[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 159 (Wednesday, November 12, 1997)]
[House]
[Pages H10646-H10660]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




            IRAN MISSILE PROLIFERATION SANCTIONS ACT OF 1997

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the 
bill (H.R. 2709) to impose certain sanctions on foreign persons who 
transfer items contributing to Iran's efforts to acquire, develop, or 
produce ballistic missiles, as amended.
  The Clerk read as follows:

                               H.R. 2709

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,
             TITLE I--IRAN MISSILE PROLIFERATION SANCTIONS

     SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Iran Missile Proliferation 
     Sanctions Act of 1997''.

     SEC. 102. REPORTS ON MISSILE PROLIFERATION TO IRAN.

       (a) Reports.--Except as provided in subsection (c), the 
     President shall, at the times specified in subsection (b), 
     submit to the Committee on International Relations of the 
     House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations of the Senate a report identifying every foreign 
     person with respect to whom there is credible information 
     indicating that that person, on or after August 8, 1995--
       (1)(A) transferred items on the MTCR Annex, or items that 
     the United States proposes for addition to the MTCR Annex, 
     that contributed to Iran's efforts to acquire, develop, or 
     produce ballistic missiles, or
       (B) provided technical assistance or facilities which the 
     President deems to be of concern because of their direct 
     contribution to Iran's efforts to acquire, develop, or 
     produce ballistic missiles; or
       (2)(A) attempted to transfer items on the MTCR Annex, or 
     items that the United States proposes for addition to the 
     MTCR Annex, that would have contributed to Iran's efforts to 
     acquire, develop, or produce ballistic missiles, or
       (B) attempted to provide technical assistance or facilities 
     which the President deems to be of concern because of their 
     direct contribution to Iran's efforts to acquire, develop, or 
     produce ballistic missiles.
       (b) Timing of Reports.--The reports under subsection (a) 
     shall be submitted not later than 30 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, not later than 180 days after such 
     date of enactment, not later than 1 year after such date of 
     enactment, and not later than the end of each 1-year period 
     thereafter.
       (c) Exceptions.--Any foreign person who--
       (1) was identified in a previous report submitted under 
     subsection (a) on account of a particular transfer, 
     transaction, or attempt,
       (2) has engaged in a transfer or transaction that was the 
     basis for the imposition of sanctions with respect to that 
     person under section 73 of the Arms Export Control Act or 
     section 1604 of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 
     1992,
       (3) may have engaged in a transfer or transaction, or made 
     an attempt, that was the subject of a waiver under section 
     104, or
       (4) has engaged in a transfer or transaction, or made an 
     attempt, on behalf of, or in concert with, the Government of 
     the United States,

     is not required to be identified on account of that same 
     transfer, transaction, or attempt in any report submitted 
     thereafter under this section.
       (d) Submission in Classified Form.--When the President 
     considers it appropriate, reports submitted under subsection 
     (a), or appropriate parts thereof, may be submitted in 
     classified form.

     SEC. 103. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.

       (a) Requirement To Impose Sanctions.--
       (1) Requirement to impose sanctions.--The sanctions 
     described in subsection (b) shall be imposed on--
       (A) any foreign person identified under subsection (a)(1) 
     of section 102 in a report submitted under that section, and
       (B) any foreign person identified under subsection (a)(2) 
     of section 102 in a report submitted under that section, if 
     that person has been identified in that report or a previous 
     report as having made at least 1 other attempt described in 
     subsection (a)(2) of that section.
       (2) Effective date of sanctions.--The sanctions shall be 
     effective--
       (A) 30 days after the report triggering the sanction is 
     submitted, if the report is submitted on or before the date 
     required by section 102(b);
       (B) 30 days after the date required by section 102(b) for 
     submitting the report, if the report triggering the sanction 
     is submitted within 30 days after that date; and
       (C) on the date that the report triggering the sanction is 
     submitted, if that report is submitted more than 30 days 
     after the date required by section 102(b).
       (b) Description of Sanctions.--The sanctions referred to in 
     subsection (a) that are to be imposed on a foreign person 
     described in that subsection are the following:
       (1) Arms export sanction.--For a period of not less than 2 
     years, the United States Government shall not sell to that 
     person any item on the United States Munitions List as in 
     effect on August 8, 1995, and shall terminate sales to that 
     person of any defense articles, defense services, or design 
     and construction services under the Arms Export Control Act.
       (2) Dual use sanction.--For a period of not less than 2 
     years, the authorities of section 6 of the Export 
     Administration Act of 1979 shall be used to prohibit the 
     export to that person of any goods or technology on the 
     control list established under section 5(c)(1) of that Act.
       (3) United states assistance.--For a period of not less 
     than 2 years, the United States Government shall not provide 
     any assistance in the form of grants, loans, credits, 
     guarantees, or otherwise, to that person.

     SEC. 104. WAIVER ON BASIS OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

       (a) In General.--The President may waive the imposition of 
     any sanction that would otherwise be required under section 
     103 on any foreign person 15 days after the President 
     determines and reports to the Committee on International 
     Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee 
     on Foreign Relations of the Senate that, on the basis of 
     information provided by that person, or otherwise obtained by 
     the President, the President is persuaded that the person did 
     not, on or after August 8, 1995--
       (1)(A) transfer items on the MTCR Annex, or items that the 
     United States proposes for addition to the MTCR Annex, that 
     contributed to Iran's efforts to acquire, develop, or produce 
     ballistic missiles, or
       (B) provide technical assistance or facilities which the 
     President deems to be of concern because of their direct 
     contribution to Iran's efforts to acquire, develop, or 
     produce ballistic missiles; or
       (2) attempt on more than one occasion--
       (A) to transfer items on the MTCR Annex, or items that the 
     United States proposes for addition to the MTCR Annex, that 
     would have contributed to Iran's efforts to acquire, develop, 
     or produce ballistic missiles, or
       (B) to provide technical assistance or facilities described 
     in paragraph (1)(B).
       (b) Written Justification.--The determination and report of 
     the President under subsection (a) shall include a written 
     justification describing in detail--
       (1) the credible information indicating that the person--
       (A) transferred items described in section 102(a)(1)(A), or 
     provided technical assistance or facilities described in 
     section 102(a)(1)(B); or
       (B) attempted to transfer items described in section 
     102(a)(1)(A), or attempted to provide technical assistance or 
     facilities described in section 102(a)(1)(B);
       (2) the additional information which persuaded the 
     President that the person did not--
       (A) transfer items described in section 102(a)(1)(A), or 
     provide technical assistance or facilities described in 
     section 102(a)(1)(B); or
       (B) attempt to transfer items described in section 
     102(a)(1)(A), or attempt to provide technical assistance or 
     facilities described in section 102(a)(1)(B); and
       (3) the analysis of the information supporting the 
     President's conclusion.
       (c) Submission in Classified Form.--When the President 
     considers it appropriate, the determination and report of the 
     President

[[Page H10647]]

     under subsection (a) and the written justification under 
     subsection (b), or appropriate parts thereof, may be 
     submitted in classified form.

     SEC. 105. WAIVER ON BASIS OF NATIONAL SECURITY.

       (a) In General.--The President may waive the imposition of 
     any sanction that would otherwise be required under section 
     103 on any foreign person 15 days after the President 
     determines and reports to the Committee on International 
     Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee 
     on Foreign Relations of the Senate that such waiver is 
     essential to the national security of the United States.
       (b) Written Justification.--The determination and report of 
     the President under subsection (a) shall include a written 
     justification describing in detail the facts and 
     circumstances supporting the President's conclusion.
       (c) Submission in Classified Form.--When the President 
     considers it appropriate, the determination and report of the 
     President under subsection (a) and the written justification 
     under subsection (b), or appropriate parts thereof, may be 
     submitted in classified form.

     SEC. 106. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING ACTIONS BY 
                   GOVERNMENT OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION.

       As part of each report submitted under section 102, the 
     President shall include the following information with 
     respect to each foreign person identified in that report:
       (1) A statement regarding whether the government of primary 
     jurisdiction over that person was aware of the activities 
     that were the basis for the identification of that person in 
     the report.
       (2) If the government of primary jurisdiction was not aware 
     of the activities that were the basis for the identification 
     of that person in the report, an explanation of the reasons 
     why the United States Government did not inform that 
     government of those activities.
       (3) If the government of primary jurisdiction was aware of 
     the activities that were the basis for the identification of 
     that person in the report, a description of the efforts, if 
     any, undertaken by that government to prevent those 
     activities, and an assessment of the effectiveness of those 
     efforts, including an explanation of why those efforts 
     failed.
       (4) If the government of primary jurisdiction was aware of 
     the activities that were the basis for the identification of 
     that person in the report and failed to undertake effective 
     efforts to prevent those activities, a description of any 
     sanctions that have been imposed on that government by the 
     United States Government because of such failure.

     SEC. 107. PURCHASE OF WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY.

       (a) Sense of the Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress 
     that the President should exercise the authority granted to 
     him under section 504 of the Freedom for Russia and Emerging 
     Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992 (22 
     U.S.C. 5854)--
       (1) to prevent the transfer of weapons-related material and 
     delivery systems to Iran through the purchase, barter, or 
     other acquisition of such material and delivery systems; and
       (2) to prevent the transfer to Iran of scientific and 
     technical expertise with respect to such weapons-related 
     material and delivery systems.
       (b) Availability of Amounts.--Amounts hereafter made 
     available, subject to the availability of appropriations, to 
     carry out chapter 11 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act 
     of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2295 et seq.; relating to assistance for 
     the independent states of the former Soviet Union) may be 
     used to carry out subsection (a).

     SEC. 108. DEFINITIONS.

       For the purposes of this title--
       (1) the terms ``foreign person'' and ``person'' mean--
       (A) a natural person that is an alien;
       (B) a corporation, business association, partnership, 
     society, trust, or any other nongovernmental entity, 
     organization, or group, that is organized under the laws of a 
     foreign country or has its principal place of business in a 
     foreign country;
       (C) any foreign governmental entity operating as a business 
     enterprise; and
       (D) any successor or subsidiary of any entity described in 
     subparagraph (B) or (C);
       (2) the term ``government of primary jurisdiction'' means--
       (A) in the case of a natural person, the foreign government 
     of the country of which the person is a citizen or national;
       (B) in the case of an entity described in subparagraph (B) 
     of paragraph (1), the foreign government of the country in 
     which the entity has its principal place of business, or the 
     foreign government under whose laws that entity is organized; 
     and
       (C) in the case of a foreign governmental entity described 
     in subparagraph (C) of paragraph (1), the foreign government 
     of which that entity is a part; and
       (3) the term ``MTCR Annex'' has the meaning given that term 
     in section 11B(c)(4) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 
     (50 U.S.C. 2410b(c)(4)).
          TITLE II--CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION

     SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Chemical Weapons 
     Convention Implementation Act of 1997''.

     SEC. 202. TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       The table of contents for this title is as follows:

Sec. 201. Short title.
Sec. 202. Table of contents.
Sec. 203. Definitions.

                     Subtitle A--General Provisions

Sec. 211. Designation of United States National Authority.
Sec. 212. No abridgement of constitutional rights.
Sec. 213. Civil liability of the United States.

     Subtitle B--Penalties for Unlawful Activities Subject to the 
                   Jurisdiction of the United States

                Chapter 1--Criminal and Civil Penalties

Sec. 221. Criminal and civil provisions.

              Chapter 2--Revocations of Export Privileges

Sec. 222. Revocations of export privileges.

                        Subtitle C--Inspections

Sec. 231. Definitions in the subtitle.
Sec. 232. Facility agreements.
Sec. 233. Authority to conduct inspections.
Sec. 234. Procedures for inspections.
Sec. 235. Warrants.
Sec. 236. Prohibited acts relating to inspections.
Sec. 237. National security exception.
Sec. 238. Protection of constitutional rights of contractors.
Sec. 239. Annual report on inspections.
Sec. 240. United States assistance in inspections at private 
              facilities.

                          Subtitle D--Reports

Sec. 251. Reports required by the United States National Authority.
Sec. 252. Prohibition relating to low concentrations of schedule 2 and 
              3 chemicals.
Sec. 253. Prohibition relating to unscheduled discrete organic 
              chemicals and coincidental byproducts in waste streams.
Sec. 254. Confidentiality of information.
Sec. 255. Recordkeeping violations.

                        Subtitle E--Enforcement

Sec. 261. Penalties.
Sec. 262. Specific enforcement.
Sec. 263. Expedited judicial review.

                  Subtitle F--Miscellaneous Provisions

Sec. 271. Repeal.
Sec. 272. Prohibition.
Sec. 273. Bankruptcy actions.

     SEC. 203. DEFINITIONS.

