency shall promptly review the grounds for
each objection of the person and shall afford the objecting
person a hearing for the purpose of presenting the objections
to the disclosure. Not later than 10 days before the
scheduled or rescheduled date for the disclosure, the United
States National Authority shall notify such person regarding
whether such disclosure will occur notwithstanding the
objections.
(d) Criminal Penalty for Wrongful Disclosure.--Any officer
or employee of the United States, and any former officer or
employee of the United States, who by reason of such
employment or official position has obtained possession of,
or has access to, information the disclosure or other
provision of which is prohibited by subsection (a), and who,
knowing that disclosure or provision of such information is
prohibited by such subsection, willfully discloses or
otherwise provides the information in any manner to any

[[Page H10655]]

person (including any person located outside the territory of
the United States) not authorized to receive it, shall be
fined under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned for
not more than five years, or both.
(e) Criminal Forfeiture.--The property of any person who
violates subsection (d) shall be subject to forfeiture to the
United States in the same manner and to the same extent as is
provided in section 229C of title 18, United States Code, as
added by this title.
(f) International Inspectors.--The provisions of this
section shall also apply to employees of the Technical
Secretariat.

SEC. 255. RECORDKEEPING VIOLATIONS.

It shall be unlawful for any person willfully to fail or
refuse--
(1) to establish or maintain any record required by this
title or any regulation prescribed under this title;
(2) to submit any report, notice, or other information to
the United States Government in accordance with this title or
any regulation prescribed under this title; or
(3) to permit access to or copying of any record that is
exempt from disclosure under this title or any regulation
prescribed under this title.
Subtitle E--Enforcement

SEC. 261. PENALTIES.

(a) Civil.--
(1) Penalty amounts.--
(A) Prohibited acts relating to inspections.--Any person
that is determined, in accordance with paragraph (2), to have
violated section 236 of this Act shall be required by order
to pay a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed $25,000 for
each such violation. For purposes of this paragraph, each day
such a violation of section 306 continues shall constitute a
separate violation of that section.
(B) Recordkeeping violations.--Any person that is
determined, in accordance with paragraph (2), to have
violated section 255 of this Act shall be required by order
to pay a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed $5,000 for
each such violation.
(2) Hearing.--
(A) In general.--Before imposing an order described in
paragraph (1) against a person under this subsection for a
violation of section 236 or 255, the Secretary of State shall
provide the person or entity with notice and, upon request
made within 15 days of the date of the notice, a hearing
respecting the violation.
(B) Conduct of hearing.--Any hearing so requested shall be
conducted before an administrative law judge. The hearing
shall be conducted in accordance with the requirements of
section 554 of title 5, United States Code. If no hearing is
so requested, the Secretary of State's imposition of the
order shall constitute a final and unappealable order.
(C) Issuance of orders.--If the administrative law judge
determines, upon the preponderance of the evidence received,
that a person or entity named in the complaint has violated
section 236 or 255, the administrative law judge shall state
his findings of fact and issue and cause to be served on such
person or entity an order described in paragraph (1).
(D) Factors for determination of penalty amounts.--In
determining the amount of any civil penalty, the
administrative law judge shall take into account the nature,
circumstances, extent, and gravity of the violation or
violations and, with respect to the violator, the ability to
pay, effect on ability to continue to do business, any
history of prior such violations, the degree of culpability,
the existence of an internal compliance program, and such
other matters as justice may require.
(3) Administrative appellate review.--The decision and
order of an administrative law judge shall become the final
agency decision and order of the head of the United States
National Authority unless, within 30 days, the head of the
United States National Authority modifies or vacates the
decision and order, with or without conditions, in which case
the decision and order of the head of the United States
National Authority shall become a final order under this
subsection.
(4) Offsets.--The amount of the civil penalty under a final
order of the United States National Authority may be deducted
from any sums owed by the United States to the person.
(5) Judicial review.--A person adversely affected by a
final order respecting an assessment may, within 30 days
after the date the final order is issued, file a petition in
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or
for any other circuit in which the person resides or
transacts business.
(6) Enforcement of orders.--If a person fails to comply
with a final order issued under this subsection against the
person or entity--
(A) after the order making the assessment has become a
final order and if such person does not file a petition for
judicial review of the order in accordance with paragraph
(5), or
(B) after a court in an action brought under paragraph (5)
has entered a final judgment in favor of the United States
National Authority,
the Secretary of State shall file a suit to seek compliance
with the order in any appropriate district court of the
United States, plus interest at currently prevailing rates
calculated from the date of expiration of the 30-day period
referred to in paragraph (5) or the date of such final
judgment, as the case may be. In any such suit, the validity
and appropriateness of the final order shall not be subject
to review.
(b) Criminal.--Any person who knowingly violates any
provision of section 236 or 255 of this Act, shall, in
addition to or in lieu of any civil penalty which may be
imposed under subsection (a) for such violation, be fined
under title 18, United States Code, imprisoned for not more
than one year, or both.

