[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 154 (Thursday, November 6, 1997)]
[House]
[Pages H10149-H10158]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




  UNITED STATES-TAIWAN ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION ACT

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 302, I call up 
the bill (H.R. 2386) to implement the provisions of the Taiwan 
Relations Act concerning the stability and security of Taiwan and 
United States cooperation with Taiwan on the development and 
acquisition of defensive military articles, and ask for its immediate 
consideration in the House.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Gibbons). The bill is considered read 
for amendment.
  The text of H.R. 2386 is as follows:

                               H.R. 2386

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``United States-Taiwan Anti-
     Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Act''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       The Congress finds the following:
       (1) The stability and security of Taiwan and the balance of 
     power in the Taiwan Strait are key elements for the continued 
     peace and stability of the greater Asia-Pacific region, and 
     the indefinite continuation of such stability and security 
     and balance of power is in the vital national security 
     interest of the United States.
       (2) The People's Republic of China is currently engaged in 
     a comprehensive military modernization campaign that is 
     enhancing the power-projection capabilities of the People's 
     Liberation Army, including the introduction of advanced 
     ballistic and cruise missiles that could alter the current 
     balance of power in the Taiwan Strait and in the greater 
     Asia-Pacific region.
       (3) The current lack of transparency in the People's 
     Republic of China military infrastructure and its associated 
     defense establishment and the opaqueness of the comprehensive 
     efforts of the People's Liberation Army to modernize its 
     ballistic and cruise missile programs could spark a regional 
     arms race that would destabilize the East Asia and Western 
     Pacific regions and threaten vital United States national 
     security interests.
       (4) In March 1996, the People's Liberation Army created a 
     temporary, but de facto, blockade of both the international 
     shipping lanes of the Taiwan Strait and the international 
     airspace around Taiwan by conducting live-fire military 
     exercises which included the launch of several advanced, 
     nuclear-capable M-9 ballistic missiles to target areas close 
     to major ports in both the northern and southern areas of 
     Taiwan.
       (5) In March 1996, the locations of People's Liberation 
     Army military activities and M-9 missile target areas nearby 
     to Taiwan's two largest ports, Keelung and Kaohsiung, created 
     a de facto blockade of the Taiwan Strait, international 
     waters and airspace, interfered with United States and 
     international shipping and aviation, and impinged upon the 
     national security interests of the United States, requiring 
     the immediate deployment of two United States aircraft 
     carrier battle groups to the South China Sea.
       (6) The actions of the People's Liberation Army in such 
     close proximity to Taiwan were deliberate attempts to disrupt 
     Taiwan's social and economic stability and were carried out 
     as attempts to intimidate the people of Taiwan during the 
     period leading up to Taiwan's historic first democratic 
     presidential election.
       (7) The early development and deployment of an effective 
     United States theater missile defense system to the Asia-
     Pacific region, and the adjustment of United States policy to 
     include Taiwan, including the Penghu Islands, Kinmen, and 
     Matsu, under the protection of such defense system, would be 
     prudent and appropriate responses to--
       (A) the refusal by the People's Republic of China to 
     renounce the use of force to determine the future of Taiwan;
       (B) the nature of the military threat of the People's 
     Republic of China posed by the increased focus of the 
     People's Liberation Army on advanced missile development; and
       (C) the demonstrated intent of the Government of the 
     People's Republic of China to use live-fire military 
     exercises and ballistic missile tests against the people and 
     Government of Taiwan as tools of so-called coercive missile 
     tests against the people and Government of Taiwan as tools of 
     so-called coercive diplomacy.
       (8) The early deployment of a United States theater anti-
     ballistic missile system in the Asia-Pacific region would 
     maintain a balance of power in the Taiwan Strait and deter 
     the People's Republic of China from resorting to military 
     intimidation tactics to coerce or manipulate the people and 
     freely-elected Government of Taiwan in the future.
       (9) Taiwan's local air-defense capability provided by the 
     United States Modified Air Defense System (MADS) is not 
     adequate for the task of defending local areas of Taiwan, 
     including the Penghu Islands, Kinmen, and Matsu, from limited 
     ballistic missile attacks or deterring the threat and use of 
     force against Taiwan by the People's Liberation Army to 
     achieve the political goals of the core leadership of the 
     People's Republic of China.
       (10) Taiwan has requested further United States cooperation 
     on missile defense, including the conduct of a joint 
     architecture study of the requirements for the establishment 
     and operation of a missile defense system for Taiwan, 
     including the Penghu Islands, Kinmen, and Matsu.

     SEC. 3. APPLICABILITY OF TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT.

       Section 3 of the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3302) is 
     amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(d) The provisions of subsections (a) and (b) supersede 
     any provision of the Joint Communique of the United States 
     and China of August 17, 1982.''.

     SEC. 4. STUDY AND REPORT RELATING TO ESTABLISHMENT AND 
                   OPERATION OF A THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE 
                   DEFENSE SYSTEM IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.

       (a) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall carry out a 
     study of the architecture requirements for the establishment 
     and operation of a theater ballistic missile defense system 
     in the Asia-Pacific region that would have the capability to 
     protect Taiwan from ballistic missile attacks. The study 
     shall include a description of appropriate measures by which 
     the United States would cooperate with Taiwan and provide 
     Taiwan with an advanced local-area ballistic missile defense 
     system.
       (b) Report.--Not later than July 1, 1998, the Secretary of 
     Defense shall submit to the Committee on National Security of 
     the House of Representatives and the Committee on Armed 
     Services of the Senate a report containing--
       (1) the results of the study conducted under subsection 
     (a);
       (2) the factors used to obtain such results;
       (3) a description of any existing United States missile 
     defense system that could be transferred to Taiwan in 
     accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act in order to allow 
     Taiwan to provide for its self-defense against limited 
     ballistic missile attacks.
       (c) Form of Report.--The report under subsection (b) shall 
     be submitted in both classified and unclassified form.

     SEC. 5. TRANSFER OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS TO 
                   TAIWAN.

       It is the sense of the Congress that the President, if 
     requested by the Government of Taiwan and in accordance with 
     the results of the study conducted under section 4, should 
     transfer to the Government of Taiwan appropriate defense 
     articles or defense services under the foreign military sales 
     program under chapter 2 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 
     U.S.C. 2761 et seq.) for the purpose of establishing and 
     operating a local-area ballistic missile defense system to 
     protect Taiwan, including the Penghu Islands, Kinmen, and 
     Matsu, against limited ballistic missile attacks.

     SEC. 6. STATEMENT OF POLICY RELATING TO UNITED STATES THEATER 
                   MISSILE DEFENSES FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.