       In this title:
       (1) Chemical weapon.--The term ``chemical weapon'' means 
     the following, together or separately:
       (A) A toxic chemical and its precursors, except where 
     intended for a purpose not prohibited under this title as 
     long as the type and quantity is consistent with such a 
     purpose.
       (B) A munition or device, specifically designed to cause 
     death or other harm through toxic properties of those toxic 
     chemicals specified in subparagraph (A), which would be 
     released as a result of the employment of such munition or 
     device.
       (C) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in 
     connection with the employment of munitions or devices 
     specified in subparagraph (B).
       (2) Chemical weapons convention; convention.--The terms 
     ``Chemical Weapons Convention'' and ``Convention'' mean the 
     Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
     Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their 
     Destruction, opened for signature on January 13, 1993.
       (3) Key component of a binary or multicomponent chemical 
     system.--The term ``key component of a binary or 
     multicomponent chemical system'' means the precursor which 
     plays the most important role in determining the toxic 
     properties of the final product and reacts rapidly with other 
     chemicals in the binary or multicomponent system.
       (4) National of the united states.--The term ``national of 
     the United States'' has the same meaning given such term in 
     section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
     U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)).
       (5) Organization.--The term ``Organization'' means the 
     Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
       (6) Person.--The term ``person'', except as otherwise 
     provided, means any individual, corporation, partnership, 
     firm, association, trust, estate, public or private 
     institution, any State or any political subdivision thereof, 
     or any political entity within a State, any foreign 
     government or nation or any agency, instrumentality or 
     political subdivision of any such government or nation, or 
     other entity located in the United States.
       (7) Precursor.--
       (A) In general.--The term ``precursor'' means any chemical 
     reactant which takes part at any stage in the production by 
     whatever method of a toxic chemical. The term includes any 
     key component of a binary or multicomponent chemical system.
       (B) List of precursors.--Precursors which have been 
     identified for the application of verification measures under 
     Article VI of the Convention are listed in schedules 
     contained in the Annex on Chemicals of the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention.
       (8) Purposes not prohibited by this title.--The term 
     ``purposes not prohibited by this title'' means the 
     following:
       (A) Peaceful purposes.--Any peaceful purpose related to an 
     industrial, agricultural, research, medical, or 
     pharmaceutical activity or other activity.
       (B) Protective purposes.--Any purpose directly related to 
     protection against toxic

[[Page H10648]]

     chemicals and to protection against chemical weapons.
       (C) Unrelated military purposes.--Any military purpose of 
     the United States that is not connected with the use of a 
     chemical weapon and that is not dependent on the use of the 
     toxic or poisonous properties of the chemical weapon to cause 
     death or other harm.
       (D) Law enforcement purposes.--Any law enforcement purpose, 
     including any domestic riot control purpose and including 
     imposition of capital punishment.
       (9) Technical secretariat.--The term ``Technical 
     Secretariat'' means the Technical Secretariat of the 
     Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
     established by the Chemical Weapons Convention.
       (10) Schedule 1 chemical agent.--The term `Schedule 1 
     chemical agent' means any of the following, together or 
     separately:
       (A) O-Alkyl (C10, incl. cycloalkyl) 
     alkyl
       (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-phosphonofluoridates
       (e.g. Sarin: O-Isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate Soman: 
     O-Pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridate).
       (B) O-Alkyl (C10, incl. cycloalkyl) 
     N,N-dialkyl
       (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-phosphoramidocyanidates
       (e.g. Tabun: O-Ethyl N,N-dimethyl phosphoramidocyanidate).
       (C) O-Alkyl (H or C10, incl. 
     cycloalkyl) S-2-dialkyl
       (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-aminoethyl alkyl
       (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonothiolates and corresponding 
     alkylated or protonated salts
       (e.g. VX: O-Ethyl S-2-diisopropylaminoethyl methyl 
     phosphonothiolate).
       (D) Sulfur mustards:
       2-Chloroethylchloromethylsulfide
       Mustard gas: (Bis(2-chloroethyl)sulfide
       Bis(2-chloroethylthio)methane
       Sesquimustard: 1,2-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)ethane
       1,3-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-propane
       1,4-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-butane
       1,5-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-pentane
       Bis(2-chloroethylthiomethyl)ether
       O-Mustard: Bis(2-chloroethylthioethyl)ether.
       (E) Lewisites:
       Lewisite 1: 2-Chlorovinyldichloroarsine
       Lewisite 2: Bis(2-chlorovinyl)chloroarsine
       Lewisite 3: Tris (2-clorovinyl)arsine.
       (F) Nitrogen mustards:
       HN1: Bis(2-chloroethyl)ethylamine
       HN2: Bis(2-chloroethyl)methylamine
       HN3: Tris(2-chloroethyl)amine.
       (G) Saxitoxin.
       (H) Ricin.
       (I) Alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonyldifluorides
       e.g. DF: Methylphosphonyldifluoride.
       (J) O-Alkyl (H or C10, incl. 
     cycloalkyl)O-2-dialkyl
       (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-aminoethyl alkyl
       (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonites and corresponding 
     alkylated or protonated salts
       e.g. QL: O-Ethyl O-2-diisopropylaminoethyl 
     methylphosphonite.
       (K) Chlorosarin: O-Isopropyl methylphosphonochloridate.
       (L) Chlorosoman: O-Pinacolyl methylphosphonochloridate.
       (11) Schedule 2 chemical agent.--The term `Schedule 2 
     chemical agent' means the following, together or separately:
       (A) Amiton: O,O-Diethyl S-[2-(diethylamino)ethyl]
       phosphorothiolate and corresponding alkylated or protonated 
     salts.
       (B) PFIB: 1,1,3,3,3-Pentafluoro-2-(trifluoromethyl)-1-
     propene.
       (C) BZ: 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate
       (D) Chemicals, except for those listed in Schedule 1, 
     containing a phosphorus atom to which is bonded one methyl, 
     ethyl or propyl (normal or iso) group but not further carbon 
     atoms,
       e.g. Methylphosphonyl dichloride Dimethyl methylphosphonate
       Exemption: Fonofos: O-Ethyl S-phenyl 
     ethylphosphonothiolothionate.
       (E) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphoramidic 
     dihalides.
       (F) Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) N,N-dialkyl (Me, Et, n-
     Pr or i-Pr)-phosphoramidates.
       (G) arsenic trichloride.
       (H) 2,2-Diphenyl-2-hydroxyacetic acid.
       (I) Quinuclidine-3-ol.
       (J) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethyl-2-
     chlorides and corresponding protonated salts.
       (K) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethane-2-ols 
     and corresponding protonated salts
       Exemptions: N,N-Dimethylaminoethanol and corresponding 
     protonated salts N,N-Diethylaminoethanol and corresponding 
     protonated salts.
       (L) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethane-2-thiols 
     and corresponding protonated salts.
       (M) Thiodiglycol: Bis(2-hydroxyethyl)sulfide.
       (N) Pinacolyl alcohol: 3,3-Dimethylbutane-2-ol.
       (12) Schedule 3 chemical agent.--The term `Schedule 3 
     chemical agent' means any the following, together or 
     separately:
       (A) Phosgene: carbonyl dichloride.
       (B) Cyanogen chloride.
       (C) Hydrogen cyanide.
       (D) Chloropicrin: trichloronitromethane.
       (E) Phosphorous oxychloride.
       (F) Phosphorous trichloride.
       (G) Phosphorous pentachloride.
       (H) Trimethyl phosphite.
       (I) Triethyl phosphite.
       (J) Dimethyl phosphite.
       (K) Diethyl phosphite.
       (L) Sulfur monochloride.
       (M) Sulfur dichloride.
       (N) Thionyl chloride.
       (O) Ethyldiethanolamine.
       (P) Methyldiethanolamine.
       (Q) Triethanolamine.
       (13) Toxic chemical.--
       (A) In general.--The term ``toxic chemical'' means any 
     chemical which through its chemical action on life processes 
     can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm 
     to humans or animals. The term includes all such chemicals, 
     regardless of their origin or of their method of production, 
     and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in 
     munitions or elsewhere.
       (B) List of toxic chemicals.--Toxic chemicals which have 
     been identified for the application of verification measures 
     under Article VI of the Convention are listed in schedules 
     contained in the Annex on Chemicals of the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention.
       (14) United states.--The term ``United States'' means the 
     several States of the United States, the District of 
     Columbia, and the commonwealths, territories, and possessions 
     of the United States and includes all places under the 
     jurisdiction or control of the United States, including--
       (A) any of the places within the provisions of paragraph 
     (41) of section 40102 of title 49, United States Code;
       (B) any civil aircraft of the United States or public 
     aircraft, as such terms are defined in paragraphs (17) and 
     (37), respectively, of section 40102 of title 49, United 
     States Code; and
       (C) any vessel of the United States, as such term is 
     defined in section 3(b) of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement 
     Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1903(b)).
       (15) Unscheduled discrete organic chemical.--The term 
     ``unscheduled discrete organic chemical'' means any chemical 
     not listed on any schedule contained in the Annex on 
     Chemicals of the Convention that belongs to the class of 
     chemical compounds consisting of all compounds of carbon, 
     except for its oxides, sulfides, and metal carbonates.
                     Subtitle A--General Provisions

     SEC. 211. DESIGNATION OF UNITED STATES NATIONAL AUTHORITY.

       (a) Designation.--Pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article VII of 
     the Chemical Weapons Convention, the President shall 
     designate the Department of State to be the United States 
     National Authority.
       (b) Purposes.--The United States National Authority shall--
       (1) serve as the national focal point for effective liaison 
     with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
     and other States Parties to the Convention; and
       (2) implement the provisions of this title in coordination 
     with an interagency group designated by the President 
     consisting of the Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of 
     Defense, Secretary of Energy, the Attorney General, and the 
     heads of agencies considered necessary or advisable by the 
     President.
       (c) Director.--The Secretary of State shall serve as the 
     Director of the United States National Authority.
       (d) Powers.--The Director may utilize the administrative 
     authorities otherwise available to the Secretary of State in 
     carrying out the responsibilities of the Director set forth 
     in this title.
       (e) Implementation.--The President is authorized to 
     implement and carry out the provisions of this title and the 
     Convention and shall designate through Executive order which 
     agencies of the United States shall issue, amend, or revise 
     the regulations in order to implement this title and the 
     provisions of the Convention. The Director of the United 
     States National Authority shall report to the Congress on the 
     regulations that have been issued, implemented, or revised 
     pursuant to this section.

     SEC. 212. NO ABRIDGEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.

       No person may be required, as a condition for entering into 
     a contract with the United States or as a condition for 
     receiving any benefit from the United States, to waive any 
     right under the Constitution for any purpose related to this 
     title or the Convention.

     SEC. 213. CIVIL LIABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES.

       (a) Claims for Taking of Property.--
       (1) Jurisdiction of courts of the united states.--
       (A) United states court of federal claims.--The United 
     States Court of Federal Claims shall, subject to subparagraph 
     (B), have jurisdiction of any civil action or claim against 
     the United States for any taking of property without just 
     compensation that occurs by reason of the action of any 
     officer or employee of the Organization for the Prohibition 
     of Chemical Weapons, including any member of an inspection 
     team of the Technical Secretariat, or by reason of the action 
     of any officer or employee of the United States pursuant to 
     this title or the Convention. For purposes of this 
     subsection, action taken pursuant to or under the color of 
     this title or the Convention shall be deemed to be action 
     taken by the United States for a public purpose.
       (B) District courts.--The district courts of the United 
     States shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the 
     United States Court of Federal Claims, of any civil action or 
     claim described in subparagraph (A) that does not exceed 
     $10,000.

[[Page H10649]]

