[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 155 (Friday, November 7, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11918-S11921]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
WARD VALLEY
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I would like to address the issue of
low-level waste in this country and the issue of Ward Valley.
California is the first State to site a low-level waste facility under
legislation passed by Congress which granted States with the authority
and responsibility for low-level waste. Low-level radioactive waste is
produced from cancer treatments, medical research, industrial
activities, and scientific research. In the
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State of California there are some 800 sites where this medical waste
is being stored. It is being stored in temporary facilities that were
not designed for permanent storage.
This waste is stored near homes, schools, it's stored at college
campuses, medical facilities, and so forth.
This radioactive waste is vulnerable to accidental release from the
fires and earthquakes, neither of which are uncommon in California.
Public health and safety demands that this waste be moved from
locations scattered across California to a single, monitored location--
preferably, in a remote and sparsely populated area.
The State of California is the first State to take advantage of the
Federal process that we authorized for the States to develop their own
low-level waste sites. But it is interesting to note how the progress
has gone--not because of the lack of commitment by California, but the
lack of cooperation from the Department of Interior to simply conduct a
very simple land exchange.
The State of California, in a process which began a decade ago, is
trying to get their facility opened. They selected a site known as Ward
Valley in the remote Mojave Desert.
The California license was issued in accordance with all State and
Federal laws, and has withstood all court challenges. The license
contains 130 specific conditions designed to protect public health,
safety, and the environment.
But here comes the villain--the Department of Interior--having
earlier agreed to sell California the land for the site--changed its
mind, returned the check, and has refused to transfer the land.
Since that time, the Department of the Interior has engaged in
continuous, purposeful delay. They seek more studies, allegedly to
assure that the site will be safe.
We all insist on a safe disposal site, and we expect no less. Thus
far, we have had two environmental impact studies and a special
National Academy of Science study that all point to the safety of the
site.
Now, the State of California, in accordance with the guidelines of
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and all applicable State and Federal
laws, has done its job and done it well. But the Interior Department is
still not satisfied. They want more studies. For starters, they insist
on an additional water infiltration study and a third impact
environmental statement.
The State of California has generously agreed to perform the water
infiltration study prior to any land transfer which was a tremendous
concession on California's part. However, Interior has not thus far
allowed California access to the land to conduct the very tests that
Interior insists upon. Instead of working to resolve the matter, the
Department of the Interior seems to be engaged in a cycle of continuous
study and endless delay. One has to wonder why the Department of the
Interior is taking such a tack.
Are these delays and demands for more tests designed to assure public
safety? Or are they merely part of a carefully orchestrated public
relations campaign? Well, we can answer that question.
Several weeks ago, a memo we uncovered from the Department of the
Interior shed an extraordinary light on this question. In fact, this
memo makes the motivations behind the Interior Department's actions
absolutely clear.
I have read this memorandum once on the floor of this body. I think
it needs to be read again. This is a memo from Deputy Secretary John
Garamendi, to Secretary Bruce Babbitt, Department of the Interior. It
is short enough to read in its entirety.
It says:
February 21, 1996
Memorandum
To: Bruce Babbitt
From: John Garamendi
Subject: Ward Valley
Attached are the Ward Valley clips. We have taken the high
ground. [Governor Pete] Wilson is the venal toady of special
interests.
I do not think GreenPeace will picket you any longer. I
will maintain a heavy PR campaign until the issue is firmly
won.
There you have the words of John Garamendi relative to his
willingness to work with California to act in order that the low-level
waste at some 800 sites in California can be removed and put in one
area that will be monitored out in the Mojave Desert.
I think this memorandum shows that Ward Valley has become a political
football, a public relations issue. It also suggests that Interior has
no plans other than to delay the transfer of the land. They just want
to wage a PR campaign and delay a decision until somebody else's watch.
They don't want to make this decision on their watch. They are putting
it off because they know this administration is a few years from
becoming history. They don't want to address it, they don't want the
responsibility.
But what has Secretary Garamendi told the Senate with regard to Ward
Valley? How do his private statements compare to his public ones?
At his confirmation hearing on July 27, 1995, John Garamendi
testified under oath to our committee that the Ward Valley issue should
and would be resolved quickly. Two years later, at a hearing on July
22, 1997, John Garamendi told the committee that he would work in good
faith to resolve the matter in further negotiations with the State of
California.