       The Congress declares that it is in the national interest 
     of the United States that Taiwan be included in any effort at 
     ballistic missile defense cooperation, networking, or 
     interoperability with friendly and allied nations in the 
     Asia-Pacific region.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 302, the 
committee amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in the bill 
and modified by the amendments printed in part 4 of House Report 105-
379 is adopted.
  The text of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute as 
amended pursuant to House Resolution 302 is as follows:

                               H.R. 2386

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

[[Page H10150]]

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``United States-Taiwan Anti-
     Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Act''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       The Congress finds the following:
       (1) The stability and security of Taiwan and the balance of 
     power in the Taiwan Strait are key elements for the continued 
     peace and stability of the greater Asia-Pacific region, and 
     the indefinite continuation of such stability and security 
     and balance of power is in the vital national security 
     interest of the United States.
       (2) The People's Republic of China is currently engaged in 
     a comprehensive military modernization campaign that is 
     enhancing the power-projection capabilities of the People's 
     Liberation Army, including the introduction of advanced 
     ballistic and cruise missiles that could alter the current 
     balance of power in the Taiwan Strait and in the greater 
     Asia-Pacific region.
       (3) The current lack of transparency in the People's 
     Republic of China military infrastructure and its associated 
     defense establishment and the opaqueness of the comprehensive 
     efforts of the People's Liberation Army to modernize its 
     ballistic and cruise missile programs could spark a regional 
     arms race that would destabilize the East Asia and Western 
     Pacific regions and threaten vital United States national 
     security interests.
       (4) In March 1996, the People's Liberation Army created a 
     temporary, but de facto, blockade of both the international 
     shipping lanes of the Taiwan Strait and the international 
     airspace around Taiwan by conducting live-fire military 
     exercises which included the launch of several advanced, 
     nuclear-capable M-9 ballistic missiles to target areas close 
     to major ports in both the northern and southern areas of 
     Taiwan.
       (5) In March 1996, the locations of People's Liberation 
     Army military activities and M-9 missile target areas nearby 
     to Taiwan's two largest ports, Keelung and Kaohsiung, created 
     a de facto blockade of the Taiwan Strait, international 
     waters and airspace, interfered with United States and 
     international shipping and aviation, and impinged upon the 
     national security interests of the United States, requiring 
     the immediate deployment of two United States aircraft 
     carrier battle groups to the South China Sea.
       (6) The actions of the People's Liberation Army in such 
     close proximity to Taiwan were deliberate attempts to disrupt 
     Taiwan's social and economic stability and were carried out 
     as attempts to intimidate the people of Taiwan during the 
     period leading up to Taiwan's historic first democratic 
     presidential election.
       (7) The early development and deployment of an effective 
     United States theater missile defense system to the Asia-
     Pacific region, and the adjustment of United States policy to 
     include Taiwan, including the Penghu Islands, Kinmen, and 
     Matsu, under the protection of such defense system, would be 
     prudent and appropriate responses to--
       (A) the refusal by the People's Republic of China to 
     renounce the use of force to determine the future of Taiwan;
       (B) the nature of the military threat of the People's 
     Republic of China posed by the increased focus of the 
     People's Liberation Army on advanced missile development; and
       (C) the demonstrated intent of the Government of the 
     People's Republic of China to use live-fire military 
     exercises and ballistic missile tests against the people and 
     Government of Taiwan as tools of so-called coercive 
     diplomacy.
       (8) The early deployment of a United States theater anti-
     ballistic missile system in the Asia-Pacific region would 
     maintain a balance of power in the Taiwan Strait and deter 
     the People's Republic of China from resorting to military 
     intimidation tactics to coerce or manipulate the people and 
     freely-elected Government of Taiwan in the future.
       (9) While Taiwan is currently acquiring a local aircraft 
     and ballistic and cruise missile defense capability in the 
     form of the Modified Air Defense System (MADS), a larger 
     portion of Taiwan's territory and population would be 
     protected if this system were expanded to include a defense 
     of the Taichung region, Kaohsiung, the Penghu Islands, 
     Kinmen, and Matsu from limited ballistic missile attacks and 
     a deterrent against the threat and use of force against 
     Taiwan by the People's Liberation Army to achieve the 
     political goals of the core leadership of the People's 
     Republic of China.
       (10) Taiwan has requested further United States cooperation 
     on missile defense, including the conduct of a joint 
     architecture study of the requirements for the establishment 
     and operation of a missile defense system for Taiwan, 
     including the Penghu Islands, Kinmen, and Matsu.
       (11) On June 9, 1898, the ``Convention Respecting an 
     Extension of Hong Kong Territory'' was agreed to between 
     representatives of the governments of Great Britain and China 
     to lease the New Territories for the period of 99 years 
     beginning on July 1, 1898.
       (12) On December 19, 1984, the ``Sino-British Joint 
     Declaration'', agreed to between representatives of the 
     governments of Great Britain and China, established the terms 
     for the return to China on July 1, 1997, of the Hong Kong 
     area (including the Hong Kong Island, Kowloon, and the New 
     Territories (hereafter in this resolution referred to as 
     ``Hong Kong'').
       (13) No treaties exist between the People's Republic of 
     China and Taiwan which determine the future status of Taiwan.
       (14) The People's Republic of China attempts to apply to 
     Taiwan the formula commonly known as ``one country, two 
     systems'' in a effort to annex Taiwan to China.
       (15) The People's Republic of China has refused to renounce 
     the use of force against Taiwan and held military exercises 
     in the Taiwan Strait in March 1996 in an attempt to 
     intimidate the people of Taiwan in their first presidential 
     elections.
       (16) The Taiwan Relations Act states that ``[i]t is the 
     policy of the United States . . . to consider any effort to 
     determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, 
     including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and 
     security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to 
     the United States''.

     SEC. 3. STUDY AND REPORT RELATING TO ESTABLISHMENT AND 
                   OPERATION OF A THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE 
                   DEFENSE SYSTEM IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.

       (a) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall carry out a 
     study of the architecture requirements for the establishment 
     and operation of a theater ballistic missile defense system 
     in the Asia-Pacific region that would have the capability to 
     protect Taiwan from ballistic missile attacks. The study 
     shall include a description of appropriate measures by which 
     the United States would cooperate with Taiwan and provide 
     Taiwan with an advanced local-area ballistic missile defense 
     system.
       (b) Report.--Not later than July 1, 1998, the Secretary of 
     Defense shall submit to the Committee on National Security of 
     the House of Representatives and the Committee on Armed 
     Services of the Senate a report containing--
       (1) the results of the study conducted under subsection 
     (a);
       (2) the factors used to obtain such results;
       (3) a description of any existing United States missile 
     defense system that could be transferred to Taiwan in 
     accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act in order to allow 
     Taiwan to provide for its self-defense against limited 
     ballistic missile attacks.
       (c) Form of Report.--The report under subsection (b) shall 
     be submitted in both classified and unclassified form.

     SEC. 4. TRANSFER OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS TO 
                   TAIWAN.

       It is the sense of the Congress that the President, if 
     requested by the Government of Taiwan and in accordance with 
     the results of the study conducted under section 3, should 
     transfer to the Government of Taiwan appropriate defense 
     articles or defense services under the foreign military sales 
     program under chapter 2 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 
     U.S.C. 2761 et seq.) for the purpose of establishing and 
     operating a local-area ballistic missile defense system to 
     protect Taiwan, including the Penghu Islands, Kinmen, and 
     Matsu, against limited ballistic missile attacks.

     SEC. 5. STATEMENT OF POLICY RELATING TO UNITED STATES THEATER 
                   MISSILE DEFENSES FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.

       The Congress declares that it is in the national interest 
     of the United States that Taiwan be included in any effort at 
     ballistic missile defense cooperation, networking, or 
     interoperability with friendly and allied nations in the 
     Asia-Pacific region.

     SEC. 6. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS URGING THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE 
                   CLEAR TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA THE 
                   COMMITMENT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO SECURITY 
                   AND DEMOCRACY IN TAIWAN.

