[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 155 (Friday, November 7, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11957-S11958]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      SENATOR BIDEN'S NATO SPEECH

  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, our colleague, Senator Joe Biden, addressed 
the Permanent Representatives to the North Atlantic Council, the so 
called NAC, during their visit to the United States last month. His 
speech was an impressive overview of the state of debate here in the 
United States on NATO enlargement and how that debate is being affected 
the debate in Europe on issues of transatlantic security. Among these 
are, of course, the effort to foster reconciliation and peace in the 
Balkans.
  The next coming months will feature a number of important events 
concerning NATO enlargement, including the NAC ministerial in mid-
December which will yield protocols of accession into NATO for Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic.
  Keeping in mind the debate that we will have early next year on NATO 
enlargement, I encourage my colleagues to read Senator Binden's 
statement. It is one that should also be closely read by our colleagues 
in the executive branch.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Biden's 
outstanding speech on NATO enlargement be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

          Ratification of NATO Enlargement by the U.S. Senate

                   (By Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.)

       I am honored by the invitation of the North Atlantic 
     Council to share my thoughts on the American side of one of 
     the most important foreign policy decisions that our alliance 
     has faced for many decades: ratification of the admission of 
     Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to membership in the 
     North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
       First, let me make clear that I am a strong proponent of 
     NATO enlargement. In the interest of brevity, and because 
     there is no need to persuade this audience, I will not go 
     into the details of my rationale.
       Let me just say I believe the case for enlargement is 
     overwhelmingly persuasive. First, it is my belief that the 
     inclusion of the three aforementioned countries--if they meet 
     all of NATO's rigid political, military, and economic 
     criteria--would strengthen the alliance and enhance the 
     security of the United States.
       Second, the consequences if we fail to act are equally 
     serious. The history of the twentieth century has taught us 
     that if the United States distances itself from European 
     affairs, the result on the continent is instability leading 
     to chaos. Ultimately, dealing with the instability and chaos 
     will cost far more in blood and treasure than the initial 
     costs of staying engaged.
       Finally, there is the moral factor. As Secretary of State 
     Albright noted in her testimony before the Senate Foreign 
     Relations Committee:
       What possible justification can there be for confirming the 
     old cold war division of Europe by freezing out the new 
     democracies east of Germany?
       As most of you know, according to the U.S. Constitution, 
     international treaties must be ratified by a two-thirds 
     majority in the Senate. In this case, we would be ratifying 
     an amendment to the Treaty of Washington of 1949. As the 
     Democratic party's chief foreign policy spokesman in the 
     Senate, I have the responsibility to lead the fight for 
     ratification.
       Despite what I believe to be the overwhelming logic for 
     NATO enlargement, ratification will not be easy--it will not 
     be a ``slam dunk,'' as we say in this country. It will be 
     considered, not only in the context of national security 
     policy, but in the context of domestic politics.
       And in the context of our debate about engagement versus 
     isolationism. I know most of you are primarily concerned with 
     military matters. But I hope you will convey to the civilian 
     and political leaders in each of your countries the kinds of 
     issues that could derail ratification in the U.S. Senate--to 
     the detriment of all of us.
       My principal reasons for being cautious about NATO 
     enlargement revolve around two sides of the same issue: 
     burden-sharing. The first side relates to sharing the costs 
     of NATO enlargement; the second side relates to sharing the 
     military duties in Bosnia.
       Contrary to assertions by some European politicians, these 
     cost and burden-sharing issues are not superficial problems. 
     They have direct relevance, not only to the ratification of 
     enlargement, but also to the kind of alliance we will have in 
     the 21st century.
       First the costs. There has been a good deal of publicity in 
     the United States about three widely differing cost estimates 
     of NATO enlargement. NATO's own cost-estimate--mandated by 
     the North Atlantic Council at last July's Madrid summit--will 
     not be known until just before the December NATO ministerial. 
     So any firm predictions about how that will come out would be 
     risky and premature.
       Nonetheless, the latest estimate from the Clinton 
     administration, offered this week in testimony before the 
     Foreign Relations Committee, was somewhat reassuring. It 
     appears that the NATO estimate may be somewhat lower than the 
     Pentagon's earlier study because only three--not four--
     countries are to be added to the alliance, and some of their 
     militaries are in a bit better shape than previously thought.
       Whatever the final numbers, the atmospherics of the debate 
     over cost-sharing since Madrid have been damaging to Trans-
     Atlantic solidarity. Public statements from West European 
     leaders that their countries should not--or even will not--
     pay any additional costs for enlargement given potent 
     ammunition both to neo-isolationists in the U.S. Senate and 
     to those who favor engagement but who have legitimate 
     questions about costs.
       Although there have been many warnings in the United States 
     about the possibly huge costs of NATO enlargement, to my 
     knowledge not a single American politician has said that we 
     will not pay our share if enlargement is ratified. Yet when 
     European leaders--before even waiting for the official NATO 
     cost-study to come out in December--threaten not to pay even 
     one additional franc or mark for enlargement, it is waving a 
     red flag in front of my colleagues in the Senate.
       Many of my fellow Senators are aware of the fact that West 
     Europeans face competing priorities. We know that the eleven 
     European NATO members who are also members of the European 
     Union are currently engaged in painful budget cutting in 
     order to meet the criteria for a single currency, the 
     Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) on January 1, 1999. And we 
     are aware that Germany and others are insisting that those 
     countries who qualify be held to rigid fiscal discipline 
     thereafter through a so-called ``stability pact'' without 
     ``political'' criteria.

