[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 156 (Saturday, November 8, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12192-S12193]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




               SUPPORT THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

 Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I rise to join a number of my 
colleagues in speaking briefly about one of the most important issues 
that will come before the Senate next year in the second session of the 
105th Congress.
  In late September, President Clinton submitted the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty to the Senate for ratification. The President's transmission 
statement includes the following:

       The Conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty 
     is a signal event in the history of arms control. The subject 
     of the treaty is one that has been under consideration by the 
     international community for

[[Page S12193]]

     nearly 40 years, and the significance of the conclusion of 
     negotiations and the signature to date of more than 140 
     states cannot be overestimated. The Treaty creates an 
     absolute prohibition against the conduct of nuclear weapon 
     test explosions or any other nuclear explosion anywhere. . . 
     . The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is of singular 
     significance to the continuing efforts to stem nuclear 
     proliferation and strengthen regional and global stability. 
     Its conclusion marks the achievement of the highest priority 
     item on the international arms control and nonproliferation 
     agenda.

  I commend the President for his leadership on this issue. I look 
forward to working closely and in a bipartisan fashion to secure prompt 
ratification of the CTBT. I will do absolutely everything I can to 
support the passage of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I expect a 
spirited debate on the CTBT including vigorous opposition from some who 
continue to believe in nuclear expansion and experimentation.
  Several Senate hearings have recently been held and I urge the body 
to move forward in a timely and deliberative manner early in 1998. As a 
member of the Appropriations Energy and Water subcommittee with funding 
responsibility for nuclear weapons activities including stockpile 
stewardship, I look forward to actively participating in Senate 
consideration of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
  Mr. President, at this point, I ask that a brief titled, ``Ten 
Reasons for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,'' be printed in the 
Record. This information was prepared by a nongovernmental organization 
in support of CTBT ratification.
  The material follows:

       Ten Reasons for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.


  1. the ctbt would guard against the renewal of the nuclear arms race

       The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would limit the ability 
     of nuclear weapons states to build new nuclear weapons by 
     prohibiting ``any nuclear weapon test explosions and all 
     other nuclear explosions.'' The ban on nuclear explosions 
     would severely impede the development of new, sophisticated 
     nuclear weapons by the existing nuclear powers. While 
     countries could build advanced, new types of nuclear weapons 
     designs without nuclear explosive testing, they will lack the 
     high confidence that the weapons will work as designed. Thus, 
     the Treaty can impede a nuclear arms buildup by five declared 
     and three undeclared nuclear weapon states.


          2. The CTBT would curb nuclear weapons proliferation

       Under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, ``threshold'' 
     states would be prevented from carrying out the types of 
     tests required to field a modern nuclear arsenal. While a 
     country could develop nuclear weapons for the first time 
     without conducting nuclear explosions, the bomb design would 
     be fare from optimal in size and weight and its nuclear 
     explosive power would remain uncertain. The CTBT is therefore 
     vital to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to 
     additional states, where these weapons could destabilize 
     international security.


   3. The CTBT would strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

       The conclusion of the CTBT is a key element in the global 
     bargain that led to the signing and the extension of the 
     Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. in May 1995, non-nuclear 
     states agreed to extend that Treaty in May 1995 with the 
     understanding that Article VI measures in the original 
     treaty--like the CTBT--would be implemented. At the May 1995 
     NPT extension conference, all nations agreed to ``The 
     completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the 
     negotiations on a universal and internationally and 
     effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
     no later than 1996.'' Ratification of the CTBT would further 
     legitimize U.S. non-proliferation efforts and lay the basis 
     for universal enforcement of the CTBT, even against the few 
     nations that may not sign.