       It is the sense of the Congress that the Clinton 
     Administration should make clear to the leadership of the 
     People's Republic of China, the American people's firm 
     commitment for security and democracy for the people of 
     Taiwan and that the United States fully expects that the 
     resolution of security issues on both sides of the Taiwan 
     Strait will be resolved by peaceful means.

     SEC. 7. ADDITIONAL SENSE OF THE CONGRESS REGARDING TAIWAN.

       It is the sense of the Congress that--
       (1) the transfer of Hong Kong to the People's Republic of 
     China does not alter the current and future status of Taiwan;
       (2) the future of Taiwan should be determined by peaceful 
     means through a democratic process; and
       (3) the United States should assist in the defense of 
     Taiwan in case of threats or military attack by the People's 
     Republic of China against Taiwan.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 302, the 
gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] and the gentleman from Indiana 
[Mr. Hamilton] each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman].
  (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)


                             General Leave

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and 
to include extraneous material on H.R. 2386.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from New York?

[[Page H10151]]

  There was no objection.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to commend the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Hunter], a member of the Committee on National Security, for 
introducing this legislation. And I am proud to be an original 
cosponsor of the measure, and I support it wholeheartedly.
  I want to thank, too, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Deutsch] and 
the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Frost] for their amendments, which help 
to further clarify and improve the initial bill.
  The People's Republic of China is currently engaged in a 
comprehensive military modernization program that is enhancing the 
power projection capabilities of its armed forces, the People's 
Liberation Army. Included in this modernization program is the 
development and deployment of advanced ballistic missiles that can soon 
alter the balance of power across the Taiwan Strait.
  The security of Taiwan and the maintenance of a balance of power in 
the Taiwan Strait are key aspects for continued peace and prosperity in 
the region and an assurance that the question of Taiwan will be 
resolved peacefully as the United States and China have agreed in 
previous communiques. The PRC should hold no doubt that the United 
States would view with great concern any efforts to do otherwise.
  Furthermore, there are pragmatic reasons to be concerned. We all 
should be deeply troubled by the actions of the Chinese just last year 
when they fired ballistic missiles into international air and sea lanes 
off the coast of Taiwan in an effort to intimidate the people of Taiwan 
during the first democratic elections in 5,000 years of Chinese 
history.
  Mr. Speaker, the United States had to respond by deploying two 
aircraft carriers to the region. This sort of missile diplomacy by the 
Chinese is unacceptable. For our own national security and for peace 
and stability of the region, we should consider providing Taiwan with 
this sort of defensive system when it is fielded in the Asia-Pacific 
region. This bill does just that.
  Accordingly, I urge my colleagues to support this measure.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman 
from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter], chairman of our Subcommittee on Asia and 
the Pacific and chairman of our Committee on International Relations.


                   Amendment Offered by Mr. Bereuter

  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment 
I placed at the desk be considered as adopted.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Bereuter:
       In section 7(3) after the word ``States'' insert the 
     following: ``, in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act 
     and the constitutional processes of the United States,''.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the amendment is 
considered as adopted.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the bill, for several reasons. 
First of all, it is apparent I think, as we read the bill, that it has 
a flawed internal logic. It mandates a study and a Presidential report 
about the establishment of a theater ballistic missile defense system 
that includes Taiwan. At the same time, without waiting for the results 
of that study, it calls for making such a system available to Taiwan. 
That does not, it seems to me, make a lot of sense.
  Secondly, I do not think the bill is necessary. Taiwan does not need 
this technology and, so far, does not even want it. The United States 
Department of Defense already has an ongoing ballistic missile defense 
program with Taiwan. It sold Taiwan a Patriot derivative that is 
comparable to a system just introduced in the U.S. Army last year.
  The senior Taiwanese military leaders are not ready to commit to an 
unproved ballistic missile defense technology. It really is not a 
question of money. Taiwan has purchased over $8 billion in arms from 
the United States in the last 5 years. It has $87 billion in reserves. 
If it wanted this technology, Taiwan would be knocking on our door to 
buy it. But nobody is knocking.
  I have a letter dated September 29, 1997, from the United States 
Department of Defense. It reads, in part, ``Senior Taiwan military 
leaders are highly skeptical of a significant investment in the area of 
ballistic missile defense. The Taiwan military is rightly concerned 
about the potential for a huge diversion of resources to ballistic 
missile defense programs that have an uncertain future at best.''

                              {time}  1930

  The third reason is I think the bill is provocative. Everyone knows 
that China regards Taiwan as an integral part of the People's Republic 
of China. Offering Taiwan some of the world's most advanced weaponry, 
weaponry that Taiwan does not want or need, appears to be deliberately 
designed to provoke China. I do not think that helps our friends in 
Taiwan, and it carries some risk for Taiwan.
  There was another reason to be against this bill, but I think that 
reason has now been corrected by the unanimous consent made at the 
suggestion of the gentleman from Nebraska. I want to thank him for 
making that unanimous consent, because I think the language that was 
inserted into the bill by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Deutsch] has 
now had an addition to it which brings the language in the bill in line 
with the framework that has provided peace and stability and prosperity 
in the region for over two decades. It does not, I think, alter that 
framework language. I think the unanimous consent language is a good 
addition to this bill.
  In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I think the bill has an internal logic in 
it that is flawed. I think the bill is not necessary. I think it is 
provocative. It carries, it seems to me, some risk with no prospect for 
any benefit. I think, therefore, it may reduce and not enhance the 
security of our friends in Taiwan. It is my understanding that the 
administration strongly opposes this bill. I urge its defeat.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Hunter].
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from New York 
[Mr. Gilman], the chairman of the committee, for helping to shepherd 
this bill through the process and get it to the House floor and for all 
the work that he has done and other members of the committee, including 
the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter] and the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Deutsch], have done with respect to the contents of the 
bill.
  The bill is logical, it is reasonable, it is prudent and it is in 
total accord with the Taiwan Relations Act. There is no faulty logic 
that I can see, internal logic flaw that the gentleman from Indiana 
says there is. Reading the part of the bill that I think he is talking 
about, and that is the part of the bill that, following the study, 
says:
  ``It is the sense of the Congress that the President, if requested by 
the Government of Taiwan and in accordance with the results of the 
study conducted under section 3, should transfer to the Government of 
Taiwan appropriate defense articles under the foreign military sales 
program under chapter 2 of the Arms Export Control Act for the purpose 
of establishing and operating a local-area defense ballistic missile 
defense system to protect Taiwan.''
  That says in accordance with the results of the study. That obviously 
infers that the study has to be completed. We cannot transfer the 
articles until we have results, and so I think that is a reasonable, 
logical sequence that is manifest in the bill and I do not see any 
problem there.
  I think it is important, Mr. Speaker, to send an unmistakable signal 
to friends and foes alike. I think that that is the lesson we learned 
in the Middle East with respect to the invasion of Kuwait. Saddam 
Hussein claims that he was under the notion that we did not care if 
there was an invasion of Kuwait. Maybe he is lying, maybe he is 
misbehaving. He does that often. But certainly the statements of our 
representatives were not clear, were not unambiguous. It is important 
if you are going to defend an ally and you are going to offer that 
defense umbrella and that defense umbrella was unmistakably offered in 
the recent incident