[[Page S11958]]

       We do not underestimate the political stakes: resentment 
     against this belt-tightening played a key role in the defeat 
     of President Chirac's coalition in the French national 
     elections last June and in the one-day temporary fall of 
     Prime Minister Prodi's government in Italy earlier this 
     month. Several other EU member states have also seen anti-
     austerity demonstrations.
       As a politician, I empathize with the challenge my European 
     parliamentary colleagues face. But we all have to make 
     difficult choices. For example, in my country after years of 
     spirited debate we have finally agreed upon a plan to balance 
     the Federal budget by the year 2002. In fact, by having taken 
     extremely painful measures like reducing the civilian Federal 
     workforce by more than a quarter-million individuals we may 
     reach a balanced budget even earlier.
       So however difficult it may be, if you--our European 
     allies--want continued American involvement in your security, 
     to use a baseball metaphor, your governments will have to 
     ``step up to the plate.'' Let me be as frank as I possibly 
     can: Americans simply must not be led to believe that our 
     European allies will cut corners on NATO in order to fulfill 
     their obligations to the European union.
       Let me go one step further, if NATO is to remain a vibrant 
     organization with the United States playing a lead role, when 
     the alliance cost figures are issued in December, the non-
     U.S. members must join the United States in declaring their 
     willingness to assume their fair share of direct enlargement 
     costs.
       This includes developing the power projection capabilities 
     to which all alliance members agreed in the ``strategic 
     concept'' in 1991, before enlargement was even being 
     seriously discussed. The flexibility afforded by these power 
     projection enhancements are central to NATO's ability to 
     carry out its expanded, new mission--to defend our common 
     ideals beyond our borders, while we continue to carry out the 
     core function of defending the territory of alliance members.
       Some of our European allies--the United Kingdom, France, 
     Germany, and the Netherlands, in particular--are making 
     strides in improving the deployability and sustainability of 
     their forces. But neither their forces, nor those of the rest 
     of our European partners, are as yet fully deployable.
       If our European partners were not to meet these force-
     projection obligations--and it was this part of the Pentagon 
     study that occasioned the loudest criticism from across the 
     Atlantic--the United States would continue to possess the 
     only fully deployable and sustainable land and air forces in 
     the alliance and would therefore be cast in the permanent 
     role of ``the good gendarme of Europe''--a role that neither 
     the American people, nor the Senate of the United States, 
     would accept.
       I also would like to comment on the recent call by some 
     West European defense ministers for counting economic 
     assistance to Central and Eastern Europe as a substitute for 
     meeting their countries' current alliance commitments and 
     their future share of enlargement costs. Their proposal makes 
     no sense and is totally counter-productive.
       First of all, European statistics on economic assistance 
     typically include healthy components of export credits, tied 
     aid, and investment, making alleged comparisons with U.S. 
     assistance one of ``apples versus oranges.'' Thus, the 
     difference in the amount of economic aid from Western Europe 
     and from the United States is less significant than some 
     European politicians would have us believe.
       Second, even if Western European economic assistance to the 
     East since 1990 has exceeded our own, it would be unwise to 
     consider these contributions as a substitute for obligations 
     related to NATO's military budget: it would only reinforce 
     the ``European businessman''/``American gendarme'' syndrome. 
     It would widen the military gap between the U.S. and the 
     continent and, not unintentionally, give a comparative 
     advantage to Western European companies in dealing with the 
     East on the economic front. We in the United States simply 
     won't play that game.
       Third, and most importantly, such substitution arguments 
     are ultimately self-defeating for Europe. As many of my 
     Senate colleagues are eager to point out, if Western Europe 
     claims security credit for its economic assistance to Eastern 
     Europe, then the United States can justifiably claim credit 
     for its worldwide containment of the threat of nuclear 
     proliferation, for keeping international sea lanes open, and 
