[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 155 (Friday, November 7, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11918-S11921]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                              WARD VALLEY

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I would like to address the issue of 
low-level waste in this country and the issue of Ward Valley. 
California is the first State to site a low-level waste facility under 
legislation passed by Congress which granted States with the authority 
and responsibility for low-level waste. Low-level radioactive waste is 
produced from cancer treatments, medical research, industrial 
activities, and scientific research. In the

[[Page S11919]]

State of California there are some 800 sites where this medical waste 
is being stored. It is being stored in temporary facilities that were 
not designed for permanent storage.
  This waste is stored near homes, schools, it's stored at college 
campuses, medical facilities, and so forth.
  This radioactive waste is vulnerable to accidental release from the 
fires and earthquakes, neither of which are uncommon in California.
  Public health and safety demands that this waste be moved from 
locations scattered across California to a single, monitored location--
preferably, in a remote and sparsely populated area.
  The State of California is the first State to take advantage of the 
Federal process that we authorized for the States to develop their own 
low-level waste sites. But it is interesting to note how the progress 
has gone--not because of the lack of commitment by California, but the 
lack of cooperation from the Department of Interior to simply conduct a 
very simple land exchange.
  The State of California, in a process which began a decade ago, is 
trying to get their facility opened. They selected a site known as Ward 
Valley in the remote Mojave Desert.
  The California license was issued in accordance with all State and 
Federal laws, and has withstood all court challenges. The license 
contains 130 specific conditions designed to protect public health, 
safety, and the environment.
  But here comes the villain--the Department of Interior--having 
earlier agreed to sell California the land for the site--changed its 
mind, returned the check, and has refused to transfer the land.
  Since that time, the Department of the Interior has engaged in 
continuous, purposeful delay. They seek more studies, allegedly to 
assure that the site will be safe.
  We all insist on a safe disposal site, and we expect no less. Thus 
far, we have had two environmental impact studies and a special 
National Academy of Science study that all point to the safety of the 
site.
  Now, the State of California, in accordance with the guidelines of 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and all applicable State and Federal 
laws, has done its job and done it well. But the Interior Department is 
still not satisfied. They want more studies. For starters, they insist 
on an additional water infiltration study and a third impact 
environmental statement.
  The State of California has generously agreed to perform the water 
infiltration study prior to any land transfer which was a tremendous 
concession on California's part. However, Interior has not thus far 
allowed California access to the land to conduct the very tests that 
Interior insists upon. Instead of working to resolve the matter, the 
Department of the Interior seems to be engaged in a cycle of continuous 
study and endless delay. One has to wonder why the Department of the 
Interior is taking such a tack.
  Are these delays and demands for more tests designed to assure public 
safety? Or are they merely part of a carefully orchestrated public 
relations campaign? Well, we can answer that question.
  Several weeks ago, a memo we uncovered from the Department of the 
Interior shed an extraordinary light on this question. In fact, this 
memo makes the motivations behind the Interior Department's actions 
absolutely clear.
  I have read this memorandum once on the floor of this body. I think 
it needs to be read again. This is a memo from Deputy Secretary John 
Garamendi, to Secretary Bruce Babbitt, Department of the Interior. It 
is short enough to read in its entirety.

  It says:

       February 21, 1996
       Memorandum
       To: Bruce Babbitt
       From: John Garamendi
       Subject: Ward Valley
       Attached are the Ward Valley clips. We have taken the high 
     ground. [Governor Pete] Wilson is the venal toady of special 
     interests.
       I do not think GreenPeace will picket you any longer. I 
     will maintain a heavy PR campaign until the issue is firmly 
     won.