SEC. 262. SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT.

(a) Jurisdiction.--The district courts of the United States
shall have jurisdiction over civil actions to--
(1) restrain any violation of section 236 or 255 of this
Act; and
(2) compel the taking of any action required by or under
this title or the Convention.
(b) Civil Actions.--
(1) In general.--A civil action described in subsection (a)
may be brought--
(A) in the case of a civil action described in subsection
(a)(1), in the United States district court for the judicial
district in which any act, omission, or transaction
constituting a violation of section 236 or 255 occurred or in
which the defendant is found or transacts business; or
(B) in the case of a civil action described in subsection
(a)(2), in the United States district court for the judicial
district in which the defendant is found or transacts
business.
(2) Service of process.--In any such civil action process
may be served on a defendant wherever the defendant may
reside or may be found, whether the defendant resides or may
be found within the United States or elsewhere.

SEC. 263. EXPEDITED JUDICIAL REVIEW.

(a) Civil Action.--Any person or entity subject to a search
under this title may file a civil action challenging the
constitutionality of any provision of this title.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, during the full
calendar year of, and the two full calendar years following,
the enactment of this Act, the district court shall accord
such a case a priority in its disposition ahead of all other
civil actions except for actions challenging the legality and
conditions of confinement.
(b) En Banc Review.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, during the full calendar year of, and the two full
calendar years following, the enactment of this Act, any
appeal from a final order entered by a district court in an
action brought under subsection (a) shall be heard promptly
by the full Court of Appeals sitting en banc.
Subtitle F--Miscellaneous Provisions

SEC. 271. REPEAL.

Section 808 of the Department of Defense Appropriation
Authorization Act, 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1520; relating to the use
of human subjects for the testing of chemical or biological
agents) is repealed.

SEC. 272. PROHIBITION.

(a) In General.--Neither the Secretary of Defense nor any
other officer or employee of the United States may, directly
or by contract--
(1) conduct any test or experiment involving the use of any
chemical or biological agent on a civilian population; or
(2) use human subjects for the testing of chemical or
biological agents.
(b) Construction.--Nothing in subsection (a) may be
construed to prohibit actions carried out for purposes not
prohibited by this title (as defined in section 203(8)).
(c) Biological Agent Defined.--In this section, the term
``biological agent'' means any micro-organism (including
bacteria, viruses, fungi, rickettsiae or protozoa), pathogen,
or infectious substance, or any naturally occurring, bio-
engineered or synthesized component of any such micro-
organism, pathogen, or infectious substance, whatever its
origin or method of production, capable of causing--
(1) death, disease, or other biological malfunction in a
human, an animal, a plant, or another living organism;
(2) deterioration of food, water, equipment, supplies, or
materials of any kind; or
(3) deleterious alteration of the environment.

SEC. 273. BANKRUPTCY ACTIONS.

Section 362(b) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by striking paragraphs (4) and (5); and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following:
``(4) under paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (6) of subsection
(a) of this section, of the commencement or continuation of
an action or proceeding by a governmental unit or any
organization exercising authority under the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for
signature on January 13, 1993, to enforce such governmental
unit's or organization's police and regulatory power,
including the enforcement of a judgment other than a money
judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by the
governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's or
organization's police or regulatory power;''.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from New
York [Mr. Gilman] and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton] each
will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman].

