[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 154 (Thursday, November 6, 1997)]
[House]
[Pages H10149-H10158]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
UNITED STATES-TAIWAN ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION ACT
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 302, I call up
the bill (H.R. 2386) to implement the provisions of the Taiwan
Relations Act concerning the stability and security of Taiwan and
United States cooperation with Taiwan on the development and
acquisition of defensive military articles, and ask for its immediate
consideration in the House.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Gibbons). The bill is considered read
for amendment.
The text of H.R. 2386 is as follows:
H.R. 2386
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``United States-Taiwan Anti-
Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds the following:
(1) The stability and security of Taiwan and the balance of
power in the Taiwan Strait are key elements for the continued
peace and stability of the greater Asia-Pacific region, and
the indefinite continuation of such stability and security
and balance of power is in the vital national security
interest of the United States.
(2) The People's Republic of China is currently engaged in
a comprehensive military modernization campaign that is
enhancing the power-projection capabilities of the People's
Liberation Army, including the introduction of advanced
ballistic and cruise missiles that could alter the current
balance of power in the Taiwan Strait and in the greater
Asia-Pacific region.
(3) The current lack of transparency in the People's
Republic of China military infrastructure and its associated
defense establishment and the opaqueness of the comprehensive
efforts of the People's Liberation Army to modernize its
ballistic and cruise missile programs could spark a regional
arms race that would destabilize the East Asia and Western
Pacific regions and threaten vital United States national
security interests.
(4) In March 1996, the People's Liberation Army created a
temporary, but de facto, blockade of both the international
shipping lanes of the Taiwan Strait and the international
airspace around Taiwan by conducting live-fire military
exercises which included the launch of several advanced,
nuclear-capable M-9 ballistic missiles to target areas close
to major ports in both the northern and southern areas of
Taiwan.
(5) In March 1996, the locations of People's Liberation
Army military activities and M-9 missile target areas nearby
to Taiwan's two largest ports, Keelung and Kaohsiung, created
a de facto blockade of the Taiwan Strait, international
waters and airspace, interfered with United States and
international shipping and aviation, and impinged upon the
national security interests of the United States, requiring
the immediate deployment of two United States aircraft
carrier battle groups to the South China Sea.
(6) The actions of the People's Liberation Army in such
close proximity to Taiwan were deliberate attempts to disrupt
Taiwan's social and economic stability and were carried out
as attempts to intimidate the people of Taiwan during the
period leading up to Taiwan's historic first democratic
presidential election.
(7) The early development and deployment of an effective
United States theater missile defense system to the Asia-
Pacific region, and the adjustment of United States policy to
include Taiwan, including the Penghu Islands, Kinmen, and
Matsu, under the protection of such defense system, would be
prudent and appropriate responses to--
(A) the refusal by the People's Republic of China to
renounce the use of force to determine the future of Taiwan;
(B) the nature of the military threat of the People's
Republic of China posed by the increased focus of the
People's Liberation Army on advanced missile development; and
(C) the demonstrated intent of the Government of the
People's Republic of China to use live-fire military
exercises and ballistic missile tests against the people and
Government of Taiwan as tools of so-called coercive missile
tests against the people and Government of Taiwan as tools of
so-called coercive diplomacy.
(8) The early deployment of a United States theater anti-
ballistic missile system in the Asia-Pacific region would
maintain a balance of power in the Taiwan Strait and deter
the People's Republic of China from resorting to military
intimidation tactics to coerce or manipulate the people and
freely-elected Government of Taiwan in the future.
(9) Taiwan's local air-defense capability provided by the
United States Modified Air Defense System (MADS) is not
adequate for the task of defending local areas of Taiwan,
including the Penghu Islands, Kinmen, and Matsu, from limited
ballistic missile attacks or deterring the threat and use of
force against Taiwan by the People's Liberation Army to
achieve the political goals of the core leadership of the
People's Republic of China.
(10) Taiwan has requested further United States cooperation
on missile defense, including the conduct of a joint
architecture study of the requirements for the establishment
and operation of a missile defense system for Taiwan,
including the Penghu Islands, Kinmen, and Matsu.
SEC. 3. APPLICABILITY OF TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT.
Section 3 of the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3302) is
amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(d) The provisions of subsections (a) and (b) supersede
any provision of the Joint Communique of the United States
and China of August 17, 1982.''.
SEC. 4. STUDY AND REPORT RELATING TO ESTABLISHMENT AND
OPERATION OF A THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE
DEFENSE SYSTEM IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.
(a) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall carry out a
study of the architecture requirements for the establishment
and operation of a theater ballistic missile defense system
in the Asia-Pacific region that would have the capability to
protect Taiwan from ballistic missile attacks. The study
shall include a description of appropriate measures by which
the United States would cooperate with Taiwan and provide
Taiwan with an advanced local-area ballistic missile defense
system.
(b) Report.--Not later than July 1, 1998, the Secretary of
Defense shall submit to the Committee on National Security of
the House of Representatives and the Committee on Armed
Services of the Senate a report containing--
(1) the results of the study conducted under subsection
(a);
(2) the factors used to obtain such results;
(3) a description of any existing United States missile
defense system that could be transferred to Taiwan in
accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act in order to allow
Taiwan to provide for its self-defense against limited
ballistic missile attacks.
(c) Form of Report.--The report under subsection (b) shall
be submitted in both classified and unclassified form.
SEC. 5. TRANSFER OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS TO
TAIWAN.
It is the sense of the Congress that the President, if
requested by the Government of Taiwan and in accordance with
the results of the study conducted under section 4, should
transfer to the Government of Taiwan appropriate defense
articles or defense services under the foreign military sales
program under chapter 2 of the Arms Export Control Act (22
U.S.C. 2761 et seq.) for the purpose of establishing and
operating a local-area ballistic missile defense system to
protect Taiwan, including the Penghu Islands, Kinmen, and
Matsu, against limited ballistic missile attacks.
SEC. 6. STATEMENT OF POLICY RELATING TO UNITED STATES THEATER
MISSILE DEFENSES FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.
The Congress declares that it is in the national interest
of the United States that Taiwan be included in any effort at
ballistic missile defense cooperation, networking, or
interoperability with friendly and allied nations in the
Asia-Pacific region.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 302, the
committee amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in the bill
and modified by the amendments printed in part 4 of House Report 105-
379 is adopted.
The text of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute as
amended pursuant to House Resolution 302 is as follows:
H.R. 2386
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
[[Page H10150]]
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``United States-Taiwan Anti-
Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds the following:
(1) The stability and security of Taiwan and the balance of
power in the Taiwan Strait are key elements for the continued
peace and stability of the greater Asia-Pacific region, and
the indefinite continuation of such stability and security
and balance of power is in the vital national security
interest of the United States.
(2) The People's Republic of China is currently engaged in
a comprehensive military modernization campaign that is
enhancing the power-projection capabilities of the People's
Liberation Army, including the introduction of advanced
ballistic and cruise missiles that could alter the current
balance of power in the Taiwan Strait and in the greater
Asia-Pacific region.
(3) The current lack of transparency in the People's
Republic of China military infrastructure and its associated
defense establishment and the opaqueness of the comprehensive
efforts of the People's Liberation Army to modernize its
ballistic and cruise missile programs could spark a regional
arms race that would destabilize the East Asia and Western
Pacific regions and threaten vital United States national
security interests.