    4. Nuclear testing is not necessary to maintain the safety and 
                    reliability of the U.S. arsenal

       The U.S. has a solid and proven warhead surveillance and 
     maintenance program to preserve the safety and reliability of 
     the U.S. nuclear deterrent without nuclear test explosions 
     and this program is being augmented through the Science-Based 
     Stockpile Stewardship Program (SBSS). Although some of the 
     projects that are part of the SBSS program are not essential 
     to the maintenance of the stockpile, many objective experts--
     both critics and supporters of the program--agree that the 
     program can ensure the safety and reliability of the U.S. 
     nuclear stockpile without resorting to nuclear explosive 
     testing.
       All operational U.S. nuclear weapons are already ``one-
     point safe'' against accidental detonation of the warhead's 
     high explosives, making even low-yield nuclear explosions, 
     known as ``hydronuclear'' tests unnecessary. in addition, the 
     nuclear warhead designs of operational U.s. nuclear weapons 
     incorporate additional modern safety features. Since 
     instituting a new annual warhead safety and reliability 
     certification process in 1995, U.S. nuclear weapons have been 
     twice certified without nuclear test explosions.


                 5. The CTBT is effectively verifiable

       The CTBT would put into place an extensive, global array of 
     170 seismic monitoring stations, 80 radionuclide monitoring 
     stations, 11 hydroacoustic monitoring stations, and 60 
     infrasound monitoring stations to detect and deter possible 
     nuclear test explosions. Monitoring capabilities would be 
     especially sensitive at and around the established nuclear 
     test sites. With this monitoring system, the CTBT would--with 
     high confidence--be able to detect nuclear test explosions 
     that are militarily significant. In addition, the CTBT 
     would provide an additional deterrent against potential 
     test ban violations by establishing on-site inspection 
     (OSI) rights that could allow detection of the radioactive 
     gases leaking from an underground nuclear test.


    6. the ctbt would substantially enhance current u.s. monitoring 
                              capabilities

       Whether or not the CTBT is ratified, U.S. intelligence 
     agencies will be tasked with monitoring nuclear weapons 
     programs of the nuclear powers and the efforts of non-nuclear 
     states and groups to attain nuclear weapons. The Treaty will 
     make that task easier by establishing a far-reaching 
     international monitoring system across the globe that would 
     augment existing national intelligence tools. Clearly, U.S. 
     intelligence capabilities to detect nuclear tests and nuclear 
     weapons development programs would be far better with the 
     CTBT


   7. the ctbt would enhance the international norm against nuclear 
                                testing

       If the five declared nuclear weapon states ratify the 
     Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, it will strengthen the global 
     norm against testing and weapons development that helps make 
     the nuclear ``have-not'' nations far less inclined to develop 
     nuclear weapons. The U.S. has not tested a nuclear weapon 
     since 1992 when Congress passed and President Bush signed the 
     Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell legislation establishing a moratorium 
     on nuclear testing. This law, which remains in effect, says 
     that the U.S. may not conduct a nuclear test explosion unless 
     another nation conducts a test. CTBT ratification would help 
     bring other nations in line with U.S. policy.


  8. the ctbt is supported by a large majority of the american people

       The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is supported by a large 
     majority of the American people. U.S. public support for a 
     nuclear weapons test ban has remained consistently high since 
     the early days of the Cold War. The most recent poll, 
     conducted in September 1997 by the Mellman Group, revealed 
     that 70 percent of Americans support United States 
     ratification of a nuclear test an treaty.


  9. the ctbt is the longest-sought initiative to help reduce nuclear 
                            weapons dangers

       The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty marks an historic 
     achievement pursued by Presidents since Dwight D. Eisenhower. 
     For forty years, Presidents and activists have worked for an 
     end to nuclear testing. Previous negotiations have been 
     hindered by international incidents, the failure to 
     compromise at key times, and most importantly, the political 
     dynamics of the Cold War nuclear arms race itself. 
     Ratification of the CTBT would mark an important milestone in 
     the effort to end the nuclear arms race.


      10. The ctbt would protect human health and the environment

       Since 1945, six nations have conducted 2,046 nuclear test 
     explosions--an average of one test every nine days. These 
     tests spread dangerous levels of radioactive fallout downwind 
     and into the global atmosphere. A 1997 National Cancer 
     Institute Study estimates that fallout from only 90 U.S. 
     nuclear test will likely cause 10,000--75,000 additional 
     thyroid cancers in the U.S. Underground testing also poses 
     environmental hazards: each blast spreads highly radioactive 
     material underground; many underground nuclear explosions 
     have vented radioactive gases. The Energy Department reports 
     that 114 of the 723 U.S. nuclear tests since 1963 released 
     radioactive material into the atmosphere.

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