Well, we still don't have a resolution. California does not even have
permission to do the additional testing Interior seems to want to see
performed.
Instead of moving a process forward and transferring the land,
Interior seems intent on waging a public relations campaign designed to
further delay rather than enlighten.
Now, what have others said about the Interior Department's handling
of this issue? Let's look at the experts.
The General Accounting Office, GAO, contends that the Department of
the Interior is attempting to assess the site's suitability--a job that
belongs to California by law and that California has already undertaken
and completed--despite the fact that Interior ``lacks the criteria and
expertise'' for the job. That is the opinion of the General Accounting
Office--that Interior lacks the criteria and expertise.
The GAO report also contends that there is no need for the new
environmental impact statement sought by Interior since the substantive
issues have already been addressed and that new information uncovered
since the last environmental impact statement is generally favorable to
the facility.
Well, this report is too lengthy to insert into the Record, but for
the benefit of my colleagues, I am referring to GAO report RCED-97-184,
dated July 1997, for anybody who might want to look it up.
To again summarize what GAO says, Mr. President, it says: First,
Interior is trying to do a job that belongs to the State of California.
The State of California was given the authority to do it; second,
Interior is calling for new studies that aren't needed; third, Interior
lacks the technical expertise to even perform these tasks.
GAO isn't alone in their criticism of the Department of Interior's
handling of this issue. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC, has
joined in the process as well.
Specifically, the NRC has been critical of the Interior Department
for distributing fact sheets which contain errors, misleading
statements, and information falsely attributed to the NRC that was
actually provided by project opponents.
That is pretty strong stuff, Mr. President, but that is factual.
So not only is Interior waging a PR campaign, they are playing fast
and loose with the truth in the conduct of that campaign, according to
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
I ask unanimous consent that the letter from the Chairman of the NRC
to the Secretary of the Interior, dated July 22, 1997, be printed in
the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC, July 22, 1997.
Hon. Bruce Babbitt,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Interior, Washington, DC.
Dear Secretary Babbitt: I am writing on behalf of the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to share our views
related to the Department of Interior's (DOI) actions
regarding the proposed Ward Valley low-level radioactive
waste (LLW) disposal facility in California. In February
1996, DOI announced that it would prepare a second supplement
to an environmental impact statement (SEIS) for the transfer
of land from the Federal government to the State of
California, for the development of the Ward Valley
[[Page S11920]]
low-level radioactive waste (LLW) disposal facility. We
understand that DOI has identified 13 issues that it believes
need to be addressed in the SEIS. DOI also stated that it
would not make a decision on the land transfer until the SEIS
was completed. NRC will actively serve as a ``commenting
agency'' on the SEIS in accordance with the Council of
Environmental Quality regulations in 40 CFR 1503.2, ``Duty To
Comment.'' NRC's interest in the Ward Valley disposal
facility is focused on protection of public health and
safety, and many of the 13 issues to be addressed in the SEIS
are related to our areas of expertise. As a commenting
agency, we will review the draft SEIS, and provide comments
based on the requirements in federal law and regulations, and
our knowledge of policy, technical, and legal issues in LLW
management. We would also be available to discuss these
issues with DOI, both before and after publication of the
draft SEIS.
On a related matter, it is our understanding that Deputy
Secretary John Garamendi of DOI held a press conference on
July 22, 1996, addressing the effect of Ward Valley facility
availability on the use of radioisotopes in medicine and
medical research. It was recently brought to our attention
that DOI distributed a document entitled, ``Medical,
Research, and Academic Low Level Radioactive Waste (LLRW)
Fact Sheet'' at the press conference. This Fact Sheet
contains several errors and statements that may mislead the
reader. To assist DOI, we have addressed these errors and
statements in the enclosure to this letter. Some of the
points contained in the Fact Sheet are useful and contribute
to the dialogue on this issue; however, NRC is concerned that
some of the subjective information of the document is
characterized as factual. We are particularly concerned by
the statement that the NRC definition of LLW ``. . . is an
unfortunate and misleading catch-all definition . . .'' In
fact, NRC's definition is taken from Federal law,
specifically the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of
1980, and the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments
Act of 1985 (LLRWPAA). Additionally, it is NRC's view that
some of the information that was referenced or relied on
in the Fact Sheet may not represent a balanced perspective
based on facts. For example, a table of the sources and
amounts of radioactive waste that is projected to go to
the Ward Valley facility is erroneously attributed to NRC,
the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. Ecology, the
Southwestern Compact, and the Ward Valley EIS. Raw data
from the sources quoted appear to have been interpreted
based on uncertain assumptions about future activities of
generators to produce the figures in the table.