General Leave

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members

[[Page H10656]]

may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their
remarks on this measure.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from New York?
There was no objection.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act
of 1997 is intended to close loopholes in our counterproliferation laws
in order to address a matter of critical concern to our national
security, the risk that Iran may soon obtain from firms in Russia and
elsewhere the capability of producing its own medium and long-range
ballistic missiles.
This legislation enjoys extremely strong support on both sides of the
aisle. At last count, over 263 Members had asked to be listed as
cosponsors, including both the Speaker, Mr. Gingrich, and the
Democratic leader, Mr. Gephardt]. A companion measure in the Senate has
84 cosponsors, led by the Senate majority leader, Mr. Lott, and by Mr.
Lieberman of Connecticut.
The urgency for this legislation is apparent from press reports. For
more than a year, our Government has been in constant dialog with the
Russian leadership regarding Russian assistance to the Iranian
ballistic missile program. The meetings have been going on, more talks
are scheduled, more summits are held, yet the Iranian military
continues to make rapid progress in developing long-range missiles with
critically needed assistance from Russian firms. Unless something
happens soon, according to press reports, Iran is likely to achieve the
ability to produce its own ballistic missiles within less than 1 year.
It is now time for the Congress to say that enough is enough. We need
to back up our rhetoric on nonproliferation with meaningful action.
With this legislation, we will be giving Russian firms compelling
reasons not to trade with Iran. The sanctions which this legislation
threatens to impose will force those firms to choose between their
short-term profits from dealing with Iran and potentially far more
lucrative long-term economic relations with our own Nation.
To make certain that the President takes a careful look at this
legislation, the amendment before us also adds to our Iranian sanctions
measure the text of Senate 610, the Chemical Weapons Convention
Implementation Act of 1997, which passed the Senate unanimously earlier
this year. Unlike the Chemical Weapons Convention itself, which was
controversial in the Senate, the implementing legislation is strongly
supported all across the political spectrum, from the administration to
Senators such as John Kyl and Jesse Helms who have led the fight
against the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Mr. Speaker, in the 1980's the world stood by as Saddam Hussein built
up the Iraqi arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. This bill will
help make certain that Iran does not follow the example of its
neighbors in Iraq and become the next threat to international
stability. Accordingly, I urge my colleagues to join in support of this
measure.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this bill, and I oppose it for 3
reasons:
First, the bill links a missile sanctions bill to the Senate-passed
Chemical Weapons Convention implementation legislation. The House
should consider these bills separately so that S. 610 can proceed
quickly to enactment.
Second, this missile sanctions bill is harmful to current United
States diplomatic efforts to stop missile technology transfers from
Russia to Iran.
And, third, the bill itself is flawed.
Let me spell out these reasons in more detail.
With regard to the first point, the missile sanctions bill and the
Chemical Weapons Convention implementation legislation are separate and
distinct pieces of legislation. They deserve separate consideration.
Today the United States is out of compliance with its obligations to
the Chemical Weapons Convention and will continue to be out of
compliance until this implementation legislation, S. 610, is enacted.
We should act on S. 610 as soon as possible. We should send it
directly to the President as a freestanding measure and not attach it
to another measure and send it back to the Senate.
The sponsors of the missile sanctions bill, H.R. 2709, have attached
S. 610 to it because they believe that S. 610 will lead to the swift
enactment of the sanctions bill.
The President's National Security Adviser and the Secretary of State
strongly oppose the missile sanctions bill. They recommend that he veto
it if it is presented to the President in its current form. They also
recommend a veto if S. 610 is attached. I quote from the Statement of
Administration Policy:

S. 610 has strong bipartisan support from Members on both
sides of the aisle. If S. 610 is attached to H.R. 2709,
however, the Secretary of State and the National Security
Adviser would have no choice other than to recommend that the
President veto the combined bill.