       (2) Notification.--Any person intending to bring a civil 
     action pursuant to paragraph (1) shall notify the United 
     States National Authority of that intent at least one year 
     before filing the claim in the United States Court of Federal 
     Claims. Action on any claim filed during that one-year period 
     shall be stayed. The one-year period following the 
     notification shall not be counted for purposes of any law 
     limiting the period within which the civil action may be 
     commenced.
       (3) Initial steps by united states government to seek 
     remedies.--During the period between a notification pursuant 
     to paragraph (2) and the filing of a claim covered by the 
     notification in the United States Court of Federal Claims, 
     the United States National Authority shall pursue all 
     diplomatic and other remedies that the United States National 
     Authority considers necessary and appropriate to seek redress 
     for the claim including, but not limited to, the remedies 
     provided for in the Convention and under this title.
       (4) Burden of Proof.--In any civil action under paragraph 
     (1), the plaintiff shall have the burden to establish a prima 
     facie case that, due to acts or omissions of any official of 
     the Organization or any member of an inspection team of the 
     Technical Secretariat taken under the color of the 
     Convention, proprietary information of the plaintiff has been 
     divulged or taken without authorization. If the United States 
     Court of Federal Claims finds that the plaintiff has 
     demonstrated such a prima facie case, the burden shall shift 
     to the United States to disprove the plaintiff's claim. In 
     deciding whether the plaintiff has carried its burden, the 
     United States Court of Federal Claims shall consider, among 
     other things--
       (A) the value of proprietary information;
       (B) the availability of the proprietary information;
       (C) the extent to which the proprietary information is 
     based on patents, trade secrets, or other protected 
     intellectual property;
       (D) the significance of proprietary information; and
       (E) the emergence of technology elsewhere a reasonable time 
     after the inspection.
       (b) Tort Liability.--The district courts of the United 
     States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions for 
     money damages for any tort under the Constitution or any 
     Federal or State law arising from the acts or omissions of 
     any officer or employee of the United States or the 
     Organization, including any member of an inspection team of 
     the Technical Secretariat, taken pursuant to or under color 
     of the Convention or this title.
       (c) Waiver of Sovereign Immunity of the United States.--In 
     any action under subsection (a) or (b), the United States may 
     not raise sovereign immunity as a defense.
       (d) Authority for Cause of Action.--
       (1) United states actions in united states district 
     court.--Notwithstanding any other law, the Attorney General 
     of the United States is authorized to bring an action in the 
     United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
     against any foreign nation for money damages resulting from 
     that nation's refusal to provide indemnification to the 
     United States for any liability imposed on the United States 
     by virtue of the actions of an inspector of the Technical 
     Secretariat who is a national of that foreign nation acting 
     at the direction or the behest of that foreign nation.
       (2) United states actions in courts outside the united 
     states.--The Attorney General is authorized to seek any and 
     all available redress in any international tribunal for 
     indemnification to the United States for any liability 
     imposed on the United States by virtue of the actions of an 
     inspector of the Technical Secretariat, and to seek such 
     redress in the courts of the foreign nation from which the 
     inspector is a national.
       (3) Actions brought by individuals and businesses.--
     Notwithstanding any other law, any national of the United 
     States, or any business entity organized and operating under 
     the laws of the United States, may bring a civil action in a 
     United States District Court for money damages against any 
     foreign national or any business entity organized and 
     operating under the laws of a foreign nation for an 
     unauthorized or unlawful acquisition, receipt, transmission, 
     or use of property by or on behalf of such foreign national 
     or business entity as a result of any tort under the 
     Constitution or any Federal or State law arising from acts or 
     omissions by any officer or employee of the United States or 
     any member of an inspection team of the Technical Secretariat 
     taken pursuant to or under the color of the Convention or 
     this title.
       (e) Recoupment.--
       (1) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to 
     recoup all funds withdrawn from the Treasury of the United 
     States in payment for any tort under Federal or State law or 
     taking under the Constitution arising from the acts or 
     omissions of any foreign person, officer, or employee of the 
     Organization, including any member of an inspection team of 
     the Technical Secretariat, taken under color of the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention or this title.
       (2) Sanctions on foreign companies.--
       (A) Imposition of sanctions.--The sanctions provided in 
     subparagraph (B) shall be imposed for a period of not less 
     than ten years upon--
       (i) any foreign person, officer, or employee of the 
     Organization, including any member of an inspection team of 
     the Technical Secretariat, for whose actions or omissions the 
     United States has been held liable for a tort or taking 
     pursuant to this title; and
       (ii) any foreign person or business entity organized and 
     operating under the laws of a foreign nation which knowingly 
     assisted, encouraged or induced, in any way, a foreign person 
     described in clause (i) to publish, divulge, disclose, or 
     make known in any manner or to any extent not authorized by 
     the Convention any United States confidential business 
     information.
       (B) Sanctions.--
       (i) Arms export transactions.--The United States Government 
     shall not sell to a person described in subparagraph (A) any 
     item on the United States Munitions List and shall terminate 
     sales of any defense articles, defense services, or design 
     and construction services to a person described in 
     subparagraph (A) under the Arms Export Control Act.
       (ii) Sanctions under export administration act of 1979.--
     The authorities under section 6 of the Export Administration 
     Act of 1979 shall be used to prohibit the export of any goods 
     or technology on the control list established pursuant to 
     section 5(c)(1) of that Act to a person described in 
     subparagraph (A).
       (iii) International financial assistance.--The United 
     States shall oppose any loan or financial or technical 
     assistance by international financial institutions in 
     accordance with section 701 of the International Financial 
     Institutions Act to a person described in subparagraph (A).
       (iv) Export-import bank transactions.--The United States 
     shall not give approval to guarantee, insure, or extend 
     credit, or to participate in the extension of credit to a 
     person described in subparagraph (A) through the Export-
     Import Bank of the United States.
       (v) Private bank transactions.--Regulations shall be issued 
     to prohibit any United States bank from making any loan or 
     providing any credit to a person described in subparagraph 
     (A).
       (vi) Blocking of assets.--The President shall take all 
     steps necessary to block any transactions in any property 
     subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in which a 
     person described in subparagraph (A) has any interest 
     whatsoever, for the purpose of recouping funds in accordance 
     with the policy in paragraph (1).
       (vii) Denial of landing rights.--Landing rights in the 
     United States shall be denied to any private aircraft or air 
     carrier owned by a person described in subparagraph (A) 
     except as necessary to provide for emergencies in which the 
     safety of the aircraft or its crew or passengers is 
     threatened.
       (3) Sanctions on foreign governments.--
       (A) Imposition of sanctions.--Whenever the President 
     determines that persuasive information is available 
     indicating that a foreign country has knowingly assisted, 
     encouraged or induced, in any way, a person described in 
     paragraph (2)(A) to publish, divulge, disclose, or make known 
     in any manner or to any extent not authorized by the 
     Convention any United States confidential business 
     information, the President shall, within 30 days after the 
     receipt of such information by the executive branch of 
     Government, notify the Congress in writing of such 
     determination and, subject to the requirements of paragraphs 
     (4) and (5), impose the sanctions provided under subparagraph 
     (B) for a period of not less than five years.
       (B) Sanctions.--
       (i) Arms export transactions.--The United States Government 
     shall not sell a country described in subparagraph (A) any 
     item on the United States Munitions List, shall terminate 
     sales of any defense articles, defense services, or design 
     and construction services to that country under the Arms 
     Export Control Act, and shall terminate all foreign military 
     financing for that country under the Arms Export Control Act.
       (ii) Denial of certain licenses.--Licenses shall not be 
     issued for the export to the sanctioned country of any item 
     on the United States Munitions List or commercial satellites.
       (iii) Denial of assistance.--No appropriated funds may be 
     used for the purpose of providing economic assistance, 
     providing military assistance or grant military education and 
     training, or extending military credits or making guarantees 
     to a country described in subparagraph (A).
       (iv) Sanctions under export administration act of 1979.--
     The authorities of section 6 of the Export Administration Act 
     of 1979 shall be used to prohibit the export of any goods or 
     technology on the control list established pursuant to 
     section 5(c)(1) of that Act to a country described in 
     subparagraph (A).
       (v) International financial assistance.--The United States 
     shall oppose any loan or financial or technical assistance by 
     international financial institutions in accordance with 
     section 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act 
     to a country described in subparagraph (A).
       (vi) Termination of assistance under foreign assistance act 
     of 1961.--The United States shall terminate all assistance to 
     a country described in subparagraph (A) under the Foreign 
     Assistance Act of 1961, except for urgent humanitarian 
     assistance.
       (vii) Private bank transactions.--The United States shall 
     not give approval to guarantee, insure, or extend credit, or 
     participate in the extension of credit through the Export-
     Import Bank of the United States to a country described in 
     subparagraph (A).
       (viii) Private bank transactions.--Regulations shall be 
     issued to prohibit any United

[[Page H10650]]

     States bank from making any loan or providing any credit to a 
     country described in subparagraph (A).
       (ix) Denial of landing rights.--Landing rights in the 
     United States shall be denied to any air carrier owned by a 
     country described in subparagraph (A), except as necessary to 
     provide for emergencies in which the safety of the aircraft 
     or its crew or passengers is threatened.
       (4) Suspension of sanctions upon recoupment by payment.--
     Sanctions imposed under paragraph (2) or (3) may be suspended 
     if the sanctioned person, business entity, or country, within 
     the period specified in that paragraph, provides full and 
     complete compensation to the United States Government, in 
     convertible foreign exchange or other mutually acceptable 
     compensation equivalent to the full value thereof, in 
     satisfaction of a tort or taking for which the United States 
     has been held liable pursuant to this title.
       (5) Waiver of sanctions on foreign countries.--The 
     President may waive some or all of the sanctions provided 
     under paragraph (3) in a particular case if he determines and 
     certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
     Senate that such waiver is necessary to protect the national 
     security interests of the United States. The certification 
     shall set forth the reasons supporting the determination and 
     shall take effect on the date on which the certification is 
     received by the Congress.
       (6) Notification to congress.--Not later than five days 
     after sanctions become effective against a foreign person 
     pursuant to this title, the President shall transmit written 
     notification of the imposition of sanctions against that 
     foreign person to the chairmen and ranking members of the 
     Committee on International Relations of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
     Senate.
       (f) Sanctions for Unauthorized Disclosure of United States 
     Confidential Business Information.--The Secretary of State 
     shall deny a visa to, and the Attorney General shall exclude 
     from the United States any alien who, after the date of 
     enactment of this Act--
       (1) is, or previously served as, an officer or employee of 
     the Organization and who has willfully published, divulged, 
     disclosed, or made known in any manner or to any extent not 
     authorized by the Convention any United States confidential 
     business information coming to him in the course of his 
     employment or official duties, or by reason of any 
     examination or investigation of any return, report, or record 
     made to or filed with the Organization, or any officer or 
     employee thereof, such practice or disclosure having resulted 
     in financial loses or damages to a United States person and 
     for which actions or omissions the United States has been 
     found liable of a tort or taking pursuant to this title;
       (2) traffics in United States confidential business 
     information, a proven claim to which is owned by a United 
     States national;
       (3) is a corporate officer, principal, shareholder with a 
     controlling interest of an entity which has been involved in 
     the unauthorized disclosure of United States confidential 
     business information, a proven claim to which is owned by a 
     United States national; or
       (4) is a spouse, minor child, or agent of a person 
     excludable under paragraph (1), (2), or (3).
       (g) United States Confidential Business Information 
     Defined.--In this section, the term ``United States 
     confidential business information'' means any trade secrets 
     or commercial or financial information that is privileged and 
     confidential--
       (1) including--
       (A) data described in section 234(e)(2) of this Act,
       (B) any chemical structure,
       (C) any plant design process, technology, or operating 
     method,
       (D) any operating requirement, input, or result that 
     identifies any type or quantity of chemicals used, processed, 
     or produced, or
       (E) any commercial sale, shipment, or use of a chemical, or
       (2) as described in section 552(b)(4) of title 5, United 
     States Code,

     and that is obtained--
       (i) from a United States person; or
       (ii) through the United States Government or the conduct of 
     an inspection on United States territory under the 
     Convention.
     Subtitle B--Penalties for Unlawful Activities Subject to the 
                   Jurisdiction of the United States

                CHAPTER 1--CRIMINAL AND CIVIL PENALTIES

     SEC. 221. CRIMINAL AND CIVIL PROVISIONS.

       (a) In General.--Part I of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended by inserting after chapter 11A the following new 
     chapter:

                    ``CHAPTER 11B--CHEMICAL WEAPONS

``Sec.
``229. Prohibited activities.
``229A. Penalties.
``229B. Criminal forfeitures; destruction of weapons.
``229C. Individual self-defense devices.
``229D. Injunctions.
``229E. Requests for military assistance to enforce prohibition in 
              certain emergencies.
``229F. Definitions.

     ``Sec. 229. Prohibited activities

       ``(a) Unlawful Conduct.--Except as provided in subsection 
     (b), it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly--
       ``(1) to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, transfer 
     directly or indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own, 
     possess, or use, or threaten to use, any chemical weapon; or
       ``(2) to assist or induce, in any way, any person to 
     violate paragraph (1), or to attempt or conspire to violate 
     paragraph (1).
       ``(b) Exempted Agencies and Persons.--
       ``(1) In general.--Subsection (a) does not apply to the 
     retention, ownership, possession, transfer, or receipt of a 
     chemical weapon by a department, agency, or other entity of 
     the United States, or by a person described in paragraph (2), 
     pending destruction of the weapon.
       ``(2) Exempted persons.--A person referred to in paragraph 
     (1) is--
       ``(A) any person, including a member of the Armed Forces of 
     the United States, who is authorized by law or by an 
     appropriate officer of the United States to retain, own, 
     possess, transfer, or receive the chemical weapon; or
       ``(B) in an emergency situation, any otherwise nonculpable 
     person if the person is attempting to destroy or seize the 
     weapon.
       ``(c) Jurisdiction.--Conduct prohibited by subsection (a) 
     is within the jurisdiction of the United States if the 
     prohibited conduct--
       ``(1) takes place in the United States;
       ``(2) takes place outside of the United States and is 
     committed by a national of the United States;
       ``(3) is committed against a national of the United States 
     while the national is outside the United States; or
       ``(4) is committed against any property that is owned, 
     leased, or used by the United States or by any department or 
     agency of the United States, whether the property is within 
     or outside the United States.

     ``Sec. 229A. Penalties

       ``(a) Criminal Penalties.--
       ``(1) In general.--Any person who violates section 229 of 
     this title shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for 
     any term of years, or both.
       ``(2) Death penalty.--Any person who violates section 229 
     of this title and by whose action the death of another person 
     is the result shall be punished by death or imprisoned for 
     life.
       ``(b) Civil Penalties.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Attorney General may bring a civil 
     action in the appropriate United States district court 
     against any person who violates section 229 of this title 
     and, upon proof of such violation by a preponderance of the 
     evidence, such person shall be subject to pay a civil penalty 
     in an amount not to exceed $100,000 for each such violation.
       ``(2) Relation to other proceedings.--The imposition of a 
     civil penalty under this subsection does not preclude any 
     other criminal or civil statutory, common law, or 
     administrative remedy, which is available by law to the 
     United States or any other person.
       ``(c) Reimbursement of Costs.--The court shall order any 
     person convicted of an offense under subsection (a) to 
     reimburse the United States for any expenses incurred by the 
     United States incident to the seizure, storage, handling, 
     transportation, and destruction or other disposition of any 
     property that was seized in connection with an investigation 
     of the commission of the offense by that person. A person 
     ordered to reimburse the United States for expenses under 
     this subsection shall be jointly and severally liable for 
     such expenses with each other person, if any, who is ordered 
     under this subsection to reimburse the United States for the 
     same expenses.

     ``Sec. 229B. Criminal forfeitures; destruction of weapons

       ``(a) Property Subject to Criminal Forfeiture.--Any person 
     convicted under section 229A(a) shall forfeit to the United 
     States irrespective of any provision of State law--
       ``(1) any property, real or personal, owned, possessed, or 
     used by a person involved in the offense;
       ``(2) any property constituting, or derived from, and 
     proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the 
     result of such violation; and
       ``(3) any of the property used in any manner or part, to 
     commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such violation.