(4) In March 1996, the People's Liberation Army created a
temporary, but de facto, blockade of both the international
shipping lanes of the Taiwan Strait and the international
airspace around Taiwan by conducting live-fire military
exercises which included the launch of several advanced,
nuclear-capable M-9 ballistic missiles to target areas close
to major ports in both the northern and southern areas of
Taiwan.
(5) In March 1996, the locations of People's Liberation
Army military activities and M-9 missile target areas nearby
to Taiwan's two largest ports, Keelung and Kaohsiung, created
a de facto blockade of the Taiwan Strait, international
waters and airspace, interfered with United States and
international shipping and aviation, and impinged upon the
national security interests of the United States, requiring
the immediate deployment of two United States aircraft
carrier battle groups to the South China Sea.
(6) The actions of the People's Liberation Army in such
close proximity to Taiwan were deliberate attempts to disrupt
Taiwan's social and economic stability and were carried out
as attempts to intimidate the people of Taiwan during the
period leading up to Taiwan's historic first democratic
presidential election.
(7) The early development and deployment of an effective
United States theater missile defense system to the Asia-
Pacific region, and the adjustment of United States policy to
include Taiwan, including the Penghu Islands, Kinmen, and
Matsu, under the protection of such defense system, would be
prudent and appropriate responses to--
(A) the refusal by the People's Republic of China to
renounce the use of force to determine the future of Taiwan;
(B) the nature of the military threat of the People's
Republic of China posed by the increased focus of the
People's Liberation Army on advanced missile development; and
(C) the demonstrated intent of the Government of the
People's Republic of China to use live-fire military
exercises and ballistic missile tests against the people and
Government of Taiwan as tools of so-called coercive
diplomacy.
(8) The early deployment of a United States theater anti-
ballistic missile system in the Asia-Pacific region would
maintain a balance of power in the Taiwan Strait and deter
the People's Republic of China from resorting to military
intimidation tactics to coerce or manipulate the people and
freely-elected Government of Taiwan in the future.
(9) While Taiwan is currently acquiring a local aircraft
and ballistic and cruise missile defense capability in the
form of the Modified Air Defense System (MADS), a larger
portion of Taiwan's territory and population would be
protected if this system were expanded to include a defense
of the Taichung region, Kaohsiung, the Penghu Islands,
Kinmen, and Matsu from limited ballistic missile attacks and
a deterrent against the threat and use of force against
Taiwan by the People's Liberation Army to achieve the
political goals of the core leadership of the People's
Republic of China.
(10) Taiwan has requested further United States cooperation
on missile defense, including the conduct of a joint
architecture study of the requirements for the establishment
and operation of a missile defense system for Taiwan,
including the Penghu Islands, Kinmen, and Matsu.
(11) On June 9, 1898, the ``Convention Respecting an
Extension of Hong Kong Territory'' was agreed to between
representatives of the governments of Great Britain and China
to lease the New Territories for the period of 99 years
beginning on July 1, 1898.
(12) On December 19, 1984, the ``Sino-British Joint
Declaration'', agreed to between representatives of the
governments of Great Britain and China, established the terms
for the return to China on July 1, 1997, of the Hong Kong
area (including the Hong Kong Island, Kowloon, and the New
Territories (hereafter in this resolution referred to as
``Hong Kong'').
(13) No treaties exist between the People's Republic of
China and Taiwan which determine the future status of Taiwan.
(14) The People's Republic of China attempts to apply to
Taiwan the formula commonly known as ``one country, two
systems'' in a effort to annex Taiwan to China.
(15) The People's Republic of China has refused to renounce
the use of force against Taiwan and held military exercises
in the Taiwan Strait in March 1996 in an attempt to
intimidate the people of Taiwan in their first presidential
elections.
(16) The Taiwan Relations Act states that ``[i]t is the
policy of the United States . . . to consider any effort to
determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means,
including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and
security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to
the United States''.
SEC. 3. STUDY AND REPORT RELATING TO ESTABLISHMENT AND
OPERATION OF A THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE
DEFENSE SYSTEM IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.
(a) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall carry out a
study of the architecture requirements for the establishment
and operation of a theater ballistic missile defense system
in the Asia-Pacific region that would have the capability to
protect Taiwan from ballistic missile attacks. The study
shall include a description of appropriate measures by which
the United States would cooperate with Taiwan and provide
Taiwan with an advanced local-area ballistic missile defense
system.
(b) Report.--Not later than July 1, 1998, the Secretary of
Defense shall submit to the Committee on National Security of
the House of Representatives and the Committee on Armed
Services of the Senate a report containing--
(1) the results of the study conducted under subsection
(a);
(2) the factors used to obtain such results;
(3) a description of any existing United States missile
defense system that could be transferred to Taiwan in
accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act in order to allow
Taiwan to provide for its self-defense against limited
ballistic missile attacks.
(c) Form of Report.--The report under subsection (b) shall
be submitted in both classified and unclassified form.
SEC. 4. TRANSFER OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS TO
TAIWAN.
It is the sense of the Congress that the President, if
requested by the Government of Taiwan and in accordance with
the results of the study conducted under section 3, should
transfer to the Government of Taiwan appropriate defense
articles or defense services under the foreign military sales
program under chapter 2 of the Arms Export Control Act (22
U.S.C. 2761 et seq.) for the purpose of establishing and
operating a local-area ballistic missile defense system to
protect Taiwan, including the Penghu Islands, Kinmen, and
Matsu, against limited ballistic missile attacks.
SEC. 5. STATEMENT OF POLICY RELATING TO UNITED STATES THEATER
MISSILE DEFENSES FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.
The Congress declares that it is in the national interest
of the United States that Taiwan be included in any effort at
ballistic missile defense cooperation, networking, or
interoperability with friendly and allied nations in the
Asia-Pacific region.
SEC. 6. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS URGING THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE
CLEAR TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA THE
COMMITMENT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO SECURITY
AND DEMOCRACY IN TAIWAN.
It is the sense of the Congress that the Clinton
Administration should make clear to the leadership of the
People's Republic of China, the American people's firm
commitment for security and democracy for the people of
Taiwan and that the United States fully expects that the
resolution of security issues on both sides of the Taiwan
Strait will be resolved by peaceful means.
SEC. 7. ADDITIONAL SENSE OF THE CONGRESS REGARDING TAIWAN.
It is the sense of the Congress that--
(1) the transfer of Hong Kong to the People's Republic of
China does not alter the current and future status of Taiwan;
(2) the future of Taiwan should be determined by peaceful
means through a democratic process; and
(3) the United States should assist in the defense of
Taiwan in case of threats or military attack by the People's
Republic of China against Taiwan.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 302, the
gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] and the gentleman from Indiana
[Mr. Hamilton] each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman].
(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
General Leave
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may
have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and
to include extraneous material on H.R. 2386.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from New York?
[[Page H10151]]
There was no objection.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I want to commend the gentleman from California [Mr.
Hunter], a member of the Committee on National Security, for
introducing this legislation. And I am proud to be an original
cosponsor of the measure, and I support it wholeheartedly.
I want to thank, too, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Deutsch] and
the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Frost] for their amendments, which help
to further clarify and improve the initial bill.
The People's Republic of China is currently engaged in a
comprehensive military modernization program that is enhancing the
power projection capabilities of its armed forces, the People's
Liberation Army. Included in this modernization program is the
development and deployment of advanced ballistic missiles that can soon
alter the balance of power across the Taiwan Strait.