Additionally, NRC noted that the figures in the table are
identical to those in a March 1994 Committee to Bridge the
Gap report.
With respect to the relationship between LLW disposal
policy and medicine and medical research, we note that the
National Academy of Sciences Board on Radiation Effects
Research has prepared a Prospectus for a study entitled,
``The Impact of United States Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Management Policy on Biomedical Research.'' The study would,
among other things, ``Evaluate the effects of higher disposal
costs and on-site storage on the current and future
activities of biomedical research, including the effects of
state non-compliance [with the LLRWPAA of 1985] on
institutions conducting biological and biomedical research
and on hospitals where radioisotopes are crucial for the
diagnosis and treatment of disease.'' Thus, the issue of
medical uses of radioisotopes and how they have been affected
by the Ward Valley process is far less clear than the Fact
Sheet portrays.
Finally, since there are no formal arrangements that permit
NRC to review and comment on the technical accuracy of
various DOI documents on LLW and Ward Valley, we may not be
aware such documents exist, thus the absence of NRC comments
does not imply an NRC judgment with respect to the technical
accuracy or completeness of such documents.
I trust our comments will be helpful in your efforts to
address Ward Valley issues.
Sincerely,
Shirley Ann Jackson.
Enclosure: As stated.
NRC Staff Comments on the Department of Interior ``Fact Sheet'' \1\
1. The Fact Sheet contains a projection of LLW to be sent
to the Ward Valley disposal facility over its 30-year life,
and attributes the table to the Department of Energy, the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Southwestern Compact,
U.S. Ecology, and the Ward Valley environmental impact
statement. In fact, the figures in the table are identical to
those in a table from a March 1994 Committee to Bridge the
Gap report, are substantially different from California
projections, and are based on assumptions that are not
identified. The actual assumptions used are contained in the
Committee to Bridge the Gap report and minimize the amount
and importance of the medical waste stream.
2. The Fact Sheet is incomplete in that it provides only
anecdotal evidence of the impact of not having the Ward
Valley disposal facility available to medical generators.
Although its arguments about short-lived radionuclides appear
to be generally true, the Fact Sheet downplays the effects on
generators that use longer-lived radionuclides. According to
the Fact Sheet, there are an estimated 53 research hospitals
in California, out of some 500 hospitals overall. The Fact
Sheet describes the impact at three of these research
organizations and concludes that they can manage their waste,
either by disposing of it at an out-of-state facility
(Barnwell or Envirocare), storing it, or, for sealed sources,
sending them back to the manufacturer. The Fact Sheet
concludes that there is no health and safety impact from the
approach, but does not address broader issues such as the
continued availability of existing disposal sites as an
option, and the fact that transferring a sealed source to a
manufacturer does not eliminate the problem, but simply
shifts it from one organization to another.
3. The Fact Sheet does not address the more complex issues
concerning use of radioisotopes in medicine, such as how
medical research in general has been affected by issues such
as disposal and storage cost increases, and the need to
switch from longer-lived radionuclides to short-lived
nuclides or non-radioactive materials. The National Academy
of Sciences Board on Radiation Effects Research has prepared
a Prospectus for a study entitled ``The Impact of United
States Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Policy on
Biomedical Research.'' The study would, among other things,
``Evaluate the effects of higher disposal costs and on-site
storage on the current and future activities of biomedical
research, including the effects of state noncompliance on
institutions conducting biological and biomedical research
and on hospitals where radioisotopes are crucial for the
diagnosis and treatment of disease.'' Thus, the issue of
medical uses of radioisotopes and how they have been affected
by the Ward Valley process is far less clear than the Fact
Sheet portrays.
4. The Fact Sheet characterizes the NRC definition of LLW
in 10 CFR Part 61 as ``unfortunate and misleading'' because
it includes both long-lived and short-lived radionuclides. It
fails to acknowledge that this definition is contained in
Federal law (the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of
1980 and the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments
Act of 1985) and that information on the kinds and amounts of
radionuclides contained in LLW for land disposal is widely
available in NRC regulations and/or NUREGS, and from DOE. In
developing Part 61 in the early 1980s. NRC sought public
comment on the proposed rule, and provided extensive
information on the assumptions, analyses, and proposed
content of the regulation for review. In developing the
regulations for LLW, including how different classes are
defined, NRC received and considered extensive public input.
