[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 157 (Sunday, November 9, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12235-S12236]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




  REDUCING THE RISK OF UNAUTHORIZED OR ACCIDENTAL LAUNCH OF BALLISTIC 
                                MISSILES

  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, as hard as it is for me to believe, it 
was 8 years ago this month that the Berlin Wall came tumbling down. Who 
among us can forget the stirring pictures of that moment? The entire 
world watched as jubilant Germans, separated for 38 years by a man-made 
scar running the length of their country, breached this once 
impregnable barrier. In so doing, they not only united Germany, they 
brought together a continent.
  The dismantlement of the wall dramatically symbolized to all that 
democracy had at last triumphed over totalitarianism. The fall of the 
wall set in motion a series of incredible events. In June 1991, Boris 
Yeltsin became the first democratically elected Russian President. Two 
months later Yeltsin disbanded the Communist Party. By the end of 1991, 
the Soviet Union itself ceased to exist. And the Warsaw Pact, the once 
fearsome military alliance established to counter and defeat NATO, was 
officially dissolved.
  After five decades of tension, the loss of thousands of lives, and 
the expenditure of several trillion dollars, the cold war was over. 
However, as the euphoria of this historic occasion began to melt away, 
leaders in the United States, Europe, and Russia began to realize that 
the national security paradigms they had used for nearly half a century 
no longer applied. They would be required to think anew--a task that 
presented both challenges and opportunities.
  President George Bush took the first steps toward aligning our 
national security posture with the emerging post-cold war realities in 
September 1991.
  Acting on the advice of Gen. George Butler, the commander in chief of 
the U.S. Strategic Command, President Bush ordered the U.S. Air Force 
to stand-down the portion of our strategic bomber force it had kept 
ready to fly at a moment's notice for most of the cold war. Shortly 
thereafter, the nuclear weapons on-board these planes were removed and 
placed in storage. President Bush would also take off alert status 
those strategic missiles earmarked for elimination under the START I 
Treaty.
  President Clinton has also contributed to solving our post-cold war 
security concerns. Under his leadership, the Senate ratified the START 
II Treaty, which limits the United States and Russia to no more than 
3,500 strategic weapons. President Clinton completed negotiations on 
the Chemical Weapons Convention and secured the Senate's approval this 
past April. The CWC treaty would eliminate the scourge of chemical 
weapons from the face of the Earth. And finally, just 1 month ago, 
President Clinton submitted to the

[[Page S12236]]

Senate the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. If enacted, this treaty would 
be a useful tool in our efforts to stem proliferation. I hope the 
Senate will be allowed to act on this treaty when we return.
  While we have made some progress in realigning our national security 
policies to more fully reflect the realities of the post-cold war 
world, we still have much more to accomplish. Perhaps the most 
startling and dramatic indicator of how far we have to go is the fact 
that, as I stand here today--8 years after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall--the United States and Russia still possess roughly 14,000 
strategic nuclear weapons and tens of thousands more tactical nuclear 
weapons. And even more alarming, both sides keep the vast majority of 
their strategic weapons on a high level of alert.
  In a recent editorial, former Senator Sam Nunn and Dr. Bruce Blair 
assert that each nuclear superpower maintains roughly 3,000 strategic 
nuclear warheads ready to launch at a moment's notice. According to 
Nunn and Blair, while this practice may have been necessary during the 
cold war, ``today [it] constitutes a dangerous anachronism.''
  Mr. President, I believe we can and must do much more to address the 
threat posed by nuclear weapons. On September 17, I sent a letter to 
the Congressional Budget Office asking them to assess the budgetary and 
security consequences of a series of measures designed to reduce the 
spread of nuclear weapons and the likelihood they would ever be used.
  I expect to receive preliminary results from this inquiry by early 
next year. In addition, I conducted a meeting earlier this week to 
explore one particular means of reducing the risk of unauthorized or 
accidental use of nuclear weapons--removing from alert status some 
fraction of the strategic ballistic missile force.
  As a result of this meeting and a series of discussions with Senator 
Nunn, Dr. Blair, and General Butler, I am convinced that it is time to 
seriously consider de-alerting at least a portion of our strategic 
ballistic missile. I say this for several reasons. First, the 
likelihood of a surprise, bolt-out-of-the-blue attack of our strategic 
nuclear forces is unimaginable if not impossible in today's world.
  Keeping large numbers of weapons on high alert status fails to 
recognize this reality.
  Second, concerns are growing about the reliability and condition of 
the Russian early warning and command and control systems. United 
States security depends on the Russians' ability to accurately assess 
the status of United States forces and to control their own forces. 
Public reports indicate their early warning sensors are aging and 
incomplete, their command and control system is deteriorating, and the 
morale of the personnel operating these systems is suffering as a 
result of the lack of pay and difficult working conditions.
  It is in our interest to have Russian missiles taken off alert and 
Russian leaders given more time to interpret and respond to events.
  Third, de-alerting a portion of our strategic missile force now could 
strengthen the hand of those in the Russian Duma who support START II 
and other United States-Russian security measures. De-alerting some 
United States strategic missiles could send an important signal at a 
crucial stage in Russia's consideration of the START II Treaty. In 
addition, when President Bush took unilateral action to de-alert a 
portion of our strategic forces, President Gorbachev reciprocated by 
removing from alert a number of Russian land- and sea-based missiles.
  Finally, de-alerting a portion of our strategic missile force would 
not sacrifice U.S. security. The United States has already indicated a 
willingness to reduce its total strategic force to as few as 2,000 
weapons. Even if we were to de-alert the entire MX force, the United 
States would retain roughly 2,500 weapons on alert status, and several 
thousand more could be made ready to launch. Moreover, should 
circumstances warrant, the United States could reverse any de-alerting 
measures it may take.
  Mr. President, despite the fact that the Soviet Union dissolved and 
the cold war ended, the risks posed by nuclear weapons persist and 
evolve.
  I plan to do what I can to explore options for reducing these risks. 
I believe de-alerting a portion of our missile force merits further 
study in this regard. I look forward to working with my colleagues and 
the administration in the next session of Congress to fully explore 
this measure as well as any other that could lessen the dangers of 
nuclear weapons.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.

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