     The court, in imposing sentence on such person, shall order, 
     in addition to any other sentence imposed pursuant to section 
     229A(a), that the person forfeit to the United States all 
     property described in this subsection. In lieu of a fine 
     otherwise authorized by section 229A(a), a defendant who 
     derived profits or other proceeds from an offense may be 
     fined not more than twice the gross profits or other 
     proceeds.
       ``(b) Procedures.--
       ``(1) General.--Property subject to forfeiture under this 
     section, any seizure and disposition thereof, and any 
     administrative or judicial proceeding in relation thereto, 
     shall be governed by subsections (b) through (p) of section 
     413 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control 
     Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 853), except that any reference under 
     those subsections to--
       ``(A) `this subchapter or subchapter II' shall be deemed to 
     be a reference to section 229A(a); and
       ``(B) `subsection (a)' shall be deemed to be a reference to 
     subsection (a) of this section.
       ``(2) Temporary restraining orders.--
       ``(A) In general.--For the purposes of forfeiture 
     proceedings under this section, a temporary restraining order 
     may be entered

[[Page H10651]]

     upon application of the United States without notice or 
     opportunity for a hearing when an information or indictment 
     has not yet been filed with respect to the property, if, in 
     addition to the circumstances described in section 413(e)(2) 
     of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 
     1970 (21 U.S.C. 853(e)(2)), the United States demonstrates 
     that there is probable cause to believe that the property 
     with respect to which the order is sought would, in the event 
     of conviction, be subject to forfeiture under this section 
     and exigent circumstances exist that place the life or health 
     of any person in danger.
       ``(B) Warrant of seizure.--If the court enters a temporary 
     restraining order under this paragraph, it shall also issue a 
     warrant authorizing the seizure of such property.
       ``(C) Applicable procedures.--The procedures and time 
     limits applicable to temporary restraining orders under 
     section 413(e) (2) and (3) of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
     Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 853(e) (2) and 
     (3)) shall apply to temporary restraining orders under this 
     paragraph.
       ``(c) Affirmative Defense.--It is an affirmative defense 
     against a forfeiture under subsection (b) that the property--
       ``(1) is for a purpose not prohibited under the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention; and
       ``(2) is of a type and quantity that under the 
     circumstances is consistent with that purpose.
       ``(d) Destruction or Other Disposition.--The Attorney 
     General shall provide for the destruction or other 
     appropriate disposition of any chemical weapon seized and 
     forfeited pursuant to this section.
       ``(e) Assistance.--The Attorney General may request the 
     head of any agency of the United States to assist in the 
     handling, storage, transportation, or destruction of property 
     seized under this section.
       ``(f) Owner Liability.--The owner or possessor of any 
     property seized under this section shall be liable to the 
     United States for any expenses incurred incident to the 
     seizure, including any expenses relating to the handling, 
     storage, transportation, and destruction or other disposition 
     of the seized property.

     ``Sec. 229C. Individual self-defense devices

       ``Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit 
     any individual self-defense device, including those using a 
     pepper spray or chemical mace.

     ``Sec. 229D. Injunctions

       ``The United States may obtain in a civil action an 
     injunction against--
       ``(1) the conduct prohibited under section 229 or 229C of 
     this title; or
       ``(2) the preparation or solicitation to engage in conduct 
     prohibited under section 229 or 229D of this title.

     ``Sec. 229E. Requests for military assistance to enforce 
       prohibition in certain emergencies

       ``The Attorney General may request the Secretary of Defense 
     to provide assistance under section 382 of title 10 in 
     support of Department of Justice activities relating to the 
     enforcement of section 229 of this title in an emergency 
     situation involving a chemical weapon. The authority to make 
     such a request may be exercised by another official of the 
     Department of Justice in accordance with section 382(f)(2) of 
     title 10.

     ``Sec. 229F. Definitions

       ``In this chapter:
       ``(1) Chemical weapon.--The term `chemical weapon' means 
     the following, together or separately:
       ``(A) A toxic chemical and its precursors, except where 
     intended for a purpose not prohibited under this chapter as 
     long as the type and quantity is consistent with such a 
     purpose.
       ``(B) A munition or device, specifically designed to cause 
     death or other harm through toxic properties of those toxic 
     chemicals specified in subparagraph (A), which would be 
     released as a result of the employment of such munition or 
     device.
       ``(C) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly 
     in connection with the employment of munitions or devices 
     specified in subparagraph (B).
       ``(2) Chemical weapons convention; convention.--The terms 
     `Chemical Weapons Convention' and `Convention' mean the 
     Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
     Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their 
     Destruction, opened for signature on January 13, 1993.
       ``(3) Key component of a binary or multicomponent chemical 
     system.--The term `key component of a binary or 
     multicomponent chemical system' means the precursor which 
     plays the most important role in determining the toxic 
     properties of the final product and reacts rapidly with other 
     chemicals in the binary or multicomponent system.
       ``(4) National of the united states.--The term `national of 
     the United States' has the same meaning given such term in 
     section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
     U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)).
       ``(5) Person.--The term `person', except as otherwise 
     provided, means any individual, corporation, partnership, 
     firm, association, trust, estate, public or private 
     institution, any State or any political subdivision thereof, 
     or any political entity within a State, any foreign 
     government or nation or any agency, instrumentality or 
     political subdivision of any such government or nation, or 
     other entity located in the United States.
       ``(6) Precursor.--
       ``(A) In general.--The term `precursor' means any chemical 
     reactant which takes part at any stage in the production by 
     whatever method of a toxic chemical. The term includes any 
     key component of a binary or multicomponent chemical system.
       ``(B) List of precursors.--Precursors which have been 
     identified for the application of verification measures under 
     Article VI of the Convention are listed in schedules 
     contained in the Annex on Chemicals of the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention.
       ``(7) Purposes not prohibited by this chapter.--The term 
     `purposes not prohibited by this chapter' means the 
     following:
       ``(A) Peaceful purposes.--Any peaceful purpose related to 
     an industrial, agricultural, research, medical, or 
     pharmaceutical activity or other activity.
       ``(B) Protective purposes.--Any purpose directly related to 
     protection against toxic chemicals and to protection against 
     chemical weapons.
       ``(C) Unrelated military purposes.--Any military purpose of 
     the United States that is not connected with the use of a 
     chemical weapon or that is not dependent on the use of the 
     toxic or poisonous properties of the chemical weapon to cause 
     death or other harm.
       ``(D) Law enforcement purposes.--Any law enforcement 
     purpose, including any domestic riot control purpose and 
     including imposition of capital punishment.
       ``(8) Toxic chemical.--
       ``(A) In general.--The term `toxic chemical' means any 
     chemical which through its chemical action on life processes 
     can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm 
     to humans or animals. The term includes all such chemicals, 
     regardless of their origin or of their method of production, 
     and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in 
     munitions or elsewhere.
       ``(B) List of toxic chemicals.--Toxic chemicals which have 
     been identified for the application of verification measures 
     under Article VI of the Convention are listed in schedules 
     contained in the Annex on Chemicals of the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention.
       ``(9) United states.--The term `United States' means the 
     several States of the United States, the District of 
     Columbia, and the commonwealths, territories, and possessions 
     of the United States and includes all places under the 
     jurisdiction or control of the United States, including--
       ``(A) any of the places within the provisions of paragraph 
     (41) of section 40102 of title 49;
       ``(B) any civil aircraft of the United States or public 
     aircraft, as such terms are defined in paragraphs (17) and 
     (37), respectively, of section 40102 of title 49; and
       ``(C) any vessel of the United States, as such term is 
     defined in section 3(b) of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement 
     Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1903(b)).''.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--
       (1) Weapons of mass destruction.--Section 2332a of title 
     18, United States Code, is amended--
       (A) by striking ``Sec. 2332a. Use of weapons of mass 
     destruction'' and inserting ``Sec. 2332a. Use of certain 
     weapons of mass destruction'';
       (B) in subsection (a), by inserting ``(other than a 
     chemical weapon as that term is defined in section 229F)'' 
     after ``weapon of mass destruction''; and
       (C) in subsection (b), by inserting ``(other than a 
     chemical weapon (as that term is defined in section 229F))'' 
     after ``weapon of mass destruction''.
       (2) Table of chapters.--The table of chapters for part I of 
     title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after 
     the item for chapter 11A the following new item:

``11B. Chemical Weapons......................................229''.....

       (c) Repeals.--The following provisions of law are repealed:
       (1) Section 2332c of title 18, United States Code, relating 
     to chemical weapons.
       (2) In the table of sections for chapter 113B of title 18, 
     United States Code, the item relating to section 2332c.

              CHAPTER 2--REVOCATIONS OF EXPORT PRIVILEGES

     SEC. 222. REVOCATIONS OF EXPORT PRIVILEGES.

       If the President determines, after notice and an 
     opportunity for a hearing in accordance with section 554 of 
     title 5, United States Code, that any person within the 
     United States, or any national of the United States located 
     outside the United States, has committed any violation of 
     section 229 of title 18, United States Code, the President 
     may issue an order for the suspension or revocation of the 
     authority of the person to export from the United States any 
     goods or technology (as such terms are defined in section 16 
     of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 
     2415)).
                        Subtitle C--Inspections

     SEC. 231. DEFINITIONS IN THE SUBTITLE.

       (a) In General.--In this subtitle, the terms ``challenge 
     inspection'', ``plant site'', ``plant'', ``facility 
     agreement'', ``inspection team'', and ``requesting state 
     party'' have the meanings given those terms in Part I of the 
     Annex on Implementation and Verification of the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention. The term ``routine inspection'' means an 
     inspection, other than an ``initial inspection'', undertaken 
     pursuant to Article VI of the Convention.
       (b) Definition of Judge of the United States.--In this 
     subtitle, the term ``judge of the United States'' means a 
     judge or magistrate judge of a district court of the United 
     States.

[[Page H10652]]

     SEC. 232. FACILITY AGREEMENTS.

       (a) Authorization of Inspections.--Inspections by the 
     Technical Secretariat of plants, plant sites, or other 
     facilities or locations for which the United States has a 
     facility agreement with the Organization shall be conducted 
     in accordance with the facility agreement. Any such facility 
     agreement may not in any way limit the right of the owner or 
     operator of the facility to withhold consent to an inspection 
     request.
       (b) Types of Facility Agreements.--
       (1) Schedule two facilities.--The United States National 
     Authority shall ensure that facility agreements for plants, 
     plant sites, or other facilities or locations that are 
     subject to inspection pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article VI 
     of the Convention are concluded unless the owner, operator, 
     occupant, or agent in charge of the facility and the 
     Technical Secretariat agree that such an agreement is not 
     necessary.
       (2) Schedule three facilities.--The United States National 
     Authority shall ensure that facility agreements are concluded 
     for plants, plant sites, or other facilities or locations 
     that are subject to inspection pursuant to paragraph 5 or 6 
     of Article VI of the Convention if so requested by the owner, 
     operator, occupant, or agent in charge of the facility.
       (c) Notification Requirements.--The United States National 
     Authority shall ensure that the owner, operator, occupant, or 
     agent in charge of a facility prior to the development of the 
     agreement relating to that facility is notified and, if the 
     person notified so requests, the person may participate in 
     the preparations for the negotiation of such an agreement. To 
     the maximum extent practicable consistent with the 
     Convention, the owner and the operator, occupant or agent in 
     charge of a facility may observe negotiations of the 
     agreement between the United States and the Organization 
     concerning that facility.
       (d) Content of Facility Agreements.--Facility agreements 
     shall--
       (1) identify the areas, equipment, computers, records, 
     data, and samples subject to inspection;
       (2) describe the procedures for providing notice of an 
     inspection to the owner, occupant, operator, or agent in 
     charge of a facility;
       (3) describe the timeframes for inspections; and
       (4) detail the areas, equipment, computers, records, data, 
     and samples that are not subject to inspection.

     SEC. 233. AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT INSPECTIONS.

       (a) Prohibition.--No inspection of a plant, plant site, or 
     other facility or location in the United States shall take 
     place under the Convention without the authorization of the 
     United States National Authority in accordance with the 
     requirements of this subtitle.
       (b) Authority.--
       (1) Technical secretariat inspection teams.--Any duly 
     designated member of an inspection team of the Technical 
     Secretariat may inspect any plant, plant site, or other 
     facility or location in the United States subject to 
     inspection pursuant to the Convention.
       (2) United states government representatives.--The United 
     States National Authority shall coordinate the designation of 
     employees of the Federal Government to accompany members of 
     an inspection team of the Technical Secretariat and, in doing 
     so, shall ensure that--
       (A) a special agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
     as designated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
     accompanies each inspection team visit pursuant to paragraph 
     (1);
       (B) no employee of the Environmental Protection Agency or 
     the Occupational Safety and Health Administration accompanies 
     any inspection team visit conducted pursuant to paragraph 
     (1); and
       (C) the number of duly designated representatives shall be 
     kept to the minimum necessary.
       (3) Objections to individuals serving as inspectors.--
       (A) In general.--In deciding whether to exercise the right 
     of the United States under the Convention to object to an 
     individual serving as an inspector, the President shall give 
     great weight to his reasonable belief that--
       (i) such individual is or has been a member of, or a 
     participant in, any group or organization that has engaged 
     in, or attempted or conspired to engage in, or aided or 
     abetted in the commission of, any terrorist act or activity;
       (ii) such individual has committed any act or activity 
     which would be a felony under the laws of the United States; 
     or
       (iii) the participation of such individual as a member of 
     an inspection team would pose a risk to the national security 
     or economic well-being of the United States.
       (B) Not subject to judicial review.--Any objection by the 
     President to an individual serving as an inspector, whether 
     made pursuant to this section or otherwise, shall not be 
     reviewable in any court.

     SEC. 234. PROCEDURES FOR INSPECTIONS.

