[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 157 (Sunday, November 9, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12401-S12403]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         FAST-TRACK LEGISLATION

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I want to offer some thoughts on the 
proposed fast-track legislation.
  A number of other Members have made some excellent points on this 
subject, in large part reflecting my own views.
  This is especially true of the comments made by the senior Senator 
from West Virginia [Mr. Byrd], and I want to commend him for his 
constancy on this critical issue of preserving the constitutional role 
of Congress in matters of trade.
  He has rightly framed this issue, not as a question of favoring or 
opposing free or fair trade, but as a question of what role Congress 
plays in trade agreements.
  Mr. President, the fast-track proposal we are considering, and its 
predecessors, are quite recent inventions.
  Prior to the Tokyo round of the GATT, there was no fast-track 
mechanism.
  In fact, of the hundreds and hundreds of trade agreements our Nation 
has negotiated and entered into, only five have used the fast-track 
procedures.
  Mr. President, this should dispose of the argument that fast track is 
necessary for us to negotiate trade agreements.
  Fast track has been the exception, not the rule, with regard to trade 
negotiations.
  I understand this Administration has negotiated and implemented over 
200 trade agreements without fast track.
  What were some of those agreements?
  Well, Mr. President, they included: the market access agreement with 
Argentina for textiles and clothing; the market access agreement with 
Australia for textiles and clothing; the agreement on bilateral trade 
relations with Belarus; the market access agreement with Brazil for 
textiles and clothing; an agreement concerning intellectual property 
rights with Bulgaria; an agreement between the United States of America 
and the Kingdom of Cambodia on trade relations and intellectual 
property rights protection; the agreement on salmon and herring with 
Canada; the agreement on ultra-high temperature milk with Canada; the 
agreement on trade in softwood lumber with Canada; the agreement on 
intellectual property rights protection with Ecuador; a memorandum of 
understanding on trade in bananas with Costa Rica; several agreements 
with the European Union; an agreement on intellectual property rights 
protection with India; several dozen agreements with Japan; several 
dozen agreements with Korea; and many, many more agreements with dozens 
of other countries.

  And not only bilateral agreements, Mr. President, but also 
multilateral agreements such as the complex Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment, the Information Technology Agreement, and the Telecomm 
Agreement--these last two having been both negotiated and implemented 
without fast-track procedures.
  Indeed, Mr. President, the phrase ``fast-track negotiating 
authority'' is a misnomer.
  The President already has the authority to negotiate and implement 
trade agreements.
  That broad authority was most recently extended indefinitely to the 
President as part of the 1994 GATT Uruguay round implementing 
legislation.
  That authority, called ``Proclamation Authority,'' has its roots in 
the Reciprocal Trade Act of 1934, which allowed a President to ``enter 
into foreign trade agreements * * * and to proclaim such modifications 
of existing duties and other import restrictions * * * as are required 
or appropriate to carry out any foreign trade agreement.''
  Mr. President, while the ability to negotiate and enter into 
international agreements are inherently part of the President's 
constitutional powers, the Constitution grants exclusive authority to 
Congress ``to regulate Commerce with foreign nations.''
  Congress has sole constitutional authority over setting tariff levels 
and making or changing federal law.
  With the 1934 act, though, Congress delegated some of its authority 
to the President when the number and frequency of trade negotiations 
began increasing.
  It is under this ``Proclamation Authority'' that President Clinton 
has negotiated and entered into over 200 trade agreements.

[[Page S12402]]