The security of Taiwan and the maintenance of a balance of power in
the Taiwan Strait are key aspects for continued peace and prosperity in
the region and an assurance that the question of Taiwan will be
resolved peacefully as the United States and China have agreed in
previous communiques. The PRC should hold no doubt that the United
States would view with great concern any efforts to do otherwise.
Furthermore, there are pragmatic reasons to be concerned. We all
should be deeply troubled by the actions of the Chinese just last year
when they fired ballistic missiles into international air and sea lanes
off the coast of Taiwan in an effort to intimidate the people of Taiwan
during the first democratic elections in 5,000 years of Chinese
history.
Mr. Speaker, the United States had to respond by deploying two
aircraft carriers to the region. This sort of missile diplomacy by the
Chinese is unacceptable. For our own national security and for peace
and stability of the region, we should consider providing Taiwan with
this sort of defensive system when it is fielded in the Asia-Pacific
region. This bill does just that.
Accordingly, I urge my colleagues to support this measure.
Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman
from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter], chairman of our Subcommittee on Asia and
the Pacific and chairman of our Committee on International Relations.
Amendment Offered by Mr. Bereuter
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment
I placed at the desk be considered as adopted.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Bereuter:
In section 7(3) after the word ``States'' insert the
following: ``, in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act
and the constitutional processes of the United States,''.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the amendment is
considered as adopted.
There was no objection.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the bill, for several reasons.
First of all, it is apparent I think, as we read the bill, that it has
a flawed internal logic. It mandates a study and a Presidential report
about the establishment of a theater ballistic missile defense system
that includes Taiwan. At the same time, without waiting for the results
of that study, it calls for making such a system available to Taiwan.
That does not, it seems to me, make a lot of sense.
Secondly, I do not think the bill is necessary. Taiwan does not need
this technology and, so far, does not even want it. The United States
Department of Defense already has an ongoing ballistic missile defense
program with Taiwan. It sold Taiwan a Patriot derivative that is
comparable to a system just introduced in the U.S. Army last year.
The senior Taiwanese military leaders are not ready to commit to an
unproved ballistic missile defense technology. It really is not a
question of money. Taiwan has purchased over $8 billion in arms from
the United States in the last 5 years. It has $87 billion in reserves.
If it wanted this technology, Taiwan would be knocking on our door to
buy it. But nobody is knocking.
I have a letter dated September 29, 1997, from the United States
Department of Defense. It reads, in part, ``Senior Taiwan military
leaders are highly skeptical of a significant investment in the area of
ballistic missile defense. The Taiwan military is rightly concerned
about the potential for a huge diversion of resources to ballistic
missile defense programs that have an uncertain future at best.''
{time} 1930
The third reason is I think the bill is provocative. Everyone knows
that China regards Taiwan as an integral part of the People's Republic
of China. Offering Taiwan some of the world's most advanced weaponry,
weaponry that Taiwan does not want or need, appears to be deliberately
designed to provoke China. I do not think that helps our friends in
Taiwan, and it carries some risk for Taiwan.
There was another reason to be against this bill, but I think that
reason has now been corrected by the unanimous consent made at the
suggestion of the gentleman from Nebraska. I want to thank him for
making that unanimous consent, because I think the language that was
inserted into the bill by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Deutsch] has
now had an addition to it which brings the language in the bill in line
with the framework that has provided peace and stability and prosperity
in the region for over two decades. It does not, I think, alter that
framework language. I think the unanimous consent language is a good
addition to this bill.
In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I think the bill has an internal logic in
it that is flawed. I think the bill is not necessary. I think it is
provocative. It carries, it seems to me, some risk with no prospect for
any benefit. I think, therefore, it may reduce and not enhance the
security of our friends in Taiwan. It is my understanding that the
administration strongly opposes this bill. I urge its defeat.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Hunter].
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from New York
[Mr. Gilman], the chairman of the committee, for helping to shepherd
this bill through the process and get it to the House floor and for all
the work that he has done and other members of the committee, including
the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter] and the gentleman from
Florida [Mr. Deutsch], have done with respect to the contents of the
bill.
The bill is logical, it is reasonable, it is prudent and it is in
total accord with the Taiwan Relations Act. There is no faulty logic
that I can see, internal logic flaw that the gentleman from Indiana
says there is. Reading the part of the bill that I think he is talking
about, and that is the part of the bill that, following the study,
says:
``It is the sense of the Congress that the President, if requested by
the Government of Taiwan and in accordance with the results of the
study conducted under section 3, should transfer to the Government of
Taiwan appropriate defense articles under the foreign military sales
program under chapter 2 of the Arms Export Control Act for the purpose
of establishing and operating a local-area defense ballistic missile
defense system to protect Taiwan.''
That says in accordance with the results of the study. That obviously
infers that the study has to be completed. We cannot transfer the
articles until we have results, and so I think that is a reasonable,
logical sequence that is manifest in the bill and I do not see any
problem there.
I think it is important, Mr. Speaker, to send an unmistakable signal
to friends and foes alike. I think that that is the lesson we learned
in the Middle East with respect to the invasion of Kuwait. Saddam
Hussein claims that he was under the notion that we did not care if
there was an invasion of Kuwait. Maybe he is lying, maybe he is
misbehaving. He does that often. But certainly the statements of our
representatives were not clear, were not unambiguous. It is important
if you are going to defend an ally and you are going to offer that
defense umbrella and that defense umbrella was unmistakably offered in
the recent incident
[[Page H10152]]
when China lobbed missiles, M-9 missiles over the bow of Taiwan and we
came to the aid of Taiwan with American ships and American force
projection, it is obvious that Taiwan is under our defense umbrella. We
have demonstrated that.
It is also obvious that missiles are the weapon of choice for China.
They are building missiles at a rapid rate. The administration tells us
that by the year 2010, there will be over 2,000 missiles, many of them
fast missiles, ballistic missiles, in the Chinese armory. If we are
going to defend Taiwan and hopefully if we are going to give Taiwan the
ability to defend itself so that American troops do not always have to
be rushed into that area of the world and American navies do not always
have to be projected into that area of the world, it is important to
meet the weapon of the day. The weapon of the day clearly and the
weapon of the future for China is missiles, theater ballistic missiles,
some of them fairly fast, some of them faster than the PAC-II missiles
that we are currently developing.
All this bill does is request that DOD, that the President and DOD
commence a study to evaluate an architecture that could be deployed in
this area of Asia. And upon completing that study and if requested by
the government of Taiwan and in accord with the Taiwan Relations Act,
which incidentally says that the United States will provide articles of
defense for Taiwan, then it is the sense of Congress that we should put
together a defense system that includes in its area the defense of
Taiwan.
Mr. Speaker, I would say simply this is something that we are doing
with our allies around the world. We are working on theater missile
defense with our European allies right now. We are developing a
partnership program in cooperation with Israel with development of the
TMD system, the Arrow, which is an antitheater missile defense system,
and it is absolutely appropriate, reasonable and logical and in the
interest of the United States to have this study and ask the Clinton
administration to report back to us and then take further action if the
study, the results of the study and the request of Taiwan is in that
direction.
Mr. Speaker, I want to commend everybody who has worked on this
language and put it together. I think this is an important part of our
China package. It says that we stand with our friends and that we
continue, as we do under the Taiwan Relations Act, to support our
friends with defense articles and that we realize that defending
against M-9 missiles and their successors is an important part of that
duty.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 7 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt].
