[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 153 (Wednesday, November 5, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Page S11787]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[[Page S11787]]
IN SUPPORT OF ENLARGING NATO TO INCLUDE THE NEW INVITEES AND THE BALTIC 
                               COUNTRIES

 Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I rise today in support of 
enlarging the NATO alliance to include the current invitees of Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic during this round, and the Baltic 
countries of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia during the next round. For 
the past few weeks, various Senate committees have been reviewing the 
costs of bringing Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO. 
The administration estimates the entire cost for this first round of 
NATO enlargement at $27-$35 billion in the 13-year period from 1997 to 
2009. Opponents suggest that the actual costs might actually be much 
higher, although we will really not have a clear picture until after 
new estimates are made early next year based on a commonly agreed-upon 
set of military requirements that NATO ministers will decide on in 
December. In any case, two things are clear. First, most of these costs 
would have to be paid anyway--even if NATO did not enlarge. Second, the 
U.S. share of the total costs will be relatively small.
  As part of the present effort to enlarge NATO, Poland, Hungary, and 
the Czech Republic must restructure and modernize their armed forces. 
However, they would need to do this in any case and the costs of doing 
so would probably be much higher without enlargement, since they would 
have to rely entirely on their own resources to protect themselves. 
Additionally, current European NATO members must reconfigure their 
forces so they are more flexible and more easily deployed; but these 
changes result from the requirements of NATO's New Strategic Concept 
agreed on by all alliance members in 1991, and not from enlargement as 
such. These enlargement costs will be paid for by our allies and not by 
us. From our perspective, these enlargement costs should really be seen 
as benefits--improvements to NATO's security paid for by our allies, 
not by us.
  The only extra costs of the current round of NATO enlargement are the 
so-called direct costs of enlargement, which include such things as 
upgrading communications, air defenses, and infrastructure for rapid 
reinforcement. These costs would be borne jointly by all NATO members 
with the United States paying roughly one-quarter of the cost. This 
means that for every dollar we put toward these direct costs, our 
allies, old an new, would put in three. You can't get better value for 
your money than that. Thus, the range of costs the United States would 
have to pay for the present round of enlargement over the next 13 years 
would be somewhere between $2 billion--if you believe the 
administration's figures--and $7 billion--if you believe the recent 
report by the CATO Institute. Given the millions of lives lost in World 
War I and II, and the billions of dollars spent during these conflicts, 
the cold war and now in Bosnia, NATO enlargement is the cheapest single 
investment we can make.
  Aside from the costs, we get real benefits from NATO enlargement. As 
Secretary Albright and other administration officials have repeatedly 
and convincingly pointed out, NATO enlargement will deter future 
threats, prevent the development of a dangerous power vacuum in the 
heart of Europe, make border and ethnic conflicts far less likely and 
solidify democratic institutions and free markets in Europe. Just as 
importantly, the United States will be gaining strong new allies in 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, who between them will add 
300,000 troops to the alliance. The costs of enlargement will fall 
heaviest on them, but these countries know the price of freedom. Each 
country has been invaded more than once this century and each suffered 
under Communist domination for over 40 years. They understand that 
their own security is indivisible from that of the rest of Europe and 
have already expressed their commitment to be producers of security, 
and not merely consumers, by cooperating with NATO forces to implement 
the Dayton accords in Bosnia.

  If we refuse to enlarge NATO, we would have told these countries that 
despite their epic and inspiring struggle to liberate themselves from 
communism, the West had once again turned its back on them. Even worse, 
we would leave Central Europe without an effective security system, 
creating a heightened sense of insecurity in these countries, forcing 
them to devote more resources to military expenditures, and lowering 
their potential for economic growth. Under these circumstances, a 
backlash against Western values might very well develop, yielding a 
vicious cycle of authoritarianism, militarism, economic stagnation, and 
greater conflict between neighbors--a pattern this region has seen in 
the past. This would inevitably bring more problems for the United 
States in Europe.
  Some have asked what's the hurry over NATO enlargement. Surely, the 
end of the cold war gives us plenty of time to contemplate so momentous 
a decision. However, if we don't enlarge now when it's relatively easy 
and inexpensive, how can we be sure that we'll be ready to respond to a 
crisis in time? We were slow to respond to World War I, World War II, 
and Yugoslavia out of the fear of the costs. If we wait until a crisis 
develops, our capacity to deal with it early on will be less, the costs 
will be higher and our reluctance will be greater. Let's make the 
decision to enlarge now.
  I would remind my colleagues that as the debate over this issue draws 
near, we must also look beyond the present round of enlargement. In 
particular, we must pay especially close attention to Lithuania, 
Latvia, and Estonia.
  Given their geography and history, the Baltic countries are a weather 
vane indicating which way the winds from Russia will blow. Any 
ambiguity in our commitment to the Baltic countries can only encourage 
those forces in Russia which have not reconciled themselves to the 
transformation of the Soviet Union. We must make it clear that Russia 
is welcome to cooperate with the undivided, free, prosperous, and 
secure Europe that is being built. However, it can only do so if it is 
prepared to recognize one of the cardinal principles of the new Europe, 
articulated by Secretary of State Albright during her visit to 
Lithuania last July: that all States, large and small must have the 
right to choose their own alliances and associations.
  By their actions, the Baltic States have clearly made their choice 
known. They have applied for membership in NATO and the European Union, 
they participate in NATO's Partnership for Peace program and they are 
contributing directly to NATO's security by cooperating on a regional 
airspace initiative. By providing troops for NATO-led operations in 
Bosnia and by participating in the Vilnius Conference on good 
neighborly relations hosted by Lithuania in September, they have shown 
their willingness to be producers, not just consumers, of security. 
Having been invaded by both Stalin and Hitler and having suffered 50 
years of Communist occupation, the people of the Baltic countries, no 
less than the people of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, know 
the price of freedom and are willing to pay for it.
  If we are serious about our commitment to create a Europe that is 
whole and free, than the Baltic countries must be included. For that 
reason, the United States must make it absolutely clear at the earliest 
possible moment that it supports NATO membership for Lithuania, Latvia, 
and Estonia.

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