[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 159 (Wednesday, November 12, 1997)]
[House]
[Pages H10594-H10596]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




   CONTINUATION OF EMERGENCY REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION--
 MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 105-169)

  The SPEAKER pro tempore [Mr. Petri] laid before the House the 
following message from the President of the United States; which was 
read and, together with the accompanying papers, without objection, 
referred to the Committee on International Relations and ordered to be 
printed:

To the Congress of the United States:
  On November 14, 1994, in light of the dangers of the proliferation of 
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (``weapons of mass 
destruction''--(WMD)) and of the means of delivering such weapons, I 
issued Executive Order 12938, and declared a national emergency under 
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et 
seq.). Under section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 
1622(d)), the national emergency terminates on the anniversary date of 
its declaration, unless I publish in the Federal Register and transmit 
to the Congress a notice of its continuation.
  The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues to pose an 
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign 
policy, and economy of the United States. Therefore, I am advising the 
Congress that the national emergency declared on November 14, 1994, and 
extended on November 14, 1995 and November 14, 1996, must continue in 
effect beyond November 14, 1997. Accordingly, I have extended the 
national emergency declared in Executive Order 12938 and have sent the 
attached notice of extension to the Federal Register for publication.
  The following report is made pursuant to section 204(c) of the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)) section 
401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), regarding 
activities taken and money spent pursuant to the emergency declaration. 
Additional information on nuclear, missile, and/or chemical and 
biological weapons (CBW) nonproliferation efforts is contained in the 
most recent annual Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and 
Essential Components of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, 
provided to the Congress pursuant to section 1097 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 
102-190), also known as the ``Nonproliferation Report,'' and the most 
recent annual report provided to the Congress pursuant to section 308 
of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination 
Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-182), also known as the ``CBW Report.''


                    chemical and biological weapons

  The three export control regulations issued under the Enhanced 
Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) remained fully in force and 
continue to be applied in order to control the export of items with 
potential use in chemical or biological weapons or unmanned delivery 
systems for weapons of mass destruction.
  Chemical weapons continue to pose a very serious threat to our 
security and that of countries friendly to us. On April 29, 1997, the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (the 
``Chemical Weapons Convention'' or (CWC)) entered into force with 87 of 
the CWC's 165 signatories as original States Parties. The United States 
was among their number, having deposited its instrument of ratification 
on April 25. As of November 5, 104 countries had become States Parties.
  Russia did not complete its legislative approval process in time to 
be among the original CWC States Parties. In our March meeting in 
Helsinki, President Yeltsin did, however, assure me of his 
understanding of the importance of the CWC to Russia's own security. On 
October 31, 1997, the Russian Duma (lower house) approved ratification 
of the CWC. On November 5, 1997, the Russian Federation Council 
unanimously approved the CWC and the Russian government deposited its 
instrument of ratification. Russia's ratification makes it possible for 
Russia to join the United States in playing a leadership role in 
ensuring that all of the Convention's benefits are realized.
  Given Russia's financial situation during this difficult period of 
transition to a market economy, serious concerns have been raised about 
the high costs of environmentally sound destruction of the large stocks 
of chemical weapons Russia inherited from the former Soviet Union. 
Through the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, we are working with 
Russia to help address these complex problems, and we will continue to 
do so now that Russia has ratified the CWC.
  The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has 
been established to achieve the object and purpose of the CWC, to 
ensure the implementation of its provisions and provide a forum for 
consultation and cooperation among States Parties. The executive organ 
of the OPCW, the Executive Council, has met five times since May to 
oversee decisions related to inter alia data declarations, inspections, 
and organizational issues. The United States plays an active role in 
ensuring effective implementation of the Convention.
  The CWC is an ambitious undertaking by the world community to ban an 
entire class of weapons of mass destruction. Its members have committed 
themselves to totally eliminating chemical weapons stocks and 
production facilities, prohibiting chemical weapons-related activities, 
banning assistance for such activities and restricting trade with non-
Parties in certain relevant chemicals. Destruction of U.S. chemical 
weapons stocks is moving forward. Other CWC States Parties have now 
taken on a similar task, and we are working hard with the other members 
of the CWC to make membership in this treaty universal.
  The United States is determined to ensure full implementation of the 
concrete measures in the CWC that will raise the costs and the risks 
for any state or terrorist attempting to engage in chemical weapons-
related activities. The CWC's declaration requirements will improve our 
knowledge of possible chemical weapons activities, whether conducted by 
countries or terrorists. Its inspection provisions provide for access 
to declared and undeclared facilities and locations, thus making 
clandestine chemical weapons production and stockpiling more difficult, 
more risky, and more expensive.