So for those of you who support swift passage of the Chemical Weapons
Convention implementation legislation, I urge you to oppose this bill.
This bill will delay, not speed up, U.S. compliance with the Chemical
Weapons Convention.
Second, I believe that Congress and the executive branch certainly
share the same policy goal, to stop the transfer of missile technology
to Iran. The question before us is the most effective way to achieve
that shared goal.
The gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman] and others deserve
credit for their efforts to focus attention on the important issue of
missile technology transfers to Iran. I think they have got the right
approach, which is to express the strong sense of Congress on the
issue. But I do not agree with the approach taken in this bill.
Stopping the transfer of missile technology to Iran requires
diplomacy. It requires the President to pursue a high-level diplomatic
effort with those countries that provide missile technology to Iran. At
the end of the day, this problem is going to be solved by diplomacy.
This is exactly what the administration is doing. The President's
envoy, Ambassador Wisner, is conducting negotiations with Russia on
this topic. He was in Moscow last week. The administration is working
as hard as it can, from the President to the Vice President on down, to
stop Russian missile technology transfers to Iran. They believe, the
administration, that they are starting to make progress, and they
believe they can show a lot more progress between now and January.
Senior Russian officials have already indicated that Iranian missiles
are not in their interest. Our diplomacy is beginning to achieve
results, but we do not yet have a satisfactory result.

{time} 2100

That is the view of the Secretary of State, the National Security
Advisor, and the Vice President. The Vice President has made a strong
plea for a little more time to show results, and we should give it to
him. If there is no progress, we can come back to this bill in January.
Third and finally, this missile sanctions bill has several flaws. It
establishes too low a threshold for the imposition of sanctions. It
would require the executive to report and impose sanctions based on
credible information it receives about transfers or attempted transfers
of missile-related goods and technology to Iran.
``Credible information'' is not defined in the bill and is subject to
very broad interpretation. One report or one phone call could be
``credible information'' and could trigger a requirement to report and
to impose sanctions.
The bill does not allow enough time between the requirement to report
and the requirement to sanction. Sanctions would have to be imposed no
later than 30 days after the date of the required resort. In many
cases, sanctions can be imposed erroneously, needlessly damaging U.S.
credibility with other governments in our efforts to prevent Iran from
obtaining missile technology.
The bill has no requirement that actions subject to sanctions be
taken knowingly. Sanctions would be imposed on entities unaware that
items are going to Iran or will be used in missiles. Such a provision
is fundamentally unfair and will undermine U.S.

[[Page H10657]]