  There you have the words of John Garamendi relative to his 
willingness to work with California to act in order that the low-level 
waste at some 800 sites in California can be removed and put in one 
area that will be monitored out in the Mojave Desert.
  I think this memorandum shows that Ward Valley has become a political 
football, a public relations issue. It also suggests that Interior has 
no plans other than to delay the transfer of the land. They just want 
to wage a PR campaign and delay a decision until somebody else's watch. 
They don't want to make this decision on their watch. They are putting 
it off because they know this administration is a few years from 
becoming history. They don't want to address it, they don't want the 
responsibility.
  But what has Secretary Garamendi told the Senate with regard to Ward 
Valley? How do his private statements compare to his public ones?
  At his confirmation hearing on July 27, 1995, John Garamendi 
testified under oath to our committee that the Ward Valley issue should 
and would be resolved quickly. Two years later, at a hearing on July 
22, 1997, John Garamendi told the committee that he would work in good 
faith to resolve the matter in further negotiations with the State of 
California.
  Well, we still don't have a resolution. California does not even have 
permission to do the additional testing Interior seems to want to see 
performed.
  Instead of moving a process forward and transferring the land, 
Interior seems intent on waging a public relations campaign designed to 
further delay rather than enlighten.
  Now, what have others said about the Interior Department's handling 
of this issue? Let's look at the experts.
  The General Accounting Office, GAO, contends that the Department of 
the Interior is attempting to assess the site's suitability--a job that 
belongs to California by law and that California has already undertaken 
and completed--despite the fact that Interior ``lacks the criteria and 
expertise'' for the job. That is the opinion of the General Accounting 
Office--that Interior lacks the criteria and expertise.
  The GAO report also contends that there is no need for the new 
environmental impact statement sought by Interior since the substantive 
issues have already been addressed and that new information uncovered 
since the last environmental impact statement is generally favorable to 
the facility.
  Well, this report is too lengthy to insert into the Record, but for 
the benefit of my colleagues, I am referring to GAO report RCED-97-184, 
dated July 1997, for anybody who might want to look it up.
  To again summarize what GAO says, Mr. President, it says: First, 
Interior is trying to do a job that belongs to the State of California. 
The State of California was given the authority to do it; second, 
Interior is calling for new studies that aren't needed; third, Interior 
lacks the technical expertise to even perform these tasks.
  GAO isn't alone in their criticism of the Department of Interior's 
handling of this issue. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC, has 
joined in the process as well.
  Specifically, the NRC has been critical of the Interior Department 
for distributing fact sheets which contain errors, misleading 
statements, and information falsely attributed to the NRC that was 
actually provided by project opponents.
  That is pretty strong stuff, Mr. President, but that is factual.
  So not only is Interior waging a PR campaign, they are playing fast 
and loose with the truth in the conduct of that campaign, according to 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
  I ask unanimous consent that the letter from the Chairman of the NRC 
to the Secretary of the Interior, dated July 22, 1997, be printed in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                             United States Nuclear


                                        Regulatory Commission,

                                    Washington, DC, July 22, 1997.
     Hon. Bruce Babbitt,
     Secretary, U.S. Department of Interior, Washington, DC.
       Dear Secretary Babbitt: I am writing on behalf of the U.S. 
     Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to share our views 
     related to the Department of Interior's (DOI) actions 
     regarding the proposed Ward Valley low-level radioactive 
     waste (LLW) disposal facility in California. In February 
     1996, DOI announced that it would prepare a second supplement 
     to an environmental impact statement (SEIS) for the transfer 
     of land from the Federal government to the State of 
     California, for the development of the Ward Valley

[[Page S11920]]

     low-level radioactive waste (LLW) disposal facility. We 
     understand that DOI has identified 13 issues that it believes 
     need to be addressed in the SEIS. DOI also stated that it 
     would not make a decision on the land transfer until the SEIS 
     was completed. NRC will actively serve as a ``commenting 
     agency'' on the SEIS in accordance with the Council of 
     Environmental Quality regulations in 40 CFR 1503.2, ``Duty To 
     Comment.'' NRC's interest in the Ward Valley disposal 
     facility is focused on protection of public health and 
     safety, and many of the 13 issues to be addressed in the SEIS 
     are related to our areas of expertise. As a commenting 
     agency, we will review the draft SEIS, and provide comments 
     based on the requirements in federal law and regulations, and 
     our knowledge of policy, technical, and legal issues in LLW 
     management. We would also be available to discuss these 
     issues with DOI, both before and after publication of the 
     draft SEIS.
       On a related matter, it is our understanding that Deputy 
     Secretary John Garamendi of DOI held a press conference on 
     July 22, 1996, addressing the effect of Ward Valley facility 
     availability on the use of radioisotopes in medicine and 
     medical research. It was recently brought to our attention 
     that DOI distributed a document entitled, ``Medical, 
     Research, and Academic Low Level Radioactive Waste (LLRW) 
     Fact Sheet'' at the press conference. This Fact Sheet 
     contains several errors and statements that may mislead the 
     reader. To assist DOI, we have addressed these errors and 
     statements in the enclosure to this letter. Some of the 
     points contained in the Fact Sheet are useful and contribute 
     to the dialogue on this issue; however, NRC is concerned that 
     some of the subjective information of the document is 
     characterized as factual. We are particularly concerned by 
     the statement that the NRC definition of LLW ``. . . is an 
     unfortunate and misleading catch-all definition  . . .'' In 
     fact, NRC's definition is taken from Federal law, 
     specifically the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 
     1980, and the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments 
     Act of 1985 (LLRWPAA). Additionally, it is NRC's view that 
     some of the information that was referenced or relied on 
     in the Fact Sheet may not represent a balanced perspective 
     based on facts. For example, a table of the sources and 
     amounts of radioactive waste that is projected to go to 
     the Ward Valley facility is erroneously attributed to NRC, 
     the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. Ecology, the 
     Southwestern Compact, and the Ward Valley EIS. Raw data 
     from the sources quoted appear to have been interpreted 
     based on uncertain assumptions about future activities of 
     generators to produce the figures in the table. 
     Additionally, NRC noted that the figures in the table are 
     identical to those in a March 1994 Committee to Bridge the 
     Gap report.
       With respect to the relationship between LLW disposal 
     policy and medicine and medical research, we note that the 
     National Academy of Sciences Board on Radiation Effects 
     Research has prepared a Prospectus for a study entitled, 
     ``The Impact of United States Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
     Management Policy on Biomedical Research.'' The study would, 
     among other things, ``Evaluate the effects of higher disposal 
     costs and on-site storage on the current and future 
     activities of biomedical research, including the effects of 
     state non-compliance [with the LLRWPAA of 1985] on 
     institutions conducting biological and biomedical research 
     and on hospitals where radioisotopes are crucial for the 
     diagnosis and treatment of disease.'' Thus, the issue of 
     medical uses of radioisotopes and how they have been affected 
     by the Ward Valley process is far less clear than the Fact 
     Sheet portrays.
       Finally, since there are no formal arrangements that permit 
     NRC to review and comment on the technical accuracy of 
     various DOI documents on LLW and Ward Valley, we may not be 
     aware such documents exist, thus the absence of NRC comments 
     does not imply an NRC judgment with respect to the technical 
     accuracy or completeness of such documents.
       I trust our comments will be helpful in your efforts to 
     address Ward Valley issues.
           Sincerely,
                                              Shirley Ann Jackson.
       Enclosure: As stated.