  Countries that refuse to join the CWC will be politically isolated 
and banned from trading with States Parties in certain key chemicals. 
The relevant Treaty provision is specifically designed to penalize in a 
concrete way countries that refuse to join the rest of the world in 
eliminating the threat of chemical weapons.
  The United States also continues to play a leading role in the 
international

[[Page H10595]]

effort to reduce the threat from biological weapons. We are an active 
participant in the Ad Hoc Group striving to create a legally binding 
protocol to strengthen and enhance compliance with the Convention on 
the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction 
(the ```Biological Weapons Convention'' or (BWC)). This Ad Hoc Group 
was mandated by the September 1994 BWC Special Conference. The Fourth 
BWC Review Conference, held in November 1996, commended the work done 
by the Ad Hoc Group and urged it to complete the protocol as soon as 
possible but not later than the next Review Conference to be held in 
2001. A draft rolling text was introduced by the Chairman at the July 
Ad Hoc Group session. Work is progressing on insertion of national 
views and clarification of existing text, largely drawn from the 
consultative phase of Ad Hoc Group work since 1994. Three-week sessions 
are scheduled for January, July, and September of 1998. Another 2-week 
session will be scheduled for either March or December of 1998. Early 
completion of an effective BWC protocol is high on our list of 
nonproliferation goals.
  The United States continues to be a leader in the Australia Group 
(AG) chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation regime. Last 
year, the United States supported the entry into the AG of the Republic 
of Korea, which became the group's 30th member in time for the October 
1996 plenary.
  The United States attended this year's annual AG plenary session from 
October 6-9, 1997, during which the Group continued to focus on 
strengthening AG export controls and sharing information to address the 
threat of CBW terrorism. At the behest of the United States, the AG 
first began in-depth political-level discussion of CBW terrorism during 
the 1995 plenary session following the Tokyo subway nerve gas attack 
earlier that year. At the 1996 plenary, the United States urged AG 
members to exchange national points of contact for AG terrorism 
matters. At the 1997 plenary, the AG accepted a U.S. proposal to survey 
all AG members on efforts each has taken to counter this threat.
  The Group also reaffirmed the members' collective belief that full 
adherence to the CWC and the BWC is the best way to achieve permanent 
global elimination of CBW, and that all states adhering to these 
Conventions have an obligation to ensure that their national activities 
support this goal.
  AG participants continue to seek to ensure that all relevant national 
measures promote the object and purposes of the BWC and CWC. The AG 
nations reaffirmed their belief that existing national export licensing 
policies on chemical weapons-related items fulfill the obligation 
established under Article I of the CWC that States Parties never 
assist, in any way, the acquisition of chemical weapons. Given this 
understanding, the AG members also reaffirmed their commitment to 
continuing the Group's activities now that the CWC has entered into 
force.
  The AG also reaffirmed its commitment to continue to provide 
briefings for non-AG countries, and to promote regional consultations 
on export controls and nonproliferation to further awareness and 
understanding of national policies in these areas.
  During the last 6 months, we continued to examine closely 
intelligence and other reports of trade in chemical weapons-related 
material and technology that might require action, including evaluating 
whether sanctions under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and 
Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 were warranted. In May 1997, we imposed 
sanctions on seven Chinese entities and one Hong Kong company for 
knowingly and materially contributing to Iran's CW program through the 
export of dual-use chemical precursors and/or chemical production 
equipment and technology. In September 1997, we imposed sanctions on a 
German citizen and a German company determined to have been involved in 
the export of chemical production equipment to Libya's CW program.
  The United States continues to cooperate with its AG partners in 
stopping shipments of proliferation concern. By sharing information 
through diplomatic and other channels, we and our AG partners have been 
successful in interdicting various shipments destined to CBW programs.


           missiles for weapons of mass destruction delivery

  During the reporting period, the United States carefully controlled 
exports that could contribute to unmanned delivery systems for weapons 
of mass destruction and closely monitored activities of potential 
missile proliferation concern. We also continued to implement U.S. 
missile sanctions law, in cases where sanctionable activity was 
determined to have occurred. In August 1997, we imposed sanctions 
against two North Korean entities determined to have engaged in missile 
proliferation activities. Similar sanctions imposed in May 1996 remain 
in effect against two entities in Iran and one entity in North Korea 
for transfers involving Category II Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR) Annex items.
  During this reporting period, MTCR Partners continued to share 
information about proliferation problems with each other and with other 
potential supplier, consumer, and transshipment states. Partners also 
emphasized the need for implementing effective export control systems. 
This cooperation has resulted in the interdiction of missile-related 
materials intended for use in missile programs of concern.