credibility and the willingness of foreign entities to cooperate with
the United States.
The bill's waiver provisions, while a step forward, could be improved
further. It lacks flexibility for the President. The bill is
retroactive in its application. The bill applies sanctions on U.S.
subsidiaries of foreign firms that are sanctioned.
I do not believe Congress has a full understanding of the bill's
impact if it is enacted into law. I believe further consultation with
the executive branch is necessary. Further consultation would improve
this bill so it will strengthen, not undermine, the President's ability
to achieve the goals that all of us share to stop Iran's missile
program.
So I believe the bill will negatively impact U.S. national interests.
It is going to slow down our ability to get the President a bill that
he will sign so that he can meet our treaty obligations under the
Chemical Weapons Convention. It will be counterproductive to our
efforts to stop the transfer of missiles technology to Iran. And as I
have indicated, the Secretary and the National Security Advisor are
going to recommend that the President veto this bill if it is sent to
him in the form that we have it before the House this evening.
I urge a ``no'' vote.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Iran Missile
Proliferation Act introduced by the distinguished chairman of the
Committee on International Relations, the gentleman from New York [Mr.
Gilman].
As the gentleman from New York has noted, this legislation is
intended to provide additional leverage for the United States in
responding to assistance by Russian institutes and research facilities
for Iran's medium and long-range missile programs.
H.R. 2709 will close loopholes in existing U.S. sanction laws as
these loopholes have been used in the past to avoid sanctioning firms
that have transferred missile goods or technology to Iran. It does not
target an entire government but, rather, the individuals and entities
which are actually the perpetrators of proliferation activities.
The President would be required to submit a report identifying those
individuals and entities where there is credible evidence that they
have transferred key missile components of technology to Iran. Thirty
days after this report, a number of important sanctions denying
munition licenses, dual-use technology licenses, and U.S. foreign
assistance to these entities, those kind of things will be imposed for
a period of at least 2 years on the identified entities.
Mr. Speaker, our distinguished colleague from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton]
has given quite a list of things that he finds objectionable from the
existing legislation. Whether it is this legislation or other
legislation, I think it is imperative that this House and the Congress
speak out very strongly that we want the kind of proliferation being
conducted by Russian entities to Iran to stop. We cannot sit back and
be asked simply that the route towards diplomacy be pursued for the
next several months. We are at a critical point, and this Congress has
a responsibility to say we want action now, it is essential while we
are putting much of the Middle East and much of Europe in jeopardy.
Mr. Speaker, the prevention of Iran's acquisition of ballistic
missiles and weapons of mass destruction is one of this Nation's most
important national security objectives. Iranian possession of ballistic
missiles poses an unacceptable threat to the military forces of the
United States and its allies throughout the Persian Gulf, Middle East,
and southern and southeastern Europe. H.R. 2709 is an important tool to
limit the proliferation of the Persian Gulf. I believe it would be
irresponsible if we simply took no action, did not express ourself, did
not try to pass legislation before we adjourn this year.
Frankly speaking, Mr. Speaker, this legislation would be unnecessary
if the executive branch were willing to comply with existing law
governing missile technology controls. This is not simply a criticism
of this President or this administration, for previous Presidents have
been equally reluctant to enforce the law when it comes to sanctions on
these crucial matters.
When an administration, this one or a previous one, continually
refuses to invoke the law, whether it is the Arms Control Export Act or
the refusal to declare that a coup has occurred in Cambodia because the
resulting sanctions would reduce the State Department's flexibility, a
word we hear often, it demeans the law. It encourages this body to
pursue every more stringent sanctions.
Mr. Speaker, this Member hopes that this body can get out of the
business of imposing new sanctions, but this will not happen until the
executive branch, this one, the previous ones, come into compliance
with the law, respect the law as Congress enacts it. This Member
therefore would urge the executive branch to adhere to the provisions
of H.R. 2709 which I hope this Congress will enact.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from California [Mr. Berman].
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr.
Bereuter], who is controlling time for the majority, if he would yield
an additional 3 minutes to me.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 3 minutes to the
gentleman from California [Mr. Berman].
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Calvert). The gentleman from California
[Mr. Berman] is recognized for 6 minutes.
(Mr. BERMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, while I agree with a number of the points
made by my dear friend and the ranking member of the Committee on
International Relations, I come to a different conclusion on the issue
of House passage of this bill, and I rise in support of the passage of
H.R. 2930. I think it pays to take a couple of moments to just restate
sort of what we know about contributions to the Iranian missile
program.
First of all, we know it has been clearly reported, it is not in
dispute, that Iran has developed, has a nuclear weapons program. It is
also quite clear that Iran has also embarked on a program to develop
medium and long-range missiles. The Iranian missile program has been
contributed to recently by a number of transfers of technology in parts
from the Russian SS-4 intermediate range ballistic missile, and
apparently Iran Shihab-3 and Shihab-4 missiles are being designed with
Russian assistance to expand to a range of 930 to 1,250 miles. There
have been additional reports that Iran is working toward developing a
multistage intercontinental missile with a range of 3,500 missiles.
When we take their nuclear program and their missile program
together, I think everyone in this Chamber can understand just how
dangerous this can be if Iran is successful in its pursuits in these
areas.
The more sophisticated weapon assistance that Iran receives from
abroad, the quicker Iran will realize its goal of a long-range weapon
delivery system.
Robert Pelletreau, who was then Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern Affairs, testified, only by imposing a real and heavy price can
we and other countries convince the Iranian leadership that changing
its threatening behavior is in Iran's own interest. That threatening
behavior continues, and this legislation is another effort to convince
other countries that a real and heavy price must be paid for aiding
Iran's weapons program.
I would just like to deal with a couple of the points raised by the
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton], the ranking member of the full
committee. There are some flaws in this legislation, but I think he
would agree, the legislation is significantly improved from the form in
which it was introduced. The kind of conduct that it has focused on
deals now with violations of the Missile Technology Control Regime and
other efforts that are governed by that regime that the administration,
and only the administration, certify constitutes significant
contributions to the Iranian missile program.