[[Page H10152]]

when China lobbed missiles, M-9 missiles over the bow of Taiwan and we 
came to the aid of Taiwan with American ships and American force 
projection, it is obvious that Taiwan is under our defense umbrella. We 
have demonstrated that.
  It is also obvious that missiles are the weapon of choice for China. 
They are building missiles at a rapid rate. The administration tells us 
that by the year 2010, there will be over 2,000 missiles, many of them 
fast missiles, ballistic missiles, in the Chinese armory. If we are 
going to defend Taiwan and hopefully if we are going to give Taiwan the 
ability to defend itself so that American troops do not always have to 
be rushed into that area of the world and American navies do not always 
have to be projected into that area of the world, it is important to 
meet the weapon of the day. The weapon of the day clearly and the 
weapon of the future for China is missiles, theater ballistic missiles, 
some of them fairly fast, some of them faster than the PAC-II missiles 
that we are currently developing.
  All this bill does is request that DOD, that the President and DOD 
commence a study to evaluate an architecture that could be deployed in 
this area of Asia. And upon completing that study and if requested by 
the government of Taiwan and in accord with the Taiwan Relations Act, 
which incidentally says that the United States will provide articles of 
defense for Taiwan, then it is the sense of Congress that we should put 
together a defense system that includes in its area the defense of 
Taiwan.
  Mr. Speaker, I would say simply this is something that we are doing 
with our allies around the world. We are working on theater missile 
defense with our European allies right now. We are developing a 
partnership program in cooperation with Israel with development of the 
TMD system, the Arrow, which is an antitheater missile defense system, 
and it is absolutely appropriate, reasonable and logical and in the 
interest of the United States to have this study and ask the Clinton 
administration to report back to us and then take further action if the 
study, the results of the study and the request of Taiwan is in that 
direction.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to commend everybody who has worked on this 
language and put it together. I think this is an important part of our 
China package. It says that we stand with our friends and that we 
continue, as we do under the Taiwan Relations Act, to support our 
friends with defense articles and that we realize that defending 
against M-9 missiles and their successors is an important part of that 
duty.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 7 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt].
  (Mr. SPRATT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, this bill concerns our national security, 
but it was not heard, it was not debated, it was not marked up, it was 
not reported by the Committee on National Security because the 
committee waived jurisdiction. The first time I knew of it was today 
when the gentleman from California [Mr. Cox] called it to my attention. 
I read the bill, read the report, read the dissenting views and I 
reluctantly oppose it, reluctantly because I think those who sponsor it 
are well-intended, but I disagree with the means they are using to 
advance this particular proposal.
  On its face, this bill does seem simple. It asks the Pentagon to 
study the architecture of a theater ballistic missile defense system in 
the Asia-Pacific region which would protect Taiwan. It asks those who 
do that study to spell out just how the United States would cooperate 
with Taiwan and how we would provide Taiwan, specifically Taiwan, with 
a missile defense system which would not only cover Taiwan but would 
cover Matsu and Kinmen and the Penghu Islands. The bill asks for the 
study by July 1 and, even before the bill is completed and the study is 
started, it throws in a sense of the Congress that this resolution 
should make clear to the People's Republic of China the commitment of 
the American people to security in Taiwan. Just what that means, I am 
not really sure. I would be cautious about the way we broadcast such 
commitments to the world without clearly knowing what security 
obligations we are undertaking.
  The study sought by this bill in my opinion is wholly unnecessary. 
The BMD or ABM missile defense architecture it asks for is easy enough 
to spell out right here on the floor of the House. First of all, it 
would consist of the THAAD, theater high altitude interceptor, on the 
ground in Taiwan when it becomes operational, maybe 4, 5, 6 years from 
now. The THAAD would take out incoming missiles in their late mid-
phase, as they honed in on Taiwan. It would have to be complemented 
because there would probably be some leakers that the THAAD would not 
get by a Navy system called the Upper Tier or Area Defense. This would 
be based on surface ships like cruisers, the Aegis cruisers 
specifically, and when and if it becomes operational 4, 5, 6 years from 
now, its role would be to take out incoming missiles in the ascent 
phase, right after booster burnout if at all possible. Both of these 
systems would be complemented by, in the case with the THAAD, ground-
based radar, based in Taiwan, and by the SPY radar on Aegis cruisers, 
and both would likely include some linkage to our DSB satellite for the 
detection of a missile launch and to queue the interceptors and their 
radars. Eventually around 2004, 2005 or 2006 this system would probably 
be tied into our so-called SMTS, low earth orbit satellites, 18 to 24 
of them, with infrared seekers that will be in orbit around the whole 
globe if our plans are carried out today as they are designed.
  This system is not deployed today, it is not ready for deployment. 
The THAAD is not deployed today, it is not ready for deployment. The 
Navy's Upper Tier system is not deployed today. The THAAD and the Upper 
Tier system have been tested 4 or 5 times each and each has yet to make 
a successful intercept. They are still in the late phases of 
engineering development. The SMTS, the low earth orbit satellite, are 
at least 6 or 7 years off before they can be deployed.
  Nevertheless, knowing what we know of these components today, doing a 
little viewgraph engineering, we can design this architecture. We do 
not have to spend $500,000 to design the architecture. We know 
basically what it is. So this bill serves no practical purpose that I 
can see, none whatsoever. If Members want to know what the architecture 
is, I have just about told them what it can be. If they want anything 
more elaborate, it is too early to tell because the components are not 
yet systems in being. To the extent that Members want to know more, 
they can get it. Write the Ballistic Missile Defense Office a letter, 
have the chairman of the committee or the chairman of the Committee on 
National Security write him a letter and he will be over here in a 
week, not 6 or 7 months. A week. He will tell you essentially what I 
have just told you except he has got CADCAM, he will bring drawings, he 
will bring viewgraphs, he will bring anything you want to see on the 
architecture. You will not have to wait 6 months and it will not cost 
you $500,000.
  If you want the United States to cooperate with Taiwan, we are 
already cooperating with Taiwan in a very discreet manner, but in a 
very concrete manner as well. The Taiwanese are right now buying and 
taking delivery of the PAC-II, Patriot II batteries, 8 of them 
altogether. In addition, we are letting them have our extended range 
intercept missiles called the PAC-IIIs, the latest thing off the 
production line. We are making those available to them as well. So we 
are actually cooperating now.
  We do not need to wave this red flag, and we can accomplish the same 
purpose that this resolution proposes without the provocation and 
without the cost. A wise President once said with respect to our 
foreign policy that we should speak softly but carry a big stick. A 
wise Congress would do well to remember that sage advice and vote this 
resolution down.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from 
South Carolina [Mr. Spence], the distinguished chairman of our 
Committee on National Security.
  (Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this

[[Page H10153]]

time. I rise in support of H.R. 2386, the United States-Taiwan Anti-
Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Act. In my opinion, issues of 
national security have been ignored for far too long in the debate over 
the People's Republic of China.