  The United States was an active participant in the MTCR's June 1997 
Reinforced Point of Contact Meeting (RPOC). At the RPOC, MTCR Partners 
engaged in useful discussions of regional missile proliferators' 
concerns, as well as steps the Partners could take to increase 
transparency and outreach to nonmembers.
  In July 1997, the United States also played a leading role at the 
Swiss-hosted MTCR workshop on the licensing and enforcement aspects of 
transshipment. The workshop was successful in focusing attention on the 
enforcement problems raised by proliferators' misuse of transshipment 
and fostered a productive exchange of ideas on how countries can better 
address such activity.
  The United States worked unilaterally and in coordination with its 
MTCR Partners to combat missile proliferation and to encourage 
nonmembers to export responsibly and to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines. 
Since the last report, we have continued our missile nonproliferation 
dialogue with China, the Republic of Korea (ROK), North Korea (DPRK), 
and Ukraine. In the course of normal diplomatic relations, we also have 
pursued such discussions with other countries in Central Europe, the 
Middle East, and Asia.
  In June 1997, the United States and the DPRK held a second round of 
missile talks, aimed at freezing the DPRK's indigenous missile 
development program and curtailing its missile-related export 
activities. The DPRK appeared willing to consider limits on its 
missile-related exports, in return for sanctions-easing measures, but 
did not engage in discussion of limits on its missile development 
program. We intend to pursue further missile talks with the DPRK.
  In July 1997, we held another round of nonproliferation talks with 
the ROK. These talks were productive and made progress toward 
facilitating ROK membership in the MTCR.
  In response to reports that Iran had acquired sensitive items from 
Russian entities for use in Iran's missile development program, the 
United States intensified its high-level dialogue with Russia on this 
issue. We held a number of productive discussions with senior Russian 
officials aimed at finding ways the United States and Russia can work 
together to prevent Iran's ballistic missile development program from 
acquiring Russian technology and equipment. This process is continuing.


                            nuclear weapons

  In a truly historic landmark in our efforts to curb the spread of 
nuclear weapons, the 50th U.N. General Assembly on September 10, 1996, 
adopted and called for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT), negotiated over the previous 2\1/2\ years in the 
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The overwhelming passage of this 
U.N. resolution (158-3-5) demonstrates the CTBT's strong international 
support and marks a major success for United States foreign policy. On 
September 24, 1996, I and other international leaders signed the CTBT 
in New York.

[[Page H10596]]

  During 1997, CTBT signatories have conducted numerous meetings of the 
Preparatory Commission in Vienna, seeking to promote rapid completion 
of the International Monitoring System established by the Treaty. On 
September 23, I transmitted the CTBT to the Senate, requesting prompt 
advice and consent to ratification.
  The CTBT will serve several United States national security interests 
in banning all nuclear explosions. It will constrain the development 
and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons; end the development of 
advanced new types; contribute to the prevention of nuclear 
proliferation and the process of nuclear disarmament; and strengthen 
international peace and security. The CTBT marks an historic milestone 
in our drive to reduce the nuclear threat and to build a safer world.
  Formal preparations for the year 2000 Review Conference for the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) began in 1997 
with the first of three annual Preparatory Committee meetings of the 
Parties to the Treaty. The United States is committed to working to 
ensure that the 2000 NPT review Conference will further strengthen the 
NPT and reinforce global nuclear nonproliferation objectives. Since the 
1995 NPT Conference, eight additional states have joined the NPT, 
leaving only five states worldwide currently outside the NPT regime. 
The NPT Exporters (Zangger) Committee added China to its membership in 
1997.
  The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) continued its efforts to upgrade 
control lists and export control procedures. NSG members confirmed 
their agreement to clarifications to the nuclear trigger list to accord 
with trigger list changes agreed to by the members of the NPT Exporters 
(Zangger) Committee, and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
published these understandings on September 16, 1997. The NSG also is 
actively pursuing steps to enhance the transparency of the export 
regime in accordance with the call in Principles 16 and 17 of the 1995 
NPT Review and Extension Conference.
  The NSG held an export control seminar in Vienna on October 8 and 9, 
1997, which described and explained the role of the NSG (and the 
Zangger Committee) in preventing nuclear proliferation. The NSG also 
continued efforts to enhance information sharing among members 
regarding the nuclear programs of proliferant countries by (1) 
``officially'' linking the NSG members through a dedicated computer 
network allowing for real-time distribution of license denial 
information, and by (2) creating a separate session for exchange of 
information on the margins of the NSG plenary meeting.
  NSG membership will increase to 35 with the acceptance of Latvia. The 
ultimate goal of the NSG is to obtain the agreement of all suppliers, 
including nations not members of the regime, to control nuclear and 
nuclear-related exports in accordance with the NSG guidelines.


                                expenses

  Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 
1641(c)), I report that there were no expenses directly attributable to 
the exercise of authorities conferred by the declaration of the 
national emergency in Executive Order 12938 during the semiannual 
reporting period.
                                                  William J. Clinton.  
  The White House, November 12, 1997.

                          ____________________