(Mr. SPRATT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, this bill concerns our national security,
but it was not heard, it was not debated, it was not marked up, it was
not reported by the Committee on National Security because the
committee waived jurisdiction. The first time I knew of it was today
when the gentleman from California [Mr. Cox] called it to my attention.
I read the bill, read the report, read the dissenting views and I
reluctantly oppose it, reluctantly because I think those who sponsor it
are well-intended, but I disagree with the means they are using to
advance this particular proposal.
On its face, this bill does seem simple. It asks the Pentagon to
study the architecture of a theater ballistic missile defense system in
the Asia-Pacific region which would protect Taiwan. It asks those who
do that study to spell out just how the United States would cooperate
with Taiwan and how we would provide Taiwan, specifically Taiwan, with
a missile defense system which would not only cover Taiwan but would
cover Matsu and Kinmen and the Penghu Islands. The bill asks for the
study by July 1 and, even before the bill is completed and the study is
started, it throws in a sense of the Congress that this resolution
should make clear to the People's Republic of China the commitment of
the American people to security in Taiwan. Just what that means, I am
not really sure. I would be cautious about the way we broadcast such
commitments to the world without clearly knowing what security
obligations we are undertaking.
The study sought by this bill in my opinion is wholly unnecessary.
The BMD or ABM missile defense architecture it asks for is easy enough
to spell out right here on the floor of the House. First of all, it
would consist of the THAAD, theater high altitude interceptor, on the
ground in Taiwan when it becomes operational, maybe 4, 5, 6 years from
now. The THAAD would take out incoming missiles in their late mid-
phase, as they honed in on Taiwan. It would have to be complemented
because there would probably be some leakers that the THAAD would not
get by a Navy system called the Upper Tier or Area Defense. This would
be based on surface ships like cruisers, the Aegis cruisers
specifically, and when and if it becomes operational 4, 5, 6 years from
now, its role would be to take out incoming missiles in the ascent
phase, right after booster burnout if at all possible. Both of these
systems would be complemented by, in the case with the THAAD, ground-
based radar, based in Taiwan, and by the SPY radar on Aegis cruisers,
and both would likely include some linkage to our DSB satellite for the
detection of a missile launch and to queue the interceptors and their
radars. Eventually around 2004, 2005 or 2006 this system would probably
be tied into our so-called SMTS, low earth orbit satellites, 18 to 24
of them, with infrared seekers that will be in orbit around the whole
globe if our plans are carried out today as they are designed.
This system is not deployed today, it is not ready for deployment.
The THAAD is not deployed today, it is not ready for deployment. The
Navy's Upper Tier system is not deployed today. The THAAD and the Upper
Tier system have been tested 4 or 5 times each and each has yet to make
a successful intercept. They are still in the late phases of
engineering development. The SMTS, the low earth orbit satellite, are
at least 6 or 7 years off before they can be deployed.
Nevertheless, knowing what we know of these components today, doing a
little viewgraph engineering, we can design this architecture. We do
not have to spend $500,000 to design the architecture. We know
basically what it is. So this bill serves no practical purpose that I
can see, none whatsoever. If Members want to know what the architecture
is, I have just about told them what it can be. If they want anything
more elaborate, it is too early to tell because the components are not
yet systems in being. To the extent that Members want to know more,
they can get it. Write the Ballistic Missile Defense Office a letter,
have the chairman of the committee or the chairman of the Committee on
National Security write him a letter and he will be over here in a
week, not 6 or 7 months. A week. He will tell you essentially what I
have just told you except he has got CADCAM, he will bring drawings, he
will bring viewgraphs, he will bring anything you want to see on the
architecture. You will not have to wait 6 months and it will not cost
you $500,000.
If you want the United States to cooperate with Taiwan, we are
already cooperating with Taiwan in a very discreet manner, but in a
very concrete manner as well. The Taiwanese are right now buying and
taking delivery of the PAC-II, Patriot II batteries, 8 of them
altogether. In addition, we are letting them have our extended range
intercept missiles called the PAC-IIIs, the latest thing off the
production line. We are making those available to them as well. So we
are actually cooperating now.
We do not need to wave this red flag, and we can accomplish the same
purpose that this resolution proposes without the provocation and
without the cost. A wise President once said with respect to our
foreign policy that we should speak softly but carry a big stick. A
wise Congress would do well to remember that sage advice and vote this
resolution down.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from
South Carolina [Mr. Spence], the distinguished chairman of our
Committee on National Security.
(Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
[[Page H10153]]
time. I rise in support of H.R. 2386, the United States-Taiwan Anti-
Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Act. In my opinion, issues of
national security have been ignored for far too long in the debate over
the People's Republic of China.
{time} 1945
While promoting American political values and free trade are
essential elements of United States foreign policy, protecting our
national security interests is the bedrock upon which our policy ought
to be built.
Today in East Asia, and despite recent fluctuations in financial
markets, economic activity is proceeding at a frenetic pace bringing
prosperity to more and more people. Likewise, as clearly demonstrated
in Taiwan, democracy is taking hold. These developments are a direct
result of a general geopolitical stability that characterizes much of
East Asia, a stability more often than not guaranteed by the United
States.
The quandary we now face is how to look at China in the context of an
Asian, even a global, security regime. China's economy is growing by
leaps and bounds and is already recognized in the region as a great
power. However, whether or not Chinese political, economic and military
power will be a force for stability remains unknown and raises several
fundamental questions.
First, what are China's national ambitions? China, the so-called
Middle Kingdom, has long considered itself a great nation and center of
the civilized world. Chinese leaders have stated that they intend to
become a dominant power in Asia as well as a world power. China is not
content with the current geopolitical status quo and appears to
envision a long-term competition with the United States both in the
region and elsewhere.
Second, what are China's strategic goals? China is embroiled in a
variety of border disputes and claims of sovereignty around virtually
its entire perimeter. Moreover, as Chinese leaders realize that their
economic growth is increasingly dependent on foreign trade, their
security interests also are becoming more expansive. China's ties to
Iran and other Middle East nations, links to Latin America and budding
strategic partnership with Russia are indicative of Beijing's
broadening horizons.
Third, what is China's national military strategy? Great power
ambitions and expanding strategic horizons have forced the Chinese to
shift from their longtime focus on homeland defense to developing the
ability to project power in maritime East Asia and beyond.
Finally, where is China headed with regard to military modernization?
Until recently, assessments of Chinese modernization have focused
primarily on the new warships and combat aircraft being built and
bought, especially from Russia. However, the People's Republic, the
People's Liberation Army has proved an astute student of the lessons of
Operation Desert Storm. The PLA was stunned at the effectiveness with
which our Armed Forces waged a high technology war.
At the same time the Chinese obviously noted the inability of the
United States to fully defend against the crude Scud missiles in Saddam
Hussein's arsenal. During last year's tense confrontation between China
and Taiwan, the PLA used ballistic missiles as an aggressive form of
blockade in support of its own coercive diplomacy. China's President
Jiang Zemin himself concluded several years ago in reviewing the
lessons of the Gulf War, and I quote, modern warfare has become high-
tech warfare. It is a multidimensional war, electronic war, missile
war, unquote.
According to Jiang, the ability to conduct this missile war is our
major principle in military modernization. Those who downplay China's
military buildup do not understand the kind of threat this missile war
presents. Preserving some measure of stability in East Asia will in the
future increasingly rely on effective missile defenses.