[[Page H10658]]

The report that is required by this legislation can now be classified
at the discretion of the administration, and it is clear from the
report language accompanying this bill that the national security
waiver, which has been put into this bill, may be utilized where an
entity in any country, and specifically in Russia, has made an improper
and illegal transfer.
Remember, Russia has committed to adhering to the Missile Technology
Control Regime, but when they make such a transfer, if the
administration is assured that they will no longer do so and believes
that it is important that those sanctions be waived, they are able to
use the national security waiver to do that.
So that even with some of the other flaws, particularly the credible
information threshold, which is too low a threshold, I think this
legislation is worthy of our support, because it is a forcing mechanism
and it is a statement by the House of Representatives that this is a
critical problem, that our relationships with Russia and its ability to
control the entities within that country that are contributing to this
program are going to be seriously affected by its future conduct.
There is no doubt that this administration now is heavily engaged in
this issue. They are pressing the Russians hard to cut off that aid.
President Clinton, Vice President Gore, and Ambassador Wisner have
raised our concern with the Russian leadership, although there is some
evidence that assistance continues to flow.
I believe the administration should view the House passage of this
legislation as aiding and assisting their efforts to persuade the
Russians to cut off all aid to the Iranian missile program and to
enforce export controls which will ensure no additional aid leaks out.
I wish that the majority had not combined this bill with the Chemical
Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1997. My fear is that the
result of combining these two important pieces of legislation will mean
that when this bill gets over in the Senate, neither one will pass.
That decision to combine has been made. Both bills are important.
I might point out, by the way, that both Russia and Iran have now
ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, so that passage of the
implementing legislation is quite important on its own. My only hope is
that if the Senate chooses, for whatever reason, to sever the two bills
and send the chemical weapons implementation legislation back to us
tomorrow and before we adjourn for the year, that we will take that
legislation up separately. But both bills are important, and the
decision has been made to combine them, and I would urge my colleagues
to support its passage.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Fox], a member of the
committee.
Mr. FOX of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, we in the House are persuaded
that missile transfers from Russia to Iran pose a great threat to the
United States and to our allies in the Middle East and Europe. We are
especially troubled by reports we received to the effect that Iran is
only 9 to 12 months away from achieving an indigenous missile capacity.
We welcome the efforts undertaken with Russia to resolve this
problem, but we cannot ignore the reports that we received that since
Ambassador Wisner went to work on this problem, the pace of Russian
transfers to Iran has increased rather than decreased. At this stage,
we therefore feel compelled to act on this matter.
Our legislation is based on a slightly different philosophy than the
administration's diplomatic efforts. We are not seeking to coerce the
Russian Government to do anything. Rather, we target our sanctions on
the Russian entities that are making missile transfers to Iran. Most of
these entities are interested in future business dealings with the
United States, particularly in the area of aerospace cooperation. The
point of our legislation is to tell these entities in no uncertain
terms that continued dealings with Iran will be fatal to any future
cooperation with the United States.

{time} 2115

Our legislation has 263 cosponsors in the House, including its main
sponsor, the gentleman from New York, Chairman Gilman, the Speaker of
the House, the Democratic leader; and the companion bill in the Senate
has similarly strong support.
The statement of administration policy that has been quoted on the
House floor is dated November 7, 1997. H.R. 2709 has been modified
since the statement of administration policy was originally written.
One of the modifications in the bill was specifically made to address
the administration's concerns.
Section 2 of the bill requires the administration to submit a report
which identifies those foreign companies where there is credible
evidence that they have transferred or retransferred goods or
technology or provided technical assistance to Iran's efforts to
acquire, develop or produce ballistic missiles.
The bill report from the committee required this administration
submit this report in unclassified form. That section now has been
modified to allow the report to be classified. The committee is
persuaded that such a change will assist the administration's efforts
to halt the transfer of missile technology to Iran. We urge the
administration to consider this bill modification as it reviews its
position on the bill.
I am not surprised the administration does not support the bill. Why?
Because the bill does not give the administration the usual loopholes
to avoid sanctioning foreign countries that assist Iran.
The administration's statement of policy states that the standard of
evidence sanctions and reporting requirements of H.R. 2709 are broad
and vague. Nothing could be further from the truth. The committee
report details what we mean by the term ``credible information.'' The
report details the three sanctions to be imposed, and the report
details sanctions required in the bill. These requirements are neither
broad nor vague.
Simply put, Mr. Speaker, the administration does not like this bill
because they know they cannot ignore it, they cannot shove it under the
table, and the sanctions must go forward, if appropriate.
I would therefore urge our colleagues to support H.R. 2709, the Iran
Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished
gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Cardin].
(Mr. CARDIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the ranking member for yielding me
this time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 2709, the Iran Missile
Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997. Iran is the leading sponsor of
international terrorism. That is a conclusion that has been reached by
our President, by our Secretary of State and by the Director of the
CIA. The evidence is also clear that Russian entities are aiding the
Iranian Government in its efforts to acquire and develop ballistic
missiles. Thus, this legislation is needed.
This legislation appropriately imposes sanctions on foreign persons
who transfer key missile components or technology to Iran. I understand
the concerns that have been expressed by the ranking member, but I
think it is important that this House move this legislation forward,
and I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 2709.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to
the gentleman from California [Mr. Cunningham].
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, although this bill deals primarily with
missiles, I would like this body to consider, China just bought 200 SU-
27s from Russia, better than our F-14s and F 15s, along with AA-12.
China has sold nuclear components and chemical and biological weapons
to Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan.
China and Russia are not our friends, and I think it is time that we
need to realize that. Yes, we need to engage. I do not think there will
be peace in my lifetime in the Middle East, and we need to engage both
of those parties, but they are still very, very dangerous.
In Bosnia, there are over 10,000 mujahedin and Hamas surrounding
Izetbegovic's government. Yet we in the United States continue to arm
the Muslims in that portion of the world, when the balance has gone
over.