                              {time}  1945

  While promoting American political values and free trade are 
essential elements of United States foreign policy, protecting our 
national security interests is the bedrock upon which our policy ought 
to be built.
  Today in East Asia, and despite recent fluctuations in financial 
markets, economic activity is proceeding at a frenetic pace bringing 
prosperity to more and more people. Likewise, as clearly demonstrated 
in Taiwan, democracy is taking hold. These developments are a direct 
result of a general geopolitical stability that characterizes much of 
East Asia, a stability more often than not guaranteed by the United 
States.
  The quandary we now face is how to look at China in the context of an 
Asian, even a global, security regime. China's economy is growing by 
leaps and bounds and is already recognized in the region as a great 
power. However, whether or not Chinese political, economic and military 
power will be a force for stability remains unknown and raises several 
fundamental questions.
  First, what are China's national ambitions? China, the so-called 
Middle Kingdom, has long considered itself a great nation and center of 
the civilized world. Chinese leaders have stated that they intend to 
become a dominant power in Asia as well as a world power. China is not 
content with the current geopolitical status quo and appears to 
envision a long-term competition with the United States both in the 
region and elsewhere.
  Second, what are China's strategic goals? China is embroiled in a 
variety of border disputes and claims of sovereignty around virtually 
its entire perimeter. Moreover, as Chinese leaders realize that their 
economic growth is increasingly dependent on foreign trade, their 
security interests also are becoming more expansive. China's ties to 
Iran and other Middle East nations, links to Latin America and budding 
strategic partnership with Russia are indicative of Beijing's 
broadening horizons.
  Third, what is China's national military strategy? Great power 
ambitions and expanding strategic horizons have forced the Chinese to 
shift from their longtime focus on homeland defense to developing the 
ability to project power in maritime East Asia and beyond.
  Finally, where is China headed with regard to military modernization? 
Until recently, assessments of Chinese modernization have focused 
primarily on the new warships and combat aircraft being built and 
bought, especially from Russia. However, the People's Republic, the 
People's Liberation Army has proved an astute student of the lessons of 
Operation Desert Storm. The PLA was stunned at the effectiveness with 
which our Armed Forces waged a high technology war.
  At the same time the Chinese obviously noted the inability of the 
United States to fully defend against the crude Scud missiles in Saddam 
Hussein's arsenal. During last year's tense confrontation between China 
and Taiwan, the PLA used ballistic missiles as an aggressive form of 
blockade in support of its own coercive diplomacy. China's President 
Jiang Zemin himself concluded several years ago in reviewing the 
lessons of the Gulf War, and I quote, modern warfare has become high-
tech warfare. It is a multidimensional war, electronic war, missile 
war, unquote.
  According to Jiang, the ability to conduct this missile war is our 
major principle in military modernization. Those who downplay China's 
military buildup do not understand the kind of threat this missile war 
presents. Preserving some measure of stability in East Asia will in the 
future increasingly rely on effective missile defenses.
  Mr. Speaker, I submit that we all must recognize that protection of 
America's own national security interests is essential to our evolving 
China policy. If we fail to recognize this reality, our overall China 
policy will be inconsistent; in the long run, ineffective.
  H.R. 2386, the United States-Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense 
Cooperation Act, represents an important statement on one security-
related element of our China policy. Defending Taiwan against the very 
real threat of Chinese ballistic missile attack will promote regional 
stability, and it will strengthen our United States alliances.
  I urge the support of my colleagues.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Deutsch].
  Mr. DEUTSCH. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 
2386. This bill addresses two core issues in U.S. policies toward 
China: No. 1, the current and future political status of Taiwan; and, 
No. 2, the defense of Taiwan from threats or military attacks by China.
  H. Con. Resolution 100, which I introduced back on June 18 just prior 
to the return of Hong Kong to China, is now included in the bill of the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Hunter]. My legislation has 42 
cosponsors and broad bipartisan support. It specifically expresses the 
sense of Congress that, one, the transfer of Hong Kong to China does 
not alter the current and future status of Taiwan; two, the future 
status of Taiwan should be determined by peaceful means through a 
democratic process; and, three, the United States should assist in the 
defense of Taiwan in cases of threat or military attack by China 
against Taiwan.
  The historic transfer of Hong Kong to China on July 1 should bear no 
consequence on the future status of Taiwan. The case of Taiwan is 
separate and distinct from Taiwan. Unlike Hong Kong, Taiwan has never 
entered into any agreements with China that determine the future status 
of Taiwan. Taiwan is, in fact, a de facto independent state and should 
determine its official future political status peacefully through 
democratic means.
  Beijing's claim on Taiwan is based neither on historic nor legal 
realities. The facts are clear. With the exception of a brief period 
from 1887 to 1895, Taiwan has been free of Chinese rule. Today Taiwan 
has separate governments, financial markets, dialects and cultures from 
mainland China.
  Mr. Speaker, by calling something black does not make it black; by 
calling something white does not make it white. Taiwan is a de facto 
independent state.
  The second major component of this legislation is the U.S. role in 
the defense of Taiwan. I was deeply concerned last year as I watched 
the so-called military exercises by the Chinese in the Taiwan Strait. 
It is obvious that the Chinese attempted to test the will of the United 
States with those exercises. The United States demonstrated with the 
deployment of two aircraft carriers and aggressive diplomacy that we 
would stand up to the Chinese and defend Taiwan against these acts of 
aggression.
  H.R. 2386 will further the U.S. commitment to assist in the defense 
of Taiwan by providing them with arms of a defensive nature which 
should act as a deterrent from future Chinese threats and protection in 
case of an attack. H.R. 2386 is consistent with the three communiques 
and the Taiwan Relations Act which states that any threat to Taiwan's 
safety and security is of grave concern to the United States.
  Speaker Gingrich bolstered the basis of the communiques and the act 
on his recent visit to China when he told China's President that the 
United States will defend Taiwan, period. I commend the Speaker for his 
comments and urge this body to adopt such a stance with the passage of 
this legislation.
  This is not a partisan issue. I say to my colleagues on both sides of 
the aisle that we have a responsibility to fortify and defend 
democracies throughout the world. That is at the crux of U.S. foreign 
policy. Our relations with Taiwan should not be treated any 
differently.
  The issue is not for the U.S. Congress to determine the current or 
future status of Taiwan or to be their sole defenders in all 
confrontations. Rather, it is our duty to ensure that Taiwan has the 
means to defend itself against acts of aggression by China as it seeks 
to define its political status.
  Mr. Speaker, I commend the gentleman from California [Mr. Hunter] for 
this important piece of legislation, as well as the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Cox], the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] and the 
gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] for their

[[Page H10154]]

hard work and leadership. I urge all my colleagues to support H.R. 
2386.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Cunningham].
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, I am not going to have to raise my voice 
tonight because I respect all the Members on this issue and, as a 
matter of fact, good friends with them. But I would disagree, and I 
would like to explain on some of the issues.
  During the Navy I served with Admiral Brown on 7th Fleet staff. I was 
responsible for the defense of all Southeast Asia countries. For 
example, in Korea it was Team Spirit. We dealt with the host countries, 
not only the potential and exercise threat, but I had linguists that 
actually monitored North Korea in the real threat. We had Yama Secura, 
Japan; Cobra Gold and Tangent Flash in Philippines, and part of that 
was the threat on Taiwan.
  China is not our ally, in my opinion. I think that Hong Kong will 
have much more effect on China than China has on Hong Kong. And I do 
not think there will be peace in the Middle East in my lifetime, but I 
believe we have to engage in the Middle East and constantly work in 
that direction.
  I think the same is true with China. I think we have to engage in 
China, realizing that it takes a long time to change a 10,000-year-old 
dog, and especially a dog that has got very sharp and brutal teeth and 
is willing to use them at any time.
  The real problem: During the recent missile firings from China in the 
direction of Taiwan, any time we take the U.S. fleet through the 
straits, they are in peril. It could be very difficult, and China has a 
formidable force that could make us pay bitterly. That is why the 
Upper-Tier system connected with the THAAD system is so very important, 
and the treaty not to slow down the missiles, because that would make 
us have to have more Aegis cruisers.
  But while we are trying to get through those straits, Taiwan is going 
to have a period of time where it is very difficult for them to 
survive. It is not very far across those straits, and they have the 
landing forces in which Taiwan is going to have to have some defense 
for itself. This will help us. If we get there after China was already 
embarked, we could pay even a bitter price.
  So I support the gentleman's amendment, and I think it is very 
important.
  I would say one other thing not connected to this bill, that Israel 
just sold missiles to Turkey. I plan on offering a bill that denies or 
will refuse to have Turkey employ those air-to-air missiles in Cyprus, 
because I think that would be potentially dangerous.
  I thank Members on both sides of the aisle for their thoughtfulness.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Rohrabacher].
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, it was not that long ago when we stood 
and watched as Red Chinese missiles were flung over the islands of 
Taiwan in an attempt to intimidate the people who lived there during 
their first free election.