  And he is free to continue that work.
  He did not need fast track to negotiate those agreements, and he does 
not need it to negotiate additional agreements.
  At a recent meeting on this very issue, one of the participants 
suggested that everyone ought to pay a one dollar fine every time they 
used the phrase ``fast-track negotiating authority,'' because it was so 
fundamentally misleading.
  Mr. President, the Senate might consider adopting such a rule, and if 
we did adopt a $1 fine for using the phrase ``fast-track negotiating 
authority,'' we might balance the budget ahead of schedule, maybe even 
begin to pay down the debt.
  Until we do adopt such a rule, Mr. President, we will just have to be 
alert to the misuse of that phrase, and correct those who employ it.
  Mr. President, those who support fast track constantly make the 
argument that if you want free trade, you have to enact fast track.
  They equate fast track with free trade.
  The reason is obvious.
  The arguments for free trade are powerful.
  Indeed, I agree with those arguments.
  We as a nation are better off in a world with freer trade than we are 
without it.
  But the underlying premise, that we need fast track to achieve free 
and fair trade, is absolutely false.
  Mr. President, I have referred to the hundreds of trade agreements 
negotiated by this Administration without fast-track procedures.
  That is evidence enough.
  But let me also argue that not only is fast track not necessary for 
free trade, it may actually undermine it.
  Mr. President, one of the greatest defects of the recently enacted 
NAFTA and GATT agreements was the perception that those agreements 
picked winners and losers.
  I believe strongly that those perceptions are based on reality, that 
some industries were huge winners in those agreements, while other 
industries were effectively written off.
  Mr. President, Wisconsin had more than its share of those industries 
that were written off, and at the top of that list, at the very top was 
the dairy farmer.
  There is no doubt in my mind that other industries were given a 
higher priority than our dairy farmers, and the results of those 
agreements underscore that feeling.
  Under the GATT, the European Union is allowed to export 20 times the 
amount of dairy products under subsidy that the United States is 
allowed to export.
  Mr. President, not only did we formally provide the EU this 
significant advantage in that agreement with respect to dairy, 
apparently the EU is not even complying with those incredibly generous 
limitations.
  The lower priority industries do not end with dairy, and while our 
more populous cities--Milwaukee, Madison, Green Bay--experienced 
serious job the fallout from the winners and losers approach extended 
to many smaller communities.
  Even if we only use the extremely conservative statistics collected 
by the Department of Labor--statistics which many argue grossly 
understate actual job loss--smaller communities all over Wisconsin have 
been the victim of this winners and losers approach to trade 
agreements.
  These include places such as: DeForest, with 40 lost jobs; Elkhorn, 
with 50 lost jobs; Hawkins, with 443 lost jobs; Mauston, with 48 lost 
jobs; Merrill, with 84 lost jobs; Montello, with 25 lost jobs; 
Peshtigo, with 69 lost jobs; and Platteville, with 576 lost jobs.

  Mr. President, to trade negotiators whose focus was on advancing the 
prospects of those industries they predetermined to be winners, the 
losses experienced elsewhere apparently were unfortunate but 
acceptable.
  For the communities I mentioned, Mr. President, those losses were 
real--real workers with real families to support.
  Mr. President, the fast-track procedures under which GATT and NAFTA 
were negotiated and implemented invites this kind of polarization at 
the negotiating table.
  And it is this kind of economic disparity produced by these trade 
agreements--the picking of winners and losers--that undermines broad 
public support for pursuing free trade agreements.
  Mr. President, free trade ought to benefit all sectors of the 
economy.
  Without fast-track procedures, our negotiators will know their work 
product will undergo rigorous congressional scrutiny.
  And they will know that it will be much more difficult to enact a 
trade agreement that disproportionately benefits some while 
disadvantaging others.
  Mr. President, it is this kind of trade agreement--one which benefits 
the entire economy--that will enhance the cause of free trade.
  Mr. President, fast track also encourages another disturbing trend in 
trade agreements, namely advancing the short-term interests of 
multinational corporations over those of the average worker and 
consumer.
  The increasing globalization of the economy confronts us every day.
  Few can doubt the enormous power multinational corporations wield in 
trade agreements, from the negotiating table itself to the closed-door 
bargaining that will go on before the implementing legislation is sent 
to Congress.
  Fast track procedures make it all the easier for those interests to 
advance an agreement that may include provisions which conflict with 
the interests of our Nation.
  With opposition to the entire agreement the only alternative left to 
Congress, and with the considerable weight of the multinational 
corporate interests behind any proposal, it is likely that Congress 
will swallow even a deeply flawed agreement.
  Mr. President, what does that do for the public support necessary for 
free trade?
  It severely undermines it, Mr. President, and puts future trade 
agreements that can enhance our economy at risk.
  Fast-track also undermines the cause of free trade in another 
important way, Mr. President.
  The proposal we are considering partitions off a number of issues 
that are vital to achieving a sustainable trade agreement, including 
currency stability, human rights, and worker and environmental 
protections.
  None of these issues is brought under fast-track procedures.
  Mr. President, we have only to look to recent Mexican history, their 
political turmoil and fiscal roller coaster culminating in the peso 
crisis, to understand the importance of these other issues to the long-
term success of any trade agreement.
  Even NAFTA's most ardent supporters will concede these events 
severely undermined any benefits to our economy that were hoped for 
under that agreement.
  Mr. President, one might have thought those events would have been a 
lesson on which we could draw.
  Instead, the fast-track proposal actually backslides in this area.
  And for what reason, Mr. President?
  What possible reason can there be to specifically exclude these areas 
from fast-track procedures?
  Some might suggest the reason is that while our national long-term 
interests could be well served by including these issues in a trade 
agreement to ensure a rising quality of living with our trading 
partners, such issues might conflict with the short-term goals of some 
multinational interests that look only at next year's bottom line.
  Others might argue the reason stems from the desire of some interests 
to pursue a race to the bottom in worker and environmental protection, 
and in basic human rights.
  Such interests can use the leverage of international trade to change 
those fundamental standards they have been unable to change directly.
  Mr. President, there is certainly no argument that specifically 
excluding these issues from fast-track procedures will enhance our 
ability to negotiate.
  Human rights, working conditions, environmental protections --these 
are all great strengths of this Nation.
  Preventing our trade negotiators from drawing on these great national 
strengths limits our flexibility at the table.
  There is no reason to tie our negotiators hands in these areas.
  In this important regard, the fast-track proposal we are considering 
is a barrier to a sustainable free trade agreement.