[[Page H10659]]

I would rise in support of this. The Cold War is over, but it is a
very, very hostile world, and especially if you look at Russia today is
building a first nuclear strike site. Russia today is building under
the Ural Mountains a first-strike nuclear weapons site larger than
inside the Beltway. That is huge. Why?
Yet we need to arm the President, the White House, and this body,
along with the other body, needs to hold firm. While we downgrade our
own military, this is a first step in holding the line on proliferation
for other countries.
Why downgrade our own military, and let other nations build theirs
up, which are not only a threat to us? If you look in Bosnia, that is a
threat to Greece, it is a threat to Europe, especially with the
mujahedin and Hamas. Yes, we are going to look at some of those same
missiles ourselves.
So I laud the gentleman in this bill and rise in support.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from New York [Mr. Engel].
(Mr. ENGEL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I thank my distinguished colleague, the
gentleman from Indiana, for yielding me time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2709, and I must tell
you that I have heretofore resisted any legislation which puts
sanctions on Russia or any entities. But I think the time has come that
the Congress really needs to take a tough stand.
It is no secret that Russia and Russian companies have been providing
technology to Iran and missile goods to Iran. The one thing that
strikes me is if you go to the Middle East and you speak with heads of
governments of all of the countries, Israel and the Arab States may
have many disagreements, but the one thing on which they all agree is
that Iran is the threat to the region. You will hear the same thing in
Jerusalem, the capital of Israel, as you will hear in Cairo, the
capital of Egypt, as you will hear in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi
Arabia, and all the Persian Gulf countries. While at the moment we are
focused on Iraq and the crisis there with Iraq, the governments will
all say the long-range threat comes from Iran.
When we look to see which countries are assisting Iran in developing
this technology, we look to China, and the President has had an
agreement with the Chinese leadership to stop any kind of transfer of
technology to Iran. We look to North Korea, they have done it; and, of
course, Russia.
I think that it is very, very important that the Russian Government
and the Russian companies understand that our patience has worn thin;
that because Iran is not only a threat to the region, but indeed a
threat to the world, supporting terrorism, we do not feel that we can
simply let the status quo continue.
Iran has the capability and will have the capability in a few months
to be able to strike out and hit all the countries that I mentioned if
it goes unchecked. Now, it is clear that Russia has already provided
Iran with critical know-how and technological support. The question
facing us now is whether we can halt any further assistance, and time
is short. As I mentioned, we have but a few months to prevent Iran from
achieving a significant advance in its missile program.
Most critical in the short term is the prospect of Iran enhancing its
ballistic missile capacity. Iranian acquisition of ballistic missiles
with a range of 1,300 kilometers or more poses an unacceptable threat
to American forces in the Middle East, as well as our allies throughout
the Persian Gulf region.
It is hard for me to believe that Russia's assistance to Iran does
not violate Russia's international obligations as an adherent to the
Missile Technology Control Regime, the MTCR. It is also inconceivable
to me that such transfers would not trigger U.S. missile sanction laws.
I think it is time for this Congress to stand tall and to say to
Russia and Russian companies that we are not going to permit this
transfer, and H.R. 2709 goes a long way in that direction.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from New York [Mr. Nadler].
(Mr. NADLER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2709. This
bill would force the President to impose sanctions on entities that
assist Iran's missile program, mostly Russian, perhaps some Chinese
entities, perhaps some European entities as well.
Mr. Speaker, others have expressed well the dangers that Iranian
missiles, perhaps armed eventually with nuclear warheads, pose to
Israel, to some of our Arab quasi-allies, and to American security
interests.
Russian help and Chinese help for this development is not a friendly
act, and is the most profoundly irresponsible act, and the
administration, for all its protestation, has shown a pattern of
certifying when Congress passed this law that says, we do not want
most-favored-nation treatment, we have seen that when we pass laws that
say that this or that should not be done unless the President certifies
that human rights are being adhered to or that nonproliferation is
being adhered to, the certification comes whether the facts support
them or not all too often. So I think it is time for Congress to step
in and tighten the legal regime, as this bill does, to make it more
clear that these sanctions must be imposed.
I also think that, given the sometimes unclear circumstances as to
whether the Russian Government has effective control over these
entities, that it is good that this legislation applies directly to
these business entities, and not simply to the foreign governments.
So I support this legislation. I regret the necessity of it, but it
is time to step in with this kind of legislation to reduce the
likelihood that we will be faced with the kind of foreign policy
catastrophe that will be presented by Iranian possession and threat of
use of long-range missiles.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished
gentlewoman from Oregon [Ms. Furse].
Ms. FURSE. Mr. Speaker, I think there is an unfortunate problem that
has occurred on this bill that Members should be aware of. I was an
original cosponsor of the original 2709, but the bill before us is not
that bill, because the bill before us also includes the chemical
weapons convention implementing legislation.
Now, there is a real problem for this, and Members should know about
that. If the President should decide to veto 2709, which there has been
some talk of, he will also veto the chemical weapons convention
legislation, the legislation that implements it.
For years we have been fighting for a chemical weapons convention. It
would be a tragedy if tonight, by just a mistake, if people think they
are only voting for 2709. They must know they are putting at jeopardy
the chemical weapons convention implementing legislation.
I would urge Members to vote against 2709, even though, as I say, I
was a cosponsor, in order to protect that chemical weapons convention.
A no vote will protect the chemical weapons convention.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, a bipartisan coalition of Members of this House, a
strong one, want to have action on the chemical weapons convention. We
also want to see the implementation of it. We also want to see action
on the Iran missile proliferation issue.
We understand the larger picture with respect to Russia. We
understand the administration's position on that. We understand the
importance the administration understandably places on a Russian-
American joint space exploration program.
We have listened to the distinguished Vice President of the United
States. We have listened to the highest officials in the Clinton
administration. We have heard their arguments on this issue.