  NRC Staff Comments on the Department of Interior ``Fact Sheet'' \1\

       1. The Fact Sheet contains a projection of LLW to be sent 
     to the Ward Valley disposal facility over its 30-year life, 
     and attributes the table to the Department of Energy, the 
     U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Southwestern Compact, 
     U.S. Ecology, and the Ward Valley environmental impact 
     statement. In fact, the figures in the table are identical to 
     those in a table from a March 1994 Committee to Bridge the 
     Gap report, are substantially different from California 
     projections, and are based on assumptions that are not 
     identified. The actual assumptions used are contained in the 
     Committee to Bridge the Gap report and minimize the amount 
     and importance of the medical waste stream.
       2. The Fact Sheet is incomplete in that it provides only 
     anecdotal evidence of the impact of not having the Ward 
     Valley disposal facility available to medical generators. 
     Although its arguments about short-lived radionuclides appear 
     to be generally true, the Fact Sheet downplays the effects on 
     generators that use longer-lived radionuclides. According to 
     the Fact Sheet, there are an estimated 53 research hospitals 
     in California, out of some 500 hospitals overall. The Fact 
     Sheet describes the impact at three of these research 
     organizations and concludes that they can manage their waste, 
     either by disposing of it at an out-of-state facility 
     (Barnwell or Envirocare), storing it, or, for sealed sources, 
     sending them back to the manufacturer. The Fact Sheet 
     concludes that there is no health and safety impact from the 
     approach, but does not address broader issues such as the 
     continued availability of existing disposal sites as an 
     option, and the fact that transferring a sealed source to a 
     manufacturer does not eliminate the problem, but simply 
     shifts it from one organization to another.
       3. The Fact Sheet does not address the more complex issues 
     concerning use of radioisotopes in medicine, such as how 
     medical research in general has been affected by issues such 
     as disposal and storage cost increases, and the need to 
     switch from longer-lived radionuclides to short-lived 
     nuclides or non-radioactive materials. The National Academy 
     of Sciences Board on Radiation Effects Research has prepared 
     a Prospectus for a study entitled ``The Impact of United 
     States Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Policy on 
     Biomedical Research.'' The study would, among other things, 
     ``Evaluate the effects of higher disposal costs and on-site 
     storage on the current and future activities of biomedical 
     research, including the effects of state noncompliance on 
     institutions conducting biological and biomedical research 
     and on hospitals where radioisotopes are crucial for the 
     diagnosis and treatment of disease.'' Thus, the issue of 
     medical uses of radioisotopes and how they have been affected 
     by the Ward Valley process is far less clear than the Fact 
     Sheet portrays.
       4. The Fact Sheet characterizes the NRC definition of LLW 
     in 10 CFR Part 61 as ``unfortunate and misleading'' because 
     it includes both long-lived and short-lived radionuclides. It 
     fails to acknowledge that this definition is contained in 
     Federal law (the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 
     1980 and the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments 
     Act of 1985) and that information on the kinds and amounts of 
     radionuclides contained in LLW for land disposal is widely 
     available in NRC regulations and/or NUREGS, and from DOE. In 
     developing Part 61 in the early 1980s. NRC sought public 
     comment on the proposed rule, and provided extensive 
     information on the assumptions, analyses, and proposed 
     content of the regulation for review. In developing the 
     regulations for LLW, including how different classes are 
     defined, NRC received and considered extensive public input. 
     Four regional workshops were held, and 107 persons commented 
     on the draft rulemaking, for 10 CFR Part 61, which defines 
     LLW. In short, NRC encouraged public involvement in 
     developing the definition of, and defining the risk 
     associated with, LLW.
       The Fact Sheet focuses on the half-life of radionuclides, 
     but fails to discuss risk to the public from the effects of 
     ionizing radiation and how they are affected by the half-life 
     of radionuclides. Public health and safety is measured in 
     terms of risk, not half-life. Risk is a function of radiation 
     dose, and the determination of risk depends on a variety of 
     factors, including the type of radiation emitted, the 
     concentration of radionuclides in the medium in which they 
     are present, the likelihood that barriers isolating the 
     radionuclides will be effective, and the likelihood of 
     exposure if radioactive materials are not fully contained. 
     The Fact Sheet is misleading when it states that the half-
     life of I \123\ used in medicine is 13 hours, and that of I 
     \129\ from nuclear power plants is 16 million years and that 
     it remains hazardous for 160-320 million years. Either 
     isotope can be a risk to the public, depending upon the other 
     factors discussed above, and half-life by itself does not 
     indicate risk.
       5. In the definition section, the Fact Sheet defines 
     ``radioactive half-life'' as ``The general rule is that the 
     hazardous life of a radioactive substance is 10-20 times its 
     half-life.'' This definition contains a new term (hazardous 
     life) not used by the national or international health 
     physics or radiation protection communities, and not defined 
     in the Fact Sheet.
     \1\ ``Medical, Research, and Academic Low Level Radioactive 
     Waste (LLRW) Fact Sheet.'' U.S. Department of Interior, 
     Office of the Deputy Secretary. Distributed at a press 
     conference of the Deputy Secretary on July 22, 1996.