                              {time}  2000

  This was an attempt by a regime in Beijing, the last remnants of 
Communist dictatorships on this planet, to exert their power over the 
20 million people of Taiwan, and we stood helplessly. No, we did not 
just stand helplessly, but we did send aircraft carriers.
  Is it more important for us to send aircraft carriers? Is that what 
we want as our only option, is to send offensive weapons into this 
troubled region, when the Chinese Communists decide to flex their 
muscles?
  It would be a travesty for us not to develop a system, a defensive 
system, with the Taiwanese, that we can exercise when the Communist 
Chinese are trying to exert their influence in an improper way.
  We have seen them do it before, and we had no other option but to 
send those aircraft carriers. Thousands of American lives were at stake 
in order to prevent aggression upon Taiwan.
  This resolution that we are discussing today will lead, hopefully, 
after a study, towards a relationship with Taiwan, where we will be 
permitted to defend Taiwan, something that is completely within the 
Taiwan Relations Act. This is an agreement we have had with the 
Chinese, with the Communist Chinese, over the years, that we could sell 
them defensive weapons. If we back away from this, if we back away from 
this alternative, what are the Chinese Communists going to say?
  Certainly they do not believe we are going to use offensive weapons 
against them should they move against Taiwan. No. They will say what we 
have heard here earlier before tonight, and that is, ``Well, you can 
talk about freedom, you can talk about being against oppression in 
China, just don't do anything about it.''
  Well, here we have an option that we can do something about potential 
aggression that threatens the peace of the world and puts the 
democracies of the world on notice and on the line about what their 
response will be. We can prepare with the Taiwanese a defensive missile 
system that will protect them against this type of horrible aggression 
of high-technology missiles aimed at their population centers.
  We should not back away from this. If we do, we will have no other 
option but to send offensive weapons into that theater at a time of 
crisis and chaos. That is the very last thing that we want to do, is 
leave ourselves with that option, only the offensive option.
  So I would plead with my colleagues, let us do what is right. We can 
strike a blow for freedom, but not threaten anyone, because these are 
defensive systems we are talking about. We can provide ourselves the 
option that in a future crisis we will have something other than an 
offensive threat that actually threatens their people in a response to 
Communist Chinese aggressive acts. It makes all the sense in the world.
  Those of us who are trying to make sure that we have a more peaceful 
world, those of us who do not want to send a wrong message to Communist 
Chinese bosses in Beijing, we want to send them the message that we are 
strongly behind democracy in Taiwan and will not see them take it out 
by force, it is good to provide them a missile defense system.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
South Carolina [Mr. Spratt].
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Rohrabacher] would respond to a question, is the gentleman aware that 
we are now providing Taiwan PAC-2 missile defense systems and we also 
have agreed to sell them PAC-3, and that is state of the art, that is 
the best we can provide right now?
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SPRATT. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, this bill is totally consistent with 
our agreement.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, I understand. The 
gentleman is saying we would have nothing other than an offensive 
option. We are already providing them with the most that we have got.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. We are moving forward.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SPRATT. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, it is the understanding I have, and I have 
asked some of our experts on this, the missiles that China is evolving 
right now outstrip the capability of PAC-2 and PAC-3.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, there is no question 
about that. To the extent they are effective at all, it is what we have 
got, and we are giving them that right now, number one. Number two, the 
THAAD and the upper-tier are not available to give. They are not in 
production.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield further, so this 
makes absolute sense to have a track that you are following that starts 
us working with Taiwan to develop that system, so that when we have it, 
it is mature, it is in place, and it takes over for the PAC-2 and the 
PAC-3, which cannot handle the M-9.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman must understand, this is 
a study. What harm has it done to study this issue, so we can be 
prepared in case what we have already done is not adequate to meet the 
threats of the future?

[[Page H10155]]

  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, there is no harm done. 
The study is unnecessary. The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization 
can come right now and paint you the architecture, but the components 
to fill in the architecture are not systems in being; they are several 
years off from production.
  The fact that we are providing the PAC-3 is ample indication that 
when these systems are available, we will provide them, too. That is 
enough. You do not have to go this far.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon], the distinguished chairman of 
our Committee on Rules.
  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time, 
and also thank the gentleman from California [Mr. Hunter] and the 
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Deutsch].
  Mr. Speaker, I guess I have spoken enough on these bills over the 
last couple of days. I guess I will not go back into the problems that 
exist with the People's Republic of China. It is just sickening to 
think about the deplorable human rights violations, the religious 
persecution, and the sale of chemical and biological factories to 
countries like Iran, and missiles. It just goes on and on and on.
  But let me just go back to 1978 when something very sad happened. We 
had a President named Jimmy Carter, and he was one of the kindest, most 
decent men I think I ever met; too kind and too decent perhaps. But he 
saw fit to derecognize a country called the Republic of China, and now 
it is called Taiwan.
  But all during the fight, all during those years, during the Second 
World War and then fighting communism, Taiwan and the Republic of China 
were one of the links in the chain of defense against the spread of 
death and deadly atheistic communism, and we, the United States of 
America, turned our back, for the first time in history, on these 
people that stood side by side with us, shoulder to shoulder. It was 
just disgraceful, but it happened.
  Then, in 1979, even before Ronald Reagan got here, Members sitting 
here today, the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman], myself, the 
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton], and others, wrote something 
called the Taiwan Relations Act, and it is now the law of the land.
  The law of the land always supersedes any kind of communiques, any 
kind of agreements that are made between people. It is the law of the 
land, and that Taiwan Relations Act says that we will provide the 
people of Taiwan with the qualitative and quantitative weaponry to 
defend themselves.
  Well, with what we see happening throughout the Chinese Government in 
recent years, with the missile proliferation, we know there is a real 
danger, not only to the American fleet there and American soldiers in 
the area, but certainly to the people of Taiwan, to which we owe a 
great deal.
  That is why this bill is so terribly important today. We need to pass 
this legislation. We need to continue to send the message to the 
People's Republic of China that we will not put up with what they 
attempted to do back in March of 1996 when they tried to interrupt the 
elections going on in free China, on Taiwan, with their missile 
deployment.
  We need to stand steady with our allies, even though we do not 
recognize them officially, and this legislation does just that. That is 
why I have such great praise for the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Hunter] and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Deutsch], who amended the 
legislation, and certainly the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] for 
bringing this important legislation to the floor of this House. I urge 
support of the legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, anyone who can remember back to March 1996 knows why we 
need this bill. Recall how, during that month, Taiwan was conducting 
the first democratic presidential election in the history of Chinese 
civilization. Well, that was too much for the Communist dictators in 
Beijing, so they started firing missiles just off the coast of 
democratic Taiwan.
  It was one of the most despicable acts by Communist China since 
Tiananmen Square. That, and that alone, is why we need this bill. China 
is building its missile arsenal aggressively, and we know what they 
intend to do with them. Peaceful, democratic Taiwan needs to be able to 
defend itself.
  This bill only requires a study of Taiwan's defense needs. How can 
you reasonably oppose it? Let me remind members that the Taiwan 
Relations Act obligates us to provide defensive weapons to Taiwan. The 
law grants Congress a role in the analysis of Taiwan's defense needs 
and states that defense sales to Taiwan will be based solely on our 
assessment of those needs.
  Now I know that the Pentagon has sent a letter over here opposing 
this bill and stating that Taiwan doesn't want or need a lot of missile 
defense, and Mr. Speaker, that upsets me because I know it is untrue 
and so does the Pentagon. Everytime I talk to the Taiwanese I hear them 
say they want missile defenses. It's a high priority for them and don't 
believe otherwise.
  I commend Mr. Hunter and Chairman Gilman for bringing us this bill 
and I also commend Mr. Deutsch for his addition to the bill, which 
reminds us that Hong Kong is no model for Taiwan and which restates 
over commitment and obligation to assist Taiwan should they become 
victims of Communist Chinese aggression.
  I urge an aye vote on this critical legislation.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to speak out of order for just a moment with 
respect to H.R. 2358, the Political Freedom in China Act, which was 
debated here a day or so ago. During that debate, I was waiting for a 
letter to come over from the White House with respect to the Gilman-
Markey amendment. The letter did not arrive on time, so I am going to 
read that letter now with respect to H.R. 2358. The letter is dated 
November 5, 1997.