{time} 2130

But collectively, a large majority of people on both sides of the
aisle in this House, and indeed in the other body, believe that we have
waited long enough to see the imposition of effective sanctions brought
to bear upon the Russian entities that seem to be providing missile
technology to Iran. We are unwilling to bear the risk of further delays
in implementing sanctions.

[[Page H10660]]

We are sending a very, very clear message to the government of Russia
that we want entities in Russia to stop providing this kind of
cooperation to the government of Iran.
Mr. Speaker, because it places in jeopardy very large parts of the
Persian Gulf, our allies in the Middle East, and major parts of Europe,
we want to have action on this issue. We see the only way to have a
likelihood that the President will sign the legislation is attaching it
to the implementation legislation for the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Alternatively, we can see the Iranians developing the missile capacity
that enables them to bring great explosive destruction or even weapons
of mass destruction to bear on the Persian Gulf, on the Middle East and
Europe. Therefore, we urge our colleagues to support H.R. 2709.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore [Mr. Calvert]. All time has expired.
The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Nebraska
[Mr. Bereuter] that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R.
2709, as amended.
The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor
thereof) the rules were suspended and the bill was passed.
The title of the bill was amended so as to read:

A bill to impose certain sanctions on foreign persons who
transfer items contributing to Iran's efforts to acquire,
develop, or produce ballistic missiles, and to implement the
obligations of the United States under the Chemical Weapons
Convention.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

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