       (a) Types of Inspections.--Each inspection of a plant, 
     plant site, or other facility or location in the United 
     States under the Convention shall be conducted in accordance 
     with this section and section 235, except where other 
     procedures are provided in a facility agreement entered into 
     under section 232.
       (b) Notice.--
       (1) In general.--An inspection referred to in subsection 
     (a) may be made only upon issuance of an actual written 
     notice by the United States National Authority to the owner 
     and to the operator, occupant, or agent in charge of the 
     premises to be inspected.
       (2) Time of Notification.--The notice for a routine 
     inspection shall be submitted to the owner and to the 
     operator, occupant, or agent in charge within six hours of 
     receiving the notification of the inspection from the 
     Technical Secretariat or as soon as possible thereafter. 
     Notice for a challenge inspection shall be provided at any 
     appropriate time determined by the United States National 
     Authority. Notices may be posted prominently at the plant, 
     plant site, or other facility or location if the United 
     States is unable to provide actual written notice to the 
     owner, operator, or agent in charge of the premises.
       (3) Content of notice.--
       (A) In general.--The notice under paragraph (1) shall 
     include all appropriate information supplied by the Technical 
     Secretariat to the United States National Authority 
     concerning--
       (i) the type of inspection;
       (ii) the basis for the selection of the plant, plant site, 
     or other facility or location for the type of inspection 
     sought;
       (iii) the time and date that the inspection will begin and 
     the period covered by the inspection; and
       (iv) the names and titles of the inspectors.
       (B) Special rule for challenge inspections.--In the case of 
     a challenge inspection pursuant to Article IX of the 
     Convention, the notice shall also include all appropriate 
     evidence or reasons provided by the requesting state party to 
     the Convention for seeking the inspection.
       (4) Separate notices required.--A separate notice shall be 
     provided for each inspection, except that a notice shall not 
     be required for each entry made during the period covered by 
     the inspection.
       (c) Credentials.--The head of the inspection team of the 
     Technical Secretariat and the accompanying employees of the 
     Federal government shall display appropriate identifying 
     credentials to the owner, operator, occupant, or agent in 
     charge of the premises before the inspection is commenced.
       (d) Timeframe for Inspections.--Consistent with the 
     provisions of the Convention, each inspection shall be 
     commenced and completed with reasonable promptness and shall 
     be conducted at reasonable times, within reasonable limits, 
     and in a reasonable manner.
       (e) Scope.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in a warrant issued 
     under section 235 or a facility agreement entered into under 
     section 232, an inspection conducted under this subtitle may 
     extend to all things within the premises inspected (including 
     records, files, papers, processes, controls, structures and 
     vehicles) related to whether the requirements of the 
     Convention applicable to such premises have been complied 
     with.
       (2) Exception.--Unless required by the Convention, no 
     inspection under this subtitle shall extend to--
       (A) financial data;
       (B) sales and marketing data (other than shipment data);
       (C) pricing data;
       (D) personnel data;
       (E) research data;
       (F) patent data;
       (G) data maintained for compliance with environmental or 
     occupational health and safety regulations; or
       (H) personnel and vehicles entering and personnel and 
     personal passenger vehicles exiting the facility.
       (f) Sampling and Safety.--
       (1) In general.--The Director of the United States National 
     Authority is authorized to require the provision of samples 
     to a member of the inspection team of the Technical 
     Secretariat in accordance with the provisions of the 
     Convention. The owner or the operator, occupant or agent in 
     charge of the premises to be inspected shall determine 
     whether the sample shall be taken by representatives of the 
     premises or the inspection team or other individuals present. 
     No sample collected in the United States pursuant to an 
     inspection permitted by this title may be transferred for 
     analysis to any laboratory outside the territory of the 
     United States.
       (2) Compliance with regulations.--In carrying out their 
     activities, members of the inspection team of the Technical 
     Secretariat and representatives of agencies or departments 
     accompanying the inspection team shall observe safety 
     regulations established at the premises to be inspected, 
     including those for protection of controlled environments 
     within a facility and for personal safety.
       (g) Coordination.--The appropriate representatives of the 
     United States, as designated, if present, shall assist the 
     owner and the operator, occupant or agent in charge of the 
     premises to be inspected in interacting with the members of 
     the inspection team of the Technical Secretariat.

     SEC. 235. WARRANTS.

       (a) In General.--The United States Government shall seek 
     the consent of the owner or the operator, occupant, or agent 
     in charge of the premises to be inspected prior to any 
     inspection referred to in section 304(a). If consent is 
     obtained, a warrant is not required for the inspection. The 
     owner or the operator, occupant, or agent in charge of the

[[Page H10653]]

     premises to be inspected may withhold consent for any reason 
     or no reason. After providing notification pursuant to 
     subsection (b), the United States Government may seek a 
     search warrant from a United States magistrate judge. 
     Proceedings regarding the issuance of a search warrant shall 
     be conducted ex parte, unless otherwise requested by the 
     United States Government.
       (b) Routine Inspections.--
       (1) Obtaining administrative search warrants.--For any 
     routine inspection conducted on the territory of the United 
     States pursuant to Article VI of the Convention, where 
     consent has been withheld, the United States Government shall 
     first obtain an administrative search warrant from a judge of 
     the United States. The United States Government shall provide 
     to the judge of the United States all appropriate information 
     supplied by the Technical Secretariat to the United States 
     National Authority regarding the basis for the selection of 
     the plant site, plant, or other facility or location for the 
     type of inspection sought. The United States Government shall 
     also provide any other appropriate information available to 
     it relating to the reasonableness of the selection of the 
     plant, plant site, or other facility or location for the 
     inspection.
       (2) Content of affidavits for administrative search 
     warrants.--The judge of the United States shall promptly 
     issue a warrant authorizing the requested inspection upon an 
     affidavit submitted by the United States Government showing 
     that--
       (A) the Chemical Weapons Convention is in force for the 
     United States;
       (B) the plant site, plant, or other facility or location 
     sought to be inspected is required to report data under 
     subtitle D of this title and is subject to routine inspection 
     under the Convention;
       (C) the purpose of the inspection is--
       (i) in the case of any facility owned or operated by a non-
     Government entity related to Schedule 1 chemical agents, to 
     verify that the facility is not used to produce any Schedule 
     1 chemical agent except for declared chemicals; quantities of 
     Schedule 1 chemicals produced, processed, or consumed are 
     correctly declared and consistent with needs for the declared 
     purpose; and Schedule 1 chemicals are not diverted or used 
     for other purposes;
       (ii) in the case of any facility related to Schedule 2 
     chemical agents, to verify that activities are in accordance 
     with obligations under the Convention and consistent with the 
     information provided in data declarations; and
       (iii) in the case of any facility related to Schedule 3 
     chemical agents and any other chemical production facility, 
     to verify that the activities of the facility are consistent 
     with the information provided in data declarations;
       (D) the items, documents, and areas to be searched and 
     seized;
       (E) in the case of a facility related to Schedule 2 or 
     Schedule 3 chemical agents or unscheduled discrete organic 
     chemicals, the plant site has not been subject to more than 1 
     routine inspection in the current calendar year, and, in the 
     case of facilities related to Schedule 3 chemical agents or 
     unscheduled discrete organic chemicals, the inspection will 
     not cause the number of routine inspections in the United 
     States to exceed 20 in a calendar year;
       (F) the selection of the site was made in accordance with 
     procedures established under the Convention and, in 
     particular--
       (i) in the case of any facility owned or operated by a non-
     Government entity related to Schedule 1 chemical agents, the 
     intensity, duration, timing, and mode of the requested 
     inspection is based on the risk to the object and purpose of 
     the Convention by the quantities of chemical produced, the 
     characteristics of the facility and the nature of activities 
     carried out at the facility, and the requested inspection, 
     when considered with previous such inspections of the 
     facility undertaken in the current calendar year, shall not 
     exceed the number reasonably required based on the risk to 
     the object and purpose of the Convention as described above;
       (ii) in the case of any facility related to Schedule 2 
     chemical agents, the Technical Secretariat gave due 
     consideration to the risk to the object and purpose of the 
     Convention posed by the relevant chemical, the 
     characteristics of the plant site and the nature of 
     activities carried out there, taking into account the 
     respective facility agreement as well as the results of the 
     initial inspections and subsequent inspections; and
       (iii) in the case of any facility related to Schedule 3 
     chemical agents or unscheduled discrete organic chemicals, 
     the facility was selected randomly by the Technical 
     Secretariat using appropriate mechanisms, such as 
     specifically designed computer software, on the basis of two 
     weighting factors: (I) equitable geographical distribution of 
     inspections; and (II) the information on the declared sites 
     available to the Technical Secretariat, related to the 
     relevant chemical, the characteristics of the plant site, and 
     the nature of activities carried out there;
       (G) the earliest commencement and latest closing dates and 
     times of the inspection; and
       (H) the duration of inspection will not exceed time limits 
     specified in the Convention unless agreed by the owner, 
     operator, or agent in charge of the plant.
       (3) Content of warrants.--A warrant issued under paragraph 
     (2) shall specify the same matters required of an affidavit 
     under that paragraph. In addition to the requirements for a 
     warrant issued under this paragraph, each warrant shall 
     contain, if known, the identities of the representatives of 
     the Technical Secretariat conducting the inspection and the 
     observers of the inspection and, if applicable, the 
     identities of the representatives of agencies or departments 
     of the United States accompanying those representatives.
       (4) Challenge inspections.--
       (A) Criminal search warrant.--For any challenge inspection 
     conducted on the territory of the United States pursuant to 
     Article IX of the Chemical Weapons Convention, where consent 
     has been withheld, the United States Government shall first 
     obtain from a judge of the United States a criminal search 
     warrant based upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
     affirmation, and describing with particularity the place to 
     be searched and the person or things to be seized.
       (B) Information provided.--The United States Government 
     shall provide to the judge of the United States--
       (i) all appropriate information supplied by the Technical 
     Secretariat to the United States National Authority regarding 
     the basis for the selection of the plant site, plant, or 
     other facility or location for the type of inspection sought;
       (ii) any other appropriate information relating to the 
     reasonableness of the selection of the plant, plant site, or 
     other facility or location for the inspection;
       (iii) information concerning--

       (I) the duration and scope of the inspection;
       (II) areas to be inspected;
       (III) records and data to be reviewed; and
       (IV) samples to be taken;

       (iv) appropriate evidence or reasons provided by the 
     requesting state party for the inspection;
       (v) any other evidence showing probable cause to believe 
     that a violation of this title has occurred or is occurring; 
     and
       (vi) the identities of the representatives of the Technical 
     Secretariat on the inspection team and the Federal Government 
     employees accompanying the inspection team.
       (C) Content of warrant.--The warrant shall specify--
       (i) the type of inspection authorized;
       (ii) the purpose of the inspection;
       (iii) the type of plant site, plant, or other facility or 
     location to be inspected;
       (iv) the areas of the plant site, plant, or other facility 
     or location to be inspected;
       (v) the items, documents, data, equipment, and computers 
     that may be inspected or seized;
       (vi) samples that may be taken;
       (vii) the earliest commencement and latest concluding dates 
     and times of the inspection; and
       (viii) the identities of the representatives of the 
     Technical Secretariat on the inspection teams and the Federal 
     Government employees accompanying the inspection team.

     SEC. 236. PROHIBITED ACTS RELATING TO INSPECTIONS.

       It shall be unlawful for any person willfully to fail or 
     refuse to permit entry or inspection, or to disrupt, delay, 
     or otherwise impede an inspection, authorized by this title.

     SEC. 237. NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTION.

       Consistent with the objective of eliminating chemical 
     weapons, the President may deny a request to inspect any 
     facility in the United States in cases where the President 
     determines that the inspection may pose a threat to the 
     national security interests of the United States.

     SEC. 238. PROTECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CONTRACTORS.

       (a) The Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 
     403 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

     ``SEC. 39. PROTECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF 
                   CONTRACTORS.

       ``(a) Prohibition.--A contractor may not be required, as a 
     condition for entering into a contract with the Federal 
     Government, to waive any right under the Constitution for any 
     purpose related to Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation 
     Act of 1997 or the Chemical Weapons Convention (as defined in 
     section 203 of such Act.)
       ``(b) Construction.--Nothing in subsection (a) shall be 
     construed to prohibit an executive agency from including in a 
     contract a clause that requires the contractor to permit 
     inspections for the purpose of ensuring that the contractor 
     is performing the contract in accordance with the provisions 
     of the contract.''.
       (b) The table of contents in section 1(b) of such Act is 
     amended by adding at the end the following:

``Sec. 39. Protection of constitutional rights of contractors.''.

     SEC. 239. ANNUAL REPORT ON INSPECTIONS.

       (a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President 
     shall submit a report in classified and unclassified form to 
     the appropriate congressional committees on inspections made 
     under the Convention during the preceding year.
       (b) Content of Reports.--Each report shall contain the 
     following information for the reporting period:
       (1) The name of each company or entity subject to the 
     jurisdiction of the United States reporting data pursuant to 
     subtitle D of this title.
       (2) The number of inspections under the Convention 
     conducted on the territory of the United States.

[[Page H10654]]

       (3) The number and identity of inspectors conducting any 
     inspection described in paragraph (2) and the number of 
     inspectors barred from inspection by the United States.
       (4) The cost to the United States for each inspection 
     described in paragraph (2).
       (5) The total costs borne by United States business firms 
     in the course of inspections described in paragraph (2).
       (6) A description of the circumstances surrounding 
     inspections described in paragraph (2), including instances 
     of possible industrial espionage and misconduct of 
     inspectors.
       (7) The identity of parties claiming loss of trade secrets, 
     the circumstances surrounding those losses, and the efforts 
     taken by the United States Government to redress those 
     losses.
       (8) A description of instances where inspections under the 
     Convention outside the United States have been disrupted or 
     delayed.
       (c) Definition.--The term ``appropriate congressional 
     committees'' means the Committee on the Judiciary, the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on the 
     Judiciary, the Committee on International Relations, and the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives.

     SEC. 240. UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE IN INSPECTIONS AT PRIVATE 
                   FACILITIES.