       Dear Mr. Speaker: I am writing to express the 
     Administration's strong opposition to legislation offered by 
     Representatives Gilman and Markey in connection with the 
     certification by the President on China's nonproliferation 
     policies and practices. In our judgment, the legislation 
     would put at risk the substantial achievements we have made 
     in our nonproliferation dialogue with China and undercut our 
     ability to make further progress.
       First, the United States achieved extremely valuable 
     nonproliferation commitments from China, based on the current 
     law governing certifications to Congress implementing the 
     U.S.-China agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation. By 
     ``moving the goalposts,'' this proposal would undermine our 
     credibility with China, possibly causing Beijing to 
     reconsider some of its important commitments, for example 
     regarding Iran.
       The existing 30-day review period provides ample time for 
     consideration of the President's certification package. Even 
     when the nuclear cooperation agreement is in full effect, 
     nuclear exports will be licensed on a case-by-case basis, and 
     may be suspended at any time. This provides continuing 
     leverage over Chinese behavior and a lengthy period of time 
     for monitoring the implementation of Chinese assurances.
       Second, this proposal would imprudently revise the 
     established process under the Atomic Energy Act for 
     Congressional consideration of agreements for peaceful 
     nuclear cooperation. Unlike previous law, which established 
     clear requirements for the President's certifications, under 
     this proposal Congress could permanently block nuclear 
     exports to China, without providing any guidance to the 
     Executive Branch as to the conditions that need to be met to 
     implement the agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation. 
     Going forward with the nuclear cooperation would then require 
     the passage of new legislation in order to undo the 
     prohibition on nuclear exports. This would amount to a 
     fundamental and unnecessary review of the Atomic Energy Act 
     and a major obstacle to ever reaching agreement with China on 
     the conditions for peaceful nuclear cooperation.
       Sincerely, John Hilly, Senior Advisor to the President and 
     Director for Legislative Affairs.

  I thank the Speaker for permitting me to read this statement.
  Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time on the bill pending, 
and I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield the balance of my time 
to the gentleman from California [Mr. Cox], who has been one of the 
major movers in these series of bills that we have been considering the 
last few days.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Gibbons). The gentleman from California 
[Mr. Cox] is recognized for 7\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished 
chairman of the Committee on International Relations, and I also thank 
the ranking member for his very, very worthwhile comments and important 
perspective on this, because, frankly, we are this close, even though 
he opposes the bill,

[[Page H10156]]

to agreeing on all the fundamental points.
  The ranking member, after all, makes the point that while this bill 
would support a study of cooperation with Taiwan on theater missile 
defense, that is already our policy. We already supply missile defense 
systems. We have supplied four Patriot systems to Taiwan. We already 
cooperate with them on missile defense. But, whereas the fact that this 
bill is consistent with our policy is my reason for supporting it and 
offering it, it is the ranking member's reason for opposing it.
  As we heard in debate, the Patriot systems that we have made 
available to Taiwan, and which, incidentally, Taiwan purchases, we do 
not provide them as foreign aid, they have long since outgrown that, 
are inadequate to deal with the very realistic threats that Taiwan now 
faces and that this Congress faced in one of its finest moments last 
year.
  We all recall when Franklin Delano Roosevelt called the United States 
of America the arsenal of democracy, making it very plain that 
sometimes in order to have freedom one has to fight for it, and the 
United States was then and is now the arsenal of democracy. But the 
People's Republic of China we saw last year is essentially the arsenal 
of antidemocracy, because they used their military power to try to 
prevent legislative elections in 1995 in Taiwan and the first ever 
presidential elections in 1996, in 5,000 years of Chinese history.