Mr. Speaker, I submit that we all must recognize that protection of
America's own national security interests is essential to our evolving
China policy. If we fail to recognize this reality, our overall China
policy will be inconsistent; in the long run, ineffective.
H.R. 2386, the United States-Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense
Cooperation Act, represents an important statement on one security-
related element of our China policy. Defending Taiwan against the very
real threat of Chinese ballistic missile attack will promote regional
stability, and it will strengthen our United States alliances.
I urge the support of my colleagues.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Deutsch].
Mr. DEUTSCH. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of H.R.
2386. This bill addresses two core issues in U.S. policies toward
China: No. 1, the current and future political status of Taiwan; and,
No. 2, the defense of Taiwan from threats or military attacks by China.
H. Con. Resolution 100, which I introduced back on June 18 just prior
to the return of Hong Kong to China, is now included in the bill of the
gentleman from California [Mr. Hunter]. My legislation has 42
cosponsors and broad bipartisan support. It specifically expresses the
sense of Congress that, one, the transfer of Hong Kong to China does
not alter the current and future status of Taiwan; two, the future
status of Taiwan should be determined by peaceful means through a
democratic process; and, three, the United States should assist in the
defense of Taiwan in cases of threat or military attack by China
against Taiwan.
The historic transfer of Hong Kong to China on July 1 should bear no
consequence on the future status of Taiwan. The case of Taiwan is
separate and distinct from Taiwan. Unlike Hong Kong, Taiwan has never
entered into any agreements with China that determine the future status
of Taiwan. Taiwan is, in fact, a de facto independent state and should
determine its official future political status peacefully through
democratic means.
Beijing's claim on Taiwan is based neither on historic nor legal
realities. The facts are clear. With the exception of a brief period
from 1887 to 1895, Taiwan has been free of Chinese rule. Today Taiwan
has separate governments, financial markets, dialects and cultures from
mainland China.
Mr. Speaker, by calling something black does not make it black; by
calling something white does not make it white. Taiwan is a de facto
independent state.
The second major component of this legislation is the U.S. role in
the defense of Taiwan. I was deeply concerned last year as I watched
the so-called military exercises by the Chinese in the Taiwan Strait.
It is obvious that the Chinese attempted to test the will of the United
States with those exercises. The United States demonstrated with the
deployment of two aircraft carriers and aggressive diplomacy that we
would stand up to the Chinese and defend Taiwan against these acts of
aggression.
H.R. 2386 will further the U.S. commitment to assist in the defense
of Taiwan by providing them with arms of a defensive nature which
should act as a deterrent from future Chinese threats and protection in
case of an attack. H.R. 2386 is consistent with the three communiques
and the Taiwan Relations Act which states that any threat to Taiwan's
safety and security is of grave concern to the United States.
Speaker Gingrich bolstered the basis of the communiques and the act
on his recent visit to China when he told China's President that the
United States will defend Taiwan, period. I commend the Speaker for his
comments and urge this body to adopt such a stance with the passage of
this legislation.
This is not a partisan issue. I say to my colleagues on both sides of
the aisle that we have a responsibility to fortify and defend
democracies throughout the world. That is at the crux of U.S. foreign
policy. Our relations with Taiwan should not be treated any
differently.
The issue is not for the U.S. Congress to determine the current or
future status of Taiwan or to be their sole defenders in all
confrontations. Rather, it is our duty to ensure that Taiwan has the
means to defend itself against acts of aggression by China as it seeks
to define its political status.
Mr. Speaker, I commend the gentleman from California [Mr. Hunter] for
this important piece of legislation, as well as the gentleman from
California [Mr. Cox], the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] and the
gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] for their
[[Page H10154]]
hard work and leadership. I urge all my colleagues to support H.R.
2386.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Cunningham].
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, I am not going to have to raise my voice
tonight because I respect all the Members on this issue and, as a
matter of fact, good friends with them. But I would disagree, and I
would like to explain on some of the issues.
During the Navy I served with Admiral Brown on 7th Fleet staff. I was
responsible for the defense of all Southeast Asia countries. For
example, in Korea it was Team Spirit. We dealt with the host countries,
not only the potential and exercise threat, but I had linguists that
actually monitored North Korea in the real threat. We had Yama Secura,
Japan; Cobra Gold and Tangent Flash in Philippines, and part of that
was the threat on Taiwan.
China is not our ally, in my opinion. I think that Hong Kong will
have much more effect on China than China has on Hong Kong. And I do
not think there will be peace in the Middle East in my lifetime, but I
believe we have to engage in the Middle East and constantly work in
that direction.
I think the same is true with China. I think we have to engage in
China, realizing that it takes a long time to change a 10,000-year-old
dog, and especially a dog that has got very sharp and brutal teeth and
is willing to use them at any time.
The real problem: During the recent missile firings from China in the
direction of Taiwan, any time we take the U.S. fleet through the
straits, they are in peril. It could be very difficult, and China has a
formidable force that could make us pay bitterly. That is why the
Upper-Tier system connected with the THAAD system is so very important,
and the treaty not to slow down the missiles, because that would make
us have to have more Aegis cruisers.
But while we are trying to get through those straits, Taiwan is going
to have a period of time where it is very difficult for them to
survive. It is not very far across those straits, and they have the
landing forces in which Taiwan is going to have to have some defense
for itself. This will help us. If we get there after China was already
embarked, we could pay even a bitter price.
So I support the gentleman's amendment, and I think it is very
important.
I would say one other thing not connected to this bill, that Israel
just sold missiles to Turkey. I plan on offering a bill that denies or
will refuse to have Turkey employ those air-to-air missiles in Cyprus,
because I think that would be potentially dangerous.
I thank Members on both sides of the aisle for their thoughtfulness.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Rohrabacher].
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, it was not that long ago when we stood
and watched as Red Chinese missiles were flung over the islands of
Taiwan in an attempt to intimidate the people who lived there during
their first free election.
{time} 2000
This was an attempt by a regime in Beijing, the last remnants of
Communist dictatorships on this planet, to exert their power over the
20 million people of Taiwan, and we stood helplessly. No, we did not
just stand helplessly, but we did send aircraft carriers.
Is it more important for us to send aircraft carriers? Is that what
we want as our only option, is to send offensive weapons into this
troubled region, when the Chinese Communists decide to flex their
muscles?
It would be a travesty for us not to develop a system, a defensive
system, with the Taiwanese, that we can exercise when the Communist
Chinese are trying to exert their influence in an improper way.
We have seen them do it before, and we had no other option but to
send those aircraft carriers. Thousands of American lives were at stake
in order to prevent aggression upon Taiwan.
This resolution that we are discussing today will lead, hopefully,
after a study, towards a relationship with Taiwan, where we will be
permitted to defend Taiwan, something that is completely within the
Taiwan Relations Act. This is an agreement we have had with the
Chinese, with the Communist Chinese, over the years, that we could sell
them defensive weapons. If we back away from this, if we back away from
this alternative, what are the Chinese Communists going to say?
Certainly they do not believe we are going to use offensive weapons
against them should they move against Taiwan. No. They will say what we
have heard here earlier before tonight, and that is, ``Well, you can
talk about freedom, you can talk about being against oppression in
China, just don't do anything about it.''