Four regional workshops were held, and 107 persons commented
on the draft rulemaking, for 10 CFR Part 61, which defines
LLW. In short, NRC encouraged public involvement in
developing the definition of, and defining the risk
associated with, LLW.
The Fact Sheet focuses on the half-life of radionuclides,
but fails to discuss risk to the public from the effects of
ionizing radiation and how they are affected by the half-life
of radionuclides. Public health and safety is measured in
terms of risk, not half-life. Risk is a function of radiation
dose, and the determination of risk depends on a variety of
factors, including the type of radiation emitted, the
concentration of radionuclides in the medium in which they
are present, the likelihood that barriers isolating the
radionuclides will be effective, and the likelihood of
exposure if radioactive materials are not fully contained.
The Fact Sheet is misleading when it states that the half-
life of I \123\ used in medicine is 13 hours, and that of I
\129\ from nuclear power plants is 16 million years and that
it remains hazardous for 160-320 million years. Either
isotope can be a risk to the public, depending upon the other
factors discussed above, and half-life by itself does not
indicate risk.
5. In the definition section, the Fact Sheet defines
``radioactive half-life'' as ``The general rule is that the
hazardous life of a radioactive substance is 10-20 times its
half-life.'' This definition contains a new term (hazardous
life) not used by the national or international health
physics or radiation protection communities, and not defined
in the Fact Sheet.
\1\ ``Medical, Research, and Academic Low Level Radioactive
Waste (LLRW) Fact Sheet.'' U.S. Department of Interior,
Office of the Deputy Secretary. Distributed at a press
conference of the Deputy Secretary on July 22, 1996.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, you might ask, why would a Senator from
Alaska even care about a facility in California that is not needed to
dispose of radioactive waste generated in Alaska? We don't generate
hardly any.
Part of the answer involves my responsibilities as the chairman of
the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, and our oversight
responsibilities. Not surprisingly, my position on Ward Valley is the
same one taken by my predecessor as chairman, Bennett Johnston of
Louisiana. He understood, as I do, that Ward Valley is really more than
a debate over the future of a thousand acres of land in the Mojave
Desert; it is more than a debate over the disposition of low-level
radioactive waste in California, Arizona, and the Dakotas; it is even
more than the debate over the viability or even the future of the Low-
Level Radioactive
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Waste Policy Act. I suggest there is much more at stake.
I am taking on this battle because there is an intrinsic value in
opposing the careless disregard of science and the decisionmaking
process. It's important to stand up against those who engage in this
dangerous manipulation of public fear. It is my job to work against the
oppression of the public good by a vocal few. Because I very much care
about human health, safety and the environment, I believe it makes
sense to store this radioactive low-level waste at a single, monitored
location in the desert, rather than at 800-some locations throughout
California, near schools, neighborhoods, hospitals, medical centers,
and so forth.
Finally, I believe it is important to ensure that the Government
keeps its promises. It was the intent of Congress, when it passed the
Low-Level Waste Policy Act of 1980, and further amended it in 1985,
that the safe management of low-level radioactive waste would be a
responsibility of the States. That is precisely what the Secretary of
the Interior, Bruce Babbitt, lobbied for when he was Governor. He
argued that low-level waste should be a State responsibility. At that
time, he was serving with the now President, but then Governor, Bill
Clinton in the National Governors' Association. Well, he has changed
his position.
I know the view from the top floor of the Department of the Interior
changes one's perspective from time to time, but it's difficult to
appreciate, much less justify, the actions of the Department in this
regard.
Are the continuing delays at Ward Valley the good-faith actions of
public officials purporting to act in the public interest? I think not.
To answer those questions, I am announcing today that we are going to
explore, in great detail on the committee, the Ward Valley issue in the
next session, with a series of investigatory oversight hearings. What
we are attempting to obtain, obviously, are the facts on why this
administrative bungling seems to continue. I would like all who have an
interest in this issue to be aware that these hearings will commence
early in the next session.
In the interim, we will be seeking relevant documentation from the
Department of the Interior and the White House. With that notice given,
I thank you, Mr. President, and yield the floor.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the period
of morning business be extended for about 5 or 6 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. I thank the Chair.
____________________