                              {time}  2015

  The People's Republic of China, the government run by the Communist 
Party in Beijing, is fond of saying that Taiwan is but a province of 
China, it is part of China. If that is so, then we in America should 
reward the progress that democracy is making in Taiwan.
  We, in America, should look favorably upon this, and we should look 
with grave concern upon any effort by the largest standing military on 
Earth, the People's Liberation Army, to use force to prevent democracy 
in Taiwan, and that is exactly what went on in 1995 when missiles were 
launched in order to intimidate the electorate. When that preceded in 
1996, when 150,000 troops were amassed in Fujian Province right on the 
border of the Taiwan Strait, 220 fighter aircraft, and when the effect 
of launching the missiles was to blockade, effectively, the entire 
island, both ends of the Island of Taiwan and interfere not just with 
Taiwan's shipping, but with the United States, to interfere with 
commercial shipping, to interfere with commercial air travel by the 
United States, we took it very, very seriously, and we also responded 
here in the Congress.
  The United States House of Representatives moved a very pointed 
resolution on the floor of this House that I introduced, the Policy 
Committee prepared, that stated that if the People's Republic of China 
should try to invade the Island of Taiwan by force, without provocation 
to attack Taiwan, then the United States would defend Taiwan, and that 
resolution passed this House of Representatives with 435 Members, with 
only 14 votes against.
  It was a strong and clear statement, a strong and clear statement in 
response to what theretofore had been the Clinton administration's 
utterly ambiguous policy. In fact, the Clinton administration called 
their policy strategic ambiguity. But abandoning immediately their 
policy of so-called strategic ambiguity in the teeth of this very, very 
clear statement from the United States Congress within days of the 
passage of our resolution, stating clearly that if, without 
provocation, the People's Republic of China would attack the Island of 
Taiwan, the administration sent two carrier battle groups into the 
Taiwan Strait, a clear show of support for the democratic elections 
that were about to take place on the Island of Taiwan. And within days 
of that measure, the People's Republic of China canceled the scheduled 
balance of their military exercises of the missile test and called off 
the blockade.
  The scheduled presidential elections, the first ever in 5,000 years 
of Chinese history, took place on schedule. The months following have 
been peaceful. That is all to the good.
  But it is ironic that the Clinton administration described its own 
policy of strategic ambiguity when that would be my criticism of it. 
How is the government in Beijing to know what would be the United 
States response if they did attack, and why would we want them to be in 
the dark about that? We were risking war through weakness, rather than 
advancing a policy of peace through strength.
  The missile threat to Taiwan is very, very clear. That is why our 
policy of cooperating with them on theater missile defense is the right 
policy, and that is why congressional leadership on this issue remains 
important.
  What this bill seeks is very simple, a study by the Defense 
Department, by the Clinton Defense Department, of an appropriate 
defensive system for the Asia Pacific region. There is a July 1, 1998 
reporting date back to the Congress, and the Clinton administration 
will make its own determination in that report to Congress whether or 
not an adequate missile defense, adequate to the new threats, the very 
real and existing threats that Taiwan now faces, is available for sale 
to Taiwan, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, and in fact, that 
is the language of the bill itself.
  That is what this bill does. It is utterly reasonable, and because 
this Congress has so strongly in the past supported the Taiwan 
Relations Act, made it clear to the People's Republic of China and the 
Communist Party in Beijing that aggression is no way to deal with the 
cross-strait problems, it is important that we not back away from that 
tonight. It is important that we vote in favor of this legislation, 
because the peace of the strait depends upon it, because the peace of 
Asia and the Pacific depend upon it, and the peace of the world depend 
upon it.
  I congratulate the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] for bringing 
this bill to the floor, and I congratulate its author, the gentleman 
from California [Mr. Hunter].
  Mrs. LINDA SMITH of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support 
of H.R. 2386, the United States-Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense 
Cooperation Act. The Taiwanese people only wish to see that the safety 
and security of Taiwan is enhanced. The United States must play an 
important role in this process.
  This legislation, H.R. 2386, requires the Secretary of Defense to 
conduct a study on a plan for Taiwan to acquire a missile defense 
system to protect the territory of Taiwan. The missile firings 
conducted by the Chinese Government off the coast of Taiwan less than 2 
years ago is proof that Taiwan's long term security and the United 
States' interests in the Pacific Rim demand that we stand firm in 
ensuring Taiwan's safety.
  This study will ensure that all facets of Taiwan's security are 
examined and the feasibility of a missile defense system is fully 
considered. The Taiwanese people should be reassured that their safety 
is of great concern to the American people.
  I ask my colleagues to please join me in supporting H.R. 2386, the 
United States-Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Act.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Cox] for his concluding remarks, and I yield back the balance of my 
time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore [Mr. Blunt]. Pursuant to House Resolution 
302, the previous question is ordered on the bill, as amended.
  The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a 
quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not 
present.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
  The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 301, 
nays 116, not voting 16, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 601]

                               YEAS--301

     Abercrombie
     Aderholt
     Andrews
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baesler
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis

[[Page H10157]]


     Bishop
     Bliley
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Boswell
     Boyd
     Brady
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Canady
     Cannon
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Clay
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Collins
     Combest
     Condit
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     DeLay
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Ensign
     Etheridge
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fossella
     Fowler
     Fox
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gephardt
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gilman
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill
     Hilleary
     Hilliard
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Hooley
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kim
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Klink
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lipinski
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Lucas
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Manton
     Manzullo
     Martinez
     Mascara
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McHale
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Meek
     Menendez
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Mollohan
     Moran (KS)
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pallone
     Pappas
     Parker
     Pascrell
     Paxon
     Pease
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Redmond
     Regula
     Reyes
     Riggs
     Rodriguez
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rothman
     Roukema
     Royce
     Ryun
     Salmon
     Sanchez
     Sandlin
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer, Dan
     Schaffer, Bob
     Schumer
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherman
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Slaughter
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (OR)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith, Linda
     Snowbarger
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stump
     Stupak
     Sununu
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Torres
     Towns
     Traficant
     Turner
     Upton
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Wexler
     Weygand
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wise
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                               NAYS--116

     Ackerman
     Allen
     Archer
     Baldacci
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Berman
     Berry
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brown (CA)
     Cardin
     Castle
     Clayton
     Clement
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cummings
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     Delahunt
     Dellums
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Edwards
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fazio
     Filner
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gillmor
     Gordon
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hefner
     Hinchey
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Jackson (IL)
     Jefferson
     Johnson (WI)
     Kanjorski
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kleczka
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Markey
     Matsui
     McDermott
     McGovern
     Meehan
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (CA)
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Murtha
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Pickett
     Poshard
     Price (NC)
     Rivers
     Roemer
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sanford
     Sawyer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Skaggs
     Skelton
     Smith, Adam
     Snyder
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Thurman
     Tierney
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Woolsey
     Wynn

                             NOT VOTING--16

     Boehner
     Carson
     Coburn
     Cubin
     DeLauro
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Gonzalez
     Greenwood
     Linder
     McKinney
     Neal
     Riley
     Schiff
     Stokes
     Yates

                              {time}  2043

  The Clerk announced the following pair:
  On this vote:

       Mr. Riley for, with Ms. McKinney against.

  Messrs. RUSH, HOYER, DELAHUNT, WYNN, HINCHEY, and MOAKLEY, Mrs. 
LOWEY, Mr. CARDIN, and Mr. DOGGETT changed their vote from ``aye'' to 
``no.''
  Ms. BROWN of Florida, Mr. STRICKLAND, and Mr. NADLER changed their 
vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


          Motion To Reconsider The Vote Offered by Mr. Pallone

  Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
bill was passed.


                Motion To Table Offered by Mr. Bereuter

  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I move to lay on the table the motion to 
reconsider.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter] to lay on the table the motion 
to reconsider offered by the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Pallone].
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 245, 
noes 175, not voting 13, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 602]

                               AYES--245

     Abercrombie
     Aderholt
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baesler
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Boswell
     Boyd
     Brady
     Bryant
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Canady
     Cannon
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Condit
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Cox
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cunningham
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeLay
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Ensign
     Eshoo
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fossella
     Fowler
     Fox
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kim
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Lucas
     Manzullo
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Moran (KS)
     Morella
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pappas
     Parker
     Paul
     Paxon
     Pease
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Redmond
     Regula
     Riggs
     Rivers
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roukema
     Royce
     Ryun
     Salmon
     Sandlin
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer, Dan
     Schaffer, Bob
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherman
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (OR)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith, Linda
     Snowbarger
     Solomon
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stump
     Sununu
     Talent
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Tierney
     Traficant
     Turner
     Upton
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                               NOES--175

     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baldacci
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Cardin
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Cummings
     Danner
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro

[[Page H10158]]


     Dellums
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Engel
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fazio
     Filner
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gordon
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Holden
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson (WI)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Manton
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McHale
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (CA)
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Moran (VA)
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Pickett
     Pomeroy
     Poshard
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sawyer
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Skaggs
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith, Adam
     Snyder
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Thompson
     Thurman
     Torres
     Towns
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wynn

                             NOT VOTING--13

     Carson
     Cubin
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Gonzalez
     McKinney
     Neal
     Riley
     Sabo
     Schiff
     Souder
     Stokes
     Yates

                              {time}  2103

  Mr. GUTIERREZ changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  So the motion to table the motion to reconsider was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

                          ____________________