Well, here we have an option that we can do something about potential
aggression that threatens the peace of the world and puts the
democracies of the world on notice and on the line about what their
response will be. We can prepare with the Taiwanese a defensive missile
system that will protect them against this type of horrible aggression
of high-technology missiles aimed at their population centers.
We should not back away from this. If we do, we will have no other
option but to send offensive weapons into that theater at a time of
crisis and chaos. That is the very last thing that we want to do, is
leave ourselves with that option, only the offensive option.
So I would plead with my colleagues, let us do what is right. We can
strike a blow for freedom, but not threaten anyone, because these are
defensive systems we are talking about. We can provide ourselves the
option that in a future crisis we will have something other than an
offensive threat that actually threatens their people in a response to
Communist Chinese aggressive acts. It makes all the sense in the world.
Those of us who are trying to make sure that we have a more peaceful
world, those of us who do not want to send a wrong message to Communist
Chinese bosses in Beijing, we want to send them the message that we are
strongly behind democracy in Taiwan and will not see them take it out
by force, it is good to provide them a missile defense system.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
South Carolina [Mr. Spratt].
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman from California [Mr.
Rohrabacher] would respond to a question, is the gentleman aware that
we are now providing Taiwan PAC-2 missile defense systems and we also
have agreed to sell them PAC-3, and that is state of the art, that is
the best we can provide right now?
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SPRATT. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, this bill is totally consistent with
our agreement.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, I understand. The
gentleman is saying we would have nothing other than an offensive
option. We are already providing them with the most that we have got.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. We are moving forward.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SPRATT. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, it is the understanding I have, and I have
asked some of our experts on this, the missiles that China is evolving
right now outstrip the capability of PAC-2 and PAC-3.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, there is no question
about that. To the extent they are effective at all, it is what we have
got, and we are giving them that right now, number one. Number two, the
THAAD and the upper-tier are not available to give. They are not in
production.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield further, so this
makes absolute sense to have a track that you are following that starts
us working with Taiwan to develop that system, so that when we have it,
it is mature, it is in place, and it takes over for the PAC-2 and the
PAC-3, which cannot handle the M-9.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman must understand, this is
a study. What harm has it done to study this issue, so we can be
prepared in case what we have already done is not adequate to meet the
threats of the future?
[[Page H10155]]
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, there is no harm done.
The study is unnecessary. The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
can come right now and paint you the architecture, but the components
to fill in the architecture are not systems in being; they are several
years off from production.
The fact that we are providing the PAC-3 is ample indication that
when these systems are available, we will provide them, too. That is
enough. You do not have to go this far.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon], the distinguished chairman of
our Committee on Rules.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time,
and also thank the gentleman from California [Mr. Hunter] and the
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Deutsch].
Mr. Speaker, I guess I have spoken enough on these bills over the
last couple of days. I guess I will not go back into the problems that
exist with the People's Republic of China. It is just sickening to
think about the deplorable human rights violations, the religious
persecution, and the sale of chemical and biological factories to
countries like Iran, and missiles. It just goes on and on and on.
But let me just go back to 1978 when something very sad happened. We
had a President named Jimmy Carter, and he was one of the kindest, most
decent men I think I ever met; too kind and too decent perhaps. But he
saw fit to derecognize a country called the Republic of China, and now
it is called Taiwan.
But all during the fight, all during those years, during the Second
World War and then fighting communism, Taiwan and the Republic of China
were one of the links in the chain of defense against the spread of
death and deadly atheistic communism, and we, the United States of
America, turned our back, for the first time in history, on these
people that stood side by side with us, shoulder to shoulder. It was
just disgraceful, but it happened.
Then, in 1979, even before Ronald Reagan got here, Members sitting
here today, the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman], myself, the
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton], and others, wrote something
called the Taiwan Relations Act, and it is now the law of the land.
The law of the land always supersedes any kind of communiques, any
kind of agreements that are made between people. It is the law of the
land, and that Taiwan Relations Act says that we will provide the
people of Taiwan with the qualitative and quantitative weaponry to
defend themselves.
Well, with what we see happening throughout the Chinese Government in
recent years, with the missile proliferation, we know there is a real
danger, not only to the American fleet there and American soldiers in
the area, but certainly to the people of Taiwan, to which we owe a
great deal.
That is why this bill is so terribly important today. We need to pass
this legislation. We need to continue to send the message to the
People's Republic of China that we will not put up with what they
attempted to do back in March of 1996 when they tried to interrupt the
elections going on in free China, on Taiwan, with their missile
deployment.
We need to stand steady with our allies, even though we do not
recognize them officially, and this legislation does just that. That is
why I have such great praise for the gentleman from California [Mr.
Hunter] and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Deutsch], who amended the
legislation, and certainly the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] for
bringing this important legislation to the floor of this House. I urge
support of the legislation.
Mr. Speaker, anyone who can remember back to March 1996 knows why we
need this bill. Recall how, during that month, Taiwan was conducting
the first democratic presidential election in the history of Chinese
civilization. Well, that was too much for the Communist dictators in
Beijing, so they started firing missiles just off the coast of
democratic Taiwan.
It was one of the most despicable acts by Communist China since
Tiananmen Square. That, and that alone, is why we need this bill. China
is building its missile arsenal aggressively, and we know what they
intend to do with them. Peaceful, democratic Taiwan needs to be able to
defend itself.
This bill only requires a study of Taiwan's defense needs. How can
you reasonably oppose it? Let me remind members that the Taiwan
Relations Act obligates us to provide defensive weapons to Taiwan. The
law grants Congress a role in the analysis of Taiwan's defense needs
and states that defense sales to Taiwan will be based solely on our
assessment of those needs.
Now I know that the Pentagon has sent a letter over here opposing
this bill and stating that Taiwan doesn't want or need a lot of missile
defense, and Mr. Speaker, that upsets me because I know it is untrue
and so does the Pentagon. Everytime I talk to the Taiwanese I hear them
say they want missile defenses. It's a high priority for them and don't
believe otherwise.
I commend Mr. Hunter and Chairman Gilman for bringing us this bill
and I also commend Mr. Deutsch for his addition to the bill, which
reminds us that Hong Kong is no model for Taiwan and which restates
over commitment and obligation to assist Taiwan should they become
victims of Communist Chinese aggression.
I urge an aye vote on this critical legislation.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I want to speak out of order for just a moment with
respect to H.R. 2358, the Political Freedom in China Act, which was
debated here a day or so ago. During that debate, I was waiting for a
letter to come over from the White House with respect to the Gilman-
Markey amendment. The letter did not arrive on time, so I am going to
read that letter now with respect to H.R. 2358. The letter is dated
November 5, 1997.
Dear Mr. Speaker: I am writing to express the
Administration's strong opposition to legislation offered by
Representatives Gilman and Markey in connection with the
certification by the President on China's nonproliferation
policies and practices. In our judgment, the legislation
would put at risk the substantial achievements we have made
in our nonproliferation dialogue with China and undercut our
ability to make further progress.
First, the United States achieved extremely valuable
nonproliferation commitments from China, based on the current
law governing certifications to Congress implementing the
U.S.-China agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation. By
``moving the goalposts,'' this proposal would undermine our
credibility with China, possibly causing Beijing to
reconsider some of its important commitments, for example
regarding Iran.
The existing 30-day review period provides ample time for
consideration of the President's certification package. Even
when the nuclear cooperation agreement is in full effect,
nuclear exports will be licensed on a case-by-case basis, and
may be suspended at any time. This provides continuing
leverage over Chinese behavior and a lengthy period of time
for monitoring the implementation of Chinese assurances.