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, you might ask, why would a Senator from 
Alaska even care about a facility in California that is not needed to 
dispose of radioactive waste generated in Alaska? We don't generate 
hardly any.
  Part of the answer involves my responsibilities as the chairman of 
the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, and our oversight 
responsibilities. Not surprisingly, my position on Ward Valley is the 
same one taken by my predecessor as chairman, Bennett Johnston of 
Louisiana. He understood, as I do, that Ward Valley is really more than 
a debate over the future of a thousand acres of land in the Mojave 
Desert; it is more than a debate over the disposition of low-level 
radioactive waste in California, Arizona, and the Dakotas; it is even 
more than the debate over the viability or even the future of the Low-
Level Radioactive

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Waste Policy Act. I suggest there is much more at stake.
  I am taking on this battle because there is an intrinsic value in 
opposing the careless disregard of science and the decisionmaking 
process. It's important to stand up against those who engage in this 
dangerous manipulation of public fear. It is my job to work against the 
oppression of the public good by a vocal few. Because I very much care 
about human health, safety and the environment, I believe it makes 
sense to store this radioactive low-level waste at a single, monitored 
location in the desert, rather than at 800-some locations throughout 
California, near schools, neighborhoods, hospitals, medical centers, 
and so forth.
  Finally, I believe it is important to ensure that the Government 
keeps its promises. It was the intent of Congress, when it passed the 
Low-Level Waste Policy Act of 1980, and further amended it in 1985, 
that the safe management of low-level radioactive waste would be a 
responsibility of the States. That is precisely what the Secretary of 
the Interior, Bruce Babbitt, lobbied for when he was Governor. He 
argued that low-level waste should be a State responsibility. At that 
time, he was serving with the now President, but then Governor, Bill 
Clinton in the National Governors' Association. Well, he has changed 
his position.
  I know the view from the top floor of the Department of the Interior 
changes one's perspective from time to time, but it's difficult to 
appreciate, much less justify, the actions of the Department in this 
regard.
  Are the continuing delays at Ward Valley the good-faith actions of 
public officials purporting to act in the public interest? I think not.
  To answer those questions, I am announcing today that we are going to 
explore, in great detail on the committee, the Ward Valley issue in the 
next session, with a series of investigatory oversight hearings. What 
we are attempting to obtain, obviously, are the facts on why this 
administrative bungling seems to continue. I would like all who have an 
interest in this issue to be aware that these hearings will commence 
early in the next session.
  In the interim, we will be seeking relevant documentation from the 
Department of the Interior and the White House. With that notice given, 
I thank you, Mr. President, and yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the period 
of morning business be extended for about 5 or 6 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I thank the Chair.

                          ____________________