[[Page S12403]]

  Mr. President, let me turn to another provision in the current fast-
track proposal.
  It may surprise some to know that while specific issues closely 
related to the long-term success and sustainability of any trade 
agreement are excluded, the provisions which offset the costs of any 
trade agreement--provisions which have absolutely no connection to the 
trade agreement or the willingness of our partners to negotiate with 
us--those funding provisions are covered by fast-track procedures.
  What does this mean, Mr. President?
  It means that Congress cannot amend, it cannot even strike, 
provisions which are attached to implementing legislation to offset the 
costs of the trade agreement.
  It means that the most unjustified funding mechanism attached to 
trade implementing legislation under fast track will remain unscathed.
  Mr. President, let me stress these funding provisions are not part of 
the trade agreement itself.
  Our trading partners do not get a say in how we offset the cost of a 
trade agreement.
  One might ask, if our trading partners have no say in the offset 
provisions, why are those provisions included under fast-track 
procedures.
  An excellent question, Mr. President.
  Many of us will recall the GATT implementing measure which included 
some controversial funding provisions, including a change in the 
actuarial standards of the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp. and what 
many viewed as a sweetheart deal for certain media giants that gave 
them preferential treatment with respect to FCC licenses.
  Neither of those offsets had anything to do with the underlying trade 
agreement.
  Both certainly deserved more scrutiny than they received under the 
constraints of fast-track procedures.
  Whatever justification there may be for providing special procedures 
for trade agreements, procedures which supporters argue are necessary 
to attract our trading partners to the table, there is no such 
justification for shielding the funding provisions from thorough 
congressional scrutiny and review.
  Mr. President, we are talking about possible tax increases here.
  Though not required, as I understand it, among the offsets that 
comply with our budget rules are tax increases.
  To put it gently, it is ironic that many who would amend our 
Constitution to require a supermajority vote before any taxes could be 
increased are now prepared to support a fast-track bill that sweeps 
away even the most modest review of possible tax increases.
  Evidently, as long as it is done in the name of free trade, even the 
most outrageous inconsistency is permitted.
  Mr. President, let me reiterate that many of us who support free and 
fair trade find nothing inconsistent with that support and insisting 
that Congress be a full partner in approving agreements.
  Indeed, as Senator Byrd has noted, support for fast-track procedures 
reveals a lack of confidence in the ability of our negotiators to craft 
a sound agreement, or a lack of confidence in the ability of Congress 
to weigh regional and sectoral interests against the national interest, 
or may simply be a desire by the administration to avoid the hard work 
necessary to convince Congress to support the agreements it negotiates.
  Mr. President, I can think of no better insurance policy for a sound 
trade agreement than the prospect of a thorough Congressional review, 
complete with the ability to amend that agreement.
  Not only would the threat of possible Congressional modification spur 
our negotiators to produce the best product possible, that potential 
for Congressional intervention could serve as an effective club in the 
hands of our negotiators when bargaining with our trading partners.
  Mr. President, with hundreds of trade agreements negotiated and 
implemented without fast track, the refrain we hear again and again, 
that we need to enact fast track in order to negotiate trade 
agreements, is off key.
  We do not need fast track to negotiate trade agreements.
  As I have argued today, in several important ways, fast-track invites 
bad trade agreements.
  It produces agreements that pick winners and losers instead of 
advancing all sectors of the economy together.
  It produces agreements designed to respond to the short-term 
interests of multinational corporations instead of fostering long-term 
sustainable economic growth.
  It produces agreements that encourage a race-to-the-bottom in 
critical areas of human rights, and worker and environmental 
protection, instead of improving those standards around the World.
  It protects the completely unrelated funding provisions in trade 
implementing legislation, and as such invites enormous abuse.
  Mr. President, fast track is bad for free trade.
  We don't need it, and we shouldn't enact it.
  I urge my colleagues to join me in opposing this legislation, and in 
doing so, voting for free and fair trade.

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