Second, this proposal would imprudently revise the
established process under the Atomic Energy Act for
Congressional consideration of agreements for peaceful
nuclear cooperation. Unlike previous law, which established
clear requirements for the President's certifications, under
this proposal Congress could permanently block nuclear
exports to China, without providing any guidance to the
Executive Branch as to the conditions that need to be met to
implement the agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation.
Going forward with the nuclear cooperation would then require
the passage of new legislation in order to undo the
prohibition on nuclear exports. This would amount to a
fundamental and unnecessary review of the Atomic Energy Act
and a major obstacle to ever reaching agreement with China on
the conditions for peaceful nuclear cooperation.
Sincerely, John Hilly, Senior Advisor to the President and
Director for Legislative Affairs.
I thank the Speaker for permitting me to read this statement.
Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time on the bill pending,
and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield the balance of my time
to the gentleman from California [Mr. Cox], who has been one of the
major movers in these series of bills that we have been considering the
last few days.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Gibbons). The gentleman from California
[Mr. Cox] is recognized for 7\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished
chairman of the Committee on International Relations, and I also thank
the ranking member for his very, very worthwhile comments and important
perspective on this, because, frankly, we are this close, even though
he opposes the bill,
[[Page H10156]]
to agreeing on all the fundamental points.
The ranking member, after all, makes the point that while this bill
would support a study of cooperation with Taiwan on theater missile
defense, that is already our policy. We already supply missile defense
systems. We have supplied four Patriot systems to Taiwan. We already
cooperate with them on missile defense. But, whereas the fact that this
bill is consistent with our policy is my reason for supporting it and
offering it, it is the ranking member's reason for opposing it.
As we heard in debate, the Patriot systems that we have made
available to Taiwan, and which, incidentally, Taiwan purchases, we do
not provide them as foreign aid, they have long since outgrown that,
are inadequate to deal with the very realistic threats that Taiwan now
faces and that this Congress faced in one of its finest moments last
year.
We all recall when Franklin Delano Roosevelt called the United States
of America the arsenal of democracy, making it very plain that
sometimes in order to have freedom one has to fight for it, and the
United States was then and is now the arsenal of democracy. But the
People's Republic of China we saw last year is essentially the arsenal
of antidemocracy, because they used their military power to try to
prevent legislative elections in 1995 in Taiwan and the first ever
presidential elections in 1996, in 5,000 years of Chinese history.
{time} 2015
The People's Republic of China, the government run by the Communist
Party in Beijing, is fond of saying that Taiwan is but a province of
China, it is part of China. If that is so, then we in America should
reward the progress that democracy is making in Taiwan.
We, in America, should look favorably upon this, and we should look
with grave concern upon any effort by the largest standing military on
Earth, the People's Liberation Army, to use force to prevent democracy
in Taiwan, and that is exactly what went on in 1995 when missiles were
launched in order to intimidate the electorate. When that preceded in
1996, when 150,000 troops were amassed in Fujian Province right on the
border of the Taiwan Strait, 220 fighter aircraft, and when the effect
of launching the missiles was to blockade, effectively, the entire
island, both ends of the Island of Taiwan and interfere not just with
Taiwan's shipping, but with the United States, to interfere with
commercial shipping, to interfere with commercial air travel by the
United States, we took it very, very seriously, and we also responded
here in the Congress.
The United States House of Representatives moved a very pointed
resolution on the floor of this House that I introduced, the Policy
Committee prepared, that stated that if the People's Republic of China
should try to invade the Island of Taiwan by force, without provocation
to attack Taiwan, then the United States would defend Taiwan, and that
resolution passed this House of Representatives with 435 Members, with
only 14 votes against.
It was a strong and clear statement, a strong and clear statement in
response to what theretofore had been the Clinton administration's
utterly ambiguous policy. In fact, the Clinton administration called
their policy strategic ambiguity. But abandoning immediately their
policy of so-called strategic ambiguity in the teeth of this very, very
clear statement from the United States Congress within days of the
passage of our resolution, stating clearly that if, without
provocation, the People's Republic of China would attack the Island of
Taiwan, the administration sent two carrier battle groups into the
Taiwan Strait, a clear show of support for the democratic elections
that were about to take place on the Island of Taiwan. And within days
of that measure, the People's Republic of China canceled the scheduled
balance of their military exercises of the missile test and called off
the blockade.
The scheduled presidential elections, the first ever in 5,000 years
of Chinese history, took place on schedule. The months following have
been peaceful. That is all to the good.
But it is ironic that the Clinton administration described its own
policy of strategic ambiguity when that would be my criticism of it.
How is the government in Beijing to know what would be the United
States response if they did attack, and why would we want them to be in
the dark about that? We were risking war through weakness, rather than
advancing a policy of peace through strength.
The missile threat to Taiwan is very, very clear. That is why our
policy of cooperating with them on theater missile defense is the right
policy, and that is why congressional leadership on this issue remains
important.
What this bill seeks is very simple, a study by the Defense
Department, by the Clinton Defense Department, of an appropriate
defensive system for the Asia Pacific region. There is a July 1, 1998
reporting date back to the Congress, and the Clinton administration
will make its own determination in that report to Congress whether or
not an adequate missile defense, adequate to the new threats, the very
real and existing threats that Taiwan now faces, is available for sale
to Taiwan, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, and in fact, that
is the language of the bill itself.
That is what this bill does. It is utterly reasonable, and because
this Congress has so strongly in the past supported the Taiwan
Relations Act, made it clear to the People's Republic of China and the
Communist Party in Beijing that aggression is no way to deal with the
cross-strait problems, it is important that we not back away from that
tonight. It is important that we vote in favor of this legislation,
because the peace of the strait depends upon it, because the peace of
Asia and the Pacific depend upon it, and the peace of the world depend
upon it.
I congratulate the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] for bringing
this bill to the floor, and I congratulate its author, the gentleman
from California [Mr. Hunter].
Mrs. LINDA SMITH of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support
of H.R. 2386, the United States-Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense
Cooperation Act. The Taiwanese people only wish to see that the safety
and security of Taiwan is enhanced. The United States must play an
important role in this process.
This legislation, H.R. 2386, requires the Secretary of Defense to
conduct a study on a plan for Taiwan to acquire a missile defense
system to protect the territory of Taiwan. The missile firings
conducted by the Chinese Government off the coast of Taiwan less than 2
years ago is proof that Taiwan's long term security and the United
States' interests in the Pacific Rim demand that we stand firm in
ensuring Taiwan's safety.
This study will ensure that all facets of Taiwan's security are
examined and the feasibility of a missile defense system is fully
considered. The Taiwanese people should be reassured that their safety
is of great concern to the American people.
I ask my colleagues to please join me in supporting H.R. 2386, the
United States-Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Act.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California [Mr.
Cox] for his concluding remarks, and I yield back the balance of my
time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore [Mr. Blunt]. Pursuant to House Resolution
302, the previous question is ordered on the bill, as amended.