       (a) Assistance in Preparation for Inspections.--At the 
     request of an owner of a facility not owned or operated by 
     the United States Government, or contracted for use by or for 
     the United States Government, the Secretary of Defense may 
     assist the facility to prepare the facility for possible 
     inspections pursuant to the Convention.
       (b) Reimbursement Requirement.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the 
     owner of a facility provided assistance under subsection (a) 
     shall reimburse the Secretary for the costs incurred by the 
     Secretary in providing the assistance.
       (2) Exception.--In the case of assistance provided under 
     subsection (a) to a facility owned by a person described in 
     subsection (c), the United States National Authority shall 
     reimburse the Secretary for the costs incurred by the 
     Secretary in providing the assistance.
       (c) Owners Covered by United States National Authority 
     Reimbursements.--Subsection (b)(2) applies in the case of 
     assistance provided to the following:
       (1) Small business concerns.--A small business concern as 
     defined in section 3 of the Small Business Act.
       (2) Domestic producers of schedule 3 or unscheduled 
     discrete organic chemicals.--Any person located in the United 
     States that--
       (A) does not possess, produce, process, consume, import, or 
     export any Schedule 1 or Schedule 2 chemical; and
       (B) in the calendar year preceding the year in which the 
     assistance is to be provided, produced--
       (i) more than 30 metric tons of Schedule 3 or unscheduled 
     discrete organic chemicals that contain phosphorous, sulfur, 
     or fluorine; or
       (ii) more than 200 metric tons of unscheduled discrete 
     organic chemicals.
                          Subtitle D--Reports

     SEC. 251. REPORTS REQUIRED BY THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL 
                   AUTHORITY.

       (a) Regulations on Recordkeeping.--
       (1) Requirements.--The United States National Authority 
     shall ensure that regulations are prescribed that require 
     each person located in the United States who produces, 
     processes, consumes, exports, or imports, or proposes to 
     produce, process, consume, export, or import, a chemical 
     substance that is subject to the Convention to--
       (A) maintain and permit access to records related to that 
     production, processing, consumption, export, or import of 
     such substance; and
       (B) submit to the Director of the United States National 
     Authority such reports as the United States National 
     Authority may reasonably require to provide to the 
     Organization, pursuant to subparagraph 1(a) of the Annex on 
     Confidentiality of the Convention, the minimum amount of 
     information and data necessary for the timely and efficient 
     conduct by the Organization of its responsibilities under the 
     Convention.
       (2) Rulemaking.--The Director of the United States National 
     Authority shall ensure that regulations pursuant to this 
     section are prescribed expeditiously.
       (b) Coordination.--
       (1) Avoidance of duplication.--To the extent feasible, the 
     United States Government shall not require the submission of 
     any report that is unnecessary or duplicative of any report 
     required by or under any other law. The head of each Federal 
     agency shall coordinate the actions of that agency with the 
     heads of the other Federal agencies in order to avoid the 
     imposition of duplicative reporting requirements under this 
     title or any other law.
       (2) Definition.--As used in paragraph (1), the term 
     ``Federal agency'' has the meaning given the term ``agency'' 
     in section 551(1) of title 5, United States Code.

     SEC. 252. PROHIBITION RELATING TO LOW CONCENTRATIONS OF 
                   SCHEDULE 2 AND 3 CHEMICALS.

       (a) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     this title, no person located in the United States shall be 
     required to report on, or to submit to, any routine 
     inspection conducted for the purpose of verifying the 
     production, possession, consumption, exportation, 
     importation, or proposed production, possession, consumption, 
     exportation, or importation of any substance that contains 
     less than--
       (1) 10 percent concentration of a Schedule 2 chemical; or
       (2) 80 percent concentration of a Schedule 3 chemical.
       (b) Standard for Measurement of Concentration.--The percent 
     concentration of a chemical in a substance shall be measured 
     on the basis of volume or total weight, which measurement 
     yields the lesser percent.

     SEC. 253. PROHIBITION RELATING TO UNSCHEDULED DISCRETE 
                   ORGANIC CHEMICALS AND COINCIDENTAL BYPRODUCTS 
                   IN WASTE STREAMS.

       (a) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     this title, no person located in the United States shall be 
     required to report on, or to submit to, any routine 
     inspection conducted for the purpose of verifying the 
     production, possession, consumption, exportation, 
     importation, or proposed production, possession, consumption, 
     exportation, or importation of any substance that is--
       (1) an unscheduled discrete organic chemical; and
       (2) a coincidental byproduct of a manufacturing or 
     production process that is not isolated or captured for use 
     or sale during the process and is routed to, or escapes, from 
     the waste stream of a stack, incinerator, or wastewater 
     treatment system or any other waste stream.

     SEC. 254. CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION.

       (a) Freedom of Information Act Exemption for Certain 
     Convention Information.--Except as provided in subsection (b) 
     or (c), any confidential business information, as defined in 
     section 213(g), reported to, or otherwise acquired by, the 
     United States Government under this title or under the 
     Convention shall not be disclosed under section 552(a) of 
     title 5, United States Code.
       (b) Exceptions.--
       (1) Information for the technical secretariat.--Information 
     shall be disclosed or otherwise provided to the Technical 
     Secretariat or other states parties to the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention in accordance with the Convention, in particular, 
     the provisions of the Annex on the Protection of Confidential 
     Information.
       (2) Information for congress.--Information shall be made 
     available to any committee or subcommittee of Congress with 
     appropriate jurisdiction upon the written request of the 
     chairman or ranking minority member of such committee or 
     subcommittee, except that no such committee or subcommittee, 
     and no member and no staff member of such committee or 
     subcommittee, shall disclose such information or material 
     except as otherwise required or authorized by law.
       (3) Information for enforcement actions.--Information shall 
     be disclosed to other Federal agencies for enforcement of 
     this title or any other law, and shall be disclosed or 
     otherwise provided when relevant in any proceeding under this 
     title or any other law, except that disclosure or provision 
     in such a proceeding shall be made in such manner as to 
     preserve confidentiality to the extent practicable without 
     impairing the proceeding.
       (c) Information Disclosed in the National Interest.--
       (1) Authority.--The United States Government shall disclose 
     any information reported to, or otherwise required by the 
     United States Government under this title or the Convention, 
     including categories of such information, that it determines 
     is in the national interest to disclose and may specify the 
     form in which such information is to be disclosed.
       (2) Notice of disclosure.--
       (A) Requirement.--If any Department or agency of the United 
     States Government proposes pursuant to paragraph (1) to 
     publish or disclose or otherwise provide information exempt 
     from disclosure under subsection (a), the United States 
     National Authority shall, unless contrary to national 
     security or law enforcement needs, provide notice of intent 
     to disclose the information--
       (i) to the person that submitted such information; and
       (ii) in the case of information about a person received 
     from another source, to the person to whom that information 
     pertains.
     The information may not be disclosed until the expiration of 
     30 days after notice under this paragraph has been provided.
       (B) Proceedings on objections.--In the event that the 
     person to which the information pertains objects to the 
     disclosure, the agency shall promptly review the grounds for 
     each objection of the person and shall afford the objecting 
     person a hearing for the purpose of presenting the objections 
     to the disclosure. Not later than 10 days before the 
     scheduled or rescheduled date for the disclosure, the United 
     States National Authority shall notify such person regarding 
     whether such disclosure will occur notwithstanding the 
     objections.
       (d) Criminal Penalty for Wrongful Disclosure.--Any officer 
     or employee of the United States, and any former officer or 
     employee of the United States, who by reason of such 
     employment or official position has obtained possession of, 
     or has access to, information the disclosure or other 
     provision of which is prohibited by subsection (a), and who, 
     knowing that disclosure or provision of such information is 
     prohibited by such subsection, willfully discloses or 
     otherwise provides the information in any manner to any

[[Page H10655]]

     person (including any person located outside the territory of 
     the United States) not authorized to receive it, shall be 
     fined under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned for 
     not more than five years, or both.
       (e) Criminal Forfeiture.--The property of any person who 
     violates subsection (d) shall be subject to forfeiture to the 
     United States in the same manner and to the same extent as is 
     provided in section 229C of title 18, United States Code, as 
     added by this title.
       (f) International Inspectors.--The provisions of this 
     section shall also apply to employees of the Technical 
     Secretariat.

     SEC. 255. RECORDKEEPING VIOLATIONS.

       It shall be unlawful for any person willfully to fail or 
     refuse--
       (1) to establish or maintain any record required by this 
     title or any regulation prescribed under this title;
       (2) to submit any report, notice, or other information to 
     the United States Government in accordance with this title or 
     any regulation prescribed under this title; or
       (3) to permit access to or copying of any record that is 
     exempt from disclosure under this title or any regulation 
     prescribed under this title.
                        Subtitle E--Enforcement

     SEC. 261. PENALTIES.

       (a) Civil.--
       (1) Penalty amounts.--
       (A) Prohibited acts relating to inspections.--Any person 
     that is determined, in accordance with paragraph (2), to have 
     violated section 236 of this Act shall be required by order 
     to pay a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed $25,000 for 
     each such violation. For purposes of this paragraph, each day 
     such a violation of section 306 continues shall constitute a 
     separate violation of that section.
       (B) Recordkeeping violations.--Any person that is 
     determined, in accordance with paragraph (2), to have 
     violated section 255 of this Act shall be required by order 
     to pay a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed $5,000 for 
     each such violation.
       (2) Hearing.--
       (A) In general.--Before imposing an order described in 
     paragraph (1) against a person under this subsection for a 
     violation of section 236 or 255, the Secretary of State shall 
     provide the person or entity with notice and, upon request 
     made within 15 days of the date of the notice, a hearing 
     respecting the violation.
       (B) Conduct of hearing.--Any hearing so requested shall be 
     conducted before an administrative law judge. The hearing 
     shall be conducted in accordance with the requirements of 
     section 554 of title 5, United States Code. If no hearing is 
     so requested, the Secretary of State's imposition of the 
     order shall constitute a final and unappealable order.
       (C) Issuance of orders.--If the administrative law judge 
     determines, upon the preponderance of the evidence received, 
     that a person or entity named in the complaint has violated 
     section 236 or 255, the administrative law judge shall state 
     his findings of fact and issue and cause to be served on such 
     person or entity an order described in paragraph (1).
       (D) Factors for determination of penalty amounts.--In 
     determining the amount of any civil penalty, the 
     administrative law judge shall take into account the nature, 
     circumstances, extent, and gravity of the violation or 
     violations and, with respect to the violator, the ability to 
     pay, effect on ability to continue to do business, any 
     history of prior such violations, the degree of culpability, 
     the existence of an internal compliance program, and such 
     other matters as justice may require.
       (3) Administrative appellate review.--The decision and 
     order of an administrative law judge shall become the final 
     agency decision and order of the head of the United States 
     National Authority unless, within 30 days, the head of the 
     United States National Authority modifies or vacates the 
     decision and order, with or without conditions, in which case 
     the decision and order of the head of the United States 
     National Authority shall become a final order under this 
     subsection.
       (4) Offsets.--The amount of the civil penalty under a final 
     order of the United States National Authority may be deducted 
     from any sums owed by the United States to the person.
       (5) Judicial review.--A person adversely affected by a 
     final order respecting an assessment may, within 30 days 
     after the date the final order is issued, file a petition in 
     the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or 
     for any other circuit in which the person resides or 
     transacts business.
       (6) Enforcement of orders.--If a person fails to comply 
     with a final order issued under this subsection against the 
     person or entity--
       (A) after the order making the assessment has become a 
     final order and if such person does not file a petition for 
     judicial review of the order in accordance with paragraph 
     (5), or
       (B) after a court in an action brought under paragraph (5) 
     has entered a final judgment in favor of the United States 
     National Authority,
     the Secretary of State shall file a suit to seek compliance 
     with the order in any appropriate district court of the 
     United States, plus interest at currently prevailing rates 
     calculated from the date of expiration of the 30-day period 
     referred to in paragraph (5) or the date of such final 
     judgment, as the case may be. In any such suit, the validity 
     and appropriateness of the final order shall not be subject 
     to review.
       (b) Criminal.--Any person who knowingly violates any 
     provision of section 236 or 255 of this Act, shall, in 
     addition to or in lieu of any civil penalty which may be 
     imposed under subsection (a) for such violation, be fined 
     under title 18, United States Code, imprisoned for not more 
     than one year, or both.

     SEC. 262. SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT.

       (a) Jurisdiction.--The district courts of the United States 
     shall have jurisdiction over civil actions to--
       (1) restrain any violation of section 236 or 255 of this 
     Act; and
       (2) compel the taking of any action required by or under 
     this title or the Convention.
       (b) Civil Actions.--
       (1) In general.--A civil action described in subsection (a) 
     may be brought--
       (A) in the case of a civil action described in subsection 
     (a)(1), in the United States district court for the judicial 
     district in which any act, omission, or transaction 
     constituting a violation of section 236 or 255 occurred or in 
     which the defendant is found or transacts business; or
       (B) in the case of a civil action described in subsection 
     (a)(2), in the United States district court for the judicial 
     district in which the defendant is found or transacts 
     business.
       (2) Service of process.--In any such civil action process 
     may be served on a defendant wherever the defendant may 
     reside or may be found, whether the defendant resides or may 
     be found within the United States or elsewhere.

     SEC. 263. EXPEDITED JUDICIAL REVIEW.

       (a) Civil Action.--Any person or entity subject to a search 
     under this title may file a civil action challenging the 
     constitutionality of any provision of this title. 
     Notwithstanding any other provision of law, during the full 
     calendar year of, and the two full calendar years following, 
     the enactment of this Act, the district court shall accord 
     such a case a priority in its disposition ahead of all other 
     civil actions except for actions challenging the legality and 
     conditions of confinement.
       (b) En Banc Review.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, during the full calendar year of, and the two full 
     calendar years following, the enactment of this Act, any 
     appeal from a final order entered by a district court in an 
     action brought under subsection (a) shall be heard promptly 
     by the full Court of Appeals sitting en banc.
                  Subtitle F--Miscellaneous Provisions

     SEC. 271. REPEAL.

       Section 808 of the Department of Defense Appropriation 
     Authorization Act, 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1520; relating to the use 
     of human subjects for the testing of chemical or biological 
     agents) is repealed.

     SEC. 272. PROHIBITION.