     for guaranteeing continued access to Middle East oil.
       To be blunt: I don't think you want us to play that game, 
     because we can win it hands down.
       The real point is that burden-sharing is not a book-keeping 
     exercise. We would all do well to restrict the NATO burden-
     sharing discussion to just that--military burden-sharing in 
     the alliance.
       One other point related to comparative spending on defense: 
     above and beyond enlargement and power-projection capability, 
     unless you--our European allies--significantly upgrade your 
     militaries, particularly in gathering and real-time 
     processing of information, a ``strategic disconnect'' between 
     a technologically superior United States military and 
     outdated Western European militaries will eventually make it 
     impossible for NATO to function effectively. From several 
     personal conversations, I believe that this is a worry that 
     many of you share.
       There is a second dark cloud looming on the horizon of 
     Trans-Atlantic relations. In the spring of 1998, just when 
     the U.S. Senate is likely to be voting on amending the Treaty 
     of Washington to accept new members, American SFOR ground 
     forces are scheduled to be completing their withdrawal from 
     Bosnia.
       As it now stands, our European NATO allies will follow 
     suit, in line with their ``in together, out together'' 
     policy, despite a U.S. offer to make our air, naval, 
     communications, and intelligence assets available to a 
     European-led follow-on force, with an American rapid reaction 
     force on standby alert ``over the horizon'' in Hungary or 
     Italy.
       My colleagues in the Senate have listened carefully as some 
     European NATO members, led by France, call for more European 
     leadership in the alliance and for a sturdier ``European 
     pillar'' in NATO. But when they hear those same European 
     voices say they will refuse to maintain troops in Bosnia 
     without U.S. participation, it sounds like unfair burden-
     sharing and it only reinforces their doubts about NATO 
     itself. After all, if Bosnia is the prototypical crisis 
     the alliance will face in the next century, and internal 
     squabbling prevents it from dealing effectively with 
     Bosnia now, even staunch NATO supporters will be hard-
     pressed to defend its continued relevance.
       France's position on Bosnia is particularly irritating when 
     one considers its insistence on European command of Allied 
     Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) in Naples, the home of the 
     U.S. Sixth Fleet. No matter how Paris tries to dress it up, 
     this demand is perceived by U.S. Senators as a gratuitous 
     poke in the eye. Not only is this idea a non-starter, it 
     simply poisons the Trans-Atlantic atmosphere.
       As many of you may know, I have been deeply involved in our 
     policy toward Bosnia since 1991. My own personal view is that 
     it was unwise to have set a June 1998 date for SFOR's 
     withdrawal and that the United States should agree to a 
     scaled-down ground force in Bosnia beyond that date, with 
     Europeans comprising the overwhelming majority of the ground 
     forces. In short, a C.J.T.F. (combined joint task force), but 
     one in which the United States has at least some forces 
     present in all its components.
       But whatever the final mix of post-SFOR forces, it is 
     essential that we settle this issue this fall in order for an 
     orderely redeployment to take place and to clear the air for 
     the parliamentary debates on NATO enlargement. Time is 
     running short.
       Let me sum up by giving you my prognosis for ratification 
     of NATO enlargement in the U.S. Senate. The debate has 
     already begun and will continue to be lively. In the end, I 
     believe it will be very difficult for most of my colleagues 
     to vote against admitting the Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians 
     if the final accession negotiations reveal that they are 
     qualified for membership.
       But I also believe that unless the United States quickly 
     comes to a satisfactory burden-sharing understanding with our 
     European and Canadian allies, the future of NATO in the next 
     century will be very much in doubt.
       In that context, an advance European declaration of 
     willingness to share fairly in the enlargement costs that 
     NATO will announce in December, and a spirit of compromise on 
     a post-SFOR force for Bosnia, would considerably enhance the 
     chances for ratification of NATO enlargement by the U.S. 
     Senate.
       Together we can enlarge and strengthen NATO, but only if we 
     fairly share the burden of meeting the challenges of the 
     twenty-first century.

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