The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a
quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not
present.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 301,
nays 116, not voting 16, as follows:
[Roll No. 601]
YEAS--301
Abercrombie
Aderholt
Andrews
Armey
Bachus
Baesler
Baker
Ballenger
Barcia
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Bereuter
Bilbray
Bilirakis
[[Page H10157]]
Bishop
Bliley
Blunt
Boehlert
Bonilla
Bono
Boswell
Boyd
Brady
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bryant
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Canady
Cannon
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Christensen
Clay
Clyburn
Coble
Collins
Combest
Condit
Cook
Cooksey
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Cunningham
Danner
Davis (VA)
Deal
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLay
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Doolittle
Doyle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
Engel
English
Ensign
Etheridge
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Foley
Forbes
Fossella
Fowler
Fox
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gilman
Goode
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Graham
Granger
Green
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hansen
Hastert
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Hefley
Herger
Hill
Hilleary
Hilliard
Hinojosa
Hobson
Hoekstra
Holden
Hooley
Horn
Hostettler
Hulshof
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jenkins
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kaptur
Kasich
Kelly
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kim
Kind (WI)
King (NY)
Kingston
Klink
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Lampson
Lantos
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Lipinski
Livingston
LoBiondo
Lucas
Maloney (CT)
Maloney (NY)
Manton
Manzullo
Martinez
Mascara
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McIntyre
McKeon
McNulty
Meek
Menendez
Metcalf
Mica
Miller (FL)
Mollohan
Moran (KS)
Myrick
Nadler
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nussle
Ortiz
Owens
Oxley
Packard
Pallone
Pappas
Parker
Pascrell
Paxon
Pease
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Quinn
Radanovich
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Redmond
Regula
Reyes
Riggs
Rodriguez
Rogan
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Rothman
Roukema
Royce
Ryun
Salmon
Sanchez
Sandlin
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer, Dan
Schaffer, Bob
Schumer
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherman
Shimkus
Shuster
Sisisky
Skeen
Slaughter
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Smith, Linda
Snowbarger
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Stearns
Stenholm
Strickland
Stump
Stupak
Sununu
Talent
Tanner
Tauscher
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thompson
Thornberry
Thune
Tiahrt
Torres
Towns
Traficant
Turner
Upton
Walsh
Wamp
Watkins
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Wexler
Weygand
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wise
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NAYS--116
Ackerman
Allen
Archer
Baldacci
Barrett (WI)
Becerra
Bentsen
Berman
Berry
Blagojevich
Blumenauer
Bonior
Borski
Boucher
Brown (CA)
Cardin
Castle
Clayton
Clement
Conyers
Costello
Coyne
Cummings
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Delahunt
Dellums
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Edwards
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Fazio
Filner
Ford
Frank (MA)
Furse
Gejdenson
Gillmor
Gordon
Hamilton
Harman
Hefner
Hinchey
Houghton
Hoyer
Jackson (IL)
Jefferson
Johnson (WI)
Kanjorski
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kleczka
Kucinich
LaFalce
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lofgren
Lowey
Luther
Markey
Matsui
McDermott
McGovern
Meehan
Millender-McDonald
Miller (CA)
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Moran (VA)
Morella
Murtha
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Pastor
Paul
Payne
Pelosi
Pickett
Poshard
Price (NC)
Rivers
Roemer
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sanford
Sawyer
Scott
Serrano
Skaggs
Skelton
Smith, Adam
Snyder
Spratt
Stabenow
Stark
Thurman
Tierney
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Waters
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Woolsey
Wynn
NOT VOTING--16
Boehner
Carson
Coburn
Cubin
DeLauro
Flake
Foglietta
Gonzalez
Greenwood
Linder
McKinney
Neal
Riley
Schiff
Stokes
Yates
{time} 2043
The Clerk announced the following pair:
On this vote:
Mr. Riley for, with Ms. McKinney against.
Messrs. RUSH, HOYER, DELAHUNT, WYNN, HINCHEY, and MOAKLEY, Mrs.
LOWEY, Mr. CARDIN, and Mr. DOGGETT changed their vote from ``aye'' to
``no.''
Ms. BROWN of Florida, Mr. STRICKLAND, and Mr. NADLER changed their
vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Motion To Reconsider The Vote Offered by Mr. Pallone
Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I move to reconsider the vote by which the
bill was passed.
Motion To Table Offered by Mr. Bereuter
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I move to lay on the table the motion to
reconsider.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter] to lay on the table the motion
to reconsider offered by the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Pallone].
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Recorded Vote
Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 245,
noes 175, not voting 13, as follows:
[Roll No. 602]
AYES--245
Abercrombie
Aderholt
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baesler
Baker
Ballenger
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Bereuter
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bliley
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Boswell
Boyd
Brady
Bryant
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Canady
Cannon
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Christensen
Coble
Coburn
Collins
Combest
Condit
Cook
Cooksey
Cox
Crane
Crapo
Cunningham
Davis (VA)
Deal
DeLay
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Doolittle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Ensign
Eshoo
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Foley
Forbes
Fossella
Fowler
Fox
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Goode
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Graham
Granger
Greenwood
Gutknecht
Hall (TX)
Hansen
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Hefley
Herger
Hill
Hilleary
Hobson
Hoekstra
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hulshof
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Jenkins
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kasich
Kelly
Kim
Kind (WI)
King (NY)
Kingston
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Livingston
LoBiondo
Lucas
Manzullo
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McIntyre
McKeon
Metcalf
Mica
Miller (FL)
Moran (KS)
Morella
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nussle
Oxley
Packard
Pappas
Parker
Paul
Paxon
Pease
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Redmond
Regula
Riggs
Rivers
Rogan
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roukema
Royce
Ryun
Salmon
Sandlin
Sanford
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer, Dan
Schaffer, Bob
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherman
Shimkus
Shuster
Sisisky
Skeen
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Smith, Linda
Snowbarger
Solomon
Spence
Stearns
Stenholm
Strickland
Stump
Sununu
Talent
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thornberry
Thune
Tiahrt
Tierney
Traficant
Turner
Upton
Walsh
Wamp
Watkins
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NOES--175
Ackerman
Allen
Andrews
Baldacci
Barcia
Barrett (WI)
Becerra
Bentsen
Berman
Berry
Bishop
Blagojevich
Blumenauer
Bonior
Borski
Boucher
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Cardin
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Conyers
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Cummings
Danner
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
[[Page H10158]]
Dellums
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Doyle
Edwards
Engel
Etheridge
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Fazio
Filner
Ford
Frank (MA)
Frost
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gordon
Green
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hamilton
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Holden
Hooley
Hoyer
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson (WI)
Johnson, E. B.
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kleczka
Klink
Kucinich
LaFalce
Lampson
Lantos
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Lofgren
Lowey
Luther
Maloney (CT)
Maloney (NY)
Manton
Markey
Martinez
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McDermott
McGovern
McHale
McNulty
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Millender-McDonald
Miller (CA)
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Moran (VA)
Murtha
Nadler
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Pickett
Pomeroy
Poshard
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Rodriguez
Roemer
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sanchez
Sanders
Sawyer
Schumer
Scott
Serrano
Skaggs
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith, Adam
Snyder
Spratt
Stabenow
Stark
Stupak
Tanner
Tauscher
Thompson
Thurman
Torres
Towns
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Waters
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Wexler
Weygand
Wise
Woolsey
Wynn
NOT VOTING--13
Carson
Cubin
Flake
Foglietta
Gonzalez
McKinney
Neal
Riley
Sabo
Schiff
Souder
Stokes
Yates
{time} 2103
Mr. GUTIERREZ changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
So the motion to table the motion to reconsider was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
____________________