       (a) In General.--Neither the Secretary of Defense nor any 
     other officer or employee of the United States may, directly 
     or by contract--
       (1) conduct any test or experiment involving the use of any 
     chemical or biological agent on a civilian population; or
       (2) use human subjects for the testing of chemical or 
     biological agents.
       (b) Construction.--Nothing in subsection (a) may be 
     construed to prohibit actions carried out for purposes not 
     prohibited by this title (as defined in section 203(8)).
       (c) Biological Agent Defined.--In this section, the term 
     ``biological agent'' means any micro-organism (including 
     bacteria, viruses, fungi, rickettsiae or protozoa), pathogen, 
     or infectious substance, or any naturally occurring, bio-
     engineered or synthesized component of any such micro-
     organism, pathogen, or infectious substance, whatever its 
     origin or method of production, capable of causing--
       (1) death, disease, or other biological malfunction in a 
     human, an animal, a plant, or another living organism;
       (2) deterioration of food, water, equipment, supplies, or 
     materials of any kind; or
       (3) deleterious alteration of the environment.

     SEC. 273. BANKRUPTCY ACTIONS.

       Section 362(b) of title 11, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking paragraphs (4) and (5); and
       (2) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following:
       ``(4) under paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (6) of subsection 
     (a) of this section, of the commencement or continuation of 
     an action or proceeding by a governmental unit or any 
     organization exercising authority under the Convention on the 
     Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and 
     Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for 
     signature on January 13, 1993, to enforce such governmental 
     unit's or organization's police and regulatory power, 
     including the enforcement of a judgment other than a money 
     judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by the 
     governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's or 
     organization's police or regulatory power;''.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from New 
York [Mr. Gilman] and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton] each 
will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman].


                             General Leave

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members

[[Page H10656]]

may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their 
remarks on this measure.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from New York?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act 
of 1997 is intended to close loopholes in our counterproliferation laws 
in order to address a matter of critical concern to our national 
security, the risk that Iran may soon obtain from firms in Russia and 
elsewhere the capability of producing its own medium and long-range 
ballistic missiles.
  This legislation enjoys extremely strong support on both sides of the 
aisle. At last count, over 263 Members had asked to be listed as 
cosponsors, including both the Speaker, Mr. Gingrich, and the 
Democratic leader, Mr. Gephardt]. A companion measure in the Senate has 
84 cosponsors, led by the Senate majority leader, Mr. Lott, and by Mr. 
Lieberman of Connecticut.
  The urgency for this legislation is apparent from press reports. For 
more than a year, our Government has been in constant dialog with the 
Russian leadership regarding Russian assistance to the Iranian 
ballistic missile program. The meetings have been going on, more talks 
are scheduled, more summits are held, yet the Iranian military 
continues to make rapid progress in developing long-range missiles with 
critically needed assistance from Russian firms. Unless something 
happens soon, according to press reports, Iran is likely to achieve the 
ability to produce its own ballistic missiles within less than 1 year.
  It is now time for the Congress to say that enough is enough. We need 
to back up our rhetoric on nonproliferation with meaningful action. 
With this legislation, we will be giving Russian firms compelling 
reasons not to trade with Iran. The sanctions which this legislation 
threatens to impose will force those firms to choose between their 
short-term profits from dealing with Iran and potentially far more 
lucrative long-term economic relations with our own Nation.
  To make certain that the President takes a careful look at this 
legislation, the amendment before us also adds to our Iranian sanctions 
measure the text of Senate 610, the Chemical Weapons Convention 
Implementation Act of 1997, which passed the Senate unanimously earlier 
this year. Unlike the Chemical Weapons Convention itself, which was 
controversial in the Senate, the implementing legislation is strongly 
supported all across the political spectrum, from the administration to 
Senators such as John Kyl and Jesse Helms who have led the fight 
against the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  Mr. Speaker, in the 1980's the world stood by as Saddam Hussein built 
up the Iraqi arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. This bill will 
help make certain that Iran does not follow the example of its 
neighbors in Iraq and become the next threat to international 
stability. Accordingly, I urge my colleagues to join in support of this 
measure.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this bill, and I oppose it for 3 
reasons:
  First, the bill links a missile sanctions bill to the Senate-passed 
Chemical Weapons Convention implementation legislation. The House 
should consider these bills separately so that S. 610 can proceed 
quickly to enactment.
  Second, this missile sanctions bill is harmful to current United 
States diplomatic efforts to stop missile technology transfers from 
Russia to Iran.
  And, third, the bill itself is flawed.
  Let me spell out these reasons in more detail.
  With regard to the first point, the missile sanctions bill and the 
Chemical Weapons Convention implementation legislation are separate and 
distinct pieces of legislation. They deserve separate consideration.
  Today the United States is out of compliance with its obligations to 
the Chemical Weapons Convention and will continue to be out of 
compliance until this implementation legislation, S. 610, is enacted.
  We should act on S. 610 as soon as possible. We should send it 
directly to the President as a freestanding measure and not attach it 
to another measure and send it back to the Senate.
  The sponsors of the missile sanctions bill, H.R. 2709, have attached 
S. 610 to it because they believe that S. 610 will lead to the swift 
enactment of the sanctions bill.
  The President's National Security Adviser and the Secretary of State 
strongly oppose the missile sanctions bill. They recommend that he veto 
it if it is presented to the President in its current form. They also 
recommend a veto if S. 610 is attached. I quote from the Statement of 
Administration Policy:

       S. 610 has strong bipartisan support from Members on both 
     sides of the aisle. If S. 610 is attached to H.R. 2709, 
     however, the Secretary of State and the National Security 
     Adviser would have no choice other than to recommend that the 
     President veto the combined bill.

  So for those of you who support swift passage of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention implementation legislation, I urge you to oppose this bill. 
This bill will delay, not speed up, U.S. compliance with the Chemical 
Weapons Convention.
  Second, I believe that Congress and the executive branch certainly 
share the same policy goal, to stop the transfer of missile technology 
to Iran. The question before us is the most effective way to achieve 
that shared goal.
  The gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman] and others deserve 
credit for their efforts to focus attention on the important issue of 
missile technology transfers to Iran. I think they have got the right 
approach, which is to express the strong sense of Congress on the 
issue. But I do not agree with the approach taken in this bill.
  Stopping the transfer of missile technology to Iran requires 
diplomacy. It requires the President to pursue a high-level diplomatic 
effort with those countries that provide missile technology to Iran. At 
the end of the day, this problem is going to be solved by diplomacy.
  This is exactly what the administration is doing. The President's 
envoy, Ambassador Wisner, is conducting negotiations with Russia on 
this topic. He was in Moscow last week. The administration is working 
as hard as it can, from the President to the Vice President on down, to 
stop Russian missile technology transfers to Iran. They believe, the 
administration, that they are starting to make progress, and they 
believe they can show a lot more progress between now and January. 
Senior Russian officials have already indicated that Iranian missiles 
are not in their interest. Our diplomacy is beginning to achieve 
results, but we do not yet have a satisfactory result.

                              {time}  2100

  That is the view of the Secretary of State, the National Security 
Advisor, and the Vice President. The Vice President has made a strong 
plea for a little more time to show results, and we should give it to 
him. If there is no progress, we can come back to this bill in January.
  Third and finally, this missile sanctions bill has several flaws. It 
establishes too low a threshold for the imposition of sanctions. It 
would require the executive to report and impose sanctions based on 
credible information it receives about transfers or attempted transfers 
of missile-related goods and technology to Iran.
  ``Credible information'' is not defined in the bill and is subject to 
very broad interpretation. One report or one phone call could be 
``credible information'' and could trigger a requirement to report and 
to impose sanctions.
  The bill does not allow enough time between the requirement to report 
and the requirement to sanction. Sanctions would have to be imposed no 
later than 30 days after the date of the required resort. In many 
cases, sanctions can be imposed erroneously, needlessly damaging U.S. 
credibility with other governments in our efforts to prevent Iran from 
obtaining missile technology.
  The bill has no requirement that actions subject to sanctions be 
taken knowingly. Sanctions would be imposed on entities unaware that 
items are going to Iran or will be used in missiles. Such a provision 
is fundamentally unfair and will undermine U.S.

[[Page H10657]]

credibility and the willingness of foreign entities to cooperate with 
the United States.
  The bill's waiver provisions, while a step forward, could be improved 
further. It lacks flexibility for the President. The bill is 
retroactive in its application. The bill applies sanctions on U.S. 
subsidiaries of foreign firms that are sanctioned.
  I do not believe Congress has a full understanding of the bill's 
impact if it is enacted into law. I believe further consultation with 
the executive branch is necessary. Further consultation would improve 
this bill so it will strengthen, not undermine, the President's ability 
to achieve the goals that all of us share to stop Iran's missile 
program.
  So I believe the bill will negatively impact U.S. national interests. 
It is going to slow down our ability to get the President a bill that 
he will sign so that he can meet our treaty obligations under the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. It will be counterproductive to our 
efforts to stop the transfer of missiles technology to Iran. And as I 
have indicated, the Secretary and the National Security Advisor are 
going to recommend that the President veto this bill if it is sent to 
him in the form that we have it before the House this evening.
  I urge a ``no'' vote.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Iran Missile 
Proliferation Act introduced by the distinguished chairman of the 
Committee on International Relations, the gentleman from New York [Mr. 
Gilman].
  As the gentleman from New York has noted, this legislation is 
intended to provide additional leverage for the United States in 
responding to assistance by Russian institutes and research facilities 
for Iran's medium and long-range missile programs.
  H.R. 2709 will close loopholes in existing U.S. sanction laws as 
these loopholes have been used in the past to avoid sanctioning firms 
that have transferred missile goods or technology to Iran. It does not 
target an entire government but, rather, the individuals and entities 
which are actually the perpetrators of proliferation activities.
  The President would be required to submit a report identifying those 
individuals and entities where there is credible evidence that they 
have transferred key missile components of technology to Iran. Thirty 
days after this report, a number of important sanctions denying 
munition licenses, dual-use technology licenses, and U.S. foreign 
assistance to these entities, those kind of things will be imposed for 
a period of at least 2 years on the identified entities.
  Mr. Speaker, our distinguished colleague from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton] 
has given quite a list of things that he finds objectionable from the 
existing legislation. Whether it is this legislation or other 
legislation, I think it is imperative that this House and the Congress 
speak out very strongly that we want the kind of proliferation being 
conducted by Russian entities to Iran to stop. We cannot sit back and 
be asked simply that the route towards diplomacy be pursued for the 
next several months. We are at a critical point, and this Congress has 
a responsibility to say we want action now, it is essential while we 
are putting much of the Middle East and much of Europe in jeopardy.
  Mr. Speaker, the prevention of Iran's acquisition of ballistic 
missiles and weapons of mass destruction is one of this Nation's most 
important national security objectives. Iranian possession of ballistic 
missiles poses an unacceptable threat to the military forces of the 
United States and its allies throughout the Persian Gulf, Middle East, 
and southern and southeastern Europe. H.R. 2709 is an important tool to 
limit the proliferation of the Persian Gulf. I believe it would be 
irresponsible if we simply took no action, did not express ourself, did 
not try to pass legislation before we adjourn this year.
  Frankly speaking, Mr. Speaker, this legislation would be unnecessary 
if the executive branch were willing to comply with existing law 
governing missile technology controls. This is not simply a criticism 
of this President or this administration, for previous Presidents have 
been equally reluctant to enforce the law when it comes to sanctions on 
these crucial matters.
  When an administration, this one or a previous one, continually 
refuses to invoke the law, whether it is the Arms Control Export Act or 
the refusal to declare that a coup has occurred in Cambodia because the 
resulting sanctions would reduce the State Department's flexibility, a 
word we hear often, it demeans the law. It encourages this body to 
pursue every more stringent sanctions.
  Mr. Speaker, this Member hopes that this body can get out of the 
business of imposing new sanctions, but this will not happen until the 
executive branch, this one, the previous ones, come into compliance 
with the law, respect the law as Congress enacts it. This Member 
therefore would urge the executive branch to adhere to the provisions 
of H.R. 2709 which I hope this Congress will enact.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from California [Mr. Berman].
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. 
Bereuter], who is controlling time for the majority, if he would yield 
an additional 3 minutes to me.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Berman].
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Calvert). The gentleman from California 
[Mr. Berman] is recognized for 6 minutes.
  (Mr. BERMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, while I agree with a number of the points 
made by my dear friend and the ranking member of the Committee on 
International Relations, I come to a different conclusion on the issue 
of House passage of this bill, and I rise in support of the passage of 
H.R. 2930. I think it pays to take a couple of moments to just restate 
sort of what we know about contributions to the Iranian missile 
program.
  First of all, we know it has been clearly reported, it is not in 
dispute, that Iran has developed, has a nuclear weapons program. It is 
also quite clear that Iran has also embarked on a program to develop 
medium and long-range missiles. The Iranian missile program has been 
contributed to recently by a number of transfers of technology in parts 
from the Russian SS-4 intermediate range ballistic missile, and 
apparently Iran Shihab-3 and Shihab-4 missiles are being designed with 
Russian assistance to expand to a range of 930 to 1,250 miles. There 
have been additional reports that Iran is working toward developing a 
multistage intercontinental missile with a range of 3,500 missiles.
  When we take their nuclear program and their missile program 
together, I think everyone in this Chamber can understand just how 
dangerous this can be if Iran is successful in its pursuits in these 
areas.
  The more sophisticated weapon assistance that Iran receives from 
abroad, the quicker Iran will realize its goal of a long-range weapon 
delivery system.
  Robert Pelletreau, who was then Assistant Secretary of State for Near 
Eastern Affairs, testified, only by imposing a real and heavy price can 
we and other countries convince the Iranian leadership that changing 
its threatening behavior is in Iran's own interest. That threatening 
behavior continues, and this legislation is another effort to convince 
other countries that a real and heavy price must be paid for aiding 
Iran's weapons program.
  I would just like to deal with a couple of the points raised by the 
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton], the ranking member of the full 
committee. There are some flaws in this legislation, but I think he 
would agree, the legislation is significantly improved from the form in 
which it was introduced. The kind of conduct that it has focused on 
deals now with violations of the Missile Technology Control Regime and 
other efforts that are governed by that regime that the administration, 
and only the administration, certify constitutes significant 
contributions to the Iranian missile program.

[[Page H10658]]

  The report that is required by this legislation can now be classified 
at the discretion of the administration, and it is clear from the 
report language accompanying this bill that the national security 
waiver, which has been put into this bill, may be utilized where an 
entity in any country, and specifically in Russia, has made an improper 
and illegal transfer.
  Remember, Russia has committed to adhering to the Missile Technology 
Control Regime, but when they make such a transfer, if the 
administration is assured that they will no longer do so and believes 
that it is important that those sanctions be waived, they are able to 
use the national security waiver to do that.
  So that even with some of the other flaws, particularly the credible 
information threshold, which is too low a threshold, I think this 
legislation is worthy of our support, because it is a forcing mechanism 
and it is a statement by the House of Representatives that this is a 
critical problem, that our relationships with Russia and its ability to 
control the entities within that country that are contributing to this 
program are going to be seriously affected by its future conduct.
  There is no doubt that this administration now is heavily engaged in 
this issue. They are pressing the Russians hard to cut off that aid. 
President Clinton, Vice President Gore, and Ambassador Wisner have 
raised our concern with the Russian leadership, although there is some 
evidence that assistance continues to flow.
  I believe the administration should view the House passage of this 
legislation as aiding and assisting their efforts to persuade the 
Russians to cut off all aid to the Iranian missile program and to 
enforce export controls which will ensure no additional aid leaks out.
  I wish that the majority had not combined this bill with the Chemical 
Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1997. My fear is that the 
result of combining these two important pieces of legislation will mean 
that when this bill gets over in the Senate, neither one will pass. 
That decision to combine has been made. Both bills are important.
  I might point out, by the way, that both Russia and Iran have now 
ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, so that passage of the 
implementing legislation is quite important on its own. My only hope is 
that if the Senate chooses, for whatever reason, to sever the two bills 
and send the chemical weapons implementation legislation back to us 
tomorrow and before we adjourn for the year, that we will take that 
legislation up separately. But both bills are important, and the 
decision has been made to combine them, and I would urge my colleagues 
to support its passage.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Fox], a member of the 
committee.
  Mr. FOX of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, we in the House are persuaded 
that missile transfers from Russia to Iran pose a great threat to the 
United States and to our allies in the Middle East and Europe. We are 
especially troubled by reports we received to the effect that Iran is 
only 9 to 12 months away from achieving an indigenous missile capacity.
  We welcome the efforts undertaken with Russia to resolve this 
problem, but we cannot ignore the reports that we received that since 
Ambassador Wisner went to work on this problem, the pace of Russian 
transfers to Iran has increased rather than decreased. At this stage, 
we therefore feel compelled to act on this matter.
  Our legislation is based on a slightly different philosophy than the 
administration's diplomatic efforts. We are not seeking to coerce the 
Russian Government to do anything. Rather, we target our sanctions on 
the Russian entities that are making missile transfers to Iran. Most of 
these entities are interested in future business dealings with the 
United States, particularly in the area of aerospace cooperation. The 
point of our legislation is to tell these entities in no uncertain 
terms that continued dealings with Iran will be fatal to any future 
cooperation with the United States.

                              {time}  2115

  Our legislation has 263 cosponsors in the House, including its main 
sponsor, the gentleman from New York, Chairman Gilman, the Speaker of 
the House, the Democratic leader; and the companion bill in the Senate 
has similarly strong support.
  The statement of administration policy that has been quoted on the 
House floor is dated November 7, 1997. H.R. 2709 has been modified 
since the statement of administration policy was originally written. 
One of the modifications in the bill was specifically made to address 
the administration's concerns.
  Section 2 of the bill requires the administration to submit a report 
which identifies those foreign companies where there is credible 
evidence that they have transferred or retransferred goods or 
technology or provided technical assistance to Iran's efforts to 
acquire, develop or produce ballistic missiles.
  The bill report from the committee required this administration 
submit this report in unclassified form. That section now has been 
modified to allow the report to be classified. The committee is 
persuaded that such a change will assist the administration's efforts 
to halt the transfer of missile technology to Iran. We urge the 
administration to consider this bill modification as it reviews its 
position on the bill.
  I am not surprised the administration does not support the bill. Why? 
Because the bill does not give the administration the usual loopholes 
to avoid sanctioning foreign countries that assist Iran.
  The administration's statement of policy states that the standard of 
evidence sanctions and reporting requirements of H.R. 2709 are broad 
and vague. Nothing could be further from the truth. The committee 
report details what we mean by the term ``credible information.'' The 
report details the three sanctions to be imposed, and the report 
details sanctions required in the bill. These requirements are neither 
broad nor vague.
  Simply put, Mr. Speaker, the administration does not like this bill 
because they know they cannot ignore it, they cannot shove it under the 
table, and the sanctions must go forward, if appropriate.
  I would therefore urge our colleagues to support H.R. 2709, the Iran 
Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Cardin].
  (Mr. CARDIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the ranking member for yielding me 
this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 2709, the Iran Missile 
Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997. Iran is the leading sponsor of 
international terrorism. That is a conclusion that has been reached by 
our President, by our Secretary of State and by the Director of the 
CIA. The evidence is also clear that Russian entities are aiding the 
Iranian Government in its efforts to acquire and develop ballistic 
missiles. Thus, this legislation is needed.
  This legislation appropriately imposes sanctions on foreign persons 
who transfer key missile components or technology to Iran. I understand 
the concerns that have been expressed by the ranking member, but I 
think it is important that this House move this legislation forward, 
and I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 2709.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to 
the gentleman from California [Mr. Cunningham].
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, although this bill deals primarily with 
missiles, I would like this body to consider, China just bought 200 SU-
27s from Russia, better than our F-14s and F 15s, along with AA-12. 
China has sold nuclear components and chemical and biological weapons 
to Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan.
  China and Russia are not our friends, and I think it is time that we 
need to realize that. Yes, we need to engage. I do not think there will 
be peace in my lifetime in the Middle East, and we need to engage both 
of those parties, but they are still very, very dangerous.
  In Bosnia, there are over 10,000 mujahedin and Hamas surrounding 
Izetbegovic's government. Yet we in the United States continue to arm 
the Muslims in that portion of the world, when the balance has gone 
over.

[[Page H10659]]

  I would rise in support of this. The Cold War is over, but it is a 
very, very hostile world, and especially if you look at Russia today is 
building a first nuclear strike site. Russia today is building under 
the Ural Mountains a first-strike nuclear weapons site larger than 
inside the Beltway. That is huge. Why?
  Yet we need to arm the President, the White House, and this body, 
along with the other body, needs to hold firm. While we downgrade our 
own military, this is a first step in holding the line on proliferation 
for other countries.
  Why downgrade our own military, and let other nations build theirs 
up, which are not only a threat to us? If you look in Bosnia, that is a 
threat to Greece, it is a threat to Europe, especially with the 
mujahedin and Hamas. Yes, we are going to look at some of those same 
missiles ourselves.
  So I laud the gentleman in this bill and rise in support.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from New York [Mr. Engel].
  (Mr. ENGEL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I thank my distinguished colleague, the 
gentleman from Indiana, for yielding me time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2709, and I must tell 
you that I have heretofore resisted any legislation which puts 
sanctions on Russia or any entities. But I think the time has come that 
the Congress really needs to take a tough stand.
  It is no secret that Russia and Russian companies have been providing 
technology to Iran and missile goods to Iran. The one thing that 
strikes me is if you go to the Middle East and you speak with heads of 
governments of all of the countries, Israel and the Arab States may 
have many disagreements, but the one thing on which they all agree is 
that Iran is the threat to the region. You will hear the same thing in 
Jerusalem, the capital of Israel, as you will hear in Cairo, the 
capital of Egypt, as you will hear in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi 
Arabia, and all the Persian Gulf countries. While at the moment we are 
focused on Iraq and the crisis there with Iraq, the governments will 
all say the long-range threat comes from Iran.
  When we look to see which countries are assisting Iran in developing 
this technology, we look to China, and the President has had an 
agreement with the Chinese leadership to stop any kind of transfer of 
technology to Iran. We look to North Korea, they have done it; and, of 
course, Russia.
  I think that it is very, very important that the Russian Government 
and the Russian companies understand that our patience has worn thin; 
that because Iran is not only a threat to the region, but indeed a 
threat to the world, supporting terrorism, we do not feel that we can 
simply let the status quo continue.
  Iran has the capability and will have the capability in a few months 
to be able to strike out and hit all the countries that I mentioned if 
it goes unchecked. Now, it is clear that Russia has already provided 
Iran with critical know-how and technological support. The question 
facing us now is whether we can halt any further assistance, and time 
is short. As I mentioned, we have but a few months to prevent Iran from 
achieving a significant advance in its missile program.
  Most critical in the short term is the prospect of Iran enhancing its 
ballistic missile capacity. Iranian acquisition of ballistic missiles 
with a range of 1,300 kilometers or more poses an unacceptable threat 
to American forces in the Middle East, as well as our allies throughout 
the Persian Gulf region.
  It is hard for me to believe that Russia's assistance to Iran does 
not violate Russia's international obligations as an adherent to the 
Missile Technology Control Regime, the MTCR. It is also inconceivable 
to me that such transfers would not trigger U.S. missile sanction laws.
  I think it is time for this Congress to stand tall and to say to 
Russia and Russian companies that we are not going to permit this 
transfer, and H.R. 2709 goes a long way in that direction.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from New York [Mr. Nadler].
  (Mr. NADLER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2709. This 
bill would force the President to impose sanctions on entities that 
assist Iran's missile program, mostly Russian, perhaps some Chinese 
entities, perhaps some European entities as well.
  Mr. Speaker, others have expressed well the dangers that Iranian 
missiles, perhaps armed eventually with nuclear warheads, pose to 
Israel, to some of our Arab quasi-allies, and to American security 
interests.
  Russian help and Chinese help for this development is not a friendly 
act, and is the most profoundly irresponsible act, and the 
administration, for all its protestation, has shown a pattern of 
certifying when Congress passed this law that says, we do not want 
most-favored-nation treatment, we have seen that when we pass laws that 
say that this or that should not be done unless the President certifies 
that human rights are being adhered to or that nonproliferation is 
being adhered to, the certification comes whether the facts support 
them or not all too often. So I think it is time for Congress to step 
in and tighten the legal regime, as this bill does, to make it more 
clear that these sanctions must be imposed.
  I also think that, given the sometimes unclear circumstances as to 
whether the Russian Government has effective control over these 
entities, that it is good that this legislation applies directly to 
these business entities, and not simply to the foreign governments.
  So I support this legislation. I regret the necessity of it, but it 
is time to step in with this kind of legislation to reduce the 
likelihood that we will be faced with the kind of foreign policy 
catastrophe that will be presented by Iranian possession and threat of 
use of long-range missiles.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentlewoman from Oregon [Ms. Furse].
  Ms. FURSE. Mr. Speaker, I think there is an unfortunate problem that 
has occurred on this bill that Members should be aware of. I was an 
original cosponsor of the original 2709, but the bill before us is not 
that bill, because the bill before us also includes the chemical 
weapons convention implementing legislation.
  Now, there is a real problem for this, and Members should know about 
that. If the President should decide to veto 2709, which there has been 
some talk of, he will also veto the chemical weapons convention 
legislation, the legislation that implements it.
  For years we have been fighting for a chemical weapons convention. It 
would be a tragedy if tonight, by just a mistake, if people think they 
are only voting for 2709. They must know they are putting at jeopardy 
the chemical weapons convention implementing legislation.
  I would urge Members to vote against 2709, even though, as I say, I 
was a cosponsor, in order to protect that chemical weapons convention. 
A no vote will protect the chemical weapons convention.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, a bipartisan coalition of Members of this House, a 
strong one, want to have action on the chemical weapons convention. We 
also want to see the implementation of it. We also want to see action 
on the Iran missile proliferation issue.
  We understand the larger picture with respect to Russia. We 
understand the administration's position on that. We understand the 
importance the administration understandably places on a Russian-
American joint space exploration program.
  We have listened to the distinguished Vice President of the United 
States. We have listened to the highest officials in the Clinton 
administration. We have heard their arguments on this issue.

                              {time}  2130

  But collectively, a large majority of people on both sides of the 
aisle in this House, and indeed in the other body, believe that we have 
waited long enough to see the imposition of effective sanctions brought 
to bear upon the Russian entities that seem to be providing missile 
technology to Iran. We are unwilling to bear the risk of further delays 
in implementing sanctions.

[[Page H10660]]

 We are sending a very, very clear message to the government of Russia 
that we want entities in Russia to stop providing this kind of 
cooperation to the government of Iran.
  Mr. Speaker, because it places in jeopardy very large parts of the 
Persian Gulf, our allies in the Middle East, and major parts of Europe, 
we want to have action on this issue. We see the only way to have a 
likelihood that the President will sign the legislation is attaching it 
to the implementation legislation for the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Alternatively, we can see the Iranians developing the missile capacity 
that enables them to bring great explosive destruction or even weapons 
of mass destruction to bear on the Persian Gulf, on the Middle East and 
Europe. Therefore, we urge our colleagues to support H.R. 2709.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore [Mr. Calvert]. All time has expired.
  The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Nebraska 
[Mr. Bereuter] that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 
2709, as amended.
  The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor 
thereof) the rules were suspended and the bill was passed.
  The title of the bill was amended so as to read:

       A bill to impose certain sanctions on foreign persons who 
     transfer items contributing to Iran's efforts to acquire, 
     develop, or produce ballistic missiles, and to implement the 
     obligations of the United States under the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention.

  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

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